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  THE FIRST EPISTLE OF ST. JOHN
  by Erich Haupt
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Haupt's detailed exegetical commentary on the First Epistle of John, examining
the Greek text and discussing key theological themes including eternal life as
manifested in Christ, the nature of divine life, and the apostle's presentation
of fellowship with God.

  Chapters: 84

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  TABLE OF CONTENTS
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    1. 01 - 1Jn 1:1
    2. 02 - 1Jn 1:2
    3. 03 - 1Jn 1:3
    4. 04 - 1Jn 1:4
    5. 05 - 1Jn 1:5
    6. 06 - 1Jn 1:6
    7. 07 - 1Jn 1:7
    8. 08 - 1Jn 1:8
    9. 09 - Jn 1:9
   10. 10 - 1Jn 1:10
   11. 11 - 1Jn 2:1
   12. 12 - 1Jn 2:2
   13. 13 - 1Jn 2:3-11
   14. 14 - 1Jn 2:3
   15. 15 - 1Jn 2:4
   16. 16 - 1Jn 2:5
   17. 17 - 1Jn 2:6
   18. 18 - 1Jn 2:7-8
   19. 19 - 1Jn 2:9-11
   20. 20 - 1Jn 2:12-14
   21. 21 - 1Jn 2:15
   22. 22 - 1Jn 2:16
   23. 23 - 1Jn 2:17
   24. 24 - 1Jn 2:18
   25. 25 - 1Jn 2:19
   26. 26 - 1Jn 2:20-21
   27. 27 - 1Jn 2:20
   28. 28 - 1Jn 2:21
   29. 29 - 1Jn 2:22
   30. 30 - 1 Jn 2:23
   31. 31 - 1Jn 2:24
   32. 32 - 1Jn 2:25
   33. 33 - 1Jn 2:26-27
   34. 34 - 1Jn 2:28-29
   35. 35 - 1Jn 3:1
   36. 36 - 1Jn 3:2
   37. 37 - 1Jn 3:3
   38. 38 - 1Jn 3:4
   39. 39 - 1Jn 3:5
   40. 40 - 1Jn 3:6
   41. 41 - 1Jn 3:7
   42. 42 - 1Jn 3:8
   43. 43 - 1Jn 3:9-10a
   44. 44 - 1Jn 3:11
   45. 45 -  1Jn 3:12
   46. 46 - 1Jn 3:13-15
   47. 47 - 1Jn 3:16
   48. 48 - 1Jn 3:17
   49. 49 - 1Jn 3:18
   50. 50 - 1Jn 3:19-20
   51. 51 - 1Jn 3:21-22
   52. 52 - 1Jn 3:23
   53. 53 - 1Jn 3:24a
   54. 54 - 1Jn 4:1
   55. 55 - 1Jn 4:2
   56. 56 - 1Jn 4:3
   57. 57 - 1Jn 4:4-6
   58. 58 - 1Jn 4:7
   59. 59 - 1Jn 4:8
   60. 60 - 1Jn 4:9
   61. 61 - 1Jn 4:10
   62. 62 - 1Jn 4:11
   63. 63 - 1Jn 4:12
   64. 64 - 1Jn 4:13-16
   65. 65 - 1Jn 4:17
   66. 66 - 1Jn 4:18
   67. 67 - 1Jn 4:19
   68. 68 - 1Jn 4:20
   69. 69 - 1Jn 4:21
   70. 70 - 1Jn 5:1
   71. 71 - 1Jn 5:2
   72. 72 - 1Jn 5:3
   73. 73 - 1Jn 5:4
   74. 74 - 1Jn 5:5
   75. 75 - 1Jn 5:6-11
   76. 76 - 1Jn 5:12
   77. 77 - 1Jn 5:13
   78. 78 - 1Jn 5:14
   79. 79 - 1Jn 5:15
   80. 80 - 1Jn 5:16
   81. 81 - 1Jn 5:17
   82. 82 - 1Jn 5:18
   83. 83 - 1Jn 5:19
   84. 84 - 1Jn 5:20-21

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  CHAPTER 1: 01 - 1JN 1:1
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1Jn 1:1

Ὃ ἦνἀπ’ἀρχῆς,ὃ ἀκηκόαμεν,ὃ ἑωράκαμεν τοῖςὀφθαλμοῖςἡμῶν,ὃ ἐθεασάμεθα
καὶαἱχεῖρεςἡμῶνἐψηλάφησαν περὶτοῦλόγου τῆς ζωῆς. As to the construction of the
first verses of this Epistle, modern exegesis has come to a pretty clear
agreement. The period contains a double specification of the object; first, it
is given in the relative clauses with ὃ [“which”]; and then, secondly, it is
summed up in the words: περὶτοῦλόγουτῆςζωῆς [“concerning the word of life”]. The
predicate to which all these definitions of the object belong is ἀπαγγέλλομεν
[“we proclaim”] in 1Jn 1:3. But before this is announced the apostle inserts a
parenthesis for the closer explanation of the περὶτοῦλόγουτῆςζωῆς [“concerning
the word of life”] (1Jn 1:2); and then the broken thread is taken up again by a
brief repetition of the object (ὃἑωράκαμενκαὶἀκηκόαμεν [“which we have seen and
heard”]). But when the form is settled, the matter yet remains for
interpretation. What is the substance of the announcement which St. John has to
make? Is it a thing? In favour of this seems the neutral beginning, the fourfold
ὃ [“which”]. Or is it a person? For this speaks the matter of these same neutral
clauses: ἦνἀπ’ἀρχῆς, αἱχεῖρεςἡμῶνἐψηλάφησαν, κ.τ.λ. [“was from the beginning,
which our hands have touched, etc.”]; for this also the allusion to the
beginning of the Gospel, where in part the same is said concerning the Logos;
for this, finally, the summarizing expression: λόγοςτῆςζωῆς [“word of life”]. It
is certainly inadmissible to translate these words as meaning the annunciation
or message concerning life; for St. John’s aim is not to speak about the
preaching of the apostles, but to announce that preaching itself. We can
understand περὶτῆςζωῆςἀπαγγέλλομεν [“concerning the life we proclaim”]; but
περὶτοῦλόγουτῆςζωῆς [“concerning the word of life”] would be, on such a theory
of interpretation, an embarrassing thought. The undeniable coincidence between
the beginning of the Epistle and the prologue of the Gospel requires that we
take the λόγος [“word”] here in the same sense as there,—that is, as the
description of the Son of God, the eternal Revealer of the divinity.

All the expressions of the verse showing that it is a person who is in the
apostle’s view, how comes it that he begins with the neuter? We shall find the
right answer when we seek for the solution of another and easier question: why,
that is, the apostle does not, in summing up the object of his annunciation, use
the simple accusative, τὸνλόγοντῆςζωῆςἀπαγγέλλομεν [“we proclaim the word of
life”], instead of saying, περὶτοῦλόγου [“concerning the word”]. These two are
by no means equivalent. We might expect to find τὸνλόγονἀπαγγέλλομεν [“we
proclaim the word”] in the beginning of the Gospel, or in the beginning of the
Epistle to the Hebrews, or, in fact, of any document which might be occupied
with the person of our Lord; but it is obvious to the most superficial
consideration, that our Epistle neither gives nor professes to give a detailed
disclosure of the characteristics of the person and nature of the Logos. It is
true that the Logos is the fundamental matter and pith of the Epistle; not,
however, His person in itself, but in its effects, in its glorious outbeamings,
which only in an indirect way lead to any conclusions concerning His own nature
as a person. Consequently the apostle announces assuredly περὶτοῦλόγου
[“concerning the word”], merely things which stand connected with the Logos, but
not directly τὸνλόγον [“the word”]. From this point of view we can explain
primarily the clause: περὶτοῦλόγουτῆςζωῆς [“concerning the word of life”]. This
phrase also carries us back to the prologue of the Gospel. We read, Joh 1:4,
concerning the Logos, ἐναὐτῷζωὴἦν [“in him was life”]; in Joh 14:6 the Lord
calls Himself absolutely the Life; and, according to Joh 5:26:
ἔδωκενὁπατὴρτῷυἱῷζωὴνἔχεινἐνἑαυτῷ [“the Father has granted to the Son to have
life in himself”]. It might appear, from this combination, as if the expression
λόγοντῆςζωῆς [“the word of life”] signified only the Logos who hath life, the
true life, in Himself. But a closer study of the passages quoted shows that in
all of them life comes into consideration not as shut up in the Logos alone, but
also as streaming forth from Him, so that His life is at the same time a power;
penetrating and filling the world. So even in the Gospel of Joh 1:4, the words
which immediately follow declare that ἡζωὴἦντὸφῶςτῶνἀνθρώπων [“the life was the
light of men”]; and in Joh 5:26 the Lord makes it emphatic that He had life in
Himself, only to demonstrate His authority as the Giver of life, as the ζωοποιῶν
[“to make alive”]. And the same holds good of Joh 14:6 when we consider the
clause added: οὐδεὶςἔρχεταιπρὸςτὸνπατέραεἰμὴδι’ἐμοῦ [“no one comes to the Father
except through me”], which states the design of the definitions of Himself given
by Christ in the former member of the sentence. But in order to arrive at a
surer determination of the meaning of λόγοςτῆςζωῆς [“word of life”] in our
passage, we must consider another series of Johannaean passages—those, namely,
in which, as here, the life is the genitival definition of another name, such as
ἄρτοςτῆςζωῆς [“bread of life”], Joh 6:35, and φῶςτῆςζωῆς [“light of life”], Joh
8:12. These passages also lay down not only that the bread and the light are
themselves living, but that they are life-giving also. In the latter of them,
the words ὁἀκολουθῶνἐμοιἕξειτὸφῶςτῆςζωῆς [“the one who follows me will have the
light of life”] do not aim to show that where there is life merely Christ will
become to that life light also, but that the light which He gives awakens life;
and, that ἄρτοςτῆςζωῆς [“bread of life”] makes emphatic not the internal quality
of the bread, but its effect as such, is proved, apart from other
considerations, by Joh 6:33, where the words ἄρτοςζωὴνδιδοὺςτῷκόσμῳ [“bread of
life given to the world”] prescribe the sense in which the ἄρτοςτῆςζωῆς [“bread
of life”] ought in this connection to be understood.

Thus also in our passage we shall, guided by the analogy of these collective
parallels, understand by the λόγοςτῆςζωῆς [“word of life”], not only the Logos
so far as He has life, but so far also as He gives life. As it lies in the
nature of light that it is not only luminous itself, but also makes other things
luminous, so it lies in the idea of the Logos, as viewed by our apostle, that He
communicates and diffuses whatever He is, and therefore His life. This latter
aspect could here least of all be excluded; for the apostle’s design is not to
impart any purely theoretical communications concerning that which is in Christ,
but to set it forth as the possession of His people; and he sums up the scope of
his Epistle, 1Jn 5:13, as consisting in this, that we by means of our faith
should know ourselves in possession of life. That which, therefore, conclusively
and distinctly, the writer would announce, is the life; as appears plainly from
the circumstance that in the expression λόγοςτῆςζωῆς [“word of life”], in 1Jn
1:2, he selects and makes prominent that element which is the most
important,—that is, the life. Thus, when the apostle says that he would make his
record περὶτοῦλόγουτῆςζωῆς [“concerning the word of life”], he indicates, by
means of the genitive, that element on account of which he speaks generally of
the Logos,—that is, of the Logos in as far as He is life, and, according to what
follows, life become manifest and communicable. Thus, while it is the Logos
which certainly is present to his view, it is not the Person in Himself, and as
such, that is the matter of his announcement: not His acts nor His process, but
only that quality in Him which is life, life in His person and flowing from it.
Fundamentally, therefore, it is quid and not a quis of which the apostle would
speak; hence he is justified in saying that he declares not τὸνλόγον [“the
word”], but more generally περὶτοῦλόγου [“concerning the word”]; and he is right
in defining the object of his announcement not as masculine, but as neuter.

Since it is plain that the expression περὶτοῦλόγουτῆςζωῆς [“concerning the word
of life”] can denote only the same object of announcement which the preceding
relatival clauses indicate, the task lies before us to ascertain whether our
definition of that object accords with all these. It is found that it does in
the highest degree: the same interfusion of person and thing meets us as in the
λόγοςτῆςζωῆς [“word of life”]. Of course it may be objected, that what the
disciples heard, saw, and touched had not been the life which was hidden in
Christ, but the Person, the Logos, Himself; and it might seem that this is fatal
both to our explanation of the neutral pronouns and to our definition of the
object generally. But let this be closely examined. By the ἀκούειν [“to hear”]
certainly not the mere sound of Christ’s words is to be understood, but the
substance of His discourse; what was that but the announcement of the life which
was in Christ, and which was to flow into the apostles? Surely, too, by the ὁρᾶν
[“to see”] and θεᾶσθαι [“look upon”] was not signified merely the beholding of
the corporeal form of the Lord, so that a Caiaphas might have been included
under the plural ἑωράκαμεν [“we have seen”]; but what they beheld was His works,
not according to their outward occurrence, but according to their inward
significance; and what did the disciples see, other than that the Lord both was
the life and imparted it? Finally, it has probability in its favour
preliminarily, and will hereafter be more fully shown, that the ψηλαφᾶν [“to
touch”] refers directly to the narrative of Thomas after the resurrection.
Moreover, it is demonstrable that even this last expression does not allude to
the touching of the person of Christ as such, but to the knowledge of Him as the
life which the touching was the medium of obtaining. We know it had been the
opinion of the disciples that He who appeared was an apparition, an appearance
which belonged essentially to the dead and had only the semblance of life. By
means of the ψηλαφᾶν [“to touch”] Thomas discerned that the Saviour had in
Himself true, perfect, and not merely seeming life,—in fact, that He was the
Conqueror of death. The main thing, then, was not the handling of the Logos, but
of the λόγοςτῆςζωῆς [“word of life”]. And when, in virtue of that touch, he
broke out into the words “My Lord and my God!” the Lord approved Himself to him
not merely as the Possessor of life, but as the Dispenser of it. For the rest,
what we have now arrived at is as follows. As St. John says that what he had
heard, had seen, had touched, was the matter of his annunciation, he cannot mean
the annunciation of external occurrences, such as the words and acts of the
Lord; for the Epistle contains directly no such matters. No more can he mean the
seeing, hearing, touching of the person of the God-man in itself; for that would
have required a masculine form at the outset. He means rather the seeing,
hearing, and touching of the Lord as of the life. In fine, the apostle speaks of
Christ, but not of Christ as a person,—not of the Son in Himself, but of the Son
as He is the life. In this way every word of the clause finds its full and
unrestricted meaning.

Let us now descend to details. The relative clauses which introduce the Epistle
are grouped primarily in two parts: the first declares the objective existence
of the λόγοςτῆςζωῆς [“word of life”] from the beginning, the others declare His
manifestation as in the presence of the apostles. But these two divisions are,
in the style adopted by the writer to arrange and connect the words, not to be
viewed as antithetic, but as gradational. The contrast is not between the
eternal existence and the temporal manifestation to certain persons, and at a
specific season,—had it been so, we should have read ὃἀπ’ἀρχῆςἦν,
νυνὶδὲἡμεῖςἀκηκόαμεν [“that which was from the beginning, but now we heard”], or
ἡμεῖςδὲἀκηκόαμεν [“but we heard”]. But the ἀκούειν [“to hear”] is an advancement
on the εἶναι [“to be”], as is plain from the precedence of the ἦν [“was”] in the
former clause and the absence of the ἡμεῖς [“we”] in the latter. The meaning of
the earlier words will be made more plain by a comparison with the Gospel. This
begins with ἐνἀρχῇἦνὁλόγος [“in the beginning was the word”]; in antithesis to
the ἐνἀρχῇἐποίησε [“in the beginning he created”] of Genesis [Gen 1:1], St. John
writes ἐνἀρχῇἦν [“in the beginning was”Joh 1:1]: when God made all things, the
Logos was already in existence. Here, on the other hand, the question is not of
the priority of the Logos as opposed to the world, but of the priority of His
being as opposed to His manifestation: the life that filled eternity had entered
into the world of manifestation. Further, our ἀπ’ἀρχῆς [“from the beginning”] is
to be noted in its relation to the ἐνἀρχῇ [“in the beginning”] of the Gospel, In
the latter we must understand, following the pervasive parallel with the first
words of Genesis, that ἐνἀρχῇ [“in the beginning”] is the same as the
רֵאשִׁ֖ית|בְּ [“in the beginning”] of Gen 1:1,—that is, the element of the first
creating, of the beginning of the creature, is contained in it. If we take the
word in the same sense in our own passage, then the apostle affirms that
ἀπ’ἀρχῆς [“from the beginning”], since the beginning of the creation, that of
which he will speak, the true life, existed. Nothing would then be said in this
passage of the pre-temporal, pre-creaturely existence of the true life, and the
possessor of that life, the Word; nor, indeed, was anything necessary to be
said. But ἀρχή [“beginning”] may be understood in another sense,—that is, not as
the beginning of the world, and therefore of time, but as the starting-point of
human thought in its way over the limits of the creaturely universe. As we can
form no conception of timelessness, we are wont to define that which was before
the creation by terms taken from time,—even this “before” introduces the
temporal idea where it does not belong, for we cannot shake off the restraints
of time and space. In this sense, as a help to express the notion of eternity,
ἀρχή [“beginning”] is often employed in Scripture. The beginning of the world is
not then denoted, as in Gen 1:1; but the absolute First, going before all things
else. Thus, for example, in the passage of the Old Testament which lies at the
basis of the Logos-doctrine, Pro 8:23: [Κύριος“The Lord”]
ἐθεμελίωσέμεἐνἀρχῇπρὸτοῦἐνἀρχῇτὴνγῆνποιῆσαι [“established me in the beginning,
from in the beginning when he made the earth”], where the last words show that
the ἐνἀρχῇ [“in the beginning”] cannot be understood of the beginning of the
world, but designates eternity. Furthermore, in 2Th 2:13, according to the right
reading, εἵλατοὑμᾶςὁθεὸςἀπ’ἀρχῆςεἰς σωτηρίαν [“God chose you from the beginning
for salvation”], where ἀπ’ἀρχῆς [“from the beginning”] may be supposed to
express the same thought as elsewhere is expressed by πρὸκαταβολῆςκόσμου
[“before the creation of the world”] (Joh 17:24; Eph 1:4; 1Pe 1:20). Similarly,
the description of Christ as ἀρχὴκαὶτέλος, [“the beginning and the end”] Rev
21:6[n], is intended to teach the truth, not only that Christ lives through all
time, but that He is above time: in fact, to declare His super-temporal nature.
To accept in this way the ἀπ’ἀρχῆς [“from the beginning”] of our own passage is
recommended to us by the thought which St. John aims to express: it cannot be
his design to assert, that, since the world was, Christ, or the eternal life,
has been; but he would describe the absolute primordial life of Christ Himself.
When we clearly perceive that in the whole verse the notion of ζωή [“life”] is
that which floats before the apostle’s vision, we shall be constrained to accept
this idea as the substance also of the ὃἦνἀπ’ἀρχῆς [“which was from the
beginning”]: the eternal life, which I would publish to you, was before all
time, existing therefore before all manifestation of itself. As in Pro 8:22 it
is said of Wisdom that she was the beginning of the ways of God, so here it is
said of the life; for both had from eternity rested in the Logos, who Himself is
or was the Wisdom and the Life. But that which thus has its essence in the
eternities has become to the apostle and to his fellow-apostles—this is
evidently the meaning of the plural form—the object of personal and most
interior experience. As St. Paul, with all his independence, and notwithstanding
his self-assured relation even to the other apostles, finds it a necessity, when
he writes officially and of his office, to regard his own person as part only of
a greater whole,—that is, of the apostolate ordained of Christ,—and therefore to
use the plural, so also it is a necessity to St. John. “We note in the stream of
his discourse, always strengthening in its volume and never doing itself full
justice, how important it was to him to make emphatic the reality of the amazing
revelations which had been made to him; and how, on the other hand, an
overwhelming joy on their account pours out everywhere on his words its
inspiring influence. Between the four predicates, which describe the
manifestation of what was from the beginning, we find a twofold relation in the
fact that the last two by a single ὃ [“which”] are linked closely together;
these take the place of one whole, as over against the first two predicates;
while, again, between the first and second, and further, between the third and
fourth predicates, an advance is indicated through the instrumental definition
which is connected with the second and fourth particularly. Thus we have two
pairs of clauses; and there is, indeed, an elevation of meaning discernible
first between each pair, and then also between the first and the second pair.
First, by the ἀκηκόαμεν [“we have heard”] the altogether general thought is
expressed of a knowledge touching the object; it is not yet said whether that
was the result of direct hearing or indirectly through a third hand. The ὁρᾶν
[“to see”] takes a step in advance, with its addition τοῖςὀφθαλμοῖςἡμῶν [“with
our eyes”], an addition which affirms the extraordinary character belonging to
this immediate contemplation: “it is scarcely credible, but I affirm it, with
our own eyes we saw it.” The ὁρᾶν [“to see”] in holy writ always stands higher
than ἀκούιεν [“to hear”]; it indicates the most assured and the most
incontestable evidence. Again, we have the ἐθεασάμεθα [“we have looked upon”].
The word by its root (compare θάμβος [“amazement”], θαῦμα [“wonder”]) points to
a seeing which, in regard to its object, is connected with astonishment and
wonder; something was exhibited to the apostles which was most worthy to be
beheld and contemplated. With regard to the seeing subject, it connects the
perfect energy and intensity of the act; the word itself is stronger than ὁρᾶν
[“to see”], and describes a purposed and most diligent beholding. The ψηλαφᾶν
[“touch”] finally establishes, so to speak, the most material kind of knowledge,
which excludes even the faintest doubt. Now, as we cannot, of course, think of
an accidental or fortuitous touching of the Lord, while obviously the position
at the close of the four predicates leads to the conclusion that, with ψηλαφᾶν
[“to touch”], as with θεᾶσθαι [“to look upon”], the intention is to make
prominent a deliberate and conscious and purposed attainment of knowledge, we
arrive necessarily, in a new and striking way, at the relation between the first
and second pair of predicates. Ὁρᾶν [“to see”] and ἀκούιεν [“to hear”] indicate
immediate perceptions of sense; θεᾶσθαι [“to look upon”] and ψηλαφᾶν [“to
touch”] indicate investigation pursued with full purpose and diligence, and
therefore with all exactitude. Now, as St. John, and only he, in the Gospel
records the transaction with Thomas, in which precisely this industrious θεᾶσθαι
[“to look upon”] and ψηλαφᾶν [“to touch”] plays a part, it is almost evident
that in these words he is thinking of that event, and generally of the time
after the resurrection. If this is the right point of view to assume for the
interpretation of the last pair of predicates, the change of tense is at once
explained, namely, that the first two verbs are in the perfect, and the last two
in the aorist; the former are to describe the evidences of the sense running
through the whole of the life of Christ, and completed as one whole; the latter
by the aorists point to definite historical individual occurrences, which are to
be described as such.

Thus St. John has given a twofold utterance concerning the object of his
publication: that He in His nature is eternal, and therefore divine; and also
that He descended into the domain of human, yea, sensible experience, and thus
became manifest, so that He became known in a perfectly assured manner. More
distinctly is the object of the writing laid down in the words
περὶτοῦλόγουτῆςζωῆς [“concerning the word of life”]; the subject is the λόγος
[“word”], but, as we have seen, the Logos, not as in Himself, but as He is the
λόγοςτῆςζωῆς [“word of life”]; and precisely this makes it clear why the apostle
lays so much stress on the θεᾶσθαι [“to look upon”] and ψηλαφᾶν [“to touch”] of
the risen Lord; why the Lord was so emphatically present to his eye as risen.
For Christ had indeed from the beginning of His ministry manifested Himself as
the life, and, like the χάριςκαὶἀληθεία [“grace and truth”], the ζωή [“life”]
also had ever been reflected from His face; but beyond all comparison more
abundantly did the characteristic of ζῶν [“to live”] and ζωοποιῶν [“to make
alive”] declare itself in Him when the long-restrained source of life was fully
unsealed in the resurrection:
ἐὰνμὴὁκόκκοςτοῦσίτουἀποθάνῃ,αὐτὸςμόνοςμένει,ἐὰνδὲἀποθάνῃ,πολὺνκαρπὸνφέρει
[“unless a grain of wheat falls into the earth and dies, it remains alone; but
if it dies, it bears much fruit” cf. Joh 12:24].


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  CHAPTER 2: 02 - 1JN 1:2
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1Jn 1:2

(Καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἐφανερώθη, καὶ ἑωράκαμεν καὶ μαρτυροῦμεν καὶ ἀπαγγέλλομεν ὑμῖν τὴν
ζωὴν τὴν αἰώνιον ἥτις ἦν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα καὶ ἐφανερώθη ἡμῖν.) But with all this,
St. John has not laid down precisely enough the object of his Epistle. Of the
two ideas contained in λόγος τῆς ζωῆς [“word of life”] he therefore singles out
and makes prominent that one which concerns him particularly; not the person
bearing and enfolding the life, but this life itself is the main idea. The
Gospel begins with ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο [“the word became flesh” cf. Joh 1:14],
for it treats of the person of Him through whose mediation the ζωή [“life”]
came. The Epistle says ἡ ζωὴἐφανερώθη [“the life was made manifest”], for its
object is not the person, but the influences flowing through the medium of the
person. It is true that in the Gospel also the influences and energies of the
Logos are depicted; but it is in such a manner as to exhibit His person in
richer light, and define that person more precisely. It is true also that,
conversely, the Epistle speaks of the person of the Logos; but it is in such a
manner that thereby the influences of that person should be made more
conspicuous. This life has entered into the world of manifestation, ἐφανερώθη
[“to make manifest”]. It is obvious that it could not be said of the ζωή
[“life”] that it σὰρξἐγένετο [“became flesh”]; for while the λόγος [“word”], the
person, might indeed become man, no attribute or qualification of Him could be
incarnate. The eternal life of the Logos with the Father, and the earthly life
below, are diverse forms in which the ζωή [“life”] clothes itself; itself,
however, becomes not σάρξ [“flesh”]; rather, as the result of the incarnation,
it presents itself to us as manifested. But, apart from the logical
impossibility in such a passage as ours of the σὰρξἐγένετο [“became flesh”], it
is to be remarked that elsewhere the Epistle of St. John betrays a preference
for the more general φανεροῦσθαι [“to make manifest”]. And naturally so. For the
assumption of flesh was in fact only the means of the manifestation, and
moreover, a medium which had not eternal continuance; for, when the Lord was
glorified. He remained indeed man, but not σάρξ [“flesh”]. The flesh, whose note
is weakness, was penetrated and swallowed up by the power of the Spirit that
pervaded it. In our Epistle, where the subject is the life-giving energy of the
Lord, and at this point, where the first verse has indicated that this was to be
found specifically in the risen Saviour, who was no longer σάρξ [“flesh”], the
more general φανεροῦσθαι [“to make manifest”] is on all accounts the most
adequate and pertinent expression.

What has been said makes it clear that ζωή [“life”] cannot here be a personal
name of the Logos; it is rather that quality or characteristic of the Logos
which the writer would by means of his Epistle implant in us. The ζωή [“life”]
is a potency constituting the personality, but not the person himself. What has
led to the contrary opinion, namely, that ζωή [“life”] is a definition of the
person of the Logos, is the second clause of our verse, where we read, ἡ ζωὴ
ἥτις ἦν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα [“the life which was with the father”], that being
declared concerning the life which in the Gospel is declared concerning the
Logos, But the testimony of the Gospel may with equal propriety be turned
against this view; for there it runs expressly, ζωὴ ἦν ἐν αὐτῷ [“life was in
him”], and thus even in the Gospel the life is not used as a personal name, but
as a characteristic inherent in the Logos. What there is of right in this
opinion, which, however, we cannot accept, is that here, more than elsewhere,
the eternal life is described as something enfolded in Christ and inseparable
from His person. Only through the manifestation of the Son could the life
become! manifest; but not on that account is the life an idea which may be used
interchangeably with Christ or the Logos. This life, which has been manifested
in the Logos, and which we have learned to recognise as the object of
apostolical annunciation, is in the second half of the verse more precisely
defined as ζωὴαἰώνιος [“eternal life”],—that is, looked at on the side most
important for the aim of the writer. At the outset it must be noted that
“eternal life” is not to St. John merely a term for un broken continuance in
being, as if it were simply equivalent to the ζωὴἀκατάλυτος [“indestructible
life”] of Heb 7:16[N]; that it does not define the form of this life so much as
the nature and meaning of it: ζωὴαἰώνιος [“eternal life”] is, in other words, a
description of divine life, of the life which is in God, and which by God is
communicated. It is with this expression as it is with the βασιλείατῶνοὐρανῶν
[“kingdom of heaven”]. To the οὐρανός [“heaven”] the New Testament does
undoubtedly attach first of all a local meaning. When Christ teaches us to pray
that the will of God may be done here as it is done in heaven, and when we read
of a descending from and ascending to heaven, this meaning is sufficiently
manifest. But then the word passes from the external and local into the internal
and spiritual or ethical sense. The βασιλείατῶνοὐρανῶν [“kingdom of heaven”] is
not only a kingdom whose seat is heaven in the ordinary sense, but, at the same
time, a kingdom which has the same ethical quality that characterizes the
super-terrestrial world, and hence this βασιλείατῶνοὐρανῶν [“kingdom of heaven”]
may indeed be literally on earth. In other words, οὐρανός [“heaven”] is the
antithesis not only of the physical, but also of the ethical idea of the κόσμος
[“world”]. The same thing holds good of the ζωὴαἰώνιος [“eternal life”]
primarily it denotes, of course, the antithesis of the external, temporal
finiteness and restriction of the earthly life, as, for instance, when we read
of a ζήσεσθαιεἰςτὸναἰῶνα. [“will be alive for eternity”]. But when Christ calls
Himself ζωή [“life”], or is called ζωὴαἰώνιος [“eternal life”], Joh 17:3,[N]1Jn
5:20, this notion recedes before the internal quality of the life so defined; by
ζωὴαἰώνιος [“eternal life”] a life is meant which really and truly is life, life
in the fullest sense, life and nothing but life, in a word, divine life; while
all earthly life is in some sense death. This last interpretation of the
ζωὴαἰώνιος [“eternal life”] is an absolute necessity in our present passage. For
only when it is thus interpreted does the added clause, ἥτις ἦν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα
[“which was with the Father”], acquire a satisfactory meaning. At the outset,
the fact that instead of the simple ἥ [“which”] the connection by ἥτις [“which”]
is preferred, indicates that the interjected relative clause contains a reason
for the preceding name, or an explanation of it. But, apart from that, only two
ways of interpreting the relative clause are possible. The first would be to
consider the apostle as resuming by means of it what he had said about the life:
what he had said having been the εἶναιἀπ’ἀρχῆς [“being from the beginning”] the
φανερωθῆναι [“manifested”]. But we must reject this explanation, because the
εἶναι ἀπ’ ἀρχῆςεἶναιἀπ’ἀρχῆς [“being from the beginning”] is not really taken up
again, but instead of it comes in the idea of εἶναιπρὸς τὸν πατέρα [“being with
the Father”], which is, after all, another; here the counterparts are being in
the Father and being in the world, while in 1Jn 1:1 they are being from the
beginning and manifestation in time; and however nearly related these two pairs
may be, they are not identical, and the one is not a resumption of the other.
But, granted that the substance of what precedes was to be recapitulated by the
relative clause, and thus εἶναιπρὸς τὸν πατέρα [“being with the Father”] was to
be altogether equivalent to εἶναι ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς [“being from the beginning”], yet
even this does not give αἰώνιος [“eternal”] the idea of mere superiority to the
limitations of time, for then the αἰώνιος [“eternal”] would itself be a
recapitulation of the εἶναι ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς [“being from the beginning”], and this
latter would be twice resumed, once by the αἰώνιος [“eternal”], and a second
time by ἥτις ἦν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα [“which was with the Father”]. But, as it has
been made evident, this whole notion of an analepsis of what had preceded by
means of the relative clause is not to be justified; there is, however, another
analepsis which commends itself, namely, that the relative clause gives a reason
for the declaration, ἀπαγγέλλομενὑμῖν τὴν ζωὴν τὴν αἰώνιον [“we proclaim to you
the eternal life”]. That this ζωή [“life”] is an αἰώνιος [“eternal”];—that is,
as seen above, a divine life, life in the true ethical sense—is established and
proved by the fact that it springs from the Father; that St. John can and will
announce it, is established and proved by the fact that it has passed into
manifestation, that it has become knowable, and therefore communicable. It is
not the life, as it is in God the Father, that the apostle can and will declare,
but the life which is in the Son, who says of Himself, Joh 5:26, John 6:57: ἐγὼ
ζῶ διὰ τὸν πατέρα [“I live because of the Father”]. The life of the Father is
sealed and shut up in itself, and that which is said of the Father generally may
be said of His life: Θεὸν οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἑώρακεν, ὁ μονογενὴς υἱὸς ἐξηγήσατο.
[“No one has ever seen God,butthe only begotten Son has made him known.” cf. Joh
1:18]. It is the life of the Son of God, more particularly of the incarnate Son
of God, that St. John beheld and would fain implant in the church. Hence it is
not said, ἥτις ἦνἐντῷ θεῷ [“which was with God”], but πρὸς τὸν πατέρα [“with the
Father”]. And here, as in the prologue of the Gospel, we must carefully mark
that it is not παρά [“beside”], but πρός [“with”],—that is, it is thus to be
asserted that the life existing in the Logos is not a life originating in
Himself, but one that is His only in virtue of a permanent relation to the
Father, through the eternal turning towards Him. And it is precisely this
reference of itself to the Father that makes αἰώνιος ζωὴ [“eternal life”] the
true and divine life.

Let us now retrace our steps and measure our progress to this point. In always
more specific definitions and always narrowing circles, the apostle has laid
down the object of his writing more and more precisely. It is something eternal,
yet, at the same time, something to him made known in immediate and therefore
most assured experience, that is the first point of his announcement. It is
something, again, as he still more closely defines it, which concerns the λόγος
τῆς ζωῆς [“the word of life”]. That is, in the third stage, it is precisely the
life existing in the Son; and, finally, this as the only true life in the
fullest sense, as ζωὴαἰώνιος [“eternal life”]. While he places this true life in
inseparable conjunction with the Logos, and makes it matter of knowledge and
announcement only through the manifestation of the Logos, he places it thus in
antithesis to all that before was called or might be called life. All previous
life, even that which most of all bore the stamp of divinity in itself, was
nevertheless mingled with sin and death, and therefore no true life. Not till
the manifestation of Jesus Christ did the ζωὴαἰώνιος [“eternal life”] in its
deepest sense appear, but with its appearance all previous life was stamped with
the character of darkness. As to the object of the apostolical announcement, we
might now feel tolerably clear; but the manner in which it is and becomes known
has yet to be considered. This is defined to us by the threefold predicative:
ἑωράκαμεν [“we have looked upon”], μαρτυροῦμεν [“we bear witness”],
ἀπαγγέλλομεν[“we proclaim”]. In these we have a climax; the predicate that
precedes is always the basis for that which follows. Let us, in order to see
this more clearly, observe the three predicates in their inverted order. The
last, ἀπαγγέλλομεν [“we proclaim”], denotes a promulgation for the hearers’
sake, through such means to be edified; what the apostle himself knows and
enjoys he would make over to the hearers of his message. But if the message lays
claim to be accepted, it must itself be true, and this presupposition is
guaranteed by the μαρτυρεῖν [“to bear witness”]. Μαρτυρία [“testimony”], to wit,
is ever the declaration of something self-experienced and self-observed by the
witness. A witness is not primarily appointed to be serviceable to others, but
purely to serve the cause of truth. Whether it is profitable or not, received or
rejected, is a matter of indifference to testimony as such: it is an actus
forensis, though in this case the forum is a divine one only. In the ἀπαγγέλλεῖν
[“to proclaim”] the emphasis lies on the communication of truth; in the
μαρτυρεῖν [“to bear witness”] the emphasis lies on the communication of truth.
As already noted, the μαρτυρία [“testimony”] rests always on personal
experience, hence the word which Christ, Joh 3:11, spoke to Nicodemus, ὃ
ἑωράκαμεν μαρτυροῦμεν [“what we have seen and testify to”]; hence the
sedulousness with which the apostles in the Acts present themselves as witnesses
of the resurrection; hence in our passage the ἑωράκαμεν [“we have looked upon”]
placed before the μαρτυροῦμεν [“we bear witness”]. That this word and not
ἀκηκόαμεν [“we have heard”] is chosen, has its reason in the fact that the
former rather than the latter expresses the direct evidence of the senses, so
that ὁρᾶν [“to see”] is alone selected of the four verbs of perception used in
the first verse; as well as in the fact that in all languages the idea of seeing
is used for sensible cognizance of every kind. In the previous verse it is
easily intelligible why the apostle spoke in the plural, for the experiences
recorded there had always been his in the fellowship of the other apostles; but
for the same reason he here also writes ἀπαγγέλλομεν [“we proclaim”], since,
though he alone writes the Epistle that follows, he recognises himself in the
act as only the organ of the apostolical function as a whole.


========================================================================
  CHAPTER 3: 03 - 1JN 1:3
========================================================================

1Jn 1:3

Ὃ ἑωράκαμεν καὶ ἀκηκόαμεν, ἀπαγγέλλομεν ὑμῖν, ἵνα καὶ ὑμεῖς κοινωνίαν ἔχητε μεθ᾽
ἡμῶν, καὶ ἡ κοινωνία δὲ ἡ ἡμετέρα μετὰ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ μετὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦ
Χριστοῦ.

Thus the object of the Epistle has evolved itself to our apprehension in a
series of more and more definite ideas. Nevertheless, the question as to the
substance of his annunciation is not to St. John the most important. This is
obvious when we consider that he introduces the more exact specification of it
as ζωὴ [“life”], and indeed ζωὴαἰώνιος [“eternal life”], only in a parenthesis.
That cannot possibly be the most momentous thing in the view of an author which
he inserts in a parenthetical manner. It is clear also when we consider that in
the third verse the object is reintroduced in the first more general
expressions: ὃἑωράκαμενκαὶἀκηκόαμεν [“which we have seen and heard”]. This very
circumstance points to the conclusion that the emphasis in the context before us
does not rest upon the object of the annunciation, but upon the assured
knowledge of that object. Even in the parenthesis of the second verse, the idea,
for the sake of which generally it is interpolated, is that of the ἐφανερώθη
[“he was made manifest”]. We have in the first two verses a double series of
ideas and a double tendency; one series specifies the object about which it
treats, the other the assurance concerning the nature of that object. But that
the latter series is the most important for the present aim of the apostle, is
shown by the very commencement of 1Jn 1:3, which, recapitulating all that went
before, selects an expression which defines the object altogether in its
generality, while it defines the certitude of experience concerning it in the
most pregnant way. If it had run τὴν ζωὴνἀπαγγέλλομεν [“we proclaim the life”],
this latter element would, conversely, have receded instead. That the order of
the words is not the same as in 1Jn 1:1 (here ἑωράκαμεν [“we have seen”] before
ἀκηκόαμεν [“we have heard”]) cannot be regarded as a designed gradation, the
less so as we certainly have such a gradation in 1Jn 1:1, and there the ἀκούειν
[“to hear”] is the first verb. The present order is rather to be explained from
the circumstance that the ὁρᾶν [“to see”] of the former verb is still lingering
in the apostle’s ear, and therefore presented itself first. But that only ὁρᾶν
[“to see”] and ἀκούειν [“to hear”], and not also θεᾶσθαι [“to look upon”] and
ψηλαφᾶν [“to touch”], are repeated, is to be accounted for on the ground that
for an epanalepsis or resumption, which should be as short as possible, and yet
as comprehensive as possible, the most general expressions are the most
pertinent.

After the substance and trustworthiness of his document are satisfied, the
writer lays down further the aim of it. We may interpret this in two ways:
either the apostle purposes to establish a fellowship between himself and the
readers, or between God and the readers. In the former case the κοινωνία μεθ᾽
ἡμῶν [“fellowship with us”], would be translated as covimunio inter nos et vos;
in the latter as cadem quae jam nobis (mihi) est communio sc.eum Deo. The
decision depends upon two expressions: the μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν [“with us”] and then the
καὶ [“and”] before ὑμεῖς [“you”]. We decide for the former of the two
explanations: the apostle says primarily that he would establish a fellowship
between himself and the readers, not that he would introduce them into that
fellowship which he had with God. To be more particular, it is, in the first
place, not true, as some have maintained, that κοινωνία [“fellowship”] is in the
New Testament employed only of communion with God: the passage Act 2:42
sufficiently refutes that idea. Secondly, it is highly forced to take the μετά
in the same sentence, connected with the same substantive twice in close
succession used, in two different senses: the first time (κοινωνία μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν
[“fellowship with us”]) to indicate the same common fellowship, as it were,
eadem communio quam nos inter nos hahemus; the second time (ἡκοινωνίαἡ ἡμετέρα
μετὰτοῦπατρὸς [“our fellowship is with the father”]) to indicate the subject
with whom I have fellowship. And, finally, how in all the world can the
expression κοινωνία μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν [“fellowship with us”] then define the same thing
as ἡαὐτὴκοινωνίαἦνκαὶ ἡμεῖςἔχομεν [“the same fellowship which also we have with
you”]? For all these reasons it is plain that the purpose of the apostle is, in
the first place, to establish a communion between himself and his readers. And
this makes the reference of the καί [“and,” “also”] as before ἡμεῖς [“you”]
clear; on this supposition it cannot mean to say that the readers also, like the
apostles, should have fellowship with God, but that the readers of this Epistle
should, like other Christians, enter into fellowship with the apostles. And
thus, once more, we have the elements of decision as to the right reading: the
reading ἀπαγγέλλομεν καὶ ὑμῖν [“we proclaim to you also”], which on external
grounds is to be preferred, yields an altogether appropriate sense on this
interpretation. The first καὶ [“and,” “also”] after ἀπαγγέλλομεν [“we proglaim”]
emphasizes the community of the announcement which is made to the readers as to
others before them, and the second καί [“and,” “also”] before ὑμεῖς [“you”] the
community and equality of the blessing which should be the fruit of this
announcement. That this bond between apostles and churches was not only a high
benefit to the churches, but that it was found such on the side of the apostles
also, we have a Pauline testimony in Rom 1:11-12; and the stress laid upon this
is in precise harmony with the drift of our Epistle, which aims always at the
awakening of ἀγάπη [“love”], or the sentiment of fellowship. It may be thought
surprising that St. John here speaks as if this community or fellowship was yet
to be constituted, the readers being obviously Christians already, and therefore
such a link between them and the apostles already established. To this it might
be replied that the readers were as yet unknown to the apostle, and that of
necessity the fellowship between them would become much deeper if they entered
into personal association, even though it were only through the medium of a
written communication. But apart from the historical grounds of this hypothesis,
there is a deeper reason to be sought. It is quite customary with St. John, on
the one hand, to consider his readers as perfected and in possession of all the
blessings of salvation, while yet, on the other hand, he regards them as
altogether in the beginnings of development; as when he expressly writes his
Gospel to Christian men, and yet avows the creation of faith in them as his aim
(Joh 20:20). In order to understand the second part of the verse, it is of
primary importance to assign the force of ἡμετέρα [“our/your”]. Till now, the
first person has been always appropriated to the apostles. If we would accept it
so here, the meaning would be: “the fellowship which we the apostles have is a
fellowship with the Father and the Son.” Then this sentence would be a simple
declaration, and by no means dependent on ἵνα [“in order that”], for the abiding
fact of the fellowship between God and the apostles is altogether independent of
the Epistle that follows. This interpretation can be held fast, however, only so
long as we explain the preceding words, κοινωνίανμεθ᾽ ἡμῶν [“fellowship with
us”], as “the same fellowship with us,” that is, the same which we have; but
this explanation we have proved untenable. But if we translate these words,
“that ye may enter into fellowship with us the apostles,” it is impossible that
the following ἡκοινωνίαἡ ἡμετέρα [“our/your fellowship”] can be referred again
to the apostles: “and indeed we the apostles have fellowship with God.” The
essential main idea, that the readers also should have fellowship with God, is
on this interpretation simply not expressed. Thus we are led to understand the
ἡμετέρα [“our/your”] otherwise, that is, in such a way as to make it combine the
ἡμεῖςκαὶ ὑμεῖς [“us and you”], the apostles and the readers. The writer
presupposes that the aim prescribed in the preceding clause with ἵνα [“in order
that”] is accomplished, the fellowship with his readers which he desired is
established, and is regarded in the expression ἡκοινωνίαἡ ἡμετέρα [“our/your
fellowship”] as perfect. The manner and the meaning of this fellowship are now
more clearly defined, that it is at the same time a fellowship with God. “The
fellowship which each one of us must have with God I would show, but at the same
time thereby also most closely bind us all together in one.” Thus we shall make
the second clause depend on the ἵνα [“in order that”], especially as the
grammatical impossibility of supplying the conjunctive ᾖ [“which”] is certainly
not proved. And thus the junction of the latter part by καί [“and”] has justice
done to it. This can enter only when a new thought is introduced (καί [“and”]),
which, however, at the same time stands in something like antithesis to the
preceding (δέ [“but”]. So it is here; the subject was of brotherly fellowship,
and now the new thought distinguished from the former is added. " But this
fellowship should at the same time and essentially be a fellowship with God.”


========================================================================
  CHAPTER 4: 04 - 1JN 1:4
========================================================================

1Jn 1:4

Καὶ ταῦτα γράφομεν ὑμῖν, ἵνα ἡ χαρὰ ἡμῶν ᾖ πεπληρωμένη. But not even this
redoubled specification of his purpose, as given in what precedes, exhausts the
apostle’s design: his aim is not only to establish a fellowship whether with God
or with the brethren; but this itself is to him again a means toward the
elevation to its highest stage of their individual interests and their
attainment of the joy of life (χαρά [“joy”]), and that in its most perfect
degree (πεπληρωμένη [“full”]). This is the substance of the fourth verse.
Ταῦταγράφομενὑμῖν [“these things we write to you”] (the reading ἡμεῖς [“us”] is
neither sufficiently attested, nor is there any internal reason for such
prominence to the subject) cannot without violence be referred to anything but
the letter before us, to the ἐπαγγελία [“announcement”] announced in the
previous verse and defined more closely as to its tendency. If we ask by what
means this joy is brought to a state of πεπληρωμένη [“full”], we are led to the
everywhere observable coincidence between the Epistle and the Gospel of the
apostle. Specifically we have in the latter the πλήρωσιςτῆςχαρᾶς [“fullness of
joy”]. Primarily we find it in Joh 15:11; there we read: “If ye keep My
commandments, ye shall abide in My love; even as I keep My Father’s
commandments, and abide in His love. And this have I said unto you, that My joy
may remain in you, καὶ ἡχαρὰ ὑμῶν πληρωθῇ [“your joy may be full”].” The meaning
is, that the keeping of the Father’s commands is Christ’s joy, and will be that
of His disciples, yea, that their joy would thereby reach its highest point. The
commandment, the fulfilment of which is here in question, is then in Joh 15:12
mentioned as ἀγαπᾶνἀλλήλους,καθὼςἠγάπησεὑμᾶς [“love one another, just as i have
loved you”], and thus the πλήρωσις [“fullness”] of the joy is attained according
to this passage through the confirmation of brotherly love. With this let Php
2:2 be compared, where the πλήρωσις [“fullness”] of the apostolical joy is
sought in this, that the church has τὴναὐτὴνἀγάπην [“the same love”]. A second
time St. John’s Gospel speaks of χαρὰπεπληρωμένην [“fullness of joy”] Joh
17:13;[N] there the ground of it is given in the consciousness that Christ has
kept His own, and that the Father will go on to keep them: thus fellowship with
the Father and the Son begins the consummated joy. If we combine together the
two passages in the Gospel, the fellowship with the Lord and fellowship with the
brethren is St. John’s ground of χαρὰπεπληρωμένην [“fullness of joy”];
literally, therefore, the same which is specified here in the combination of 1Jn
1:3 with 1Jn 1:4 as its ground and substance. We may further point attention to
Php 4:4-5, where both these are still laid down as the foundation of a
permanent, continuous, intense Christian joy: ὁκύριοςἐγγύς [“the Lord if near”]
comes first as the perfected fellowship with the Lord in the near prospect, and
then the requirement resulting from this, τὸ ἐπιεικὲςὑμῶνγνωσθήτωπᾶσινἀνθρώποις
[“let your gentleness be made known to all men”], follows as the manifestation
of brotherly love in its widest comprehension. And, in fact, all joy, that is,
every heightened feeling of life, rests upon the consciousness of a communion
evermore firmly established and articulated; hence the fulfilment of all joy is
produced, first, through the highest, object with whom this fellowship is
entered into, that is by God, and then through the participation of others in,
this fellowship; accordingly, throughout the Scripture the community of the
heavenly songs of praise is regarded as an essential factor of blessedness.

It is accepted by common consent, that with the first four verses the
introduction of the Epistle is complete. But as at the very outset a natural and
justifiable expectation would independently arise that the introduction will
stand in an organic relation to the whole, so we are all the more warranted in
expecting it in the present case, inasmuch as the apostle has in express terms
laid down the scope of his communication. We shall venture, therefore, to enter
on the Epistle with the presumption that we shall find in it a twofold element;
the requirement to enter into fellows hip with God; but this such a form that
from it shall issue the requirement to enter into brotherly fellowship. Finally,
however, we shall be constrained to expect that through both the apostle will
lead us to perfected joy. Whether, indeed, this presupposition, thus encouraged
by the author himself, will be found warranted in the Epistle, and if so, in
what manner this, end is attained, will be shown by a detailed interpretation.


========================================================================
  CHAPTER 5: 05 - 1JN 1:5
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1Jn 1:5

Καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπαγγελία ἣν ἀκηκόαμεν ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἀναγγέλλομεν ὑμῖν, ὅτι ὁ
Θεὸς φῶς ἐστι, καὶ σκοτία ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία. In one most impressive
sentence St. John sums up the whole matter of his annunciation. This message—we
must read ἀγγελία [“message”], not ἐπαγγελία [“announcement”], which, according
to New Testament usage (2Ti 1:1 being no exception), could only have meant
promise; here, as in 1Jn 3:11, the copyists inserted the familiar ἐπαγγελία
[“announcement”] instead of the ἀγγελία [“message”], which is found nowhere
else—was communicated to the apostles ἀπ᾽αὐτοῦ [“from him”], that is, by Christ,
who is the last most immediate antecedent (compare 1Jn 5:3); and they
communicate this fundamental declaration, thus unique, in their turn. Quod
Filius annunciavit, renuneiat apostolus. The substance of the record which had
been given to him St. John condenses into one clause: Θεὸςφῶς [“God is light”].
At the first glance this seems to have no discernible connection with the
constituent ideas of the introduction. The ζωή [“life”] was to have been the
subject, and that as manifested by One who had come within the range of personal
and sensible observation and experience. But both the idea of life and that of
sensible experience here fall into the background and disappear. The key to the
connection in this case also is found in the prologue of the Gospel. There, too,
we find the three ideas which have hitherto entered as constituent elements; and
we find them in the same order, λόγος [“word”], ζωή [“life”], φῶς [“light”];
there also as here, and here as there, the antithesis being supplied to φῶς
[“light”] by the σκοτία. Now it is manifest, that in the Gospel φῶς [“light”] is
a closer definition of the ζωή [“life”], and that in its highest stage. As ζωή
[“life”] the Logos created all things which generally were created; as φῶς
[“light”] He is described only in relation to man: ἐν αὐτῷζωὴ ἦν καὶ ἡζωὴ ἦν
τὸφῶς τῶνἀνθρώπων [“in him was life, and the life was the light of men” cf. Joh
1:4]. This definition of the λόγος [“word”] as φῶς [“light”] is that on which
the whole Gospel rests; for the following words, to τὸφῶςἐν τῇσκοτίᾳφαίνει καὶ
ἡσκοτία οὐκατέλαβεναὐτὸ [“the light shines in the darkness, but the darkness has
not mastered it” cf. Joh 1:5], might serve as the programme, particularly of the
first great division of the Gospel down to John 12:1-50. They declare, as the
present tense itself indicates, something altogether universal, running through
the entire course of history, which reached in the work and influence of the
manifested incarnate Logos its highest stage of expression and development.

Inasmuch as the life is described as the light of men, it is declared that He
manifested Himself for them in a manner in which it was not possible that He
would manifest Himself in regard to the rest of the creation. It is
self-understood that the designation light is not to be understood in the
physical sense, but in its reference to the spiritual domain. It is the property
of light that it communicates itself to those objects which are capable of
receiving it, and makes them light. We may compare that other word of Scripture:
“The light of the body is the eye; if therefore thine eye be single, thy whole
body shall be full of light.” There our thought is expressly declared: the eye
receives the light, and thereby becomes itself enlightened and enlightening. So
also in the prologue of the Gospel: the whole creation manifests the Logos as
the life; but only man is capable of light, that is, can so receive the nature
of the Logos pouring forth toward him, that he himself shall be consciously
transformed into it. Inasmuch as man has not only a passive relation to his
life, that is, instinctively fulfils his destiny, but an active one also, his
life being at all points and throughout ethically ordered, therefore he has the
capacity not only to receive life from the Logos, but also to have this life as
a light, that is, to be able to discern or know Him in His nature, in order to
reflect His image in himself. Now, wherever this destination is forgotten by
man, and he closes against it the eye which was given him in order to be able to
receive the Logos into himself as light, there is the dominion of darkness as
the σκοτία [“darkness”]. According to St. John’s view, what constitutes the
ground or characteristic of belonging to the σκοτία [“darkness”], is not the
fact of not coming under the influence of the light, but only the fact of that
not submitting to it which ought or was destined to be subject to it. Only in
the domain of the rational world does the Logos manifest Himself as φῶς
[“light”]; hence only in regard to that is there any question of φῶς [“light”]
or σκοτία [“darkness”]; all else lies outside of the sphere of these
counterparts, and the two ideas have no longer any application. Accordingly,
what we have learned from Joh 1:4 is, that the revelation of the Logos as light
is the highest stage of His revelation, that it is specifically a higher potency
of His manifestation as life, and that therefore it takes place only in relation
to men, because these alone have the organ for receiving Him as φῶς [“light”].
To the same relation between ζωή [“life”] and φῶς [“light”] we are led by Joh
8:12, ἕξειν τὸφῶς τῆς ζωῆς [“he will have the light of life”]: the Lord promises
His believing disciples the life, not, however, life in general, but in its
development as φῶς [“light”],—such life, namely, of His as becomes at the same
time light for them. Where the φῶς [“light”] is, there is also ζωή [“life”]; but
the converse does not hold good. When a man is said to be a partaker of eternal
life, ζωὴαἰώνιος [“eternal life”], that takes place through his becoming a
τέκνονφωτός [“child of light”]. Thus it is clear in what certain connection the
message here announced, Θεὸςφῶς [“God is light”], stands with the introduction
of the Epistle: to wit, inasmuch as here, precisely as in the Gospel, there is
an ascent from the idea of the ζωή [“life”] to that of the light, men having the
possibility in the ordination of God for sharing in the life. But there is
another point of view from which, however little obvious it may be, the
connection between the fifth verse and what precedes may be traced. Hitherto the
stress had been laid on the φανέρωσις [“announcement”] of the λόγος τῆς ζωῆς
[“the word of life”], on His entering into the sphere of experience. And this
element is noteworthy for the interpretation of 1Jn 1:5. In order to discern
this clearly, let us start from another difficulty. We know that the declaration
Θεὸςφῶς [“God is light”], which St. John lays down as the compendium of the
message of Christ, does not occur in the Gospels in this particular form, Christ
indeed is called φῶς [“light”], Joh 1:4; John 3:19, John 8:12, but not the
Father. It may be said, of course, that in the Johannaean view, according to
which Christ and the Father are one, so that he who sees the one sees also the
other, there is direct propriety in assigning whatever Christ predicates of
Himself to the Father also. But we do not need this extrication; nor need we
seek for individual passages in which the ἀγγελία [“message”] with which we now
have to do is literally contained. For, as the whole substance of the Gospel may
be epitomized in the expression θεὸςἀγάπη [“God is love”], even though in no one
passage this phrase is found, because the real essential meaning of every saving
word and every saving act is no other than this, that God is love; so also the
real essential meaning, patent to every unprejudiced eye, of all that Christ
ever said and did, is no other than that which is summarized and announced in
the words: Θεὸς φῶς [“God is light”]. Θεὸςφῶς [“God is light”]: for to this end
was Christ born, and came into the world, that He might reveal the Father whom
no man hath seen; and Θεὸςφῶς [“God is light”]: for if, according to John 1:4,
this is the peculiar vocation of mankind, that in relation to it God reveals
Himself as φῶς [“light”], then all revelation of the Father through Christ
becomes a manifestation as light. And if Christ in His whole life, in word and
deed, reveals the Father, and yet this revelation of God as proceeding towards
men is a revelation of God as φῶς [“light”], then the whole life of Christ, His
person and His work, must have for its one meaning the proclamation Θεὸςφῶς
[“God is light”]; it is indeed the representation to the senses, in a sense the
incarnation, of the truth: Θεὸςφῶς [“God is light”]. Thus it is made clear that
the φανέρωσις [“announcement”], made prominent in the introduction, of the λόγος
τῆς ζωῆς [“the word of life”], His entering into personal, sensible
perceptibility and observation, is the necessary basis for our affirmation that
God is light; for all that the apostles had learnt concerning the Logos by
hearing and seeing, beholding and handling, may be condensed into this one
sentence. But with all this investigation we have not in the slightest degree
explained the meaning of this sentence. We do not yet know what it signifies
that God is light, nor what thought was to be expressed by this designation.
There is a difference between this passage and the others in which the fact that
Christ is light appears. In these latter we have not so much to consider the
immanent nature of Christ, or the definition of His essence, as an assertion or
vindication of His being. Thus in Joh 1:4-5, ἦν φῶς τῶνἀνθρώπων, τὸφῶς φαίνει
τῷκόσμῳ [“was the light of men, the light shines in the world”], where it is
obvious that the question is, not what the Logos is in Himself, but what He is
and wills to be for men; in Joh 3:19, where the light as a judicial power is
treated of; in Joh 8:12, where, apart from the expression φῶς τοῦκόσμου [“light
of the world”], the light is represented as a power passing over or reaching to
man. We may compare also Joh 9:10-11. Similarly, in our passage it is certainly
affirmed that the nature of God, which is light, will have its effect upon us,
so that we also may ἐν φωτὶπεριπατῶμεν [“let is walk in the light”], or, to
adopt St. Paul’s parallel word, may be τέκναφωτός [Eph 5:8]. But, on the other
hand, it is clear of itself that the practical vindication of Christ or of God
as light presupposes a quality in Him corresponding, as in general every
transitive energy implies an immanent characteristic. And it is this latter
which in our passage, otherwise than in those before mentioned, is placed in the
foreground. Not only does the general proposition Θεὸςφῶς [“God is light”]
produce the impression that it gives us a general definition of the divine
essence, without any reference as yet to influence ad extra, but also the
subsequent teaching that we should walk in the light, ὡς αὐτόςἐστινἐν τῷφωτί
[“he is in the light”], shows that the apostle is thinking of His being light as
of an absolute, immanent characterization of God. As God is life, apart from any
particular life-giving energy, so also He is light, apart from any enlightening
act. Consequently we see how impossible it is to accept φῶς [“light”] as simply
equivalent to σωτηρία [“salvation”], salvation; for salvation is a relative
idea, absolutely requiring the added thought of someone who is the object of the
salvation, while God must be light, according to all that has been said, not
only in a relative, but in an absolute sense also.

It is usual to illustrate the idea of the φῶς [“light”] by making it a figure,
in this case to be applied in the intellectual or moral direction; for example,
as the figurative designation of the divine wisdom or holiness. But this way of
looking at it does not meet all the requirements of the apostolical view. When
we reflect that, in the most strikingly abundant and persistent way, the
scriptures of both Testaments place God in peculiar and immediate relation to
light,—calling it His garment. His dwelling-place, φῶς οἰκῶνἀπρόσιτον [“dwelling
in unapproachable light”], 1Ti 6:16[N],—we shall be disposed to seek in these
expressions for more than a mere figure of some particular attribute of God, and
shall be constrained, giving up the purely figurative application altogether, to
assign to them the meaning of reality. Moreover, to this we shall be forced by
another passage of Scripture. In Jas 1:17, God is directly called πατὴρτῶν φώτων
[“Father of lights”]. This phrase cannot be intended to designate God as only
the Creator of the stars; it is nowhere, and in no connection, the manner of the
New Testament to identify the creative activity of God with His fatherly
relation: the latter always presupposes a fellowship of nature between Creator
and creature, and therefore stands in a higher sphere than the former. Where
there is a father, the question is not of production, but of generation.
Accordingly God, in the passage quoted, must be called πατὴρτῶν φώτων [“Father
of lights”], only because the creatures or natures of light, which are intended
here, are in some sense of the same nature with Him,—that is, because He is
Himself light. Thus, when we have learned from Scripture that the definition of
God as light or φῶς [“light”] is a characterization of essence, there remains
only the possibility that we have here a metaphorical description of His divine
nature, and that the φῶτα [“lights”], whose Father He is, are so called in a
figurative sense. But that will not avail; for St. James, when he says φῶτα
[“lights”], is certainly thinking of light-natures in the ordinary sense: even
if the expression φῶτα [“lights”] were not to be referred to the stars, but to
any spiritual light-natures, yet even then the description would be used not on
account of any ethical quality in them, but on account of the bodies of light
with which Scripture customarily invests them. We must therefore hold to it as a
scriptural view, that God is in the proper and unfigurative sense light. Of
course we do not mean to assign to Him material light, nor, indeed, that
supernatural yet still material light which shed its beams around the Lord, or
surrounded the angel forms; but we mean a light purely unmaterial. The matter
stands simply thus: The earthly light is not the proper and real, and the
description of God as light therefore figurative; but the divine light-nature is
the true light, the earthly being only the divine light translated into the
creating domain and the earthly reflection of it. Everywhere it is not the
bodily and the material which is the reality, but the spiritual and the
immaterial, which makes for itself a body in matter, and thus comes to
manifestation. As the tabernacle was the copy of heavenly realities, not merely
a symbol, therefore, but a type, so in the end everything material is only the
copy of heavenly realities. If, therefore, God is called light, we are taught to
think that He possesses, in the fullest intensity and in the most real because
spiritual manner, that which for us upon earth is the light. Consequently more
is asserted than any particular attribute of God. All united attributes are far
from furnishing the essence of God itself; they are only particular modalities,
outbeamings, or forms of His nature: at the basis of them all lies the divine
essence, as the source whence they flow; and this. His essence, the θείαφύσις
[“divine nature”], the primal ground of His being, it is which St. John defines
as φῶς [“light”]. The necessity of such a view will be evident at once, if we
cease to think of spirit as mere force. All force presupposes something in which
it inheres; and it is this something, this ground-essence in God, which is meant
by the φῶς [“light”].

Thus our word φῶς [“light”] is not intended to be a figure for any particular
divine attribute, but it is the altogether real, though not materially
understood, designation of the divine essence. We are carried now a step farther
by the circumstance that we read, as following hard one on the other: Θεὸςφῶς
[“God is light”] and Θεὸςἐν τῷφωτί [“God is in the light”]. These are by no
means one and the same thing. It is only in the case of this word φῶς [“light”]
that such a variation of the phraseology is possible. We cannot, in the same
way, say Θεὸςἐντῇζωῇ [“God is in the life”], but only Θεὸςζωή [“God is life”];
or ζωὴ ἐντῷΘεῷ [“life is in God”]. The expression Θεὸςἐν τῷφωτί [“God is in the
light”] corresponds pretty nearly to the applications “light is His garment,” or
φῶς οἰκῶν [“dwelling of light”]. In all three the light is not thought of as in
God, but, conversely, as surrounding God. Thus they lead us to consider a
similar representation, in which St. Paul describes it by μορφῇΘεοῦ [“form of
God”], Php 2:6.[N] In this last-mentioned word we may most easily trace the idea
which all these descriptions would set before us. To the μορφῇΘεοῦ [“form of
God”]corresponds, in Phil, ii., the μορφῇδούλου [“form of a servant”]. Now, as
the nature of the μορφῇδούλου [“form of a servant”] is further depicted by
obedience, this leads us to conclude, and the connection of the passages
confirms it, that the μορφῇΘεοῦ [“form of God”] is dominion. This is the figure
which God has given Himself, the form under which we see and know Him, which
Jesus Christ laid aside, and, instead of it, assumed the μορφῇδούλου [“form of a
servant”], when He became obedient. The lordship of God is thus a transitive
idea; if we seek the corresponding immanent quality within the divine nature, in
virtue of which God can exercise the dominion, we are led at once to the
biblical idea of the δόξα [“glory”]. The Scripture, to wit, understands by δόξα
[“glory”] the perfect unfolding of the divine essence in its altogether infinite
riches,—the revelation of Himself before Himself, as distinguished from His
revelation only in the creature and to the creature. Now this, His essence,
which He reveals before Himself, is called φῶς [“light”] and inasmuch as this
self-manifestation of God before Himself, His δόξα [“glory”], is yet to be
distinguished from His nature as pure potency, it is called His garment, or it
is said of Him here: Θεὸςἐν τῷφωτί [“God is in the light”]. As the clothing of
the lily is inseparably bound up with its nature, and yet is the first φανέρωσις
[“reveal”] of its nature as unfolded in the germ, so the light-nature of God has
become a δόξα [“glory”] surrounding Him, so that it may be said with equal
propriety Θεὸςφῶς [“God is light”], and also Θεὸςἐν τῷφωτί [“God is in the
light”]. As we have thus to keep steadily before our eyes the fact that by the
word φῶς [“light”], the heavenly pattern of our light, something purely
super-creaturely—the essence of God—is intended to be expressed, it becomes
evident that we cannot think out and make clear, in human ideas, this divine
nature. But, on the other hand, it is assuredly true that the apostles tell us
nothing which should have no practical bearing, and therefore no conceivable
meaning. Especially here, where St. John aims to deduce from the light-nature of
God conclusions affecting us, he evidently must intend that with the expression
Θεὸςφῶς [“God is light”] should be connected an altogether definite meaning. All
utterances concerning divine things transcend, it is true, all human
understanding. Not, however, that they are therefore empty of meaning; it is
only that we cannot seize their full import. Hitherto we have placed in the
foreground that side of the apostolical utterance which points to depths which
go beyond all fathoming of human thought; but now, on the other hand, we must
needs consider what it contains for us of practical and accessible bearing. The
way is indicated for us by those passages of the Gospel, again and again
referred to, in which Christ describes Himself as the light of the world, and
the light of men. The enlightening energy of Christ has relation pre-eminently
to the understanding of men: He shows them the right and the truth. He who would
give clearness to others must have it himself; he who would enlighten must be
light. Now, absolute clearness in human thought is to be found only when I know
a thing altogether, and look through it on all sides, and in its connections. If
God is to give this intelligence. He must of course have it Himself: that means.
He must possess all truth. But the enlightening activity of God refers not
merely to the impartation of certain abstract truths, but to the communication
of the good generally, which, on its theoretical and intelligible side, we call
the truth, and goodness on its practical side. If, then, God is the light of
men, it means that in Him all goodness an d all perfection dwell; there is no
good which is not in Him; He is the πλήρωμα [“fullness”], out of the fullness of
which we all receive. And this is the concrete and practical import of the word
Θεὸςφῶς [“God is light”], that in Him is all perfection, all truth, blessedness,
and holiness; and in such a sense in Him, that as the light everywhere diffuses
around its own nature, so all that is good radiates from God.

What is beyond, that this metaphysical essence of God is to be conceived, not as
the sum of individual perfections, but as the substance and archetype of the
light, passes, indeed, human power of comprehension. But it is a gain even to
know that such an original ground, such a primal substance, is in God, out of
which all His perfections flow; to know, further, that it is such as may be most
fitly described by the word φῶς [“light”], even though we cannot also know how
this is to be conceived. Is it no enrichment of science, that chemical
researches have detected to us the existence of ultra-violet colours, though we
cannot discover them with the eye, and have no suspicion of their appearance? Or
was it no enrichment of theology, that the union of the two natures in Christ
was defined by the terms, ἀσυγχύτως [“without confusion”], ἀμερίστος
[“unchangeable”], ἀχωρίστως [“indivisible”], ἀδιαιρέτως [“inseparable”],
although, being pure negations, they say nothing positive as to the manner of
that union? There are two kinds of ignorance—one concerning the being of an
object, and the other concerning its character as being. The latter marks an
advanced stage in relation to the former. So it is a great thing to know that in
God there is an essential nature which is to be called light, though we do not
know how we are to conceive of it. That in this expression we have in general a
definition of the divine essence, which is not to be limited one-sidedly to the
region of His willing or of His thinking activity, is confirmed by the progress
of the apostolical discussion. That is to say, when it speaks of a περιπατυεῖνἐν
τῷφωτί [“walk in the light”], that points rather to the exhibition of the nature
by act, and therefore to the will; when it speaks of the ὁμολογίατῶνἁμαρτιῶν
[“confess our sins”] as required, that points rather to the domain of the
thinking. To make it more plain, however, the negative is added to the positive
declaration, καὶσκοτίαἐναὐτῷοὐκἔστινοὐδεμία [“and there is no darkness in him at
all”]. First, it must be observed that this sentence is, as to its form,
distinguished as well from Θεὸςφῶς [“God is light”] as from Θεὸςἐν τῷφωτὶἐστιν
[“God being in light”]. To the former would have corresponded accurately
οὐκἔστινσκοτία [“not being darkness”], He is light and not darkness; it is
clear, however, that this would have been far less pregnant than the expression
selected by St. John. To the latter would have corresponded οὐκἔστινἐντῇσκοτίᾳ
[“not being in darkness”]. But this idea would be a harsh one, since it is
obvious that the self-revelation of God before Himself, His garment—for this is
meant by εἶναιἐν [“being in”]—must correspond with His inmost essence; and it
was necessary therefore to deny, not that in it, but that in God, there is any
darkness. The form οὐκἔστινἐντῇσκοτίᾳ [“not being in darkness”] would not have
been parallel with Θεὸςφῶς [“God is light”], which, however, it would be
supposed to be. Generally speaking, to God as φῶς [“light”] there is no
counterpart nature which in a similar way would be the sum of all σκοτία
[“darkness”]: not Satan; for though he is indeed ἐντῇσκοτίᾳ [“in darkness”], and
ἄρχων of the kingdom of darkness, he is not the epitome of darkness, so that
there is no darkness outside of him; while all light dwells and has its source
in God, and is derived from Him, and wrapped up in Him, the σκοτία [“darkness”]
comes to realization only in the community of collective persons who are
ἐντῇσκοτίᾳ [“in darkness”]; darkness, as a whole, is only an ideal, and not a
concrete unity. For the rest, that the positive expression Θεὸςφῶς [“God is
light”] is followed by the negative one, has its reason—apart from the tendency
of St. John to move by preference in antitheses—in the consideration that
follows: because, to wit, the purport of the teaching is to make it emphatic
that the slightest fellowship with darkness excludes fellowship with God, as God
has no darkness in Himself, but is light, and only light.


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  CHAPTER 6: 06 - 1JN 1:6
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1Jn 1:6

Ἐὰν εἴπωμεν ὅτι κοινωνίαν ἔχομεν μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐν τῷ σκότει περιπατῶμεν,
ψευδόμεθα, καὶ οὐ ποιοῦμεν τὴν ἀλήθειαν·

It is obvious at once that the following verses aim to deduce the consequences
which flow from the nature of God being light; and further, that these
consequences are two-fold, each of the two being again unfolded into two
counterpart sentences. But, before we exhibit the thoughts in their clear
connection, it is important here also to define the ideas that constitute the
whole. The first consequence is, that we should walk in the light; the second,
that we must ever remain conscious of our sin. What is meant by
περιπατεῖνἐντῷφωτί [“walk in the light”]? At the very outset we see the
incorrectness of the common explanation of φῶς [“light”] by holiness or holy
love. For, since in 1Jn 1:7 the presupposition is assumed that we walk in the
light as God is in the light, there would be assumed also a holiness in us
altogether corresponding to the divine holiness, which is absolute; but how in
that case would such a presupposition (ἐάν [“if”]) of absolute holiness be
consistent with the necessity of καθαρίζεσθαιἀπὸπάσηςἁμαρτίας [“to be cleansed
from all sin”], and of a perpetual consciousness of sin? Such an explanation of
the φῶς [“light”] requires the exposition to soften down
ἐνφωτὶπεριπατεῖνὡςαὐτόςἐνφωτὶ ἔστιν [“walk in the light as he is in the light
”]in a way that does violence to the plain meaning of the words.

Now, let us see if the interpretation we have given will help us on our way. Our
starting-point is, that in our verse it is not, as in the former, Θεὸςφῶς [“God
is light”], and accordingly ἡμεῖςφῶς [“we are light”], but αὐτόςἐνφωτὶ ἔστιν
[“he is in light”], and, corresponding with it, ἡμεῖςἐντῷφωτί [“we are in the
light”]. We saw that Θεὸςἐντῷφωτί [“God is in the light”] defines the divine
nature not in itself, but in its self-manifestation before itself, the θείαφύσις
[“divine nature”], as St. Peter says [2Pe 1:4]; in short, that it is the sphere
homogeneous with His essential being. The expression, therefore, thus carried
over to men, would indicate not so much the bearing and character of a being in
itself, as the sphere in which he moves. In relation to God, however, it is not
ἐνφωτὶπεριπατεῖν [“walk in the light”], an expression which would not do justice
to the divine, immutable nature, but simply ἔστιν [“be,” “exist”]. But the
former expression is used of men, because the apostle is concerned with a
permanent, never-resting confirmation of the ἐνφωτὶεἶναι [“being in the light”].
Thus the writer is not here reflecting upon the sinning or not sinning, the
holiness or the unholiness of human conduct; in fact, not upon its ethical
quality at all, but purely and simply upon the sphere to which this conduct
belongs. This will be made yet more plain when we carefully mark the contrast,
ἐνσκοτίᾳπεριπατεῖν [“walk in darkness”]. We read in the Gospel, Joh 8:12, I that
he who follows the Lord “shall not walk in darkness;” and it is clear that the
darkness there means primarily something that is round about men, even as the
light there is primarily a sphere external to men. Similarly, in Joh 3:19 we
read that men “loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil;”
now here, while certainly there is a connection established between the light
and the ethical quality of men, it is clear, on the other hand, that the Saviour
distinguishes the light and the darkness themselves from the works. Now, if the
light is the divine, taking it thus generally at the outset, then the darkness
is the undivine or what is opposed to God,—that is, the nature turned away from
God, and not directed to Him.

Hence the σκοτία [“darkness”] coincides with the New Testament idea of the
κόσμος [“world”]; it is the principle which animates and governs the κόσμος
[“world”], and which comes in it into outward exhibition and form. Similarly,
the φῶς [“light”] must be the principle coming into exhibition as opposed to the
κόσμος [“world”], which is represented, namely, in the βασιλείατῶνοὐρανῶν, the
βασιλείατοῦΘεοῦ [“kingdom of God”]. Thus the ἐνφωτὶπεριπατεῖν [“walk in light”]
is in close affinity with the biblical idea of the μετανοία [“repentance”]. The
meaning of μετανοεῖν [“repentance”] is the being translated or turning oneself
over to the interests of the kingdom of God, instead of being, as before, rooted
in the domain of the κόσμος [“world”], with all its thinking, and willing, and
nature. Through the μετανοεῖν [“repentance”], as well as through the
περιπατεῖνἐνφωτί [“walk in light”], a change passes upon the sphere in which the
man lives, the circle of his interests, the powers with which he reckons, only
that in the μετανοεῖν [“repentance”] there is reference to the turning to a new
sphere of life, while in the περιπατεῖνἐνφωτί [“walk in light”] there is
reference to his belonging to it, the latter being the consequence of the
former. ὩςὁΘεὸςἐν τῷφωτὶ ἔστιν [“as God is in the light”]: that is, as His
self-manifestation is in harmony with and adequate to His internal divine
light-nature, so should man ἐνφωτὶπεριπατεῖν [“walk in light”]; his light-sphere
should be the same with that of God. The kingdom of God is the element of his
life which surrounds him, the air of which he breathes, and the breath of which
encircles him with its nourishing influence.

Thus it is now perfectly clear that the idea of the ἐνφωτὶπεριπατεῖν [“walk in
the light”] is by no means coincident with that of personal holiness and
sinlessness. For as, in Act 11:18,[N] the forgiveness of sins is represented as
the consequence of the μετανοία [“repentance”], so in our passage the
καθαρίζεσθαιἀπὸπάσηςἁμαρτίας [“to be cleansed from all sin”] is represented as
the consequence of the ἐνφωτὶπεριπατεῖν [“walk in the light”]. Only he who opens
himself to the light, and has entered into the domain of light, can experience
in himself the effects of the light. Only when the father’s house sways all the
thoughts of the prodigal son, and he has come back again to this sphere of his
home, does the father come to meet him with the announcement of forgiveness. The
kingdom of God, and its interests, its views, and its measure of all things, are
to the natural man altogether sealed up and strange. But when, instead of this,
he obtains an eye and a heart for these, he enters into the sphere of light, and
that light begins at once its ethical influence upon him and in him. The ethical
deportment of the man is therefore a consequence of his περιπατεῖν [“walk”] in
the sphere of light or of darkness respectively. But as the light by its shining
reveals, according to the Gospel, the darkness as darkness, so here also the
immediate result of the ἐνφωτὶπεριπατεῖν [“walk in the light”]is that the man
perceives where in himself the darkness is, and recognises it as darkness. The
ἐνφωτὶπεριπατεῖν [“walk in the light”] is, admitting all this, not, so to speak,
a predominant, characteristic tendency of the human life only, a series of
points of light with which may co-exist another though smaller series of points
of darkness; it is rather a thorough and perfect characterization with which no
other can co-exist. Every interruption of it, every dissolution of the once
established fellowship with God, must fall under the condemnation of Heb 6:4-6.
He who has once entered into this κοινωνίατοῦφωτός [“fellowship of light”] walks
now habitually in the light. But with this it is quite consistent that the sin
is not, so to speak, only a thing past for him, as might be concluded from the
perfect ἐὰνεἴπωμενὅτιοὐχἡμαρτήκαμεν [“if we say we have not sinned”], 1Jn 1:10;
such an error is at once repelled by the ἁμαρτίανοὐκἔχομεν [“we do not have
sin”] in 1Jn 1:8. On the contrary, the σάρξ [“flesh”] yet remains in the man as
the stronghold of his sin, from which, indeed, it is not to be ejected in a
magical and instantaneous manner. This only is necessary, that, as every
fellowship in which we find ourselves reacts against all that is directly
opposed to it, so the sphere of light to the empire of which we have become
subject reacts against every such indwelling sin. Only he who should refuse to
be convicted by the light, who should decline to bring all that is in him before
the bar of the light, would be said again to walk ἐντῇσκοτίᾳ [“in darkness”].
Moreover, these individual sinful acts, the presence of which in the Christian
life is admitted, and the acknowledgment of which is required, have a deep
significance in relation to what constitutes belonging to the kingdom of God;
for, after all, the man should not only be ἐν τῷφωτί [“in the light”], but
should also be φῶς [“light”] itself. Now, God is first φῶς [“light”], and then
afterwards is said to be ἐν τῷφωτί [“in the light”]; but in the case of man the
order is inverted: he must first be ἐν τῷφωτί [“in the light”], in order that
then, through the energy and operation of the light, he may himself become φῶς
[“light”]. Hence here, in the beginning of his exposition, St. John gives the
former side of the question precedence, reserving the other for later
development.

Let us now descend to the details. It has long since been pointed out, that from
1Jn 1:6-10, 1Jn 2:1-8 the apostle speaks in the form of emphatic conditional
sentences; that from that point he applies the participial construction in order
to express the conditional clauses: in harmony with which we have in the first
chapter the verb ψεύδεσθαι [“to lie”], and in the second chapter the
substantival form ψεύστηνεἶναι [“to be a liar”]. It is common to both sections
that we find the genuine Johannaean habit of carrying on the process of thought
through the medium of antithesis. The sixth verse takes up the idea of κοινωνία
[“fellowship”] laid down in the introduction. This is fundamentally a fellowship
with God; he, therefore, who will generally be a Christian—as was the case with
the readers of this Epistle—must, in virtue of an internal necessity, give
utterance to the avowal of such a fellowship with God. Rightly then does the
apostle now lay down his proposition in the first person; for the former part of
the conditional clause, ἐάνεἴπωμενὅτικοινωνίανἔχομενμετ᾽αὐτοῦ [“if we say we
have fellowship with him”], is already an accomplished fact in regard to him and
all his readers. Moreover, that αὐτός [“him”] refers to the Father, to God
Himself, follows not only from the fact that He is the immediate antecedent, but
especially from the explanatory clause, 1Jn 1:7, ὡςαὐτόςἐστινἐντῷφωτὶ [“as he is
in the light”]. But if, St. John continues, with this avowal there is connected
a περιπατεῖνἐντῷσκότει [“walk in the darkness”], a direction of all the
interests of life to the κόσμος [“world”], then we lie. Here, too, we have the
first person; not in the spirit of a “modesty that would spare them,” but,
conversely, in the spirit of holy severity which yields itself personally up to
the common judgment. The lie is evidently here the disparity between word and
deed. The second expression, however, demands special notice,
οὐποιοῦμεντὴνἀλήθειαν [“we do not do the truth”]. This expression is commonly
explained as if it asserted that by our deeds we prove that we are liars. The
ψεύδεσθαι [“to lie”] which precedes is thus supposed to be more closely defined
by this, that it is made evident by works that it is so. But to signify that,
the present expression would be far-fetched; on the other hand, the repetition ἡ
ἀλήθειαοὐκἔστινἐνἡμῖν [“the truth is not in us”], 1Jn 1:8, as also the entire
phraseology of the New Testament, point to another interpretation. When we read
in Joh 18:37,[N]ὁ ὢνἐκ τῆςἀληθείαςἀκούει μου τῆν φωνῆν [“the one who belongs to
the truth hears my voice”], and immediately before, ἐγὼ ἐλήλυθαἵνα μαρτυρήσω τῇ
ἀληθείᾳ [“I came in order to bear witness to the truth”]; and further, Joh 14:6,
ἐγὼεἰμιἡ ἀλήθεια [“I am the truth”], and finally in St. Paul, τῇ
ἀληθείᾳοὐπείθεσθαι [“not obeying the truth”] [Gal 5:7]: all these passages urge
upon us a peculiar, specific, objective idea of the word ἀλήθεια [“truth”]. We
are accustomed to regard truth as a definite relation between two things;
whether the congruence between word and deed, or the congruence between nature ,
and manifestation, or what not. In short, truth is to us an altogether relative
idea, an idea of relation between two things. Now this notion does not suit, or
very badly suits, the passages which have been quoted from Scripture; in them
the truth is something independent and absolute. What shall we make with the
relatival idea in such expressions as ἐκ τῆςἀληθείαςεἶναι [“belonging to the
truth”], τῇ ἀληθείᾳπείθεσθαι [“doing the truth”]?

It may be attempted to preserve the idea of a relation in the expression ἐγὼ
ἀλήθεια [“I am truth”], by saying that in God His actual essence and the notion
of Him coincide with each other. For first, on the one hand, we should thereby
separate between the notion of God and His essence, which is impossible; for the
idea of Him exists only in virtue of His nature, and we should by such a course
only reach the empty conclusion that God is such as He is. Secondly, on the
other hand, Christ speaks this word concerning Himself, and that in relation to
men; but the statement that in Him idea and reality coincide does not permit, so
far as we can see, an unforced application to His relation to men. We are driven
therefore to conclude that ἀλήθεια [“truth”] must be accepted as expressing a
purely absolute and objective truth. It means the being which is absolutely
filled with reality, and is substantially real; all generally that is, is in God
pre-eminently; and what is not in God has generally no reality, no real being.
And this definition of the idea is vindicated in its right when we observe the
antithesis,—that is, the ψεῦδος [“lie”]. The κόσμος [“world”] is subjected to
the father of the lie, and all its members are therefore liars; this signifies,
however, that they have no true, substantial, real being, that their being has
no positive substance. The κόσμος [“world”] belongs to death, but God is life;
as it is essential to the world to be without real being, to be nothing, so to
God it is essential to have a being that is absolutely filled and satisfied.
Thus, truth and life are correlative and interchangeable ideas: the former is
the substance of the latter; no life would be possible without a being filling
it, without a substantial reality. God is accordingly the truth. His kingdom is
a kingdom of truth, because here is the seat of all substantial being, the only
place where realities are to be found. The Lord came τῇ ἀληθείᾳμαρτυρεῖν
[“testify to the truth”], that is, to bring demonstration in His own Person that
there is a true being, the counterpart and antithesis of death; and to show in
what this ἀλήθεια [“truth”] consists, and how it is to be manifested.

It is obvious, finally, that this notion of ἀλήθεια [“truth”] harmonizes well
even with the common application of the word in human affairs; all untruth is
mere appearance, being which has only the form of being, to which the
substantial contents are lacking; but truth is the presence of a reality. This
being, as perfectly and substantially full, God has absolutely and primarily: He
is therefore truth. But man must first establish the reality of this truth in
himself by his works. We do not, however, read τὰ ἀληθῆοὐποιεῖ [“not practicing
what is true”]: for our passage does not mean to intimate that the man in
question fails to exhibit in action the individual realities which lie in the
collective being of God; but we read οὐποιεῖτὴνἀλήθειαν [“not practicing the
truth”]: his action has in it altogether nothing of the divine fulness of truth,
of real and substantial being; it is directed only to semblance and death. Not
only the individual outbeamings of truth, τὰ ἀληθῆ [“the true things”], but
truth itself, conceived as one whole, is absent from his deeds.

Consequently, the meaning of the whole verse is this: If any man makes an avowal
of fellowship with God, and yet the darkness, or the κόσμος [“world”], is the
object to which his life and action tend (περιπατεῖ [“walk”]), he thereby speaks
untruth, and shows that his deeds are not directed to the truth and its
realization in himself. The περιπατεῖνἐντῷφωτὶ [“walk in the light”] suggests
the existing sphere into which the man has entered; but in the expression
τὴνἀλήθειανποιεῖν [“doing the truth”] we have the element of personal activity;
for the entering into that sphere does not come to pass without the act of man,
without the direction to it of his own will.


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  CHAPTER 7: 07 - 1JN 1:7
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1Jn 1:7

Ἐὰν δὲ ἐν τῷ φωτὶ περιπατῶμεν, ὡς αὐτός ἐστιν ἐν τῷ φωτὶ, κοινωνίαν ἔχομεν μετ᾽
ἀλλήλων, καὶ τὸ αἷμα Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ καθαρίζει ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ πάσης
ἁμαρτίας. The opposite case to that just assumed is introduced by a δὲtn
[“but”]: that is, the accordance between the word and the deed. But, instead of
simply declaring this accordance, there is connected with it an emphatic
expression of its happy results, and in such a way that a twofold progression of
the thought is introduced. One advance is marked by the words κοινωνίανἔχομεν
μετ’ἀλλήλων [“we have fellowship with one another”]; this reading is undoubtedly
to be preferred to that of μετ’αὐτοῦ [“with him”]. It is true that the exact
antithesis to the previous verse would be ἐὰνἐν
τῷφωτὶπεριπατῶμεν,κοινωνίανἔχομενμετ᾽αὐτοῦ [“if we walk in the light, we have
fellowship with him”]; it is, however, altogether Johannaean not to repeat
precisely the same thought, but to define it more closely at the same time, or
to supplement it. In 1Jn 1:3 fellowship with God is brought into view only as
the foundation, as the essential substance, of brotherly fellowship. So here,
also, the superstructure is brought into view, the consequence of that
principle, that he who is in the light is connected by a bond with the
τέκνατοῦφωτός [“children of light”]. The bond, however, is at this point no
other than the likeness of the mutual life element: not yet brotherly love, or
the reference of any action to the brethren, but the foundation of every such
personal relation, the similarity and community of the same element in which we
all alike, and in which we all alike have an interest. But that the apostle
dwells first on this side of the matter, and only afterwards passes on to the
καθαρίζεσθαιἀπὸπάσηςἁμαρτίας [“to be cleansed from all sin”], has its reason in
this, that in the present connection he can treat of the former only ὡςἐν παρόδῳ
[“as in passing”], in order then to go onward more specifically to another fruit
of the περιπατεῖνἐνφωτί [“walk in the light”]. This second fruit, the second new
element that enters here, is embraced in the words καὶτὸαἷμαἸησοῦ [“and the
blood of Jesus”] (the Χριστοῦ [“Christ”] must be struck out)
τοῦυἱοῦαὐτοῦκαθαρίζειἡμᾶςἀπὸπάσηςἁμαρτίας [“his son cleanses us from all sin”].
It is obvious that the life in the light—in other words, the internal direction
of the whole man towards the kingdom of God—cannot but have its results as to
the inner man. For, the kingdom of God is by no means an abstract notion, it is
something altogether real; and thus the life that is in him is not a life merely
in the sphere of dead thoughts, it is a life moved by the powers of the world to
come. That this light is poured abundantly into the man has the positive effect
of making him a τέκνατοῦφωτός [“children of light”]: negatively expressed, that
of abolishing in him the ruling power of sin.

Now this connection of thought itself shows that καθαρίζειν [“cleanse”] must not
be understood of the forgiveness of sins past, but of sanctification. To the
same meaning we are led by the words themselves; the cleansing from actual
committed sins through forgiveness would have been expressed by
καθαρίζεινἀπὸπασῶν τῶνἁμαρτιῶνἡμῶν [“cleanse from all our sins”], or something
of the same kind. But πᾶσαἁμαρτία, every sin, is much too comprehensive a word
for the sins of the past; it signifies not “all our sins,” but “all that is
called sin.” Up to this point the expression has been altogether rooted in the
context, but the addition τὸαἷμαἸησοῦ,κ.τ.λ. [“the blood of Jesus, etc.”] seems
to introduce something quite new,—something of which the context has given no
indication. We have here two questions to discuss: first, how far sanctification
is ascribed to the blood of Jesus; secondly, whether this participation in the
benefit of the blood of Christ is not already included in the περιπατεῖνἐνφωτί
[“walk in the light”]. As to the former point, it is undoubtedly biblical
doctrine that Christ in His death has borne the penalty of our sin, and
therefore released us from its punishment. But the power of the blood of Christ
is not limited to this. The fundamental passage as to the question is St. John’s
sixth chapter in the Gospel [Joh 6:53-58]. There the drinking of the blood of
Christ is presented as the means for procuring eternal life. As the shedding of
that blood brought about the death of redemption, so also it rendered it
possible that the blood should be an open fountain which might overflow upon
others: the death of the corn of wheat illustrates its effect, that of His life
passing over as a power to others. Blood and life are in the Scripture
equivalent terms: where that is, there is this; for the life is in the blood,
according to the language of the Old Testament. Thus, then, the
καθαρισμὸςἀπὸπάσηςἁμαρτίας [“cleansing from all sins”] is possible only in
consequence of the blood of Christ entering into our life as a new principle of
life. There is absolutely no Christian sanctification imaginable which does not
take place through the blood,—that is, through the Redeemer’s power of life
working its effects and ruling within us. As to the second point, it is supposed
that this blood has its effect only in those who walk in the light. The light is
the circle within which the divine life reigns; on earth, therefore, it is the
kingdom of God, the church, whose Head is Christ. But as that church has been
founded only through the death of the Redeemer, and as the life of the church
has its basis and principle only in His blood, he who ἐν φωτὶπεριπατεῖ [“walks
in the light”] by the very supposition comes into immediate contact with the
influence of that blood; and if the φῶς [“light”] has its effect upon him, that
is only in connection with the constant carrying on of the work of Christ’s
blood upon him,—that is, in its cleansing from sin, from the corruption still
clinging to the soul. Now, as the expression αἷμαἸησοῦ [“blood of Jesus”],
according to this exposition, lies indicated in the previous expression, so has
the supplemental clause τοῦυἱοῦαὐτοῦ [“his son”]its relation also to that
previous expression. As well in the third as in the sixth verse the discourse
had been of fellowship with God; accordingly, it is here said that he who comes
into contact with the blood of Christ, by that very means has fellowship with
God. For the man Jesus, whose blood that is, is at the same time the Son of God.

Textual note tnNestle-Aland 28th edition omits δὲ in 1Jn 1:7, even though the
manuscript evidence seems to strongly support it. All previous editions of
NA1-27 retain δὲ. The reason for omitting δὲ from the text of Nestle-Aland 28th
edition is unclear (and seems unjustified).

δὲ is supported by א, A, B, C, K, L, P, 5, 18, 33, 69c, 81, 218, 307, 398, 424*,
436, 442, 453, 614, 621, 623, 630, 642, 720, 808, 1067, 1409, 1448, 1505, 1523,
1524, 1611, 1735, 1844, 1852, 2138, 2298, 2344, 2492, 2541, 2805, Vulgate,
Syriacph Copticsa Clement, Ps-Oecumenius. || δὲ does not appear in Ψ, 6, 322,
323, 424c, 945, 1241, 1243, 1739, 1881, ith,l,r,w,z* Copticbo mss Cyril, and
Jerome.


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  CHAPTER 8: 08 - 1JN 1:8
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1Jn 1:8

Ἐὰν εἴπωμεν ὅτι ἁμαρτίαν οὐκ ἔχομεν, ἑαυτοὺς πλανῶμεν καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν
ἡμῖν.

After the author has, in the two previous verses, illustrated the first
deduction from the Θεὸςφῶς [“God is light”], and exhibited its special blessing,
he goes on in this verse to exhibit the second result with its blessing also.
This second consequence, the acknowledgment of our sinfulness, has in itself a
close connection with what precedes; for we saw that it is involved in the very
fact of walking in the light. But the connection is made still closer by the
words καθαρίζεσθαιἀπὸπάσηςἁμαρτίας [“to be cleansed from all sin”] at the end of
the foregoing verse. If the cleansing from sin is an essential element of our
walking in light, so the denial of its necessity is a token of εἶναιἐνσκότει
[“being in darkness”]. This inference is also unfolded, like the other, in two
antithetical clauses, so that 1Jn 1:8 corresponds with 1Jn 1:6, and 1Jn 1:9 with
1Jn 1:7.

First, then, for the false position, the denial of sin. The expression
ἁμαρτίανἔχειν [“to have sin”] requires consideration. It is specifically
Johannaean; comp. Joh 9:41;[N]John 15:22, John 15:24, John 19:11. Obviously it
says something different from, and indeed something less than, ἐνἁμαρτίᾳεἶναι
[“being in sin”]. It is indeed impossible that he who abides ἐνφωτί [“in
light”], in the sphere of light, should at the same time continue ἐνσκοτίᾳ [“in
darkness”], in the precisely opposite sphere; but there may nevertheless be sin
yet in him. Accordingly St. Paul also uses the peculiar form ἐνἁμαρτίᾳεἶναι
[“being in sin”] only in the passage 1Co 15:17, where he is denying absolutely
any connection with God. He who denies that he has sin, would by that very fact
πλανάν [“deceive”] himself. The word occurs in no other document of the New
Testament so often as in the Apocalypse. But in all the passages it is employed
with a very definitely stamped meaning; never for mere error with express
limitation as such, but always for fundamental departure from the truth. It
occurs concerning the artifices of Satan, of the Antichrist, of the beast, and
once of the false teachers in Thyatira, Rev 2:20, whose work, however, is
expressly marked by its signs as fundamental deception. In precisely the same
significance is the word used in the only other passage of our Epistle where it
occurs, 1Jn 2:26,—that is, of the Antichrist. Finally, we find it twice in the
Gospel said concerning the Lord, Joh 7:48, but in the mouth of those who in John
8:1-159 reproached Him with being of the devil, and therefore with the most
pregnant meaning used it. Accordingly we must in our passage, too, assume that
it is employed in the same sense: “If we say that we have no sin, we enter upon
an altogether false course, a godless way of life;” not as if it were only that
“we fall into an error.” The application of the word thus found is confirmed by
what follows; St. John’s πλανάν [“deceive”] is illustrated by ἡ
ἀλήθειαοὐκἔστινἐνἡμῖν [“the truth is not in us”]. As already remarked upon 1Jn
1:6, it is not the apostle’s meaning that in the present matter we have no
truth, but ἡ ἀλήθεια [“the truth”] is the truth in the absolute sense. In such a
case our whole life and being is fallen into the πλανάν [“deceive”], the empty
appearance; we are lacking in any real substantial life. For, where there is
even only a trace of life, and of the divine fulness, this must immediately
manifest sin to be sin. Hence, where there is no consciousness of sin, there can
be not even the beginning of the only true life and its rich substantial
meaning.


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  CHAPTER 9: 09 - JN 1:9
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Joh 1:9

Ἐὰν ὁμολογῶμεν τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν, πιστός ἐστιν καὶ δίκαιος, ἵνα ἀφῇ ἡμῖν τὰς
ἁμαρτίας καὶ καθαρίσῃ ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ πάσης ἀδικίας. In the same manner as 1Jn 1:7
forms an antithesis to 1Jn 1:6, 1Jn 1:9 does to 1Jn 1:8; but here, however, also
we have no mere logical contrast, but at the same time the introduction of a new
element which exhibits, like 1Jn 1:7, the blessing of the right condition of the
heart, of the περιπατεῖνἐντῷφωτί [“walk in the light”]. It is true that the
antithesis to 1Jn 1:8 is not introduced, like 1Jn 1:7, by a δὲtn [“but”]. On the
one hand, that antithesis appears of itself sufficiently marked by its matter,
and St. John does not prefer the accumulation of particles; on the other hand,
the intention is that in this manner the thought introduced should be brought
forward in its own absolute significance, being presented by an asyndeton, and
therefore to be considered not alone in its relation to what precedes. As, in
the seventh verse, the mere assertion of a fellowship with God has not only
placed against it in antithesis the actual fact of fellowship, as stated in
εἶναιἐντῷφωτί [“being in the light”], but also this fact is, as it were,
strengthened by the περιπατεῖν [“walk”], and placed in its full intensity and
active force; so in our verse the εἴπεῖνὅτιἁμαρτίαν οὐκἔχομεν [“to say we do not
have sin”] is not only paralleled by a mere εἴπεῖνὅτιἁμαρτίανἔχομεν [“to say we
have sin”], but the whole energy of the consciousness of sin opens itself out in
the ὁμολογεῖν [“to confess”]. As to the emphatic significance of this word, we
may compare Joh 1:20, καὶὡμολόγησενκαὶοὐκἠρνήσατο,καὶὡμολόγησεν, [“he confessed
and did not deny, but he confessed”], where the element of earnest emphasizing
and prominence which lies in the of ὁμολογεῖν [“confess”] is made still more
prominent through the negative expression οὐκἀρνεῖσθαι [“did not deny”]. It is
not unimportant that, instead of the singular in 1Jn 1:8, οὐκἔχομενἁμαρτίαν [“we
do not sin”], here the articulated plural comes in: the recognition and
confession has not reference to sinfulness in general, but to the individual
sinful actions of which I am conscious to myself. Against sin I cannot contend,
and the consciousness of sinfulness in general will not conduce to an effectual
repentance; I control sin only by fixing my eye keenly upon its particular
outbursts and war against individual transgressions. This kind of acknowledgment
of sins cannot fail of its benefit; as a response to it, God, for the sake of
His justice and righteousness, forgives them all. But what, then, is that? In
the majority of passages—of the New Testament especially—where the faithfulness
of God is spoken of. His fidelity to His promise is meant: that He performs what
He has promised. At the first glance this seems unsuitable here; for where in
the whole context has there been any reference to promise? The idea of promise
must needs in that case be enlarged. Not alone by words, but also through deeds,
a promise may be given, and it is of such practical promises that it is said
πιστὸςὁΘεός [“God is faithful”]; comp. 1Th 5:24,[N]πιστὸςὁκαλῶνὃς καὶποιήσει
[“The one who calls you is faithful and he will do it”], and, so far as the
thing goes, though the word is not used, Php 1:6,[N]πέποιθαὅτιὁ
ἐναρξάμενοςἐνὑμῖνἔργονἀγαθὸνἐπιτελέσει [“that he who began a good work in you
will perfect it”]. This particular application of the πιστίς [“faithful”] would
be more appropriate here; the ἐνφωτὶπεριπατεῖν [“walk in light”], which is
manifested in the ὁμολογεῖν τὰςἁμαρτίας [“to confess of sin”], is such a real
beginning of the divine energy of which the final and good result must be, in
the faithfulness of God, the effectual cleansing from all sin. But even this
explanation has its difficulty. It is true, indeed, that the περιπατεῖνἐντῷφωτί
[“walk in the light”] and ὁμολογεῖν τὰςἁμαρτίας [“to confess of sin”] take place
as the result of the divine action on the soul; but this view of the matter is
not made prominent in our passage, and both are brought into consideration as
human acts. Moreover, we are wont to speak of fidelity in yet another sense. One
is true to himself when he does that which he must do according to the
constitution of his whole nature. Now, here God’s nature is described as φῶς
[“light”] only; and therefore the fidelity of God refers to His ever manifesting
Himself truly as the light. Man, in the apostle’s supposition, has already
entered into connection with God, inasmuch as he has passed into the kingdom of
light; and it belongs to the very nature of God—that is, it comports with His
fidelity—that He should appear Himself as light in him who has come near to Him,
and that by destroying and taking away his sin.

Again, He shows Himself, in the forgiveness of sins, δίκαιος [“righteous”],
righteous. This idea occurs in St. John with the same two meanings which we
attach to our word “right;” one, that is, signifying the rectitude of the judge
who judges according to the evidence, the other signifying the rectitude of the
judged who answers to the standard applied to him, who therefore in this case is
holy and sinless. The former is the meaning in almost all the passages of the
Apocalypse, not only Rev 16:5, Rev 16:7; Rev 19:2, but also Rev 15:3, where the
connection leads directly to the same signification; with which compare also Joh
5:30; John 7:24, both confirming this. In the second meaning, that of holiness,
it occurs in 1Jn 2:29; 1Jn 3:12 of our Epistle, as also in Rev 22:11 and Joh
17:25, where the sense is not that the Father must, in His judicial capacity,
hear the Son’s request,—for in that case the address to the Father must belong
to the preceding verse,—but that He as the Holy One, withdrawn from all sin,
cannot be effectually known by the world, save only by the Son. These two
interpretations, however, do not lie wide apart; because God is in possession of
immanent, objective righteousness, therefore He can exercise the transitive and
subjective righteousness of the judge; this latter is only the outgoing of the
former. This reconciliation or synthesis of the two meanings must be maintained
if we would understand the δίκαιος [“just”] of our passage. On the one hand,
that is, the transitive righteousness of God is exhibited in its true character
when sin is forgiven, this being certainly an act of the judge: He could forgive
no sin if His righteousness, and not His grace only, did not require it. But, on
the other hand, the immanent righteousness comes also to its rights; God as the
light cannot be otherwise than such towards those who stand in a true relation
to the light; He cannot regard them as ἐνσκοτίᾳπεριπατοῦντες [“those walking in
darkness”]. In other words, he who knows and acknowledges his sin has in fact
separated himself inwardly from it: hence the transitive or subjective
righteousness of God requires, that is, His judicial function demands, that He
should in fact, by His pronounced sentence, acknowledge this internal
separation. Further, as He is in Himself in an immanent sense righteous, God
approves Himself holy towards the sinner, inasmuch as He, by virtue of His own
holiness, effectually takes away the sin that is still present in him, imparting
instead a portion of His own perfection. With all this correspond the two
following predicatives, the ἀφεῖναιτὰςἁμαρτίας [“forgiveness of sin”] and the
καθαρίζεινἀπὸπάσηςἁμαρτίας [“cleansing from all sin”]: the former refers to the
actus forensis [“legal action”], the latter to the renewal of the nature in
virtue of the δικαιοσύνη [“righteousness”] indwelling in him.

Thus the meaning of the supplementary clause is this: by πιστός [“faithful”] it
is said primarily and generally that God, in the forgiveness of sins, approves
Himself faithful to His own nature, which is light; then by δίκαιος [“just”] it
is more specifically said under what aspect this fidelity shows itself. But in
the previous discussion we have evidently laid ourselves open to the charge of
inexactness, inasmuch as we have treated the passage as if it had been
δίκαιοςἐστιτὰςἁμαρτίας καὶκαθαρίζω, κ.τ.λ. [“he is righteous and just to
cleanse, etc.”]. But the apostle’s phrase, instead of that, moves in a telic
clause, or “in order that.” It has been attempted to rob the sentence of its
strange peculiarity by interpreting the ἵνα [“in order that”] as ecbatic, as if
it were ὥστε [“so that”]. It is undoubtedly true that with the decline of a
language there is frequently a marked enfeebling of its conjunctions; and as to
ἵνα [“in order that”] in particular, looked at philologically, a multitude of
examples have been adduced from later Greek, especially from Plutarch. But, in
the first place, these examples from classical Greek require a very careful
sifting, for there are not a few among them which show that by the exhibition of
the consequence as if it were a design, a certain effect is attained and a
precision intentionally introduced into the thought (as, for example, in
Plutarch, Moral, p. 333a); and, secondly, there is need of doubly careful
sifting in the Scripture, where from the very beginning much is viewed as design
which to our apprehension is primarily only consequence or result. We have only
to think of the hardening of Pharaoh, which is referred to as the purpose of
God; and yet more appropriately, Mat 13:15. The thought is, as in all such
cases, only weakened if we do not hold fast the reference to design or purpose.
Assuredly the righteousness and fidelity is grounded in His inmost nature, and
both attributes belong to Him apart from every possible demonstration of them in
act, and every purpose outside of Himself to which they refer. But as all that
He has, and not only; so, but also all that He is. He gives to the Son, so that
He places all, so to speak, at His Son’s service, so all is, absolutely and
entirely devoted to the service of man. The whole fulness of His unfathomable
essence is turned to nothing else but the salvation of His creatures, so that it
is to Him only the means, yea, His very self is only the means, to effect His
creatures’ happiness and good. As a friend has lived for his friend when his
whole life has had his friend’s wellbeing for its aim, so God makes the whole
πλήρωμααὐτοῦ [“his fullness”] into the means for bringing us to our salvation.
It is a deduction from the sentence Θεὸςἀγάπῃ [“God is love”]that He refers His
whole nature only to others, whether to His own Son or to the creature. His
fidelity, His righteousness, and in like manner all His other perfections, are
for Him existent, only to be applied to His creatures’ benefit, to our
salvation. Here is the impressive thought which lies in the ἵνα [“in order
that”]. In this one particle lies the most comprehensive and the highest witness
of the power of His love that it is possible to conceive. For the rest, whether
we are to read at the close of the verse καθαρίσῃ[V-AAS-3S]tn [“he may cleanse”]
or καθαρίζει [V-PAI-3S] [“he cleanses”], is irrelevant to the sense; even in the
latter case the καθαρίζει [“cleanse”] must be in fact parallel with ἀφῇ
[“forgiveness”], and the form is only after the Hebrew manner released from
strict grammatical symmetry. footnote Plutarch, Moralia, 333a

καὶ ἀποδράσεις τῶνἐπιτιθεμένων; καὶταυτίγεκἀκεῖνοι λέγοντεςἀποκναίουσιν,ἐν ταῖς
εἰσαγωγαῖςἑκάστοτε τὴν “πρόθεσιν”ὁριζόμενοι “σημείωσινἐπιτελειώσεως,”
τὴνδ᾿“ἐπιβολὴν” “ὁρμὴν πρὸ ὁρμῆς,” “παρασκευὴν”δὲ“πρᾶξιν πρὸπράξεως,”
“μνήμην”δὲ“κατάληψινἀξιώματος παρεληλυθότος, οὗτὸπαρὸνἐξ αἰσθήσεως κατελήφθη.”
And yet those very authors rasp our ears by repeatedly defining in
theirIntroductions“purpose” as “an indication of intent to complete,”
“design”as"an impulse before an impulse," “preparation”as“an act before an
act,”and“memory”as“an apprehension of a proposition in the past tense of which
the present tense has been apprehended by perception.” tnNestle-Aland 28th
edition omits δὲ in 1Jn 1:7, even though the manuscript evidence seems to
strongly support it. All previous editions of NA1-27 retain δὲ. The reason for
omitting δὲ from the text of Nestle-Aland 28th edition is unclear (and seems
unjustified).

δὲ is supported by א, A, B, C, K, L, P, 5, 18, 33, 69c, 81, 218, 307, 398, 424*,
436, 442, 453, 614, 621, 623, 630, 642, 720, 808, 1067, 1409, 1448, 1505, 1523,
1524, 1611, 1735, 1844, 1852, 2138, 2298, 2344, 2492, 2541, 2805, Vulgate,
Syriacph Copticsa Clement, Ps-Oecumenius. || δὲ does not appear in Ψ, 6, 322,
323, 424c, 945, 1241, 1243, 1739, 1881, ith,l,r,w,z* Copticbo mss Cyril, and
Jerome.

tnThe print edition reads καθαρίζῃ[V-PAS-2S] [“you may cleanse”]. However, this
seems to be a typo, since there is no known manuscript with this form of the
word at 1Jn 1:9.


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  CHAPTER 10: 10 - 1JN 1:10
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1Jn 1:10

Ἐὰν εἴπωμεν ὅτι οὐχ ἡμαρτήκαμεν, ψεύστην ποιοῦμεν αὐτὸν, καὶ ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ οὐκ
ἔστιν ἐν ἡμῖν. With 1Jn 1:9 the author has developed his thought in a logically
clear and precise manner. The two deductions which he has drawn from the Θεὸςφῶς
[“God is light”] in relation to the Christian life have been plainly exhibited,
each in an antithetical form. Returning now once more to the idea already
touched in 1Jn 1:8, that self-justification excludes from the kingdom of God, it
is evident that he has no logical interest in doing so, but is moved by purely
practical reasons, and aims only at edification. In fact, as the whole letter is
directed to Christians as such, members of the kingdom of God, it was important
for the apostle to lay the utmost stress upon what was the fundamental condition
of this, the acknowledgment of sin. Hence the resumption of the subject now
before us. Not, indeed, that this resumption is at all tautological; the idea is
so ordered that, in harmony with the very solemn purpose of the verse, its
characteristics are more keen and more penetrating than in 1Jn 1:8. We would
not, indeed, lay stress on the ἁμαρτάνειν [“to sin”] being used instead of the
ἔχεινἁμαρτίαν [“having sin”] above. The former refers rather to individual
sinful acts, and the latter to sinfulness in general; and that the former is
here selected has its reason probably in the τὰςἁμαρτίαςὁμολογεῖν [“confess
sin”] of 1Jn 1:9, which also referred, of course, to individual sinful acts. But
as to matter of fact, this can hardly be of much significance here. The pith of
the verse obviously lies rather in the words ψεύστηνποιοῦμεναὐτόν [“confess
sin”]. Till now, the verbs ψεύδεσθαι [“make him a liar”] and πλανάν [“deceive”]
had been used only to make prominent the sin which we ourselves in our own
person bring upon ourselves by a false condition of our hearts. Here the
emphasis is laid upon a much heavier sin into which we fall: we make God Himself
a sinner. So blasphemous is the denial of our sinfulness that we thereby degrade
God, who is the φῶς [“light”] and ἀλήθεια [“truth”], into the domain of darkness
and the lie. And here we have not to think only of the fact that God expressly
declares in the utterances of the Old and New Testament Scriptures the
sinfulness of man, and therefore that we make the Scripture, the word of God
which οὐδύναταιλυθῆναι [“cannot be broken” cf. Joh 10:35; Psa 82:6], lie to us.
All the spiritual institutions of the divine economy, the ἀφιέναιτὰςἁμαρτίας,
[“forgiveness of sin”] the καθαρίζεινἀπὸ ἁμαρτίας [“cleansing from sin”], His
entire government and work upon earth, yea, the whole manifestation of the Son
of God, which was based upon the presupposition of human, sin, is reduced to one
comprehensive lie. And thereby all possible fellowship with Him is broken off:
ὁλόγοςαὐτοῦοὐκἔστινἐνἡμῖν [“his word is not in us”]. That the λόγοςΘεοῦ [“word
of God”] here does not mean the personal Logos, the Son of God, is plain enough
if we consider that in the preceding context nothing had been said of any
indwelling of the Son in us. Nor must we regard the sayings of the Old Testament
as intended by the words; for not only is there nothing here to suggest such an
allusion, but it is a fact that the apostle in this Epistle generally refers
very little to the Old Testament, so that the Epistle in this respect is in a
certain contrast with the Gospel and the Apocalypse, which are pervaded with
formal allusions to the ancient Scriptures. But then, again, we are not to think
of specific sayings of Christ, as if λόγοςαὐτοῦ [“his word”] were simply
equivalent to ῥήματααὐτοῦοὐκἔστινἐνἡμῖν: [“hissayingsare not in us”] that would
mean only that we observe not His commandments, or that they do not dwell in us.
The λόγος [“word”] means to say more than the mere ῥήματα [“sayings”] would say.
We must be guided by such passages as Joh 8:31: ἐάνὑμεῖςμείνητεἐντῷλόγῳτῷ ἐμῷ,
ἀληθῶςμαθηταίμουἐστὲ; [“If you continue in my word, you are truly my
disciples”]; or Joh 5:38: τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦοὐκἔχετε μένονταἐναὐτῷ; [“you do not
have His word abiding in you”]; or, so far as the analogy of the matter goes
without the word, Joh 6:63: τὰ ῥήματαἃ ἐγὼλαλῶ ὑμῖνπνεῦμάκαὶζωή [“thesayingsthat
I speak to you are spirit and life”]. As in all these places, so here also,
ὁλόγοςαὐτοῦ [“his word”] is the aggregate collective internal unity of the
entire divine announcement; not, indeed, as to the external words, but these
words as they are spirit and life, as a power laying fast hold upon men. The
words of God, as they have been revealed in the incarnate Logos, are the divine
ἀλήθεια [“truth”] comprehended in a definite form. Thus what was said above, καὶ
ἡ ἀλήθειαοὐκἔστινἐνἡμῖν [“and the truth is not in you”], corresponds to our
expression, ὁλόγοςαὐτοῦοὐκἔστινἐνἡμῖν [“his word is not in you”]; only that this
latter specifies, instead of the purely objective idea of the truth, the means
whereby that absolute truth is implanted in our nature.


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  CHAPTER 11: 11 - 1JN 2:1
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1Jn 2:1

Τεκνία μου, ταῦτα γράφω ὑμῖν, ἵνα μὴ ἁμάρτητε· καὶ ἐάν τις ἁμάρτῃ, παράκλητον
ἔχομεν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα, Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν δίκαιον· The first two verses of this new
chapter are strictly connected with the preceding. The ταῦτα [“these”] at the
outset shows that. On a first glance, the μὴἁμάρτητε [“you may not sin”], our
not sinning at all, would not seem to be directly prepared for by anything in
the previous chapter. It is true that the second clause of our verse,
ἐάντιςἁμάρτῃ,παράκλητονἔχομεν [“if anyone sins, we have an Advocate”], is
founded on what the other chapter says as to man, and even the Christian man,
being still sinful; but that is not the case with the first clause,
ἵναμὴἁμάρτητε [“in order that that youmay not sin”]. And yet it appears as if
precisely that second clause is introduced as a new thought; for it does not
stand in connection with what precedes by ἵνα [“in order that”], as a resumption
of it with ταῦτα [“these”]. On the other hand, the first clause is actually
placed by ἵνα [“in order that”] in telic connection with what precedes, which,
however, does not appear to afford any reason for such connection. When we look
more closely into the matter it takes a different turn. The first statement on
which the apostle laid emphasis was this, that we must walk in light, and that
its consequence would be the blessing that, so walking, the Lord would cleanse
us from all unrighteousness. Thus the cleansing from sin—and that we have seen
to comprehend not only the atoning, but specifically the delivering power of
Christ, the abolition of sin in us—constitutes the consequence of the τῷ φωτὶ
περιπατεῖν [“walk in the light”]: it is therefore also at the same time the end
for the sake of which St. John exhorts to a walk in light. Thus, in fact, he has
a right to lay it down as the goal of his statements in 1Jn 1:6-7 that we should
not sin, that sin should cease to be a power within us. Thus the ταῦτα [“these”]
is primarily a resumption of these verses. But, further, he has taught in 1Jn
1:8-10 that sin still remains even in the Christian; that the purifying energy
of Jesus Christ is not consummated at one stroke; that fellowship with the
kingdom of light does not immediately make a man himself light. Thus what the
apostle, in the words ταῦταγράφωἵναμὴἁμάρτητε [“these things I write in order
that you may not sin”], surveys in a single glance, is really the result of
continuous effort, a process filling the whole life of the man. It is to this
second aspect of the matter, as made prominent in the former chapter, that the
second half of our 1Jn 2:1 refers. Moreover, the paracletic work of Christ, the
ἱλασμός[“atoneing sacrifice”], which is wrapped up in it, also refers back to
the former chapter,—that is, to the mention of the αἷμα Ἰησοῦ in 1Jn 1:7. Hence
we are justified, so far as the matter of the words goes, to include 1Jn 2:1-2
under the ἵνα [“in order that”], and accordingly to sum up under the ταῦτα
[“these”] the whole substance of 1Jn 1:5-10. The fact that ἵνα [“in order that”]
does not formally stretch to the second clause of the first verse, is to be
accounted for by the particular form the apostle has given to his thought. It
was indeed impossible to write ταῦταγράφωἵναπαράκλητονἔχομεν [“these things I
write in order thatwe have an Advocate”], for the παράκλητονἔχειν [“Advocate we
have”] is not the end of the Epistle, as that goes on independently of anything
the apostle or man may do: his aim in writing is only that we mayknowthat we
have a Paraclete. He might therefore have written
ταῦταγράφομενἵναεἰδῆτεὅτιπαράκλητονἔχομεν [“these things we write soyou may know
that we have an Advocate”]. But the Gospel has given us abundant evidence how
constantly the apostle thinks in the Hebrew style, by co-ordinating thoughts,
and not in the Greek style, by subordinating them one to another. Thus, as in
1Jn 1:9 —the reading καθαρίζει [“to cleanse”] being otherwise established—the
close of the verse is formally sundered from the preceding telic clause and
becomes an independent sentence, precisely so it is here. And here with all the
more propriety, because the thought expressed in 1Jn 1:6 finds a more full
elucidation in 1Jn 2:2, and thus assumes or lays claim to a certain
independence. Thus, if we have discerned the reference of the ταῦτα [“these”] to
all that precedes, and therewith, at the same time, the connection of the
following verses, we shall not be in any doubt as to their actual significance,
as to the reason why they are added. In the previous chapter the apostle had
spoken objectively, he had announced simple facts; but the last verse came in
with a hortatory meaning, and for practical reasons. These two verses of the new
chapter now give ex professo the subjective application of what had been said,
the practical aim which those objective declarations should subserve.
Accordingly there follows here, and that for the first time, the direct address
to the readers; and the diminutive form of this address, τεκνία
[“littlechildren”], shows how full the apostle’s heart is, and with what ardour
he pours out this exhortation.

Looking now more closely into the thoughts of the verse before us, we are
immediately struck by the collocation of its two leading ideas. That is to say,
while the apostle first exhibits their ceasing from sin as the essential aim of
his words, he yet seems to take away from his exhortation its very nerve by
straightway supposing it not to be followed. Notwithstanding this, we must be on
our guard against explaining it, as it were, thus: “but if ye, despite of this,
should fall into sin,” for the words italicized are not there. It would be
equally a mistake to understand in the first ἁμαρτάνειν [“to sin”] a περιπατεῖν
[“to walk”] or a μένεινἐντῇἁμαρτίᾳ [“remain insin”], and to make the meaning of
the second mere sins of infirmity. What shadow of justification would there be
for that, when the expressions are identical, the same words being used also in
the same sentence? In both cases the same kind of ἁμαρτίᾳ [“sin”] must be
intended. It is better to say that the apostle specifies two different ways of
being delivered from sin: one, that of doing no sin at all, in the phrase
ἵναμὴἁμάρτητε [“in order that that youmay not sin”]; and then the other, that
any such sins as might nevertheless remain may be done away by forgiveness. The
circumstance that these are conjoined as they are, so that the former comes
first and the latter last, may be explained by this, that if the forgiveness had
been placed first, the result might have been a rash and unthinking reliance
upon the grace that freely pardons. That the two kinds were placed together at
all was demanded by what preceded. The first thought had been this, that the
Christian enjoys sanctifying fellowship with the light: whence followed the
exhortation. Let sin cease entirely in your case. The second thought was, that
the Christian still sins: whence followed the encouragement. Let the sins you
have done obtain their forgiveness. Thus the ἁμαρτάνειν [“tosin”] refers in both
cases to the sins of believers, and therefore, if you will, to sins of
infirmity. Most supremely must we be on our guard against them, for they easily
lead to the περιπατεῖν ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ [“walk in darkness”]. But the consciousness
of this danger might very well lead to despair, and therefore the reminder that
we have in the Lord Jesus a Representative and Propitiation, who as such secures
the forgiveness of sins; of the two exhortations which result from the
preceding,—not to sin, and to secure forgiveness for any sin that may arise,—it
is only the former that the apostle urges in the form of exhortation; the latter
he changes into the more needful tone of encouragement. And this gives us a new
reason, the most real one, why the apostle, instead of going on with the ἵνα
[“in order that”], so expressly shapes the second part into an independent
sentence.

The consolation which he would impart consists in this, that Christ is our
παράκλητοςπρὸςτὸνπατέρα [“Advocate with the Father”]. Of the two meanings which
have been assigned to the word παράκλητος [“Advocate”], Comforter and
Advocate,—the former in the sense of παρακαλῶν [“to encourage”], the latter in
that of παρακληθείς [“to exhort”],—most decidedly the second is the only one
admissible here; it alone answers to the passive form of the word, and the
explicit use of the term in classical Greek. Now as, apart from these reasons,
it is inappropriate to assume that in the same author, in the same general
period of his writing, and especially in the case of an idea so very important,
the same word has two distinct meanings, our passage must be regarded as
shedding some light upon the passages in the Gospel where the word occurs. It is
true that there it is the Holy Ghost that is spoken of, while here it is the
Son; but apart from the fact that in Joh 14:16 the Holy Ghost is mentioned as
ἂλλοςπαράκλητος [“another Advocat”] which indirectly at least calls the Lord a
παράκλητος [“Advocate”] also, the difference is only an apparent one; for the
Holy Ghost is in the New Testament the Spirit of Jesus Christ.


========================================================================
  CHAPTER 12: 12 - 1JN 2:2
========================================================================

1Jn 2:2

Καὶ αὐτὸς ἱλασμός ἐστι περὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν· οὐ περὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων δὲ μόνον,
ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου. But there is a second condition which must be met
if a successful intervention with God shall take place: the question or case
advocated must be in conformity with the divine righteousness. The second verse
shows us that this is the case, and how: not in itself is our cause righteous,
for the question is of sinners and sins; but because the Lord Himself has taken
away their unrighteousness.Καὶαὐτὸς [“and he”], the apostle writes,ἱλασμόςἐστιν
[“is an atoning sacrifice”]. Certainly,theκαὶαὐτός[“and he”] must not be taken
in the Latin meaning ofet ipse, as if it meant that the very same who is an
advocate has at the same time set right our cause; for theκαὶ [“and”] serves
here only for the simple connection of the two sentences. That idea, however,
which we have discussed is in itself sound enough; for the mereαὐτός [“he”],
without the appendage of aκαίbelonging to it, itself asserts that concerning the
previous subject a second and new predicate is to be affirmed. This new element
is the idea ofἱλασμός [“atoning sacrifice”]. As the wordsκαταλλάσσειν[“to
reconcile”] andκαταλλαγή[“reconciliation”] occur only in St. Paul’s writings,
and not often in them, soἱλασμός[“atoning sacrifice”] is peculiar to St. John,
and in his writings only twice occurs, here and 1Jn 4:10. The two ideas are not
identical.

Καταλλάσσειν[“to reconcile”] means, to wit, that God and theworld are reconciled
with each other; the relation of the two is always understood in the word. It is
not otherwise when St. Paul uses it of human relations, as that of marriage,
in1Co 7:11, and such we find it in its reference to the death of Christ, 2Co
5:19,[N]καταλλάξας ἡμᾶς ἑαυτῷ, [“reconciled us to himself”], and2Co 5:20,
καταλλάγητε [ὑμεῖς] τῷ Θεῷ [“(you) be reconciled to God”], andRom 5:10,
κατηλλάγημεν[ἡμεῖς]τῷ Θεῷ [“(we) were reconciled to God”]. Thesame may be said
of the decompositumἀποκαταλλάσσω [“reconcile”]. Whether theἀπό[“from”] here
means a perfect reconciliation, or a renewed reconciliation, or a reconciliation
which brings back out of estrangement, inany case the reconciliation in Col
1:20andCol 1:21is, as inEph 2:16, that of mankind with God, the opposition
between the two parties being abolished. Even if, which we do not believe, a
reconciliation of two portions of mankind with each other is spoken of inEph
2:16, our assertion would still hold good, for the verbwould have reference to
the relation between two separate beings or parties. On the other
hand,ἱλασμός[“atoning sacrifice”] keeps in view the reconciliation of God with
Himself; it does not therefore refer to the relation of two to each other, but
to the relation of one nature to itself. It expresses the overcoming of the
divine wrath, or its being brought into harmony or understanding with the divine
love; and thus it is the reconciliation of these two characteristics of
theinteriordivine nature which had been brought into collision by human
sin.Ἱλασμός[“atoning sacrifice”] is, indeed, according to the form of the word,
that by means of which any one is made favourable orἵλεως [“merciful”], and thus
it is thepropitiation, while καταλλαγή [“reconciliation”] is the reconciliation
which has taken place in consequence of the propitiation or atonement, which
has, in fact, been rendered possible by that atonement. The atonement or
propitiation applies only to the one party, the offended; the reconciliation
takes place between the two parties. Thus it comes to pass, that while indeed
ἱλάσκεσθαι [“expiate”] may have things for its object (Heb 2:17, τὰς ἁμαρτίας
[“the sins”] once), for there is an expiation or atonement of sins, the
κατάλλασσειν [“to reconcile”] can never be referred to things as its object, for
only personal beings can be reconciled.

Now, as it regards our passage in particular, it is first of all essential to
inquire if there is any sacrificial idea involved in the ἱλασμός [“atoning
sacrifice”]. Certainly it is currently used in the Septuagint in passages where
there is no allusion to sacrifices; as, for example, in Psa 130:4.[N] it is the
translation of the Hebrew סְלׅיחָה [sĕlı̂ḥâ, “forgiveness”]. But when we mark,
on the other hand, that ἱλάσκεσθαι is the standing translation of כּׅפֵּר [kipper,
“atone,” “forgive”], and that ἱλασμός [“atoning sacrifice”] is the specific
translation off כִפֻּרִים, [kippūrı̂m, “atonement”] we must decide in favour of
the sacrificial element. It is true that כּׅפֵּר [kipper,“atone,” “forgive”]
itself occurs in many passages without any expressed reference to a sacrifice
(Psa 65:3;[N]Psa 78:38; Psa 79:9); but always it is the sacrifice which is the
means, whether expressed or not, through which, according to the Old Testament
point of view, the covering of human sin is effected. But more: it has not been
proved that the substantive כִּפּוּרִים [kippūrı̂m, “atonement”], which precisely
corresponds to our ἱλασμός [“atoning sacrifice”], ever occurs without an express
reference to sacrifice; rather is the idea so closely associated with the
sacrificial offering, that כִּפּוּרִים [kippūrı̂m, “atonement”], is the standing
term for the great day of atonement. Now, when we add to this that in Heb
2:17ἱλάσκεσθαι, on the only occasion when it is used, is brought in precisely at
the point when for the first time the high-priesthood of Christ is mentioned,
and remember also that the ancient high priest had, specially on the כִּפּוּרִיםיוֹם
[yomkippūrı̂m, “day of atonement”], the function which made him the type of
Christ; and observe further that the substantive ἱλαστήριον [“atonement,” “mercy
seat”], derived from the same root, is in the New Testament (Rom 3:25, and Heb
9:5), as in the Septuagint, the current reproduction of the mercy-seat or
כַפֹּרֶת [kappōret, “place of atonement,” “mercy seat”], which in that
high-priestly sacrificial day occupied so prominent and central a place, and by
its very name at least alluded to that mercy-seat,—then shall we feel inclined
to take the expression ἱλασμός [“atoning sacrifice”] in our passage also as
connected with the sacrificial institute generally, and with the great
sacrificial offering of the day of atonement in particular. In accordance with
this, the ἱλασμός [“atoning sacrifice”] is the expiation, inasmuch as it was
wrought and perfected by our great High Priest on the New Testament day of
atonement by the sacrifice of Himself We do not mean that the expression ἱλασμός
[“atoning sacrifice”] of itself signifies that sacrifice: it points only to the
atonement or propitiation accomplished by its means. But this is what we
maintain: כִּפּוּרִים, [kippūrı̂m, “atonement”] has a sacrificial meaning; ἱλασμός
[“atoning sacrifice”] was the apostle’s designed and chosen translation of that
word. The whole New Testament beholds in the death oi Christ the antitype of the
great day of atonement, and the great central sacrifice of that day. Hence St.
John did actually, in the use of this in itself broader word ἱλασμός [“atoning
sacrifice”], think precisely and only of that sacrifice. And it is in precise
and striking harmony with this that in our present passage the apostle says that
the ἱλασμός [“atoning sacrifice”] had reference not only to our sins, the sins
of believers, but also to the sins of the whole world. As in the classical
passage of the Epistle to the Hebrews special stress is laid upon the fact that,
in contrast with the yearly renewed sacrifices of the old economy, Christ
presented His sacrifice once for all; so in this passage stress is laid upon the
fact that the virtue of His oblation extends, not, like the old offerings,
merely to the covenant people, but to the whole world of mankind, having
efficacy for all alike, believers as well as unbelievers. Thus this universal
dictum not only furnishes a most befitting conclusion for the first section of
our Epistle, but also the consolation or encouragement, which it is the
apostle’s desire to afford to those who still feel the weight of sin, is carried
to its highest point. Tor, if all sins are expiated or atoned for, how were it
possible that their sins should not be included in the propitiation, who, as ἐν
φωτὶ περιπατοῦντες [“walking in the light”], have, as it were, the first right
to stand in the closest connection with the Saviour and His atoning work?

Here we may perceive the right answer to the question why Christ is here termed
not ἱλασμήρ [“place of atonement”], but ἱλασμός [“atoning sacrifice”]. For this
reason, namely, because it was not the object to lay stress upon the fact that
He was the true High Priest, but that He was that true high-priestly offering in
virtue of which sin is expiated. Moreover, the construction of ἱλασμός [“atoning
sacrifice”] with περί is in strict correspondence with the Hebrew, where עַל
[’al lit. “above”] or בְּעַר [bear lit. “on high”] is used with the meaning de or
concerning. A little above, we said in passing that the ὅλος κόσμος [“whole
world”], for which Christ is the propitiation, is to be understood of the world
in the widest sense, all unbelievers included. It is well known that many from
predestinarian prepossessions have sought to restrict the compass of the word to
those who should obtain actual participation in the benefits of redemption. But,
not to mention the arbitrariness of any such enfeebling of the words, their
hortatory and encouraging purport, as we have shown above, pleads against such
an interpretation. "Quam late patet peccatum, tarn late propitiatio.” Through
the ἱλασμός [“atoning sacrifice”] of Christ all sin and the sins of all are
atoned for; if the salvation of all does not take effect, the fault is not that
God will not forgive the sins of any one, but that the unforgiven sinner repels
the fatherly heart that moves towards him in mercy.


========================================================================
  CHAPTER 13: 13 - 1JN 2:3-11
========================================================================

1Jn 2:3-11 The exposition of the following verses depends very much on our clear
perception of their relation to what precedes. The first thing that helps us to
understand that is the verb ἐγνώκαμεν αὐτὸν [“know him”] in the third verse.
Unless we assume that this idea enters here without any link of connection, and
so leave a yawning chasm between 1Jn 2:3 and what goes before,—which, indeed,
the καί [“and”], linking the two portions together, would not allow,—we must
find in what we have just been studying an idea of which the development is this
γιγνώσκειναὐτόν [“not perceive”]. Now, to get a clearer notion of what it is, we
must first of all define who is meant by the αὐτός [“him”], God or Christ.
Certainly it cannot be other than the same person who in the second part of the
verse is again described by αὐτός [“him”]: ἐὰν τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ τηρῶμεν [“if we
keep his commandments”]. Now, as in all that follows God is invariably the
source of command, and Christ is introduced only as the pattern we must imitate
in obeying His commandments; as, besides this, Christ is distinguished as
ἐκεῖνος from Him who is marked out by αὐτός [“him”],—it will appear that αὐτός
[“him”] here can be only God the Father. But then, in that case, the γιγνώσκειν
αὐτὸν [“know him”] cannot attach itself to 1Jn 2:1-2; for they contain no
element that enters into the knowledge of the Father, while they point to the
knowledge of Christ if to any knowledge at all. We may suppose, perhaps, that
the train of thought which begins with 1Jn 2:3 is a continuation of the passage,
1Jn 1:8-10: he who walks in the light must first of all confess his sins, and,
secondly, keep the divine commandments. But that is made simply impossible by
1Jn 2:1-2. We have seen that these two verses sum up by way of recapitulation
the whole contents of 1Jn 1:6-10; and consequently 1Jn 2:3, when it begins
again, must be the continuation of this whole section. But that, after a
resuming summary of the whole, the thought should recur to one particular part,
and rest upon it without actually and expressly mentioning what, is hardly to be
supposed. If, however, we ask to what γιγνώσκειν τὸν Θεον [“know God”] may
positively be referred, 1Jn 1:5 points the way; for it tells us expressly that
God is light; and the most obvious explanation of the idea in our passage is,
accordingly, that to know God is to know His nature of light, to know Him as
light. Then, in that case, 1Jn 2:3 would immediately join on to 1Jn 1:5, and
introduce a new second section which runs parallel with the entire section from
1Jn 1:6-10, 1Jn 2:1-2. The construction of the whole, to which we have thus been
guided by the idea of γιγνώσκειν τὸν Θεον [“know God”], would receive its strong
confirmation from the ninth verse; for it is clear that the clause ὁ λέγων ἐν τῷ
φωτὶ εἶναι, καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὑτοῦ μισῶν, ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ ἐστὶν [“the one who says
he is in the light, but hates his brother, is in the darkness”] corresponds
precisely to the sentence in 1Jn 1:6. But this evidence is effectual only on the
supposition of its having been already proved that 1Jn 2:9 is part of the
section begun with 1Jn 2:3, and that this section therefore does not end with
the sixth verse. Such proof, however, requires us to point out and establish
that the ἐντολαὶ Θεοῦ [“commandments of God”], 1Jn 2:3, the λόγοςΘεοῦ [“word of
God”], 1Jn 2:5, the περιπατεῖν καθὼς ἐκεῖνος περιεπάτησεν [“walk just as he
walked”], and the commandment of brotherly love, 1Jn 2:9, have substantially the
same meaning. It is in favour of this that, if we make the section end with 1Jn
2:6, the clause concerning brotherly love is absolutely wanting in any, whether
external or internal, connection with what goes before. Without that link the
reader would not by any means have understood the seventh and the eighth verses
concerning the old and the new commandment; for the previous verses, which on
this supposition speak of sanctification in quite general terms, furnish no
point of help to the interpretation. But if we suppose that the apostle, from
1Jn 2:3-6, has already the commandment of brotherly love in his eye, the readers
are already put in a right position to perceive the meaning in which he speaks
of an old and of a new commandment. In fact, they might at once have perceived,
from the whole tenor of the paragraph from 1Jn 2:3-6, that brotherly love was
the subject treated. True it is that the first expression, τηρεῖν τὰς ἐντολὰς
τοῦ Θεοῦ [“to keep the commandments of God”], is quite general, and signifies
obedience to the will of God in all directions and in all the particulars of
obedience. But then the following τηρεῖν τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ [“to keep his word”]
reduces back the universality of that first expression to its unity again, as we
saw, indeed, already in 1Jn 1:10 that the meaning of the latter sentence is,
that the full manifoldness of the words and teaching of our Lord is summed up in
one living and life-giving unity. But those who are acquainted with St. John’s
Gospel, as these readers were, know at once that this unity is nowhere else to
be sought but in the commandment of love.

What thus in the word λόγοςτοῦ Θεοῦ [“word of God”] lies wrapped up as a germ is
clearly unfolded in the words ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ τετελείωται [“the love of God is
made complete”] of the following clause; if, indeed, we can suppose from other
considerations that ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ [“the love of God”] here means the love
which we have to Him. Certainly there are some other reasons for adopting the
inverted sense of the expression: the love of God to us. First, there is the
parallel clause that forms the pendant and sequel of the fourth verse. Then the
result of disobedience to the divine commandments is declared to be the
inference, ἡ ἀλήθειαοὐκἔστινἐνἡμῖν [“the truth is not in you”]; and we have seen
in the interpretation of the preceding chapter that ἀλήθεια [“truth”] means the
real fulness of the divine nature. Hence it commends itself to our feeling, that
in the fifth verse there is found a parallel thought: if we keep the
commandments of God, His love is in us in a perfected sense, analogous to His
ἀλήθεια [“truth”] being in us. Again, when we compare other passages, such as
1Jn 4:10, ἐν τούτῳ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀγάπη, οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς ἠγαπήσαμεν αὐτὸν ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι αὐτὸς
ἠγάπησεν ἡμᾶς [“in this is love, not that we loved him but that he loved us”],
and such as 2Ti 2:19, where it is specified as the seal of belonging to God that
He knows us, not that we know Him, then in our passage also, thus looked at, the
subjective genitive becomes probable, as in the interpretation: “the love of God
to us.” Nevertheless, there are equally strong reasons for taking it as the
genitives objectivus, or our love to God. For we have from 1Jn 1:6-10, 1Jn
2:1-11 a number of conditional sentences, the conclusion of which in every case
exhibits the blessing attached to a right posture of heart required in those
conditions; but in every case it is a blessing which we receive for use and
application, not only for enjoyment. So it is when it is said, ἡ
ἀλήθειαἔστινἐνἡμῖν [“the truth is in you”], or the purification from sin is
ascribed to us. The same should we expect here also. But the meaning of God’s
love to us does not harmonize with this; for that is indeed an experience or
enjoyment of which we are partakers, but not something with which we can
operate, and of which we can make any use. Further, the love of God to us is a
thought which in the present context is by no means brought into prominence, but
would enter here as an abrupt and isolated idea. If, then, on the one side there
are the strongest reasons for taking Θεοῦ [“of God”] as a genitivus subjectivus,
and on the other side equally strong reasons for understanding something to be
spoken of that we receive for use and application in ourselves, how are we to
decide between them? The materials for decision are presented to us in the text.
It is purely arbitrary for one half of the expositors to speak of God’s love to
us, and the other half to speak of our love to God: we read nothing but ἀγάπη
τοῦ Θεοῦ [“love of God”],—that is, the divine love, love as it is in God,
without the addition of any object for that love. The right meaning has escaped
them simply through the interjection of an object for the love. The apostle says
that he who keeps the commandment of God—that is, the commandment of love—has
the love of God, has love as God is love, and as it is in God, dwelling and
ruling within him as a power of life. As in the former passage the truth, which
God is and which God has, comes upon us as a power filling and penetrating our
being; so here the love of God, which He is and which He has, attains in us its
perfected sway. He who keeps the divine commandment, the apostle means, has in
himself the love from which God’s commandment flows, and which is in God. Thus
the preceding λόγοςτοῦ Θεοῦ [“word of God”] is, in the conclusion of the fifth
verse, more closely defined; the reader receives into himself the idea of love.

St. John takes one step further towards his end in the sixth verse, in the
requirement of περιπατεῖν καθὼς ἐκεῖνος περιεπάτησεν [“walk just as he walked”].
Looked at on one side, the word περιπατεῖν [“walk”] contains an enlargement of
the τηρεῖν τὰς ἐντολὰς, τὸν λόγον τοῦ Θεοῦ [“to keep the commandments, the word
of God”]. We have seen—that is, on 1Jn 1:6—how περιπατεῖν [“walk”] denotes the
whole complex movement of life, not only in the outward act, but in the
collective expression of it, inward as well as outward; and therefore in this
closer definition the τηρεῖν τὰς ἐντολάς [“to keep the commandments”] must
embrace not a greater or less number of individual acts, but the essential habit
of the entire life. On the other side, the addition καθὼς ἐκεῖνος περιεπάτησεν
[“just as he walked”] gives another and additional point to the previous
thought. As the ἐντολαὶ Θεοῦ [“commandments of God”], ordered
πολυτρόπωςκαὶπολυμερῶς, [“many times and many ways”] find their ideal unity in
the λόγοςτοῦ Θεοῦ [“word of God”], in the annunciation of Christ, which forms
one living whole; so the real, visible, concrete unity is found in the life of
Jesus Christ itself. But the question how He walked is answered in the whole
Gospel. In Joh 13:1, His entire life is gathered up in one word: Ἰησοῦς ἀγαπήσας
τοὺς ἰδίους ἠγάπησεν εἰς τέλος [“Jesus loved his own, he loved to the end”].
Now, then, at last in 1Jn 2:9 the apostle’s thought, to which he had been
converging in ever-narrowing circles, bursts into clear expression: he is
treating of brotherly love.

If it has been established in detail that the four expressions now considered
have as to their matter the same substantial meaning; that the apostle has
before his eyes in the first and most general of them, αἱἐντολαὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ [“the
commandments of God”], the last and most special of them, and aims to bring the
reader only by degrees to the unity and central point of these ἐντολαί
[“commandments”]; and thus that 1Jn 2:9 forms the pith of the whole
discussion,—then it has been demonstrated that we must not think of separating
1Jn 2:3-6 from what follows, but must make the whole from 1Jn 2:3-11 as one
connected whole. Again, as not only the expression ἐγνωκέναιτὸν Θεον [“to know
God”] points back to 1Jn 1:5, as we have seen, but also 1Jn 2:9 stands in
express dependence on 1Jn 1:5, and is parallel with 1Jn 1:6, it is further
demonstrated that the section 1Jn 2:3-11 runs strictly parallel with the section
1Jn 1:6-10, 1Jn 2:1-2. As we have further perceived that the contents of the new
section are simply brotherly love, we have already half found the mutual
relation of the two main divisions of our Epistle which we now have in hand. The
subject of the first section, 1Jn 1:6-10, 1Jn 2:1-2, may be briefly stated to be
the relation of man to God. He who walks in the light, says the apostle,
receives the purification from sins on the one band through deliverance from
them, 1Jn 1:7b, and ἵνα μὴ ἁμάρτητε [“that you may not sin”], 1Jn 2:1; on the
other hand, he receives that purification through forgiveness of the sins still
committed by him, 1Jn 1:9; 1Jn 2:2. The new section treats of the relation of
the Christian not to God, but to the brethren: he who walks in the light must
love the brethren. Thus the first two sections of the Epistle strictly
correspond with the purpose which, according to 1Jn 1:3, the apostle had in view
in his first announcement: the assertion and proof of the κοινωνία
[“fellowship”]: first, μετὰ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ μετὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦ [“with the
Father and with his Son Jesus”]; and then, secondly, μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων [“with one
another”] [1Jn 1:7]. The former end is kept in view in 1Jn 1:6-10, 1Jn 2:1-2;
the latter, in 1Jn 2:3-11. This second section of the Epistle in its
construction answers almost exactly to that of the first. Both are complete in
two sub-sections: the first, 1Jn 1:6-7, and 1Jn 1:8-10, if we leave apart for a
moment the hortatory summing up in 1Jn 2:1-2; the second, 1Jn 2:3-5 and 1Jn
2:6-11. There is a difference indeed in the detail: the former section in the
first chapter treats its subject in the form of antithesis; while the second, in
the second chapter, places a superscription before each topic, or, to put it
better, there is a statement of the subject placed before each. Its first
general sub-section, which in a certain sense lays the foundation, 1Jn 2:3-5,
has 1Jn 2:3 for its statement of contents; the second and more special
sub-section, 1Jn 2:6-11, has 1Jn 2:6-8 for its heading. But then the most
perfect similarity returns again in the two chapters; for the proper development
takes place still in antithesis, of which each particular sentence is not indeed
here formally a conditional one, but yet is really such, inasmuch as the
participial sentences have essentially a conditional meaning. And the conformity
in the structure may be traced still further. As in the first chapter the first
sub-section, 1Jn 1:6-7, consists of two sentences over against each other, so
also the first of the second chapter, 1Jn 2:4-5; and as in the first chapter the
second sub-section runs in three opposed sentences, 1Jn 1:8-10, so does also the
second sub-section in the second chapter, 1Jn 2:9-11. Of course the apostle did
not work according to a scheme laid down beforehand; but this concert and
uniformity, descending into the very details, shows how clearly his thoughts
were before his mind down to their minutest shade. This portion of the Epistle
itself, to go no further, shows how much injustice is done to the author by
those who refuse to find in him any regular process of thought.


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  CHAPTER 14: 14 - 1JN 2:3
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1Jn 2:3

Καὶ ἐν τούτῳ γινώσκομεν ὅτι ἐγνώκαμεν αὐτὸν, ἐὰν τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ τηρῶμεν·

Let us now descend to the particulars. The sentence at the outset, which gives
us our point of view for the whole, is to the effect that we know God only if we
keep His commandments. If γιγνώσκειν τὸν Θεον [“know God”] means, as we have
seen in full, to know Him as light, as He alone is described, it is obvious of
itself that the γιγνώσκειν [“know”] must be taken in its ordinary meaning, and
by no means as equivalent to ἀγαπᾶν [“love”]. But certainly this knowing is
throughout the New Testament never a merely external knowledge; it is rather, so
to speak, a knowledge full of soul, which involves and establishes of itself a
fellowship with Him who is known. In the same sense as St. Paul uses the
composite word ἐπίγνωσις [“full knowledge”], which is not found in St. John, St.
John uses the simple word. In this plerophoric meaning the term often occurs in
the Gospel: Joh 1:10, where the οὐκἔγνω [“not know”] answers to the οὐκατέλαβεν
[“not perceive”] of Joh 1:5[N]; Joh 8:55[N]; John 14:7, and others. It is not
altogether strange to the Synoptics; comp. Mar 9:18[N]. If, then, to know is, in
our apostle’s use of it, the appropriation or the personal reception into I
ourselves of another and foreign nature, it is clear that the knowledge of God
includes in itself a participation of His nature as known; and that thus the
γνῶναιτὸν Θεον [“know God”] here is essentially related to the περιπατεῖνἐνφωτί
[“walk in the light”] of 1Jn 1:6: the rather as here also the connection
requires us to assume that God is known as light. Such fellowship with God
should declare itself in the τηρεῖν τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ [“keep his commandments”].
This sentence, laying its foundation for what follows, is then further unfolded
in two verses containing two antithetical clauses.


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  CHAPTER 15: 15 - 1JN 2:4
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1Jn 2:4

Ὁ λέγων, “ἔγνωκα αὐτὸν,” καὶ τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ μὴ τηρῶν, ψεύστης ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐν
τούτῳ ἡ ἀλήθεια οὐκ ἔστιν. The former of these two clauses corresponds with
perfect exactness to 1Jn 1:6. It is true that, in the place of the expressly
conditional ἐάν τις εἴπῃ [“if someone says”] there, we have here the more
positive term ὁ λέγων [“the one who says”], which is the form that rules the
whole of this new section; but it is obvious that the meaning is the same. The
uniformity of the external construction within the two sections,—in the one
always ἐάν [“if”], in the other always the nominative participle,—as also the
slight change of form between the two, serve only to set the parallelism of the
thoughts in a light doubly clear. Further, that the ἔγνωκα αὐτὸν [“know him”] in
our passage corresponds as to its substance with the assertion κοινωνίαν ἔχομεν
μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ [“we have fellowship with him”], 1Jn 1:6, we have just now seen; and
it is equally obvious that the μὴ τηρεῖντὰς ἐντολάς [“to not keep commandment”]
runs parallel here with the περιπατεῖνἐντῷ σκότει [“walking in darkness”] there.
The form of the condemning conclusion is, with all the similarity of contents in
the two passages, rather different; and that difference presents a slight change
in the thought. In 1Jn 1:1-10 the conclusion lays down two kinds of activity,
ψεύδεσθαι [“to lie”] and ἀλήθειανοὐ ποιεῖν [“not do the truth”]; but here we
have, on the contrary, two states or conditions, that of ψεύστης εἶναι [“to be a
liar”] and that in which a man is not partaker of the truth. In the former it is
said that the original pattern of truth, its full reality, the real substance of
the divine being, does not communicate itself to the man; here it is said that
generally it is not in him.


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  CHAPTER 16: 16 - 1JN 2:5
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1Jn 2:5

Ὃς δ᾽ ἂν τηρῇ αὐτοῦ τὸν λόγον, ἀληθῶς ἐν τούτῳ ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ τετελείωται. ἐν
τούτῳ γινώσκομεν ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐσμεν. In the same way as 1Jn 2:4 corresponds with
1Jn 1:6, 1Jn 2:5 corresponds with 1Jn 1:7. Both passages urge the importance of
the exhibition of true godliness as opposed to the mere semblance of it. The
form of the first limb of the sentence, or the protasis, in the latter case is
not the participle, as in the previous verse, nor is it an actual conditional
clause, as in the former chapter; but it is a relative sentence with ἄνfn,
which closely approximates to the positive form with nominative nouns which
prevails throughout the section. In the present case also, the last limb of the
sentence, or the apodosis, corresponds in 1Jn 1:7-10, 1Jn 2:1-5; as in the
former the highest benefit of the walk in light is specified as the καθαρίζει
τὸαἷμαἸησοῦ,κ.τ.λ. [“the blood of Jesus cleanses, etc.”], so also here the
closing clause declares the blessing of τηρεῖντὸν λόγοντοῦ Θεοῦ [“to keep the
word of God”] to be the full and perfect participation in the divine nature of
love. The passage of the Gospel, Joh 8:31, which gave us above the right hint
for the right interpretation of the λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ [“the word of God”] will shed
some light on the ἀληθῶς [“truly”] also: ἐὰν ὑμεῖς μείνητε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ ἐμῷ,
ἀληθῶς μαθηταί μου ἐστὲ [“If you continue in my word, you are truly my
disciples”]. It may be, indeed, that ἀληθῶς [“truly”] occurs sometimes in the
New Testament with the meaning of mere affirmation, equivalent to profecto; but
that is never the case in St. John, not even in Joh 1:48: the expression as he
uses it always denotes the internal reality as opposed to the outward appearance
only. So it is here. With him who obeys the λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ [“the word of God”],
love, the love which makes the character or nature of God, is perfected in its
fullest reality and entire fulness. Τελειοῦσθαι [“made complete”] is reserved by
St. John for the consummation of love, and of perfected fellowship with God
through love; compare besides 1Jn 4:12, 1Jn 4:17-18; Joh 17:23[N] in the Gospel.
In itself it is not a startling or revolting thought, that the love of God
should dwell in us in its full measure and in its simple perfection. According
to Eph 4:13[N], we are to grow up μέτρον ἡλικίας τοῦ πληρώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ
[“the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ”]; but here our
perfecting (μέτρον ἡλικίας [“measure of the stature”]) is this, that the whole
fulness of Christ dwells in us. Again, as Christ is the χαρακτήρκαὶἀπαύγασμα
[“exact representation and radiance” cf. Heb 1:3] of the Father in such a manner
that the whole πλήρωματοῦ Θεοῦ [“fullness of God”] dwells in Him, this proves
that the πλήρωματοῦ Θεοῦ [“fullness of God”] is supposed to dwell in us. And
that this πλήρωμα [“fullness”] of God is essentially love, we are taught by the
fundamental dictum of 1Jn 4:16; as also St. Paul exhorts us, in the only place
(Eph 5:1-2[N]) where he places God before us as a pattern, to strive after that
pattern through walking in love. The little clause that follows, ἐν τούτῳ
γινώσκομεν ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐσμεν [“by this we know that we are in him”], takes up
again the fundamental thought placed first in 1Jn 2:3, and thus bears its
witness that the first sub-section of the new section has come to its close.
Marking the uniformity of structure throughout, it is not to be
overlooked—though we venture to give it only as a supposition—that in 1Jn 2:5
there is but one conclusion, while in 1Jn 1:7, the verse correlative with 1Jn
2:5, there are two; here then we have, instead of the second, this summing up
repetition of the fundamental thought. The parallel ἐν τούτῳ [“in this”] of 1Jn
2:3 testifies, were any proof necessary, that these words are not to be referred
to the last conclusion, ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ τετελείωται [“the love of God is made
complete”], but to the first clause, ἐὰντηρῶμεν [“if we obey”], or still better
probably, to the whole preceding period.


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  CHAPTER 17: 17 - 1JN 2:6
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1Jn 2:6

Ὁ λέγων ἐν αὐτῷ μένειν, ὀφείλει, καθὼς ἐκεῖνος περιεπάτησε, καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτως
περιπατεῖν.

It is clear now that there is a progression in the following verses; but it is
important to keep it in the right order. For instance, it is not to be found
forthwith in the new idea μένεινἐνΘεῷ [“to abide in God”]. It is undoubtedly
true that the three ideas γινῶναι [“to know”], 1Jn 2:3, εἶναι [“to be”], 1Jn
2:5, μένειν [“to abide”], 1Jn 2:6, express a gradation: cognitio, communio,
constantia in communione. But because the progress of the thought might rest
upon this gradation, that does not prove that it does so in the present case.
This is opposed first of all by the fact that in 1Jn 2:5, at the end of the
section which began with the γνῶσιςΘεοῦ [“knowledge of God”], what was said is
summed up again by εἶναιἐν αὐτῷ [“to be in him”]; it could not have been the
apostle’s point to introduce a new thought in the recapitulation; and the
emphasis must lie not upon the difference between γινῶναι [“to know”] and εἶναι
[“to be”], but upon what they have in common. The main consideration, however,
is this. If the gradation in the three ideas before us were the point which
carries the apostle’s thoughts onwards, the emphasis would have lain on the
blessing conferred in keeping the divine commandments; that, however, is
obviously not the case, but it lies in the following the commandment itself. The
distinctive feature of our section is not promissory, but hortatory.
Consequently, the three ideas only in passing indicate the whole
comprehensiveness of the blessing which is attached to the keeping of the divine
word, marking it out under its several aspects. The emphasis, however, lies not
upon their difference, but upon their relative identity. The progression of the
thought rests rather upon the περιπατεῖν καθὼς ἐκεῖνος περιεπάτησεν [“walk just
as he walked”]. In that phrase the contents of the divine will, hitherto viewed
generally as ἐντολαὶ [“commandments”], and again made more specific as
λόγοςαὐτοῦ [“his word”], is yet again more closely defined. We also must exhibit
the same walk which Christ exhibited. What was said before had shown, even if
the reader did not know it from the outset, that the walking in love was alone
signified. And this resemblance to the Lord is imposed on us as the supreme
obligation; if indeed the οὕτως [“thus”], against which there is certainly some
slight external evidence, is the true reading: the καί [“and”] and the οὕτως
[“thus”] would doubly emphasize the αὐτό [“him”] and thus strengthen the
parallel. And this walk is obligatory on the Christian (ὀφείλει [“to owe”]);
moreover, through an obligation contracted by his own free act, that is, by his
own word (ὁλέγων [“the ones saying]). That, for the rest, Holy Scripture has
exhibited Christ as a pattern only in His sufferings, is a fact which, admitted
by all expositors, we keep in our view here in passing; without, however,
entering upon the question whether our passage constitutes an exception, and how
far it does so. The sequel will clear up this point.


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  CHAPTER 18: 18 - 1JN 2:7-8
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1Jn 2:7-8

Ἀδελφοὶ, οὐκ ἐντολὴν καινὴν γράφω ὑμῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐντολὴν παλαιὰν, ἣν εἴχετε ἀπ᾽
ἀρχῆς. ἡ ἐντολὴ ἡ παλαιά ἐστιν ὁ λόγος ὃν ἠκούσατε ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς· Πάλιν ἐντολὴν
καινὴν γράφω ὑμῖν, ὅ ἐστιν ἀληθὲς ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐν ὑμῖν, ὅτι ἡ σκοτία παράγεται,
καὶ τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινὸν ἤδη φαίνει.

We enter on that sequel with a double expectation. First, that is, we are
obliged to expect a closer definition of the contents of 1Jn 2:6, as we have
seen in our general remarks upon the section that we are still on the way to its
central point in 1Jn 2:9. But what constitutes the closer relation between 1Jn
2:6 and the sequel can, in the absence of any external bond of connection, be
shown only by a penetrating study of the particulars. But, secondly, the appeal,
so emphatic and disconnected, which stands at the beginning, and so obviously
springs from a vehement feeling, points us to the fact that the apostle attaches
a special importance to what is about to follow. As to the ἀδελφοὶ [“brothers”]
of the Textus Receptus, however aptly it may suit a section on love of brethren,
we are obliged by external reasons to prefer the reading ἀγαπητοί [“beloved”].
But the main question is, what we are to understand by the ἐντολὴκαινή [“new
commandment”] and παλαιά [“old”]. There has been a disposition to interpret them
of two distinct commandments: in which case, probably, the ἐντολὴπαλαιά [“old
commandment”] would be brotherly love, and the ἐντολὴκαινή [“new commandment”]
the imitation of Christ; or the order might be inverted; or a third
interpretation might be supposable, since the section itself furnishes no key,
and the idea of two separate commandments of course opens the way for all kinds
of solutions. But the notion of thus dividing them is as a theory full of
insurmountable difficulties, both formal and in the matter. The expression
itself opposes it, as it seems to us; for we should in such a case expect, not
οὐκἐντολὴν καινὴνἀλλὰπαλαιάν [“not a new but an old commandment”], but “as well
a new commandment as an old,” or something like this; and similarly, in 1Jn 2:8,
instead of πάλινἐντολὴν καινὴν γράφω [“on the other hand, I am writing a new
commandment”], we should expect “and yet again I write,” and so forth. For if
the apostle, in fact, announced two commandments an old one and a new one, it
would be impossible for him to have said, without any further explanation, that
one of then he did not announce. Thus we must understand that only one
commandment is meant, which, viewed from different points, may now be considered
as new and now as old. But there are material as well as formal difficulties in
the theory of two separate commandments. For it would be most obvious on that
supposition to describe the command to follow Christ as the ἐντολὴπαλαιά [“old
commandment”], and that of brotherly love as the καινή [“new”]. But it is
impossible to admit that the former of these was older than the other; even in
the sense that the churches received the precept to follow Christ before they
received that of loving one another. For where can we imagine a church which had
not been taught to include this among the elements of the faith? Still less can
we conceive that St. John should call that commandment old because it had been
communicated in what he had said above, and the other new because he was about
to communicate it: for how can a commandment be called old because it has just
been announced? Thus we must regard the ἐντολὴκαινή καὶπαλαιά [“a commandment
new and old”] as one and the same commandment viewed under different aspects.
This being so, of course it can mean no other than that of brotherly love, of
which the section before us treats. Even if the commandment in question were
referred to the περιπατεῖν καθὼς ἐκεῖνος περιεπάτησεν [“walk just as he
walked”], that would make no material difference, for we have seen that even
these words have for their substance nothing but the example of brotherly love.
Formally, of course, there would then be a certain difference introduced into
the thought; but we will for the time assume that brotherly love in general is
the matter of the precept. Further consideration will show whether 1Jn 2:7 and
1Jn 2:8 are to be referred forwards to 1Jn 2:9, that is, to the ἀγαπᾶν
τοὺςἀδελφούς [“love the brothers”], or backwards to 1Jn 2:6, the περιπατεῖν
καθὼς ἐκεῖνος περιεπάτησεν [“walk just as he walked”]. In what sense, then, is
the commandment of brotherly love an old one? It seems obvious and plausible at
the outset to consider this as meaning that it had been already given in the Old
Testament, and that it was called also an ἐντολὴκαινή [“new commandment”],
because Christ had in an altogether new way established it as a law. Nor would
it be a valid objection to this that the readers were for the most part Gentile
Christians, to whom the Old Testament had no authority; for the New Testament
regards the whole kingdom of God as one unity, so that the Gentile Christians
were the legitimate heirs of the ancient oracles. But, certainly, were this the
right interpretation, we should expect to find the apostle using the plural, as
including himself and all: ἣν ἔσχετε, ἣνἠκούσαμεν [“which you have received,
which you have heard”]. But by speaking in the second person he distinguishes
himself from his readers as his disciples; and this of itself makes it probable
that the ἀπ᾽ἀρχῆςἔσχετε [“you have received from the beginning”] refers to the
beginning of their Christianity. Moreover, we have seen that λόγοςτοῦΘεοῦ [“word
of God”] in 1Jn 2:5 points to the announcement made through Christ, and it would
seem obvious to refer the λόγος [“word”] of 1Jn 2:7 also to this; accordingly,
the λόγος ὃν ἠκούσατε [“word which you have heard”] is the announcement of
salvation communicated through the apostles. We must note how delicately careful
is the insertion and omission of the article in our verse; not a new commandment
write I unto you, the author says, but an old one, which ye have had since the
beginning of your Christianity; and the saving announcement which ye then heard
(the second ἀπ᾽ἀρχῆς [“from the beginning”] at the end of the verse must be
struck out), the entire λόγος [“word”] concerning the personal Logos, has only
this meaning, the very same old commandment (here the article comes in)
concerning which I speak. And now, once more, how can this commandment be termed
a new one? The answer of this difficult question, or the way to it, is indicated
evidently enough; for in Joh 13:34 we have a quite similar utterance. The Lord
says in connection with the last Passover: ἐντολὴν καινὴν δίδωμι ὑμῖν, ἵνα
ἀγαπᾶτε ἀλλήλους· καθὼς ἠγάπησα ὑμᾶς, ἵνα καὶ ὑμεῖς ἀγαπᾶτε ἀλλήλους [“A new
commandment I give to you, that you love one another, even as I have loved you,
that you also love one another”]. In this verse we find the constitutive
elements of our present passage: here as there brotherly love is called an
ἐντολὴ καινή [“new commandment”]; here as there the same closer definition is
appended, for the περιπατεῖν καθὼς ἐκεῖνος περιεπάτησεν [“walk just as he
walked”] corresponds precisely to the ἀγαπᾶνκαθὼς ἠγάπησα ὑμᾶς [“love just as I
have loved you”]. But the same question arises as to the passage in the Gospel
itself, how far brotherly love could be there called a new commandment; since it
was not only prescribed in the Old Testament, but had been by Christ Himself,
during the course of His ministry, again and again imprinted upon His disciples’
minds as the second great commandment, like unto the first. But when we narrowly
examine it, we find a difference. So to love as He Himself loved, the Lord had
never before commanded; and it will be evident that in this appendage not only
is there a new and stronger incentive to brotherly love, but that also the
precept in fact receives an altogether new colour. Brotherly love on this
foundation, and enforced by this example, does in very deed become a perfectly
new commandment. To apprehend this more fully, we must take a step onward in the
evangelical history. The evangelist begins the second great division of the
Gospel, the narrative of the passion, with the words, Ἰησοῦς ἀγαπήσας τοὺς
ἰδίους εἰς τέλος ἠγάπησεν αὐτούς [“Jesus loved his own, he loved them to the
end” cf. John 13:1]. It is manifest that this does not say merely that our Lord
also, in the last days of His earthly life, advanced in the love which He had
all along displayed: for how should it occur to the thought of any one to deny
that? What was there in this general idea that could have moved the apostle to
place it in the foreground with such deep emphasis? We are constrained rather to
believe that the justification of an utterance thus made emphatic lay in this,
that a peculiar power of love was manifested in the passion of Christ, that it
was a specifically arduous love, a higher degree of love, which enabled the Lord
to continue, even εἰς τέλος [“to the end”], in the course of love which He had
always displayed. And, in fact, it would have been—to speak humanly—natural if
the Lord had been frightened back from this ἀγαπὴεἰς τέλος [“love to the end”],
which imposed upon Him such an unspeakable burden; and it signalized the full
glory of His power to love, that it was capable of sustaining such a test. Thus
the verse of the Gospel distinguishes two grades or kinds of love with which the
Lord loved His own. The same result emerges from a closer examination of Joh
13:12 ff., especially of the Joh 13:15. The most superficial glance shows at
once that the Lord Himself and His evangelist exhibited the feet-washing as a
demonstration of love bearing a peculiar character, such as His former life had
not yet displayed. And with this we now connect the remark, that precisely on
this occasion, and on this occasion alone, Jesus required of His disciples to
love one another as He had loved them. The washing of their feet is the theme
which runs through its variations in the whole of the following section. See Joh
13:15: ὑπόδειγμα γὰρ ἔδωκα ὑμῖν, ἵνα καθὼς ἐγὼ ἐποίησα ὑμῖν, καὶ ὑμεῖς ποιῆτε,
[“for I gave you an example, that just as I have done to you, you should do
also”], with Joh 13:34: ἐντολὴν καινὴν δίδωμι ὑμῖν [“a new commandment I give to
you”]. If, then, we ask wherein the distinctiveness of this proof of love lay,
as distinguished from all the other demonstrations of love which the hand of the
Redeemer’s love had wrought out during His previous life, the answer is
threefold. First, in all the other deeds through which the Lord’s love dispensed
grace and help, He acted, according to His own express testimony, on the
suggestion of His heavenly Father: they were tokens of love, but He wrought them
not as expressions of love, but as expressions of obedience. But we cannot say
the same in precisely the same sense concerning this act of the feet-washing:
beyond all other acts, it leaves the impression that it sprang from a perfectly
spontaneous and instantaneous impulse. It was indeed in absolute harmony with
the Father’s will; but the Lord performed it not as of obedience , but as from
the source of His own love gushing forth in unwonted power. Secondly, in all the
previous demonstrations of His love, the Lord had ever maintained His position
of κύριος [“Lord”] and διδάσκαλος [“teacher”]; they were the manifestations of
Himself precisely as of a loving διδάσκαλος [“teacher”]. But in the feet-washing
He denied Himself this very position, and was constrained to deny Himself of it
in order to accomplish the act. In this deed of humility He was no longer the
διδάσκαλος [“teacher”], but rather the διακονῶν [“one serving”]. And there
especially is the emphatic love which, according to John Chapter 13, was
manifested in the passion, that He surrendered the supreme and exalted place
which, despite His humiliation, was always His, and descended from the dignity
of the prophet to the deep renunciation of the cross. Thirdly, in all the other
demonstrations of Christ’s love we receive the impression that He must act as He
did, and that if He did not so act there would have been a blot on His image; we
know also that His disciples and the people expected from Him His miracles. On
the other hand, the feet-washing was expected by no one, nor could anyone have
expected it; yea, if we suppose Him to have pretermitted it, no blot would have
rested on His person.

Thus we have, in connection with our Lord Himself, two different kinds of
demonstration of love. Only in the latter did He present Himself as a pattern to
His disciples; and it is this precise love, exercised in imitation of Him, that
He Himself described as the ἐντολὴ καινή [“new commandment”]. Now, as the Lord’s
love εἰς τέλος [“to the end”], that which He showed in the feet-washing, was
related to His earlier demonstrations, so must, among His disciples, the love
which He commands them to exercise in imitation of Himself be related to the
love with which they had hitherto loved, such as they had found prescribed in
the Old Testament. As the Lord, according to our remarks above, until the night
of the passion had performed His acts, not in the first instance as from love,
but rather from obedience, so until the night of the passion it had been for the
disciples a commandment obligatory to love their neighbour; they practised love
as a duty, and in every particular act were constrained to remember the
obligation. For it is obvious that the question is here not of those testimonies
of love which spring from natural and instinctive sympathy,—these do not
generally lie at the basis of any ethics,—but of such love as is exercised in
conscious self-denying acts. Such acts of self-denial it was necessary for men
before Christ, and it is necessary to every man now, especially in the beginning
of the Christian life, to constrain himself to perform. As, again, in all the
earlier demonstrations of His love, Christ had still remained the διδάσκαλος
[“teacher”] and κύριος [“Lord”], so also the natural position of man in the
first stage of love thus considered remains uninvaded and untouched: in His
loving acts the King remains what He is: He is simply a loving King, even as the
Lord among His own was a loving διδάσκαλος [“teacher”]. But when this same Lord
presents Himself, that is to say, more particularly His feet-washing, as the
pattern of love, it is His will to put an end to this love from mere obedience:
from that time His disciples were to love after the model He gave them
generally, and gave them specifically at that very hour; in such a way, namely,
that the individual act should spring, not from the obligation of law, but from
the direct and compulsory pressure of the heart. Further, as the Lord
surrendered His position as Lord in the feet-washing, and in His passion
generally, so should we also so love as that all human distinctions may cease in
its presence: no longer loving the πλησίον [“neighbour”], but the ἀδελφόν
[“brother”], as it stands written: οὐκ ἔνι Ἰουδαίοις καὶ Ἕλλην, οὐκ ἔνι δοῦλος
καὶ ἐλεύθερος·πάντεςὑμεῖς εἷς ἐστε ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ [“There is neither Jew or
Greek, neither slave or free; for you are all one in Christ Jesus” cf. Gal
3:28]. It is love when the Lord exhibits Himself as a loving Master towards
slaves; but love as the ἐντολὴ καινή [“new commandment”] is commended to us, to
be regarded and to be felt, not as Lord, but as itself δοῦλος [“slave,”
“servant”]. And this touches the third mark which we perceived to be the
peculiarity of the feet-washing: this love will not limit itself to cases in
which there is a visible occasion or external necessity for its display; but its
unrestrained vehemence as a living spring will go beyond all expectations, and
approve itself literally without measure or degree. Further, it is clear that
this ἐντολὴ καινή [“new commandment”] can be called such only in a broader sense
of the word commandment: it is, namely, a goal set before men, for ever to be
striven after; not, however, as properly speaking an obligatory law; for as soon
as it is exercised as such, it ceases to be the new commandment. Rather the
matter stands thus: that the new spring of love, which in the passion issued
forth from the Redeemer’s heart, streams, through His return to the Father, His
glorification, and the consequent mission of the Spirit, into the hearts of
Christians as an active energy of their life; and thus the commandment comes of
itself into fulfilment, not qua commandment, but as an irrepressibly energizing
power. Finally, we may be permitted to complete this biblical disquisition by
pointing out how both the kinds or stages of love which we have distinguished in
the spiritual domain are reproduced in all human relations. As well the love of
friendship as the conjugal love exhibit them in their degree, seeking especially
all individual opportunities for their manifestation. But the more internal the
relation is, the more surely does this necessity of seeking cease; because the
whole life and being are more and more fashioned into one entire demonstration
of love.

Having thus established the meaning of ἐντολὴ καινή [“new commandment”] in the
passage of the Gospel, we may easily apply it to our present passage, and it
will be found to harmonize with the whole in the completest and most
satisfactory manner. The commandment of love, St. John says, is to you a παλαιόν
[“old”]; for it is the λόγος [“word”] which ye heard from the beginning. There
is no evangelical annunciation possible without this precept: indeed, the whole
Gospel itself is nothing but this precept. That is the first stage of Christian
brotherly love; and, as the benediction upon it, it is most pertinently assured
by the apostle that the love of God, as that of the Father, dwells in us after a
perfected manner. That is to say, God cannot deprive Himself of His nature: it
is true that His love flows not from any obligation, but out of the
inexhaustible source of His being, which is love; yet He remains ever the loving
God, the loving Lord. Hence it is this blessed consequence of our brotherly
love,—why speak we of consequence? it is this blessed ground of it,—to wit, that
His nature of love abides in us, and in us makes its dwelling, which the apostle
makes prominent first of all. But this is not the highest blessing of it. That
the love of Christ dwells in us is yet more, and a higher stage of love; for His
was the self-renouncing, self-denying, all-surrendering, and self-sacrificing
love. And this love is the καινὴἐντολή [“new commandment”] which is proclaimed
to us. The στοιχεῖα [“way of life”] of Christianity had been long embraced by
the church; now the great point was that they ἐπὶτὴντελείωσινφέρεσθαι [“pressed
on to perfection”] (Heb 6:1). To the τελείωσις [“perfection”], especially to the
τελείαχαρά [“perfect joy”] would the apostle lead them on; and we have already
seen in 1Jn 1:4 that this perfect joy rests in one sense iipon the perfectness
of brotherly love. The one passage has the other in view. At the point thus
carefully secured we are in a position to decide whether our verses look forward
to the expression ἀγαπᾶν τοὺςἀδελφούς [“love the brothers”], or backwards to the
περιπατεῖν καθὼς Χριστὸς περιεπάτησεν [“walk just as Christ walked”]. The latter
is obviously favoured by the circumstance that the readers, when they came to
the words οὐκ ἐντολὴν καινὴν γράφω ὑμῖν [“I am not writing a new commandment to
you”], must necessarily have at once thought that the apostle was referring to
the commandment just given to them; but a still stronger reason is, that he
expressly describes the καινὴἐντολή [“new commandment”] as the λόγος, ὃν ἤκουσαν
[“word, which you heard”], thus taking up again the λόγος [“word”] of 1Jn 2:5.
The weightiest argument, however, is found in what we have already perceived,
that the commandment thus impressed upon them was no other than that they should
walk after the example of Christ. The matter, strictly speaking, stands thus:
First, he describes the conversation, or rather the whole life of Jesus quite
generally as the commandment; but then he goes on, more definitely, to exhibit
the love of Christ manifested in the passion, and the imitation of it he makes
into a commandment by means of the word ἐντολὴ καινή [“new commandment”]: this
word being naturally understood by the readers acquainted with the Gospel,
without any express reference to the passage on which our exposition has been
based. Thus, moreover, we may justify to ourselves the remark already made, that
Christ is presented to us as a pattern only in His passion,—that is to say,
after we have heard a quite general exhortation to the following of His life of
love, the emphasis in our passage declines upon the ἀγάπη εἰς τέλος [“love to
the end”], upon the love which the Lord manifested on the night of His sorrows.
For the rest, it may be observed once more, that not all the thoughts which we
have brought in here were by the apostle himself expressly set forth. They are
rather only the premises which must have been living in his spirit when he used
the word which he did use. We may infer from his utterance here, that all this
was in the background of his mind. But a new difficulty emerges, after all our
exposition, in consequence of the appended clause, ὅ ἐστιν ἀληθὲς ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν
ὑμῖν. The words admit of a double grammatical construction. Either they are
regarded as the proper object of γράφω [“I write”], and the preceding ἐντολὴ
καινή [“new commandment”] as an attributive describing it: I write now to you
this, which in you is the truth, as a new commandment. Or, inverting it, we may
take the ἐντολὴκαινή [“new commandment”] as the object, and the relative clause
as merely a declarative closer definition: I write to you a new commandment,
namely, that which in you is truth. When we now observe that the idea of the
ἐντολὴκαινή [“new commandment”] is the fundamental theme of 1Jn 2:8, that,
further, the ἐντολὴν παλαιά is certainly the objective of the γράφειν in 1Jn
2:7, which formally and materially corresponds with this, we are constrained to
decide in favour of the latter. But we must remember that the sentence with ὅ
[“which”] is by no means the same as the sentence with ἥ [“which”], or to be
taken as simply a closer definition of the ἐντολή [“commandment”]. Apart from
the question,—which, however, we ought not to omit,—why the apostle in that case
did not use the feminine pronoun, the thought would on that supposition be
altogether different. If we had a relative clause with ἥ [“which”] belonging to
the ἐντολή [“commandment”], we should have generally only one objective
definition; brotherly love would be simply called a new commandment; but as it
is, we find two parallel definitions of it,—one as a new commandment, and the
other as something that is truth in the readers. But if we regard the form as
settled, the matter of the sentence meets us with new questions. For instance,
how comes it to pass that what is truth in the readers—that is, according to the
firmly fixed idea of the word, living reality in them—is yet exhibited as a
commandment? This would seem indeed to place the reality of what is commanded
before the readers as their aim, and not regard it as a present experienced
fact. Again, how is it possible that what is supposed to be a reality in the
readers, is nevertheless described to them as a new announcement? But the view
we have established of the ἐντολὴκαινή [“new commandment”] itself suggests the
possibility of giving right answers to these questions.

We have seen that objectively, in relation to brotherly love, there has been a
twofold commandment; for, while it was taught from the beginning, both in the
Old Testament and in the New, it was so taught by the passion of Christ as to
become an altogether new commandment. Not only so; we have seen, further, that
subjectively also in the life of every Christian the same twofold characteristic
approves itself: in the beginning of the Christian career love is of the former,
in its further stages it is of the latter kind. Further, we have discerned that
brotherly love as an ἐντολὴκαινή [“new commandment”] can by no means be
fulfilled as an obligatory law; that its nature is rather to flow from its own
free and independent personal impulse, while at the same time it is effectual
only through the Spirit of Him who exercised it symbolically and in its original
and perfect character. Now, if the readers of the Epistle have received this
Spirit, there must be in them at least the commencement or starting-point of
this new and higher brotherly love; in some definite degree it must have become
in them ἀληθής [“true”]. It is therefore a new commandment only in as far as
now, in virtue of the apostle’s word, they are, on the one hand, made conscious
of its possession, the old precept becoming a new one because now it has become
their own conscious possession; and, on the other hand, that word presents to
them that which they already had, being Christians, as now to be a conscious
end, the realization, and indeed perfect realization of which must be their
problem and goal: thus this higher kind of brotherly love becomes after all an
ἐντολή [“commandment”] to them. What we, in our remarks upon Joh 13:34, saw to
be a feature of the new commandment,—that it was at once a commandment and yet
not a commandment, because springing directly from the impulse of the
heart,—that the apostle says here expressly; and this, as we think, impresses on
our exposition the seal of its approval. Thus, as the previous words present the
brotherly love which the apostle commends as at once an old and yet a new
commandment, so in our verse it is presented as a commandment, and yet again as
not a commandment. But this double character of the idea is designedly not
exhibited as an antithesis,—as if it were ἐντολὴν παλαιάν γράφω ὑμῖν, πάλιν δὲ
καινήν [“I am writing to you an old commandment, but on the other hand, new”],—
but as perfectly interwoven and one. Hence the first time it is the πάλιν
[“again”], merely marking a new starting-point; the second time, the simple
appositional clause ὅ ἐστιν ἀληθὲς [“which is true”].

Thus upon the complete sentence, as appended, ἀληθὲς ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν ὑμῖν [“true
in him and in you”], there now falls a clear light,—that is, the brotherly love
now in question as ἐντολὴκαινή [“new commandment”] has been brought into the
world only through the example of Christ, and can by us be attained only through
fellowship with Him. Hence the apostle, by ἐν αὐτῷ [“in him”], assigns the
reason on account of which this brotherly love was in them, so far as it really
dwelt in their souls. But how it comes to pass that what in Christ is truth is
truth also in them, the last words of the verse explain: ὅτι ἡ σκοτία παράγεται,
καὶ τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινὸν ἤδη φαίνει [“that the darkness is passing away and the
true light is already shining”]. That this ὅτι [“that”] is not declarative, and
to be taken as stating the contents of the ἐντολὴκαινή [“new commandment”], is
obvious from the very matter of the sentence. It describes, forsooth, a purely
objective historical fact, while the idea of ἐντολή [“commandment”] in its very
nature contains a subjective element: I may indeed represent a fact as at the
same time involving a requirement, as indeed this clause shows; but a mere
objective fact cannot as such be called an ἐντολή [“commandment”]. Thus the
words simply announce a reason. But of what must a reason be given? We might
think of the ἐντολὴκαινή [“new commandment”], and say that the apostle gives
this command because of the fact now impressively stated: “since now the
darkness recedes, the true light now unfolds its reality; walk then as it
becomes you, like τέκναφωτός, [“children of light”], in this light.” The
warranty for the precept would then be essentially parallel with that of Rom
13:11-14.

Against this we have nothing really material to urge; but still the reason
assigned is more pointed, and appears to us more natural also, if we refer the
causal clause to the immediately preceding sentence, ὅ ἐστιν ἀληθὲς ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ
ἐν ὑμῖν [“which is true in him and in you”], thus making it explain how that
commandment has its reality in us: to put it more plainly, a reason is given for
the καί in the words referred to. “Ye are indeed already under the power of the
light; therefore that which is ἐν αὐτῷ [“in him”] is also ἐν ὑμῖν [“in you”],
and the law which I demand has its reality in you; but the great consideration
is, that it be brought into full consciousness and to its perfection.” The
darkness is passing away, St. John writes. He does not add, in connection with
it, ἐν ὑμῖν [“in you”]: the proposition is therefore to be taken in its
universality. The place in which the darkness reigns is, as we saw on chapter 1,
the world in its biblical meaning; and with the appearing of Him who has
overcome the world, both it and its prince are judged and condemned, and the
power of darkness is broken. It has not yet passed away, but it is in the act of
passing; the spread of the kingdom of God, and, what is equivalent to that, the
passing away of the world, are the signature and the very matter of all church
history. But alongside of this negative, the παράγεσθαι [“departure”] of the
darkness, there runs a parallel positive, τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινὸν ἤδη φαίνει [“the
light is already shining”]. This expression is a distinct remembrancer of Joh
1:4, 1Jn 1:9, in which latter verse we find it in the same words; and if we add
that St. John always understands by φῶς [“light”], Christ, or, as in 1Jn 1:5
here, God, it will commend itself to think of the Lord Himself as here directly
signified. It is not a contradiction to this, that in the previous words the
σκοτία [“darkness”] does not expressly refer to a person; for we have already
shown on 1Jn 1:5 that here lies the all-pervading distinction, that while the
light is concentrated in a person, the darkness never is. All goodness is in the
power of divine light, a lesser jet from the greater Flame; but all evil, while
it is occasioned by Satan, is not in the same sense an effluence from him as the
light is an out-beaming from God.

Christ, however, is not called φῶς [“light”] merely, but φῶς ἀληθινόν [“true
light”]: a genuine Johannaean appendage. While ἀλήθεια [“truth”] signifies the
objective truth which is absolute fulness and reality, ἀληθινόν [“true”]
signifies that a specified person is that which is predicated of him in the
fullest possible degree. It is the application of the ἀλήθεια [“truth”] to one
particular question or point; yet so that ἀληθινός [“true”], as compared with
ἀληθής [“truly”], specifies the form as opposed to the matter: φῶς ἀληθές [“true
light”] would mean that the light is a true one, and not merely has the
semblance of it; φῶς ἀληθινόν [“true light”], on the contrary, declares that the
idea φῶς [“light”] must be taken in its full reality. The true light “already”
shineth: the ἤδη [“already”] is the correlative of the present παράγεται
[“passing away”] in the preceding sentence; the light has already commenced its
activity. This clause also is altogether general and objective,—spoken without
any external or obvious reference to the readers. But when we consider that, as
the σκοτία [“darkness”] comes to manifestation in the κόσμος [“world”], so the
light developes its energy in the βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ [“kingdom of God”]; and
again, that the readers are supposed to be τῷ φωτὶ περιπατοῦντες [“walking in
the light”], living under the power of the light,—it will be clear that these
general statements also specifically indicate that the light appears in them,
that they have their portion in that love which is gathered up in the φῶς
ἀληθινόν [“true light”].

How far this is the case, thus how far brotherly love can be exhibited as the
consequence of walking in light; that is to say, further, how far the close of
the eighth verse demonstrates the beginning of it; and lastly, how far the whole
section results from the one sentence θεὸς φῶς [“God is light”],—is now the
concluding question which requires summary answer. The collective elements of
the answer lie in the words of the apostle. If Christ, namely, like God, is φῶς
[“light”],—if His walk was a walk in love,—it is clear that fellowship with His
light-nature is and must be fellowship with His walk in love. What inwardly, in
the subjects themselves, approves itself as ἀλήθεια [“truth”], shows itself
outwardly in relation to other subjects as ἀγάπη [“love”].


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  CHAPTER 19: 19 - 1JN 2:9-11
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1Jn 2:9-11

Ὁ λέγων ἐν τῷ φωτὶ εἶναι, καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ μισῶν, ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ ἐστὶν ἕως
ἄρτι. Ὁ ἀγαπῶν τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ, ἐν τῷ φωτὶ μένει, καὶ σκάνδαλον ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ
ἔστιν· ὁ δὲ μισῶν τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ‚ ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ
περιπατεῖ, καὶ οὐκ οἶδε ποῦ ὑπὰγει, ὃτι ἡ σκοτία ἐτύφλωσε τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς αὐτοῦ.
The two verses just expounded correspond, in their relation to the whole, with
the third verse of the chapter: in both cases the matter of the sub-section is
summed up compendiously and placed at the head. The following verses, from 1Jn
2:7-9, correspond, on the one hand, to1Jn 2:4-5within our second section; while,
on the other hand, they run parallel with 1Jn 1:8-10. The thought presented in
the preceding words is now elucidated; but in the genuine Johannaean style, that
of bringing out into prominence the constituent elements involved in the ideas
themselves. We might well wonder that the apostle, after he had preparatively
spoken of brotherly love with such solemn and plain emphasis, should now descend
to the terseness of simple dialectical disquisition about it. But it is
precisely here, where he has set the supreme beauty of brotherly love before his
readers in the preceding words, that he now, with inexorable logic, asks the
question, Art thou of God or not? Hast thou attained thisgoal or not? The former
of the verses is here also negative, as we have found to be the case always. He
who saith that he is in the light—the expression is occasioned by the words
going just before, τὸφῶςἤδηφαίνει [“the light is already shining”]—and
doesnotlove: this is the first supposition. Fellowship with God, and with God as
light, is ever the final goal of all the apostle’s exhortations: hence this is
placed here in the foreground. But here this fellowship is only asserted: in
very fact there is, hatred instead. The formal negation,μὴἀγαπᾶν [“do not
love”], is displaced in favour of the full positive expressionμένειν [“to
abide”].Tertium non datur. Particularly in the case of brethren, and in relation
to them,—for that is the question here,—indifference is utterly impossible. We
may indeed speak in common life of inclinations and dislikes, but these are
really nothing but stages of love or hatred not yet come to their full
development or into clear consciousness. Indeed, the apostle does not speak of
hatred in general, but of the most fearful and unnatural hatred: that which has
our brethren for its object. The expression may refer to theπλησίον
[“neighbour”], to every man; but also specifically to those whowith us are
members of the body of Christ. Now, as the apostle in what precedes had been
exhorting us so to love as Jesus loved; as he almost expressly reminds us of the
feet-washing, and this, we know, referred, like the whole section of the
Gospelin which theἐντολὴκαινή [“new commandment”]is the subject (John 13:1-38,
John 14:1-31, John 15:1-27, John 16:1-33, John 17:1-26), to the disciples of
Jesus in the strictestsense, we are constrained to limit the term “brethren”to
the inmost circle of the Christian discipleship. But we should expect here, as
parallel with the corresponding verse of the previous section, some such
conclusion as ψεύστηςἐστίν [“is a liar”]. Instead of this, the apostle lays down
here, with keen severity, the antithesis of the mere assertion of walking in the
light ὁλέγων [“the one who says”] in the words τῇσκοτίᾳ ἐστὶνἕωςἄρτι [“is in the
darkness until now”]. The last words evidently have the emphasis. Even yet: so
much and so long as he nevertheless declares the contrary; or, probably with
more correctness: even yet, although the true light already shines and the
darkness is wearing away.

Now for the obverse of all this. He that loveth his brother—here also, as in 1Jn
1:9, the direct antithesis is not formally indicated, but to the feeling of the
reader it is thereby all the more emphatic—abideth in the light. Assuredly this
light is not kindled in him by brotherly love; but this latter is itself the
result of the εἶναιἐντῷφωτὶ [“is in the light”]. But as, in the natural life,
life itself is the condition of all living activities, and is then by these
activities confirmed and strengthened, so it is in this case. Hence the
expression μένειν [“to abide”]. By the side of this positive benediction of the
ἀγαπᾶντοὺςἀδελφούς [“love of the brothers”] there runs a negative: σκάνδαλονἐν
αὐτῷοὐκἔστιν [“no cause for stumbling in him”]. But the question, very difficult
of decision, arises, whether the offence has for its object the ἀγαπᾶν [“love”]
itself or the brethren,—that is, whether the believer has no occasion of his own
sin in himself, or is not to be an occasion of sinning to his brother. There are
weighty reasons on both sides. In favour of the former is the strong
consideration, that throughout the whole section the subject is how every
individual is to secure his own salvation, not how he may effect or influence
his brethren’s. And this view of it would yield a good meaning. As all sin is
egoism, he who in love walks as Christ walked has no longer any impulse of sin
within him; every temptation to sin is restrained by the habitual stream of love
from issuing in act. On the other hand, in favour of the second meaning is the
consistent usage of the New Testament, which without exception regards σκάνδαλον
[“cause for stumbling”] as the offence or cause of stumbling which may be put in
the way of others. And when we reflect with what solemn earnestness our Lord, in
St. Matthew and St. Luke, threatens those who are the cause of offence, it is
evident that in fact there is a higher blessing in being exempt from cause of
stumbling in our fellow-Christians. And with this agrees our experience, that
lovelessness on our part is wont to occasion sin in others beyond anything else;
and the doctrine of St. Peter, that we by well-doing, or by expressions of love,
may stop the mouths of ignorant men. Consequently, we may well temporarily
decide for this latter interpretation, without, however, being able positively
to refute the other.

Just as in the second sub-section of the first section, the second of our
present one also consists of three clauses; and the third (1Jn 2:11) is here, as
there, more full and more forcible than the preceding ones. He that hateth his
brother not only is in darkness,—that was also already in the μένει [“to
abide”], of 1Jn 2:9, —but the darkness rules all the actions of his life,
περιπατεῖ ἐν τῇσκοτίᾳ [“walk in darkness”]; and, forsooth, as his way is wrapped
in darkness, his goal also is hidden from him, οὐκ οἶδε ποῦ ὑπάγει. Now, when a
verb of motion like ὑπάγειν [“going”] is connected with a ποῦ [“where”], that
is, with an adverb of rest, corresponding to ἐν [“in”] with a dative, two points
are made emphatic: as well the movement to an end as also the result of it. And
what is the goal to which the hating man moves without knowing it? Generally, it
is quite right to explain that he knows not to what a depth of sinful ruin he
may be driven down by means of his hatred. But it is simpler and more exact to
take the σκοτία [“darkness”] itself as his goal. The persons in question say,
and that without conscious hypocrisy, that they are in the light; and precisely
through this ignorance as to their own condition, as to the way in which they
are found, they are blinded also as to the goal, which is again no other than
darkness. And how comes it that they so absolutely know not this sure end of
all? The same darkness hath blinded their eyes. Ὀφθαλμοὺς [“eyes”] is not the
“natural power of apprehension,” the intellectual eye in the ordinary sense; but
in the New Testament style it is the organ by means of which man becomes
susceptible to the powers of light and dark ness compassing him about, this
being altogether distinct from the mere understanding. According as it is
determined in its function by the one or the other, is the whole man light or
darkness. Finally, let us not fail to observe the progression in the last three
verses: 1Jn 2:9 has only one predicate in the conclusion, 1Jn 2:10 has two, 1Jn
2:11 three.


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  CHAPTER 20: 20 - 1JN 2:12-14
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1Jn 2:12-14

Γράφω ὑμῖν, τεκνία, ὅτι ἀφέωνται ὑμῖν αἱ ἁμαρτίαι διὰ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ. Γράφω
ὑμῖν, πατέρες, ὅτι ἐγνώκατε τὸν ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς. γράφω ὑμῖν, νεανίσκοι, ὅτι νενικήκατε
τὸν πονηρόν. γράφω ὑμῖν, παιδία, ὅτι ἐγνώκατε τὸν πατέρα. Ἔγραψα ὑμῖν, πατέρες,
ὅτι ἐγνώκατε τὸν ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς. ἔγραψα ὑμῖν, νεανίσκοι, ὅτι ἰσχυροί ἐστε, καὶ ὁ
λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐν ὑμῖν μένει, καὶ νενικήκατε τὸν πονηρόν. The position of the
three following verses in the organism of the Epistle cannot be determined
before we have examined their meaning somewhat in detail, and made it clear to
our minds. The apostle addresses himself to his readers in a sixfold appeal; but
the meaning of this depends in some measure on the right reading in1Jn 2:13. If
the Textus Receptusin that verse is correct,γράφωὑμῖνπαιδία [“I write to you
children”],it is inevitably necessary to connect thisγράφω[“I write”]with
theγράφω[“I write”]of the three previous clauses; but in that case the
πατέρες[“fathers”] must, in contradistinction from the πατέρες [“fathers”] and
νεανίσκοι [“young men”] of the two former members, be understood of actual
children, so that the apostle would be supposed to address three several classes
of age. But the external evidence is very strong in favour of the other reading,
ἔγραψαὑμῖνπαιδία [“I wrote to you children”].In that case the clause no longer
belongs to the preceding, but to the following; and we have three denominations
of the readers in parallel and contrast: on the one hand,τεκνία [“little
children”], πατέρες[“fathers”], and νεανίσκοι [“young men”] bound together
byγράφω[“I write”];and, on the other hand,παιδία [“children”],
πατέρες[“fathers”], νεανίσκοι[“young men”] bound together by ἔγραψα [“I wrote”].
But then it is further obvious that byπαιδία [“children”] andτεκνία [“little
children”] children are not meant in the sense of physical age; all the readers
are thus classed together as a whole, as in1Jn 2:1. The very order seems at once
to indicate this. If actual children had been intended, the apostle would
certainly have arranged the terms in natural order, either advancing from the
youngest to the eldest, or taking the inverted line; but to mention children
first, then the fathers, and then again young men, has in it something
inharmonious. To this may be added that, supposing children generally in
physical age to have been meant, the antithesis to the νεανίσκοι[“young
men”]would require us to think of little children; but neither were these
present in the Christian assembly, for which the Epistle was primarily designed,
nor can they be supposed to have been in a position to understand the apostle’s
missive. Thus, then, the apostle addresses the whole church twice in the first
place, and then turns to the older and younger among them with special
exhortation : whether older and younger in a physical sense must be as yet left
undetermined.

Then, further, the sixfold ὅτι [“that”] in the foreground requires explanation:
the question being whether it gives the matter of the γράφω [“I write”], or the
reason assigned for it. The latter is decidedly the right view. An emphatic
assertion of the good degree, the καλόςβαθμός [“a good standing”], which the
church had purchased to itself, is not the substance of the Epistle ; nor could
it be such, unless the document had been meant to be a letter of consolation
against undue despondency, or an epistle of commendation. But it is most
manifestly neither of these. So then we must take ὅτι [“that”] as causative :
precisely because the churches were in the enjoyment and in the labour of faith,
the apostle writes to them the letter before us. He does not teach the elements
of Christianity; but it is his design to lay the finishing touches on their
perfection, and bring to maturity the πλήρωσις[LSJ] [“fullness”] of their χαρά
[“joy”].

What the apostle says to the church as a whole in his first clause, 1Jn
2:12,—that he writes to them under the supposition that they were already
partakers of the forgiveness of sins,—appears not to be in harmony with 1Jn
2:1-1, where he mentions this forgiveness of sins as the object of his writing.
In fact, this contradiction is the same as in the eighth verse, where the
apostle lays that down as an ἐντολή [“commandment”] which he in the same breath
acknowledges they had already realized; no other than what pervades the whole
Epistle, which everywhere presupposes Christianity in the hearers and yet
teaches it. It is precisely this relation, this substructure of the whole
Epistle, which explains why St. John writes nothing new, and yet writes the old
as being new: his presupposition and his object are one and the same. And the
forgiveness of sins1 he presupposes more definitely as having been
διάτὸὄνομααὐτοῦ [“through his name”]. That the pronoun here refers to Christ,
must be taken for granted because of the διά with accusative, “on account of.”
But the name might generally be explained as the revelation of His person, as
the name which the Lord by His deeds has made for Himself; but it may also refer
to that name of Christ of which mention had been made, and the idea inherent in
which was in the apostle’s immediate memory, φῶςἀληθινόν [“true light”]. The
Lord, who is light, and came to bring light into the world, has for the sake of
this His name vouchsafed us forgiveness.

Ifwehave not missed the meaning of theτεκνία [“little children”],as referring,
namely, to the whole church, it will be thereby firmly established that the two
specific utterances in regard to the πατέρες[“fathers”]and theνεανίσκοι[“young
men”]are simply deductions from the immediately preceding general clause. Now
the forgiveness of sin has two aspects: on the one hand, it produces a strong
warfare against sin, and that in the order of time is its first result; on the
other hand, it assures a deeper knowledge of the Saviour through whom so great a
benefit has been obtained and is continuously appropriated. This latter stage is
not reached without some experience of the Christian life; it is the point of
contest with sin, and therefore belongs rather, or belongs in a higher degree,
to the later period of the Christian course. For, all knowledge of the Lord
which may be supposed to spring from anything besides a warfare for the more and
more perfect appropriation of the redeeming work of Christ, would be merely
theoretic knowledge, and dead therefore in its relation to the true Christian
life. The apostle here gives prominence to this second aspect of the matter; and
the reason is that he will begin with the fathers, who naturally assumed the
more important place in the Christian church and in any allusion to its members.
The expressionsπατέρες[“fathers”] and νεανίσκοι[“young men”] must not be
referred to merely intellectual stages of advancement: the second of the words
will not allow this, as being entirely unsuitable. At the same time, it may be
naturally supposed that the elders, who had of course occupied their place
longer in the Christian church, and had more experience of life, were also
intellectually more mature than the younger. When the apostle presupposes that
the elders had knownτὸν ἀπ᾿ ἀρχῆς [“from the beginning”],the connection requires
us to understand this of our Lord Christ alone. The strongest argument is not
that the first words of the Epistle,ὃἦν ἀπ᾿ ἀρχῆς, [“what was from the
beginning”],as also the beginning of the Gospel, contain similar descriptions of
the Son; but that the forgiveness of sins emphasized in the previous
verse,διὰτὸὄνομαΧριστοῦ [“through the name of Christ”],suggests at once rather
the knowledge of the Son than the knowledge of the Father. The young men, on the
contrary, have overcome the wicked one; they have successfully withstood
hisμεθοδείας [“schemes”] (Eph 6:11). The thought seems to enter here without any
point of connection and unprepared for. Forgiveness of sins had been mentioned
in the first chapter and in the beginning of the second: what, however, of
theπονηρός [“the evil one’] and the victory over him? But when we come to
remember that theσκοτία[“darkness”], as in antithesis to the light, was a
prominent idea in the previous paragraphs, and that it is this wicked one who
has theἐξουσίατοῦσκότους [“the power of darkness”],we shall not after all find
the present mention of him so entirely isolated. That this victory over the
enemy is described in the perfect tense, is not to be regarded as meaning that
the victory was determined or finally settled and ended: it simply draws a
conclusion from the already past life of the young men. With the third member of
the thirteenth verse the second triad of addresses begins. The most striking
difference we encounter is the changedἔγραψα [“I wrote”];which is all the more
important a difference because of the general similarity in the contents of the
two triads. The essentially identical substance of the two sub-sections makes it
evident that the apostle’s aim is to lay down in the most emphatic way possible
the general fact of the Christian life and of the Christian knowledge in the
churches. Hence it seems at once obvious to take the repetition of the verb in
the sense of confirmation or additional assurance, in some distant analogy with
theὃγέγραφαγέγραφα [“what I have written I have written”],John 19:22: “I write
unto you, and I assert it again that for these reasons I write to you;”
essentially if not formally the same repetition is presented here as in Php
4:4,χαίρετε,πάλινἐρῶχαίρετε [“rejoice, again I say rejoice”].But after all, this
only accounts for the simple repetition generally, and does not explain the
preterite form of the verb. We do not read, as we might
expect,γράφωκαὶπάλινγράφω [“I write and again I write”].It is hardly admissible
to refer the preterite to the first part of the Epistle now finished, and the
preceding present to the whole of the Epistle itself,—I write unto you generally
for these reasons, and for them have specially written the previous
words,—because, first, the perfectγέγραφα [“I have written”] would have been the
more obvious form, and secondly, we should naturally expect the order to be
inverted: “I have written what precedes under this presupposition, as indeed my
whole Epistle proceeds from it.” Nor will it help the case to refer theἔγραψα
[“I wrote”] to earlier writings of St. John, such as the Gospel; for in that
case there would certainly have been some such appendage as “I write to you now,
as I have written to you before.” Nothing remains, then, but that we refer as
well theἔγραψα [“I wrote”] as the γράφω[“I write”] to the entire Epistle lying
before us; in which case the great point is to determine why at one moment the
apostle regards his writing as a matter of the present, and the next moment
views itaoristically.

Now there is certainly a good reason for this, if the writer’s purpose is to
reassert what he had said in theγράφω[“I write”]for the sake or in the service
of some particular application. This distinctive application must then be sought
in what immediately follows. The meaning would be: “I write to you on the ground
of your Christian estate; as first said, I have been induced to write for this
reason, and hence the strong injunction which I must address to you, μὴ ἀγαπᾶτε
τὸν κόσμον [“do not love the world”],” 1Jn 2:15.That, in fact, those following
words of injunction did rest upon the presupposition of their Christian
character needs no proof; for1Jn 2:15ff. themselves assert the conclusion that
the love of the world and the love of God cannot co-exist or tolerate each
other. It might be objected that this “and hence,” which we have supplied in1Jn
2:15, stands not in the text. But when we find in three consecutive sentences
the reasons given so emphatically forμὴ ἀγαπᾶν τὸν κόσμον [“to not love the
world”],there seems no strict necessity to express formally the causal relation.
After1Jn 2:14 we have thus to insert a colon; before1Jn 2:13cnot only a point,
but a period, the close of a sub-section. “I have written or wrote unto you, as
I have said, only on the supposition of your fellowship with the light, of your
victory over the darkness:” love not the world, for otherwise(1Jn 2:15b)you
discredit and shame my supposition.” In the presentγράφω[“I write”] the apostle
has in view the passing act in which he is engaged; in theaorist ἔγραψα [“I
wrote”] the Epistle is in his mind represented as finished; he speaks
historically of the intellectual conception of the Epistle which preceded the
actual performance of the writing. Because the conception of it was perfected,
and in fact its realization half accomplished, the apostle could speak of his
letter as of an historical fact; that he actually does so speak has this for its
reason, that his writing rests upon the presupposition that his readers will
follow his exhortation, μὴ ἀγαπᾶτε τὸν κόσμον [“do not love the world”]. Because
his letter was produced by these express presuppositions, the churches must on
that very account answer to them. To sum up all: the preterite form has for its
reason this, that the following injunction is presented as the necessary result
of the expectationsand presuppositions which lie at the basis of the Epistle. In
this way the course of thought pursued in the portion of that Epistle now closed
reaches the conclusion which the unity of its structure would lead us to
expect.1Jn 1:6-10 corresponds most exactly in its construction with1Jn 2:3-11;
but for1Jn 2:1-2 we find no parallel member remaining. From quite a different
point of view, we have come to the conviction that this parallel member is to be
found here: it in fact consists of1Jn 2:12-13b. The most important difference
between these two parallels is this, that1Jn 2:1-2 recapitulates only one half
of its theme in the arrangement; while, on the other hand,1Jn 2:6, 1Jn 2:12-13b
not only brings in the other half, but also winds up the two previous sections,
though its form is specifically determined by the second of them. With this
parallel relation of the two periods theγράφω[“I write”] beginning each of
them,1Jn 2:1 and1Jn 2:12, and the address to the church in τεκνία [“little
children”] common to the two, agree. Both recapitulations or resumptions give
prominence to the forgiveness of sins, but in a different way: the former makes
it an end to be attained, the latter makes it the basis or reason of the
apostle’s writing. We have already seen that the difference is only an apparent
one; but that the form in1Jn 2:12 is determined and occasioned by the thought
expressed in1Jn 2:8. The two clauses which enter into detail,1Jn 2:13aand 1Jn
2:13b, answer admirably to the resuming purpose of the period. The γνῶσίς
[“knowledge”] is in1Jn 2:3 the first fundamental thought of the second
sub-section; hence it is taken up again, not, however, as the knowledge of the
Father, as in1Jn 2:3, but as that of the Son, for throughout1Jn 2:6ff.the
knowledge of God has been specifically defined as the knowledge of Christ. And
the idea of the victory over the wicked one is contained,1Jn 2:8, in the clauseἡ
σκοτία παράγεται καὶ τὸ φῶς ἤδη φαίνει [“the darkness is passing away and the
true light is already shining”],which, to those who know the Gospel of St. John,
includes the notion of a contest between light and darkness, God and Satan.

Thus with the ἔγραψα [“I wrote”] of 1Jn 2:13c there begins an altogether new
section of the Epistle, which first of all resumes the presuppositions of the
apostle uttered at the close of the first part, in order to carry them onwards
to further uses. But, after the Johannaean manner, this resumption takes place
not in exactly the same words. In the place of the forgiveness of sins, which
was attributed to the church as a whole in 1Jn 2:12, comes in here the knowledge
of the Father. When we mark that in the section commenced with these words the
χρῖσμα [“anointing”] from God, and the knowledge of the truth thus guaranteed,
forms the conclusive particular in the apostle’s argumentation, that the whole
subject is the separation from the antichrists, and the marks by which they are
to be known, it is very evident why the apostle describes fellow ship with God
under the precise aspect of the knowledge of the Father. This knowledge of the
Father falls in 1Jn 2:14 again into two elements: the knowledge of the Son, and
victory over the evil one. Like the forgiveness of sins, the knowledge of God
also has two sides, one more theoretic and the other more practical; yet so that
the former is the foundation or presupposal of the latter. The latter is the
conflict against sin resting upon the knowledge of the good and holy will of
God; and it is pre-eminently ascribed to the young men. They are, in virtue of
their knowledge of God, or, more strictly, in virtue of their living insight
into His nature as light, ἰσχυροί [“strong ones”]: the knowledge that they stand
not alone, but that the strength of the light works in them, and on them, and
for them, makes them strong; further, the λόγοςτοῦθεοῦ [“word of God”] abides in
them, the living and effectual message of Jesus Christ and about Jesus Christ,
the concrete substance of the γνῶσίςτοῦπατρὸς [“knowledge of the Father”], has
found a place in them; and, finally, through this divine power, which lies in
the divine word, they have maintained a victorious contest against the darkness
and its prince. On the other hand, the γνῶσίςτοῦπατρὸς [“knowledge of the
Father”] has also a more theoretical side; the repose of age and the experience
of the Christian life have matured this in the fathers. They have known
τὸνἀπ᾿ἀρχῆς [“the one from the beginning”], that is, according to the
explanation already given, the Son of God. The general fellowship with God, with
the light, is specialized into fellowship with the Saviour; he who knoweth God
knoweth Him in His Son, who has said, “He that hath seen Me hath seen the
Father.”

Footnote

1The form ἀφέωνται [“have been forgiven”] is grammatically difficult. But in
Suidas, Etym. ex Herodiano, gram. Bekk. 470, 15, there is for ἀφεῖκα [“I have
forgiven”], a Doric and even Attic form vouched, from which ἀφεώκαμεν [“we have
forgiven”] and ἀφεωκέναι [“they have forgiven”] have sprung; similarly, the
Pass, in inscript. Arcad. in the imperative form ἀφεώσθω [“forgive”]. All this
leads to the assumption of an extended form ἑόω (heoō) instead of the common ἕω
(heō), against the formation of which nothing can be grammatically urged.
Compare on the passages quoted, Steph. Thes. I. p. 2662.


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  CHAPTER 21: 21 - 1JN 2:15
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1Jn 2:15

Μὴ ἀγαπᾶτε τὸν κόσμον, μηδὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ· ἐάν τις ἀγαπᾷ τὸν κόσμον, οὐκ ἔστιν
ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ πατρὸς ἐν αὐτῷ·

1Jn 2:13-14have laid the foundation of what now follows. Theapostlehas written
only on the presuppositionof their estate of Christian life and knowledge as
just described: thusresults for the churches the requirement to
correspondwiththis presupposition; and thiscanbe only through thehabsolute
abnegationof the powerofdarknessandwithdrawal from it. Hitherto theapostlehas
spoken positively on the whole;thenegative clauseshavebeenintroduced only
fortheclearing of the thought. But now theorderis inverted. No longer is the
nature ofκοινωνίατοῦφωτός [“fellowship of light”] the matter of his theme,butthe
nature of theσκοτία [“darkness”].Now, in order to warn them againstalland every
fellowship with darkness, the author exhibitsin concretothe form in which the
darkness presents itself,whereits kingdom is to be found, and thereforeagainst
whatthe Christ has to defend Himself. Hence, in theplaceof themoreabstract
andgeneralidea of darkness,comesin the more concrete ideaof theκόσμος
[“world”],which isthenagain resolved into its elements and further
developed.Σκοτία [“darkness”] andκόσμος [“world”] have the
samesubstantialcontents;but,whileσκοτία [“darkness”] is theanimating
principle,κόσμος [“world”] isthe domainin which thisprincipleworks;and theyare
relatedto each other as thesoulandthe body;theκόσμος [“world”] becomesκόσμος
[“world”] through theσκοτία [“darkness”] manifesting itself in
it.Everything,however, is subjected tothepower of darkness whichgenerally is on
earth, sofar asit has not beenrenewedbygrace;thus not only the worldof
mankindbelongstotheκόσμος [“world”]; theἐπιθυμία τῆς σαρκὸς [“lust of the
flesh”], which ispresentlymentioned as anelementoftheκόσμος [“world”], does
notalways spring absolutelyfrom man;thewhole region ofcreated things,as
described inGen 1:2ff., is subjectedto sin. But, onthe other hand,mankindbelongs
also totheκόσμος [“world”], because mankind is absolutely and
throughoutentangledin sin. The counterpart of theκόσμος [“world”], as the
kingdom of darkness, is that of the light, theβασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ [“kingdom of
God”], the limits of which in the divine ordination and its final goal are
precisely the same as those of theκόσμος [“world”], that is to say, the whole
domain of the creation.

Thus betweenκόσμος [“world”] andβασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ [“kingdom of God”] there
isprecisely the same relation as there is in a narrower spherebetween two
similar antitheses or counterparts.σῶμα [“body”] towit, is avox media,the
corporeity of man purely of itself, apart from the power dominating in it.
Butσάρξ [“flesh”] is thatσῶμα [“body”] so far as it is thoroughly penetrated
andswayed.by sinful powers; so far as it is, on the other hand, filled with
divine energies, it iscalleda newor glorifiedbody. Just so in regard to our
present counterpart ideas. Thevox media,which here corresponds to theσῶμα
[“body”], isἡ γῆ καὶ τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτῆς, [“the earth and the fullness thereof”]
Psa 24:1[LXX 23:1], theκτίσις[“creation”],Rom 8:19.Sofar as this sum of created
things is interpenetrated andswayed by the powers of darkness, it is
calledκόσμος [“world”]; sofar as it is, on theotherhand, filledandanimated by
divine energies, it is called the new heaven anu thenew earth. With the
injunction not to loveτὸν κόσμον [“the world”] is connected the further
injunction not to loveτὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ [“the things in the world”].Twoexplanations
may be given of this. It were mostobviousto understand by it the objects present
in the world, the things which collectively make up the ideaof theκόσμος
[“world”]. But that would involve tautology. If it was the apostle’s mind to
make emphatic that we should love neither theworld in general nor anything in
particular belonging it,the expression chosen would not havebeenappropriatefor
that thought; instead ofτὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ [ta en tō kosmō,“the things in the
world”], itoughtto have beenμηδὲν τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ [mēden tōn en tō
kosmō,“and not of things in the world”], orsomething like it. However, the
following verse makes it quiteimpossible tounderstand byτὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ [“the
things in the world”] the particularobjectsexisting in the world. That is to
say,when1Jn 2:16begins withπᾶν τὸ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ [“all that is in the world”], it
is manifestthatthisexpressionis equivalent to ourτὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ [“the things in
the world”]:what in the one case is comprehended in the neuter plural is inthe
second case reduced to unity by the πᾶν[“all”]. But when we read, further, that
theἐπιθυμία τῆς σαρκὸς [“desire of the flesh”]and τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν [“of the eyes”],
as also theἀλαζονείατοῦβίου [“boastful pride of life”],are theπᾶν τὸ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ
[“all that is in the world”],we have given to us a fingerpost for the true
interpretation of our expression. Those three terms are obviously not individual
objects in the world, but the ethical quality adherent to those objects. It is
true thatἐπιθυμία [“desire”] might express not the desire itself, but by
metonymy the objects of the desire; yet the additionτῆς σαρκὸς [“of the flesh”],
and still moreτῶν ὀφθαλμῶν [“of the eyes”],demands the former meaning; and
certainlyἀλαζονεία [“boastful pride”]can only be referred to an ethical
subjective quality. Accordingly, we are not permitted to interpret theπᾶν τὸ ἐν
τῷ κόσμῳ [“all that is in the world”],and by consequenceτὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ [“the
things in the world”],of the objects which constitute the κόσμος [“world”]. As
in the expression, “that which is in man,” we may understand not merely the
individual attributes that are found in him, but also the characteristic quality
which marks and expresses his whole life and nature; so also in our expression,
“that which is in the world,” we may understand the element that makes the world
to be world, its fundamental determination and inmost nature. And this idea, as
it comes out of the context, admirably fits into the context. That which makes
the world into the κόσμος [“world”], with the New Testament meaning, is not any
one object in it, but the sinful power inhering in all and pervading its
collective whole. Thus the apostle says: Love not the world, the whole circle of
objects comprised in it; and also love not—theμηδέ[“and not”] is thus as
oftenascensivein meaning—that which is in the world as its kernel and pith. The
appended clause brings out and makes prominent that which makes the love of the
world sin.

Before, however, St. John more closely in1Jn 2:16 defines and specifies the
general phraseτὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ [“the things in the world”],he indicates in the
second half of1Jn 2:15 how it is that the love of the world cannot accord with
the presupposition of a Christian walk which gave him his reason for
writing,—that is to say, because the love of the world and the love of God are
absolutely incompatible. He says,ἀγάπη τοῦ πατρὸς [“love of the father”]: for
internal reasons we may decide against the reading Θεοῦ.This, indeed, appears at
the first glance better to correspond with the general wordκόσμος [“world”],and
therefore was by some transcriber involuntarily substituted for theπατρός
[“father”], which seemed to him without any point of connection. But, in
fact,1Jn 2:14 itself, as the fundamental beginning of one section, sprang from
the ἐγνωκέναι τὸν πατέρα [“knowledge of the Father”],and it is with allusion to
that the apostle here resumes this word: “the fellowship in which I supposed you
to exist ye do not then possess; and my letter does not at all apply to you.”
Moreover, this reference back to the fundamental idea of1Jn 2:14 establishes
clearly that theἀγάπη τοῦ πατρὸς[“love of the Father”] here does not denote the
love of God to us, but our love to God. footnote Septuagint Psa 23:1

ἡγῆκαὶτὸπλήρωμααὐτῆς the earth and the fullness thereof


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  CHAPTER 22: 22 - 1JN 2:16
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1Jn 2:16

Ὅτι πᾶν τὸ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῆς σαρκὸς, καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν, καὶ
ἡ ἀλαζονεία τοῦ βίου οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου ἐστί.

Very noteworthy and strictlyJohannaeanis the method of establishing the thought
thus uttered, with which is at the same time connected a further explanation of
the idea τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ [“the things in the world”].The former takes the form of
an emphatic repetition of what had been said, while the consequences involved in
the matter itself are now brought out more tersely. This is the apostle’s
genuine method of demonstration. When we closely examine the thoughts
themselves, we find that, first of all, he specifies the con tents ofπᾶν τὸ ἐν
τῷ κόσμῳ [“all that is in the world”]by the three definitions already
mentioned,ἐπιθυμίατῆς σαρκὸς [“desire of the flesh”], ἐπιθυμία τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν
[“desire of the eyes”], ἀλαζονείατοῦ βίου [“boastful pride of life”].In the form
we have a trichotomy, which, however, resolves itself into two parts, as
theἐπιθυμία[“desire”] is developed in two directions. relation of the
ἀλαζονεία[“boastful pride”] to theἐπιθυμία[“desire”]is easily perceptible: the
latter presupposes a want, the former a possession; they are related as the
desire for enjoyment, and the enjoyment of what is desired, but in such a way
that the egoistic element is prominent. The ἀλαζονεία [“boastful pride”]is not
enjoyment in itself, but as connected with proud contempt for others; and, in
harmony with this, theἐπιθυμία[“desire”] is not desiring in itself, but the
desiring of what does not belong to me, the envying of others for the sake of
self, though this may be an unconscious sentiment. I will have, and I as in
contrast with others(ἀλαζονεία [“boastful pride”]).But
notἐπιθυμία[“desire”]andἀλαζονεία [“boastful pride”] are spoken of: they take a
definite form. The desire is partly that of the flesh, partly that of the eyes.
It is obvious that the eyes refer rather to an intellectual, psychical element
of enjoyment; the flesh rather to enjoyment in the physical domain. With this it
is connected that the flesh seeks rather active enjoyments, in which it is
itself not merely the means of that enjoyment, but also the subject that enjoys;
while the eye can only take up objects external and alien, and is viewed only as
the medium of enjoyment. Active and therefore more sensual, passive and
therefore more psychical, enjoyments are thus distinguished by the apostle. A
similar isolating specification of the eye, which, however, one might say is
already subjoined under the notion ofσάρξ [“flesh”],but by which it gains a more
independent position, we find in Mat 6:22. There the eye is set over against the
whole body; and in such a way that its characteristic quality conditions that of
the whole body. But this view of the matter is here, in conformity with the
connection, left altogether out of view.

Similarly, the termἀλαζονεία [“boastful pride”]is more closely defined by the
genitiveτοῦβίου [“of life”].St. John uses this word only once more,1Jn 3:17 but
in both passages, as throughout theNew Testament, with definite distinction
fromζωή [“life”].That is to say, like the verb βιόω[“life”] of 1Pe 1:1,—aἅπαξ
λεγόμενον[hápax legómenon, “said only once”] in the New Testament,—the noun
signifies only the external life of man as belonging to the material world,
which is sustained by eating and drinking; on the other hand, the ζωή [zōē,
“life”]refers ever to the personality of life, the spiritual being of the man,
thus forming a contrast to βίος[bios, “life”]: passages such as Luk 12:15, Luk
16:25; 1Co 1:1,[N] andJas 4:14, are no exceptions to this rule. But
bothβίος[“life”]and ζωή [“life”] occur, each in its several sphere as just
indicated, with a twofold reference. As ζωή [“life”] now describes natural
personal life, and now that life as filled with the divine eternal life; so
βίος[“life”] is sometimes used generally of the natural life in itself, and
sometimes of the powers which fill and sustain it,—that is, of thesustentationof
life. In1Jn 3:17 it is to be understood without doubt in the latter sense: how
here, is a question. The passage of this same Epistle just mentioned would
recommend us to attach to it here the same narrower meaning; but, on the other
hand, there is nothing in this passage to indicate such a restriction, while
such a restriction of the idea is not in harmony with the context, which points
to the widest possible interpretation. Not only rich nourishment, but all the
good of the present external life, high position, money, honour, and the like,
givesustentationto theἀλαζονεία [“boastful pride”].But the word βίος[“life”]is
chosen, because the life of the natural man is after all only a purely external
life. As the natural man is calledσάρξ [“flesh”], although he has also the
natural human spirit, because the flesh has the dominion, and even the most
seemingly spiritual interests stand in the long run under the empire of
corporeity impregnated with sin; so the whole life is here calledβίος[“life”],
because the pride and exultation in honour, personal consideration, and other
apparently spiritual things, are in reality nothing but the same hanging on and
cleaving to the things of the created, material world, although in another form.
As selfishness may sometimes deny itself, and postpone its pleasure, and appear
as self-renunciation; so theἀλαζονεία [“boastful pride”]may sometimes assume the
forms of a higher life, although it fundamentally springs from theσάρξ
[“flesh”]and its life, the βίος[“life”]. Now this double desire and this pride
are said to beπᾶν τὸ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ [“all that is in the world”].Or may they be
only examples of what is in the world, individual examples of theπᾶν[“all”] in
the beginning of the verse? In favour of this it may be said that the dependence
on false teachers, presently spoken of, certainly belongs to the κόσμος
[“world”];while yet it cannot be dovetailed into the specimens here adduced. But
that would be unsound argument. For the anti-Christian nature is not independent
of theἀλαζονεία [“boastful pride”]and theἐπιθυμία [“desire”];it is only the
concrete form into which these run, and it grows out of them directly. All else
that may be mentioned is only the development of these germs. But that we may
exhibit in all their clearness the thoughts of the apostle, we must once more
return and fasten our thought upon the idea of theκόσμος [“world”].We have seen
that the creation and all it contains is not of itself called κόσμος [“world”],
but only as it is determined by sin and impregnated by sinful forces. This
sinful characteristic does not inhere in itself, but it becomes partaker of it
through the fact that man makes it the instrument of his sin. Hence also its
nature and essence is presented as a subjective one; theὀφθαλμοί [“eyes”]
andσάρξ [“flesh”]; which desire belong to man, and the βίος[“life”]is the
sphere in which the man absorbs that from the earthly creation which he had
taken into his service, and has consequently also a subjective side. But in any
case, the desire and the pride itself which proceeds from the eyes, the flesh,
the life, is absolutely and altogether something subjective. Accordingly, the
proper ground and substance of the idea κόσμος [“world”] lie not in the things
of the world, but in man, who uses them. But when, on the other hand, it is said
that this desire and this pride areἐκ τοῦ κόσμου [“from the world”],the opposite
seems to hold good; sin seems to be transferred to created things, and from them
sinful desires and sinful pride seem to take their rise, and come into men. And
this view we find elsewhere in Scripture. InRom 8:19-20, ματαιότης[“depravity”]
is ascribed to the irrational creature, which longs to be freed from it, and
aδουλεία τῆς φθορᾶς[“bondage of decay”] under which it groans. And this, like
much else in the Scriptures of the Old and the New Testaments, leads us to the
thought of a change or depravation of the creature through sin. The world, which
stood in no original contact with evil, is not only depraved by man in
individual cases, or in virtue of specific sinful acts, but, as the originally
sinless body of man was not only made into the organ of sin, but in consequence
of sin evil so penetrated and pervaded it that it on its side also influences
and makes sinful the spiritual life of man; so also the whole earthly creation
has been drawn into the kingdom of darkness, and exercises now a depraving
influence on man, who had previously corrupted it. Man originally, or, more
specifically, the flesh and the eye, lusted, and he perverted the creature to
the service of pride; as the result of this, the world is so pervaded with sin,
that out of itself now the lust that covets it and the provocation to pride
proceed. The ἐπιθυμία [“desire”]andἀλαζονεία [“boastful pride”], which
originally sprang from man, now proceed from the world, and thereby it becomes
in the scriptural sense theκόσμος [“world”];thereby all that is the τὸ ἐν τῷ
κόσμῳ [“that in the world”],the evil principle filling the creature, may be said
to come ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου [“from the world”].And it is this very thing that it is
the apostle’s purpose to emphasize in one verse: he has said in the verse
preceding that love to the world and to that which is in it, as its moving
principle, cannot consist with the love of God. The evidence thus lies in the
progression from that which isἐν τῷ κόσμῳ [“in the world”] to the ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου
[“from the world”]. The difference of origin between love of God and love of the
world affirms and establishes the all-pervading and ineffaceable opposition
between the two for all time and for all stages of development.


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  CHAPTER 23: 23 - 1JN 2:17
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1Jn 2:17

Καὶ ὁ κόσμος παράγεται, καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία αὐτοῦ· ὁ δὲ ποιῶν τὸ θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ
μένει εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα. The thought is assuredly carried onward by the introduction
of a newelementin1Jn 2:17; but it is questionable whether the idea of1Jn 2:16or
that of1Jn 2:15is developed further. If that of1Jn 2:16then ’Ye have here a
second reason given for1Jn 2:15: the love of God and the loveofthe world cannot
agree together, because, first(1Jn 2:16), their origin is diametricallyopposite;
because,secondly(1Jn 2:17), their end isequallydiverse. Nevertheless, it seems
more appropriate to regard itasdeveloping1Jn 2:15:love not the world(1Jn 2:15a)
; for, first (1Jn 2:15-16), the love of the world is incompatible with the love
of God; and,secondly(1Jn 2:17), ye would, loving it, perish with the world,
while obedience towards God brings eternal life as its result. The παράγεσθαι
[“pass away”], which is here asserted concerning the world, is not absolutely
identical with that which in 1Jn 2:8 is predicated of the σκοτία [“darkness”],
although κόσμος [“world”] and σκοτία [“darkness”] are, as we have seen,
equivalent ideas. It was said in that verse that in the present state the
darkness is, in virtue of the appearance of the true light, in process of
passing away; this, therefore, is a fact stated. But here it is asserted that
the world in itself pertains to transitoriness, and this denotes an internal
quality or characteristic. That which turns away from the light is I on that
account devoted to inevitable ruin; for only the φῶς [“light”] is the ζωὴ τῶν
ἀνθρώπων [“life of humankind” cf. Joh 1:4]. But this germ of death, existing in
it potentially from the beginning, comes into actuality when the light strikes
upon it with its full power; for, as it produces life where the germs of life
are, so it produces death where they are not. And with the world passes away
also its essential nature, ἡ ἐπιθυμία αὐτοῦ [“its desire”]. This, in harmony
with the connection, does not mean the desire towards the world, but the desire
resting or abiding in the world, and constituting its signature and mark. How it
is in very deed the nature of the world appears most clearly from the
antithesis, the ποιεῖντὸ θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ [“do the will of God”]. The lust here
is the life creaturely which makes itself independent. According to the original
divine ordinance, there should be no individual desire personal to self, no
knowledge or will of our own, but only a will responsive to what God wills.
Hence the idea, θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ [“will of God”], does not by any means enter
here without introduction; it is the necessary antithesis of the
ἐπιθυμία[“desire”] after the creaturely life which would constitute itself
independent. But with the world its own desire must cease. That is precisely the
condemnation, that the possibility of sinning ceases because the material of its
activity is taken away from sin; and so, the θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ [“will of God”] not
being the power of life in the man, his existence becomes a fearful waste,
devoid of all substantial contents. But it is far otherwise if the divine will
has become my will; because the willing of God is infinite, an inexhaustible
spring of ever new invigoration and confirmation of life, consequently to the
life of the man who makes God’s will his own there is given an infinite matter,
a never-ceasing series of aims and problems; and therefore he μένει εἰς τὸν
αἰῶνα [“abides forever”]. There is hardly another example of the transformation
of Greek ideas by Christianity equally suggestive with that given by the word
αἰών [“forever”]. While the Hebrew עוֹלָם, [“forever”] translated, as is well
known, by this αἰών [“forever”], signifies at least, in its proper original
meaning, the dark futurity, lost in the distance, αἰών [“forever”] originally
referred simply to the limited and definitely measured continuance of a certain
period (acvum). The New Testament has not only given it the meaning of a long
continuance,—a meaning it had obtained also in classical Greek,—but it has used
it to express the idea of timelessness. As in the previous section of the
Epistle, 1Jn 2:3-11, the apostle adopts the course of starting from altogether
general ideas (at αἱ ἐντολαὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ [“the commandments of God”]), and then
lighting on the specific commandment of brotherly love, so also it is here. In
what immediately precedes he has treated of the κόσμος [“world”] as the opposite
generally to the kingdom of light; he now passes over to the development and
potentiality which the κόσμος [“world”] has received in consequence of the
appearance of the φῶςἀληθινόν [“true light”],—that is to say, he proceeds to the
expression of anti-Christianity. For most certainly the light has, according to
1Jn 2:8, the power to bring about the passing away of darkness; but that takes
place only through the fact that first of all the κόσμος [“world”] developes its
enmity to the light to the utmost extreme, and reveals itself as perfectly dark.
As sin becomes through the law exceeding sinful, or sin in reality, so the
darkness becomes truly dark through the contrast to the perfect light. It is
precisely through its own internal development and energizing that the darkness
in very truth puts an end to itself.


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  CHAPTER 24: 24 - 1JN 2:18
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1Jn 2:18

Παιδία, ἐσχάτη ὥρα ἐστί· καὶ, καθὼς ἠκούσατε ὅτι ὁ Ἀντίχριστος ἔρχεται, καὶ νῦν
ἀντίχριστοι πολλοὶ γεγόνασιν· ὅθεν γινώσκομεν ὅτι ἐσχάτη ὥρα ἐστίν. This isthe
general relation of the following versesto those which precede. They are closely
attached to 1Jn 2:17. The exhortation to keep themselves unspotted from the
world is all the more urgent, because the final decision and separation is
immediately before the door. And this thought of the solemnity of the time,
which makes it doubly necessaryμὴ ἀγαπᾶν τὸν κόσμον [“to not love the world”],
moves the apostle with all the vehemence of his love to appeal to the churches;
hence the repeated address,παιδία [“children”].

“It is the last hour.” What is it this expression would say? Ἐσχάτηὥρα [“last
hour”] is not a phrase current in the New Testament, though with the same
meaning we have ἔσχαταιἡμέραι [“last days”], Act 2:17; 2Ti 3:1[N]; Jas 5:3; or
ἔσχατον τῶν ἡμερῶν [“the last days”], Heb 1:2[N]; Jud 1:18[N]; 2Pe 3:3, as well
as καιρὸς ἔσχατος [“last time”], 1Pe 1:5.[N] These expressions correspond
collectively to the Old Testament phrase, הַיָּמִיםאַחֲרִית [“these days”], as
partly a comparison of the Septuagint, partly the quotation in Act 2:17, will
show; but it is the expression ἔσχατον τῶν ἡμερῶν [“the last days”] which
formally and most exactly answers to the Hebrew. The precise meaning which the
phrase in question bears is very various, no doubt, when understood in concrete.
Whilst in Gen 49:1-33 the taking possession of the promised land is indicated by
the end of the days, the same expression in Mic 4:1-13 and Isa 2:1-22 points to
the time of Christ’s first manifestation, and in 1Pe 1:5 it refers to eternity.
This variety of interpretation must be explained by the fact that Holy Scripture
everywhere knows only a dichotomy in this matter of times: the period of the
introductory preparations of salvation and that of its consummation. The latter
is in the Old Testament denoted by הַיָּמִיםאַחֲרִית [“these days”].

Now, every new period, every important event in the history of the kingdom
ofGod, contains a new germ of final development, a marked progress towards the
end. When the eye looks into the future, those new potencies in that future
strike it first which are not yet contained in the present, and in consequence
of which it believes that with the new periodthe final development will enter.
If the predicted period has actually come, then to those who live in it the new
elements, the germs of development, recedefurther into the future, and the
imperfect and unaccomplished which still lingers in it assumes its worst form
and in the clearest light. And hence the new period will come to be reckoned in
with the first of the two halves of time, and theהַיָּמִיםאַחֲרִית [“these
days”]will retire back into the futurity. Both views have accordingly their full
justification. Every age, looked at from the past, belongs to the end; looked at
from the present, it belongs to the beginning. The present has never an eye for
the procedures and gradual growth of things in the time following; ithas no eye
but for the unity of the future end. The manifoldness in this distant goal,
which is to be unfolded in sequences of events, is hidden from its view. So
Jacob beholds the possession of the holy land and the future of the Messiah in
one great picture: to him both belong to the ἐσχάταις ἡμέραις [“last days”].
When the land was laid waste, the germ which was in that fulfilment receded
further, and the development of the end passed into a later futurity. Thus the
earlier prophet beheld deliverance from the captivity as one with the final
deliverance through the Messiah; and though it was revealed to Daniel how long
was the interval between these, the entire prophecy of the Old Testament, down
to Malachi and even the time of Christ, nevertheless combined together in one
vision the incarnation of God and the coming to judgment, the גָּדוֹלוְנוֹרָאיֹום
[“great and terrible day”] of Mal 4:1-6 as the הַיָּמִיםאַחֲרִית [“these days”].
It must not seem strange, then, if, in harmony with all this, the New Testament
pushes further back the ἔσχαταιἡμέραι [“last days”], and understands them of the
second appearance of Christ. This is decisively the case in 1Pe 1:5, where the
future glorification is assigned to the καιρῷ ἐσχάτῳ [“last time”], where also
the present epoch is reckoned as the first. But in the other New Testament
places the idea of the ἔσχατον τῶν ἡμερῶν[“the last days”] appears to us to
depart more widely from that of the Old Testament. That is to say, because in
the Old Testament the entire eschatology, the immortality of the soul, and so
forth, retired far back, so also did that of eternity, and of the endless
development of the world. But the more clearly the ζωὴαἰώνιος [“eternal life”]
was unfolded to Christians, the less adequate was to them the use of the phrase
ἔσχαταιἡμέραι [“last days”], to express the infinite fulness of what was in
their expectation; the endlessness of an eternal life would no longer be fitly
described by the definition, “end of the times.” To this concurred also, that
the view of the Old Testament, just indicated, to the effect that the
הַיָּמִיםאַחֲרִית [“these days”] would come in with a mighty break in the
passing away of heaven and earth, was brought forward both by the eschatological
discourses of our Lord and the explanations of the apostles into the foreground;
and that therefore it must have appeared far more befitting to describe the
הַבָּאעוֹלָם, [“coming days” cf. Mal 4:1-6] as a new beginning, instead of the
end, as was natural in the Old Testament. Hence, while the הַיָּמִיםאַחֲרִית
[“these days”] in the Old Testament was equivalent to הַבָּאעוֹלָם, [“coming
days”], it becomes in the New Testament, for the reasons assigned, a constituent
element of the νῦναἰών [“present time”], and that as its last period, its last
stage of development. In this way we can explain such passages as2Ti 3:1; 2Pe
3:3; Jud 1:18, easily and without violence. They speak of the stage of
development which precedes the αἰώνμέλλων [“age about to come”]. But in our
present passage and in Jas 5:3 there is this peculiarity, that the apostolical
period itself—not any as yet future epoch—is described as the ἐσχάτηὥρα[“last
hour”], or, what is substantially the same, as ἔσχαταιἡμέραι [“last days”]; and
even Heb 1:2[N] seems to belong to the same category, where the
ἔσχατοντῶνἡμερῶντούτων [“these last days”], that is, τοὺαἰῶνοςτούτου [“this
age”], begins at once with the incarnation of Christ. This introduced the
concluding epoch of the present world; when it runs out there does not enter a
new epoch, but the αἰώνμέλλων [“age about to come”], the second great half of
time, that of fulfilment; of all the stages that prepare for this, the present
is regarded as the last. And in fact this view has been hitherto corroborated by
experience: from the manifestation of Christ down to the present day there is
running out a great epoch which will not reach its end but with the
ἀποκατάστασις[LSJ]πάντων [“restoration of all things”]. But this does not
exhaust the meaning of the expression in our passage. For when we consider
carefully with what sedulity the apostle here makes prominent the end of the
world as the motive of his exhortations, how he intensifies and sharpens the
usual phrase ἔσχαταιἡμέραι [“last days”] into ἐσχάτηὥρα[“last hour”], we are at
once penetrated by the feeling that he beholds this last preparatory fraction as
hastening to its end, and the final catastrophe as impending,—in other words,
that he, like St. Paul, as we well know, expected within brief limits the end of
the world. Nor can we say that this was an error which he himself corrected in
the composition of the Apocalypse, showing there as he does how much was to take
place before the Lord’s return; for, notwithstanding these its contents, the
book introduces the final and definitive utterance of Christ to this plain
effect, ἔρχομαιταχύ [“I come quickly”]. Accordingly, we also must confront the
much-agitated question, how an apostle, who had like St. John so deeply
penetrated into the process of development of the kingdom of God, could
nevertheless cling to such a view as this? For the solution of this difficulty
it is necessary, before all things, not to lose sight of the fact that the
Scripture has for the process of the times a standard of measurement different
from ours: it measures them not by their length, but according to their weight
and importance; not according to their external matter, but according to their
internal meaning. Expressions like those now before us can be understood only
when we interpret them according to the canon of 2Pe 3:8, μία ἡμέρα παρὰ Κυρίῳ
ὡς χίλια ἔτη, καὶ χίλια ἔτη, ὡς ἡμέρα μία [“one day with the Lord is as a
thousand years, and a thousand years as one day”]. But that tells us no other
than this, that in the divine estimation one day may wrap up in itself a
thousand human years, and the converse. Now if, with the Scripture, we measure
time by its contents, it is clear that the essential meaning of no epoch has
been so perfectly condensed into its beginning as that of the epoch in which we
live, and which had its commencement with the manifestation of Christ. With the
substance of the Gospels, the life of the Lord, and the outpouring of His
Spirit, its essential and proper meaning and substance were already given.
According to the adduced passage of the second Epistle of St. Peter, objective
hindrances to the coming of the world’s end are no longer present; but through
Christ’s appearance the world is already ripe for it. Only the ἀνοχή
[“forbearance”] of God protracts the last hour, deferring it to a later and
later period; and precisely because every moment has in it the possibility of
the end, and only the long-suffering of God, unaccountable to every other, makes
the finger of the dial go more slowly, no man knows in heaven or earth the day
and the hour of the end. But if this be so, it is the true Christian and
apostolical I wisdom to keep before our keen vision this possibility, we might
even say this objective probability, of the judgment of the world. The end of
all things will judge concerning the good as concerning the evil; both must
therefore have found their full development. The former took place with Christ’s
manifestation; but the latter also: the power of distinction had reached its
climax in the τέκνοιςτῆςἀπειθείας [“children of disobediance”], as the rising up
of the ἀντίχριστοι [“antichrists”] proved. This was to the apostle the sign of
the approaching end; now was he assured that the axe was already laid at the
root of the tree. Its development was quite complete: the fruits might indeed
ripen more and more, but no new fruits would yet spring forth. Thus there may
be, to speak with the Apocalypse, silence for half an hour, or, according to
human measurement, of half an eternity: potentially the development is
consummated; at any moment both Christ and Antichrist may appear, and the
decisive stroke may follow the placing of the axe at the root of the tree. All
peoples and individuals who have become Christians since the apostle wrote this,
all the developments of the Christian church, are but the growth and ripening of
germs then present, with nothing new superadded. Thus we have two things in the
present verse, according to the explanation given: one is that we stand in the
last period before the αἰώνμέλλων [“age about to come”]; and the other, that it
is already advanced to the top of its development, and therefore hastens to its
end. And both are true. As the token by which the readers may know the time, the
antichrists are expressly mentioned. They had heard of the Antichrist as of a
unity; but they may see the antichrists as a plurality. It is a question how
these expressions are related to each other: whether ὁἀντίχριστος [“the
antichrist”]; is an ideal combination of many antichrists which in concrete form
will never show himself; or whether οἱἀντίχριστοι [“the antichrists”] are only
the forerunners of that one whose near coming their appearance foreannounced.
When we first of all examine what our own Epistle affords for the decision of
this question, we see that the four passages which mention Antichrist (1Jn 2:18
and 1Jn 2:22, 1Jn 4:3, 2Jn 1:7) contain no irrefragable argument on the one side
or the other. For if, first of all, in our passage the πολλοὶἀντίχριστοι [“many
antichrists”], are supposed to furnish demonstration that the last hour was at
hand or come, then, indeed, it is possible to argue that in them “the
Antichrist,” the anti-Christian nature, had manifested itself, and that
therefore there was no further individual to be expected who should exhibit
personally the might of anti-Christianity. On the other hand, the apostle may
have meant to say: “As we already see many antichrists in vigorous activity, we
thereby discern that the scene is fully prepared for the appearance of the one
personal Antichrist. In these he is foreshadowed and predicted; and we have
therefore entered on the period of his manifestation, into the last hour.” In
fact, not only are both interpretations possible, but there is literally nothing
in this passage of ours which suggests anything for or against either
distinctively. The same may be said of 1Jn 2:22. There the characteristic of
Antichrist is declared to be the denial of the Father and of the Son; and it is
evident that such a characteristic was manifested fully and clearly in those
antichrists. But beyond this nothing is said as to whether or not all the rays
of enmity against the kingdom of God may hereafter be concentrated and reflected
from one individual: the words do not exclude the possibility; the necessity,
however, they do not include. In 1Jn 4:3 Antichrist is described as the spirit
of negation; there all pertain to Antichrist who deny the incarnate Son of God;
and anti-Christianity is pre-eminently a principle. But neither does this
passage absolutely shut out the possibility that one man, surpassing all the
forms in which the anti-Christian element has been manifested, and summing up in
himself the whole power of darkness, may hereafter appear,—that is, that the
personal Antichrist may come. Finally, in2Jn 1:7 it is said that the denial of
the incarnation is the token of the deceiver and of the Antichrist, having been
just before said explicitly that many become guilty of that great sin of denial:
hence it is clear that Antichrist primarily was understood to signify a
principle, that of unbelief, and not an individual person. Wherever this
principle exists, there is Antichrist, But is the thought thereby excluded, that
this principle may hereafter be embodied in one person after such a manner that
all earlier forms of manifestation shall be thrust into the background, so that
this one individual might be designated ὁἀντίχριστος [“the antichrist”] in the
same way as, for instance, Christ Himself was called ὁ προφήτης [“the prophet”]?
Thus we may confidently assert that, on the ground of Johannaean passages alone,
we should not be constrained to expect a personal Antichrist; but rather that
the apostle, especially in the last two passages quoted above, understands, and
would have us understand, by ὁἀντίχριστος [“the antichrist”] the personified
anti-Christian principle working in all the variety of its individual
manifestations. But should we have other reasons for assuming that such an
individual person is to be looked for hereafter, there is certainly nothing in
the passages written by St. John to contradict such an expectation:
collectively, they allow the possibility of assuming, together with the
preliminary reflections of the anti-Christian spirit, a yet future and final
personal consummation of them all.

Further, there is an argument against the theory of a concentration of
anti-Christianity in one person in the very diverse pictures which Scripture
sketches of the final destination, and which on a first glance at least seem
hardly compatible with a living individualization in one person. For, while in
our Epistle anti-Christianity bears a theological character, resting upon a
denial of the incarnation of God in Christ, and as such originating within the
church itself (ἐξ ἡμῶν ἐξῆλθον [“they went out from us”] 1Jn 2:19), in the
Apocalypse it distinctly assumes a twofold physiognomy: one, that of the
many-headed beast, that is, of the God-opposed power of the world, which is
established in direct contradiction to Christianity; and the other, that of the
beast like a lamb, which corresponds to pseudo-prophecy, and thus has some
affinity with the anti-Christianity of our passage. While one of these beasts
goes forth from the world, the other goes forth from the church. All this seems
plainly to indicate two totally distinct forms of the corruption, which could
hardly be combined in one person. But when we compare 2Th 2:1-17 the matter
assumes another aspect. It is obvious that St. Paul borrowed the colours of his
description from the prophet Daniel; and we must accordingly think of his man of
sin as, according to the analogy of Daniel, a worldly potentate. It is equally
plain that he speaks, on the other hand, of a great ἀποστασία [“apostasy”] out
of which the son of perdition should emerge; and that leads at once to a
corruption within the Christian church: the enemy sitteth in the temple of God,
and as God exacts worship, which points at least in a pseudo-prophetic
direction. The two diverse presentations of the beast in the Apocalypse are thus
combined by St. Paul into one sole picture; and the Apocalypse itself gives us a
hint how that comes to pass when it says, Rev 13:15, ἐδόθη αὐτῷ [“there was
given to him”] (that is, to the beast representing pseudo-prophecy) δοῦναι
πνεῦμα τῇ εἰκόνι τοῦ θηρίου, ἵνα καὶ λαλήσῃ ἡ εἰκὼν τοῦ θηρίου [“to give breath
to the image of the beast, that also the image of the beast may speak”].
According to this, the hostile ungodly power of the world receives the spirit of
pseudo-prophecy opposed to God; and it is not until then—that is, until both
forms of opposition are united in one—that this enmity is raised to its highest
form of activity. But again, 2Th 2:1-17 is so constructed that we can hardly
escape the conviction that it speaks of an individual in whom the ἀποστασία
[“apostasy”] should be consummated. To this all the expressions used by St. Paul
point; in the other case the singular would not be constantly used as it is; but
the real multiplicity lying at the base of it would somewhere appear, as it
does, for instance, in St. John, who in fact has primarily a principle in view.
With all this perfectly corresponds the fact, which the Scripture gives us to
discern in the ways of God, that every principle is finally presented in its
concentration in one person. As the “ideal righteous man” of the Old Testament
is not a mere abstraction, finding its full realization only in the sum of all
the individual righteous, but in Him whom our Epistle, 1Jn 2:1, terms
δίκαιοςκατ᾽ἐξοχήν [“righteouspar excellence”] finds its concrete and full
manifestation; as the יְהוָֹהעֶבֶד [“servant of the LORD”] is not only the type
and ideal of a true servant of God, but has found its final concrete realization
in Christ: so also the power of darkness will have its climax in a person who
will fulfil all that has been predicted concerning Antichrist. We have felt it
necessary briefly to indicate the true doctrine of Antichrist, because a new
question attaches itself here to the subject. If, to wit, a personal Antichrist
is yet to be expected, and if, moreover, St. John must have known this and would
have it known, the reason must needs be assigned why he altogether keeps out of
his Epistle this view of the case, and, after the single mention of ὁἀντίχριστος
[“the antichrist”], which did not positively require it, yet at once occupies
himself with the πολλοὶἀντίχριστοι [“many antichrists”] generally, with
anti-Christianity as a principle. But the reason of this it is not hard to
discover. That a personal Antichrist was to be expected, had its importance to
Christianity at that time only so far as the end of all things was not
immediately impending, this being proved by his appearance not having yet taken
place. It is with this significance that St. Paul alludes to it, in order to
obviate misconceptions as to the approaching and instant end of the world. But
our apostle follows an altogether different line, having a different end in
view: it is his purpose to show not the distance, but the nearness of the
world’s consummation; and therefore he could not make prominent what was yet to
take place, but must point out that all had taken place which was previously to
take place. Hence he says nothing about the concentration of evil still in the
future, but dwells on the fact that the antichrists already existing
fore-announce that highest climax. Prominence given to Antichrist as one person
might well have produced a relaxing effect: there is time enough to be in deep
earnest about perfect holiness until we see him come. But the conclusion, that
τὸ γὰρ μυστήριον ἤδη ἐνεργεῖται [“the mystery of lawlessness is already at work”
cf. 2Th 2:7], is a strong exhortation to the utmost possible holy earnestness.
Now, as the apostle must, according to the design of this Epistle, have felt
himself moved to give prominence to this latter aspect, so it is in harmony with
his general habit, instead of placing the final consummation of the evil in
contrast with its present imperfectness, rather to place in a strong light the
germs of that consummation already appearing in the present. Thus we find it in
his Gospel, and with specific reference to the final judgment. When our Lord, in
Joh 5:25, says, ἔρχεται ὥρα, καὶ νῦν ἐστιν, ὅτε οἱ νεκροὶ ἀκούσονται τῆς φωνῆς
τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ οἱ ἀκούσαντες ζήσονται [“an hour is coming and now is,
when the dead will hear the voice of the Son of God, and those who hear will
live”], He by no means refers only to the bodily raising of the dead which He
accomplished during His life, but to the internal judgment which already takes
place in virtue of His manifestation. So also when, in Joh 3:17 ff., He makes it
emphatic that the unbeliever is not to be judged first when he stands before the
bar, but that he is already because of his unbelief condemned. The apostle terms
the great enemy of the Lord and His principle ἀντίχριστος [“antichrist”]. Now it
is certain that in the earlier classical Greek most compounds with ἀντί
[“against”] signify not merely an opponent of the idea contained in the simple
noun, but such an opponent as would fain make himself also what the simple noun
means, and be so termed himself. Ἀντιβασιλέας[LSJ] [“rival king”] is not the
enemy of a king, but a king who declares himself the enemy of another king;
ἀντιπαλαιστής[LSJ] [“antagonist in wrestling”] is not the opponent of a
wrestler, but a wrestler who contests the place of another wrestler.
Accordingly, ἀντίχριστος [“antichrist”] would not be a mere enemy of Christ, but
such an opponent as himself claims to take the place of Christ. Thus the term
ἀντίχριστος [“antichrist”] would be an equivalent of the ψευδόχριστοι [“false
christs”] of whom the Lord speaks in Mat 24:1-51; and it would be in strict
accordance with this that in 2Th 2:1-17 the man of sin puts himself in the
temple of God, that he might be worshipped in the place of God, or, as we should
say here, in the place of Christ. But if this applies very well to the one
personal Antichrist, it does not apply to the many antichrists of whom St. John
here speaks. These, so far as we know, never made pretension to be honoured
equally with Christ; nor does the mark of the anti-Christian spirit, which is
laid down in 1Jn 2:22 and 1Jn 4:3, agree with it, for that was only the denial
of Christ, and therefore enmity to His person. Now the usage above referred to
does not hinder our taking ἀντίχριστος [“antichrist”] also in its wider meaning
of an opponent of Christ; for that usage refers only to substantives, and there
is no reason why ἀντίχριστος [“antichrist”] should not be taken as an adjective.
Thus, as ἀντίθυρος[LSJ] [“opposite the door”] means that which is over against
the door, so would ἀντίχριστος [“antichrist”] mean anti-Christian, that which is
set in opposition to Christ. In precisely the same way is ἀντιβάρβαρος
[“anti-barbarian”] constructed. That the name Antichrist occurs only in St. John
has this ground, that this apostle regards him specifically as the opponent of
Christ, as is seen in 1Jn 4:3; 2Jn 1:7, ἀρνούμενοςἸησοῦνΧριστὸνἐληλυθόταἐνσαρκί
[“those who deny Jesus Christ has come in the flesh”], while St. Paul emphasizes
his enmity against everything divine, and more general names, such as
ἄνθρωποςτῆςἁμαρτίαςtn [“man of sin” cf. 2Th 2:3], suggested themselves more
obviously to him. In fact, these are only diverse aspects of the same thing
differently presented here and there. St. John’s description helps us, moreover,
in the examination of the course of thought in our passage. In what preceded,
the exhortation was to preserve themselves unspotted from the world as the
general sum and substance of the spirit contrary to God; here, the apostle
proceeds onward to a warning against the specific embodiment of the κόσμος
[“world”] in anti-Christianity. The beast has become one with the
pseudo-prophecy.

Concerning the coming of Antichrist,—and after what has been said, we must think
here of the personal Antichrist,—the church had already heard. But from whom? It
has been usual to refer at once to the passage in the Thessalonians so often
quoted. But though it is not improbable that, at the time when St. John wrote,
that Epistle had already found its way into Asia Minor, yet this allusion is
rendered doubtful by the consideration that in such a case the apostle would
have kept closer to the Pauline expression. Still less tolerable is the
reference to Daniel; for the figure the prophet draws of the man of sin traces
other features than those which here come into view. Thus we are led to assume
that the words point to certain instructions given by St. John himself or by
other teachers to the churches concerning the eschatological discourses of
Christ, and especially those about the ψευδόχριστοι [“false christs”] and
ψευδοπροφῆται [“false prophets”] in Mat 24:1-51. They had heard that Antichrist
cometh; and by the previous words, ἐσχάτηὥραἐστίν [“it is the last hour”], as
well as by the matter itself, it had been more closely defined that he would
appear in the last age. At the same time, then, that they knew the coming of
Antichrist, and indeed his coming ἐσχάτηὥρα [“last hour”], they also see καὶνῦν
[“even now”] many antichrists: the καὶ [“even”] refers to the congruence of the
then present time with the time for which the Antichrist was presented
prominently to their view. And since there were so many of them already, this
was all the more plain an indication that the last hour had actually struck;
that the anti-Christian principle had already attained to its mighty energy. For
the rest, we have probably in the words of the apostle a subtle indication of
the fact that he did not in the πολλοὶςἀντίχριστοις [“many antichrists”] already
contemplate the one Antichrist, but only the preparation for his appearance. If
he had meant the former, he would have used some such words as ἠκούσατεὅτιὁ
ἀντίχριστοςἔρχεται,νῦνδὲκαὶ πολλοὶἀντίχριστοιγεγόνασιν [“you have heard that the
Antichrist is coming, but even now many antichrists have appeared”],—that is, in
the many the prophecy was abundantly fulfilled—not one alone, but many had
appeared. But inasmuch as he does not admit into his words this intensifying
sense, he points to the idea that the many antichrists were not an
intensification, but rather a diminution of the one Antichrist.

Textual note tnMost manuscripts, including A D F G Ψ Ï lat sy, read ἁμαρτίας
[hamartias, “of sin”] in 2Th 2:3, but several important manuscripts, including א
B 0278 6 81 1739 1881 al co, read ἀνομίας [anomias, “of lawlessness”]. This is
why some English translations read “man of sin” while others read “man of
lawlessness.” Regardless, this textual variant among the NT manuscripts does not
affect the general meaning of the text.


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  CHAPTER 25: 25 - 1JN 2:19
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1Jn 2:19

Ἐξ ἡμῶν ἐξῆλθον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἦσαν ἐξ ἡμῶν· εἰ γὰρ ἦσαν ἐξ ἡμῶν, μεμενήκεισαν ἂν
μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν· ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα φανερωθῶσιν ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶ πάντες ἐξ ἡμῶν. The warning to
Christians to be on their guard against this enemy was all the more needful,
because the antichrists came forth from the bosom of the church itself: on the
one hand, it is evident how these Christians might themselves be entangled in
their corruption; and on the other hand, their earlier connection with these men
suggested the danger of their being willing to remain in fellowship with them
notwithstanding their anti-Christian spirit. There is a peculiarly painful
feeling breathed in the words of this nineteenth verse. If to any men the
apostle’s appeal in1Jn 1:1applied, that they were not to be prayed for, it might
appear that these antichrists were the people. Nevertheless, he manifestly looks
upon them with sorrowful sympathy, with the same sympathy which we observe in
our Lord when He remembers in His high-priestly prayer theυἱὸς τῆς ἀπωλείας[“son
of perdition”cf.John 17:12]. The antichrists, like Judas their type, had once
been in another relation to the church of Christ:ἐξ ἡμῶνἐξῆλθαν[“went out from
us”]. This may be understood in the sense ofexierunt;but also in the sense
ofprodierunt;either that they left us, or that they sprang up in our midst. The
former view is distinctly opposed by the followingἀλλά[“but”]. It would be an
illogical thought that they have separated from us, hut they were not of us: we
should have expected in that case aγάρ[“for”]. This conjunctive requires us to
takeἐξῆλθαν[“went out”], as inActs 15:24, in the sense of origination:prodicrunt
a nobis. They have indeed gone out from among us, they stand in historical
connection with us, butοὐκἦσανἐξἡμῶν[“they were not of us”]; inwardly they have
always been estranged from us; for if they ever had belonged to us, they would
not have been able to leave us. He who goes back into the world has never
perfectly broken with the world. It follows from what is said here, that not the
denial, but the renunciation of Christianity is the essential nature of
Antichrist: the light has come upon him, has touched him, butἡ σκοτία οὐ
κατέλαβεν αὐτό[“the darkness did not comprehend it”]. With a brachylogical turn
the apostle goes on:ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα φανερωθῶσιν ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶ πάντες ἐξ ἡμῶν[“so that it
would be shown that they all are not of us”]. Theἀλλά[“but”] is most easily
supplemented byταῦταγέγονεν[“these became”]; and thisἀλλ᾽ἵνα[“but so that”] is
not unusual with St. John: compareJohn 8:18;John 15:25; but notJohn 14:31, where
the close of the verseἐγείρεσθεκ.τ.λ.[“at raise up, etc.”] is not to be
separated from the preceding, as in theTextus Receptus,by a point, but forms the
main sentence belonging toἀλλά[“but”]. The apostle says that it was the divine
purpose that the anti-Christian spirit which clung to the church should in the
course of time be revealed, should be made known as such, and thus the
congregation be cleansed from it. The divine purpose is represented as seen only
in theφανερωθῆναι[“to make known”], and not in the existence of the
anti-Christian element itself. Predestinarian theories can be no more extracted
from the sentence than they can be refuted by it; for, in fact, such questions
are altogether out of the scope of the passage. The presentation of the design
is here entirely the same as in the words of the psalmist (Psa
51:4[N]):עָ֫שִׂ֥יתִי|בְּעֵינֶ֗יךָ|הָרַ֥ע|בְשָׁפְטֶֽךָ|תִּזְכֶּ֥ה|בְּדָבְרֶ֗ךָ|תִּצְדַּ֥ק|לְ֭מַעַן
[“So that you are justified when you speak and blameless when you judge”]. David
there does not by any means attribute his being evil to any determination of
God, but the doing of sin, the expression of his interior evil. The meaning is,
that if I had not fallen into any of these courses of wickedness, and Thou hadst
nevertheless punished me, that would have been perfectly righteous; for only the
expressions of my evil nature would have been wanting, because the opportunity
was wanting; myself would then have been as evil as I am now. But my punishment
would then have had the semblance of injustice, because my sin would have been
perfectly known only to myself, and not to another. But now hast Thou let me
fall into dreadful guilt. Thou hast let my heart’s evil be brought to light,
that Thy judgment might be seen to be righteous. Thus, in the psalmist’s words,
not the being evil, but the manifestation of the evil was brought into act by
God. So it is also here. It is not regarded as God’s work that the antichrists
were such as they were, but they unfolded their character as such; that the mask
was withdrawn, and thus they were proved never to have belonged to the church.
Thus the divine purpose in this clause refers not to theοὐκ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἦσαν[“they
were not of us”], but to their manifest appearance and exhibition as
antichrists,1Jn 2:18. Formally, indeed, thetelicclause is not constructed with
exactness: theπάντες[“all”] is embarrassing. The author does not mean to say
that not all anti-Christians areἐξἡμῶν[“of us”]: that would have been awkward,
as they certainly are all of them notἐξἡμῶν[“of us”]; but that these
anti-Christian elements demonstrate that not all Christians areἐξἡμῶν[“of us”].
The two ideas that all the antichrists are not, and that Christians are not all,
belonging to the Christian church, are packed together into one, as often
happens in ordinary phrase. Here it is with ease explained if we assume that St.
John, like St. Paul, was in the habit of dictating his Epistles.


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  CHAPTER 26: 26 - 1JN 2:20-21
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1Jn 2:20-21

What the apostle now suddenly says of the χρίσμα [“anointing”] of Christians
seems to be in no immediate connection with what precedes. For if we should
suppose the intention to be that of setting the true nature of Christians in
contrast with that of the antichrists, we should expect the conjunction δέ
[“but”] instead of καί [“and”]. It is obvious that the thought entering the
context with 1Jn 2:20, that the Christian church possesses the χρίσμα
[“anointing”] and knows all things, is not a subordinate one, but introduces the
whole of the ensuing dissertation. It will therefore be necessary to examine if
we can find an element in the following context for which 1Jn 2:20 will be the
simple preparation, and which in itself stands in organic connection with the
statements made concerning the antichrists. The last idea prominently in our
minds was that these antichrists had not remained in the church, but had
separated from it. Now, that would obviously suggest the same exhortation or
appeal which Christ uttered when, Joh 6:67,[N] many went no longer with Him:
μὴκαὶ ὑμεῖς θέλετεὑπάγειν; [“You do not wish to go away also?”],—to wit, that at
least the remainder are and will be faithful to the Lord’s fellowship. And this
idea of the μένεινἐναὐτῷ [“abide in him”] is palpably the very nerve of the
entire remainder of the chapter. In 1Jn 2:24 it comes forward in all its
strength and emphasis; in 1Jn 2:27 it is taken up again. The whole section is
concerned with exhortation to Christians to keep themselves apart from the
world; this is then rendered more specific as a requirement to guard themselves
against antichrists, for the sin of Christian men leads immediately not only to
the unchristian, but also to the anti-Christian spirit and life. But, as the
essence of the spirit of the antichrists is apostasy or infidelity, the negative
injunction to be on guard against them slides naturally round into the positive
one of maintaining their faithfulness. He, however, who would maintain his
fidelity must before all things know what that infidelity is by which
faithfulness is wounded. This is the lie; every lie greater or less. Such
knowledge the readers have, the apostle tells them in 1Jn 2:20-21, in virtue of
the anointing of which they have been made partakers. The last words of 1Jn
2:21, πᾶν ψεῦδος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας [“every lie is not of the truth”],
form the pith of the verses before us, 1Jn 2:20-21: for the sake of them these
were written, and they themselves, on the other hand, form a point of connection
with what ensues. Thus we gain the following train of thought. Ye see the
antichrists, whose principle is infidelity, acting out their nature (1Jn
2:18-19). Ye know further (our resolution of the order takes away any temptation
to assign to the καί [“and”] of the beginning of 1Jn 2:20 an adversative
meaning; it rather introduces an actual and simple progression), in virtue of
the anointing which ye have, that πᾶν ψεῦδος [“every lie”]; excludes from the
kingdom of God the lie in any and every form, because it (1Jn 2:21) is in the
issue always a denial and renunciation of the Son of God. Ye, then, who are by
the supposition of your anointing in a satisfactory condition to discern
anti-Christian error, will assuredly avoid that error and approve your fidelity.
Thus the whole section is lightened up, and vindicates for itself a simple but
sure and orderly course of thought. The passage 1Jn 2:20-23 thus primarily
indicates that the Christian church is in a position to discern and detect
anti-Christian error down to its most subtle ramification. This it is by virtue
of the χρῖσμα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἁγίου [“an anointing from the Holy One”].


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  CHAPTER 27: 27 - 1JN 2:20
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1Jn 2:20

Καὶ ὑμεῖς χρίσμα ἔχετε ἀπὸ τοῦ ἁγίου, καὶ οἴδατε πάντα. This idea rests of
course upon the ceremony of anointing, everywhere so common in the Old
Testament. It is well known that in Hebrew the word is rendered in two ways, by
סוּ [“to anoint”] and by מָשַׁח [“to anoint”]; the former signifies always merely
outward anointing, and for common uses; the latter is the unction as a symbol of
religious consecration. So also the Septuagint has two words to reproduce the
two Hebrew terms respectively, ἀλείφειν [“to anoint”] and χρίειν [“to anoint”].
It is generally said that the former corresponds always to the סוּ [“to
anoint”], and the latter to the מָשַׁח [“to anoint”]. This is certainly not
exact, nor is it absolutely and at all points borne out by an induction of
instances. For, although we may not lay much stress on the fact that in Eze
16:9סוּ [“to anoint”] is translated by χρίειν [“to anoint”], inasmuch as the
translator might there have had in his mind a religious anointing, we find, on
the one hand, ἀλείφειν [“to anoint”] used in Exo 40:15 of religious anointing,
and, on the other, χρίειν [“to anoint”] used in 2Sa 1:21 of the anointing of a
shield for the sake of greater smoothness, and thus without any concomitant
religious idea (the similar anointing of the shield in Isa 21:5 is ἑτοιμάζειν
[“to prepare”]); as also classical Greek uses ἀλείφειν [“to anoint”] and χρίειν
[“to anoint”] promiscuously and interchangeably. Appeal may be made to Exo
40:15, and it may be said that there the translator had in view only the
external act of anointing; but when we find in the same verse, and concerning
the same anointing, χρίειν [“to anoint”] afterwards employed, it is very obvious
to infer that the distinction observed in the Hebrew is not carried out
thoroughly by the translation. But, notwithstanding these individual exceptions,
it remains true that on the wholeχρίειν [“to anoint”] is used for religious
anointing as such. As to the substantives depending on the verb, χρίσμα
[“anointing”] is the only one used in the New Testament, and there only three
times in this Epistle: the Septuagint has in connection with it χρίσις[LSJ] [“a
smearing”] also. These last, however, have not quite the same signification:
ἔλαιονχρίσεως[LSJ] [“anointing oil”] is the oil with which I anoint;
ἔλαιονχρίσματος [“anointing oil”], the oil with which I am anointed. Χρίσμα
[“anointing”], absolutely used, thus signifies (compare with our passage Exo
30:25, ἔλαιονχρίσμαἅγιον [“holy anointing oil”]) that with which we are
anointed, or the oil of anointing.

If we pass from the application of the word to the meaning of the symbol, we are
met by the expositors who point for the explanation of our passage to 1Pe 2:9,
βασίλειονἱεράτευμα,ἔθνοςἅγιονἐστε [“you are a royal priesthood, a holy nation”],
as if the χρίσμα [“anointing”] signified the dignity and elevation of the
Christian estate. But this exposition does not accord with the train of thought.
How should the apostle, without any point of connection, without any bearing on
what precedes or what follows, make such an allusion as this? Moreover, it is
plain that, according to the close of this verse, the knowledge of the truth is
the subject treated of. Then it was neither the priestly nor the kingly, but the
prophetic vocation of Christians that was involved; and the prophetic vocation
is precisely that which could not be distinguished by the term χρίσμα
[“anointing”]. For, in the Old Testament, while priests and kings were anointed,
prophets were not anointed. We find indeed the word once in 1Ki 19:16, where
Elisha’s institution to the prophetic office is referred to. But when we observe
that in the succeeding very full narrative of the calling of Elisha, not a
syllable of allusion to anointing occurs, and when we bear in mind that nowhere
else and under no circumstances do we hear of prophets being anointed, we shall
be disposed to prefer explaining the מָשַׁח [“to anoint”] in the cited passage as
a breviloquence, or summary way of describing. The Lord commands that two kings
be anointed, and thus consecrated to their office; when Elisha is mentioned, we
have to eliminate from the anointing its peculiar idea of consecration and take
that alone, understanding the expression as figurative. This one passage being
cleared away, we have no shadow of right to refer the χρίσμα [“anointing”] of
this verse to the prophetic dignity or position of Christians.

We must rather make our starting-point the fact, that in the Old Testament not
only persons, but things also—for instance, altars—were anointed. This, together
with the connection which the Pentateuch loves to establish between anointing
and ἁγιάζειν [“to consecrate”], shows that the anointing generally signifies
the separation from profane or common to religious use. Accordingly the
exposition will need to be modified by the thought that the anointing signifies
the reception of the Holy Ghost. Certainly, in Isa 61:1 this element is
expressly declared; but it is obvious that neither altars nor vessels might
receive the Spirit. This symbol was the preparation for the feasts; the oil
pertained to the expression of festal and elevated feeling; hence in times of
lamentation it was omitted. It is in such a meaning that the idea occurs in Mat
6:17. As a result of this, everything was anointed which was brought out of the
profane and common world into fellowship with God. The fundamental meaning of
the unction is that an object is withdrawn from the domain of creaturely life,
and is supposed to enter into sacred relation with God. At the stone which Jacob
anointed, the Supreme revealed Himself to him; and it was marked out by him with
oil as the place of that manifestation. The anointed altar was thereby declared
to be a sacred spot at which God would enter into union with men, and place them
through sacrifice in union with Himself.

Now, if persons are anointed, or separated from profane life to the service and
to the revelation of God, that must assuredly take place through this, that the
Holy Spirit of God works in them; and in such cases the anointing was the symbol
of the impartation of the Spirit; but it is such only as a consequence of the
fundamental idea of separation from common use; the fundamental meaning is
always the same; and χρίειν [“to anoint”] is thus the symbolical expression for
ἁγιάζειν [“to consecrate”]. And in this passage of ours, that expression is to
be understood as taken precisely in this sense. Undoubtedly, of course, the
χρίσμα [“anointing”] is here used for the reception of the Holy Ghost; for the
εἰδέναι πάντα [“you know all”], εἰδέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν [“you know the truth”], the
derivation of the anointing unction from the Holy One, the resulting
μένεινἐναὐτῷ [“abide in him”],—all this, too surely to leave any doubt, reminds
us of the Lord’s explanation touching the Paraclete whom He would send, whose
office would be ὁδηγεῖνεἰςπάσαντὴν ἀλήθειαν [“to guide into all truth”], Joh
16:13, whose proceeding from the Father and the Son is there taught, and who is
the bond of the μένεινἐναὐτῷ [“abide in him”]. But, on the other hand, all that
does not make it clear why St. John should describe the Holy Ghost precisely
here as χρίσμα [“anointing”]; for the mere similarity of sound between it and
ἀντίχριστος [“antichrist”] would be, after all, an altogether too external
reason.

It is quite otherwise if we firmly hold fast the idea that separation from the
profane is the real meaning of the symbol. The apostle is speaking pre-eminently
of the separation of Christians from the world, especially from the world in its
most perilous form as anti-Christianity. That separation was already
accomplished in the church; through their participation in the Spirit they had
been set apart from everything ungodly and opposed to God; and this significance
of the bestowment of the Holy Ghost He imprints on their souls by the
descriptive χρίσμα [“anointing”]. This separation was given them as their
portion ἀπὸ τοῦ ἁγίου [“from the Holy One”]. When we observe that the χρίσμα
[“anointing”] is to form the antithesis to the anti-Christian spirit, and
therefore to the renunciation of Christ, not of the Father, we shall see fit to
understand the ἅγιος [“Holy One”] here of the Son and not of the Father. He who
Himself was indeed in the world, but yet not of the world, has also defended His
own that they should not be mingled again with the world, Joh 17:16 ff. The
whole contents of the high-priestly prayer generally gives sufficient
confirmation of the truth of this exposition. What is here figuratively
expressed by the χρίσμα [“anointing”] is there expressed by the literal
ἁγιάζειν [“to consecrate”]. And as here the being released out of the lie
through the knowing of the truth is regarded as the matter of the χρίσμα
[“anointing”], so there the ἀλήθεια is the sphere in which the anointed are
ἡγιασμένοι [“sanctified”].


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  CHAPTER 28: 28 - 1JN 2:21
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1Jn 2:21

Οὐκ ἔγραψα ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ οἴδατε τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι οἴδατε αὐτὴν, καὶ ὅτι πᾶν
ψεῦδος ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας οὐκ ἔστι. For it is not only as matter of fact that the
church, through the anointing of the Spirit, is severed from the world to God:
it is such also theoretically and in point of knowledge. They know through the
Spirit’s power how to distinguish truth itself from error: οἴδατεπάντα [“you
know all things”], the apostle adds. And what is first as to the form laid down
as πάντα [“all things”], is now as to the matter defined as ἀλήθεια [“truth”]:
the latter is the concrete substance of the πάντα [“all things”]; it gives the
quality and meaning of the εἰδέναι [“know”], as πάντα [“all things”] gives its
range and comprehension. When studying 1Jn 1:6 we recognised the ἀλήθεια
[“truth”] to mean the collective fulness of all real being which dwells in God,
as the πλήρωματοῦπάνταἐν πᾶσινπληρουμένου [“the fullness of Him who fills all in
all” cf. Eph 1:23]. So it is here; because Christians have the χρίσμα
[“anointing”], and are brought over out of the world into the fellowship of God
and His kingdom, therefore they also have a certain knowledge of all things that
are in that divine kingdom and have to do with it; they know the fulness of its
possessions, with the powers and energies that work in it; and all this together
is the ἀλήθεια [“truth”]. And indeed they know all things, and therefore
πάσαντὴν ἀλήθειαν [“all the truth”]; because in the Spirit of God, whom they
possess, all this fulness lies enfolded and hid; the possession of Him,
therefore, includes, although ever so potentially alone, the whole compass of
this knowledge. But the εἰδέναι πάντα [“you know all things”] has another side
to it, and that is found in the close of the verse, καὶ ὅτι πᾶν ψεῦδος ἐκ τῆς
ἀληθείας οὐκ ἔστι [“and that every lie is not of the truth”]. The καὶ ὅτι [“and
that”] adjoins, that is, as is fully acknowledged by expositors, the matter of
the following clause as a second and co-ordinate element in the knowledge of the
truth. The first assertion, that Christians know the truth, is related to the
second or new one, that they know also the incompatibility of every lie with
that truth, just in the same way as the proposition, God is light, 1Jn 1:5, is
related to the proposition that in Him is no darkness at all. The εἰδέναι πάντα
[“you know all things”] includes a knowledge of the lie, which is here simply
the knowledge concerning the absolute contrariety between it and the truth.
Since there is such a thing as the lie, that is, seeming existence, to which all
true and deep reality is wanting because it is sundered from God, the source and
substance of the ζωή [“life”], therefore as well God as the man enlightened by
God must take it up into consciousness as fact, though only as absolutely
denying and rejecting it. And this absolute negation of the lie it is which
receives here the emphasis: the whole weight of the sentence rests upon the πᾶν
ψεῦδος [“every lie”]. The εἰδέναι πάντα [“you know all things”] is mentioned
only in order to show that Christians are supposed in every particular case to
know the difference between truth and lie; their knowing of the whole is to
demonstrate that every part of the whole also lies in the sphere of their
knowledge. The apostle’s meaning is, that, let the lie show itself in what form
it may, in great things or in small, in every instance ye know it as lie as
certainly as ye know that ye are forever separated from it.

Yet it is not the fact in itself that the apostle declares in 1Jn 2:21, that
Christians know everything, and can distinguish the lie as lie; but his firm
conviction of that fact, from which conviction and for the sake of which
conviction generally he writes this Epistle, ἔγραψαὑμῖν ὅτι οἴδατε [“I wrote to
because you know”],—that is, by reason of this your knowledge, prompted by it, I
have written. It is the very same kind of declaration as we found, 1Jn 2:13-14,
in the beginning of this section. As in this passage εἰδέναι πάντα [“you know
all things”] corresponds to ἐγνωκέναι τὸν πατέρα [“know the Father”], as εἰδέναι
ὅτι πᾶν ψεῦδος οὐκ ἔστι ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας [“you know that every lie is not of the
truth”] in this passage corresponds to the νενικήκατε τὸν πονηρόν [“you have
overcome the evil one”] in that, so also the ἔγραψα [“I wrote”] in our present
verse reproduces the same word in the former. In both cases the preterite or
aorist refers back to the internal conception of the letter as a whole, the
apostle speaking of that as of an historical fact preceding the actual external
accomplishment of the purpose in writing; in both we might translate without
impropriety, “I have brought myself to write.” And in fact we may find good
reason if we seek it for the reminder concerning the apostle’s presupposition in
writing the Epistle: as in the beginning of the section, so in this passage
especially, the motive is obvious. The subject is the absolute and total turning
away from the κόσμος [“world”]: but this presumes that already a separation of
the readers from the world has taken place; were that not the case, were the
preliminaries for that now to be arranged, the apostle would have had to write
in a very different way; something after the manner of St. Paul, in the first
part of his Roman Epistle, concerning sin and its power of corruption and ruin.
But he who would exhort to μένεινἐντῷφωτὶ [“remain in the light”], must
presuppose an εἶναιἐντῷφωτὶ [“to be in the light”] in those whom he exhorts. And
in our passage particularly he would warn the church against every the least
contact with the antichrists. But that presupposes in them the ability to detect
the anti-Christian nature even in its most subtle expressions and ramifications
(πᾶνψεῦδος [“every lie”]).


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  CHAPTER 29: 29 - 1JN 2:22
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1Jn 2:22

Τίς ἐστιν ὁ ψεύστης, εἰ μὴ ὁ ἀρνούμενος ὅτι Ἰησοῦς οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ Χριστός; οὗτός
ἐστιν ὁ ἀντίχριστος, ὁ ἀρνούμενος τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱόν. The proposition, that
πᾶν ψεῦδος ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας οὐκ ἔστιν [“every lie is not of the truth”], seems at
the first glance to be so perfectly clear and self-evidencing, that it needs at
the utmost only to be expressed for the sake of logical completeness. But,
however plain it may be to the theoretic consciousness, it very little governs
the practical. With Christians in general, sin can be possible only through
their forgetting that every, even the slightest lie (understood in St. John’s
full meaning), excludes from the truth. And how solemn is that assertion! It
follows from it that πᾶνψεῦδος [“every lie”] leads directly into fellowship with
the antichrist nature. This is the consequence which is deduced in 1Jn 2:22. All
depends here upon rightly understanding the article in the clause τίς ἐστιν ὁ
ψεύστης [“who is the liar”]; the parallelism with the ὁἀντίχριστος [“the
antichrist”] in this second part of the verse would suggest at once that we must
interpret this of the Antichrist himself, and to translate the article as
meaning: who is the one true arch-liar? But this yields a very loose connection
with what precedes. Hence it commends itself that we refer back the ὁ ψεύστης
[“the liar”] simply to the last words of 1Jn 2:21, and place ὁ ψεύστης [“the
liar”] in correlation with the πᾶνψεῦδος [“every lie”]. In what precedes, every
lie was declared to bear witness that the ἀλήθεια [“truth”] has no place in
the man who is the subject of it. That leads then further to the question: who
makes himself thus partaker of such ψεῦδος [“lie”]? wliat is his spirit and
nature, that it bears in itself such fearful consequences? The answer is: that
is the liar,—the article thus indicates the liar as the person spoken of just
before,—and his nature is that he does not acknowledge Jesus as the Christ. In
the assertory form the proposition would run, οὐκ ἐστιν ψεύστης εἰ μὴκ.τ.λ. [“he
is not a liar except, etc. ”]. The interrogative form is adopted in order to
indicate to the reader that the proposition concerned is one self-understood,
resting upon the fact of his own consciousness, about which there can be no
contest or doubt. The nature and moving principle of every lie (πᾶνψεῦδος
[“every lie”], 1Jn 2:21) is here declared. It is constituted by the strong
ἀρνεῖσθαι [“to deny”]: that is more than mere denying; it rather expresses that
the denial is based on the ground of opposed and better conviction. We may
compare Joh 1:20, where it is said of the Baptist, ὡμολόγησεν καὶ οὐκ ἠρνήσατο
[“he confessed and did not deny”],—that is, he gave to the truth, well known by
him, its full honour. Thus the repudiation of Jesus as the Christ is the essence
of every lie. Two questions here emerge. One is, how far this may be regarded as
the fundamental nature of the lie; and the other, how far this may be even
accounted as equal to the only lie (εἰμὴ [“except”]). The former question is
easily answered. If Jesus, to wit, is the truth, and that simply because He is
the Messiah who was anointed by God with the Spirit without measure, then the
denial of His Messiahship is not only the turning away from a truth, but a break
with all truth; for He is the concentration of all truth, which is one with Him,
and there is no other method of reaching the truth than He. But the other
question is more difficult, as to this being the only lie; since even with the
acknowledgment of the Messiahship of Jesus we may conceive many other falsehoods
as to other regions of truth to be bound up. But that is only a false
conception, and it seems so only so long as we think of a merely intellectual or
theoretical acknowledgment of the Lord; which is never the case with St. John,
who in 1Jn 2:14 connects the ἔγνωκέναιτὸνΘεόν [“know God”] immediately with the
νικᾶντὸνπονηρόν [“victory over the evil one”]. As soon as we regard the
confession of Christ as the power of spiritual life, which is supposed to sway
the whole of man’s being, it is natural to behold every lie, πᾶνψεῦδος [“every
lie”], any kind of fellowship with the ungodly, as a removal from Christ, a
renunciation of Him as the Messiah,—that is, of Him who has the
χρίσμαοὐκἐκμέτρου [“anointing without measure”], the full and perfect truth. As
certainly as the slightest obliquity in the circumference of a circle causes the
circle to be a circle no longer, disturbing the equal supremacy of the centre,
so the slightest lie is a disturbance of the supremacy of Christ.

Every lie, be it fashioned however it may, has in its essence the denial of the
Son of God. Hence, therefore—and that is the next proposition of the
apostle—every lie is a direct participation in the antichrist nature; for the
ἀρνεῖσθαι ὅτι Ἰησοῦς ἔστιν ὁ Χριστός [“to deny that Jesus is the Christ”]; is
the distinctive mark or token of Antichrist. Ὁ ψεύστης [“the liar”], that is,
according to the explanation now given, everyone who enters into fellowship with
the lie, denies Christ; and thus the lie and the antichrist nature, and the liar
and Antichrist, are one and the same. And, in order more vigorously to emphasize
this identity of the two, the apostle repeats after the οὗτός ἔστινὁἀντίχριστος
[“the one who is the Antichrist”], once more in the form of an apposition, the
element in common between the ψεύστηνεἶναι [“being a liar”] and the
ἀντίχριστονεἶναι [“being an antichrist”]: and that is, ὁ ἀρνούμενος τὸν πατέρα
καὶ τὸν υἱόν [“the one who denies Father and the Son”].

Now, it is undeniable that the proposition, which we have thus derived from the
whole, is of so extremely severe a character that it sounds almost repulsive.
But it is equally clear that it thus presents the most urgent reason which the
exhortation could bring forward in favour of utter severance from the
Antichrist: he who in the least degree recedes from the ἀλήθεια [“truth”]
falls away from fellowship with Christ, has denied Christ Himself, and has
become a member of Antichrist. Now this, even apart from the stringency of the
context, is a doctrine precisely conformable to the whole Johannaean view of
things. There is no apostle who to the same extent, and with the same
consistency, carries out the total severance between the world and the kingdom
of God. The third chapter will give us occasion to bring forward abundant
evidence of this. Commonly those men only are called antichrists who have openly
displayed the sentiment of opposition to Christ, and in whom this sentiment
rules the entire life. But here it is amply shown that every ψεῦδος [“lie”];
involves this principle, and therefore internally makes men into antichrists,
and the weight of the propositions asserted so peremptorily by the apostle is
much augmented by the total absence of conjunctions: neither does a γάρ[“for”]
unite the first half of 1Jn 2:22 with 1Jn 2:21, nor does a δέ [“but”] connect
the second half of 1Jn 2:22 with the first. The sentences fall on the reader’s
soul like notes of the trumpet. Without cement, and therefore all the more
ruggedly clasping each other, they are like a cyclopaean wall.


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  CHAPTER 30: 30 - 1 JN 2:23
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1Jn 2:23

Πᾶς ὁ ἀρνούμενος τὸν υἱὸν οὐδὲ τὸν πατέρα ἔχει, ὁ ὁμολογῶν τὸν υἱὸν καὶ τὸν
πατέρα ἔχει. At the end of 1Jn 2:22 the apostle brought forward a new point,
which has not in what precedes been demonstrated: the declaration, namely, that
the Antichrist denied not only the Son, but the Father also. The twenty-third
verse takes this up again with emphasis, in order that a due consideration may
establish it as truth. Now, if no man hath ever seen God nor can see Him, but He
is declared only by His only-begotten Son, it follows that he of necessity loses
the knowledge of the Father who rejects the way in which alone it can be found.
If Christ as the ἀπαύγασμα [“radiance”] of the Father is equally with the Father
the truth, it follows that he who has not the One cannot have the Other: else
would he at once have and not have the truth. But that the Redeemer is not here,
any more than at the close of the previous verse, called Χριστός [“Christ”], but
υἱός [“Son”], has its simple reason in the fact that He is placed in direct
relation to the Father. At the same time, the choice of both terms points to the
absolute and necessary unity and mutual indwelling of the Two, which affects
that no man can be partaker of the One without being partaker of the Other. And
because this is an internal necessity, it holds good in every particular case of
error: πᾶςὁἀρνούμενος [“everyone who denies”] declares that even the members of
the church fall under the condemnation of this sentence if they in any measure
become confederates of the lie. Yet this most solemn declaration has also its
bright converse. That lies in the second half of the verse: ὁ ὁμολογῶν τὸν υἱὸν
καὶ τὸν πατέρα ἔχει [“the one who confesses the Son has the Father also”].
Manifestly the ὁμολογεῖν [“to confess”] is the antithesis of the ἀρνεῖσθαι [“to
deny”] in the previous verse; but, instead of the more diffuse ὅτι Ἰησοῦς ἔστιν
ὁ Χριστός [“that Jesus is the Christ”] or ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ [“the Son of God”],
the simple τὸν υἱὸν [“the Son”] is appended. For he who sees not in Jesus the
Son of God, does not acknowledge another being as such, but denies generally the
existence of the Son of God. No man who has ever contended against the
Christology of Christian doctrine has ever accepted the Christian doctrine of
the Trinity.


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  CHAPTER 31: 31 - 1JN 2:24
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1Jn 2:24

Ὑμεῖς οὖν ὃ ἠκούσατε ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς, ἐν ὑμῖν μενέτω· ἐὰν ἐν ὑμῖν μείνῃ ὃ ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς
ἠκούσατε, καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐν τῷ υἱῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ μενεῖτε.

Thus has the apostle exhibited to the church the activity of the antichrists; he
has further appealed to their own knowledge of the truth, to the intent that he
might win from themselves the confession that by any degree of departure from
the truth they would be drawn into the antichrist fellowship. It remains now
that he should draw the practical conclusion from these premisses: therefore
guard yourselves against every declension from the truth; or, in its positive
form, hold fast that fellowship in which ye now safely stand in despite of all
the μεθοδείαςτοῦπονηροῦ [“schemes of the evil one”]. The apostle begins by an
asyndeton,—for the οὖν [“therefore”] of the Textus Receptus must be struck
out,—and yet with specific notification of the antithesis, by means of the
absolute ὑμεῖς [“you”] that stands first. True, that in the last words there is
contained no express antithesis to the ὑμεῖς [“you”]; but the antithesis is in
the sense, inasmuch as the whole of the previous discussion treated of the
nature of Antichrist. Accordingly, the ὑμεῖς [“you”] is not to be referred to
the ἠκούσατε [“you heard”], for then the hearing of the readers would seem to be
placed in an inscrutable contrast with the hearing of others; but it must be
referred to the μένειν [“to abide”] of the main sentence, so that it is in
reality parallel with or equivalent to its ἐνὑμῖν [“in you”]. That which they
had heard they should hold fast: the object is given in a general manner, but
its concrete meaning is preserved to it by the connection, according to which
the doctrine that Jesus is the Christ is meant. The expression occurred before
in 1Jn 2:7; but, instead of the general o here, the object there was the λόγος
[“word”], the entire message of Christ: here His person is in view, there it was
His work of love; but both are only diverse sides of the same matter. His whole
work was the commentary on His person; His person was the text of his whole
work. But in this connection we should expect that an earnest and express
exhortation would follow to keep themselves from the antichrists, or, putting it
positively, to abide in the truth. And this abiding in the truth is undoubtedly
the prevailing motive in all the verses that follow; yet the form of commandment
is almost altogether absent. More than that: human energy generally is kept as
much as possible in the background. At the outset, indeed, the μενέτω [“I
abide”] has the imperative form; but the contents of the commandment in a very
marked manner restrict human activity. That which they had heard, which had
therefore come into them from without, that should abide in them: not, that
should they suffer it to abide in them, in which case the Christians themselves
would be the subjects of the action. This turn of the thought—which is all the
more evidently intentional, as the preliminary ὑμεῖς [“you”] itself suggested
that the church’s own activity was coming—is intended obviously to refer the
μένειν [“to abide”] to the meaning and substance of the announcement: it was not
that the church must abide in the word which they had heard, but that word abide
in them. The same word which had made them Christians should keep them such; the
self-activity of the brethren recedes entirely into the rear; it has nothing to
do but to avoid hindering the power of the truth. Essentially, therefore, it is
just as when the Apostle Paul exhorts the Thessalonians, τὸ πνεῦμα μὴ σβέννυτε
[“do not quench the Spirit” cf. 1Th 5:19]; only a negative activity, a suffering
themselves to be kept, was needful on their side. Similarly, in the second half
of the verse the abiding in God is represented, not as a commandment, but as the
inevitable and natural result of the preceding; and, finally, in 1Jn 2:27 the
very necessity of any command is expressly precluded.

Now all this coincides most graciously with the set and posture of the whole
section. Not only the Christian estate of the church in general, but also
specifically the abiding of the word of God in it (1Jn 2:14), forms the
fundamental presupposition of it throughout; indeed, their νικᾶντὸνπονηρόν
[“victory over the evil one”] was expressly declared to be the result of their
abiding. Thus the apostle’s exhortation is of a more negative kind: disturb not
this energy of the truth, guard against all interruptions of it; all else will
this word, implanted in you, itself accomplish. If this continues in them, the
result will be—according to the second half of the verse—that they will continue
in the Son and in the Father, This double relation, the μένεινἐναὐτῷ [“abide in
him”] and the μένειν [“abide”] of the word of God ἐνὑμῖν [“in you”], occurs also
in the Gospel: compare Joh 15:7, ἐὰν μείνητε ἐν ἐμοὶ, καὶ τὰ ῥήματά μου ἐν ὑμῖν
μείνῃκ.τ.λ. [“If you abide in me, and my words abide in you, etc.”]. And as the
word of Christ is not viewed here as a dead letter, but as the bearer and
instrument of His Spirit, as pervaded and filled by Him, these expressions are
parallel also with Joh 15:4-5, where to the μείνατεἐνἐμοὶ [“abide in me”]
corresponds the κἀγώἐνὑμῖν [“and I in you”].

Now, that these counterpart expressions are in fact two various sides of the
same thing, and that at their basis lies a real and not merely dialectical
distinction, is shown at once by the causal relation in which one is here placed
to the other. But it is rather hard to define the distinction sharply, because
in the Gospel our abiding in God is ever exhibited as prius, while in this
passage the order is reversed. Let us try to mark the relation of the two
expressions discussed by another view, seemingly wide apart from this, which,
however, only brings before us the figure of which this is the reality. Through
all the Scriptures of the Old and the New Testaments there runs this double
aspect of the matter, that we on the one hand are the temple of God in which He
dwells, and that, on the other hand, we dwell in God Himself as our temple. In
the latter case, God is, or His temple, which comes into consideration as the
sphere of His revelation of His nature, is, the place where we find rest and
peace, and security and life: thus is expressed all that we possess in God; He
is here the giver, and we the receivers; He is active, and we are passive. When,
inversely, we are regarded as the temple in which God dwells, we are considered
ourselves as the objects in which God works and as the organs of His will; thus
is expressed, by what seems a paradox, what He has in us; we in this case are
the active. Precisely thus is it in the terms of our passage, which are only the
pure spiritual expression of the figurative statements just examined. If we
abide in God, He is the proper and essential subject, we are parts of His I: out
of His fulness we receive all, having absolutely no independent life. If He
abides in us, we are ourselves the proper and real subject, He becomes a part of
our I, insomuch as in our actions His will comes into effect. This will make it
plain why in our text the former of these two comes first. The beginning of the
relation does not lie with us, but with God; the word of Christ, and through
that word His Spirit, becomes a living power in us, μένειἐνὑμῖν [“abide in
you”]; and the more perfectly the entire Christ enters into us, the more
perfectly and the more inwardly we are wedded to Him on our part, and enter into
Him essentially: μένομενἐναὐτῷ [“abiding in him”]. Such is the actual historical
process; we may, however, with propriety invert the order with Joh 15:4 ff.:
there, forsooth, the disciples are regarded as already standing in the
fellowship of Christ; the words καθαροί ἐστε διὰ τὸν λόγον μου [“you are clean
on account of my word” cf. Joh 15:3], just as in this passage, specify the
indwelling of the λόγος [“word”] in them as the first stage of their religion;
but then comes in the μένεινἐναὐτῷ [“abide in him”] as the result, and through
this result again the abiding of Christ in the disciples is nourished and
strengthened. It is a permanent and continuous reciprocation: the abiding of
Christ in men furthers their abiding in Him; this again facilitates the former;
and so it goes on. Did they indeed but let the great message of salvation, that
Jesus is the Christ, and with that message the ruling of Christ Himself in our
hearts, have its full living development as a power! ἐὰν ἐν ὑμῖν μείνῃ ὃ
ἠκούσατε [“if what you have heard abides in you”]: then, indeed, would they be
secure against any contamination of the antichrist spirit; yea, more than that,
fellowship with God would become more continuous and perfect, and that as
fellowship with the Son and the Father. In the twenty-second verse the Father
was first, here it is the Son. That is not an accidental or indifferent
circumstance. The Father preceded before, because the apostle there had the last
consummation in his eye, and would place it before the readers as the goal from
which the antichrist lie would lead them astray, and to which fidelity would
surely attain. Here the Son precedes, because already in Him is the means and
the only means for attaining that end.


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  CHAPTER 32: 32 - 1JN 2:25
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1Jn 2:25

Καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπαγγελία, ἣν αὐτὸς ἐπηγγείλατο ἡμῖν, τὴν ζωὴν τὴν αἰώνιον.

Now at length the apostle may regard his exhibition of the truth as completed
and closed; he brings in the conclusion when he indicates that the abiding in
our Lord is the final goal and issue of the whole saving institute of Christ.
For we must be sure that the αὕτη [“this”] in the beginning of 1Jn 2:25 refers
to this abiding in the Lord,—that is, to what goes before, not to what follows.
It is indeed not to be disputed that, generally speaking, in propositions which
are constituted like this of ours, St. John is accustomed to refer the
demonstrative pronoun to what follows; but a grammatical necessity it is not,
and the sense here forbids it. For if the αὕτη [“this”] is referred to the
sequel, its meaning is the ζωὴαἰώνιος [“eternal life”]; and the thought would
be, that eternal life is the promise given to us. But in that case the
accusative τὴν ζωὴν [“the life”] would be a still greater difficulty than it is
in the explanation we shall presently give; and, moreover, the apostle would
then introduce into the close of the whole period two absolutely new ideas,
without the least indication of their connection with what precedes. It is quite
otherwise if we refer αὕτη [“this”] to what goes before: then the ζωὴαἰώνιος
[“eternal life”] is essentially in apposition with ἐπαγγελία [“promise”], and
put into the accusative only through attraction to the relative clause
ἡἐπηγγείλαμεν [“what we proclaimed”]. From this, then, we derive a meaning as
clear as it is appropriate: it is this, that the abiding in the Lord forms the
contents of the promise of eternal life which Christ has given us. It is
certainly true, again, that the words ἐπαγγελία [“promise”] and ἐπαγγέλλειν [“to
announce”] are not generally current in the Johannaean idiom; and we do not
find, in his Gospel, eternal life specified as the contents of the ἐπαγγελία
[“promise”] of Christ,—that is, in any formal expression. It is indeed the goal
to which He would conduct us, the end that He sets before us; and in this sense
is a promise actually running through the whole of our Lord’s life and teaching.
Particularly, there are two passages, out of many which treat of eternal life,
which here come into consideration. One is in the sixth chapter, where Christ
exhibits this life as the fruit of faith in Himself, Joh 6:40, John 6:47, John
6:54, while it comes further into view as the result of His words in us, compare
Joh 6:68, ῥήματα ζωῆς αἰωνίου ἔχεις [“you have words of eternal life”]:
precisely as here, in our passage, the ἀκούειντὸνλόγοναὐτοῦ [“to hear his word”]
forms the presupposition for that abiding in Him which is the substantial
meaning of the ζωὴαἰώνιος [“eternal life”]. The second is Joh 17:2-3, where
eternal life consists in this, that γινώσκωσί σε τὸν μόνον ἀληθινὸν Θεὸνκαὶ
[“they may know you, the olly true God, and”] (and the addition following is the
point concerned here) ὃν ἀπέστειλας Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν [“Jesus Christ, whom tyou
have sent”]. This γιγνώσκειν [“to know”] corresponds to the ὁμολογεῖναὐτόν [“to
confess him”] in our present passage.—Thus the Lord has set forth eternal life
as the final scope of His work; to this He will lead every man; and therefore it
is called the promise which He hath given. And this promise, according to our
present verse, He has fulfilled; this life we have received, inasmuch as He
abideth in us and we in Him: the contents and meaning of the αὕτη [“this”]. This
definition of the strict meaning of eternal life is the same—and this shows its
correctness—which we found in the introduction to our Epistle, that is, in 1Jn
1:3, where fellowship with the Father and the Son is laid down as its
substantial meaning. Moreover, it is very plain, from a consideration of our
passage, how necessary it is that we should take αἰώνιος [“eternal”] not as a
metaphysical, but as an ethical idea: it is not its super-temporal character,
but the divinity of this life which is expressed by the term.


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  CHAPTER 33: 33 - 1JN 2:26-27
========================================================================

1Jn 2:26-27

Ταῦτα ἔγραψα ὑμῖν περὶ τῶν πλανώντων ὑμᾶς·Καὶ ὑμεῖς τὸ χρίσμα ὃ ἐλάβετε ἀπ᾽
αὐτοῦ, ἐν ὑμῖν μένει, καὶ οὐ χρείαν ἔχετε ἵνα τὶς διδάσκῃ ὑμᾶς· ἀλλ᾽ ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ
χρίσμα διδάσκει ὑμᾶς περὶ πάντων, καὶ ἀληθές ἐστι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι ψεῦδος, καὶ
καθὼς ἐδίδαξεν ὑμᾶς, μενεῖτε ἐν αὐτῷ· The very fact that the apostle, in 1Jn
2:25, has come round to the selfsame point from which he started, shows that the
previous discussion has now attained its close. More particularly: since the
discourse does not return to the starting-point of the last section (from 1Jn
2:13c onwards), but to the beginning of the whole letter (compare only with the
ζωὴαἰώνιος [“eternal life”] of 1Jn 2:25 the mention of it in 1Jn 1:2, with the
μένεινἐναὐτῷ [“abide in him”] the κοινωνίαμετ᾽αὐτοῦ [“fellowship with him”], 1Jn
1:3), it follows that the development since 1Jn 1:5 has now come to its end.
But, like the two former sections of the whole first part now reaching its
close, this third section also has a summary recapitulation, 1Jn 2:26-27. Up to
this point (ταῦτα [“these things”]) the apostle has written to the churches
concerning the antichrists. Ταῦτα [“these things”] does not refer to the brevity
of the discussion (“only so much”), nor to the specific matter of it (“this and
no other that might be added”); but it places what goes before in contrast with
what follows—with what the apostle has it in his purpose yet to write. As the
section 1Jn 2:3-11[N] treats of brotherly love, although the matter is first of
all quite generally of keeping the divine commandments, so the topic of this
section has been the antichrist nature, although first of all (1Jn 2:15-17) the
discourse was of the κόσμος [“world”] in general, whose full form is
anti-Christianity. But the antichrists came into consideration as πλανώντεςὑμᾶς
[“leading you astray”]: they have aimed to make the church wander from the
truth, and then to lead them to wander back to the world. This was the practical
starting-point of the whole discussion. Against this practice of seduction the
church had, as we have seen in the previous exposition, a defence in the χρίσμα
[“anointing”]: hence this, then, is particularly taken up again in the
recapitulation. Even in the form it assumes, the resumé is faithful to itself:
here also we have the ὑμεῖς [“you”] placed significantly first; here also,
moreover, there is a marked absence of any injunction as such. The holy
anointing oil which they had received, which separated them from the world, is
within them a permanent power,—for ἀμεταμέλητα τὰ χαρίσματα καὶ ἡ κλῆσις τοῦ
Θεοῦ [“the gifts and the calling of God are irrevocable” cf. Rom 11:29] ,—and
makes every exhortation, even every apostolical exhortation, superfluous. And so
had the Lord promised to His disciples that the Paraclete should lead them into
all truth. To establish the undeceivableness of this heavenly instruction is the
object of the second clause in our verse. This second clause, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ
χρίσμα διδάσκει ὑμᾶς περὶ πάντων, καὶ ἀληθές ἐστι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι ψεῦδος [“but as
his anointing teaches you about all things, and is true and is not a lie”], is
related to the third just as a general proposition as a whole is to its
particular concrete application. Not only does the περὶ πάντων [“about all
things”] give the former its general colouring, and the μένεινἐναὐτῷ [“abide in
him”] give the latter its specific colouring, but the present διδάσκει [“he
teaches”] also shows that in the second clause a general proposition is before
us, whilst ἐδίδαξεν [“it has taught”] in the third makes prominent one definite
historical single fact out of the general domain of that clause. And thus it is
established that the words καὶ καθὼς ἐδίδαξεν ὑμᾶς [“and just as it has taught”]
are not merely a resumption of the ἀλλ᾽ ὡςκ.τ.λ. [“but as, etc.”],—that thus koI
καὶ ἀληθές ἐστικ.τ.λ. [“and is true, etc.”] is not a parenthesis, but a
conclusion to the proposition with ὡς [“as”]. Certainly it is extremely
difficult to accept the redoubled καί [“and”] as meaning, “not only but also;”
for that anything is true and not false is after all essentially no more than
one attribute which is only viewed on two different sides, while “not only but
also” presupposes two different ideas. But such a view as this of the former καί
[“and”] is not imperative; rather is the former to be translated by “also:” the
congruence between the declaration of the χρίσμα [“anointing”] and the real
bearing of the matter, between the διδάσκειν [“teaching”] and the ἀληθέςεἶναι
[“is true”], was thereby to be marked. The following καὶ οὐκ ἔστι ψεῦδος [“and
is not a lie”] is genuinely Johannaean: it is a peculiarity of this apostle to
place every idea in full prominence through setting by the side of it its
antithesis. This διδάσκειν [“teaching”] of the χρίσμα [“anointing”] is true, and
there is no lie in it; and thus the ἐστι [“to be”], in virtue of its deep
emphasis, becomes equivalent to an ἐνεστι [“in essence”].

Thus, then, the apostle in the first of the three clauses of 1Jn 2:28 has summed
up and resumed the whole fact that the χρίσμα [“anointing”] gave full
instruction to the church; in the second, he has declared that this instruction
was simply and purely true; in the third, he then draws the practical conclusion
that the church should stand firmly by the substance of the teaching here in
question, and here treated of (this is the meaning of the aorist ἐδίδαξεν [“it
has taught”]. The μενεῖτε[V-FAI-2P][“you will abide”] of the Textus Receptus
would indeed admirably suit the tone of the whole section, in which the apostle
less commands the μένειν[V-PAN] [“to abide”] than points to it as an internal
necessity; but the imperative μένετε[V-PAM-2P] [“abide”] has too strong
authentication from external evidence to be rejectedtn; and it is in itself
easily to be understood that, at the conclusion of the whole discussion, the
imperative, everywhere latent in the preceding words, should for once come out
into clear expression.

Let us throw a glance back along the course of the first part, now concluded, of
the whole Epistle. It is completed in three sections, of which each again
contains three sub-sections, two giving instruction, and one exhortation or
recapitulation. The first section deduces from the idea of the φῶςεἶναι [“being
light”] of God the nature of our fellowship with Him, and as viewed under two
aspects: that of ἐνφωτίπεριπατεῖν [“walk in the light”], and that of ὁμολογεῖν
τὰςἁμαρτίας [“to confess of sin”]. The second section discusses, on the same
basis, the nature of our fellowship with the brethren, and that also under two
aspects: as obedience to the ἐντολαὶ Θεοῦ [“commandments of God”], and as
imitation of the converse and walk of Christ. The third section points to the
enmity which exists between the kingdom of God and this world: here, again,
first as against the world in general, and then as against its antichrist
development in particular; but both in order to enforce the obligation of
breaking off from the world negatively, or positively of abiding in God. That
the two former sections of the whole discussion have their basis in Θεὸςφῶς
[“God is light”], and are evolved from this, has been shown in the proper place.
But it is true also of the third section, only that it takes up the negative
side of 1Jn 1:5[N]: καὶ σκοτία ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία [“and in him there is
no darkness at all”]. This thorough and pervasive antithesis between them, such
as forbids the very slightest contact, is the theme of the whole discussion in
1Jn 2:13-27. κόσμος [“world”] and ἀντίχριστος [“antichrist”] are only terms,
interchangeable for the σκοτία [“darkness”].

Textual Note tnμένετε[V-PAM-2P] א A B C P Ψ 5 33 81 323 614 630 945 1241 1243
1448 1505 1611 1735 1739 1852 2138 2298 2344 2464 2805 Syrp,h Arm Eth Beza WH
Treg ‖ μενεῖτε[V-FAI-2P] K L 049 056 0142 6 18 307 424 Copticsa mss ps-oec Ï TR
HF RP.


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  CHAPTER 34: 34 - 1JN 2:28-29
========================================================================

1Jn 2:28-29

Καὶ νῦν, τεκνία, μένετε ἐν αὐτῷ, ἵνα ὅταν φανερωθῇ, ἔχωμεν παῤῥησίαν, καὶ μὴ
αἰσχυνθῶμεν ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ αὐτοῦ. Ἐὰν εἰδῆτε ὅτι δίκαιός ἐστι,
γινώσκετε ὅτι πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγένηται.

We have assumed, in opposition to the current view of our day, that 1Jn 2:28
belongs to the second part of the Epistle. One circumstance may be mentioned
here as making this probable: with the exception of the μένειν [“to abide”] at
the beginning of the verse, all the ideas in it are new ones, and enter the
Epistle for the first time; but that would be a startling close of a discussion
which should introduce a new series of ideas instead of summing up the old ones.
But the connection of this verse with the second part becomes a certainty, when
we observe that the special ideas that are literally touched here for the first
time are the ever-recurring constitutive elements of the second. Thus the
φανεροῦσθαι [“to make known”] is taken up again in 1Jn 3:3-8; the παῤῥησίανἔχειν
[“to have boldness”] is elucidated in 1Jn 3:21; 1Jn 4:17, 1Jn 5:14; the
ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”] forms the fundamental idea of
the first ten verses of the following chapter; the ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγεννήσθαι [“having
been born of him”] is not only repeated in the τέκνα Θεοῦ [“children of God”],
1Jn 3:1, but also from 1Jn 3:24 onwards is more closely considered. But all this
only introduces the all-decisive reason, which is, that the thought announced in
1Jn 2:28 is precisely in the same sense the theme of the next part as 1Jn 1:5
was of that we have just closed. This argument, however, must approve itself as
our exposition pursues its course.

Now, if we have in 1Jn 2:28 the beginning of a new part, it follows that the
emphasis does not lie on the μένει [“abide”], at the beginning, but on the
clause which follows and gives the writer’s design. That word serves to place
the new part in connection with the other; the telic clause points to the
progress of the thought. The goal of abiding in God, as the end of the
development so far, is represented positively and negatively: the former by
παῤῥησίανἔχειν [“to have boldness”], the latter by μὴαἰσχυνθήναι [“not put to
shame”]. Both these ideas derive a more specific definition from the appendages,
common to them, ἐὰνφανερωθῇ [“if it may be made known”] and ἐντῇπαρουσίᾳαὐτοῦ
[“at his coming”]. That these expressions refer to the Lord’s return needs of
course no proof. But it must be observed that φανεροῦσθαι [“to make known”]
never occurs throughout the other New Testament Scriptures as denoting the
appearing of Christ for judgment: they are accustomed to express that by
ἀποκαλύπτεσθαι [“to disclose”], while St. John, again, never uses this latter
word (not even in Rev 1:1) for that purpose, but invariably φανεροῦσθαι [“to
make known”]. (The substantive φανέρωσις [“disclosure”] is not to be found at
all in his writings.) Further, it will help to clear up the the general subject
if we bear in mind that in 1Jn 3:8 the same φανεροῦσθαι [“to make known”] is
used concerning the manifestation of Christ in the flesh. The peculiarity of St.
John’s phraseology just alluded to is not a fortuitous one, but has its deep
internal reasons. Throughout the Scripture, ἀποκάλυψις [“laying bare”]
invariably designates a revelation which has taken place in an extraordinary
way, through a direct interposition of God, and therefore as i a perfectly new
development. In φανεροῦσθαι [“to make known”] this element of the entirely new
and the absolutely extraordinary is neither asserted nor denied; but the
definite meaning attached to ἀποκαλύπτειν [“to disclose”] assigns to the
φανεροῦν [“to make known”] at least a predominant application to such a
revealing as is the development of a definitive germ,—a development which is, in
comparison with ἀποκάλυψις [“laying bare”], natural and ordinary. This is the
general law in the Bible. This explains how it is that in Scripture the twofold
manifestation of Jesus in the flesh and for judgment is spoken of as one
ἀποκάλυψις [“laying bare”]: His appearance in the flesh was not in fact a result
of past development, but, beyond everything else, an immediate and extraordinary
interposition of God, an entirely new creation; and His appearance for judgment
is revealed as nothing less than an instantaneous and sudden catastrophe taking
place purely through divine causality, whose product will be a new heaven and a
new earth.

Now, however obvious would be here such an application of ἀποκάλυψις [“laying
bare”], it is not the less easy to be understood how St. John in particular
comes to use, concerning both these events, not this word ever, but always
φανεροῦσθαι [“to make known”]. “We have already often remarked that he delights
to bring out into prominence the germs of the future lying in the present; it is
the effect of this peculiarity that the difference between the present and the
future is reduced from an absolute one to one merely relative; and when the
question is of a revelation, he exhibits this rather as a φανεροῦσθαι [“to make
known”], or making visible of potencies long working secretly, than as an
ἀποκάλυψις [“laying bare”], or something entirely new, resting immediately on
divine causality. Now when St. John, in his Gospel, Joh 1:3, teaches us to
behold the operation of the λόγος [“word”] already in the creation, and, since
the creation. His energy as that of the φῶςἀληθινόν [“true light”], it must of
course have been very natural to him to regard the manifestation of our Lord in
the flesh not as something new, and as an ἀποκάλυψις [“laying bare”], but as a
φανέρωσις [“disclosure”]: this indeed we find him doing in our own Epistle, 1Jn
1:2; 1Jn 3:8. And similarly, to this apostle, with such a habit of looking at
things, who sees the decision of judgment already involved in unbelief, who
always regards the resurrection as a thing present (compare especially Joh 5:25
with Joh 11:25), the future judgment would appear not as altogether a new
thing,—that is, as an ἀποκάλυψις [“laying bare”],—but as a natural result and
conclusion of a long series of sacred events which only now brings out into
light (φανεροῦν [“to make known”]) that which had been long present spiritually
and secretly. The apostle therefore describes by ἐὰνφανερωθῇ [“if it may be made
known”] that day in which the Lord, who abideth with His people always, will
make His presence apparent at once and forever to all eyes. In the second member
of the sentence which contains the purpose there comes in an ἐντῇπαρουσίᾳαὐτοῦ
[“at his coming”] instead of the ἐὰνφανερωθῇ [“if it may be made known”]. This
expression, which is so very current among the other writers of the New
Testament, occurs in St. John nowhere but in this passage. Probably this is not
an accidental circumstance; but has its reason, though the apostle might not
have been altogether aware of it, in the very same habit of considering things
which we have been trying to explain. It was far from his thoughts at any time
to regard the appearance of the Lord as an arrival from a distance: the presence
of Jesus in the midst of His disciples, and within their hearts, was ever before
his thoughts. This, however, did not hinder him from using this expression for
once concerning the last day. When the Lord shall in that great day enter into
the world of manifestation, our relation to Him will also be a manifest one,
revealed and withdrawn from all delusion. And the μένεινἐναὐτῷ [“abide in him”]
will then fit us and enable us in our appearance before Him παῤῥησίανἔχειν [“to
have boldness”]. It has been thought, without reason, that in this and other
similar passages, παῤῥησία [“boldness”] has lost the fundamental idea of free
and unrepressed speech. But we must remember that the subject here is the
appearance of the Lord for judgment; that therefore question and answer, charge
and exculpation (compare Mat 25:34 ff.), enter into the accessories of the
scene; and then it will not be thought absolutely necessary, at least in this
passage, to resort to an enfeebled interpretation of the word. If we have
continued in Him, we shall be able to answer with perfect tranquility of mind,
unqualified by fear and trembling, the questions of our righteous Judge. The
negative counterpart of παῤῥησία [“boldness”] is given us in the αἰσχυνθήναι
[“put to shame”]. Formally, the correlative is not exactly adequate; while the
former presents to us the joyful tone of mind which we shall maintain in the day
oi judgment, the latter refers rather to the result of the judgment, as appears
from the added words ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ [“from him”]. The phrase, formed after the
analogy of the Hebrew בּוֹשׁמִן [“from shame”] compare, for example, Jer 2:36,
Sept., ἀπὸΑἰγύπτουαἰσχυνθήσῃ [“you will be ashamed of Egypt”]), does not
describe the source from whence the shame springs, which would be expressed by
ἀπὸ [“from”], but the object from whom we are in our shame severed. But as the
παῤῥησία [“boldness”] is possible only on the ground of the testimony of a good
conscience, which in itself includes the result of the judgment, its happy
consequence, so also the αἰσχυνθήναι [“put to shame”] includes its necessary
result, the separation from the Lord.

Looking at 1Jn 2:29 apart and by itself, as detached from what precedes and what
follows, we are met by no difficulties of any kind. It is obvious that the
subject in the δίκαιόςἐστιν [“he is righteous”] at the commencement is God. For,
as the meaning and bearing of the verse is that as “He” is righteous all must be
righteous too who are His children; as throughout the New Testament we never
read of a relation of sonship to Christ, only of sonship to God; as, finally, in
1Jn 3:8 we are expressly called τέκνα Θεοῦ [“children of God”],—it is impossible
to understand the δίκαιός [“righteous”], whose nature we as His children should
carry in ourselves, of our Lord Christ. It is true that 1Jn 2:28 had spoken of
Christ. But a transition, immediate and not marked by any external sign, from
discourse concerning the Son to discourse concerning the Father, is not strange
in the case of St. John, in whose consciousness the two are so profoundly
intertwined, that he very seldom thinks it necessary to mention either, or
distinguish them otherwise than by a pronoun. And this transition need not
favour the notion of a new part of the Epistle beginning with 1Jn 2:29; for in
1Jn 4:21 we find in the same way that after the Father has been spoken of
throughout several verses, suddenly the Son is mentioned, and obviously
mentioned, by the simple pronoun αὐτός [“he”], and no more. Thus the plain
meaning of the verse is: As the nature of God is righteousness, so must this
same righteousness be the token of sonship in relation to Him; the children must
bear their Father’s stamp upon them. But it is hard to determine the kind of
link which the verse has with what precedes. At the first glance there is as
little internal connection with the preceding thought as there is grammatical
bond. Nevertheless there must be connection, even on the supposition that our
verse begins the new part; for the ἐὰνεἰδῆτε [“if you know”] would certainly be
much too naked for the commencement of a different theme: we should expect at
least a τεκνία [“littlechildren”] or παιδία [“children”] in a new address. And
there is certainly a natural presumption in favour of the idea that the apostle
was moved to set out on this fresh topic by something just before said.

There are two thoughts which appear here as new, the ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to
practice righteousness”] and the γεγεννήσθαιἐκτοῦΘεοῦ [“to have been born of
God”]. Now, when we observe that in the first section of the third chapter it is
said, 1Jn 3:6, πᾶς ὁ ἐν αὐτῷ μένων οὐχ ἁμαρτάνει [“everyone who abides in him
does not continue to sin”], and in 1Jn 3:9 the same thought is expressed by πᾶς
ὁ γεγεννημένος ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἁμαρτίαν οὐ ποιεῖ [“everyone who is born of God does
not continue to practice sin”]; when we further mark that in 1Jn 3:24 the
μένεινἐναὐτῷ [“abide in him”] is in the same way connected with the τηρεῖν τὰς
ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ [“keeps his commandments”] as the γεγεννήσθαιἐξ αὐτοῦ [“having
been born of him”] is here connected with the ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice
righteousness”],—we shall no longer discern in the γεγεννήσθαιἐξ αὐτοῦ [“having
been born of him”] of our verse a new idea, but only the resumption of the
μένεινἐντῷ Θεῷ [“abide in God”] often dealt with in the previous section, and
mentioned in it finally at 1Jn 2:28. That the expression here used is
substituted for that one has its reason, apart from what later development will
show, in this, that here the divine essential righteousness (ὅτι δίκαιός ἐστι
[“that he is righteous”]) comes into consideration as the source of our
ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”]; but that this relation of
causality is made prominent as our being born of God rather than as our abiding
in Him. Thus there is at once presented a point of view from which the
connection of the present verse with the preceding becomes plain. This
connection becomes still plainer when we more closely examine and appreciate the
relation which is here established between the ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to
practice righteousness”] and the γεγεννήσθαιἐκτοῦΘεοῦ [“to have been born of
God”]. Manifestly the emphasis rests upon the latter. It is not the apostle’s
purpose to say that whosoever is born of God must therefore of necessity work
righteousness, although in itself such a proposition would be perfectly
justified; but he draws the inverted conclusion, namely, that he who doeth
righteousness is also born of God, because God’s nature, the δίκαιόνεἶναι [“to
be righteous”], has become his nature also. Thus this new sonship is not the
basis or supposition from which St. John proceeds in order to found on it the
exhortation to righteousness; but the δικαιοσύνη [“righteousness”], as already
present, is the presupposition from which he deduces the reality of their
sonship. The question is here to lay down a mark of the regeneration of the
soul. Now, if we bear in mind that the γεγεννήσθαιἐκτοῦΘεοῦ [“to have been born
of God”] is simply a resumption in another form of the μένεινἐναὐτῷ [“abide in
him”], being related to this as the planting of the tree is to its flower, we
shall perceive that here we have also a mark given us of the μένεινἐναὐτῷ
[“abide in him”]. And why is this given? In the preceding passage the παῤῥησία
[“boldness”] in the day of judgment was made dependent on the μένεινἐντῷ Θεῷ
[“abide in God”]; here it is said further how it is this παῤῥησία [“boldness”]
comes into effect,—that is, it operates thus, that he who continueth in God, and
therefore is born of God, becomes firmly assured of this his fellowship with God
through his ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”]. The synthesis of
the μένεινἐναὐτῷ [“abide in him”] and the παῤῥησία [“boldness”]—that is, their
close relation, which the former verse merely asserted—is here expressly
indicated through the mediating link between them, which is the newly introduced
idea of ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”]. The idea of the
παῤῥησία [“boldness”] presupposes not only the abiding in God, but the conscious
assurance of it: this, however, is produced by the doing of righteousness.
Strictly speaking, indeed, our abiding in God and the abiding of God in us are
in their unity something entirely internal, perceptible only to the feeling or
the consciousness; therefore it is, like every feeling, something subjective
which is itself and as such no pledge of its own objective reality. This
additional guarantee or assurance it receives through such a confirmation in
act: we are to know others by their fruits, and by our own fruits we are to know
ourselves. He who finds this ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”]
in his life has in sustaining this sure test for his knowledge of himself
(γινώσκετε [“you know”] is in the indicative), the guarantee of his being born
from above, and therewith also the παῤῥησία [“boldness”], which the apostle
bound up with fellowship with God.

Thus a close consideration of 1Jn 2:29 shows, what appeared plain enough on 1Jn
2:28 itself, that the new part begins with 1Jn 2:28, the idea of which is
supplemented and made specific by what follows. Further, there is thus afforded
to us a clear view of the relation of the part of the epistle now closed to that
which now begins. In both the apostle keeps in view the end he proposed in the
introduction, that of helping towards advancing fellowship with God and
fellowship with the brethren; but the method differs in the two. In the first
part this fellowship comes into consideration as an internal habit; in the
second it is rather its confirmation in works. From the very beginning we have
accustomed ourselves to understand the περιπατεῖνἐντῷ φωτί [“walk in the light”]
in the first chapter of more than the mere external actions of man in the
narrower sense; of the sphere, rather, in which his whole life and being are
rooted. The ἁμαρτίαι [“sins”] and the ἀδικία [“unrighteousness”] are by no means
limited to actual sins of commission; they include all sins whether in thought,
or in word or in work. Similarly, in the second chapter the τηρεῖν τὰς ἐντολὰς
[“to keep commandments”] is not to be restricted to the ποιεῖν [“do”] in the
external sense, but, as the ideas ἀγαπᾶν [“love”] and μισεῖν [“hate”]
immediately following show, pre-eminently to the inner mind. And then in the
third section of the first part the nature of it is traced to the ἐπιθυμία
[“lustful passion”] and ἀλαζονεία [“boastfulness”]: therefore it is not so much
in the outward expressions of a quality as in the quality itself. That in 1Jn
1:6 we read once of ποιεῖντὴνἀλήθειαν [“doing the truth”], and similarly in 1Jn
2:17 once of ποιεῖν τὸ θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ [“doing the will of God”], are exceptions
which have no power to alter the definitely marked character of the section in
each case; in fact, it is not the inner mind as opposed to the external
confirmation which is the subject, but the habitus of the Christians generally,
which includes the approval of its reality in works. Out of this habitus
generally is now in the second part the ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice
righteousness”] taken and brought forward prominently and laid down as the token
of that habitus: on its reality, as we have seen, the παῤῥησία [“boldness”] of
Christians, as its final consummation, depended. In details, we may observe at
the outset and in advance, the course of the whole of the second part is very
similar to that of the first. First, the ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice
righteousness”] is viewed in reference to God, then in reference to the
brethren; finally, from their combination the παῤῥησία [“boldness”] is deduced,
and thus once more we have supernumerary confirmation in the tenor of this part,
that its theme is to be found in 1Jn 2:28; for the παῤῥησία [“boldness”] spoken
of there is dilated on after the full illustration of the ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην
[“to practice righteousness”], which is introduced in 1Jn 2:29; in harmony,
therefore, with our analysis, according to which the ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to
practice righteousness”] is the middle term between what the μένεινἐναὐτῷ
[“abide in him”] treated of in the preceding and the παῤῥησία [“boldness”].

Finally, in this way we are extricated, as easily as satisfactorily, from a
difficulty which we designedly left behind in 1Jn 2:27. There the χρίσμα
[“anointing”] is introduced as an absolutely right guide, never erring and
always to be depended upon, which the church therefore might follow most
implicitly. We have seen in the proper place that the anointing oil, by which
the church is withdrawn from the world, is the Holy Ghost; and it is of course
self-understood that the Spirit cannot deceive. But here comes in the question
as to how this χρίσμα [“anointing”] may be known as such, as to what its tests
are,—that is to say, if instruction through the apostolical word is represented
as superfluous, then the door seems to be opened for all fanaticism, which is
always so ready to appeal to the internal voice of the Spirit, either esteeming
the apostolical word less or altogether despising it. The answer to the question
here proposed is given in the new part of the Epistle: only there is the χρίσμα
[“anointing”], the new birth, present with its abiding in God, where the
ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”] is found. Doing is the
evidence of all evidences; and such a doing as harmonizes or corresponds with
the divine δίκαιόν εἶναι [“to be righteous”].

Now it is precisely this relation between the governing ideas which we now have
to do with that brings out the exquisitely careful steps by which the Epistle
goes onward. The first part leads up to its climax by developing its ideas to
the point at which, by an internal necessity, they must issue, unless they are
to remain both one-sided and untrue. That the ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice
righteousness”] is the conclusive evidence of any man’s personal Christianity,
the only undeceiving mark by which the Christian may test himself, is in perfect
agreement with the Pauline view; in 2Ti 2:19 it is said concerning the sure
foundation of God, that is, according to the context, the Christian community:
ἔχει τὴν σφραγῖδα ταύτην, Ἔγνω Κύριος τοὺς ὄντας αὑτοῦ, καὶ ἀποστήτω ἀπὸ ἀδικίας
πᾶς ὁ ὀνομάζων τὸ ὄνομα Χριστοῦ [“having this seal, ‘The Lord knows those who
are His,’ and, ‘Everyone who names the name of Christ is to abstain from
unrighteousness’]. In this passage also there is, by the side of the divine
knowledge which is not within man’s apprehension, the turning away from ἀδικία
[“unrighteousness”], that is, positively, the ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice
righteousness”]; and this latter is the only possible ground of our own personal
knowledge concerning our belonging to the οἰκίαΘεοῦ [“household of God”]. Not
unlike this is the passage, Rom 10:10. There it is said that while it is faith
that justifies, confession saves (σωθῆναι [“save”]). Internally, the right
relation to God is attained through believing; but in order to the full
enjoyment of the righteousness of faith, and the realization of its purpose,
there must be the outward righteousness of the life: St. Paul, however, here
speaks of its expression in word, while St. John makes the work prominent. The
divine sonship spoken of here is imparted before any doing of man can claim or
approve it; but man’s good work demonstrates its reality, and only thus is the
full assurance of sonship attained.

After having found our position by means of a careful examination of 1Jn
2:28-29, let us take a parting glance at the details. St, John begins with καὶ
νῦν μένετε ἐν αὐτῷ [“and now, abide in him”], joining on to the preceding
context. The καὶνῦν [“and now”] is always appropriated to this use,—namely, that
of introducing something new on the basis of a previous discussion; such is its
service in the only passage of St. John’s Gospel where it occurs, Joh 17:5. The
new thought that enters is the παῤῥησία [“boldness”] in the judgment, which
thought is mediated and introduced by the ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice
righteousness”]. The principle of this mediation between them is that God
Himself is righteous, and righteousness is therefore an essential attribute of
one who is born ἐξ αὐτοῦ [“of him”],—that is, of God’s own very nature. From the
connection it follows that the righteousness of God does not here refer to His
judicial righteousness: as if it were, Ye know that the judgment will be a
righteous one, therefore so act that ye may stand in such a day as that. The
ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”] does not correspond to the
judicial righteousness of God, but to His righteous character and holiness.
Δίκαιός [“righteous”] here has the same meaning as in 1Jn 2:2 and Joh 17:25
(compare on 1Jn 1:9). This principle, that God is essentially righteous, is to
the Christian undoubted and fundamental, οἴδατε [“you know”]; and that we on our
side have in the ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”] the
assurance that we are born of Him, is the logical deduction that naturally
follows, γινώσκετε [“you know”]. A thing, however, which is to be represented as
necessary is nut expressed by the imperative, but by the indicative;
consequently we must understand γινώσκετε [“you know”] as indicative here.


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  CHAPTER 35: 35 - 1JN 3:1
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1Jn 3:1

Ἴδετε ποταπὴν ἀγάπην δέδωκεν ἡμῖν ὁ πατὴρ, ἵνα τέκνα Θεοῦ κληθῶμεν· διὰ τοῦτο ὁ
κόσμος οὐ γινώσκει ἡμᾶς, ὅτι οὐκ ἔγνω αὐτόν. The external bond of connection
between this verse and what precedes is clear; the Christian sonship, which in
1Jn 2:29 was mentioned in the last place, is resumed by means of the τέκνα
Θεοῦκληθῆναι [“called children of God”], in order to make prominent the
greatness of the divine gift which is imparted in it. Yet this evident
connection decides nothing as to the chain of thought in the following verses;
that will have to be detected on a careful consideration of the details. Ἴδετε
[“see”], St. John says, ποταπὴνἀγάπηνδέδωκενἡμῖνὁπατὴρ [“what manner of love the
Father has given us”]. Into the thought of the glory of this sacred relation our
minds should profoundly sink: the emphasis of that high dignity is not alone in
ἴδετε [“see”], which announces something most specific, but also in the pronoun
ποταπός [“what manner of”]. This never occurs in the New Testament save as
introducing an exclamation of amazement. It never serves, however, to indicate
merely external greatness (as equivalent to quantus), but always that which is
internal (qualis). The meaning is not that it is a special kind of love which we
have to wonder at in the divine relation of father, as if in proportion to other
kinds of love; but the reference is generally to the wonderfulness of its
interior characteristic: the full depth, interiority, and grace of it is marked
impressively by this word. Ἀγάπηνδιδόναι [“to give love”], says more than a mere
demonstration of love; the full power of divine i love has imparted itself to us
as our own, is a free gift to us; not only specific manifestations of the love
of God, but that love itself is given to us. And this was the Father’s act,
ὁπατήρ [“the Father”]. It might seem obvious, since the subject here is our
relation towards God as children, to refer this πατήρ [“Father”]to the relation
between God and us, and thus to read it as if it were πατήρἡμῶν [“our Father”].
But a closer consideration teaches that throughout the entire Gospel of St. John
the expression πατήρ [“Father”], when it is used absolutely of God, always
indicates the Father of Jesus Christ. The only two passages in which it might be
thought to have a different meaning are Joh 4:21, John 4:23; as the woman of
Samaria did not know the specific relation of Jesus to God, the expression must
have been unintelligible to her in that sense. But they need not be made
exceptions, especially as the woman certainly understood that the Lord was
speaking concerning God, and there was no need that she should apprehend
precisely in what sense He used the word. In our Epistle the expression ὁπατήρ
[“the Father”] is either obviously to be understood at once of God as the Father
of Jesus Christ, as, for example, in 1Jn 2:22 ff.; or it occurs without manifest
reference to Christ, as in 1Jn 2:14-16. But even in these last cases it is not
obligatory to supply ἡμῶν [“our”]; rather, in harmony with the frequent use of
the word in the lips of Jesus, it seems preferable to find in them the standing
designation of the first person in the Godhead, so that ὁπατήρ [“the Father”]
should correspond to our “God the Father.” If this be so, we are then disposed
here also to regard the expression as indicating the way in which God has
demonstrated this love to us,—that is, as the Father of Jesus Christ, and
through the mission of His Son. That the final clause with ἵνα [“in order that”]
is by most expositors softened down, and the philological purism of those
rebuked who are not content that it should be so, is easily understood, because
in fact, according to the connection, the κληθῆναιτέκναΘεοῦ [“called children of
God”] seems to be the content of the ἀγάπη [“love”]. We should, indeed, have a
perfectly satisfying interpretation if we take the ἵνα [“in order that”] in its
rigorous meaning as stating the design. What a depth and inwardness of love is
that which the Father hath given us in order that we might be called His
children! The thought would be: “How much it cost Him that I am redeemed!” But
since this idea of the mission and death of His Son comes in without any direct
mediating link, we must prefer to take the κληθῆναιτέκναΘεοῦ [“called children
of God”] as certainly the content of the ἀγάπη [“love”]; but that which is its
content and meaning is at the same time its end. The love of God is manifested
in this, that He makes us His children; but that very same thing is the goal He
aimed at, the object He pursued. Now it is precisely the latter point that is
brought into prominence, and there is no reason whatever why we should take the
ἵνα [“in order that”] as ecbatic. It is God’s will to make us His τέκνα
[“children”]: that it does not run simply τέκνααὐτοῦ [“his children”], but Θεοῦ
[“of God”] is placed instead, was intended to point to the height and greatness,
past all understanding, of this gift, to be children of the eternal and
all-glorious God.

It is well known that St. John has only the expression τέκναΘεοῦ [“children of
God”], while St. Paul has by the side of it the υἱοὶΘεοῦ [“sons of God”]. The
internal reason of this distinction in the expression will appear when we come
to examine the second verse. But the material difference between the two manners
of viewing the relation to God we may here at once illustrate. The idea of the
γεννήθῆναιἐκτοῦΘεοῦ [“to be born of God”], which, according to the connection,
constitutes the τέκναΘεοῦ [“children of God”], is not current in St. Paul’s
writings; and when he uses any expressions like them, they have a different
signification from that of St. John. We know, indeed, that the former speaks of
an ἀνακαίνωσις τοῦ νοός [“renewing of the mind”] (Rom 12:2); of a
νέοςἀνθρωποςἀνακαινούμενος εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν τοῦ κτίσαντος αὐτὸν [“a new man who is
being renewed in the knowledge of the one who created it”] (Col 3:10); of an
ἐνδύσασθαι τὸν καινὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸν κατὰ Θεὸν κτισθέντα [“put on the new man
created according to God”] (Eph 4:24[N]); of a καινὴ κτίσις [“new creation”]
(Gal 6:15). But in all these places the renewal is a formation back into the
original human nature as created of God. This is expressly brought into
prominence in the passage to the Colossians by the definition τοῦ κτίσαντος
αὐτόν [“the one who created it”]. It is a reforming back again which indeed
comes to effect through the grace of God; and it has its measure or standard
(κατὰ Θεὸν κτισθέντα [“created according to God”]) in the nature of God, because
it was simply in the image of God that man was originally created; but it is not
on that account said to take place, as it were, out of or from God’s nature.
This, however, is the side which St. John brings out in the idea of the
παλιγγενεσία [“renewal”], of the γεγεννήσθαιἐκτοῦΘεοῦ [“having been born of
God”], and keeps always before him. Even in the passage where St. Paul uses the
word παλιγγενεσία [“renewal”], Tit 3:5, we shall, after the analogy of his
general habit of thought and statement, be constrained to find only the element
of the renewal through the help of the Divine Spirit, through a renewal or
reimpartation of the original gift of the Spirit (ἀνακαίνωσις πνεύματος ἁγίου
[“renewing of the Holy Spirit”]), while St. John never fixes his eye on the mere
outpouring and help of grace, but always on the communication of God’s own
divine nature. This difference is in close connection with another which has
often been dwelt upon,—namely, that St. Paul regards us as children of God
adoptive, and therefore uses the word υἱοθεσία [“adoption”], while St. John
regards us as children in nature and reality. The former stands hard by or is
closely related to the Pauline emphasis on the Christ for us, his juridical
doctrine of satisfaction (this word we use, be it remembered, without the
slightest undertone of condemnation); the latter is more in harmony with the
Johannaean emphasis upon the Christ IN us. According to St. Paul, we receive for
Christ’s sake the rights of children; according to St. John, we receive, through
Christ, the children’s nature. According to St. Paul, the old nature of man is
transformed into a new according to St. John, an altogether new principle of
nature takes the place of the former. It is most evident that the two views are
substantially one and true; but they depend on the respective general systems of
the two apostles. And this explains, too, how the full meaning of δέδωκεν
[“gave”] is in the leading clause: the love of God is a gift; it is particularly
the gift of His Spirit; still more I particularly it is the gift of the Spirit
of Jesus Christ.

There is a remarkable difference of reading in the telic clause. According to
the authority of the manuscripts, there should be after the κληθῶμεν [“we would
be called”] a very decisive καὶ ἐσμεν [“and we are”] added. Respect for the
important witnesses in its favour will not permit us to strike it out
absolutely; yet it seems to us in a high degree suspicious; not, indeed, on
account of the continuity in the form of the sentence which it mars,—for of this
there are examples enough to be adduced,—but on account of the sense of the
whole. The greatness of the divine gift does not consist in this, that we are
acknowledged as God’s children, but primarily and pre-eminently in this, that we
are such in reality; which also the recapitulation of the thought in 1Jn 3:2 by
τέκνα Θεοῦ ἐσμεν [“we are children of God”] makes emphatic. The κληθῶμεν [“we
would be called”] of our passage would be suitable on this supposition only, as
it includes the εἶναι [“to be”] or ἐσμεν [“we are”]. But if, after the κληθῶμεν
[“we would be called”], this latter idea was supernumerarily added, then the
former word must mean only the acknowledgment of sonship, and not the being
sons. The emerging thought would then be harsh and distorted. We might, indeed,
accept ὦμεν καὶκληθῶμεν [“and we may be called”], but not the inverted order. It
is preferable, therefore, to regard the καὶ ἐσμεν [“and we are”] as a gloss
which came very early into the text; this would explain the many testimonies in
its favour as well as its indicative form. The subject of the verb, who calls us
children, is not to be regarded as God—for what would there be remarkable in His
calling us what we are?—but believers themselves; and in favour of this way of
taking it comes in the antithesis in the sequel, ὁ κόσμος οὐ γινώσκει ἡμᾶς [“the
world does not know us”]. According to our general exposition of the Epistle,
the apostle is occupied from the very beginning with the idea of the kingdom of
God, the kingdom of light; the individual comes into consideration not as an
individual, but as a member of the whole body, as a stone in the temple of God.
This recognition which the single member receives from the church is what lies
in the καλεῖσθαι [“to be called”]. And there is a double propriety of the word
in this section, which treats of the confirmation or proof of sonship in deed.
In the spiritual generation lies the point or characteristic to approve
ourselves children of God,—that is, the necessity of proving ourselves such; and
the precise counterpart of this is our recognition by others as children.

But, indeed, only on the part of the church. For, precisely in the proportion
that we approve ourselves to them as children of God, shall we be unintelligible
by the world. The διὰ τοῦτο [“for this reason”] of the last clause in 1Jn 3:1
does not refer to the following ἵνα [“in order that”] any more than it does to
the καλεῖσθαι [“to be called”] that precedes, but to the τέκνα Θεοῦ εἶναι [“to
be children of God”], or, still better, to the whole of the previous clause.
Because we have become partakers of this divine love, which communicates to us
its own essence, the world cannot know us, because it knows not Him whom we have
come to resemble so much. Substantially, therefore, this proposition is quite
naturally proved by that out of which it flows; nevertheless there is a touch of
strangeness about it, inasmuch as there is scarcely any allusion throughout the
entire section, 1Jn 3:1-10, to our relation to the world. And in fact the
significance of this added clause is gathered less from the particular thought
precisely touched upon here, than from the whole tenor of the Johannaean habit
of thinking generally. It is St. John’s manner, as we have seen it illustrated
abundantly throughout the two former chapters, always to think in antitheses: to
construct the matter of a positive idea out of its combination or contrast with
its opposite. Precisely so is it here. The greatness of God’s love, which admits
us into fellowship with God Himself, is to be brought out all the more vividly
through this antithesis, that our perfect and absolute separation from the
world, even down to a total want of common understanding, is made so prominent.
Thus the second hemistich is introduced, not for the sake of the discussion that
follows, but purely to illustrate the thought itself and as such now in hand.


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  CHAPTER 36: 36 - 1JN 3:2
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1Jn 3:2

Ἀγαπητοὶ, νῦν τέκνα Θεοῦ ἐσμεν, καὶ οὔπω ἐφανερώθη τί ἐσόμεθα· οἴδαμεν δὲ ὅτι
ἐὰν φανερωθῇ, ὅμοιοι αὐτῷ ἐσόμεθα, ὅτι ὀψόμεθα αὐτὸν καθώς ἐστι· The fellowship
with God, which is based upon the γεννήθῆναιἐξαὐτοῦ [“to be born of him”] or the
τέκνονΘεοῦεἶναι [“to be a child of God”], is the prominent idea of the section
before us: the tokens of this divine sonship, which are no other than the
ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”], are not to be more carefully
exhibited. Great as the love of God is which approves itself in the gift of our
sonship (1Jn 3:1), in that gift it has not reached its highest goal: it will
make us partakers of something higher still. What that higher prerogative is the
second verse shows. The apostle begins by an emphasized repetition of the
present gift, νῦν τέκνα Θεοῦ ἐσμεν [“now we are children of God”]. The verse
before had spoken of the κληθῆναιτέκναΘεοῦ [“called children of God”], this
verse speaks of the εἶναι [“to be”]; for in 1Jn 3:1 the apostle’s aim was not
only to bring out our filial relationship to God, but at the same time the
position which in virtue of it we attain as to other children of God in His
kingdom; but here this aspect of the matter recedes, and our absolute
relationship to God and to Him alone comes again to the front.

It is usual to expound the thought of the verse thus: we are already indeed
internally the children of God, though not yet such in the fullest sense of the
word; hereafter this internal habitus will also be externally manifested
(ἐὰνφανερωθῇ [“if it may be made known”]), and then will this sonship be
revealed, through the contemplation of God, through the ὅμοιοναὐτῷεἶναι [“to be
like him”], in all its glory and fulness. The distinction between the now and
the then would accordingly in that case be only quantitative and not
qualitative; not a difference in the thing, but in the degree of it; only the
difference between the germinal beginning and the developed consummation. But
this analysis seems to us by no means in harmony with the phraseology of the
verse. For when we read νῦν τέκνα Θεοῦ ἐσμεν καὶ οὔπω ἐφανερώθη τί ἐσόμεθα [“now
we are children of God and it is not yet made known what we will be”], there is
a difference certainly and obviously established as to the predicative
definition of the sonship: the declaration of what we shall be one day is placed
in contrast with what we now are, that is, with the τέκναΘεοῦεἶναι [“to be
children of God”]. If we seize the exact sense of the words, it can be only
this, that we shall be hereafter something different as children of God from
what we now are. If it had been the apostle’s design to express the thought
given above as the alternative, to wit, that the sonship now begun would
hereafter be consummated, we should expect οὔπωἐφανερώθητίἐσμεν [“not yet been
made known what we are”] instead of οὔπωἐφανερώθητίἐσόμεθα [“not yet made known
what we will be”],—that is, what we essentially are now already is simply not
yet come to its full expansion and development (οὔπωἐφανερώθη [“not yet made
known”]). Moreover, we should in this case look for τέκνα Θεοῦ [“children of
God”] in the beginning of the sentence, emphasized thus as the idea common to
the present and the future, τέκνα Θεοῦ ἤδη νῦν ἐσμενκ.τ.λ. [“now we are already
children of God, etc.”]. But, as the words now run, the τέκνα [“children”] is in
antithesis with what follows: now the children of God, hereafter something
different. Of course, this antithesis is not an absolute one. By the φανεροῦσθαι
[“to make known”] the future development is also exhibited as a consummation of
the present estate; only that this development leads to something beyond the
τέκναΘεοῦ [“children of God”]. Thus, then, an unbiased consideration of the
whole verse arrives at this idea: we have now the mighty gift of sonship to God,
but hereafter it will be shown what we shall be; in any case, something more
than this. The crisis at which this new development will enter is indeed,
strictly speaking, not declared; for we do not read ὅταν [“when”], but
ἐὰνφανερωθῇ [“if it may be made known”]; but, inasmuch as this φανερωθῇ [“may be
made known”] does substantially look back to the φανερωθήναι [“to be made
known”] of 1Jn 2:28, it is manifest that the apostle is thinking of the
development commencing with the judgment, that is, of eternity. But I this does
not by any means decide that the φανερωθῇ [“may be made known”] has the same
subject as in 1Jn 2:28, Christ namely; rather it is more obvious to take
τίἐσόμεθα [“what we will be”] as the subject: when it will come to the light of
day to what consummate and final development we are called.

But, though the matter and meaning of our full development does not actually lie
before our thought in revelation, yet it is already well known to us (οἴδαμεν
[“we see”]). What it is we find announced in the two sentences, ὅμοιοι αὐτῷ
ἐσόμεθα [“we will be like him”] and ὀψόμεθααὐτὸνκαθώςἐστι [“we will see him just
as he is”]. The stricter apprehension of what this means depends primarily on
the view we take of the ὅτι [“that”] which introduces the second clause. It
either gives the reason of the first, exhibiting the likeness as the result of
the seeing, or it gives the reason of the οἴδαμεν [“we see”]. But since in the
latter case it must, taken exactly, have meant that we know that we shall see
Him; and further, since the ὄπτεσθαιαὐτὸν [“to see him”] as a reason for our
ὅμοιοναὐτῷεἶναι [“to be like him”] is, as we shall see, a decidedly biblical
idea, we shall adhere to the first view, and accordingly proceed from the second
clause as the presupposition on which the first depends.

Now, however, raises the question who is to be understood by the pronoun αὐτὸν
[“him”], whether God or Christ. It cannot be denied that, taking the preceding
sentence into account, the more obvious subject is ὁΘεός; [“God”]; it is further
in favour of referring the pronoun to the Father, that in 1Jn 3:3 the Son is
defined by ἐκεῖνος [“he”]; for, if the Son is throughout spoken of, why this
change of the pronoun, why the ἐκεῖνος [“he”], which obviously seems to refer to
a more distant subject? But, as it respects the first reason, we have just now
seen that in 1Jn 2:29 the Father is without any further intimation spoken of
after the Son had been decidedly the subject in 1Jn 2:28; while it was there
obvious enough that the reader should understand the Son to be the subject
because St. John points him to the ἡμέρακρίσεως [“day of judgment”], on which,
according to scriptural teaching generally, as in particular that of 1Jn 2:28,
the Son is the active person. As to the second reason, the entering of ἐκεῖνος
[“he”] into the third verse, we may appeal to 1Jn 3:7, where ἐκεῖνος [“he”]
stands although in what precedes the Lord had been more than once spoken of as
αὐτὸς [“he”]. But yet more stringent is the appeal to Joh 5:39: ἐρευνᾶτε τὰς
γραφὰς, ὅτι ὑμεῖς δοκεῖτε ἐν αὐταῖς ζωὴν αἰώνιον ἔχειν, καὶ ἐκεῖναί εἰσιν αἱ
μαρτυροῦσαι περὶ ἐμοῦ. [“You search the Scriptures because you think that in
them you have eternal life, but it is these that testify about me”]. Here the
change of the pronouns in the same verse obviously did not arise out of a change
in the subject, but ἐκεῖνος [“he”] is substituted only for stronger emphasis on
the same subject: “these very same are they which testify of Me.” Precisely so
is it here: “He that hath this hope in Him purifieth himself, even as the same
He is pure.” But all this only proves the possibility that the pronouns of the
second and third verses collectively may be referred to Christ; it is shown to
be necessary, however, by the expression itself, ὀψόμεθααὐτὸνκαθώςἐστι [“we will
see him just as he is”]. It is everywhere the scriptural doctrine that the
Father can in no sense whatever be seen. That does not follow so much from the
Johannaean utterance, Θεὸν οὐδεὶς πώποτε τεθέαται [“no one has ever seen God”
cf. 1Jn 4:12],—for, although He is not seen here below, He might, nevertheless,
in some sense be seen in eternity,—but it is absolutely required by the Pauline
saying, Ὃν εἶδεν οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπος οὐδὲ ἰδεῖν δύναται . . . φῶς οἰκῶν ἀπρόσιτον
[“not one person has seen or is able to see” . . . “the one who dwells in
unapproachable light” cf. 1Ti 6:16]. It is true that in some passages of the New
Testament—not to speak of figurative expressions in the Old—a seeing or
beholding of God is spoken of. But Mat 5:8 can hardly be reckoned among these;
on the one hand, because the seven benedictions revolve so directly in Old
Testament terms that we must needs understand them after the meaning rather of
the Old Testament than of the New, as, for instance, in the verse immediately
following the one referred to the idea of the υἱοὶΘεοῦ [“sons of God”] is
altogether a different one from that which is exhibited, as we have seen, in our
Epistle; on the other hand, because, as promise and requirement must stand in a
close relation, the preceding καθαροὶτῇκαρδίᾳ [“those pure in heart”] seems
clearly to indicate the sphere in which the seeing is to be enjoyed, that is, in
the heart. The meaning of the words is thus no other than that of Psa
17:15תְּמוּנָתֶֽךָאֶשְׂבְּעָ֥ה’פָנֶ֑יךָ’אֶחֱזֶ֣ה’אֲוִי בְּ֭צֶדֶק’[“As for me, I
will behold your face in righteousness; I will be satisfied when I awake”] form
of God which David would contemplate is His manifestation of Himself; and thus
the first hemistich also, as similarly Mat 8:15, understands by the seeing of
God the immediate fellowship of the heart with Him. As it respects Rev 22:4, the
visions of this book also are extremely analogous with the Old Testament style
of representation, and it is hazardous to derive any dogmas immediately from its
figures; while, in addition to this, we have there the πρόσωποντοῦΘεοῦ [“face of
God”], and this of itself points us to the sphere of transcendent divine
manifestations. The doctrine of Scripture on this point comes most clearly out
of Joh 14:7. There it is expressly said that the disciples have seen the Father
because they see the Son: this is the only way in which a vision of God is
practicable. From the beginning of days down to the most distant aeons the Logos
is the only revealer of the Father; and no one enters into any union with the
Father save through His mediation. That general signification, according to
which the ὄπτεσθαι [“to see”] may certainly be predicated also of God, cannot be
applied in our present passage: here there is no allusion to any spiritual
beholding. For this takes place even on earth, and could not therefore be
appropriately assigned to futurity. Moreover, in that case, the consequence
deduced would not hold good; for, although in that spiritual sense we may indeed
already see God, we are by no means on that account ὅμοιοιαὐτῷ[“like him”]. The
reference to God is also excluded by the καθώςἐστι [“just as he is”]: this
addition can mean to indicate nothing less than an absolutely adequate knowledge
of God; but how is it possible that man, the creature, should ever reach by
contemplation the interior and perfect fulness of the Creator? But, if we are
reduced on such a supposition to accept the beholding of God in a limited sense,
the consequence deduced from it, the ὅμοιοναὐτῷεἶναι [“to be like him”], must in
like manner be limited; and the full and weighty expressions of the apostle must
become altogether indefinite and nebulous. Only in one way can we know God, that
is, through knowing Christ; and Him we may know because He has become like ns.
The same inference we draw from the expression ὅμοιοι αὐτῷ ἐσόμεθα [“we will be
like him”]. Is it the style of Scripture to say that we shall be like unto God?
Concerning Christ it affirms not only the ὅμοιονεἶναι [“to be like”], but also
the εἶναιἴσαΘεῷ [“to be like God”] (Php 2:6); but is this said also of us? One
we are to become like, the Lord Jesus; therefore it is said in Php 3:21 that our
earthly body is to be glorified into the likeness (εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι σύμμορφον
[“made into conformity”]) of His glorified body, and that we should grow up εἰς
μέτρον ἡλικίας τοῦ πληρώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ [“into the measure of the stature of
the fulness of the Christ” cf. Eph 4:13]. But nothing of this kind could be said
of God, nor is anything of this kind ever said. Finally, then, as after all our
discussion there is a phraseological possibility of referring the pronoun to
Christ, while all scriptural analogy most decidedly favours our doing so, we
must follow this guidance; and we shall find that fuller investigation of the
details will furnish further justification of our doing so.

Now when St. John declares that Christians “know” that they shall see the Lord,
the question immediately rises as to the ground of that knowledge. First of all,
we must go back to the sayings of our Lord Himself; and we find in the
high-priestly prayer, Joh 17:24, a thought altogether similar: πάτερ, οὓς
δέδωκάς μοι, θέλω ἵνα ὅπου εἰμὶ ἐγὼ, κᾀκεῖνοι ὦσι μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ, ἵνα θεωρῶσι τὴν
δόξαν τὴν ἐμὴν ἣν ἔδωκάς μοι [“Father, I desire that they also, whom you have
given me, be with me where I am, so that they may see my glory which you have
given me”]. From these words was derived and formed the Christian hope of seeing
the Lord as He is in His glory. It is precisely this which the expression says,
ὀψόμεθααὐτὸνκαθώςἐστιν [“we will see him just as he is”]. A beholding of the
glorified Redeemer as He is (καθώςἐστιν [“just as he is”]), is, in fact, on
earth impossible; it is altogether outside of the ability of the human spirit to
form a conception of the Son of man as He is now, since He has been received
again into the fellowship of Deity, the man Jesus with the attributes of the
Godhead; yea, even His glorified body we cannot conceive of. For all this we
have no faculty nor ability to contemplate now. Καθώςἦν[“just as I was”], as
He once walked on the face of this earth the Son of man, the apostles had seen
Him; thus have we also seen Him, at least in spiritual contemplation, since the
apostles have set Him before our eyes as if He were visibly amongst us
crucified; καθώςἐστιν [“just as he is”], in the glory which He had before the
foundation of the world, and which He has again now restored, no one has ever
yet seen Him, nor can any one see Him. If, then, the καθώςἐστιν [“just as he
is”] of our passage corresponds to the phrase τὴν δόξαν ἣν δέδωκάς μοι [“the
glory which you have given to me”] (Joh 17:22); if, further, the δόξα θεοῦ
[“glory of God”] of 1Jn 1:6 has been understood of His ἐνφωτὶεἶναι [“being in
the light”],—then must the seeing of the Lord as He is be no other than the
seeing Him as He is φῶς [“light”]. Assuredly, the expression Θεὸςφῶς [“God is
light”], 1Jn 1:5, applied primarily to the Father; not only, however, is it a
firmly settled point that what the Father hath the Son hath likewise, but also
it is expressly said that the Logos is to τὸφῶς τῶνἀνθρώπων [“the light of men”
cf. Joh 1:4], and in 1Jn 2:9 the expressions ἐνφωτὶεἶναι [“being in the light”],
τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινὸν ἤδη φαίνει [“the true light is already shining”], are
referred to the Son. The idea of light is so entirely the fundamental idea of
the Epistle before us, that in this passage we may translate ὄπτεσθαι
αὐτὸνκαθώςἐστι [“to see him just as he is”] by beholding the light of the
Redeemer’s glory. God dwells in an inaccessible light; but though we cannot find
direct access, indirect access we can find to His presence. Our verse lays down
the means of this: we may hereafter see the Lord in His glory, as the
ἀπαύγασματοῦφωτός [“radiance of the light”]. And thus the apostle’s assertion,
that through this beholding of the Lord (ὅτι [“that”]) we may be made like Him,
comes to its clear meaning. Here again we may refer to Mat 6:22: the eye is not
only the organ by means of which we see the light as an external thing; it is,
at the same time, the medium through which our whole body becomes light,—that
is, the medium through which the light outside of us is translated into our own
eye. Thus, he who seeth the Lord in His glory as light, becomes thereby a light
himself; what is beheld becomes his own immediate possession; he becomes like
his Lord. The ὅμοιος [“likeness”] must not be pressed too far, nor must it be
softened away: of the former we are in danger when we think of anything like
absolute equality, which the word says nothing about; of the latter we are in
danger when we think only of holiness in general. This holiness, the turning
away from all sin, should, according to the tenor of what follows, be found even
upon earth; that is a prerogative which we already have as τέκναΘεοῦ [“children
of God”]; but when it shall be manifested τίἐσόμεθα [“what we will be”], there
will be something beyond that privilege, even the glorification of our whole
being after the analogy of the being of our glorified Lord. It is an altogether
wrong and inadequate idea that limits the blessedness of heaven to sinlessness.
Through sin our whole nature has become different; and therefore the heavenly
life, the ὅμοιονεἶναι αὐτῷ [“to be like him”], will be something beyond the mere
ceasing from sin. Sinless our Lord was upon earth; yet, notwithstanding that,
His present existence is altogether different from that which He had upon earth.
And now we have arrived at the point from which we may clearly discern what is
the distinction between the τέκναΘεοῦ [“children of God”] and the τί [“what”],
of which it is said that such we shall be. That the consummation of believers
here dealt with is to be something different from the sonship, has been hitherto
maintained and proved by appeal to the expressions here used. But now we shall
vindicate the correctness of this assertion by substantial reasons taken from
the nature of the case. Here on earth the Saviour was a Son of God in the
fullest and highest sense. Indeed, He was also very much more: even here already
He was the Son of God, equal to God in power. But was He equal also in honour?
The dignity, the divine form, He had laid aside, and with respect to this He was
while upon earth, in virtue of His own spontaneous decision, not ὅμοιος τῷ Θεῷ
[“likeness of God”]. To that He was restored in its fullest and deepest sense
only by the ascension. So shall it be with us. We also are now τέκναΘεοῦ
[“children of God”]; but that does not constitute us like the Lord any more than
He Himself was in an absolute measure like God while in His humiliation, where
the μορφῇθεοῦ [“form of God”] was lacking to Him. But this we shall be, the
apostle’s promise tells us. And what means the expression which the New
Testament Scripture elsewhere uses to describe this consummated likeness?
ἈδελφοὶΧριστοῦ [“brothers of Christ”]. Our Lord gives His disciples this name
once after the resurrection (Joh 20:17); for through what it signifies the
likeness is rendered possible; that is the very foundation of it, as the Epistle
to the Hebrews clearly shows (Heb 2:11). But, on the other hand, the feeling of
every one of our hearts tells us that, while we even now may assume to be the
children of God, we cannot arrogate the dignity of brotherhood with Christ. He
is not ashamed to call us brethren (Heb 2:17); but we must not be bold enough to
adopt the name. The brotherhood, which consists in perfect likeness to the Lord
we shall reach only at the end of the days when we shall see Him as He is.

Now comes out clearly the reason of that peculiarity in St. John’s phraseology
to which we have referred,—to wit, that he uses the phrase τέκναΘεοῦ [“children
of God”], but never adopts St. Paul’s word υἱοὶΘεοῦ [“sons of God”]. The former
is a relative and transitory designation; the latter is one that never ceases.
One remains a υἱός [“son”] all through his life; He even who is exalted to the
right hand of God is a υἱόςτοῦΘεοῦ [“son of God”]; but it would be impossible
to call Him any longer a τέκνον [“child”], for in this idea there is always the
element of subordination or of a development not yet fulfilled. On earth human
parents may, indeed, still term an adult child τέκνον [“child”]; but that is
only because, in relation to their offspring, they are conscious of being in
authority, or of standing in a higher position. If St. Paul uses, in addition to
the expressions τέκναΘεοῦ [“children of God”], that of υἱοὶΘεοῦ [“sons of God”],
it is simply because he condenses all that we have or ever shall have into this
latter term, without reflecting specifically on the beginning of the development
as the definition τέκνα [“children”] would suggest it. On the other hand, St.
John uses only this latter expression, because he never leaves out of sight this
element of the commencing development. St. Paul uses child and son
promiscuously; St. John does not, for to him child always denotes the idea of
immaturity or of being under age. For the present, therefore, he knows only the
oneυἱόςΘεοῦ [“son of God”], Him who is our common Master; all the rest of us
are τέκναΘεοῦ [“children of God”]. But thus it shall not be always. He thinks of
a stage when we shall be in full possession of equality with Christ; and he
expresses his idea of this by the ὅμοιονεἶναι αὐτῷ [“to be like him”], that is,
Χριστῷ [“Christ”]. The filial relation, viewed as τέκνα εἶναι [“to be
children”], is therefore not yet identical with the ὅμοιονεἶναιΧριστῷ [“to be
like Christ”]; it is rather the germ and the principle out of which the latter
grows into full formation, like the moth from the pupa-chrysalis. And it is this
which makes the term φανεροῦσθαι [“to make known”] so admirably expressive:
nothing new will then be imparted; it will be only the full evolution or
expansion into the light of the germs already deposited. That our view of the
filial relation in St. John’s words is the right one, receives, as we think,
strong support from the circumstance that the Apocalypse, which points
throughout to this φανερωσις [“manifestation”], altogether omits the word we now
consider.


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  CHAPTER 37: 37 - 1JN 3:3
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1Jn 3:3

Καὶ πᾶς ὁ ἔχων τὴν ἐλπίδα ταύτην ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ, ἁγνίζει ἑαυτὸν, καθὼς ἐκεῖνος ἁγνός
ἐστι. The apostle’s aim in inserting here the reference to the future
consummation in the other world, becomes obvious in the third verse. His
eschatology is one that is altogether practical. To this estate of glory we
attain only through intermediate stages; it is not reached through an act of
divine despotic power; but a way is definitely marked out. If the goal is
likeness to Christ, it is of the utmost importance to have that goal always and
steadily and practically in view. Thus the third verse impresses its seal on our
interpretation of the previous one. That is to say, taking as we have done both
pronouns (αὐτός [“he”], 1Jn 3:2, and ἐκεῖνος [“he”], 1Jn 3:3) as indicating
Christ, the idea is extremely plain: Would you be hereafter perfectly like
Christ, you must even now aim at this same end. On the other hand, if we refer
the αὐτός [“he”] of the second verse to the Father, the point of connection with
the third is lost: how from the hope of becoming like God may spring the zeal to
preserve the ἁγνεία [“purity”] of Christ is not said; and yet it is that we
should expect. But we must even now aim to resemble the ἁγνεία [“purity”] of our
Lord. We must be on our guard against taking this idea as interchangeable with
that of the ὅμοιονεἶναι αὐτῷ [“to be like him”] in the previous verse. Ἁγνεία
[“purity”] is essentially the requirement of sinlessness; this is exhibited as
the goal and problem of the earthly development of the Christian. But if I think
of this requirement as fulfilled, yet this is far from including the full
meaning of the ὅμοιονεἶναι αὐτῷ [“to be like him”] as it was still more closely
defined by the addition καθώςἐστι [“just as he is”]. Christ was, indeed, sinless
here upon earth; but that did not constitute Him the glorified one whom we are
to become like. The weakness of which the Apostle Paul speaks, in relation to
Christ’s earthly life (2Co 13:4), the constraints and manifold limitation to
which He had subjected Himself, would remain in us also, even if we were
supposed to be sinless. It is therefore with perfect propriety that St. John
regards this ἁγνεία [“purity”] as only a preliminary and condition of the
ὅμοιονεἶναι αὐτῷ [“to be like”] hereafter to be attained. But the requirement of
ἁγνεία [“purity”] requires to be defined more closely. Despite its etymological
affinity with ἅγιος [“holy”], the word ἁγνός [“pure”], in profane as well as in
scriptural use, has a perfectly distinct and definite meaning apart from ἅγιος
[“holy”]. On the one hand, it is to be observed that ἁγνός [“pure”] contains
even in classical Greek a negative element, which takes form in an abundance of
connections, such as ἁγνὸςφόνου [“pure murder”], ἁγνὸςγάμου [“pure marriage”].
Further, the etymological link with ἅζεσθαι[LSJ] [“stand in awe”], fear, and
ἅγαμαι[LSJ] [“wonder at”], wonder at, is more firmly adhered to in ἁγνός
[“pure”] than in ἅγιος [“holy”]. Ἁγνός [“pure”] is he who is by any authority,
or by any power swaying him, preserved from evil. The ἁγνὸν εἶναι [“to be holy”]
comes to effect through the αἰδώς [“reverence”], the sacred fear. Hence the word
is never used of God Himself; though ἅγιος [“holy”] is used of Him, signifying
as it does generally severance from all evil. Hence, further, ἁγνός [“pure”] is
especially used of the chaste spirit; it rests essentially on the internal
abhorrence of anything that would, tarnish virgin purity and honour. Similarly,
when ἁγνός [“pure”] is said of the Nazarite: his abstinentia is grounded on the
dread of tainting by contact with the profane the divine to which lie is
consecrated. In like manner, the word is in Exodus applied to preparation for
the divine revelation of the law: here, also, there is a dread of bringing the
natural into too close proximity to the divine. From all this it appears that
ἁγνεία [“purity”] is substantially the virtue of reverentia. But this being
so,—and all passages of the New Testament in which ἁγνός [“pure”], and words
derived from it, appear, confirm it,—the idea seems altogether inappropriate to
the exalted Christ. If we read καθὼς ἐκεῖνος ἁγνός ἦν [“just as he himself was
pure”], that would not seem quite so strange, for we might suppose this
reverentia to have been displayed by the Lord while on earth; His perpetual
waiting on the will of the Father, which is so prominent in St. John’s Gospel,
is nothing but that holy fear. But can this be affirmed also of the glorified
Christ? Is that now necessary to Him? can He indeed yet exercise that? The
breath of disciplinary severity, which cannot be detached from the word ἁγνεία
[“purity”], may yet in a certain way be predicated even of the Exalted One. For
His present glory He reached, according to Scripture, only through His absolute
obedience, in virtue of His overcoming all temptations, and most entirely
submitting Himself to the obedience of the Father’s will. And that which He thus
as man attained through exercise of the ἁγνεία [“purity”] is now still stamped’
upon the countenance of the Redeemer; even as He is beheld by the same St. John
in the form and under the aspect of the ἀρνίονἐσφαγμένον [“a lamb that has been
slain” cf. Rev 5:6]. Nothing of what the Lord possessed upon earth has passed
away; everything has become an eternal element of His personality. As with man
nothing that he has experienced and has become passes away, but without it he
would be through the ages of ages different from what he is, so also with the
Lord. If, then, we are to become hereafter like Him, the apostle says, we must
on our part appropriate to ourselves the ἁγνεία [“purity”] which the Lord
exercised here below, in virtue of which He passed into His glory. There is no
word which to the same extent as this expresses the whole grace and tenderness
of the ethical habit.

Let us now gather up the connection of the strain now developed. St. John taught
us, in 1Jn 2:29, that we shall have confidence in the day of judgment only on
the ground of the ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”], which will
approve us as γεγεννήσθαιἐκτοῦΘεοῦ [“having been born of God”]. This
γεγεννήσθαιἐκτοῦΘεοῦ [“having been born of God”] is first of all, as we have
seen, and as the apostle himself firmly establishes by the ἔδωκεν [“he has
given”], a divine gift, entirely independent of human act, the gift, that is, of
the Spirit, or, more particularly, of the Spirit of Jesus Christ. That is the
beginning of all Christian development. We are called the sons of God (κληθῶμεν
[“we may be called”], 1Jn 3:1) not on account of anything we do, but in virtue
of a divine act accomplished in us. But, on the other hand, we are to become,
ἐὰνφανερωθῇ [“if it may be made known”], like Christ; and that can take place
only if the possibility of this likeness is on our part afforded by the
ἁγνίζειν [“to purify”]. Between that originating divine act, by which He gives
us the Holy Spirit and declares us to be His children, and this conclusive and
consummating divine act, by which He makes us like Christ, that is, glorifies
us, there is thus a mediating human act or doing, which is called as to its
internal characteristic ἁγνεία [“purity”], and according to its outward
expressions ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”]. Thus, while God
now beholds us as His sons on the ground of His gift. He will call us such in
the judgment only if, in the strength of that gift, we have become sons in our
act, that is, in the full transformation of our life. The subject, therefore, of
the first three verses of our chapter is to establish the ground of the
assurance that the regenerate have confidence through the working of
righteousness: the reason is contained in the exposition that the sonship as the
gift of God is only the beginning, and that between this and the consummation
(1Jn 3:2) the ἁγνεία [“purity”], or the moral character and life by which that
beginning is to be confirmed and approved, is to be intermediately carried out.


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  CHAPTER 38: 38 - 1JN 3:4
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1Jn 3:4

Πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, καὶ τὴν ἀνομίαν ποιεῖ· καὶ ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία.
The exhortation to the ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”] takes
a form habitual to our apostle: first of all, he presents sharply to view the
ἁμαρτία [“sin”], its opposite, in order that thereby he may illustrate the
meaning of the positive idea concerning which he has to speak. Here it is above
all needful that we should regard anything that opposes the δικαιοσύνην
[“righteousness”] as also a contradiction and absolute opposite to the divine
nature, as contrary to God in its very essence; and that we should be careful
not arbitrarily to restrict in any way the idea of sin. This definition and
delimitation of the idea of ἁμαρτία [“sin”] is the subject of the fourth verse.
This word is not supposed, in the apostle’s teaching, to convey a more
comprehensive idea than ἀνομία [“lawlessnes”], but to be strictly co-extensive
with it: wherever, therefore, we are constrained to find ἁμαρτία [“sin”].
Nothing evil can to the Christian man be merely imperfection, or sin, so to
speak, of the second degree: all is to him transgression of the law. Such is the
strict meaning of the word ἀνομία [“lawlessnes”] even in classical Greek: it
signifies not the conduct which proceeds from a state in which the law is either
absent or unknown, it does not imply the exclusion of a νόμος [“law”], but
rather expresses a guilt which casts aside the law already existing by actual
neglect of its requirements, just as in the German Ungesetzlichkeit is
interchangeable with Widersetzlichkeit. And thus ἀνομία [“lawlessnes”], when the
word really occurs in its full meaning, is the very strongest definition or
description of sin: the νόμος [“law”], indeed, according to St. Paul, makes sin
generally exceeding sinful, and his emphatic word ἐπικατάρατος πᾶς ὃς οὐκ
ἐμμένει ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς γεγραμμένοις ἐν τῷ βιβλίῳ τοῦ νόμου [“cursed is everyone
who does not continue in all the things written in the book of the law”] (Gal
2:20), refers, precisely as St. James does, Jas 2:10, ὅστις γὰρ ὅλον τὸν νόμον
τηρήσει, πταίσει δὲ ἐν ἑνὶ, γέγονε πάντων ἔνοχος [“For whoever keeps the whole
law and yet stumbles in one point, he has become guilty of all.”], to sin as
definitely and strictly ἀνομία [“lawlessnes”]. This sunders man unfailingly,
according to the very idea of man, from God. And the force of the apostle’s
declaration is, that ἀνομία [“lawlessnes”] is not a subordinate kind or a
specifically aggravated degree of the ἁμαρτία [“sin”], but that every ἁμαρτία
[“sin”] is at the same time ἀνομία [“lawlessnes”]: in short, that the two ideas
cannot be separated from each other. The solemn earnestness of this proposition
will appear more fully when we inquire what the νόμος [“law”] is, and what is in
St. John’s estimation that νόμος [“law”], the violation or not following of
which he speaks of in the ἀνομία [“lawlessnes”]. Most certainly it is not the
universal law of conscience; for the New Testament never calls that νόμος
[“law”]; nor yet is it, however, the law of Moses or the old covenant as such.
It is not this, first, because in the Old Testament the strict congruence or
coincidence here declared between ἁμαρτία [“sin”] and ἀνομία [“lawlessnes”] did
not yet exist: there were actually multitudes of ἁμαρτίαι [“sins”], or moral
delinquencies, for instance, in the connubial relations which were not forbidden
by the letter of the Mosaic law, and were not therefore ἀνομία [“lawlessnes”].
Secondly, not the old law, because St. John furnishes no instance of the word
νόμος [“law”], standing absolutely, being applied to the Mosaic law. It is true
that in two passages (Joh 7:49, John 12:34) it stands absolutely and as the
definition of the Old Testament canon; but it must be observed that this is put
into the mouth of the Pharisees only; and elsewhere there is the invariable
addition ὁ νόμος ἡμῶν [“our law”], ὁ νόμος Μωϋσέως [“the law of Moses”], or the
like. The reason of this is to be found in the fact that St. John starts
originally (Joh 1:18) from the great principle of a sharp antithesis between the
revelation of the law and the revelation through Christ. The Mosaic law was to
him absolutely and only the law of the Jews: although this did no violence to
the truth that Christ was born οὐκαταλῦσαιτὸννόμονἀλλὰπληρῶσαι [“not to abolish
the law, but to fulfill it” cf. Mat 5:18].

Thus we are constrained to understand the νόμος [“law”], opposition to which is
here expressed by the word ἀνομία [“lawlessnes”] of the divine law generally and
universally, as it is revealed through Christ: the expression refers as well to
the as it were new commandments given by the Saviour, as to the spirit of the
Old Testament which our lawgiver has only released from the γράμμα [“written
code” cf. Rom 2:27] enveloping it and thrust forward into the foreground. The
uttered or revealed will of God is the νόμος [“law”], therefore ἀνομία
[“lawlessnes”] is the opposition or rebellion of the lawless will against this
will. Every ἁμαρτία [“sin”], consequently, bears on its front the impress of
ἀνομία [“lawlessnes”] as thus explained: every transgression or shortcoming in
the widest sense of the word. But this view of the matter was not obvious to the
churches here addressed, any more than it is obvious to us who have received
this fundamental declaration in its true meaning: it is only too common in the
very nature of men to establish distinctions and gradations among individual
sins. As to the countless little failures and defects in common life, no man
indeed who is filled with the Spirit of Christ will justify these, or even hold
them as indifferent: but have we in relation to them a pressing consciousness of
actual transgression of law? Do we look at the manifold discords of our life,
and its deviations from the line of the Christian ideal as positive sins, every
one of which immediately and certainly separates us from God, and can be
expiated or abolished only by deep repentance and a distinct act of forgiveness?
Most assuredly in multitudes of cases it is not so: such things are thought of
as imperfections, but do not press on the consciousness as ἀνομία
[“lawlessnes”].

Now, St. John declares here that this current view of the matter as entertained
by us is not of the truth; he lays this down as an axiom without any further
demonstration: the demonstration of it is plain enough throughout the whole
teaching of the apostle. If, in fact, the Spirit of Christ guides us into all
truth, and therefore in every particular case shows us what is right, every sin
must be an act of resistance to the drawing of the Spirit, and consequently of
disobedience to the will of God as shown by the Spirit, and consequently against
the νόμοςΘεοῦ [“law of God”]. I may not in the specific case have been conscious
of the drawing of the Spirit; but then that was my fault, and does not alter the
position of things. As in the well-known passage in the Sermon on the Mount
concerning the oath, the centre and pith of the explanation—too often
unobserved—is that the mere utterance of yea must itself contain equally
inviolable truth as the oath with its strong emphasis, the simple affirmation
being lifted up to the height of the oath; so here in like manner it is the
design of St. John to elevate every sin in its whole and wide domain to the
degree of ἀνομία [“lawlessnes”]. There lies in every sin, of whatever kind for
the rest it may be, the highest grade of guiltiness. But this definition of the
nature of sin, as it is contained in the words ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία [“sin is
lawlessnes”], does not itself constitute the motive of the verse, but serves
only for the illustration of the first member of it: he who committeth sin
committeth also a breach of the law. The article before ἁμαρτίαν [“sin”] is not
intended to distinguish a specific kind of sin from other kinds; for nothing
whatever had been said about various kinds of sin in the present Epistle. It
simply comprehends the diversified acts of human sin which may take place into
the unity of one idea. He who ἁμαρτίαντιναποιεῖ [“he who practices sin”], by
that very fact also committeth τήνἁμαρτίαν [“sin”]; in every individual
transgression the nature of the sin is manifested. The emphasis lies in the
first hemistich plainly upon the ποιεῖν [“to practice”]; for generally the
apostle is here occupied with the doing of men. That the ποιεῖντήνἁμαρτίαν [“to
practice sin”] is identical with the ποιεῖντήνἀνομίαν [“to practice
lawlessness”], the apostle proves by the simple declaration that ἁμαρτία [“sin”]
and ἀνομία [“lawlessnes”] are or ought to be for Christians interchangeable
ideas. Similarity of nature implies or produces similarity of outward
manifestation. Substantially, therefore, the second universal proposition of the
verse is the demonstration or proof of the first particular proposition; but,
inasmuch as they are bound together by the general καί [“and”], we see that the
apostle reflects not precisely on the causal connection of the two propositions,
but simply regards the second as the illustration of the first. Now, if every
sin is, as well in its internal nature (1Jn 3:4b) as in its outward revelation
(1Jn 3:4a), ἀνομία [“lawlessnes”], this assertion must bear to be applied to
every specific case: hence the πᾶς [“all”] placed first with strong emphasis,
which in this particular section appears as abundant as in the section parallel
to it in the organism of the Epistle, 1Jn 1:6 ff. (compare 1Jn 1:3-4, 1Jn 1:6,
down to 1Jn 1:9-10 ff.). It is precisely this emphatic assertion of the
universal and exceptionless fact that is calculated to impress deeply the
conviction that the question here is of every individual sin and of every
individual sinner.


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  CHAPTER 39: 39 - 1JN 3:5
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1Jn 3:5

Καὶ οἴδατε ὅτι ἐκεῖνος ἐφανερώθη, ἵνα τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν ἄρῃ, καὶ ἁμαρτία ἐν αὐτῷ
οὐκ ἔστι.

Now, as every sinful work is express opposition to the commandment, the revealed
will of God, so also it is further a contradiction as well to the manifestation
of Christ (1Jn 3:5a) as to His person (1Jn 3:5b); for He appeared to no. other
end than τὰςἁμαρτίαςἆραι [“take away sins”]. This phrase may have three
meanings: either that Christ has borne our sins, or that He took them upon
Himself, or that He has taken them away. At a glance it will be plain that these
three interpretations are substantially very near to each other. If Jesus took
sins upon Himself, that could be only in order to bear them; and if He did this,
it was, however, for the sake of taking away, and with that design. On the other
hand, if the word signifies here that He has borne them away, there are abundant
reasons from other quarters to assure us that this was accomplished through His
bearing them. Nevertheless, the decision of this point is not matter of
indifference; for in the nature of the case St. John must have had expressly in
view one or other of these elements. The signification of bearing we must give
up at once, because St. John never elsewhere uses αἴρειν [“to take away”] in
this meaning; it would be necessary, therefore, to resort to it only if the
ordinary meaning was not sufficient. Our apostle uses the word either in an
external and local sense for “lifting up anything,” for example, χεῖραν [“a
hand”], λίθους [“stones”], and the like, or with the significance of “taking
away.” Now, if αἴρειν [“to take away”] is here to mean “take on Himself,” the
additional clause καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ἁμαρτία οὐκ ἔστι [“and in him there is no sin”]
must signify only that although there was no sin in Him, nevertheless He
suffered Himself to be treated as a sinner,—that, in fact, not His own sin, but
the sin of others lay upon Him. But there is nothing here to indicate such a
thought as that; and, moreover, in this case we should have read not ἔστιν
[“is”], but ἦν [“was”]. Further, the expression “take sin on Himself” would lead
us to the atonement; and the idea would be strictly parallel with that expressed
in chapter 2, that Jesus is the ἱλασμός περὶτῶνἁμαρτιῶν [“atoning sacrifice for
sins”]. But any such remembrancer of the atonement must be supposed, as in the
instance just quoted, to be applied as a consolation to those who are still and
ever harassed with sin; and what the context here requires as its design is
exhortation rather than comfort. In the case just supposed the meaning would be:
as ye were the cause of such pains to your Lord, now show yourselves thankful;
of this, however, there is not the faintest indication. But there is perfect
appropriateness in the thought of a remembrancer of the redemption from sin
fully accomplished by our Lord, as that redemption consists in the “doing away
of sin” (the ἡμῶν [“our”], “our sins,” must be struck out). If Jesus put away
sins, then no one has any part in Him who suffers himself to have any
confederacy with sin. And by what means was this putting away accomplished, and
the new man who τὴνδικαιοσύνην ποιεῖ [“practices righteousness”] implanted
instead? This is answered by the φανερωθῇ [“may be made known”]. It is clear
that the expression is larger than πάσχειν [“to suffer”] or ἀποθνήσκειν [“to
die”], of which, when redemption is in question, we usually think first of all;
but it is also quite distinct from the εἰς τὸν κόσμονἐλήλυθεν [“has come into
the world” cf. Joh 3:19] or the σὰρξ ἐγένετο [“became flesh” cf. Joh 1:14]. On
the one hand, it signifies less than those phrases, inasmuch as the manner in
which His manifestation was consummated is not indicated; while at the same time
more than they, inasmuch as it does declare that before the passion His work was
actually efficient, although by it alone it was brought to full manifestation.
The entire contents of the prologue, Joh 1:1-13,—that the Logos had been from
the beginning the light and life of the world, but by means of His incarnation
had manifested Himself as such in the highest sense,—lies wrapped up germiually
in the φανεροῦσθαι [“to make known”]. This self-manifestation was ordered
expressly with this design (ἵνα [“that”]), that sin should be made to disappear.
In the fact that the ζωή [“life”] as such is made manifest, the power of death
is substantially taken away through its manifestation; in the fact that the
φῶςἀληθινόν [“true light”] shineth, the darkness recedes immediately and in
virtue of its very shining: by a natural necessity the design of our Lord is
accomplished; and in reality His entire life, which is here comprehended in the
φανερωθῇ [“may be made known”], has not only a redeeming aim and tendency, but
also a redeeming power. Through His whole influence, word, suffering, dying,
rising again,—that is, through the whole process of His φανέρωσις
[“manifestation”]; taken on all sides,—He implanted in the world subjected to
sin the germ of sinlessness. According to the apostle’s view, this power was not
wrapped up and concluded in His death, although it was in His death that this
power was pre-eminently unfolded. The parallel passage, Joh 1:29, confirms this
view of the matter; and that is peculiarly important, because the two passages
cannot well be separated from each other. There we read, ὁ ἀμνὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ ὁ
αἴρων τὴν ἁμαρτίαν τοῦ κόσμου [“the Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the
world”]. The present participle in this sentence does not require to be
explained by the theory that St. John brings forward into the present the
element of Christ’s death; nor on the principle that the present is chosen
because the effects of that death always continue to the time that now is: on
either of these suppositions the present would really be treated as the future.
The participle must be understood in its most proper and distinctive meaning.
Already at that very time the Lord was in act to take away the sin of the world,
because He was such through His whole life; already at that time He was the
ἀμνὸςτοῦΘεοῦ [“Lamb of God”], because He was so through His whole life, and not
first in His death became the Lamb. This aspect of the matter would have much
more importance attached to it, and it would exert a healthier influence on our
entire soteriology, if we conceived more justly and laid to heart more simply
the words of Mat 8:17. The evangelist there regards the work of Christ as
already, in the first period of it, fulfilling the prophetic word, τὰς ἀσθενείας
ἡμῶν ἔλαβε, καὶ τὰς νόσους ἐβάστασεν [“He took our infirmities and carried our
diseases”]: this prophetic word we are accustomed to refer to the death of
Christ; but the evangelist’s use of it points directly to the view we have just
been exhibiting and defending. For if our Lord through His whole activity, and
specifically in His healing of the sick, bore our sorrow, so also throughout His
whole life He took it away; for the former was a reality only on account of the
latter. In Joh 1:29 we certainly find, in connection with the redeeming and
delivering element, which is represented by αἴρειν [“to bear”], the atoning
element also, as contained in the expression ἀμνὸςτοῦΘεοῦ [“Lamb of God”]; for
even if we consider this to refer at once to the paschal lamb, at any rate there
was an expiating and therefore sacrificial characteristic in it. It is indeed
otherwise in our passage: here the υἱὸςτοῦθεοῦ [“Son of God”] is the subject:
the Son of God was manifested in order to abolish sin, establish His kingdom,
and destroy the kingdom of the devil (1Jn 1:8); here, therefore, prominence is
given, not to the form of a Servant which our Lord assumed in order to our
reconciliation with God, but to the might of the Ruler who has brought to light
life and our immortality of being.

Thus the only two passages (ours and the parallel in the Gospel) which have been
adduced against the interpretation of αἴρειν [“to bear”] as take away, have been
seen to admit it as possible, and our own to require it absolutely. It is
useless, in opposition, to urge, finally, that αἴρειν [“to bear”] is the
translation of נָשָׂא [“to bear”], and that therefore it must mean bear, or at
least to take upon Himself Not only may be opposed to this the fact that the
Septuagint invariably reproduces “bear” by φέρειν [“to carry”] and the like, but
that the נָשָׂא [“to bear”], particularly in its combination with פֶּשַׁע
[“transgression”], has precisely the meaning of taking away sin; compare Psa
32:1. Thus the Old Testament gives our interpretation its full sanction. The
second clause of the verse is externally to be taken as a leading proposition;
for the Johannaean diction is so far Hebraizing, that it prefers the
juxtaposition or co-ordination of sentences to their subordination; whence it
sometimes happens that the second member of a subordinate clause is changed into
a main proposition. It is precisely so here. But if we take the second hemistich
as only formally independent, it is substantially to be regarded as dependent on
the οἴδατε [“you perceive”]. But then what is the relation of the clause, linked
with it by καί [“and”], introducing the thought of the righteousness of Jesus,
to the preceding thought of His redeeming work? When we observe that the verse
following is joined on to the close of this one,—as there is no sin in Jesus,
there ought not to be sin in him who, for his part, belongs to Jesus,—and thus
that the ἁμαρτίαςἆραι [“take away sins”] apparently comes no further into
consideration, we shall obviously see in the words ἁμαρτία ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔστιν
[“in him there is no sin”] the apostle’s more particular specification of the
grounds of the ἁμαρτίαςἆραι [“take away sins”]. That being the case, the second
hemistich only bringing out into prominence the fundamental thought of the
first, this latter must be regarded as really included in the reference when we
find that the following verse is formally linked only to the second clause. The
concluding words of the verse thus indicate the way in which Jesus has brought
to effect the ἁμαρτίαςἆραι [“take away sins”]: it is because He manifested
Himself as the sinless one, and through that same manifestation communicated His
sinlessness to men also. For if a mere human word or work can produce a
transforming effect on him to whom it is communicated, how much more will the
revelation of the righteousness of Christ be able to act transformingly on the
recipients of that revelation! For the rest, ἁμαρτία ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔστιν [“in him
there is no sin”] is by no means the equivalent of ἁγνόςἐστι [“he is pure”] in
1Jn 3:3 : the latter marks especially the internal habitus of the character, on
the ground of which sinning is impossible; the former refers rather to the
expressions of that internal quality.


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  CHAPTER 40: 40 - 1JN 3:6
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1Jn 3:6

Πᾶς ὁ ἐν αὐτῷ μένων οὐχ ἁμαρτάνει· πᾶς ὁ ἁμαρτάνων οὐχ ἑώρακεν αὐτὸν, οὐδὲ
ἔγνωκεν αὐτόν.

When, therefore, the apostle deduces from the end of the manifestation of Jesus,
and then more particularly from the nature of Him who appeared, that sin and
belonging to the Lord are perfectly irreconcilable opposites, this is logically
altogether clear and incontrovertible. But, on the other hand, there is much
that rises up against the simple and unlimited acknowledgment of the saying
before us: not only does the common Christian consciousness which—despite sin
still operative in believers—still clings to the fact of sonship to God revolt
against it, but also this exaggeration of the antithesis seems not to harmonize
with our Epistle itself. While in our verse the apostle makes it emphatic that
everyone who sins neither has nor can have had any fellowship with the Lord, he
has notwithstanding, in 1Jn 1:8-10, not only recognised the presence I of sin in
believers, but even described their denial of it as an essential lie, and as a
clear token of the absence of fellowship with the Lord. Hence it is easily to be
understood that many industrious attempts have been made to soften down the
meaning of our verse, and thus to reconcile it with clear and express
declarations elsewhere. But all these efforts are discredited by the phraseology
and the context of our passage. It has been attempted to explain
ἁμαρτάνειν[“sinning”] as continuing in sin; but the arbitrariness of such an
exegesis is manifest at once. And if the sins are limited to very grave sins,
such as the sin unto death, this is evidently contradictory to the context and
spirit of the argument, in which the apostle is simply denying every distinction
between sin and sin, and exhibiting every ἁμαρτία [“sin”] as also an ἀνομία
[“lawlessnes”]. But not less erroneous is the explanation that the Christian
does not in fact sin, because, as a Christian and according to his new man, he
cannot sin, but as such cherishes nothing but hatred against the sin which,
according to his old man, he commits. For although I may hate the sin which I
do, it still remains sin; and as it is in me, it cannot possibly be said of me
that I sin not: granted that I cannot in my new man sin, nevertheless it is the
I, my person, which is the sinning subject. Generally, the view cannot be
psychologically sustained which would introduce a total cleavage of the one
human constitution, making the half of the man a sinner—that is, the old man—at
the very time that the other half is under the influence of the Holy Spirit. All
subterfuges of this and of similar kinds are exploded by a touch of the passage
itself. We have seen that the apostle pleads against every sin as ἀνομία
[“lawlessnes”]; and that, further, according to the Scripture, every ἀνομία
[“lawlessnes”] inevitably separates from God. Then it follows directly and most
closely from these premises, that every sin, be it what it may, sunders from
God; and that he who commits it can have no communion with Him. How such a rigid
scriptural utterance as this can be reconciled with the rest of Scripture is
another and a second question, which we leave at present unconsidered. It is
enough now to establish that St. John did lay down the propositions we now
consider. The second half of the verse gives us the converse of the proposition
we have been studying, but in such a way that its idea is only made essentially
more intense. The thought of the former clause, πᾶς ὁ ἐν αὐτῷ μένων οὐχ
ἁμαρτάνει [“everyone who abides in him does not continue to sin”], is in itself
not absolutely inexplicable: it might be said that the sinning man had
fellowship with God, and will have it again; and that his sin has also
interrupted that fellowship. But all this is taken away by the second clause,
which makes it more startling than ever: the μένειν [“abide”] of the former does
seem, indeed, to presuppose that there had been an actual past union with God;
but here this is expressly denied, for we read: πᾶς ὁ ἁμαρτάνων οὐχ ἑώρακεν
αὐτὸν, οὐδὲ ἔγνωκεν αὐτόν [“everyone who continues to sin has not seen him, nor
known him”]. If we had the present tense in each case instead of the perfect,
the meaning of the latter clause would be very much the same as that of the
former: supposing that in the critical time of sinning the image of the Lord is
not on the table of my heart, might it not have been there before though it is
not there now? The ἑωρακέναι [“has seen”] here might be explained by the same
word in 1Jn 3:2. It is true that they do not refer to the same object: in 1Jn
3:2 the glorified Son of God is the object beheld; but He cannot be meant in our
present passage. He cannot according to the connection; and because, simply, we
have no image in our minds of the glorified Christ, nor can our thoughts of Him
serve us here in the least degree. Here the object beheld is the Lord as He was
once manifested, ἐφανερώθην [“made known”], and as He in fact in whom ἁμαρτία
οὐκ ἔστιν [“there is no sin”]. Thus the ἑωρακέναι [“has seen”] refers to the
Lord not καθώςἐστιν [“just as he is”], but καθὼς ἦν [“just as he was”]: just as
the apostles have depicted Him in His life and sufferings before our eyes, as if
in fact He had been crucified amongst ourselves (Gal 3:1, after Luther). Yet
even if the two beholdings in this and the second verse are different as to the
aspect of the object beheld, the seeing itself is of the very same nature, and
is followed in both cases by the same results. When we behold the glorified Lord
we shall be changed into the same image, and be in fact glorified ourselves; and
so here likewise, he who has truly beheld the Sinless One should through this
beholding himself become sinless. This consequence is so express to the
apostle’s mind as to bring out the declaration, that he who is not sinless
proves by that very fact his never having yet beheld the Lord. Of course it
needs not to be insisted on that the seeing here meant does not consist in
historical knowledge of Christ; but that such a perception is meant as is
brought about by the instrumentality of the Spirit of Christ Himself, whose
office is to bring to remembrance of the disciples both Him and all that He has
said. Hence the apostle goes on to say that the sinning man, as he has not seen
the Lord, so also he “has not known Him.” This position after ὁρᾶν [“to see”] is
intended to stamp the γινώσκειν [“to know”] as either a higher grade or as a
consequence of the seeing. It is not that ὁρᾶν [“to see”] is a figurative
expression, and γινώσκειν [“to know”] its translation into fact: this is evident
partly from the οὐδὲ [“nor”] itself, which points to a distinction between the
ideas which it divides, and partly from the circumstance that to St. John the
ὁρᾶν [“to see”] is by no means a figure, but the standing expression for a
spiritual energy which absolutely refuses to be translated into anything else.
The difference between the two words is rather this, that ὁρᾶν [“to see”]
indicates the intuition, the act in virtue of which I take something immediately
into myself or my mind; while γινώσκειν [“to know”] defines the apprehension or
knowledge which is found as the consequence of this intuition,—that is, the
consciousness and the means of it, its reconciliation with all the other objects
of my thinking. Consequently the γινώσκειν [“to know”] is the result of the ὁρᾶν
[“to see”]: the former without the latter would be an impossibility. It is
customary with the Scripture generally to take the word γινώσκειν [“to know”]
with a specially emphatic meaning. Thus, when in Mat 7:23 the Lord says to those
who would bring to His mind their great deeds: οὐδέποτε ἔγνων ὑμᾶς [“I never
knew you”]. And yet it is unimaginable that a προφητεύειν [“prophesying”], a
δαίμοναςἐκβάλλειν [“casting out demons”], in the name of Jesus, could be wrought
without some corresponding relation to the Lord behind them; but the Lord denies
any such relation. This is substantially the same case as that in our verse, and
corresponds to its assertion that he who sinneth never had fellowship with the
Lord. The only question is, how we are to understand a doctrine of Scripture
which is so clearly expressed. The history of St. Paul’s conversion may give us
help. It is said there, on the one hand, that the apostle’s companions had not
heard the voice which spoke to him (Act 22:9); and, on the other, that they had
heard it (Act 9:7). There is no contradiction here; for in the one case it is
declared that they heard a sound and perceived a voice, while in the other it is
said that they did not hear the words of this voice. It was the same with the
heavenly voice which the Lord heard in Joh 12:28: some heard the sound as it
were only of thunder; others discerned an angel’s voice; the disciples alone
heard the words which were pronounced. In this latter case it might have been
said of the people that they heard a voice as well as the seemingly direct
contrary. In both the examples thus adduced it might have been said that nothing
was heard, inasmuch as that was not heard which was properly to be heard. The
relation in our present passage between seeing and knowing is precisely similar.
St. John uses them here, as in Act 22:9 the hearing is used, with an emphatic
meaning: the sinning man demonstrates by his sin, that knowing in the strict
sense cannot be predicated of him; for had he really known, he could not have
sinned. But that does not exclude the possibility that elsewhere the same ideas
may be found with a more lax application. Even from the hem of our Saviour’s
garment a virtue issued, and there was healing in the apostle’s handkerchief;
but he who had experienced the healing power of the handkerchief was far from
being on that account acquainted with all the treasures that flowed from the
spirit of the apostle. We may here and there and in some various degrees submit
to the influence of the Holy Ghost, and break off many a sin; but so long as sin
is still in us, it is proved that we have seen only the hem of the Lord’s
garment, not His very nature; for His nature is δικαιοσύνην [“righteousness”],
and he who had seen and known Him as δίκαιος [“righteous”] must through that
seeing have become himself sinless.

Now let us sum up the meaning of the verse. He who abideth in Christ sinneth
not. The present does not express precisely the actual now, but a continuing
condition: in him in whom the μένειν [“abide”] has become a reality, for μένειν
[“abide”] carries with it the idea of abiding continuously. In him there is the
abiding condition of the οὐχἁμαρτάνειν [“does not continue to sin”]. Again, on
the other hand, in the case of him who sinneth, such an abiding state has not
been attained: the actings of the ὁρᾶν [“to see”] and γινώσκειν [“to know”]
are—let the perfects be observed—not accomplished facts. Then the sum is: every
sin demonstrates that we are not found in the fellowship of the Lord.


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  CHAPTER 41: 41 - 1JN 3:7
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1Jn 3:7

Τεκνία, μηδεὶς πλανάτω ὑμᾶς. ὁ ποιῶν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, δίκαιός ἐστι, καθὼς
ἐκεῖνος δίκαιός ἐστιν But this thought is too keen, too repellent to the natural
man, for reception in this plain form, and without qualification. Hence follows
the express exhortation not to be led astray by opposite and erroneous thoughts.
The direct appeal by no means introduces a new thought; but here as everywhere
its aim is to bring close home the apostolic utterance to the individual reader.
The words μηδεὶς πλανάτω ὑμᾶς [“let no one deceive you”] lead at once to the
supposition that the church was in danger of giving heed to such spirits of
error; but we must not overlook the fact that the temptation to lower views is
not supposed to lie in any definite relation to others and in any definite sect,
but is always grounded on the thoughtlessness of the natural man. We are too
often content with the consciousness that we stand in some special relation to
the Lord, and come to regard sin as an unavoidable evil which is not so very
hurtful as might be thought. In opposition to this, the apostle makes it
emphatic that the only test, the only sure evidence, of the righteousness of
believing is the righteousness of living: where the latter is wanting, there
must be something fundamentally wrong in the former. The stress of the seventh
verse lies on the ποιεῖν [“to do”]: he only is righteous whose righteousness is
approved in act. As we read in Joh 3:31, ὁ ὢν ἐκ τῆς γῆς, ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἐστι [“he
who is of the earth is from the earth”],—he whose origin is the earth has in
fact an earthly origin, bears its signature in himself,—so it is here with the ὁ
ποιῶν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, δίκαιός ἐστι [“he who practices righteousness is
righteous”]: he who is righteous must be simply righteous, and bear the stamp of
righteousness on himself. It is then added that this righteousness, thus
approving itself, makes us like the righteous Christ. This does not mean to say
that by such a procedure we may attain to a specially distinguished kind of
righteousness, such, namely, as Christ had; for the apostle in this present
connection knows nothing about gradations in righteousness any more than he
acknowledges gradations in sin. The clause καθώςκ.τ.λ. [“just as, etc.”] rather
points back to 1Jn 3:3: there it was said that the goal of our earthly
development is the ἁγνεία [“purity”] of Christ; and this we are supposed in the
present words of St. John to reach in the doing of righteousness.


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  CHAPTER 42: 42 - 1JN 3:8
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1Jn 3:8

Ὁ ποιῶν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου ἐστὶν, ὅτι ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς ὁ διάβολος ἁμαρτάνει.
Εἰς τοῦτο ἐφανερώθη ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἵνα λύσῃ τὰ ἔργα τοῦ διαβόλου. As we in
this way enter into fellowship with the Lord, so through the ποιῶντὴνἁμαρτίαν
[“the one who practices sin”] we enter into fellowship with the devil: this is,
generally, the matter of the eighth verse. The latter part of it first of all
demands our attention; as it in fact furnishes the logical basis of the former.
Because the devil sinneth from the beginning, do all sinners therefore spring
from him? There is certainly a suspicious tone of the post hoc ergo propter hoc
about this. But all depends on the right view of ἀπ᾽ἀρχῆς [“from the
beginning”]. The idea of the ἀρχή [“beginning”] is applied in such manifold
ways, that it must in every individual case be explained by the context. The
interpretation that the devil sins from the beginning of his being or existence
is by no means justified by the expression; for the absolutely general ἀπ᾽ἀρχῆς
[“from the beginning”] would be quite unsuitable to such a notion. The only
tolerable reference is to the ἁμαρτάνειν[“sinning”]: the devil was the origin
of sinning, or it made its beginning in him. When that beginning of sin and of
his sinning took place is not here—mentioned: it is enough that his sin was the
first. But there is assuredly no reason, and it would be entirely wrong, to
understand this beginning of the fall of Adam. What allusion can there be in the
general and indefinite ἀπ᾽ἀρχῆς [“from the beginning”] to the fall of man? It is
of no use to appeal to Joh 8:44[N] in favour of such an interpretation: that
passage affirms that the devil was a murderer of man from the beginning; but the
ἀπ᾽ἀρχῆς [“from the beginning”] has there its closer definition in the
ἀνθρωποκτόνος [“murderer”], he could have been such a murderer only when men
began to exist, and thus the context in the cited passage absolutely determines
the reference of ἀπ᾽ἀρχῆς [“from the beginning”] to the paradisiacal history.
But here we have no closer definition of the ἀπ᾽ἀρχῆς [“from the beginning”];
and it must therefore be referred to the beginning of sin in general, to the act
by which the devil became the devil. The idea of sin through him first came into
life and reality. Thus viewed, the thought is the same as would have been
expressed by ἐν ἀρχῇ [“inthe beginning”] or πρῶτοςὁδιάβολοςἡμάρτηκεν [“the devil
sinned first”]; and that this form was not selected, is to be accounted for; by
the fact that the writer thinks of his sin and would have us think of it, not as
one act once performed, but as the permanent habit and at the same time the
original deed of sinning. The combination of these two ideas hardly allows any
other expression to be used than that which the apostle employs.

Thus the clause ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς ὁ διάβολος ἁμαρτάνει [“the devil has sinned from the
beginning”], only declares really that the devil before any other being sinned,
and has since been in the continual act and habit of sinning. Now again,
consequently, the question arises with new force, how it follows from this that
every later sin, or here human sin as such, springs from the devil, and may be
traced to diabolical causality. Is it not quite conceivable that man might have
sinned, after the devil indeed, but independently of him; and this being only
possible, is not the deduction of St. John a vain one? But though we do not find
it established in the idea of the first sin, we do find it in the idea of the
first sin, that all successive sinful creatures must enter into a state of
dependence on the first one. Sin has just been described as ἀνομία
[“lawlessnes”]; it therefore presupposes a νόμος [“law”]; this, again, a Lord
who gives the law; and he who rebels against the law thereby makes himself into
a lord. This establishes the fact that he who first falls from God places
himself, in virtue of this apostasy, over against God, and therefore in rivalry
to His kingdom: in fact, setting up, though at first only in a germinal way, a
kingdom of evil in opposition to it. No sinner that follows can erect a third
kingdom, but must through his sin enter into the kingdom already opposed to God,
incorporating himself into it as a member. Whether he wills it or not, whether
he knows it or not, he makes himself dependent on the originator and
representative of this kingdom. But more than this: after these two kingdoms,
that of the light and that of the darkness, are founded, no one can any longer
be good or evil of himself from his own most proper impulse; but because he is
placed in the midst of the two kingdoms in their concrete reality, he
necessarily receives solicitations from both sides to determine his action:
thus, if he sins, his sin proceeds not from his own, but ἐκτοῦδιαβόλου [“of the
devil”]; and his sinning is the evidence that he is ἐκτοῦδιαβόλου [“of the
devil”]. Thus the deduction of the apostle is perfectly just; only it is based,
not on the ἀπ᾽ἀρχῆς [“from the beginning”] of itself, but on the ἁμαρτάνειν
ἀπ᾽ἀρχῆς[“sinning from the beginning”]. That the spiritual dependence of human
sin on sin Satanic, here only expressed as a logical necessity, was an actual
fact in human history needs no demonstration in the light of biblical and
especially Johannaean teaching. With our apostle beyond all others it is
customary to establish the Satanic origin of sin. As, in the Pauline view, the
sin of Adam was not only the temporal beginning of evil, but also the principle
of all sin in his descendants, so stands it when, with St. John, we carry up the
matter a stage further, in regard to the relation of human sin to that of Satan.
True as it is that every man is enticed or drawn away of his ἰδία ἐπιθυμία [“own
desires”], it is equally true that every sin is a work of the devil, in a
certain sense an incarnation of devilish thoughts. Just as the πόρνοι
[“fornicators”], according to St. Paul [cf. 1Co 6:16], in virtue of their
πορνεία [“fornication”] belong no longer to themselves but to the πόρνη
[“prostitute”], so does the sinner belong, in virtue of his sin, no longer to
himself, but has become a member and a living stone in the kingdom of Satan. The
thoughts we have indicated are not only necessary consequences of the expression
ὁ ποιῶν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου ἐστὶ [“the one who practices sin is of the
devil”], but are also needful to enable us to understand the second hemistich of
the verse. The proposition, that Christ was manifested to destroy the works of
the devil, is parallel with that other in 1Jn 3:5, that He appeared
τὰςἁμαρτίαςἆραι [“to take away sins”]. The works of the devil are identical with
our sins. But they can bear that denomination only if each of them has in fact
the devil for their proper agent, is a reflection of Satanic thoughts, and a
realization of Satanic tendencies. It is this relation which explains the
expression λύειν τὰ ἔργα τοῦ διαβόλου [“to destroy the works of the devil”]
exactly to the very letter. The devil will indeed never cease to be evil; to
restore him to goodness the Lord did not appear; but to be evil is not an ἔργον
[“work”]. A work requires a material to be fashioned. Without the material to be
wrought upon, no created being can perform a work. Therefore the devil also
requires for his work matter which he can impregnate with his thoughts. This
material is the earth, and the men upon it. This being withdrawn from him, he
may indeed still be evil, but he can no longer accomplish evil by ἔργοιςπονηροῖς
[“evil deeds”]. From this point of view we understand how, in the well-known
narrative of the Gadarene demoniacs, the devils ask the Lord permission to enter
the swine: they seek the matter which they may destroy; if men no longer are
available, they desire at least some equivalent. If from Satan is taken away all
material that is his consummate misery. Absolutely not to be able to accomplish
the evil lusts of his heart, to be obliged—let the word be pardoned—to consume
his own wretchedness in himself, to find no sphere of activity while yet burning
with desire for it: that is the acme of unblessedness. If men are loosed from
Satan (Luk 13:17), then is he bound, the nerves of his energy are restrained.
Conversely, if Satan is loosed (Rev 20:7), it means that he can bind men and
does bind them. Thus the expression λύειν [“to destroy”] has justice done to it.
All loosing presupposes a dissolution into the constituent elements. The devil
uses in his activity his evil lust on the one hand, and, on the other, the
material in which it becomes flesh. To take from him this material is to resolve
his works into their elements, and thus to cause that they can no longer come to
effect. This λύειν τὰ ἔργα τοῦ διαβόλου [“to destroy the works of the devil”]
has been accomplished by the Lord through the fact of His manifestation:
ἐφανερώθη [“made known”]. The expression is obviously to be taken in the same
generality as in 1Jn 3:5. Through the appearance of the light the darkness loses
its domain and is destroyed. And He who appears is with deep propriety described
here as υἱοςτοῦΘεοῦ [“Son of God”]. As St. Paul in Romans chapter 5 places
Christ as the bringer of righteousness over against Adam as the cause of sin, so
St. John here, in harmony with his higher position, places Him over against
Satan himself. Hence we find that, while in Rom 5:1-21 the Lord is described as
ἀνθρωπος [“man”], here He is the υἱοςτοῦΘεοῦ [“Son of God”]: the sin of the
first man is taken away by the righteousness of the second Adam; but in the
place of the kingdom of the devil enters the kingdom of the Son of God.

Let us now glance, in conclusion, at the strain of the whole verse. It contains
the antithesis of 1Jn 3:7. This had, by means of the καθὼςἐκεῖνοςδίκαιόςἐστιν
[“just as he himself is righteous”], declared that righteousness brings us into
union with the Lord; the new verse, conversely, draws the conclusion that sin
proves us to be members of the Satanic kingdom. It is the same severity which we
were obliged to recognise in 1Jn 3:6: there it was said that every sin gives
proof that we have not yet known the Lord; here it is said to show that we
belong to Satan. This bondage to Satan, however, the Lord in His manifestation
purposed to abolish. Hence the latter clause obviously corresponds to 1Jn 3:5;
just as similarly the first part of our verse corresponds to 1Jn 3:4. 1Jn 3:4-5
exhibit sin as a principle opposed to God and to Christ; here it is exhibited as
subjection to the devil, yea, as resistance to the only means of the only
redemption from it.


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  CHAPTER 43: 43 - 1JN 3:9-10A
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1Jn 3:9-10a

Πᾶς ὁ γεγεννημένος ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἁμαρτίαν οὐ ποιεῖ, ὅτι σπέρμα αὐτοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ
μένει· καὶ οὐ δύναται ἁμαρτάνειν, ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ γεγέννηται. Ἐν τούτῳ φανερά
ἐστι τὰ τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ τὰ τέκνα τοῦ διαβόλου. To the declaration of 1Jn
3:8a, that he who sinneth is of the devil, the proposition of 1Jn 3:9 is
attached, that he who is born of God sinneth not. But this latter is by no means
to be understood as an antithesis to the former verse; for this 1Jn 3:8 was
itself the negative counterpart of the positive contained in 1Jn 3:7. We must
rather take 1Jn 3:9 as strictly connected with 1Jn 3:10a, and as a
recapitulation of the whole section; in such a way, however, that 1Jn 3:9
briefly sums up the matter of this section itself, and then 1Jn 3:10a indicates
its place in the whole organism of the latter, pointing to the result which has
been gained by the development of it.

Let us first look more closely at the context of 1Jn 3:9. Its recapitulation
takes the form of two clauses, each of which has its own reason briefly
assigned. It is clear that in the second clause the emphasis rests upon the οὐ
δύναται ἁμαρτάνειν [“he cannot sin”], the impossibility that a child of God
should sin is made prominent; accordingly, the emphasis in the first clause can
fall only on the οὐ ποιεῖ ἁμαρτίαν [“does not practicesin”], that is, upon the
actual condition and character of God’s children: this latter, however, not
being viewed as a transitory fact; for the present ποιεῖ [“practice”] marks it
as an abiding and continuous state. Thus the actual character, and the internal
necessity of that character, of the regenerate are the two affirmations of our
verse, and to these two main propositions most precisely correspond the two
subordinate ones introduced by ὅτι [“that”] to establish the others. In the
former of them the emphasis falls on the μένει [“abide”]: because God (we leave
for a while unconsidered the σπέρμα [“seed”]) abideth in such a man, his not
sinning is a permanent condition or state. In the latter the emphasis is on the
Θεοῦ [“of God”]: because he is born of God, in whom there is no alternation of
light and darkness, of whom we know that He is essentially and of necessity
righteous (1Jn 2:29), therefore the regenerate is necessarily righteous. We
observe that the positive ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”],
which recurred again and again in the previous verses, is exchanged throughout
the present verse for the negative οὐχἁμαρτάνειν [“does not continue to sin”];
and this fact has the same reason as that which governs the predominant negative
in the decalogue. Because in man, as he is by nature, evil forms the paramount
principle, the negative definition of the new man as one free from sin is more
obvious than the positive one of his being righteous.

It has been remarked that 1Jn 3:10a indicates the place which the completed
section has in the organic whole of the Epistle. The emphasis falls therefore on
the φανερά [“manifest”]. In 1Jn 2:28 ff. it had been said that the ποιεῖν
τὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”] imparts the true παῤῥησία
[“boldness”] in the day of judgment: this is demonstrated with the help of the
idea φανερόνγενέσθαι [“become manifest”]. The doing of righteousness makes the
nature inherent in me manifest, withdraws it from the sphere of delusion or
self-deception; and this revelation of my sonship to myself produces the effect
of parrhesia or strong confidence. In other words, if I am to have παῤῥησία
[“boldness”] in the judgment, I must have become absolutely assured of my filial
relation to God—that must have become to me a φανερόν [“manifest”]; but only
through its confirmation in my life can that have taken place. This confirmation
in deed, the ποιεῖν τὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”], is therefore
in the third chapter represented as the necessary result of sonship to God; and
1Jn 3:10 draws the final conclusion, inasmuch as it connects the whole of what
precedes with 1Jn 2:28 ff. by showing that the external act makes manifest the
internal character of the man.

There are only two individual expressions in the verses we now consider which
demand elucidation. One is the σπέρματοῦΘεοῦ [“seed of God”] which is said to
be in the new man. There is not the slightest justification for referring this
phrase to the word of God, after the analogy of Mat 13:24-37 or 1Pe 1:23; for in
the context of this passage, and in the Epistle generally, this is not spoken of
in any sense. The word is entirely unique here; and the thing intended can be
made plain only by entering into the figure used. The human seed is the germ
whence a new man proceeds, which developes into man; accordingly the spiritual
seed is the divine principle, the divine germ, out of which the new spiritual
man is developed. This principle is, according to Joh 3:5, the πνεῦμα
[“Spirit”]: the Divine Spirit, viewed as seed or σπέρμα [“seed”], is the power
of life entering into the man, the living germ sinking down into his nature. As,
through the σπέρμα [“seed”] coming from the human parent, the newly-begotten
man becomes a child of his father, because he simply springs from the nature of
this man, so we are the children of God in virtue of the community of nature
with God, because we have grown out of His I, His Spirit. And thus σπέρμαμένει
[“seed remains”], the seed abideth: it is not that a single impulse proceeds
from it, and it then is again withdrawn, but it unfolds a continuous energy. And
it abides ἐναὐτῷ [“in him”]; it works not as the quickening ray of the sun works
upon the plant by energy from without, but it developes its directing and
fashioning power and activity from within outwardly. The second expression which
demands special attention is that of τέκνα τοῦ διαβόλου [“children of the
devil”], 1Jn 3:10. On the one hand, it is clear that this definition is a
distinct correlative of the closely connected τέκνατοῦΘεοῦ [“children of God”];
the word τέκνα [“children”] must in the two cases have the same meaning. On the
other hand, it is plain that, in the meaning which we attach to the expression
τέκναΘεοῦ [“children of God”] in 1Jn 3:1, it can have no distinct correlative.
The sonship there we understood to be not merely ethical, but a relation of
being, a real communication of the divine nature; and in this sense there can be
no τέκνα τοῦ διαβόλου [“children of the devil”]. God can indeed beget life, but
Satan cannot. The question then arises, whether we will give up the former
explanation of τέκνατοῦΘεοῦ [“children of God”] in favour of a more general
meaning, and regard the expression as signifying a purely ethical relation, or
whether, considering that in the tenth verse the τέκναΘεοῦ [“children of God”]
and διαβόλου [“of the devil”] must necessarily be understood alike, we may
assume a different meaning of the term τέκνα [“children”] in the tenth and first
verses of the chapter. It is to be taken for granted that any such change in the
meaning must receive its warranty in some way from the apostle himself. Now, as
to the beginning of this chapter, which is relatively the end of the preceding,
we cannot by any means surrender the meaning of the sonship established there.
It is certainly Johannaean, it is established by the one expression of the
Gospel, “born of water and of the Spirit,” and it will be found confirmed by the
fourth chapter of our Epistle. And in our 1Jn 3:1 it is further rendered
necessary by the word ἔδωκεν [“he gave”]. An ethical relation is not a gift of
God; the moral habit of the man rests naturally not upon a mere divine
bestowment, but also upon the human co-operation in act. The ethical relation of
the child of God is spoken of from 1Jn 3:3 onward: up to that point the ground
of nature which is the condition of that act is alone treated of. Finally, there
can be no doubt that in 1Jn 2:29 the γεγεννήσθαιἐκτοῦΘεοῦ [“having been born of
God”], the confirmation of which in the deeds of righteousness is in question,
cannot be identical with those confirming deeds of righteousness themselves;
and, as 1Jn 3:1 resumes that description in τέκναΘεοῦ [“children of God”], it
must there have the same meaning. We must therefore hold fast the explanation of
sonship given in 1Jn 3:1. But then it is obvious that the description τέκνα τοῦ
διαβόλου [“children of the devil”], and accordingly also that of τέκνατοῦΘεοῦ
[“children of God”] in 1Jn 3:10, will tolerate only an ethical interpretation.
When St. Paul calls Elymas υἱός διαβόλου [“a son of the devil” cf. Act 13:10],
and Christ in St. John’s Gospel calls the devil the father of the Jews [cf. Joh
8:44], these expressions say no more than what is elsewhere meant by being
ἐκτοῦδιαβόλου [“of the devil”]: the sense is that of an ethical dependence, the
being under the influence of the devil, which, however, by no means constitutes
the inpouring of a devilish spirit. Accordingly, the expression τέκνατοῦΘεοῦ
[“children of God”] in 1Jn 3:10 a will say no more than the parallel ἔστιν ἐκ
τοῦ Θεοῦ [“is of God”] in 1Jn 3:10 b. But how can we reconcile ourselves to
accept the same phrase in the same section according to two different meanings?
The answer is, because of the changed view of our relation to God which has
intermediately entered. As we have seen in the section 1Jn 3:1-3, the apostle
shows that sonship as a gift, according to 1Jn 3:1, is not the basis on which
the final consummation of the man rests, but the ethical development springing
from that as its principle. The objective divine act of begetting requires the
subjective unfolding of the new nature on the part of man. Thus also in the
tenth verse reference is no longer made to the regenerate ground of nature which
is the principle of all religious development, but to the ethical position which
the regenerate has acquired, of course always on the ground of that divine
principle. Hence it is natural that the phrase τέκνατοῦΘεοῦ [“children of God”]
must no longer be taken in that earlier metaphysical sense; the ethical likeness
to God is now the predominant idea; and therefore it can be employed as the
correlative of τέκνα τοῦ διαβόλου [“children of the devil”].

Let us now look at the section here ended as a whole, and first with regard to
its form. We shall find the same scheme of construction which was adopted in
chapters 1 and 2: not indeed as if the apostle wrote according to a plan
fore-arranged down to the minutest analysis; we see only the clear and
methodical spirit of the writer involuntarily adopting an order and measure
which appears in the harmonious articulation of his Epistle. We note in 1Jn
3:1-10 two sub-sections, 1Jn 3:1-3 and 1Jn 3:4-10. The former of these gives the
substructure of the latter, by showing to what extent at the final judgment, to
which 1Jn 2:28 had pointed, works come into consideration: because, namely, the
question will then be what we have become through the divine gift of
regeneration, in order that it may then be given to him who hath, that he may
have more abundance. The second sub-section, which introduces the proof that on
the ground of ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”] we become
assured of our sonship, is constructed with extreme symmetry. It is complete in
four members: 1Jn 3:4-5, 1Jn 3:3-6, 1Jn 3:7-8, 1Jn 3:9-10a, each of which again
consists of two clauses. The first of these four members lays the foundation of
the evidence, exhibiting sin as a principle absolutely opposed to God (ἀνομία
[“lawlessnes”], 1Jn 3:4), and absolutely opposed to Christ (1Jn 3:5). The last
member, 1Jn 3:9-10a, recapitulates the whole demonstration (1Jn 3:9), and at the
same time exhibits the result gained on the whole (1Jn 3:10) with reference to
the purpose of the section. The two intermediate members furnish the proper
assertion of the antithesis: ἐκτοῦΘεοῦεἶναι [“to be of God”] and righteousness
of life, sin and εἶναι ἐκτοῦδιαβόλου [“to be of the devil”], are interchangeable
ideas. The whole discussion proceeds in the antithetical form with which 1Jn
1:1-10 and 1Jn 2:1-29 have made us familiar. The first pair of antitheses are in
1Jn 3:6, the second in 1Jn 3:7-8. After the Johannaean manner, the second pair
throw a stronger light on the antithesis, the opposites being carried up to
their principles: righteousness being referred to Christ
(καθὼςἐκεῖνοςδίκαιόςἐστι [“just as he himself is righteous”]), and sin being
referred to the devil.

Clear and analytical as is the form of the section, and exact as is the logic
pervading it, its several clauses are full of difficulties. The whole finds its
keenest point in the assertion that he who is born of God cannot sin. When
examining 1Jn 3:6, we saw that this proposition seems opposed as well to
Christian experience as to St. John’s own doctrine, which, addressed to the
regenerate children of God (1Jn 2:13 ff., 1Jn 3:2), nevertheless urges them to
the confession of sin. We have also come to the conviction that the force of our
passage must not be softened down, as also that Christian experience cannot be
explained away. It is resorting to a hopeless expedient to say that the
Christian does not practise sin, but suffers it. Such affirmations as these seem
excellent enough, but in fact they are unmeaning. It ought not to be denied that
in a certain sense sin is actually to the Christian matter of passive
endurance—he feels himself under an alien and hostile power. Such was the
experience of St. Paul in Rom 7:1-25. But this truth would be applicable in the
present case only if the guilt of sin ceased,—that is, if human freedom were not
disparaged in connection with these failings: for a mere accident of evil cannot
be matter of personal responsibility. But it was not St. John’s intention to
teach this; every sin, even of the Christian man, is the free act of the
will,—though, it may be, not altogether spontaneous,—and is sin therefore in the
fullest sense. Moreover, this distinction between doing and suffering sin is out
of the question in our passage, as may be seen in the change between
οὐποιεῖνἁμαρτίαν [“does not practicesin”] and the simple
ἁμαρτάνειν[“sinning”]. In order to reach the solution of the difficulty, let
us look more narrowly at its proper bearing. The edge of it does not lie in the
word, “he that sinneth is of the devil,” viewed in itself. If we had this alone,
it must appear to us a frightful truth; but we should be constrained in the end
to bow before the word of Scripture, and say: “Then are we all, since we all
sin, not children of God.” The difficulty lies rather in the opposition between
this word and the oft-repeated recognition of our sonship on the part of the
apostle. There are, however, two things which serve to throw some light on the
embarrassment. One is the distinction between the sense in which St. John speaks
of our sonship in 1Jn 3:1, and that in which he speaks of it from 1Jn 3:4
onwards; the other, connected with this, is that in 1Jn 3:4 ff. he takes his
stand at the day of judgment. The former point, the twofold meaning of
τέκνατοῦΘεοῦ [“children of God”], has forced itself as a necessity on our
previous exposition. Our sonship is first considered as a divine gift,
independent of all human act (δέδωκεν ἡμῖν ὁ πατὴρ [“the father has given to
us”], 1Jn 3:1); in virtue of this gift, which consists of the impartation of His
Spirit, God beholds us as His children; in virtue of it we have the forgiveness
of sins, for through this Spirit we have become one with Christ, the God-man,
whose Spirit He is, members of His body, partakers of all that He has wrought.
Through this act of God we are, before any corresponding acts on our part, His
children: as He will also have us regarded by men (κληθῶμεν [“we would be
called”]). But what we now are as the result of a divine act, we must become as
the result of our own deeds; the principle of righteousness which the πνεῦμα
[“Spirit”] implants in us must develope itself into realization; the divine gift
must be appropriated and made our own. A field which had hitherto borne thorns
and thistles, but in which the corn is sown, is, in virtue of the seed in it, a
field of wheat; its owner speaks of it as such, and treats it as such. But if
the ground is stony, so that the good seed cannot germinate freely, but produces
weeds, and only weeds, it is thenceforward, regarded from the result, no field
of corn. The owner was justified in regarding it, and bound to regard it, first
as a wheat-field; but after the good seed has been choked, the right and
obligation so to regard it cease. So is it with men. Through the gift of the
Spirit, the σπέρματοῦΘεοῦ [“seed of God”], we are children of God; we are ἅγιοι
[“set apart ones”], that is, appointed to His service, καὶ ἠγαπημένοι [“and
beloved”], according to the divine act and destination. But as, in the
comparison just used, the seed must be developed and productive if the field is
to be, not only according to the owner’s purpose, but also in reality, a field
of wheat, so we also must place our whole life under the influence of the
Spirit, and be swayed altogether by His power, that is, ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην
[“to practice righteousness”]. Now, that by τέκναΘεοῦ [“children of God”], from
1Jn 3:4 onwards, only those are to be understood who, on the ground of the
divine generation of 1Jn 3:1, have become that in their character which they had
already been in their destination, we have established in our exposition of the
structure of the whole section; it is evident also from the correlation of
τέκναΘεοῦ [“children of God”] and τέκνα διαβόλου [“children of the devil”], 1Jn
3:10, and is demanded by the expressions ἑώρακεν [“having perceived”],ἔγνωκεν
αὐτόν [“having seen him”] in 1Jn 3:6, both these being appropriating activities
by which I receive into my consciousness something objectively existing and
real. In this way it becomes clear how the same persons are called children of
God, and yet have this name denied to them as sinners: in the one case it is the
gift which is meant, in the other the ethical habit. The child of God in 1Jn 3:1
can sin, just as the field sown with corn can bear weeds; the child of God in
1Jn 3:9 cannot sin, for he is by the imparted σπέρμα [“seed”] determined
consciously and mightily against it.

If we now examine carefully what the Christian life really is, we shall not find
in it a series of distinct and opposite elements, one half of which belong to
the kingdom of light, and the other half to the kingdom of darkness. Rather, if
we closely watch these particular elements and analyse them, the result will be
found, that in every one of them the powers of light and the powers of darkness
carry on their work in the man, so that there is no moment in the Christian’s
life when he is purely ἐκτοῦΘεοῦ [“of God”], as also by parity no moment when he
is purely ἐκτοῦδιαβόλου [“of the devil”]. It may seem hard to reconcile with
such a view the energetic way in which St. John in this section lays down the
antithesis or the alternative aut . . . aut. But this alternative is a necessary
consequence of the position he assumes in speaking; it is that of the final
judgment. The question has been ruled by 1Jn 2:28 as that of the last παῤῥησία
[“boldness”] in the great day. But then it is plain that no man can be saved on
the ground of a mere work of God wrought upon him; if salvation cannot be
reached through an opus operatum OF man, neither can it any more be reached
through an opus operatum ON man. God can never reckon that man blessed who has
not in himself the conditions of blessedness. Further, it is certain that no
admixture of good and evil can enter into the inheritance of heaven; that God
will apply to human destiny and character not a relative but an absolute
standard. Thus he who shall stand in the judgment must be absolutely righteous.
The question in the great day will not be concerning a gift imparted by God to
man (as in 1Jn 3:1), not concerning a power or principle infused into him, but
concerning what he has made of the power he received,—that is, in fact,
concerning his works. Hence it is the pervasive biblical doctrine, especially
that of the New Testament, and emphatically that of St. Paul, that man will be
judged according to his works; compare Mat 16:27; Rom 2:6; 1Co 3:8; 2Co 11:18;
Gal 6:7; Rev 2:23; Rev 20:12, Rev 22:12. As in the case of the owner of the
field already mentioned, God beholds His children below, and regards them as
such, in the hope and in the expectation and to the intent that the germ infused
into us will prove itself fruitful. The idea of a υἱοθεσία [“adoption”] in hope
suggests that it is only a limited sphere of privilege which points beyond
itself. The limit of it is the judgment, and of this the apostle treats. Wilt
thou know how thou standest towards thy God, apply to thyself the standard which
God will apply in the judgment, the standard of perfected righteousness. St.
John gives us that in the words: ὁ ποιῶν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου ἐστὶ [“the
one who practices sin is of the devil”]. However terrible the proposition
sounds, it approves itself mighty and wholesome in its effects. He who admits
that we have not to fight with flesh and blood, but with the kingdom of
darkness, must needs also admit that every deed of darkness bears witness to our
standing yet in some relation to that kingdom, and that we are not entirely
withdrawn from it. Thus judging ourselves according to the test, the absolute
test, of the divine judgment, we shall not, as sinning every day, be able to
refrain. from confessing that we are yet ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου [“of the devil”], that
the kingdom of darkness is still mighty within us. The deed of darkness makes us
manifest as children of darkness. We have, so long as we abide on earth, the
gift of sonship in an altogether stedfast manner; but that will not be the main
test at the day of judgment. It will be asked then how we appropriated the gift
and used it. Thus, therefore, the question is with the apostle not as to whether
and in what way, at any particular moment of our earthly development, light and
darkness are intermingled in the Christian; he only expresses the truth that in
the day of awards he will not stand who still in any measure sins; and that we
shall have no title then to regard ourselves as τέκνατοῦΘεοῦ [“children of God”]
in the ethical sense. Although these thoughts, in the form we give them, do not
govern the ordinary Christian consciousness, they nevertheless find in ordinary
Christian experience their justification. It is an experienced fact that the
most advanced Christians cry to God with a full heart, “Turn Thou me, Lord, and
I shall be turned!” They regard themselves, on the evidence of a series of
concurring elements, as still not entirely converted. But what other is this
than the consciousness that, tested by the true standard of God’s final
judgment, they are not yet withdrawn from the ἐξουσία τοῦ σκότους [“power of
darkness”]. The difficulties of the section, however, are not in this way
altogether solved. If we are thus rigorous in impressing our minds, when sin
occurs, with the fact that every such sin manifests us to be τέκνα τοῦ διαβόλου
[“children of the devil”], then that παῤῥησία [“boldness”] which it was the
apostle’s aim to mature seems altogether cut off and buried out of sight. The
τετελειωμένηχαρά [“perfected joy”] promised in the Epistle is exchanged for an
ever-renewed and ever-enduring φόβος [“fear”]. For though the experience,
constantly confirmed, that we are still ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου [“of the devil”] may
urge us to a more full surrender to the Holy Ghost, that the union between Him
and our own I may become a perfected reality, yet we know, on the other hand,
that down to the end of life we must needs go on sinning again. Now, if St. John
infers from every sin that we have not yet seen and known the Lord, it certainly
must seem that there is a stamp of unreality and self-deception impressed on any
kind of surrender of the heart to the Lord from the very beginning. Thus may it
not be said that all our believing and struggling, all our confidence and peace,
are rendered doubtful in their very nature? How are we to understand—that is the
question of habitual urgency—the appropriation of the divine gift, the perfect
coincidence of our human condition and character with the Divine Spirit? First
of all, it is certain that a self-surrender to the Lord, in connection with
which we have consciously retained any sin, could be of no service to us; that
would never inspire anything like παῤῥησία [“boldness”]. Secondly, and
conversely, it is equally true that if we actually have yielded up to the Lord
the whole sum of our being, and surrendered ourselves absolutely to the
illuminating influence of the φῶς ἀληθινόν [“true light”], either all sin must
cease, or, supposing it to reappear, it would subject us to the doom of Heb
6:1-12. Between these two hypotheses—a dedication, consciously not entire, to
the sanctifying Spirit, and a dedication consciously perfect—there is a third
conceivable. We may possess that is, the will to surrender ourselves, with all
that we have and are, to the Lord; but yet, in an unconscious manner, as it is
now said, the dedication may be imperfect: either as to its extent, so far as
sinful parts remain which have either not at all or not rightly been revealed to
us as darkness, and therefore have not yet been brought under the searching
influence of the light; or as to its intensity—and this is psychologically more
exact—so far as our devotion has not reached its full consummation in the
perfect energy of the spirit, in the absolutely decisive and influencing power
of the will. In such a case the word would hold good of us: “she hath done what
she could.” Consecration to the Lord would not indeed be absolutely, but yet
relatively, perfect: according, that is, to the measure of our knowledge and the
strength of our will. So far, then, as this consecration appears to me perfect,
and is perfect in the sense just indicated, there may be a παῤῥησία [“boldness”]
at the moment of this consciousness: I am assured that at this moment the light
has the victory over the darkness. But if, in the course of further development,
sin nevertheless manifests itself, this gives me to see that the last act of
consecration to the Lord was, after all, not a complete one, and thus that, in
the light of the absolute standard of the judgment, I do not stand as a
τέκνοντοῦΘεοῦ [“child of God”]. This experience, then, evermore urges us, with
respect to the past, to admit the force of the apostle’s word, οὐκἐγνώκαμεναὐτόν
[“has not come to known him”], but only to aim at it all the more diligently.
The consequence of this view is obvious, that in the moment of death every man
must have come or must come to this perfect devotion, or he cannot stand in the
judgment.

It hardly needs to be added, that this exposition of the section does not make
it in the most distant way support the merit of good works. These come into view
only as confirmation of the εἶναι ἐκτοῦΘεοῦ [“to be of God”]. But most assuredly
they are in the apostle’s meaning the test, the standard of self-knowledge, by
which we are to measure our relation to God. It cannot be made too emphatic that
it is St. John himself, who impresses us always with the predominant inwardness
of his spiritual nature, who founds the assurance of sonship on something more
than any feeling or consciousness. He leaves the decision to the simple
practical question as to the indwelling of sin. When the decision is against us,
we are rescued from despair by the needful testimony, given in 1Jn 2:1-2, to Him
who is the ἱλασμὸς περὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν [“atoning sacrifice for sins”]. To make the
works the means of knowing our spiritual state is not Johannaean only, it is
Pauline also. We may compare 2Ti 2:19, according to which the firm foundation of
God, that is, the Christian church, has for its seal or testing token: ἔγνω
Κύριος τοὺς ὄντας αὑτοῦ, καὶ ἀποστήτω ἀπὸ ἀδικίας πᾶς ὁ ὀνομάζων τὸ ὄνομα
Χριστοῦ [“the Lord knows those who are his, and everyone who names the name of
Christ must abstain from unrighteousness”]. Of these two elements, however, only
one falls into the domain of experience, and that is the second: this is
therefore the norm or standard of our judgment of ourselves; the former is the
source of our consolation. As soon as we view the words of St. John from the
point to which they themselves conduct us, all difficulty disappears. Πᾶς ὁ
γεγεννημένος ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐ δύναται ἁμαρτάνειν [“everyone born of God cannot
sin”]: this is and must ever be an ideal for us; but it is at the same time the
actual requirement, in the presence and by the application of which we can
ascertain our position before God.

1Jn 3:10 b

Πᾶς ὁ μὴ ποιῶν δικαιοσύνην, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ ὁ μὴ ἀγαπῶν τὸν ἀδελφὸν
αὑτοῦ. As early as the introduction of his Epistle the apostle announced its
twofold aim: to confirm, on the one hand, fellowship with the brethren, and, on
the other, fellowship with God. The first part of the document is constructed on
this principle of division; and the one we are now examining is similarly
divided into two halves. The first and second chapters had treated generally of
theκοινωνίατοῦφωτός [“fellowship of light”], the apostle has proceeded in this
to the confirmation of the fellowship which produces παῤῥησία [“boldness”]. This
confirmation takes place, on the one hand, through the works which are referred
to God, that is, through the ποιεῖν τὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice
righteousness”]: this has been discussed in the section just ended, 1Jn 3:4-10
a. It takes place, on the other hand, through the works which approve brotherly
love: these are discoursed of in 1Jn 3:10-18. That in a certain way brotherly
love also belongs to the obedience to the divine commandments, and thus
penetrates into the first section, the apostle had recognised in the second
chapter, and it will be seen also in what follows. But it is also self-evident
that the commandments of the second table have a relative independence by the
side of those of the first. Looking at it from this point of view, St. John
connects brotherly love with the exhortations to δικαιοσύνη [“righteousness”] by
means of a καί [“and”], which makes it a second and co-ordinate exhortation. But
who are the brethren thus to be loved? Are they the other members of the
Christian fellowship, or men generally? When we consider that Cain and Abel are
adduced as an exemplary warning, who were nevertheless only connected by
physical consanguinity, and not by similarity of relation to God; when we find
that the unrighteousness of hard dealing with those who are in bodily need is
the subject; when the opposition to brotherly love is stated to be, not that the
children of the world hate one another, but that the world hates us; when the
example of Christ is urged, who, however, died for us when we were yet sinners:
all these considerations might induce us to interpret the ἀδελφοὶ [“brothers”]
as meaning all men at large. But, on the other hand, the exhortation
ἀγαπῶμενἀλλήλους [“let us love one another”] can only refer to the Christian
fellowship; for a mutual love between Christians and the world is, according to
1Jn 3:13, impossible, since the world must hate us. Moreover, the entire
discussion of the apostle concerning love and hatred looks back to the final
discourses of the Lord in the Gospel, and these refer exclusively to the
relation of the apostles to each other. The arguments on both sides can have
justice clone to them only when we recognise that St. John does not absolutely
exclude love to all men, and that lie by no means limits with any care his
requirements to the relations of Christians to each other; while, on the other
hand, he reflects primarily and expressly only upon these, since the mutual
conduct of the brethren lay at the moment nearest his heart. The world comes
into view in the present Epistle, not so much as the field of Christian labour,
or as a power to be vanquished and Christianized: it is rather the negative pole
to the kingdom of God. The former view the apostle does not aim to deny; but he
does notbring it directly into notice.


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  CHAPTER 44: 44 - 1JN 3:11
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1Jn 3:11

Ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀγγελία ἣν ἠκούσατε ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς, ἵνα ἀγαπῶμεν ἀλλήλους· The
declaration, that he who loveth not his brother is not of God (1Jn 3:10b), is
established by the fact that the church had received the commandment of
brotherly love ἀπ᾽ἀρχῆς [“from the beginning”]. A commandment which had been
impressed among the first fundamental ideas of Christianity, which had further
been, enforced ever anew (ἀπό [“from”]), must assume a central position, and
be decisive concerning the εἶναι ἐκΘεοῦ [“to be of God”]. The words obviously
point back to 1Jn 2:7, where the ἀκούεινἀπ᾽ἀρχῆς [“to hear from the beginning”]
a similar way referred to brotherly love. The same reasons in this passage and
in that make it impossible to refer the ἀρχή[“beginning”] to the Old Testament
economy; in both the beginning of the Christian estate of the church is
intended. The matter of the announcement here before us—for ἀγγελία
[“message”], not ἀπαγγελία[“proclamation”], is the approved reading—is at the
same time its end and purpose: that the matter is brotherly love is testified by
the αὕτη [“this”]; that it is the purpose ἵνα [“that”] declares. Though these
two distinct ideas, thus indicated by the αὕτη [“this”] and the ἵνα [“that”] and
as it were blended together, did not present themselves as sharply defined to
the first readers, yet it is to be observed that both language and the truth it
delivers often mean more than either speaker or hearer is conscious of; and the
expositor—especially of the poets in classical literature, and more especially
still in sacred literature—has a right to take into account the full scope of
the words, unless, indeed, the meaning of the whole shows that part of this
scope is rendered impossible.


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  CHAPTER 45: 45 -  1JN 3:12
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1Jn 3:12

Οὐ καθὼς Κάϊν ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ ἦν, καὶ ἔσφαξε τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὑτοῦ. καὶ χάριν τίνος
ἔσφαξεν αὐτόν; ὅτι τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ πονηρὰ ἦν, τὰ δὲ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτοῦ δίκαια. As
to the detail, the apostle orders his exhortation to the exhibition of brotherly
love in this way: in 1Jn 3:12-15 he warns against hatred as the ungodly
principle, which is the token of death; and in 1Jn 3:16-18 exhorts positively to
active love. The example of Cain, adduced to affright us in 1Jn 3:12, might seem
at the first glance fitted to support that reference of ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς [“from the
beginning”]; to the Old Testament which we have denied to exist here: “in the
very first pages of the Bible the deterring example of Cain preaches the duty of
brotherly love.” But ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆςἀκούειν [“to hear from the beginning”] is, after
all, something different from ἀκούειν ἂἐν ἀρχῆγέγονεν[“came to hear in the
beginning”]; and while the deed of Cain showed the horror of hatred, that is
something different from the ἀγγελία [“message”], ἵνα ἀγαπῶμεν ἀλλήλους [“that
we should love one another”]. As to the construction of the sentence, it is not
enough for the explanation of the words καθὼς Κάϊν ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ ἦν [“just as
Cain who was of the evil one”] to assume a simple ellipsis, and therefore to
supply ὦμεν [“we may be”]; for that would leave the οὐ [“not”] to be accounted
for, as μή [“not”] ought then to have been found instead of οὐ [“not”]. It is
obvious that this is a case of simple attraction. The thought present to the
apostle’s mind was obviously this: μή ὦμεν ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ καθὼς Κάϊν ἐκ τοῦ
πονηροῦ ἦν [“may we not be of the evil one as Cain was of the evil one”]. First
of all, the point of comparison, the ἐκ τοῦπονηροῦεἶναι [“to be of the evil
one”], is only once uttered, and that as a subordinate clause; and then the
negative, which belonged to the cohortative sentence generally (μή [“not”]), is
by attraction drawn to the subordinate clause, which is merely declaratory, and
thus, instead of the subjective negation, the objective (οὐ [“not”]) appears.
The apostle’s thought was—to make the grammatical point clearer by an example—in
its form similar to that of 1Co 10:8, μὴ πορνεύωμεν καθώς τινες αὐτῶν ἐπόρνευσαν
[“let us not commit fornication as some of them committed fornication”]: which
was under the apostle’s pen so changed as if in the cited passage it stood ou οὐ
καθάς τινες αὐτῶν ἐπόρνευσαν [“not in accordance with some of them who committed
fornication”]. In 1Jn 3:10 it had been declared that brotherly love was a sign
of divine sonship; and, conversely, that the absence of it was a proof that
regeneration was wanting. Hence the apostle’s exhortation is directed in the
first place, not against the σφάζειν [“to slay”], which was only evidence of the
ἐκ τοῦπονηροῦ [“of the evil one”], but against this latter itself, and
subordinately against its evidence in murder. The part of the Epistle now before
us does not, indeed, refer to works in themselves, but to these as the marks and
signs of the internal condition. The second half of this verse shows the
internal connection between the relation to the brethren, of which the apostle
will now speak, and the ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”],—that
is, the relation to God of which he had already just spoken. The former, that
is, depends upon the latter: because Cain’s works, the collective expression of
his inner man, were not righteous like those of his brother, therefore there
arose in him hatred to that brother. Ποιεῖντὴνἁμαρτίαν [“to practicesin”] and
οὐκἀγαπᾶντὸνἀδελφὸν [“to not love the brother”] are not simply co-ordinate
evidences of the εἶναι ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ [“to be of the evil one”], as the καί
[“and”] in 1Jn 3:10b declared this co-ordination; but the latter is, on the
other hand, the plain result of the former. That the unrighteousness of Cain is
here exhibited as the ground of his hatred to his brother, is altogether in
harmony with the Old Testament record. For there we see that the motive of his
hatred to Abel was his envy, because Abel was more acceptable to God; but this
latter was founded, according to the express divine declaration, in the הֵיטִיב
[“the good”], the “good work” of Abel, which was wanting to Cain. It is
extremely appropriate that St. John does not speak of the μισεῖν [“hate”] of
Cain, but of the σφάζειν [“to slay”] in which that hatred found expression; for
he is treating generally of the outward evidence of the internal disposition,
through which outward evidence the internal disposition appears manifestly and
incontrovertibly to the man himself; and that he uses the word σφάζειν [“to
slay”], which occurs elsewhere in the New Testament only in the Apocalypse, and
there used, so to speak, as a vox solemnis, with a special fulness of meaning,
was designed to exhibit before the reader’s eyes the unmitigated fearfulness of
the act of Cain. But St. John does not pre sent the fratricide of Cain only as
one individual result of the general unrighteousness of his works, but rather as
specifically evoked by the opposite character of the works of Abel. As
everywhere, so here also evil is brought to its full maturity by means of
juxtaposition with the light, which reveals its character and makes it truly
dark. The wicked man who feels himself miserable at heart grudges the good man
the blessedness he has in his righteousness; and therefore has the disposition
to rob him of it by annihilating the good himself. As it is in the nature of the
devil, so it is in the nature of the child of the devil; they are alike
ἀνθρωποκτόνοι [“murderers”]. And the mention here of envy as the cause of the
murder accords with the record of Genesis: Cain was urged to his sinful act by
knowing that his offering was not acceptable to God, while his brother’s was
acceptable.


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  CHAPTER 46: 46 - 1JN 3:13-15
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1Jn 3:13-15

Μὴ θαυμάζετε ἀδελφοί μου, εἰ μισεῖ ὑμᾶς ὁ κόσμος. ἡμεῖς οἴδαμεν ὅτι
μεταβεβήκαμεν ἐκ τοῦ θανάτου εἰς τὴν ζωὴν, ὅτι ἀγαπῶμεν τοὺς ἀδελφούς· ὁ μὴ
ἀγαπῶν τὸν ἀδελφὸν, μένει ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ. Πᾶς ὁ μισῶν τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὑτοῦ,
ἀνθρωποκτόνος ἐστί· καὶ οἴδατε ὅτι πᾶς ἀνθρωποκτόνος οὐκ ἔχει ζωὴν αἰώνιον ἐν
αὐτῷ μένουσαν. The following verses certainly make an application of this
scriptural example to the relation between Christians and the world. There is
still a Cain on a large scale, which is the world; and there is an Abel, which
is the Christian church. What wonder is it if the same relations are sustained
which we see in the primitive times between the two brothers! But what direction
does the teaching of the apostle seem to take, when carefully examined? Does he
aim really to show that the world corresponds to Cain, and we to Abel,—that is,
will he assure us that the hatred of the world as being evil is naturally
excited against us as being good? The form which the writer has given to his
present thought does not accord with this. In such a case lie must evidently
have thrown the accent upon the fact that the world hates us, and assigned as
the obvious reason of it that we were good and the world evil. But it is not so
ordered: he speaks only of the loving and hating of brethren; an expression
which does not point to the great difference in character between the parties as
an explanation of the hatred, but, on the contrary, shows how unnatural the
feeling is as between persons of the same nature. And were that other order of
thought the right one, the conclusion would have been drawn from the character
as a whole to the consequent hatred or love; while the apostle conversely
concludes from the existence of hatred or love what is the ethical character as
a whole. All this leads us to another analysis of the three verses before us.
The apostle does not mean to indicate how natural it is(μήθαυμάζετε [“do not be
surprised”])that the world hates us, but that the world hates: the stress is not
on the object hated, but on the subject hating. This is evident, first, from the
emphasis laid on theἡμεῖς [“us”]of 1Jn 3:14, as over against theκόσμος[“world”]
of1Jn 3:13; and it is confirmed by the marked position of the κόσμος[“world”] at
the end of the sentence. It is natural for the world to hate,—the apostle
proceeds,—for hatred is simply a sign of the death into which the world,
according to the true idea of the world, has fallen; while the Christian must
love, because he, by his very nature, belongs to the life. Thus the section does
not by any means contain consolation as to the world’s hatred which falls upon
Christians, but is simply adehortationfrom hatred: the world, and only the
world, can hate; there is nothing strange in its hating; and this makes it clear
that the Christian cannot and may not hate. In1Jn 3:13 the object of the hatred
is added(ὑμᾶς [“you”]),not because the following observations have reference to
this, but simply in remembrance of the preceding comparison between Cain and
Abel; the progress of the thought does not rest upon this, that the world hates
us, but that the world hates. That hatred is characteristic of the world, the
apostle dilates upon in two ways; first, by showing that the token of divine
life is love, the very opposite of hatred (1Jn 3:14a) ;secondly, by dwelling on
the fact that hatred infallibly springs from death(1Jn 3:14-15). The conclusion,
that thus it is only the world that can hate, is not expressly repeated. The
emphasizedἡμεῖς [“us”]in1Jn 3:14 accordingly contrasts Christians with the
world; but it does not refer only to theοἴδαμεν [“we know”],as if the meaning
were: “we indeed know that we belong to the kingdom of life, but the world does
not know it:” the antithesis is found between the nature of Christians defined
in the verse and that of the world. “We Christians are partakers of life, and
know it by this, that we have brotherly love; the world hateth, and thereby
gives evidence that it belongs to death.” This part of the Epistle we now
consider deals, as a whole, with the signs ofsonship;and as such brotherly love
is here introduced.

It is not, however, that we know ourselves to be children of God, but that we
have become such, that we have passed from death unto life; for every Christian
has the conscious ness that by nature he also belonged to the world, and was
withdrawn from it only through a μετανοεῖν [“repentance”]. That in the second
hemistich the apostle does not say, as a formal parallel, “the world abides in
death, because it does not love (causa cognitionis),” but constructs the clause
generally, “He that loveth not, abideth in death,” has its reason in this, that
he is not really thinking of the world, but refers his dehortation to Christians
alone. All who hate, be they who they may, and ye also, therefore, if in this ye
are conformed to the world, are fallen under the power of death. That this is
the case the apostle makes still more emphatic, when in 1Jn 3:15 he makes hatred
equivalent to murder, which manifestly and obviously pertains to death. But this
is not meant to prove that the hater is essentially a murderer, that, as the
common exposition runs, hatred is the germ of murder; for, while it would follow
from this that the murderer must have been a hater, the converse would not
follow, that every hater is already a murderer; and yet this was to be proved.
Rather the congruence between the two lies in this, that in hatred there is no
element wanting which is contained in murder, that the animating thoughts of the
hater and the murderer are the same. In both, the existence of the brother is
opposed to me, and I seek to take it away: inwardly in hatred, denying him
existence in my thoughts; in murder outwardly, seeking to remove him out of the
world of the living. As the thought not uttered aloud does not essentially
differ from the thought spoken out, no more does hatred differ from murder. If
it does not lead to murder, that may be due to accidental circumstances, not
inherent in the hatred itself, that hinder; and then there is no difference
between it and murder in the moral estimate. Or it may be that I hate another
not enough to murder him; and in that case hate is not present in the full
comprehensiveness and maturity of its idea. But a murderer, the apostle goes on
to say, hath not eternal life abiding in him; and by the οἴδατε [“you know”]
declares that to be a fact which needs no demonstration. Here it is primarily
obvious in this passage that ζωὴαἰώνιος [“eternal life”] has in it no thought of
time, but is altogether an ethical idea or characteristic: for, if we would take
it in the sense of ζωὴἀκατάλυτος [“indestructible life”], it is clear that an οὐ
μένειν [“not abide”] of the ζωὴἀκατάλυτος [“indestructible life”] would be a
contradictio in adjecto. And the expression οὐ μένειν [“not abide”] leads us to
infer that the apostle is really addressing his inference to the readers
themselves as a dehortation, and not speaking objectively concerning the world;
for they alone have as yet received a portion in this life, and it is they alone
who could undervalue and lose this prerogative. That the murderer is under the
power of death, is placed in a clear light by the consistency between his nature
and his act: he who would deliver others to death is himself in the power of a
much more fearful death; what he purposes for others affects himself in a much
higher degree. As God can give nothing but life, because He is Himself life, so
he who is under the power of death can effect only death. Thus has the apostle,
not only by the example of Cain, but also by dialectical argument, shown that
hatred is a token of being bound in death, that therefore only the world can
hate; and thus he has in the most urgent way warned his readers against hatred.
And here we have another instance of the double-sidedness of treatment which
abounds in this Epistle: on the one hand, the warning against hatred, and, on
the other, the presupposition (1Jn 3:14a) that the church does not need such a
warning, being conscious of being actuated by love.


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  CHAPTER 47: 47 - 1JN 3:16
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1Jn 3:16

Ἐν τούτῳ ἐγνώκαμεν τὴν ἀγάπην, ὅτι ἐκεῖνος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν αὑτοῦ ἔθηκε· καὶ
ἡμεῖς ὀφείλομεν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τὰς ψυχὰς τιθέναι. To the negative view, the
dehortation from hatred, the apostle appends as an antithesis the positive (1Jn
3:16-18), love as shown in act and not merely in sentiment. As he has sharply
exhibited hatred of the brother in the example which proclaimed first in the
history of man and in the most fearful manner its type, so that in him and in
his acts we may learn what hatred really is; so now in the verses before us he
places Him in contrast who furnishes the supreme and perfect type of what love
is, that we may learn it from Him—Jesus Christ. But as the apostle is writing to
Christians, who, according to 1Jn 3:14, ἐκ τοῦ θανάτου εἰς τὴν ζωὴνμεταβεβήκσεν
[“passed out of death into life”], their learning of Christ is supposed to have
already taken place, ἐγνώκαμεν [“we know”]. The counterpart or opposite of Cain,
which the Lord presents, is as perfect as can be conceived by the mind. Cain’s
hatred consisted in this, that he sacrificed his brother’s life for his own
advantage; and in this consisted, by contrast, the love of Christ, that He
sacrificed His own life for our good. Τὴνψυχὴναὑτοῦἔθηκε [“he laid down his
life”]: a unique expression, found in Greek literature only in St. John. We meet
with it in the Gospel, and often especially in the tenth chapter (Joh 10:12,
John 10:15, John 10:17-18), as also in Joh 13:37-38; John 15:13; and we have it
here. That it occurs first in the discourses of our Lord Himself, which are
pervaded by Old Testament references, must suggest a derivation from the Old
Testament; which, indeed, is otherwise much more probable than the explanation
that makes it an application of profane Greek, such as θέσθαιἀσπίδας[LSJ] [“to
lay down one’s arms”], and so forth. The Hebrew at once presents the verb שׂוּם
[“to put”], which in so many ways responds to theτιθέναι [“to lay down”]. More
specifically we have then, on the one hand, the phrase בְּכַפּוֹשׂׅיםנֶפֶשׁ [“he put
his life in his hand” cf. 1Sa 19:5], and on the other, a suggestion ofIsa
53:10אָשָׁםנֶפֶשׁתָּשׂׅים [“he will make his life a guilt offering”].The former of
these applications signifies not so much the surrender of life as the staking
it, and therefore expresses no more than the readiness to surrender life;
whether that life be lost or not, is in the first place irrelevant. In the
passage of Isaiah the case is otherwise. For if in this place, as we
think,תָּשׂׅים[“to appoint”] is in the third person, andנֶפֶשׁ[“life”] the subject
preceding, then we must translate: when the soul(sc.of the servant of Jehovah)
pledges compensation. Wherein the compensation consists is not contained in the
words; for we must not give the verb a reflexive aspect, and translate: “when
his soul shall pledge itself for compensation.” But what is not justified as
translation is nevertheless true of the matter itself: the sacrifice of
restitution consists essentially in the life of Him who pays it down, that is,
in the life of the Messiah. But the chief thing is here to take the
verbשׂׅים[“put”] in both the phrases not in the sense of “laying down,” but in
that of “pledging,” gauging His life for something. But this interpretation is
not merely possible here; it is the only one which harmonizes with the
connection, as will presently be shown. Nothing is here said of thatsatisfactio
vicariaof which the passage in Isaiah speaks; for then we should have
read,τὴνψυχὴντιθέναι ἀντίἡμῶν [“to lay down life instead of us”],whereas
theὑπέρ[“in behalf of”] only indicates that the interposition of the life of
Christ was for our advantage: every more exact determination of it the apostle
leaves untouched. In this act of Christ we have learned to knowτὴνἀγάπην[“the
love”],—that is, not His love, but love generally, what it means to love. And,
in fact, there can be no more profound conception of love than that which is
contained in the words τιθέναι τὴνψυχήν [“to lay down life”].Every deed of love
is a staking of theψυχή [“life”]:I cannot discharge the slightest office of
charity to anyone without in some degree denying myself, my own I. As the
denying of the personality of the brother on my own account is the essence of
all hatred, so the denying of my own I for the brother’s sake is the essence of
all love. And as the apostle already in 1Jn 2:6,[N] and that with special
reference to love, had declared that
καθὼςἐκεῖνοςπεριεπάτησεκαὶαὐτὸςοὕτωςπεριπατεῖν [“ought himself also to walk just
as he walked”], so here also the same requirement is urged with specific
reference to the demonstrations of love: as the mind of the Redeemer’s love
found expression in the τιθέναι τὴνψυχήν [“to lay down life”], so it is our
obligation (ὀφείλομεν [“we ought”]) to copy this expression of love in our own
life.


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  CHAPTER 48: 48 - 1JN 3:17
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1Jn 3:17

Ὃς δ᾽ ἂν ἔχῃ τὸν βίον τοῦ κόσμου, καὶ θεωρῇ τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὑτοῦ χρείαν ἔχοντα, καὶ
κλείσῃ τὰ σπλάγχνα αὑτοῦ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, πῶς ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ μένει ἐν αὐτῷ; With
this requirement, that we lay down in this sense our life, is associated the
antithetical observation (δέ [“but”]), how it is with him who does not act thus:
it is most natural—as the rhetorical question really says—that there can be no
relation to God in that case. If I give not τὸν βίον [“resources”], what I
possess for the need and nourishment of bodily life, that signifies no other
than that I will not myself lay down my life in the very least, in the most
external circumference of it, for the advantage of my brother. The apostle says
βίοςτοῦκόσμου [“the world’s resources”], in order by this appendage to make
prominent the triviality of the matter: if ye do not in this which is least
evince your love, how will ye do it in that which is greater? Such a man as St.
Paul would surrender the very highest thing, his fellowship with Christ, for the
brethren (Rom 9:3); and will ye not surrender the least important of all things?
And it is yet more base, since ye must absolutely shut your heart against
sympathy (κλείειν [“to shut”]), and suppress the most natural impulses, natural
even in the world.1 The entire unnaturalness of such hardheartedness appears in
all its prominence in the θεωρεῖντὸνἀδελφὸναὑτοῦχρείανἔχοντα [“to see his
brother in need”]: his need is supposed to be well known to me, my eye rests
upon it, my thoughts are concerned with it, sympathy urges its claims; but yet I
bolt the doors of my heart. We need not here assume, any more than in the case
mentioned by Jas 2:15-17 ff., that such lovelessness had occurred in a marked
and express manner among the disciples; it is everywhere so common that we may
understand the exhortation without any more especial occasion for it. But if the
unnaturalness of the behaviour thus rebuked is so great, its deviation from the
required τιθέναι τὴνψυχήν [“to lay down life”] so wide, it is clear how little
consistent it must be with any near relation toGod.

St. John has from the beginning of his discussion of the subject exhibited
brotherly love as the test of εἶναι ἐκΘεοῦ [“to be of God”], and therefore as
its result; if this love be absent, the being born of God must be absent too. As
in the negative section, 1Jn 3:12-15, brotherly love was considered to be the
reflection of our relation to God, not of the relation of God to us; so also
here the ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ [“love of God”] is not God’s love to us, but our love to
Him. We might indeed here, as in 1Jn 2:5, take the ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ [“love of
God”] quite generally to be love, as it is in God and will have its reflection
in us, and therefore as a unity which contains reference to both its directions;
but since in what precedes the specific love of Christ to us had been spoken of,
the other view just presented is the more appropriate. The μένειν [“abide”] is
here to be explained as in 1Jn 3:14-15: since the apostle is writing to
Christians, he obviously presupposes the right sentiment of the heart; but
through hardness against brethren that must needs be lost. For the rest, our
verse plainly enough shows that the profound speculation of St. John is laid at
the service of the most immediate practical requirements of Christianity: there
is here andnowhere a gulf between them. footnote

1ἀποκλείειντινός [“to shut up something”] is a phrase well known in classical
Greek; but κλείειν ἀπὸτινός [“to shut off from something”] seems, on the other
hand, formed simply after the type of the Hebrew סָגַּר מִפְּנִי. [“shut up
because of” cf. Jos 6:1]


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  CHAPTER 49: 49 - 1JN 3:18
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1Jn 3:18

Τεκνία μου, μὴ ἀγαπῶμεν λόγῳ, μηδὲ γλώσσῃ, ἀλλ᾽ ἔργῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ. The men here
spoken of have no sort of love whatever. But it is not necessary that this lack
of love should exhibit itself in words. We may present the semblance of love by
words, while remaining absolutely without it in deeds. Hence follows the
exhortation to avoid such hypocritical semblance of charity. But as this is
about to close the section, and the apostle purposes here to sum up the whole in
one clause, he turns his address in affectionate earnestness to the hearts of
his readers. The wordsλόγῳμηδὲτῃγλώσσῃ [“let us not with word or tongue”], with
which we should not love, derive their explanation from the antithesisἐν ἔργῳ
καὶ ἀληθείᾳ [“in deed and truth”].To the λόγος [“word”] the ἔργον [“deed”] is
opposed. The word of love to which the λόγος[“word”] refers may be meant
sincerely, inspired by warm feeling, but be wanting in readiness for sacrifice;
we may wish the best to the brethren, but not procure it for them by the proper
τιθέναι τὴνψυχήν [“to lay down life”]. The Christians represented inJas 2:16
were suchἀγαπῶντεςἐνλόγῳ [“those loving in word”].Opposed to this is
theἀγαπᾶνἐνἔργῳ [“love in deed”].Theἐν[“in”] must be noted as the opposite of
the lack of it inλόγῳ [“word”].The apostle certainly could not have written
μὴἀγαπᾶτεἐνλόγῳ [“do not love in word”],for this would have meant that we should
not love in words, which is obviously not his meaning; but we are not to
loveἐνλόγῳ [“in word”],in the sense that the word is made the representative,
instrument, and only herald or spokesman of our love. We then come to the second
pair of the four expressions: μὴτῃγλώσσῃἀλλ᾽ἀληθείᾳ [“not in tongue but in
truth”](theἐν[“in”]is to be supplemented beforeἀληθείᾳ [“truth”]).To the truth,
the inward actuality of love, stands opposed the γλῶσσα [“tongue”], the mere
outward babbling about it. In the first member of the sentence we are exhorted
against a love which approves itself only by good, sincere, and well-intentioned
wishes; here, against hollow phrases as such. That λόγος[“word”]might come from
a sympathizing soul, without, however, energy enough in its fellow-feeling; but
in the other case mere phrases disguise the utter absence of all true sympathy.
The apostle has thus, in contrast with the hatred which reigns in the world, not
merely demanded of Christians love in general, but that love which the Lord
Himself has taught; it must be self-sacrificing(1Jn 3:16); this self-sacrifice
must approve itself in the outward relations of life(1Jn 3:17); and that not in
deceptive words, but in deed and in truth(1Jn 3:18).


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  CHAPTER 50: 50 - 1JN 3:19-20
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1Jn 3:19-20

Καὶ ἐν τούτῳ γινώσκομεν ὅτι ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐσμέν. καὶ ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ πείσομεν
τὰς καρδίας ἡμῶν, ὅτι ἐὰν καταγινώσκῃ ἡμῶν ἡ καρδία, ὅτι μείζων ἐστὶν ὁ Θεὸς τῆς
καρδίας ἡμῶν, καὶ γινώσκει πάντα.

There is certainly in the following words an advance in the thought: this is
clear on the first glance. But wherein the progress consists, and how these
verses are therefore related to what goes before, cannot be decided at the
outset. Expositors are so divided as not to know whether the passage refers to
forgiveness or condemnation, whether brotherly love or ποιεῖν τὴνδικαιοσύνην
[“to practice righteousness”] is the subject; and this division shows the
importance of considering the expressions in detail before we can gain even a
preliminary point of view whence to understand the whole connection.

First of all we must settle the readings, which itself will be a great gain for
the exposition. The καί [“and”] beginning 1Jn 3:19 is indeed wanting in many
influential manuscripts, especially Codex A and Codex B; but it is otherwise
extremely well attested. The decision as to its genuineness would be really
important only if on it depended the answer to the question whether 1Jn 3:19
introduces an altogether new thought, or is connected with what precedes. But
the καί [“and”] has no such critical weight as this: certainly 1Jn 3:19 does
spring from the preceding words, as ἐντούτῳ [“by this”] in the beginning shows,
which must necessarily be referred to them. For otherwise, if ἐντούτῳ [“by
this”] is to be referred to the following ὅτι [“that”], the condensed statement
would be simply, we may know our εἶναι ἐκτοῦΘεοῦ [“to be of God”] by this, that
God is greater than our heart. But it is plain that the proposition taken in
this general way proves too much, and therefore nothing. Laid down thus, and
without any cautionary guards, it might be used to demonstrate that even the
υἱὸςτῆςἀπωλείας [“son of perdition”] is of the truth. But if the substance of
the ἐντούτῳ [“by this”] is what precedes, and the connection of our verse with
the foregoing is held fast, then it is a matter quite irrelevant whether the καί
is or is not read in the beginning of the verse. Similarly, it is of little
moment whether we read γινώσκομεν [“we know”] or γνωσόμεθα [“we will know”]. As
to the internal grounds, the genuineness of the present tense may be argued from
the probability that copyists, having before them the future immediately
following, πείσομεν [“we will persuade”], which is co-ordinated with the
γινώσκομεν [“we know”], would be likely to change this latter also into a future
through mere lapsus memoriae; while, on the other hand, that the future
γνωσόμεθα [“we will know”] was the original reading, might be argued from the
fact that the phrase or turn ἐντούτῳ γινώσκομεν [“by this we know”] is so
current with St. John that the transcribers would naturally choose to write it.
If internal reasons are to decide, we must judge by the strength of the evidence
as it appears to us; and the future seems more likely to have been the primitive
reading. The two futures, γνωσόμεθα [“we will know”] and πείσομεν [“we will
persuade”], are then to be explained, not so much from the cohortative tone of
the section (“we should know,” and so on), but in their strictly logical sense,
as deduction from the conditions laid down by the apostle to be at once
explained: “under these suppositions shall we, as a necessary result, know.”
Finally, it is of no importance whether at the end of 1Jn 3:19καρδίας [“heart”]
or καρδίαν [“hearts”] is to be read, but the former is to be preferred. On the
other hand, everything depends on our striking out, or otherwise, the second ὅτι
[“that”] in 1Jn 3:20, that before μείζων [“greater”]. But it happens that here
we have good grounds, both external and internal, for decision. While the
external testimonies are in favour of keeping it, we can much more easily
understand that the transcribers, taking it as purely epanaleptic, left it out,
than that they inserted it where it was not, since its insertion has greatly
embarrassed the passage.

Let us now proceed to the exposition itself. After what has been discussed we
may assume that ἐντούτῳ [“by this”] looks back to what has just preceded, and
there its meaning is plain enough: it is the true and inward brotherly love to
which it refers as the ground of the γινώσκειν [“to know”]. We have perceived
that the design of the whole section from 1Jn 2:28 onwards has been to exhibit
the demonstration of divine sonship in work as its sure criterion. First, there
was a requirement of ποιεῖν τὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”] as it
respects God; then it was shown that the lack of this gives birth to hatred
towards brethren; and conversely, that love to brethren gives sufficient
evidence of the ποιεῖν τὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”] as a
character. Consequently the inference is a sound one, that true brotherly love,
as demanded in 1Jn 3:18, gives assured evidence (ἐντούτῳ γινώσκομεν [“by this we
know”]) of the right relation to God. Here, however, this is not, as before,
described as εἶναι ἐκτοῦΘεοῦ [“to be of God”], but as εἶναι ἐκτῆςἀληθείας [“to
be of the truth”]. Primarily, we may suppose, because so much prominence had
just been given to truth and semblance. We must love ἐν ἀληθείᾳ [“in truth”],
and only when we do this are we ἐκτῆςἀληθείας [“of the truth”]. But, further,
this expression probably was intended to indicate that only in virtue of the
consciousness that we are of the truth can we have tranquillity in thinking of
the divine judgment. He who is Himself the truth must acknowledge those as His
who by genuine brotherly love approve themselves as ἐκτῆςἀληθείαςὄντες [“being
of the truth”]. This position of confident assurance as in regard to God, the
apostle expresses by the words, ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ πείσομεν τὰς καρδίας ἡμῶν [“we
will persuade our hearts before him”].

There is a controversy about the meaning of the πείθειν [“to persuade”]. If we
translate it “persuade to something,” it may be asked what it is that we
persuade our hearts to accept. The omission of the object itself would not be so
strange; but in the present connection nothing has been spoken of to which we
might be supposed to persuade our hearts; for the brotherly love which had been
the matter of discourse is taken for granted in our verse (ἐντούτῳ[“by this”]),
and we have no need to persuade ourselves of that. Moreover, it is not to be
denied that “to persuade our heart to anything” is very artificial; it would
come to this in the end, that we are supposed to form some purpose: but it is
obvious that it would be extremely forced to describe that by πείθειν τὴνκαρδίαν
[“to persuade hearts”]. Besides this one, there are two other significations of
πείθειν [“to persuade”] which are suggested: “convince” and “soothe.” Now here
again we have, in respect to the former of these, the same difficulty of finding
an object concerning which we are thought to convince ourselves. The most
obvious course would then be to take the clause ὅτι μείζων ἐστὶν ὁ Θεὸς τῆς
καρδίας ἡμῶν [“for God is greater than our heart”] as this object. And the
preliminary inquiry must be the reference and meaning of the second ὅτι [“that”]
in 1Jn 3:20, which must be decided before we can decide the other point. This
may be understood as either a causal particle (because) or as defining the
object (that). Let us begin with the second of these possibilities. In that case
the ὅτι [“that”] would introduce the objective matter of the πείθειν [“to
persuade”]; and it would be declared concerning what we τὴνκαρδίαν πείσομεν [“we
persuade the heart”]. Now, if we take πείσομεν [“we persuade”] with the meaning
“convince,” we must translate: “we shall convince our heart of this, that God is
greater than our heart.” But then it must not be forgotten that the proposition
μείζων ὁ Θεὸς τῆς καρδίας ἡμῶν [“God is greater than our heart”] is so clear in
itself, that there could be no necessity of our being in any manner persuaded of
it. It might indeed be used as a premiss from which a conclusion should be
drawn; but certainly not as a thesis which itself needed to be demonstrated.
But, that being the case, on what principle should we here have to be convinced
of it? Is it that the apostle looks back on the ἐντούτῳ[“by this”], so that in
the consciousness of brotherly love we are supposed to penetrate to this
assurance of God’s greatness? But what in all the world has brotherly love to do
with the divine greatness and our conviction of it? Thus this translation is
altogether untenable.

Now let us try the second possible interpretation, and take ὅτι [“that”] as
defining the object; but taking πείθειν [“to persuade”] in the sense of
“soothing or allaying.” Then the meaning would be: “we shall encourage our heart
as to the fact that God is greater than it.” It is clear that in this case
μείζων [“greater”] refers to the greater severity of God; for, in relation to
His greater mildness, we should not need any special solace. But then again it
would be incomprehensible how this soothing should take effect: however
conscious of brotherly love we might be, the simple thought of the greater
severity of God must needs make every such solace impossible. To this must be
added that, even if we admit the meaning of soothe or solace to be right
generally (of which hereafter), yet πείθειν [“to persuade”] with this meaning is
always used absolutely, never with on following it; that at least “comfort
concerning” must be expressed. Thus it is perfectly impossible to understand the
clause with ὅτι [“that”] as objective; and we are forced to revert to the causal
meaning of the ὅτι [“that”]. But then it becomes impossible to translateπείθειν
[“to persuade”]as convincing of something. For if, as we have shown, we do not
find the object of theπείθειν [“to persuade”]in the clause with ὅτι μείζων
[“because greater”],there is generally none to be found. Yet some such objective
is peremptorily necessary if we take the meaning “to persuade or convince:” we
must be convinced of something. The question then arises, whetherπείθειν [“to
persuade”]may not have a meaning which will allow its being without a
substantial object after it. Such a meaning would be the “soothing” already
mentioned, if only it can be defended on other grounds. Classical Greek is
supposed to furnish many instances in its favour; but in most of the cases
(especially those out of the Iliad,1.100,9.112, 181, 386) this signification is
at least not obligatory, since the connection allows us to translate “persuade,”
the object of the per suasion being invariably supplied in the context. On the
other hand, the passage cited in Plato,de Rep. iii.390, probablyHesiodic,seems
to us to establish the meaning of “soothe:” δῶρα θεοὺςπείθει, δῶρ’ αἰδοίους
βασιλῆας [“Giftspersuadegods, giftspersuaderevered kings”]. As it concerns the
New Testament, Act 12:20 andAct 14:19 do not belong to this subject, as in these
passages the object of the “persuading” is easily supplied. It is other wise
withMat 28:14, where the members of the council bribe the watchers of the
sepulchre, and promise them that, if Pilate should hear of it,πείσομεναὐτὸν [“we
will persuade him”].To supply here ἀκολάστους[LSJ]ὑμᾶςἐὰν [“if you are
undisciplined”] is venturesome, on the one hand; and, on the other, this thought
needed not to be expressed, since it was already prominent enough in
theἀμερίμνους ὑμᾶς ποιήσομεν [“make you free from anxiety”]. Ratherwe must
assume that the high priests aimed at accomplishing two things: first, they
would soften Pilate’s displeasure on account of the supposed sleep of the
watchers at the sepulchre; and, secondly, they would thus deliver these watchers
from suffering the penalty. But if once the meaning of a word is established by
any confirmatory passage, as it is in the present case by the quotation from
Plato, and, less directly, by that from St. Matthew, then we are justified in
adopting this meaning in other passages which, though they do notpressingly
demand such an interpretation themselves, yet are most successfully interpreted
when such a meaning is applied to them by their help. This is the case in our
present passage, and we therefore translateπείθειν [“to persuade”]by propitiate
or soothe. And this solacing of our hearts, the apostle says, will take place
ἔμπροσθενΘεοῦ [“before God”]:that is, when we place ourselves inwardly before
God, and judge ourselves with His measure, in the consciousness of His holiness,
so can we, even in the presence of this standard, take comfort. But this
soothing presupposes anxiety of heart: whence this comes, and in what it
consists, is shown in the beginning of the following verse. That the second ὅτι
[“that”] is to be takencausativelycommends itself at once; but the first one
involves us in new difficulties. For this first ὅτι [“that”] may itself be
viewed in two ways: either it may be understood as equivalent to the second, ὅτι
[“that”] that this latter is only an epanalepsisor resumption of the former, and
then the clause withἐάν [“if”]is a conditional clause; or the first on is to be
written with the diastole(ὅ,τι [“that which”]),and understood relatively, and
thenἐάν [“if”] is only the particleἄνfn which is so frequent in the New
Testament. Against the first explanation, according to which the second ὅτι
[“that”] is anepanalepsisof the first, many very decisive arguments may be
urged: For instance, the causal ὅτι [“that”] (and we have shown that its
clause,μείζων ὁ Θεὸςκ.τ.λ. [“God is greater than, etc.”],is of this character)
is never resumed or repeated in such a way as this; certainly such an un
exampledepanalepsisis out of the question here, where only some words separate
the first ὅτι [“that”] from the second. And then, again, the conditional
clauseἐάνκαταγινώσκῃ[“if it condemns”] would in that case stand in a false
logical position. For we should have to translate: “We can comfort our hearts,
because God, in case our heart condemns us, is greater than our heart.” The
position of the conditional particle after ὅτι [“that”] would make this meaning
inevitable; the conditional clause would be dependent on the clause with ὅτι
[“that”], and thus the greatness of God would appear to beconditionedby the
accusation of our heart. That would lead to the conclusion that, if our hearts
did not condemn us, God would not be greater than they. But the only appropriate
thought is obviously that, in case our hearts condemn us, we may console
them,—that is, the conditional clause must not belong to the phrase ὅτι
μείζων[“that grater than”],but toπείσομεν [“we will persuade”].

Accordingly, as we cannot take the ὅτι [“that”] opening 1Jn 3:20 as a causal
particle, it only remains that we take it as a relative, and resolve ἐάν [“if”]
into the simple ἄν.fn Certainly the combination ὅστιςἐάν [“if whatever”],
ὅ,τιἐάν [“if that which”] is not frequent; indeed, it is very remarkable that it
is not found uncontradicted in any passage of the New Testament. Yet the reading
ὅ,τιἐάν [“if that which”] seems to us secure enough in Gal 5:10 and Col 3:17,
where the preponderant probability is in favour of retaining the ἐάν [“if”],
though even the two other passages, Acts 3:23;[N]Col 3:23;[N] must be struck
out. The interpretation of the ὅτι ἐάν [“if that”] in this manner in our passage
is not only demanded by the sense, but it is grammatically admissible; since
καταγινώσκειν [“to condemn”] elsewhere occurs with the accusative, not to say
that the pronoun even with such verbs as generally require other cases may stand
in the accusative. Moreover, the generalizing ὅ,τιἐάν [“if that which”], instead
of the usual ὅἐάν [“if that”], is here peculiarly appropriate; for it expresses
the idea that in all instances in which our hearts may happen to condemn us, we
may solace them. The two verses under consideration might therefore be thus
translated: “Herein, by this love ἐν ἔργῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ [“in deed and truth”],
rests our consciousness that we are of the truth; and hereby (the ἐντούτῳ [“by
this”] belongs also to πείσομεν [“we will persuade”]) may we soothe our hearts,
in all cases in which our heart condemns us (that here the singular καρδία
[“heart”] enters is very refined: each heart has its own particular accusations,
and the individual is in the apostle’s view), for God is greater than our heart,
and knoweth all things.”

After all this, we have only as yet busied ourselves about the mere vesture of
St. John’s thought: we have now to look at the very thought itself. Two things
the apostle takes for granted: one, in theἐντούτῳ[“by this”]of1Jn 3:19, that we
have brotherly love; the other, in the clause onὅτι ἐάνκαταγινώσκῃ κ.τ.λ.[“that
if it condemns, etc.”],that in some measure our hearts reproach us. According to
the explanation given, we are supposed to have, in the consciousness of
brotherly love, the means whereby we may allay the reproaches of our conscience.
But this thought is, as it appears, quite an alien one to the Christian
sentiment. The accusations of my heart certainly can have reference only to sins
and thesinfulnessof which I know myself to be a partaker: concerning that, am I
supposed to take comfort simply in this way, and in this way alone? and if so,
could that consolation lie in the possession of brotherly love? does not this
lead to the most superficial and vapid Rationalism ?The Apostle James says that
he who keeps the whole law, and yet sins in one particular, is guilty of the
whole law. Does not St. John here say the very opposite: if you only keep the
commandment of brotherly love, you may leave all else behind you with
confidence? Not in any work wrought by us, but in the blood of Christ or the
grace of God we are accustomed to see the only genuine ground of our hearts’
pacification. But it is God who comes primarily into view here; for the
wordsμείζων ἐστὶν ὁ Θεὸς τῆς καρδίας ἡμῶν [“God is greater than our heart”]can,
according to the interpretation given above, be brought into consideration only
as the ground that justifies our taking comfort to our hearts. Consequently the
much-contested question, whether theμείζων[“greater than”] refers to the
condemning severity of God or His pardoning kindness, is made easy at the very
outset: having become convinced thatπείθειν [“to persuade”] must be understood
in the sense of “soothe,” and ὅτι [“that”] with a causative signification, it is
clear that the clause ὅτι μείζων[“that greater than”] must, as containing matter
of consolation, exhibit not the greater strictness of God, but His greater
tenderness. For the sake, however, of the deep importance of the matter itself,
and to become still more convinced of the soundness of our interpretation, let
us look at the other way of taking the μείζων ὁ Θεὸς [“God is greater
than”].Referring it to the greater severity of God, we must make the meaning of
the verse this: we condemn ourselves, God will much more condemn us. There would
then be found a contrast between the subject-ideas, God and we; but the
predicate would apply to both, though it may be in a different degree: both
condemn. But such an antithesis as this is assuredly not supported by the
arrangement of the words: the wordsὁΘεὸς [“God”] and καρδίαἡμῶν [“our
heart”]have by no means any emphasis on them—rather come in among different
ideas. Observing the καταγινώσκῃ [“it condemns”],placed first in the subordinate
clause, this might appear to be the strength of the antithesis; and then the
condemnation would require to have a non-condemnation set over against it.
Further, the view ofὅ,τιἐάν [“if that which”]as a relative, which we have
established, would not so well harmonize with the end of the verse,γινώσκειπάντα
[“he knows all things”],on any other principle of interpretation. For, that we
thereby come to the persuasion that God is greater than our heart, in the matter
of its condemnation, is not logically and strictly demonstrated by the
proposition that Godknowethall things, but by the proposition that He more fully
knows the thing in question. Of course it may be said against that, that this is
naturally included in theγινώσκειπάντα [“he knows all things”];but there would
be a certain inconcinnity, nevertheless. We therefore adhere to the conclusion
thatμείζων[“greater than”]must be understood to exhibit the greater gentleness
of God. The gentleness of God is not regarded as absolutely and in all matters a
valid ground of consolation; but it is such as based upon His
omniscience(γινώσκειπάντα [“he knows all things”]).Thus, if our conscience
condemns us, we can find solace for ourselves only if we have made ourselves
worse than we really are, or thought ourselves more entirely sundered from God
than is actually the case,—than could indeed actually be the case, since God
knows everything. Notwithstanding the accusations of our heart, we are not
altogether rejected of God; we are ἐκτῆςἀληθείας [“of the truth”] and can
determine that we are so. But in what way? ἐντούτῳ[“by this”],by the fact of our
having brotherly love in deed and in truth. When we measure ourselves by the
terms of the whole previous section, especially from1Jn 3:1-10, we must see that
we are wanting in the first token ofsonship,theποιεῖν τὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to
practice righteousness”]:our heart condemns us on that account, because we find
much unrighteousness still clinging to our lives. Now we perfect the
self-judging, in the way the apostle has taught us; and place ourselves in the
position of the last day; and recognise that we cannot stand before God,—that,
measured by so strict and absolute a standard, we are not yet altogether
withdrawn from the sphere of darkness. But, so long as we live below, we shall
never attain to any such maturity as to fix us absolutely on the one side of the
religious alternative; we are yet in the process of a development, in the course
of a conflict between light and darkness; and it is essential to the idea of
such a struggle that the territory contended about belongs not altogether either
to the one or to the other of the several powers. In other words: though we must
day by day measure ourselves by the standard of the goal set before us,
theοὐδύναταιἁμαρτάνειν [“not able to sin”].we may, on the other hand, know where
in the course we are now found; we must needs be assured whether or not we have
made a good beginning towards the final victory. This is the question considered
and determined in the present verse.

1Jn 3:19 and the following contain a summary of what goes before; but only in a
preliminary way. The question was about the παῤῥησία [“boldness”] on the day of
judgment: if we would know whether that will be ours or not, we must judge
ourselves according to our works. If on such a judgment our heart does not
condemn us, we have already now, and already here, the parrhesia: that is the
substance of 1Jn 3:21. But if—and this is the other possibility—our hearts
condemn us, we being not as yet conscious of the δικαιοσύνην [“righteousness”],
what then? is the question of 1Jn 3:20. The confidence or parrhesia of a period
and secure trust we assuredly cannot, in any case have; but something less than
this is possibly,—we may be joyful in hope if we have only made a good
beginning, as evidenced by the required outward practice corresponding to the
divine gift within. And this good beginning is brotherly love. It is the first
and easiest commandment: for how can he who closes his heart against his brother
(1Jn 3:17) love his God? It is the first stage and first test of the love of
God. He who has this ἐν ἔργῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ [“in deed and truth”] will be able to
conclude from his having it that there is the commencement of that love in him
as the evidence of his fellowship with God; and even supposing him to be not for
the moment conscious of it, God is greater and sees deeper: He knows this very
beginning that may be concealed from ourselves. True, that in the absolute
judgment of eternity no mere beginning will avail; there must be an entire and
perfected holiness: thinking on this, we must evermore say that we have not yet
attained. But it is, nevertheless, a great thing to know that we have at least
made a beginning; for from that springs the confidence that ἐν ὑμῖν ἔργον
ἀγαθὸν, ἐπιτελέσει ἄχρις ἡμέρας Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ [“he who began a good work in you
will perfect it until the day of Christ Jesus”] (Php 1:6). And this very passage
demands for the day of Christ the same that St. John demands in our Epistle, 1Jn
2:28: the perfection of religion. But it may be repeated, that the beginning of
the good work itself inspires the hope that its completion will not be wanting
at the last. Thus our verse (1Jn 3:20) contains the counterpart of that
fearfully solemn doctrine of the judgment to which the apostle had led up in the
previous verse; and, indeed, a necessary counterpart, since, unless we bring
this also into prominence, the solemnity of the judgment might well lead us to
despair.

But, that the consolation which the apostle now administers to those whom he had
previously smitten is not sought, as in1Jn 2:1, in the remembrance of the
propitiatory death and intercession of the Lord, has its reason in the bearing
and motive of the whole section. The question in it is only of the confirmation
of fellowship with the Lord,—a fellowship the existence of which must always and
only be known by its fruits. As to the reality of my faith, the depth of my
devotion to Him, I may deceive myself; I dare not base my security on my
feeling; the energies and actings of faith alone give me a sufficient guarantee
for my confidence. If these are found in an absolute degree, so that my heart no
longer condemns me, then I have the perfectparrhesia;but if they are present in
their beginnings only, in vigorous brotherly love, that affords me the
consolation of knowing that as to my relation to God the way is fairly open
before me. And the inference which I only thus deduce is naked and open before
the eyes of Him whoπάντα γινώσκει [“he knows all things”]. Thus our verse takes
its place in the unity of the chapter as a perfectly homogeneous constituent;
and at the same time gives us additional security for the correctness of our
interpretation of what goes before. In conclusion, we may turn our attention for
a moment to the word καρδία [“heart”]. In express terms and by inference this
word has been accepted as interchangeable with συνείδησις [“conscience”]. This
latter word is, as we are aware, unknown to the Johannaean phraseology; for Joh
8:9 must not come into consideration, on account of its suspected genuineness.
It might therefore be regarded as possible or probable that the apostle
expressed the more special idea of the conscience by the more general one of the
heart. But καρδία [“heart”] itself occurs comparatively seldom in St. John’s
writings; in no case, however, with the meaning of conscience. It rather
signifies, especially in those passages which are closely dependent on the Old
Testament,—that is, in the Apocalypse (Rev 2:23[N]Rev 17:17, Rev 18:7), and in
the citation of Joh 12:40 ff.,—the entire inner man, the interior of the nature,
corresponding to the quite general לֵב [“heart”] In other instances of his use,
it signifies particularly the life of feeling and sentiment, Joh 14:1, John
14:27, John 16:6, John 16:22. The only question then is, whether we may take it
here in the latter of the senses just mentioned, or must needs limit it to the
express idea of συνείδησις [“conscience”]. This term συνείδησις [“conscience”]
itself occurs in the New Testament with a double application. One is in harmony
with the classical συνειδός[LSJ] [“to be privy to”], as the knowledge of
anything, especially of an action past: as in Heb 10:2, where
συνείδησιςτῶνἁμαρτιῶν [“conscience of sins”] is simply the consciousness that my
sin is a certain fact of the past, as is made quite clear by the parallel
ἀνάμνησις [“remembrance”] of Heb 3:3. Similarly the ἀγαθὴσυνείδησις [“good
conscience”] of Act 23:1,[N] which is simply the consciousness of the
ἀγαθόνεἶναι [“being good”] of the past conversation. In this and similar
passages συνείδησις [“conscience”] defines the moral judgment concerning the
ethical position of a person, whether he is good or whether he is evil. On the
other hand, St. Paul attaches to συνείδησις [“conscience”] a more abstract
notion: it means the measure of moral discernment which is peculiar to any
man,—that is, the consciousness of what is good and evil, not the consciousness
of my being good or evil. So, for example, in Rom 2:15: the συνείδησις
[“conscience”] of the Gentiles is not the judgment or verdict which they
pronounce on their own conduct, but the moral consciousness, the moral
discernment which belonged to them, out of which that verdict sprang. For, not
until after the apostle had first ascribed to them generally such a theoretical
knowledge does he in the clause τῶν λογισμῶν κατηγορούντων ἢ καὶ ἀπολογουμένων
[“their thoughts alternately accusing or else defending them”] declare the
sentence which they themselves pronounce upon their own concrete actions in
virtue of that moral consciousness. So, too, in the first Epistle to the
Corinthians it is plain we are not to understand by the συνείδησιςτῶν
ἀσθενούντων [“those with a weak conscience” cf. 1Co 8:7,1Co 8:10], who would eat
no sacrificed flesh, that they considered this particular thing as sin; the
phrase indicates in general the weakness of their moral perception, which
allowed them to detect sin, as in other things so in this. To be brief,
συνείδησις [“conscience”] signifies first the abstract moral consciousness,
which is quite independent of my own moral conduct, which may be very strong
even in ethical wicked ness and very weak even in great moral earnestness; and,
secondly, the judgment which I pronounce on my own deport ment as the result of
this my moral discernment. It follows that, if we would make the word καρδία
[“heart”] in our passage strictly parallel with συνείδησις [“conscience”], we
must hang to the latter of the two meanings above, for the καταγινώσκειν[“to
condemn”] is certainly an actus forensis. But it is also made plain how little
the Johannaean ideas induce such a strict parallelization with those of St.
Paul. They do not entirely coincide or cover each other; hence we do well to
consider the καρδία [“heart”] as meant simply and generally of the inner man, in
which inner man St. John does not so rigorously as St. Paul distinguish between
the νοῦς [“mind”], the λογισμόι [“reasoning”], and theσυνείδησις
[“conscience”]. footnotes Homer Illiad, Book 1

100 τότε κέν μιν ἱλασσάμενοι πεπίθοιμεν

100 thus we might propitiate and persuade him.

Homer Illiad, Book 9

112ὥς κέν μιν ἀρεσσάμενοιπεπίθωμεν

112 thus we might propitiate and persuade him

Homer Illiad, Book 9

181πειρᾶν ὡςπεπίθοιενἀμύμονα Πηλεΐωνα.

181 how he attempts to persuade the noble son of Peleus

Homer Illiad, Book 9

386οὐδέ κεν ὧς ἔτι θυμὸν ἐμὸνπείσει᾽Ἀγαμέμνων

386 not even so shall Agamemnon any more persuade my soul


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  CHAPTER 51: 51 - 1JN 3:21-22
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1Jn 3:21-22

Ἀγαπητοὶ, ἐὰν ἡ καρδία ἡμῶν μὴ καταγινώσκῃ ἡμῶν, παῤῥησίαν ἔχομεν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν·
καὶ ὃ ἐὰν αἰτῶμεν, λαμβάνομεν παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ τηροῦμεν, καὶ τὰ
ἀρεστὰ ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ ποιοῦμεν.

After the apostle has thus illustrated the one presupposition that we are in
many ways conscious of sin, and has laid emphasis in connection with that upon
brotherly love as token of a life of faith at least germinal in us, he now
passes over to the second presupposition, ἐὰν ἡ καρδία ἡμῶν μὴ καταγινώσκῃ ἡμῶν
[“if our heart does not condemn us”]. He obviously regards this case to be
possible, as is plain not only from the conditional clause, itself, but also
from his proceeding at once to base upon it the most important practical
consequences. And in this he is found in accordance with St. Paul, who certainly
and unconditionally gives himself the testimony, οὐδὲνἐμαυτῷσύνοιδα [“I am
conscious of nothing against myself”] (1Co 4:4). It is indeed a noteworthy
psychological fact, that in the hours of the most vivid consciousness of sin all
former faith and love will seem to us no more than delusion; but, on the other
hand, it is also in hours of more than ordinary elevated faith that we regard
sin as under our feet. Of such hours as these last St. John here speaks. At such
hours the παῤῥησία [“boldness”] as towards God appears in force. What we
mentioned preliminarily in the explanation of the previous verse must again be
brought to remembrance, that the point of view under which in 1Jn 2:28 the
parrhesia is assumed is not regarded here: it is not the final judgment that is
now concerned. Accordingly, it is clear that the section began with 1Jn 2:28 has
not here reached its absolute, but only its relative end. That is to say, when
the apostle was speaking of the judgment, which we in a certain sense are
supposed to anticipate in ourselves after a preliminary and typical manner, the
first effect was the question, what results to us as to our condition here below
from a course of conduct thus or thus ordered: first, in the case of the
imperfect (1Jn 3:20), a consolation springing from the consciousness of God’s
nearness, at least affecting happily the present time (1Jn 3:2),—that is to say,
a feeling of elevation, the παῤῥησία [“boldness”]. The having our prayers heard
is exhibited as a result of this. It is clear from this, first, that the idea of
confident speaking is prominent to St. John in the παῤῥησία [“boldness”]; as
finally, before the Judge, so now before foe Father we have the consciousness of
artless and perfect simplicity and freedom. Even at the last judgment we may
conceive of a real παῤῥησία [“boldness”] as a joyous request: of such
supplication as that which Christ once preferred on leaving the world, νῦν
δόξασόν με σὺ πάτερ παρὰ σεαυτῷ [“now, you Father, glorify me with yourself” cf.
Joh 17:5]. The remembrance of this word is here all the more appropriate,
because not only shall we on that day ask to be transfigured into the glory of
Christ, as He asked to be transfigured into the glory of the Father, but He also
in the same way as we attained the παῤῥησία [“boldness”] of His
supplication,—that is, through the confirmation of His divine Sonship by the
work of perfected obedience (John 14:31), and of perfected love to man (John
13:1). That which was then the matter of Christ’s prayer offered ἐνπαῤῥησία
[“with boldness”], that which will be the matter of our prayer at the end of the
days, the δοξάζεσθαι [“to make glorious”], the full and absolute fellowship with
our Lord, will naturally in some degree be the matter of our prayer even here.

But, on the other hand, the expression ὃἐὰναἰτῶμεν [“whatever we may ask”]
points by its generality to a manifold supplication. Had St. John anything
definite in his eye? When we bethink ourselves that in the last discourses of
Christ to the disciples He reminded them of the confident prayer assured of its
answer, and that in two ways, first, when He exhorted them both before and after
to brotherly love (John 15:12-17); and, secondly, when He promised to them the
Paraclete (John 16:23 ff.), thus showing that He referred to prayer for perfect
brotherly love and perfect fellowship with the Father; moreover, that the
high-priestly prayer of Jesus Himself partly referred to His own glorification
and partly to that of his disciples; again, that in our Epistle, 1Jn 5:14, the
certain assurance of prayer is again mentioned in connection with intercession
for erring brethren,—remembering all this, we shall think it probable that in
this passage also the apostle had in his mind these two sorts of petition, for
the accomplishment of our own salvation and that of our brethren. Thus viewed,
our verse assumes a position of definite and necessary importance in the whole
section. To him that hath it shall be given: if you have once obtained this
parrhesia, you will by virtue of it urge ever renewed supplications for the
fulfilment of our salvation and the consummation of the kingdom of God, and so
urge them that you will always obtain what you ask. ποιεῖν τὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to
practice righteousness”], that is fellowship with God, and the ἀγάπη [“love”],
fellowship with the brethren, were the conditions of the παῤῥησία [“boldness”];
and this again leads to an increased and deeper possession of those two elements
of religious experience. The parrhesia and the answer of prayer are strictly
correlative ideas. For the former rests upon the knowledge of my fellowship with
God; the latter upon the fact that my will is one with the divine: essentially,
therefore, they have the same foundation. it becomes probable that the clause
with ὅτι [“that”], which gives the reason, will refer not only to the λαμβάνειν
ὃἐὰναἰτῶμεν [“to receive whatever we may ask”], but to the two co-ordinated
propositions of the former half of the verse. If we remember that τηρεῖν τὰς
ἐντολὰς τοῦ Θεοῦ [“to keep the commandments of God”] was a main idea of the
first part of the Epistle, and that ποιεῖν [“to practice”] is made prominent in
the second, but that the two parts are related as the internal to the external
presentation, then we have perceived the relation of the two clauses in our
verse.


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  CHAPTER 52: 52 - 1JN 3:23
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1Jn 3:23

Καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐντολὴ αὐτοῦ, ἵνα πιστεύσωμεν τῷ ὀνόματι τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦ
Χριστοῦ, καὶ ἀγαπῶμεν ἀλλήλους, καθὼς ἔδωκεν ἐντολὴν ἡμῖν. The commandments
which the apostle is discoursing of and commending are now exhibited by him
again with reference to their meaning and aim. Two things strike us on a
superficial glance: the precepts we must obey are described in their unity (the
singularἐντολή [“commandment”]),then being again described as twofold; and the
import of the second is specified by the wordπιστεύειν [“to believe”], which now
for the first time enters the Epistle. As to the former of these points, the two
commandments of faith and brotherly love are in the same sense one commandment,
as the two tables of the law are in the issue one table and one law: they
enforce simply and only this, I am the Lord thy God, walk before me and
bethouperfect. The other question is moredifficult,how it is that faith is here
so suddenly mentioned, coming inunintroducedby anything that precedes, and
without any bearing on anything that follows. Whenever Christ has been before
alluded to, the objective value of His work has been specified as anἱλασμός
[“atoning sacrifice”]securing the forgive ness of sins, without any reference to
the method of subjective appropriation; and whenever the subjective position of
man before God has been spoken of, the confirmation of it in act and deed has
alone been made prominent, without any side glance at the root and spring of
this action. Similarly in the fourth chapter the πιστεύειν [“to believe”]recedes
into the background in comparison of the ὁμολογεῖν [“confession”]: obviously for
the same reason again, because the Epistle has for its aim the confirmation and
consummation of the joy of faith by means of the active work of religion, the
external expressions of faith. It is not until the fifth chapter that the idea
ofπίστις[“faith”] begins to lead the development of the thought. All this makes
it more urgent to ask why theπιστεύειν [“to believe”] enters precisely in our
passage, where the wordἐντολή [“commandment”]itself points to a course of action
and not a state of being, while, on the other hand, it forms the conclusion of a
section that professedly treats of works and of works alone.

If we now look at the other ideas brought forward in these verses, it becomes
evident that they also are not the same with those which have ruled the contents
of the third chapter, but that they have reverted back again to the thoughts and
phraseology of the first two chapters. It has been already remarked that
τηρεῖντὰςἐντολὰς [“to keep the commandments”], 1Jn 3:22, has in the first part
of the second chapter its own distinctive position; and similarly, the
combination of the variousἐντολαὶΘεοῦ [“commandments of God”]into the unity of
one single commandment, just as we have it here, is observable in the same
earlier part of the second chapter. In1Jn 3:24 we find the reciprocal abiding of
God in us and our abiding also in God which was already present in the second
chapter; and not only so, its juxtaposition or co-ordination with
theτηρεῖντὰςἐντολὰςαὐτοῦ[“to keep his commandments”] is substantially to be
discerned in that chapter, though not expressed in precisely the same words. On
the other hand, any such emphasis on the works as we find pervading the whole of
the second chapter is altogether wanting in 1Jn 3:23-24. The first and second
chapters contain, as has been fully shown, an exhibition of fellowship with God
and the brethren as belonging to the internal character of Christians; and this
is met in the third chapter by a requirement of the outward confirmation of that
sentiment in act. From this it appears why at the close of this final exposition
the apostle falls back again into the tone of the first chapters. The former is
supposed to be only the superstructure upon the foundation of the latter. If I
approve my fellowship with God, then must I have it already; and on this having,
this internal characteristic of the Christian, rests here in conclusion the
apostle’s eye. By the works of love to God and man we discern that we keep the
commandment of God; but this commandment itself points first and directly, not
to the external demonstration of an internal character, but to that internal
character itself: not to show that we are, but to be. Thus, therefore, in the
requirement of theπιστεύειν [“to believe”]and theἀγαπᾶν [“to love”], the
internal state of the heart is made prominent, of which we all should be and
must be partakers. But all this has only served to vindicate the substance of
the πιστεύειν τῷ ὀνόματι Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ[“to believe in the name of Jesus Christ”]
as appropriate in this place; it is the ἐντολή [“commandment”]in its interior
spirit and tone; but the expression or phrase itself is not accounted for. Would
it not seem more obvious that the apostle should have used the phrase
περιπατεῖνἐνφωτί [“walk in the light”],or something like that? But we must
remember how emphatically the writer has in1Jn 3:2 ff.laid it down that the one
essential thing on earth as the indispensable earnest of eternal glory is the
following of Christ; that he has, further, from the beginning onwards shown that
the manifestation of Christ is the principle of our entire Christian new
life(μένεινἐντῷυἱῷ [“abide in the Son”],1Jn 2:3, 1Jn 2:6). Accordingly,
throughout the whole process of his discussion it must have been natural to the
apostle to lay emphasis upon fellowship with Christ in particular when meaning
fellowship with God. That His self-manifestation(ἐντῷὀνόματι [“in the name”])as
the Son of God (τοῦυἱοῦαὐτοῦ [“his Son”])and as the Saviour of the world
(ἸησοῦΧριστοῦ [“Jesus Christ”]) at the same time and especially, has passed into
our being and inmost consciousness as a fact determining our life(πιστεύσωμεν
[“we believe”]):that is the will of God on one side. And that this
self-revelation of Christ should determine us in the obedience of His
commandments(καθὼς ἔδωκεν ἐντολὴν ἡμῖν [“just as he gave us a commendment”])to
love the brethren(ἀγαπῶμεν ἀλλήλους [“we should love one another”]):that is the
will of God on another side. Thus is explained also theaorist πιστεύσωμεν [“we
believe”]:brotherly love presupposes faith, and this preterite form of the verb
serves to indicate that very presupposition. And this shows that in ἔδωκεν
ἐντολὴν [“he gave commendment”],at the close of the verse, Christ is the
subject, which is to be assumed also for other reasons, especially because the
addition, after the already preceding αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐντολὴ αὐτοῦ [“this is his
commandment”], would otherwise be perfectly pleonastic. Moreover, brotherly love
is throughout the Epistle exhibited by preference as the commandment of Christ;
and, further, His person is formally alluded to at the close, and that with a
specific emphasis on its two aspects, the divine and the human natures. Faith
also is defined as a commandment, though not of Christ but of the Father; and in
presence of the fact that precisely in St. John’s Gospel the awakening of such a
faith is represented as the final goal of the entire work of Christ among men,
we need not seek for specific passages that demand from man this faith. Yet
these are not entirely wanting. First, John 6:40 comes at once into
consideration: τοῦτ᾽ ἐστιν τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πέμψαντός με, ἵνα πᾶς ὁ πιστεύων εἰς
τὸν υἱὸν ἔχῃ ζωὴν αἰώνιον [“this is the will of the one who sent me, that
everyone who believes in the Son may have eternal life”]. For it is plain that
these words declare not only that in the divine will the believer shall have
eternal life, but also that faith is the commanded condition of this life, and
therefore equally and in the first instance the matter of the divine will. So
again in John 14:1: πιστεύετε εἰς τὸν Θεὸν, καὶ εἰς ἐμὲ πιστεύετε [“you beleive
in God, beleive also in me”], where faith in the Lord enters not as a second
requirement by the side of faith in God, but is introduced as the way to the
latter, and is really therefore the first requirement of all.


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  CHAPTER 53: 53 - 1JN 3:24A
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1Jn 3:24a

Καὶ ὁ τηρῶν τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ, ἐν αὐτῷ μένει, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν αὐτῷ. As generally
throughout the Epistle, so especially in the passage before us, 1Jn 3:22-24, the
apostle recurs again and again to the Lord’s last discourses. The fundamental
ideas are the same in both: the observance of the divine commands, specifically
those of faith and brotherly love; the answers to prayer; the abiding in God;
and, finally, if we include 1Jn 3:24b, the mission of the Holy Ghost. We may
compare, moreover, Joh 14:11, the requirement of the faith that God is in
Christ, corresponding here to faith in Him as the Son of God; and then as the
result of that faith, Joh 14:14-15, John 15:1-27, ὅ,τιἄναἰτήσητε τοῦτο ποιήσω
[“whatever you ask this I will do”], corresponding here to 1Jn 3:22, ὃ ἐὰν
αἰτῶμεν λαμβάνομεν [“whatever we ask we will receive”]. And again, Joh
14:15-16a, ἐὰν ἀγαπᾶτέ με, τὰς ἐντολὰς τὰς ἐμὰς τηρήσατε.καὶ ἐγὼ ἐρωτήσω τὸν
πατέρα, καὶ ἄλλον παράκλητον δώσει ὑμῖν [If you love me, you will keep my
commandments.I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Comforter],
corresponding here to 1Jn 3:24, the mention of the gift of the Spirit in
connection with the τηρεῖντὰςἐντολὰς [“to keep the commandments”]. And the
μένειν [“abide”], finally, is really the fundamental idea, as of the last
discourses of Jesus, so also of the Epistle before us. In Joh 14:16 the Spirit
is sent ἵνα μένῃ μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν [“that he may abide with you”] in John 15:1-27 the
μένειν ἐνἀμπέλῳ [“to abide in the vine”] is the centre of the whole parabolical
discourse; compare, in proof, Joh 15:4, μείνατε ἐν ἐμοὶ, κᾀγὼ ἐν ὑμῖν [“abide in
me and I also in you”]; Joh 15:7ἐὰν μείνητε ἐν ἐμοὶ, καὶ τὰ ῥήματά μου ἐν ὑμῖν
μείνῃ, ὃ ἐὰν θέλητε αἰτήσεσθε, κ.τ.λ. [“If you abide in me, and my words abide
in you, ask whatever you wish, etc.”]; Joh 15:10ἐὰν τὰς ἐντολάς μου τηρήσητε,
μενεῖτε ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ μου [“If you keep my commandments, you will abide in my
love”]. And as here, at the end of the section, the μένειν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν
ὑμῖν [“abide in him and he in you”] is made prominent, so it forms the
conclusion of the last discourses of our Lord, the theme of the second part of
the high-priestly prayer, that the relation between God and Christ, as it is
expressed in the words ἐγώ ἐνσοὶκαὶ σύ ἐν ἐμοί [“I in you and you in me”], is,
as it were, to be the pattern of our relation to God, and to find its reflection
in us. These simple citations testify abundantly that there and here the
thoughts in detail and as a whole correspond. For the furtherance of a definite
view of the spirit of the passage, we have yet to decide whether the pronouns
in1Jn 3:24 refer to the Father or to Christ. If, as we have established, the
last words of1Jn 3:23 have Christ for their subject, it seems obvious that in
this verse also He is the subject. But Christ had come into consideration in
what precedes only as the giver of one commandment, that of brotherly love; on
the other hand, at the beginning of1Jn 3:23 the Father was mentioned as the
proper νομοθέτης [“lawgiver”],and therefore theτηρεῖντὰςἐντολὰς [“to keep the
commandments”]may well refer to the latter; and it is in favour of this that
in1Jn 4:13, where a part of our verse is repeated almost literally, the pronouns
decidedly must, according to the connection, point to the Father, while
certainly the Son, on the other hand, is often in the second chapter the subject
of theμένειν [“abide”],as He almost always is in the Gospel. InJohn 15:1-27this
is absolutely the case; compare Joh 15:4,μείνατε ἐν ἐμοὶ [“abide in me”],and the
often-repeatedμείνατε ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ μου [“you will abide in my love”]. InJohn
17:1-26,it is true, it begins to be common to the Father and the Son,Joh
17:21,ἵνααὐτοὶἐνἡμῖνὦσι [“that they may be in you”]; but afterwards, in Joh
17:23, the Son alone comes forward as the subject: ἐγὼ ἐν αὐτοῖς, καὶ σὺ ἐν ἐμοὶ
[“I in them, and you in me”].

Thus we have once more reached the end of a division. The thesis with which the
apostle set out in 1Jn 2:28 ff. was, that our abiding in God, or, more
definitely, our sonship to God, must be made manifest in works in order that we
may be capable of confidence at the day of judgment. Has this thesis been now
actually demonstrated? It has been shown that the idea of the εἶναι ἐκτοῦΘεοῦ
[“to be of God”], as well as the requirements of the judgment day, must lead to
most scrupulous and complete works of righteousness, to full and perfect deeds
of love; and thus that everyone who would profess to be of God must exhibit
these deeds. But the converse has not been established, though this is quite
necessary, namely, that he who doeth these works is necessarily a child of God.
It might, indeed, be thought that there could be such a practice of
righteousness without the divine sonship; this latter having been rightly
defined as not a mere ethical deportment of man, but as a substantial change in
his nature preceding and laying the foundation or that deportment. If I am
therefore to enjoy the full parrhesia at the final bar, I must have exhibited
not merely a thus and thus well-ordered deportment, but must have the assurance
that this deportment could be the result only of a divine sonship or
regeneration; and thus the one must help the assurance of the other. And this
demonstration, that the ποιεῖν τὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”] is
not only necessary, but also the certain evidence of the γεγεννήσθαιἐκτοῦΘεοῦ
[“having been born of God”], it was the apostle’s purpose to establish; for
otherwise he would, in 1Jn 2:29, have been obliged to write
πάςὁγεγεννημένοςἐκτοῦΘεοῦ ποιεῖτὴνδικαιοσύνην [“everyone who has been born of
God practices righteousness”], but not πάς ὁποιῶντὴνδικαιοσύνην,
ἐξαὐτοῦγεγένηται [“everyone who practices righteousness is born of him”]. It is
plain from what has been said that the thesis of 1Jn 2:28 ff. has not been fully
established, but only in its first principle; we yet want the argument that the
ποιεῖν τὴνδικαιοσύνην, ἀγαπᾶν τοὺςἀδελφούς [“to practice righteousness, is to
love the brothers”], which have been seen in chapter 3 to be so necessary, are
also a certain testimony of regeneration from above. The close of the section
now ended points in a preliminary and preparatory way to this internal change of
sentiment, of which the works give certain testimony; for, instead of
expressions which describe the external conduct, it chooses simply those, as we
have seen, which refer to the inner mind. That we, in the consciousness of
upright walking before God (ποιεῖν τὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”])
and before the brethren (ἀγαπᾶν [“to love”]), attain to confidence, and the more
perfect that consciousness is to all the more perfect confidence, has been
already shown; but how far and in what sense this our conduct lays the
foundation of confidence, how far it is the absolutely sure evidence of
fellowship with God, has yet to be shown. When the apostle enters upon this
question, and gives us to know (γνώσκειν [“to know”]) that we in this way are
united with God, he furnishes the complement of the third chapter. The new
section, whose theme is contained in 1Jn 3:24b, will be, so far as we can now
perceive, co-ordinated with the third chapter, but only as subordinate to the
theme announced in 1Jn 2:28 ff.

1Jn 3:24b

Καὶ ἐν τούτῳ γινώσκομεν ὅτι μένει ἐν ἡμῖν, ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος οὗ ἡμῖν ἔδωκεν. The
contents of the new section are preliminarily determined by two points in1Jn
3:24, the mention of theπνεῦμα [“Spirit”],at the close, and
theγινώσκετεὅτιμένειἐνἡμῖν [“you know that he abides in us”]. This latter must
be compared at once with the beginning of the second main division,1Jn 2:28,
where we read,καὶ νῦν τεκνία μένετε ἐν αὐτῷ [“and now, little children, abide in
him”],thus the precise converse of our present passage. This is of importance
for the whole matter of the section. For we have already become persuaded that
these two phrases are not identical, but that theμένεινἐνΘεῷ[“abide in
God”]makes prominent the human relation in the Christian estate, and theμένειν
Θεόνἐνἡμῖν [“God abide in you”] the divine. Now, at the close of 1Jn 2:1-29 it
was strictly in keeping that we should hear the exhortation to abide in God, for
there the apostle’s aim was to show that it was our duty to approve our
fellowship with God by works; therefore the question was of the human relation.
But our new section begins with God’s abiding in us, because the apostle is
about to point to the fact that our works make it evident that we are born of
God,—that is, that God had begun and was carrying on His work within us. Thus
the very expression leads us at once to the subject which our study of the
previous train of thought in the Epistle gave us reason to expect in the new
section. The second element is the mention of theπνεῦμα [“Spirit”]. That this
will be a leading idea in the new part is shown by this, that in1Jn 3:13, at the
close, namely, of the development here beginning, the clause is repeated: it
must therefore have been reckoned by the writer as containing its substance. And
this is all the more striking as the ideaπνεῦμα [“Spirit”],not failing, indeed,
in the detailed discussion, is nevertheless only found at the beginning of it,
and afterwards altogether retreats from view.

Let us, in order to harmonize these facts, take a preliminary glance at the
sequel. It is obvious at once that the two main themes which we have hitherto
found in each section of the Epistle recur here also: 1Jn 3:1-6 treat of our
relation to the Lord ; 1Jn 3:7-12, of our relation to the brethren; 1Jn 3:13-16
then give us a supplementary summary from one point of view, or, more strictly
speaking, the essence of the two discussions. It is of the nature of such a
resumé that the thoughts which are summed up should he reduced to the briefest
expression; in it, therefore, we shall be able most easily to perceive the
substance of the two preceding sections. The former is comprehended in this,
that God has sent His Son, and the confession of this divine act guarantees
fellowship with God; the second is comprehended in this, that God is love, and
he who hath this love must, again, have fellowship with God. Thus fellowship
with God and consciousness of it—for our verse shows that the
γινώσκεινὅτιμένειἐνἡμῖν [“to know that he abides in us”] is the apostle’s
point—rests upon the acknowledgment and appropriation of a divine act and of the
divine nature of love. But where the acknowledgment of the divine act in the
incarnation of Christ exists, there, as 1Jn 3:16 show, must the Holy Ghost have
wrought it; similarly, where love to the brethren exists, there, according to
1Jn 3:7-12, it must have resulted from the love of God, and thus again have been
produced by the same Holy Spirit. Accordingly, the argument of the apostle is
generally this: where there is a true confession of the incarnate Son of God, it
is the effect of the operation of the Holy Spirit; where love exists, it is the
outflowing of a divine love imparted first, and consequently is wrought of God:
he, therefore, who is the subject of this confession and this love is in
fellowship with God, and hath the Holy Ghost, who is the sole agent of all the
operations of God in man. This, therefore, perfectly establishes the thesis laid
down in 1Jn 2:28 ff. According to 1Jn 3:3, the apostle requires that our ποιεῖν
τὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”] should spring from the example of
Christ the incarnate (1Jn 3:5, φανερωθῇ [“may be made known”]), and now exalted
(1Jn 3:2), Son of God. But where the true acknowledgment of the Son of God
exists, it must be of the operation of the Holy Spirit (1Jn 4:1-6); if,
therefore, in this confession, and urged by it, we practise righteousness, we
have in ourselves the evidence that we are in God, and God in us. Similarly,
brotherly love shows, inasmuch as it can be only the expression of a
divinely-wrought love (1Jn 4:7-12) if it demonstrates its reality by works (1Jn
3:11-18), that we are of God. 1Jn 3:1-24 and 1Jn 4:1-21 thus together contain,
in fact, the effectual demonstration of 1Jn 2:28-29. Their relation to each
other is also, as we have already seen, this: that 1Jn 3:1-24 shows the
necessity of deeds, 1Jn 4:1-21 the security of the confident argument based upon
them. The exposition of the details will abundantly confirm all this.


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  CHAPTER 54: 54 - 1JN 4:1
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1Jn 4:1

Ἀγαπητοὶ, μὴ παντὶ πνεύματι πιστεύετε, ἀλλὰ δοκιμάζετε τὰ πνεύματα, εἰ ἐκ τοῦ
Θεοῦ ἐστιν· ὅτι πολλοὶ ψευδοπροφῆται ἐξεληλύθασιν εἰς τὸν κόσμον. The first six
verses of the fourth chapter give evidence of the conclusion that the confession
of the incarnate Son of God is the assurance of the energy of the Holy Ghost
within us. This demonstration is so conducted as to set over against the Holy
Spirit, who testifies of Christ and for Christ, the spirit of the world and of
Antichrist, which not only opposes this witness, hut diffuses the opposite lie.
Thus it is an argumente contrario. The exhortation of the first verse is thus
not the main thing to the apostle; but the emphasis lies on1Jn 4:2b: πᾶν πνεῦμα
ὃ ὁμολογεῖ κ.τ.λ.,ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστι [“every spirit that confesses, etc., is from
God”]. The Holy Spirit, indeed, is the sure token of divinesonship,but there are
many spirits; hence a test is necessary, a standard must be found, to
distinguish the divine Spirit from lying spirits. Now assuredly there are only
twoπνεύματα [“spirits”],that of God and that of the darkness; but since each of
these assumes a different character in individual men, there must be as great a
variety of spirits as there is of individuals, while yet they fall into two
classes, according as they bear the signature in themselves of the divine or the
anti-Christian spirit. Now the necessity of such a testing the apostle grounds
on this (ὅτι [“that”]), that lying spirits are not only possible, but also in
great numbers actually emerge. Theψευδοπροφῆται [“false prophets”],are not here
alone, but everywhere in the New Testament, wherever they are spoken of,
connected most intimately with the Antichrist; and as the token of this here and
everywhere, there is only one thing adduced, that is, thedenial of the mission
of Christ. In Mat 24:24 and the parallels theψευδόχριστοι[“false Christs”] are
named together with the false prophets; the former are falseChrists,and the
latter bear testimony to them as if they were trueChrists.In Acts 13:6,Bar-jesus
announces himself as a false prophet, in that he opposes the preaching of St.
Paul concerning Christ. In 2Pe 2:2 we have the sign of false prophets, that they
τὸν ἀγοράσαντα αὐτοὺς δεσπότην ἀρνούμενοι [“the ones denying the Master who
bought them”];and in the Apocalypse it is the false prophet who seduces men to
the beast,—that is, to apostasy from Christ. Thus there is literally everywhere
the connection withanti-Christianity.

Yet it is not to be overlooked that the name false prophet is more comprehensive
in St. John than in theSynoptists. For as he understands by theἀντίχριστος [“the
antichrist”] something more general than they understand by their
ψευδόχριστος[“false Christ”],—that is, not only those who give themselves out
for Christ, but all who are opposed to Him, who belong to the host of the
arch-Antichrist,—so also the false prophets are in his estimation not only those
who bear testimony to a false Christ, but all who do not give due honour to the
true One. Thus it comes to pass that in the Synoptists the false prophets are
only servants and helpers of the Antichrist; in St. John they appear as
antichrists themselves. Further, it is not accidental that hereψευδοπροφήται
[“false prophets”],is used, and not ψευδοδιδάσκαλοι [“false teachers”]In the
former word, to wit, prominence is given to their dependence on a higher spirit
working in the souls of men; but this token is wanting in the latter word. Since
in our passage the question is of that very higher principle energizing in men’s
souls, the former word, and not the latter, is appropriate. And these prophets
of the lie εἰς τὸν κόσμον ἐξεληλύθασιν[“have gone out into the world”].The words
may bear two interpretations: either we may take theἐξεληλύθασιν[“have gone
out”] here in the same sense asἐξἡμῶνἐξῆλθον [“went out from us”]in1Jn 2:19, of
the origination of the false teachers in the bosom of the congregation, in which
case κόσμος [“world”] is the world as the enemy of the church; or we may
understand the ἐξεληλυθέναι [“those who went out”],quite generally
asprodire,without referring the ἐξ[“out of”] to the bosom of the church, and
then κόσμος [“world”] is the world in its widest meaning, as the scene of their
activity. This latter is recommended, not only by the circumstance that the
ἐξἡμῶν [“from us”] of 1Jn 2:19 is wanting here, and that without any hint that
could supplement it in the connection, but also by some more urgent reasons. For
the clause containing the statement that many false teachers had gone out from
the congregation into the world, and given in their adhesion to the kingdom of
darkness, is by no means a foundation for the requirement δοκιμάζειντὰ πνεύματα,
εἰ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστιν [“to test the spirits, whether they are from God”]. Such
spirits would not have needed to be tested; they had become manifest by their
very severance from the church. If it was a plain and palpable fact, and this is
presupposed by the ὅτι [“that”] which assigns a reason, that they had gone out
into the ungodly κόσμος [“world”], then in this fact there could be no
inducement to the δοκιμάζειν [“to test”] for itself was the accomplishment of
the δοκιμασία [“test”]. Therefore we take the κόσμος [“world”] in the wider
meaning of the scene of the activity of those liars, and the ἐξέρχεσθαι
[“departure”] as their appearing. That, in fact, they had gone from the midst of
the Christian community is not indeed denied, it is simply not asserted here;
that it was so is to be assumed from the fact that the false prophets of this
passage must be identified with the antichrists of the second chapter (compare
especially, 1Jn 4:3). If we must find an express allusion in the ἐξέρχεσθαι
[“departure”], we must think of the kingdom of darkness generally from which
they sprang, and into which they in due time will be thrust out as being their
ἴδιοςτόπος [“own place”]. This trying of the spirits, which the presence of the
lying prophets thus alluded to so urgently required, must all Christians
discharge; for the exhortation is addressed to the entire community. Indeed,
there was, according to 1Co 12:10, a proper χαρίσματῆςδιακρίσεωςπνευμάτων [“gift
of discerning of spirits”], which was related to the charism of the prophets as
the ἑρμηνεία [“interpretation”] was related to the γλώσσαιςλαλεῖν [“speak in
tongues”] but as every charism was potentially the property of every Christian,
the apostle might well enforce, nevertheless, this testing duty upon all. In the
very presupposition that all had the Holy Spirit, lay the possibility that every
one might detect the spirit opposed.


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  CHAPTER 55: 55 - 1JN 4:2
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1Jn 4:2

Ἐν τούτῳ γινώσκετε τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ Θεοῦ· πᾶν πνεῦμα ὃ ὁμολογεῖ Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἐν
σαρκὶ ἐληλυθότα ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστι.

St. John mentions and commends the standard of judgment in 1Jn 4:2: we must take
γινώσκετε [“you know”] in the imperative sense; that elsewhere the indicative
γινώσκομεν [“we know”] so often occurs, cannot affect the application of the
second person These few words must be all the more carefully studied, because
their meaning is so important: the decision concerning others, yea, the decision
concerning my own relation to God. An ὁμολογεῖν [“confession”] is demanded: the
question is not here of πίστις[“faith”], for that is an act of my inmost and
most secret life; visible to no other, often un known to myself while often I am
conscious of it, it cannot be a standard or mark for judgment upon others. It is
something that must show itself, and be confirmed, and that in act (chapter 3);
but the act must be judged by its motive and spring, and this judgment is
measured by the confession that I make concerning my motive. But thus it is not
the confession of itself which is laid down as a standard, as if it were opposed
to the fear of confession; the emphasis rests upon the matter of the confession
or its object. In general, it is made plain by a comparison of 1Jn 4:3, where
the right readingtn comprehends the full contents of the confession in the one
word Ἰησοῦν [“Jesus”], that the question here is of the historical person of
Jesus of Nazareth. But in what sense, we must again more closely ask, is this to
be the matter of my confession? What concerning it am I to confess? Here, first
of all, the words must be grammatically arranged in their due order. Much
depends on the grammatical place of the word Χριστὸν [“Christ”]. Is it to be
immediately combined with Ἰησοῦν [“Jesus”], so that Jesus Christ is the
definition of the person concerning whom something—that is, the
ἐληλυθέναιταἐνσαρκὶ [“has come in the flesh”]—is to be confessed? or is it to
stand as an attributive, so that I am to confess Jesus as the Christ, and that
He appeared as such in the flesh? In the former case, the apostle presupposes
that Jesus is the Christ; and his requirement is only this, that I avow this
Jesus Christ to have become incarnate; in the other case, the presupposition is
that there must be a confession concerning Jesus, and the requirement is that I
avow concerning Him Messiahship and incarnation. The question is not an
irrelevant one, nor one of mere logomachy. If we take the former view, we
suppose that the confession demanded was in opposition to Docetism, which
acknowledged Jesus as the Christ, as sent of God, as the ἄνωθενέρχόμενον [“the
one who came from above”], but not as real man, who had become flesh; if we take
the latter view, we suppose it demanded in opposition to Ebionism, which would
not acknowledge Jesus as the incarnate Christ, but denied His higher nature. For
it is quite certain that Χριστός [“Christ”] here does not define Jesus as the
promised Messiah of the Jews, but expresses His higher and divine nature. It is
true that the former is the meaning in all those passages of the Gospels where
by Jews, or in opposition to Jews, Jesus is described as the Christ. But
wherever ἸησοῦςΧριστός [“Jesus Christ”] is used as a proper name, the former
word expresses His human nature, the latter His divine; and in a series of
places Χριστός [“Christ”] simply is interchangeable with υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ [“Son of
God”]. Thus it is in Joh 1:18,[N] where the words ὁμονογενὴςθεὸςκ.τ.λ. [“the
only-begotten God”] define the meaning of the Χριστός [“Christ”]; thus it is in
Joh 3:28, for the subsequent words in Joh 3:31, ὁ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἐρχόμενος [“the
one who comes from heaven”], define the substance of the name. In our Epistle we
must hold fast this significance in every passage where Χριστός [“Christ”]
occurs: in 1Jn 1:5 it is clear from the added clause that Jesus Christ is
introduced as the Son of God; in 1Jn 2:22 the denial of Jesus as the Christ is
more closely defined by the words of 1Jn 2:23, ὁ ἀρνούμενος τὸν υἱὸν [“the one
who denies the Son”]; the close of the ninth verse of the second Epistle
confirms this meaning of the name. And finally, as it concerns our present
passage, it may be most absolutely proved that Christ is interchange able with
Son of God. First, the sum of Christian doctrine which the apostle here lays
down is identical with that which he utters in Joh 1:14, ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο
[“the word became flesh”], and therefore the Χριστός [“Christ”] here
corresponds to the idea of λόγος [“word”] there. Secondly, in the resumé of our
section in 1Jn 4:14 the apostle sums up what he here says thus, that God sent
His Son as Saviour into the world: thus the Χριστός [“Christ”] here is
equivalent to υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ [“Son of God”] there; just as similarly in 1Jn 4:15
he demands the confession that Jesus is the Son of God.

After having established the full significance of the word Christ, let us turn
back to the original question: does the apostle demand the confession that the
Son of God, who is acknowledged Jesus by the supposition, became flesh and a
true man; or does he demand that the man Jesus be acknowledged as the Son of
God? In other words: Is the divinity of Jesus the thing acknowledged, the
humanity in its full meaning the thing doubted,—that is to say, the thing
denied; or is it precisely the converse of this? Finally, in the grammatical
terminis, does Χριστός [“Christ”] belong to the subject or to the predicate? In
favour of the former, it may be urged that the combination ἸησοῦςΧριστός
[“Jesus Christ”] is so common, that if the apostle had meant to divide them, he
must have shown his intention by his specific arrangement; and this he might
easily have done by simply putting the Ἰησοῦν [“Jesus”] before the ὁμολογεῖν
[“confession”]. Not the less on that account must we decide for the separation
of the Χριστόν [“Christ”] from the Ἰησοῦν [“Jesus”]. For the recapitulation in
1Jn 4:14, and especially that of 1Jn 4:15, shows that the matter of primary
importance to the apostle here was the recognition of Jesus as the Son of God:
he sums up the confession introduced before to this effect, that
Ἰησοῦςἐστινὁυἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ [“Jesus is the Son of God”]. Now if, as we have
seen, Χριστός [“Christ”] here is equivalent with υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ [“Son of God”]
there, it cannot belong to the subject, but must be separated as the predicate
of the confession demanded. Thus the question which should serve for the
δοκιμασίαπνευμάτων [“testing of spirits”] was the old one: What think ye of
Jesus? The right answer to the question was the common confession of the church
concerning His divine human person as the God-man; but this introduced in such a
way that the emphasis rests upon the divinity, while the humanity is here, as
everywhere else in the New Testament, simply taken for granted or not open to
any suspicion. In making the divinity prominent, the apostle does not say that
Christ became flesh, but that He came into the flesh. Concerning His birth as
the physical entrance into the world, St. John neither here nor anywhere else
uses ἔρχεσθαιεἰςτὸνκόσμον [“to come into the world”] and the like; it is always
rather with him the coming as the result of a higher divine causality. All the
three Johannaean documents agree in representing the coming of Jesus as
essentially a coming from heaven. Ἦν τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινόν [“the true light was
coming” cf. Joh 1:9] is the announcement of the gospel, coming, that is, from
the Father into the world; the Saviour promises to His disciples His own coming
from the Father, to whom He returns as the Paraclete; the entire Apocalypse
revolves around the ναὶἔρχουκύριεἸησοῦ [“yes, come Lord Jesus” cf. Rev 22:20],
His final coming from heaven. Accordingly, it is not the intention of the
apostle to aver here primarily that the Son of God became truly man,—that
follows only from the words used,—but by the ἔρχεσθαι [“to come”] to indicate
plainly that the man Jesus was nevertheless the Son of God, that He came into
this humanity from heaven, and therefore entered it as the eternal Logos.

We are then to regard Christ in our thoughts as ἐνσαρκὶἐληλυθότα [“the one who
has come in the flesh”]. The phrase expresses something different from εἰςσάρκα
[“in the flesh”], and something more than εἰςτὸνκόσμον [“into the world”].
Something different from εἰςσάρκα [“in the flesh”], for this would mean only
that He descended into the sphere of the σάρξ [“flesh”], of humanity as infected
by sin and guilt, without expressing in what sense He personally became σάρξ
[“flesh”]. Something higher than εἰςτὸνκόσμον [“into the world”]; for we have
already seen on 1Jn 2:16 that κόσμος [“world”] is a much more comprehensive
idea than σάρξ [“flesh”]: all potencies opposed to God which are found in the
κόσμος [“world”] are condensed in the σάρξ [“flesh”], in human nature sold
under sin, as in a focus. Σάρξ [“flesh”] means human nature not in itself, nor
as exclusively in its corporeal relation, but that human nature as having sin
lodged in it. Sin does not originate indeed in the σῶμα [“flesh”] of man; but
all that man is and does makes for itself an organ in the body, makes indeed the
body its organ. Not only does the body of man participate in the dissolution of
the human constitution which entered as the effect of sin, sickness, suffering,
and death itself included, but every sinful psychical impulse conditions or
determines man’s bodily nature, inasmuch as, in consequence of sinful impulses,
the body is adapted to the service of sin, and unfitted for the service of
righteousness. Thus, while we cannot indeed say that the flesh, that is, the
body infected with sin, is itself sin, for sin can be predicated only of that
which is psychical or spiritual, it is nevertheless pervaded through and through
by the results of sin. As nature cannot be evil, though no longer by any means
responding to the original design of the Creator, not being any longer the
representative and organ of pure, divine thoughts, so also is it with the body
of man. And this corporeity thus perverted is the σάρξ [“flesh”] in which Christ
must appear if He would and should approve Himself the σωτῆρα τοῦ κόσμου
[“Saviour of the world”] (1Jn 4:14). He must thus be manifested in it as the
Reconciler or Atonement, thus also as the Redeemer. As the former, for in taking
upon Himself the σάρξ [“flesh”], He bore all the consequences of sin; not even
His body was the adequate and homogeneous organ of His spirit, as St. Paul
declares in the averment of His ἀσθένεια [“weakness”] (2Co 13:3); He tasted
thoroughly the sorrow which sin has poured out upon the whole human estate and
life. But by this very fact He has redeemed us from the σάρξ [“flesh”]; for in
that He, by virtue of the power of the Spirit indwelling in Him, gradually
overcame, blessed and glorified the σάρξ [“flesh”], that is, the corporeity
deteriorated and bound by sin, it has become a σῶματῆςδόξης [“glorious body”],
or σῶμαπνευματικόν [“spiritual body”], that is to say, a body which is the
absolutely perfect organ of the spirit; and thereby He has opened the way for us
also on our part to undergo this process of glorification with our σάρξ
[“flesh”].

Now he who confesses to this Son of God, who was manifested in the flesh, gives
witness that he has the πνεῦματῆςἀληθείας [“Spirit of truth”], for no man can
call Jesus Lord but by His Holy Spirit; thus also, in his case, the ποιεῖν
τὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”] is the glorifying process upon the
flesh wrought through Christ’s Spirit, and after His pattern. His works are
therefore the full pledge of His divine sonship, which fact the apostle aims
here to corroborate with force this section concurs with the former to make one
whole. And the confession here demanded is not alone an unconditional token of
my estate of grace; for, while it does indeed prove that the Holy Spirit is
operating within me, it does not prove that my whole personal life is brought
under His power; again, the testimony of works demanded in 1Jn 3:1-24 is then
only efficient when it is certain that these works have the right principle as
their source, that is, the Holy Ghost. Both these elements taken together,
however, establish an unassailable security.

Textual note tnτὸν Ἰησοῦν A B Ψ 33 81 206 322 323 429 436 630 945 1067 1241 1409
1505 1611 1739 2138 2200 2298 2344 2495 itq,z vg copbo (eth) Ir1739mg Cl1739mg
NA‖ Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν K 056 0142 5 6 18 82 175 181 221 330c 424 442 450 454 457 459
469 623 627 629c 920 1127 1243 1292 1735 1852 1862 1891 2080 2127 2492 2805 2818
HF RP ‖ τὸν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν L 049 1 61 88 104 326 451 456 468 1175 1845 1875 Lect
TR ‖ τὸν Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν 93 307 614 1678 1837 2147 2412 ‖ τον Χριστον 1846 ‖
Ἰησοῦν Κύριον א ‖ τὸν υἱόν 2541


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  CHAPTER 56: 56 - 1JN 4:3
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1Jn 4:3

Καὶ πᾶν πνεῦμα ὃ μὴ ὁμολογεῖ τὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν· καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν
τὸ τοῦ ἀντιχρίστου, ὃ ἀκηκόατε ὅτι ἔρχεται, καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἐστὶν ἤδη.

Over against this trueπνεῦμα[“Spirit”] the apostle now introduces the false one:
to the Spirit of Christ is opposed that of antichrist. But we have first to
establish thegenuine reading. It is generally admitted that the object denied is
defined as simplyτὸνἸησοῦν [“Jesus”], and that the Χριστὸνἐνσαρκὶ ἐληλυθότα
[“Christ has come in the flesh”]of theTextus Receptusis an addition. If, now,
the right reading is πᾶν πνεῦμα ὃμὴὁμολογεῖτὸνἸησοῦν [“every spirit that does
not confesses Jesus”], this must be so explained as to show that the apostle
connects with the name Jesus the whole matter that he had announced in the
previousverse. And, in fact, a confession of Jesus is impossible without the
full substance of that: if I do not hold Him to be the Son of God, I may speak
of Him and know, but I have then nothing to confess. To confess to aMANis a
thing without meaning: it is nothing. But it is to me doubtful whether the
reading given above is the genuine one. The old reading,πᾶν πνεῦμα
ὃλύειτὸνἸησοῦν [“every spirit that dissolves Jesus”], appears to me to have more
value than is mostly conceded to it. That it was quoted by Socrates as an
ancient one is indeed unquestionable. The words referred to are these:
[Nestorius]ἠγνόησεν ὅτι ἐν τῇ καθολικῇ Ἰωάννου ἐγέγραπτο ἐν τοῖς παλαιοῖς
ἀντιγράφοις, ὅτι πᾶν πνεῦμα ὃ λύει τὸν Ἰησοῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν. Ταύτην γὰρ
τὴν διάνοιαν ἐκ τῶν παλαιῶν ἀντιγράφων περιεῖλον οἱ χωρίζειν ἀπὸ τοῦ τῆς
οἰκονομίας ἀνθρώπον βουλόμενοι τὴν θεότητα κ.τ.λ.[“Nestoriusdid not know that in
the Catholic Epistle of John it was written in the ancient copies,‘every spirit
thatdissolves Jesus, is not from God.’For to remove this understanding from the
ancient copies is attributed to those wishing todissolvethe humanity from the
divinity, etc.”] (Hist. Eccles. vii. 32).tn Düsterdieck supposes that it does
not follow from these words that theverse so ran, as Nestorius quotedthem; he
thinks that the phraseπεριεῖλοντὴνδιάνοιαν[“remove the understanding”] shows
rather that he was only giving the sense of the text. But in this he is wrong.
We cannot see what endthe mention of theπαλαιὰἀντίγραφα[LSJ][“ancient copies”]
would serve if there was not in them something different from what the
Nestorians read in these texts. If the heretics only by exegetical manipulation
made themeaningof the passage favourable to their views, nothing was to be
gained by a reference to the old manuscripts, and the
wordδιάνοια[“understanding”] thus receives its rights. While the heretics
changed the words,they did also in the judgment of Socrates change the sense of
them. It cannot therefore be denied that we have the testimony of Socrates
thatὃλύει [“which dissolve”], was the original reading. For the rest, indeed,the
words are not to be pressed; in spite of the repeatedτὰπαλαιὰἀντίγραφα[LSJ][“the
ancient copies”], we may not believe that all the manuscripts were collated by
Socrates and found to give evidence of his reading. Further, it is to be
observed that in the time of this Father even the manuscriptλύει[“to dissolve”]
was no longer common, since, opposing Nestorius, he in a certain sense
introduces the old reading as a novelty:ἠγνόησεν [“to be ignorant”]. In itself,
therefore, the testimony of Socrates to a reading no longer found in any
manuscript would have no great weight; but we have other witnesses. Among these
we reckon Tertullian first. It is true that his citation inDe carne
Christi,Chapter 24. (“certe qui negat Christum in carne venisse, hie
antichristus est” [“he who denies thatChristhas come in the flesh, he is
antichrist”]), seems on the first glance to support theTextus Receptus. But it
is so only in appearance; for we have not here an exact quotation of our verse,
but a blending of it with part of the preceding; the idea of thein carne venire
[“come in the flesh”] was the chief thing with Tertullian, and must therefore be
made prominent whether his copy readμὴὁμολογεῖ [“does not confess”] orλύει[“he
dissolves”]. This passage, therefore, is decisive on neither side. But it is
otherwise with the citation,adv. Marcion.5.16. Tertullian agitates the question
as to whom St. Paul meant in2Th 2:3-4, and answers: “secundum nos quidem anti
christus . . . ut docet Joannes apostolus, qui jam antichristos dicit
processisse in mundum praecursores antichristi spiritus, negantes Christum in
carne venisse et solventes Jesum, scilicet in Deo creatore” [“According to our
view, he is Antichrist . . . and especially by the Apostle John, who says that
already many false prophets are gone out into the world, the fore-runners of
Antichrist, who deny that Christ has come in the flesh, and do not acknowledge
Jesus, meaning in God the Creator”]. In these words he gives an extract from the
first three verses of our chapter: the processisse in mundum [“gone out into the
world”] refers to the first verse; the in carne venisse [“has come in the
flesh”] to the second; the solventes [“acknowledge”] to the third. As the second
verse specifies as a sign of the reception of the Holy Ghost, the
ὁμολογεῖνἸησοῦνΧριστὸνἐνσαρκὶ ἐληλυθότα [“to confess Jesus Christ has come in
the flesh”], he simply inverts this; the Antichrist denies that fact and
confession. So, too, the change of Christ in the second, of Jesus in the third
member, points to the fact that the former was to be the second, and the latter
the third verse. Tertullian, therefore, had not, as some suppose, the true
readings of the third verse before his eyes; but only the one, ὃλύει [“that
which dissolves”], and what precedes was derived from the second verse. Nor is
the solventes Jesum [“acknowledge Jesus”] to be regarded as a gloss or addition
of Tertullian, for the construction of the sentence, dicit processisse negantes
et solventes [“those who proceed to deny and not acknowledge”], manifestly
indicates that the latter words also belong to his citation: it is only in the
following scilicet that the gloss of the expositor enters. If we add to all this
the quotation from adv. Psych, 1, “quod Jesum Christum solvant” [“acknowledge
Jesus Christ”], and further, that Irenaeus, somewhat earlier than Tertullian,
has the same reading (adv. Haer. 3.18), we shall find it impossible to doubt the
existence of this reading. It will hardly be thought necessary to go further,
and examine the testimonies of Leo and Augustine, the latter of whom does not
certainly unite the two readings, as is thought, when he says, solvit Jesum et
negat in carne venisse [“deny and do not confess that Jesus has come in the
flesh”]: rather does he mark the meaning of the obscure and difficult solvere by
adding the clause derived from the previous verse, which alone makes it
intelligible. If in this citation of Augustine the solvere did not rest upon a
reading in the text, but was inserted merely as an interpretation, it would have
been more appropriately inserted, not before the negare [“deny”], but after it.
Against the genuineness of this reading as the original one its early existence
cannot be contended against after what has been said we have the fact of that
earliest citation of our Epistle and of this passage of it in Polycarp, Phm 1:7
: Πᾶς γὰρ ὃς ἂν μὴ ὁμολογῇ Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἐν σαρκὶ ἐληλυθέναι, ἀντιχριστός
ἐστιν· [“For every onewho shall not confess that Jesus Christ is come in the
flesh, is antichrist”]. When we weigh this narrowly, however, we find that even
this citation says nothing against the existence of the ὃλύει [“that dissolve”]:
were it not so, it would be of great significance against the reading, for
Polycarp certainly was older than the παλαιὰἀντίγραφα[LSJ][“ancient copies”] of
Socrates. We have, in fact, here no actual literal citation, but a paraphrastic
interpretation of the passage: there is hardly a word of the third verse which
is distinctly reproduced in the passage of Polycarp. The reason was the same
which actuated Augustine and the others: the expression λύειν τὸνἸησοῦν [“to
dissolve Jesus”] was found too difficult to make a clear sense as standing
alone. To me, therefore, it seems highly probable that in fact the reading in
dispute was in the original text, and that it was very early lost. But how? that
question cannot well be answered of course: probably through the intrusion of an
explanatory gloss. Certainly the Oriental manuscripts must at the time of the
Nestorian controversies have contained the text of the Catholic manuscripts on
the whole as we read them now; for otherwise they would assuredly not have
forgotten to cast their falsification of the Scripture in the teeth of the
heretics. Moreover, internal reasons strongly recommend the reading λύειν
τὸνἸησοῦν [“to dissolve Jesus”]. The phrase μὴὁμολογεῖτὸνἸησοῦν [“does not
confesses Jesus”] seems always to my feeling something harsh; one involuntarily
expects an attributive definition of the object to be confessed. On the other
hand, λύειν τὸνἸησοῦν [“to dissolve Jesus”] is an expression which, after the
preceding verse, is as intelligible as it is pregnant: it signifies to rend
asunder those two sides of the person of Jesus as they had been united in the
phrase Χριστὸν ἐληλυθόταἐνσαρκί[“Christ has come in the flesh”], which referred
preeminently, as we find in the explanation of 1Jn 4:2, to the denial of the
divinity of Christ. Lastly, it is more in harmony with St. John’s manner not to
make the two points in an antithesis simply contradictory of each other: he
would scarcely write ὁμολογεῖν [“to confess”] and μὴὁμολογεῖν [“not confess”],
but place in the second member something positive. The second half of the verse
now declares that such a denial of the incarnation is not only a token that one
is not of God, but a stamp also of positive anti-Christianity. As it respects
the meaning, it is comparatively matter of indifference whether with each of the
neuters, τοῦτο [“this”] and τὸτοῦἀντιχρίστου [“thespiritof the antichrist”], the
πνεῦμα [“spirit”] is supplied; or whether we regard τὸ μὴὁμολογεῖν (λύειν)
[“thespiritthat does not confess (disolves)”] as the contents of τοῦτο [“this”],
and translate τὸτοῦἀντιχρίστου [“thespiritof the antichrist”] as the nature or
characteristic of the Antichrist. Both are grammatically possible, though the
former seems on the whole the more obvious. The Antichrist, concerning whom ye
have heard that he will appear as the highest and most fearful error, and as the
most bitter enemy of Jesus, has manifested himself in this denying of the
divine-human nature of Jesus. He who was to come is already in the world: in the
future he will be the final, perfected, and personal exhibition of the
principle; now he is present in the first beginnings of the principle. footnotes
tnThe textual variant λύειτὸνἸησοῦν ( = solvit Jesum in the Latin Vulgate)
“dissolves,” “separates,” or “severs” Jesus, i.e., separates the divinity and
the humanity of Jesus, aptly defines the Cerinthian heresy. It was much appealed
to in later days against Nestorius. The ecclesiastical historian Socrates
(Historia Ecclesiastica, 7. 32) says it was the primitive reading, and was
altered by “those who wished to dissolve the humanity from the divinity.” μὴ
ὁμολογεῖ is the reading in all known extant Greek manuscripts of the New
Testament. ‖ λύει is found in some Latin sources, including itar,z Vulgate;
Ir1739mg Cl1739mg Origen.


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  CHAPTER 57: 57 - 1JN 4:4-6
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1Jn 4:4-6

Ὑμεῖς ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστε, τεκνία, καὶ νενικήκατε αὐτοὺς, ὅτι μείζων ἐστὶν ὁ ἐν
ὑμῖν ἢ ὁ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ. Αὐτοὶ ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου εἰσὶ, διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου λαλοῦσι,
καὶ ὁ κόσμος αὐτῶν ἀκούει. ἡμεῖς ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐσμεν· ὁ γινώσκων τὸν Θεὸν, ἀκούει
ἡμῶν· ὃς οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, οὐκ ἀκούει ἡμῶν. Ἐκ τούτου γινώσκομεν τὸ πνεῦμα
τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς πλάνης. The opposite principles which animate
Christians and the antichrists have their reflection also in the relation of
both to the world: the antichrists are in full friendship with it;
ὁκόσμοςαὐτῶνἀκούει [“the world listens to them”];Christians are at enmity with
it, and that a victorious enmity. From the principle the apostle passes to the
effects of it; and thus connects and combines his discussion of
theπνεῦμα[“Spirit”]as operating in the Christian with that upon his practical
life as given in the 1Jn 3:1-24. For,νικᾶντόνκόσμον[“victory over the world”]
andποιεῖν τὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”] are interchangeable
ideas. Already in 1Jn 2:1-20 theἀγαπᾶντόνκόσμον [“to love the world”] is placed
in opposition to theπεριπατεῖνἐντῷφωτί [“walk in the light”];in the third it was
exhibited as the work of Christ, as Hisποιεῖν τὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice
righteousness”],that He vanquished the devil: then the deeds of His members will
consist in this, that, as their Head overcame the head, so they, the members,
shall overcome the members of the kingdom of darkness; that is to say, vanquish
the κόσμος [“world”]. There is here below no mere positive construction, no mere
negative destruction: all doing of good is at once building up and pulling down.
For this correlative arrangement of theνικᾶντόνκόσμον[“victory over the
world”]andποιεῖν τὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”],we may compare, in
particular,1Jn 5:3-4, where the ἐντολὰςΘεοῦτηρεῖν [“to keep God’s
commandments”]and τόνκόσμοννικᾶν [“victory over the world”]are equivalent terms
and ideas.

What our section contains as to the trying of the spirits, and the relation
between the Christian and the anti-Christian spirit, is accordingly only the
means used by the apostle to bring out his subject, not the absolute end he has
in view: his sole end is the sign that the Holy Ghost is the energy and spring
of all holy action. That the testing the spirits is only the means in his
exposition appears at once from the beginning of the fourth verse. For there it
is declared as a fact, the reality of which is simply presupposed, that the
readers have the Holy Ghost and are therefore of God: this is the main
proposition of the apostle, to which all the rest leads up. But this, of course,
implies at the same time that the victory over the antichrists is achieved. That
victory is accomplished (perfect); for, in that the church has turned away from
all error, and witnessed the good confession laid down in the preceding words,
it has already been successful in the conflict and overcome
theanti-Christianity: yet not indeed in its own power, but through the power of
the Holy Ghost ruling init. Thecarrying back of all human activity for good to a
divine and spring of all holy action. That the testing the spirits influence is
quite characteristic of this section. Ὁ ἐν ὑμῖν[“the one in you”] is the God who
hath given us His Spirit, and thereby begotten us of Himself.Ὁ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ[“the
one in the world”] is he who elsewhere is called theἄρχων τοῦ κόσμου τούτου
[“the ruler of this world”] (John 12:31). The prince of the world has his work
in the false prophets, for—thus it is in1Jn 4:5—these belong to the world, to
the kingdom of darkness pervaded and governed by sinful powers; and therefore
the world acknowledges them as flesh of its flesh, and hears them. Ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου
λαλοῦσι [“they speakasfrom the world”]:that is, all their words are moulded and
ordered by the spirit ruling in the world, and therefore have a well-known and
familiar sound to the children of the world. Compare John 15:19 : εἰ ἐκ τοῦ
κόσμου ἦτε, ὁ κόσμος ἂν τὸ ἴδιον ἐφίλει [“if you were of the world, the world
would love its own”]. It is obvious that the converse must also be true (1Jn
4:6): we who are of God must be understood by him who himself knows the divine.
The pronouns refer, according to the connection, not to the apostles alone, but
the whole Christian fellowship; for they cannot possibly have another subject
than the γινώσκομεν [“we know”] (in the second half of the verse, and that this
refers to all Christians is perfectly obvious. The ὁμολογεῖν [“to confess”] of
1Jn 4:2 indeed referred not to any individual, but to all who would belong to
the Christian community: they all witness the l same confession, and they all
understand that confession when it is borne by others. Each is at once the
speakerand hearer of the confession. The second period brings in the end of the
discussion. By this we may know the Spirit of the truth and the spiritof error.
But what is meant by the ἐκτούτου [“by this”]? Is it the substance of the entire
six verses; or only the last, the ἀκούειν [“to hear”] on the part of the world
or of the children of God? Certainly the former, and pre-eminently the
confession of the incarnate Son; for the last three verses have, in fact, only
laid down the effect which such a confession produces: enmity of the world,
friendship of the children of God, in other words, incorporation into the whole
organismof the divine kingdom.


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  CHAPTER 58: 58 - 1JN 4:7
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1Jn 4:7

Ἀγαπητοὶ, ἀγαπῶμεν ἀλλήλους, ὅτι ἡ ἀγάπη ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστι, καὶ πᾶς ὁ ἀγαπῶν, ἐκ
τοῦ Θεοῦ γεγέννηται, καὶ γινώσκει τὸν Θεόν·

Hitherto St. John has exhibited the confession of the Son of God manifested in
the flesh as the principle of the divine life in man: the foundation he lays,
therefore, is not anything that is in us, but something that God has done for
us. Similarly, he places— this is the meaning of the paragraph from 1Jn
4:7-12—the ground of our love to the brethren not in ourselves; he makes it only
the reflection of the divine love to us, therefore the result again of what has
been wrought for and upon us. Thus when he begins with the hortatory
ἀγαπῶμενἀλλήλους [“love one another”], we are to regard this only as the
introductory form, the sentence of transition; the essence of the section is not
an exhortation, but, so to speak, a physiology of love. We ought to love, for
ἡἀγάπηἐκτοῦΘεοῦἐστι [“love is from God”]: it has its home, its primal
dwelling-place, in God; thus where there is love, there is somewhat that must
have come from Him. Hence, therefore, he who loveth is born of God, and he is a
partaker of the divine nature; to him God hath revealed Himself, and he on his
part knoweth God. Γεγέννῆσθαι ἐκτοῦΘεοῦ [“to be born of God”] and
γινώσκειντὸνΘεόν [“to know God”] are related as principle to result, as gift and
appropriation of the gift. We have here once more the same fundamental principle
which in 1Jn 3:2 is so clearly prominent, that all knowing pre supposes a
spiritual likeness to the person known; and that knowledge of the divine rests
upon a possession of the divine. If, accordingly, the knowledge of God is a
result of divine regeneration, and this again is discernible by the evidence of
love, it follows that the absence of this token allows the conclusion to be
drawn, that there is a lack of the knowledge of God. But here it is also shown
clearly that to the apostle the γινώσκειν [“to know”] is something very
different from a thinking based upon merely logical categories. It is indeed
perfectly possible that a man may understand all the teaching of Scripture
concerning God, and receive it into his mental being, without having any real
love. But such a fact as that does not contradict the apostle’s assertion. For
he who knows all plants by their scientific names, classes, and orders, but has
never seen any of them, must be held to be far from knowing the plants. In like
manner, he who professes to know God without love has no spiritual perception,
no experience of Him; because his ideas are only constituent elements out of
which he seeks to produce a living unity. He therefore proves that his idea of
God is a false one, since God is not a substance compounded of marks and
attributes. Only from experience, that is, from devotion, can there be any
γινώσκειντὸνΘεόν [“to know God”]; since love, which is here represented as the
token of a divine birth, is supposed to be the pure copy or mere effluence of
the divine love, we, of course, must not limit it to the love of the brethren,
but must understand it in its widest meaning.


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  CHAPTER 59: 59 - 1JN 4:8
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1Jn 4:8

Ὁ μὴ ἀγαπῶν, οὐκ ἔγνω τὸν Θεὸν, ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς ἀγάπη ἐστίν. As if it was impossible
for the apostle with too much formality to draw out a contrast, he employs here
also another antithesis which1Jn 4:8 presents to1Jn 4:7, in order to add an
impressive enlargement to the thought. Before, he had taught thatἡἀγάπηἐκ
Θεοῦἐστι [“love is from God”];now, he teaches thatὁΘεὸςἀγάπηἐστίν [“God is
love”]. But what does this import? Love is primarily under all circumstances a
reciprocal idea, or idea of relation: it necessarily requires a loving subject
and an object loved. Even in self-love this maintains its truth; for that can
exist only where the subject is conscious of itself as an object, and has
differenced a self from the self. In love the subject goes out of itself; and
this takes place more particularly in that it opens itself towards another, and
communicates itself. Moreover, it lies in the nature of love that what it
imparts is something good; is, in fact, a good: communication of what is evil as
such is the opposite of love; it can only take place at all under the
supposition that I regard the evil erroneously as something good. To wish to
communicate what is known to be evil is Satanic, and therefore the precise
opposite of loving. Accordingly, there are in the idea of love two things: one,
the pre supposition that I have a good, or, more particularly, since good if
ethically considered cannot be an accident, that I am good; another, that I
refer this good not to myself, but to another, or am conscious of the tendency
to impart it. If, now, it is said that God not only has love, but is love, that
means His being altogether and only love, love and nothing but love; and in that
again appears the second thing, that He not only has good in itself, but that He
is altogether good, has all perfection, and absolutely refers nothing to
Himself, but all to others. By means of this it is possible to determine the
relation which exists between the definition of the divine nature given here and
that of1Jn 1:5, God is light. That given in our passage presupposes, as we have
seen, that goodness is the essential quality of God which in virtue of
Hisἀγάπηεἶναι[“to be love”] He communicates. This essential quality is in1Jn 1:5
described by the termφῶς [“light”]. We foundφῶς [“light”]to be the compendium of
all His perfections, theπλήρωμα[“fullness”] of His nature; it is, in fact, the
definition of the metaphysical essence of God, asἀγάπη [“love”]is of that of His
ethical nature; the former is the immanent side of the divine essence, the
latter the transitive which presupposes the former; and the two together express
nothing but this, that God at no moment and in no measure ever has, or ever can,
or ever does refer the perfect fulness of His being to Himself. The unfathomable
and inconceivable fulness of life which is named asφῶς [“light”]is from eternity
to eternity existent under only the modality of love. Against the unlimited
force of theΘεὸςἀγάπη [“God is love”]is dashed to pieces every notion which
represents God as in any way or at any time living a life turned toward self or
folded within self.

If we take the two definitions Θεὸς φῶς [“God is light”] and Θεὸςἀγάπη [“God is
love”] together, we reach the result that no action of God is conceivable which
has not for its aim the demonstration of love; and that there is no evidence of
love which has not for its substance the communication of the divine nature of
light, of the divine δόξα [“glory”]. If this self-communication of perfect love
is conceived as in a literally absolute sense consummate, as a ray of light
passing unbroken from one point to another, then we have the eternal
ἀπαύγασμακαὶχαρακτὴρ τῆςδόξηςτοῦΘεοῦ [“radiance and exact representation of the
golry of God” cf. Heb 1:3], the Son. If it is conceived as dispersing itself in
all possible gradations of colour, which in their combination and sum, however,
are again like the colourless indifference of pure light, without
image,—consummate in time and space,—then we have the world, or, as it is called
in its final reference to God, the divine kingdom. Thus it is plain how not only
Christ, but the ἐκκλησία [“glory”], that is, the church, the perfected kingdom
of God, with its body, the earthly creation, may be called the πλήρωμα
[“fullness”] of God. If, then, light and love are as inseparably the nature
divine as form and matter make up any material thing, then it follows that
everyone who is born of God must be a partaker of this light and of this love.
But as, according to 1Jn 4:7, the birth from God is the presupposition of the
γινώσκειναὐτόν [“to know him”], the conclusion reached in our eighth verse is
perfectly clear, that he who loves not cannot know God,—that is, because he is
not born of Him.


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  CHAPTER 60: 60 - 1JN 4:9
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1Jn 4:9

Ὁ μὴ ἀγαπῶν, οὐκ ἔγνω τὸν Θεὸν, ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς ἀγάπη ἐστίν. That love, which God is
in His inmost essence, has now become manifest, and that through the mission of
His Son. But the proposition is not here laid down in this wide generality.
Certainly it is true that herein the love of God has been demonstrated in its
broadest comprehensiveness (compare Joh 3:16, οὗτοςἠγάπησενὁΘεὸςκ.τ.λ. [“God so
loved, etc.”]), so that it might have been said that ἡἀγάπη [“the love”], this
very perfect love itself, was first manifested in the Son; but when we mark that
the conclusion is, ἵνα ζήσωμεν δι᾽ αὐτοῦ [“so that we may live through him”],
and that it runs in the beginning ἐφανερώθηἡἀγάπηἐνἡμῖν [“the love was
manifested in us”], we feel that both these circumscribe the comprehensiveness
of the statement above: it is not that all the love of God generally was
manifested in the sending of His Son; but the apostle would say that His love
towardsus was in this way approved. In order to obtain a more distinct idea, we
must determine whether ἐνἡμῖν [“in us”] belongs to ἀγάπη [“love”] or to
ἐφανερώθη [“made known”], and how it is more particularly to be understood. The
former might require the article before ἐνἡμῖν[“in us”]; but that is not an
absolute argument against it, for, though we find no instance in our apostle,
yet we have one in Col 1:4 of its absence in a similar or parallel case,
ἡἀγάπηὑμῶνἐνΧριστῷἸησοῦ [“your love in Christ Jesus”]. But since this
construction must under any circumstances be harsher than the reference to
ἐφανερώθη [“made known”], we must needs prefer this latter.

But, this granted, even then the ἐνἡμῖν[“in us”] may be variously understood.
The most obvious interpretation would be that of “among us;” but this is opposed
by the form of the resumed thought in 1Jn 4:16, where it is
ἡἀγάπηἣνἔχειὁΘεὸςἐνἡμῖν[“the love which God has in us”]. If this were to be
translated “among us,” the whole phrase might easily be reduced to mean the love
which God finds existing among us, that is, our love to Him. But this is
rendered impossible by the preceding πεπιστεύκαμεν [“we have believed”]; for my
love to God can be no object of faith to me. Therefore it must be that
ἡἀγάπηἣνἔχειὁΘεὸς [“the love which God has”], 1Jn 4:16, defines the love which
God has or feels; and ἐν [“in”] can by no means be translated “among.” But then,
as ἐνἡμῖν[“in us”] in 1Jn 4:16 and in 1Jn 4:9 stand or fall together, we cannot
admit the interpretation “among” in our present verse also. It may be added that
throughout the entire context ἐν [“in”] never occurs in any other than its
proper meaning of “in.” What this apostle meant to express by the phrase
ἐφανερώθηἡἀγάπηἐνἡμῖν [“the love was manifested in us”] may be best illustrated
by comparing a similar Pauline passage. The ἐφανερώθαιἐνἡμῖν [“the love was
manifested in us”], that is, must be understood precisely in the same sense as
St. Paul’s ἀποκαλύπτετειν ἐνἐμοὶ[“to reveal in me”], Gal 1:16. This is something
different from the simple ἀποκαλύπτετεινμοι [“to reveal to me”]. St. Paul would
make it emphatic that not only Jesus Christ had been revealed to him, and that
he himself had been the receiver of the revelation, but that the revealed Christ
had become an element of his own being and life. The expression presupposes a
change which had passed within the apostle’s own nature, a renewal of his being;
without this we can form no conception of an ἀποκαλύπτετειν Ἰησοῦν ἐναὐτῷ [“to
reveal Jesus in him”]. And here also the ἐφανερώθηἡἀγάπητοῦΘεοῦ ἐνἡμῖν [“the
love of God was manifested in us”] implies much more than if the ending of it
had been ἡμῖν[“us”] simply. It means to say that not only had the love of God
become known to us through the mission of His Son, but that in virtue of that
mission it had fixed a permanent dwelling-place in us. The matter is so simple,
both in phrase and meaning, that we could hardly wish it more so: if I say
ὁΧριστόςἐφανερώθηἐντῷκόσμῳ [“Christ was manifested in the world”], I define the
world as His dwelling; if I say ἐφανερώθηἐνἡμῖν [“was manifested in us”], we
ourselves then become His dwelling. Similarly, when it is said that
ἡἀγάπητοῦΘεοῦ ἐφανερώθη ἐνἡμῖν [“the love of God was manifested in us”], we
ourselves are the sphere in which the love of God has pitched its visible tent.
The love of God, of which the verse preceding spoke, has become manifest, has
been clearly made known to us; and that—for here is the second point connected
with the former—in such a manner that it has made for itself a dwelling-place in
us. The correctness of this interpretation must be confirmed abundantly when it
is shown how in that mission of the Son here spoken of this dwelling of love in
us or that ἐφανερώθηἐνἡμῖν [“was manifested in us”] is verified. Let us look
more closely at the declaration of the apostle. The revelation of the divine
love of which St. John speaks did not consist in the fact that the Son was
manifested, that He as ἀπαύγασμα τοῦ πατρός [“the radiance of the Father”], in
whom we see the Father, has through His life of love also made known the
Father’s love; nor will St. John make it emphatic, that the mission of the Son,
or more strictly the Son sent, shows us in His person the divine love: that love
is manifested in the mission of the Son. The former thought is true, indeed, but
is not here impressed. That God sends τὸνυἱὸναὑτοῦ [“his Son”]. Him in whom He
beholds Himself, who possesses the whole fulness of His own divine essence, yea,
τὸνυἱὸντὸνμονογενῆ [“the only begotten Son”]. Him who alone has this place in
deity,—sent Him, ἀπέσταλκεν [“he sent”], so that He has not that Son for
Himself, for Himself loves Him not nor will enjoy Him, but sent Him to enter
into the living agitation, the sinful agitation, of the human world,
εἰςτὸνκόσμον [“into the world”], that human world which deserved not love but
wrath,—this is the act of love which has brought the divine nature of love in
God to full development, in which it ἐφανερώθη [“was manifested”]. And now for
the ἐνἡμῖν [“in us”]. All other acts of God in history and nature manifest also
His love, though not in the same degree as this; but when we discern in these
the tokens of love, our knowledge is, so to speak, at second hand: of all this
we might say only ἡἀγάπητοῦΘεοῦφανεροῦταιἐντῷκόσμῳἡμῖν [“the love of God is
manifested to the world in us”]. But it is otherwise in the mission of the Son.
This had for its purpose and result, ἵνα ζήσωμεν δι᾽ αὐτοῦ [“so that we may live
through him”],—that is, we ourselves are to be transformed by it, the divine
life is to be implanted in us, and thus most assuredly the love of God is to be
manifested in us because we are to be ourselves drawn into the fulness oi this
divine nature of love. In this, as we have seen, consisted the love of God
generally, that He refers not His whole being to Himself, but to others, and in
such a manner that He communicates it to others; He not only works with its
energy for the world, but commits it into our own very being. And under both
aspects His nature of love has been most perfectly revealed in the mission of
His Son: by it He has surrendered the whole fulness of His divine nature, all
that He has; and so surrendered it that He communicates it to us as a free gift;
it is not merely a power working for us and in us, but the power energizing
within us has become part of our own personality. Only when the Christ for us is
really the Christ in us, do we exhaust the meaning of the word Θεὸςἀγάπη [“God
is love”].


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  CHAPTER 61: 61 - 1JN 4:10
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1Jn 4:10

Ἐν τούτῳ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀγάπη, οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς ἠγαπήσαμεν τὸν Θεὸν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι αὐτὸς
ἠγάπησεν ἡμᾶς, καὶ ἀπέστειλε τὸν υἱὸν αὑτοῦ ἱλασμὸν περὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν. The
love of God has become in the mission of His Son a power of love working in
us,—that is, it infers the thought that in this way only can we ourselves love
in the manner and after the standard of the ἐντολὴκαινή[“new commandment”]
(compare 1Jn 2:8): this is the idea of the ninth verse, which the tenth more
fully expands. It begins with ἐντούτῳἐστὶνἡἀγάπη [“in this is love”]. This
cannot mean the love of God, for an αὐτοῦ [“of him”] would in that case hardly
have been left out; rather the subject of the loving must be derived from the
following clause with ὅτι [“that”]. That, however, contains two of them, ἡμεῖς
[“we”] and Θεὸς [“God”], and thus we must take the ἀγάπη [“love”] quite
generally, as it might be plainly expressed in the infinitive expression
“loving.” The topic is the nature of love generally, all love which may be found
in God or man: neither the love of God to us alone, nor our love to God alone.
The ἐντούτῳἐστὶν [“in this is”] suggests an unfolding of the nature of love; “it
consists in this, that;” the ὅτιἡμεῖςἠγαπήσαμεν [“that he loved us”],
ὅτιἀπέστειλεν [“that he sent”] point through the very tense up to the causality
of love, the principle of its origination. The two, however, are in fact
inseparably united. This let its try to make clear by an example. Concerning the
publicans, whom the Lord in Mat 5:46 introduces, the very converse of the
proposition before us might have been said, ἐντούτῳἐστὶνἡἀγάπητῶντελωνῶν,οὐκὅτι
ἐμὲἠγάπησανἀλλ᾽ὅτι ἐγὼαὐτοὺςἠγάπησα [“in this is the love of the tax
collectors, not that they love me but that I loved them”]. The ground of their
love to me lies not in them, but in me; if I cease to love them, they cease to
love me; thus their love to me is essentially no other than my love to them.
Therefore, as the publican’s love to me consists of or may be resolved into my
love to him, the apostle says here that all loving on earth and in heaven has
its originating cause and consists (thus are the two forms of the proposition to
be united) in God’s loving. All human loving is a flame from the divine Flame,
having in itself no independent existence: “I love” means no other than that the
divine love has become in me an over-mastering and all-pervading power of life.
Accordingly, it is not the apostle’s design here to make prominent the priority
of the divine love, to exhibit it as causa sui, as we find it in Rom 5:8. Had
that been his intention, to show that love in us has been enkindled by an
anticipation on the part of God, he would have used the perfect instead of the
aorist, in order to express the finished action and expression of it. But the
explanation we have given is in precise harmony with the aorist. The historical
fact of the mission of the Son is love: it is the demonstration and; substance
of divine love, and it is the germ and ground and substance of our love. If we
introduce the priority of the divine love, that it is the divine manner of love
to take precedence and anticipate, and that we must follow and copy it, we
derange the whole thought of the apostle. The πρῶτος [“first”], which the
Vulgate interpolates here, and which actually occurs in 1Jn 4:19, would on such
a supposition not have been wanting. To repeat what we have said: the apostle
does not say that God loves first, and we then in the second order; true as that
is, he says something more comprehensive and much higher, including the former,
to wit, that the divine love dwells in us. And this must regulate our view of
the standard aimed at in the last words of the clause, ἀπέστειλε τὸν υἱὸν αὑτοῦ
ἱλασμὸν περὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν [“he sent his Sonto bean atoning sacrifice for
our sins”]. They do not, like similar words in Rom 5:8, ὅτι ἔτι ἁμαρτωλῶν ὄντων
ἡμῶν, Χριστὸς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀπέθανε [“while we were still sinners, Christ died for
us”], indicate the anticipating love of God; but they point to the means by
which God has made us capable of being the recipients and representatives of His
love. They are altogether parallel, therefore, with the concluding words of the
previous verse, ἵνα ζήσωμεν δι᾽ αὐτοῦ [“so that we may live through him”], and
lay down only the negative condition for the positive awakening of a new life.


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  CHAPTER 62: 62 - 1JN 4:11
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1Jn 4:11

Ἀγαπητοὶ, εἰ οὕτως ὁ Θεὸς ἠγάπησεν ἡμᾶς, καὶ ἡμεῖς ὀφείλομεν ἀλλήλους ἀγαπᾶν.
From 1Jn 4:8 till now the apostle has been exhibiting how the love to the
brethren, which he enforces, comes to reality in us; purely on the ground of a
divine operation, God is love, and has through the central act of the mission of
His Son established this His love as an efficient power in us. Now in 1Jn 4:11
comes forward the application: the exhortation to suffer the germ thus deposited
in us to come to its full development. The words as they run show in the most
beautiful manner the accuracy of the above explanation of the previous verses.
For, if the current exposition were true, according to which the anticipating
love of God is argument to us that we all should love our brethren in the same
anticipating manner, the conclusion of the proposition ought to have the οὕτως
[“so”] of its beginning repeated; for then the apostle would not be commending
brotherly love in general, but a definite kind of brotherly love (οὕτως [“so”]).
But the apostle has not inserted this, and we must seek another explanation. The
emphasis lies upon the ὀφείλομεν [“we ought”]: it is explained that, in virtue
of the mission of the Son of God, love ἐνἡμῖν[“in us”] is manifested, that is,
is implanted in us as an energizing power. Let then your light shine, trade with
the pound given, is the apostle’s exhortation. This trading with the pound, the
evidencing of brotherly love, is your most solemn duty: every gift like that of
the infusion of divine love, makes us responsible for its use. And now the
interpretation of the οὕτως [“so”] in the beginning suggests itself at once: it
is our duty if God has so loved us: how? in that He hath revealed His love
ἐνἡμῖν[“in us”], implanted the germ of it in our hearts. The ἀγαπητοί
[“beloved”], which introduces the verse, resumes that of 1Jn 4:7: the former one
was only the foundation for this superstructure of exhortation. And, when he has
come to this, the apostle brings it home to his readers by an affectionate
appeal to the heart of each.


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  CHAPTER 63: 63 - 1JN 4:12
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1Jn 4:12

Θεὸν οὐδεὶς πώποτε τεθέαται· ἐὰν ἀγαπῶμεν ἀλλήλους, ὁ Θεὸς ἐν ἡμῖν μένει, καὶ ἡ
ἀγάπη αὐτοῦ τετελειωμένη ἐστὶν ἐν ἡμῖν. The following verse brings in the close
of the discussion: attributing to brotherly love the μένεινἐνΘεὸς [“abide in
God”]. It is true that, on the first glance, the words Θεὸνοὐδεὶςπώποτετεθέαται
[“no one has ever seen God”] seem to stand in the text without any mediating
link. The first thing we have to ask is, whether the emphasis rests on the Θεὸν
[“God”] or on the τεθέαται [“has seen”]. The arrangement suggests the former. In
that case we should have an antithesis between God as the invisible and the
brother as seen; but then there would arise only one sense, that we could love
the unseen God only in our brethren, and that this brotherly love would have the
same blessed result (μένεινἐν ἡμῖν[“abide in us”]) as if we could have seen God.
But where do we find in the Bible the faintest trace of the thought that we can
love God only in our brethren? Not indeed in 1Jn 4:20, where the subject is only
the confirmation of brotherly love. Love in its direction and impulse takes no
account of the visibility or invisibility of the object beloved. It has indeed
the tendency to desire sight of the object; but that is by no means necessary to
its existence or strength. Moreover, if the apostle had wished to speak of the
contrast between loving the invisible God and the visible brethren, of the ease
or the difficulty of loving the unseen and the seen, he might have by one word
indicated that contrast.

Thus we fire driven to the second possibility, that of laying the stress on the
τεθέαται [“has seen”]. The meaning then is, that no man hath indeed seen God;
any visible fellowship with Him is out of the question; but a spiritual
fellowship of another kind is possible, and becomes actual if we love I the
brethren. It is plain that this meaning is unexceptionably suitable; and, for
the rest, it may be easily explained why, notwithstanding the emphasis, the
object comes before the verb. Tor, to look closely, while it is true that inside
the verse itself, as we have just seen, there is an antithesis between the
invisibility of God and the spiritual union with Him which is nevertheless
necessary, it is still true that the verse as a whole lays the stress on that
fellowship with God into which we through love of the brethren enter, and of
which 1Jn 4:11 had spoken. Hence the Θεὸν [“God”], as the point around which the
whole revolves, is placed at the outset. That, instead of the direct phrase
οὐδυνάμεθαθεᾶσθαιτὸνΘεὸν [“we are not able to see God”], the more limited
οὐδεὶςπώποτετεθέαται [“no one has ever seen”] is used, rests on the thought that
we certainly need not hope to attain what has been inaccessible to all before
us. The promise which is here in a certain sense given to brotherly love as the
equivalent for not being able to see God, is at a first glance twofold: first,
that God will abide in us; secondly, that ἡἀγάπη αὐτοῦ τετελειωμένηἐστὶν ἐνἡμῖν
[“his love is perfected in us”]. But let us ascertain whether these two are
really distinct. That would be the case only if ἡἀγάπη αὐτοῦ [lit. “the love of
him”] meant “our love to God.” Then the two clauses would issue in what we
commonly find distinguished as ὁΘεὸςἐνἡμῖν καὶἡμεῖςἐν αὐτῷ [“God in us and we in
him”]. But this translation is impossible. For, throughout the section we have
heard of our love to our neighbour, but never once of our love to God; and this
latter idea would be a new one entering without any bond of connection, and
furthermore at the close of the section. But it is equally out of the question
to translate ἀγάπη αὐτοῦ [lit. “the love of him”] of the love of God to us; for
it would be quite out of harmony with the tenor of a section which exhibits our
love as the reflection and effluence of divine love to turn round and inversely
represent the divine love as the result of our love to the brethren. There
remains only, therefore, the solution which we found it needful to adopt in 1Jn
2:5,—that is, to exclude from the expression every objective or subjective
reference of the ἀγάπη [“love”], and to take it simply as the love which God
has, and which He is. Brotherly love shows that love which is in God is also in
us: a thought which obviously is the most striking conclusion for the whole
discussion of the section before us.

Moreover, the apostle inserts a τετελειωμένη [“perfected”], an idea which from
this point plays a conspicuous part; compare 1Jn 4:17 and 1Jn 4:18 (bis). By
this last fact we may note at once that the writer is approaching the end of his
discussion. Thus also is explained the relation between the two members of the
leading clause, ὁΘεὸςμένειἐν ἡμῖν [“God abides in us”] and ἡἀγάπη αὐτοῦ κ.τ.λ.
[“his love, etc.”]. In the latter the emphasis lies on τετελειωμένη
[“perfected”], and the two are related as general to particular: that God
abideth in us, on this or that condition or supposition, the apostle had more
than once said; but here at the end he adds expressly, that the divine nature of
love in its whole fulness and glory takes up its dwelling in us. This is the
highest perfection in God, that His love neither excludes any nor ever suffers
interruption; and this is therefore the image and ideal for love among
Christians, so that all individuals should love one another without exception
(ἀλλήλους [“one another”]), and that with uninterrupted energy (the present
ἀγαπῶμεν [“we love”]).


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  CHAPTER 64: 64 - 1JN 4:13-16
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1Jn 4:13-16

Ἐν τούτῳ γινώσκομεν ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ μένομεν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν ἡμῖν, ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος
αὑτοῦ δέδωκεν ἡμῖν· καὶ ἡμεῖς τεθεάμεθα, καὶ μαρτυροῦμεν ὅτι ὁ πατὴρ ἀπέσταλκε
τὸν υἱὸν σωτῆρα τοῦ κόσμου. Ὃς ἂν ὁμολογήσῃ ὅτι Ἰησοῦς ἐστιν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὁ
Θεὸς ἐν αὐτῷ μένει, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ Θεῷ. καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐγνώκαμεν καὶ πεπιστεύκαμεν
τὴν ἀγάπην ἣν ἔχει ὁ Θεὸς ἐν ἡμῖν. ὁ Θεὸς ἀγάπη ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ μένων ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ,
ἐν τῷ Θεῷ μένει, καὶ ὁ Θεὸς ἐν αὐτῷ.

It has been shown already that the following four verses give a recapitulation:
1Jn 4:13 summing up the substance of the whole section 1Jn 4:1-12, parallel with
1Jn 3:24, while the two particular sub-sections, 1Jn 4:1-6 and 1Jn 4:7-12, are
taken up again by 1Jn 4:14-16. But it will be plain, on the other hand, if we
examine carefully, that we have by no means a mere resumé; though what is found
to be added may be explained by the consideration that the apostle is here in
the act of gathering up the threads of his whole discussion from 1Jn 2:28
downwards. Hence at the very beginning of 1Jn 4:13 we have the double expression
ἐν αὐτῷ μένομεν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν ἡμῖν [“we abide in him and he in us”], while in the
last section, and in the theme of 1Jn 3:24 corresponding to it, only the latter
part of it comes forward. But if it is remembered that the last section is only
the substructure or pendant of the third chapter, which treats of our abiding in
God, we shall perceive how fitly the apostle, in his recapitulation here,
combines the two thoughts, and that in each of the three resuming clauses. Even
the γινώσκειν [“to know”] enters here again very appropriately; for the whole of
the second part of the Epistle treats of no other than the tokens by which the
sonship of Christians may be discerned. The thing here adduced is
ὅτιἐκτοῦπνεύματοςαὐτοῦδέδωκενἡμῖν [“that he has given us of his Spirit”]: the
same words as in 1Jn 3:24. That this is in fact the matter contained in 1Jn
4:1-12 can, after the exposition we have given, be no longer questionable. For,
to set out from the last sub-section, 1Jn 4:7-12, where it is said that all
human loving rests upon the infusion of the divine fire of love, what does that
mean but that it rests upon the Holy Spirit? And in 1Jn 4:1-6 the subject is
expressly the confessing of the God-man as a sign of possessing the Holy Ghost.
What 1Jn 4:14 brings in as new, as also in 1Jn 4:16, are the two introductory
clauses each emphasized by καὶἡμεῖς [“and we”]. That these aim to exhibit the
contents of the section as the experience of Christian life, is clear enough;
but it is not so evident to what end the experience is here introduced. Is it
alleged as the guarantee of the truth of what St. John had said, just as the
apostles collectively, and St. John in particular, elsewhere adduce the
experience of Christ’s resurrection as the demonstration of the truth? But that
would suit only the first καὶἡμεῖς [“and we”], and not the second; for, as to
the love which God has in me, my faith in that love gives me no certain
assurance, since it might be an erroneous faith. Nor does there seem any
absolute necessity for a pledge of the truth of the assurance, ὁΘεὸςἀγάπη [“God
is love”]. Rather are the clauses καὶἡμεῖς κ.τ.λ. [“and we, etc.”] necessary,
and absolutely necessary, to show that the theme of 1Jn 3:24, 1Jn 4:13 has been
demonstrated. We read there, δέδωκενἡμῖνὁΘεὸς ἐκτοῦπνεύματος[“God has given us
of his Spirit”], which expresses an experience that the readers had known. Now
in the development of 1Jn 4:1-12 nothing is said of this actual gift and
experience; only abstract and no concrete relations are treated of: he who
confesses Jesus has the Holy Ghost; he in whom the love of God is manifested
must love the brethren. Whether this was actually the case with the readers is
certainly not said here; if, therefore, the δέδωκενἡμῖν [“given us”] was really
to be established, there must be at least a single word to express the evidence
of this fact. Now that we find in the clauses before us: confession of Jesus is
necessary, and we have it; love is necessary, and it is found in us,—therefore
we have received the Holy Ghost.

Granted that we have now come to a general understanding as to our verses, we
are far from understanding them yet in detail. The first question is, to whom
the ἡμεῖς [“we”] emphatically standing at the outset refers. Primarily, it
appears, to the apostles; for in 1Jn 1:1 these are made prominent as θεασάμενοι
[“those who have seen”] and μαρτυροῦτες [“those who bear witness”]; and, even if
we took the θεᾶσθαι [“look upon”] in a figurative sense, yet the μαρτυρεῖν [“to
bear witness”] demands ever a personal eye-witness. Equally clear is it that the
second καὶἡμεῖς [“and we”] refers to the whole congregation inclusive of the
apostles; for what would be the meaning of saying that the apostle or the
apostles had known by living experience of faith the divine love ruling within
them? Certainly the object with St. John is not to show that he had received the
Holy Ghost, but that all, even the whole church, had received Him. But here
again there is a difficulty; as it seems to be asserted that the first καὶἡμεῖς
[“and we”] refers to the apostles without including the church, while the second
refers to both: in each case the καὶἡμεῖς [“and we”] is so emphatic, and they
are both put in the beginning as so manifestly corresponding to each other, that
it is almost matter of necessity to take them in the same meaning. To this must
be added, that even in 1Jn 4:14, and equally in 1Jn 4:15, as we have perceived
also in 1Jn 4:16, the apostle aims not to show that he has the Spirit, but that
the church has: that is, the emphasis cannot rest on the θεωρία[LSJ]
[“contemplation”] of the apostles, but only upon the ὁμολογία [“confession”]
(1Jn 4:15) of the congregation. The former is brought forward only for the sake
of the latter. Our confession of Jesus as the Son of God rests indeed in the
first instance on the μαρτυρία [“testimony”] of the apostles, their μαρτυρία
[“testimony”] again on their being eye-witnesses: by this they became μάρτυρες
[“witnesses”], not merely announcers, but trustworthy announcers, of the truth.
Thus, by means of their testimony we obtain a participation in what they had
first personally beheld and spiritually apprehended. This observation makes it
plain that the two καὶἡμεῖς [“and we”] are perfectly parallel, and how they are
so. For, in the first, the apostles are not regarded in contradistinction to the
church, but as the principle of the church’s ὁμολογία [“confession”]; their
θεᾶσθαικαὶμαρτυρεῖν [“to look upon and bear witness”] was the ground and essence
of that confession; in their personal experience concerning the mission of the
Son of God, the experience of the church was as it were involved. Thus, as the
καὶἡμεῖς [“and we”] in 1Jn 4:16 refers to the apostles and the church, so
essentially it is in 1Jn 4:14, although that verse formally embraces the
apostles alone. So the meaning of 1Jn 4:14-15 is: we have the Holy Ghost; for we
have the token of this, the confession of the mission of the Son as Saviour of
the world,1 on the ground of apostolical testimony; and consequently we have
perfect mutual fellowship with God. As if he would make evident at once the
reciprocity of the connection between God and man, the apostle changes the
arrangement of the words in 1Jn 4:13, 1Jn 4:15-16: now the μένομεν ἐν αὐτῷ [“we
abide in him”] comes first, now the αὐτὸς ἐν ἡμῖν [“he in us”]. The historical
fact of the manifestation of Christ, belonging to the domain of the visible
world, could be established only by the experience of testimony; the internal
fact, on the contrary, of the love of God ruling in us can only be inwardly
experienced: hence here the ἐγνώκαμενκαὶπεπιστεύκαμεν [“we have come to know and
to believe”]. That which is known and believed is love, the love
ἣνἔχειὁΘεὸςἐνἡμῖν[“which God has in us”]. The expression has already been dealt
with on 1Jn 4:9: it is the divine love, which is in God, but which He, by virtue
of the mission of His Son, implants in our hearts, so that it now is also
ἐνἡμῖν[“in us”]. It must first be known and then believed: for I can believe in
the biblical sense, that is, enter, with all the soul and perfect trust, only
into that the existence of which I know. So St. John says: we have known, it has
become plain to us, that divine love has taken up its dwelling in us; and, after
we came to know this, we have also believingly apprehended it. Let it not be
wondered at that we are said to believe in what is after all ἐνἡμῖν[“in us”]. As
certainly as I must believe in the power of God which is mighty in the
weak,—this, however, being in myself,—so certainly must I believe in the love of
God which abides in me. Without such faith neither can that power nor this love
approve itself mighty within me. The following clause, ὁΘεὸςἀγάπηἐστίν [“God is
love”], is quite necessary for the conclusion that we, in virtue of this love,
have perfect fellowship with God. It might, indeed, be conceived that he who
loves, he who has the divine love in himself, may in some degree enter into
communion with God; but not on that account into a full and complete fellowship.
This argument, however, is very plain, when it is said that God is love, and
only love, and altogether love. For, if the whole nature of God is love, it
follows that he who has this love participates in the whole nature of God; he
who possesses the love of God has God entire. This we may establish also in
other ways. If the apostle’s proposition, that by means of love we have absolute
fellowship with God, is correct, it may equally be averred that we also have
everything else which may be said concerning Him: for instance, the light-nature
of God may assuredly become the portion of him who loves. This also is quite
true; for we have seen in 1Jn 4:8 that love in its nature is diffusion of good,
this latter being presupposed; and, as the love of God presupposes His
light-nature, so does loving on our part presuppose that we participate in this
nature of light. Similarly, it follows from the declaration that both the
confession of Christ and the love of the brethren exhibit full and complete
fellowship with God, that both these are perfectly involved in each other. And
so indeed it is. For the confession of Christ rests, according to the exposition
in presupposed; and, as the love 1Jn 4:1-6, on the impartation of the Divine
Spirit, or, more strictly, of the Spirit of the incarnate Son of God; and love
rests upon the communication of the same Spirit,—that is, as He is the Spirit of
love. Confession and love are therefore only the outbeamings of one and the
selfsame Spirit; each of the two pledges the perfect unity with God. Neither is
a true avowal of Christ possible without brotherly love, nor is this latter
possible without the former; either both are wanting or both are present: at
least, that is, in their germ.

Let us now look at the position of the track in which we now find ourselves. The
theme of this division of the Epistle was said to be, in 1Jn 2:28 ff.,
μένεινἐναὐτῷ ἵναπαῤῥησίαν ἔχωμενἐντῇπαρουσίᾳαὐτοῦ [“abide in him so that we may
have boldness at his coming”]. This parrhesia, according to 1Jn 2:29, was to
spring from the consciousness of divine birth, or being born out of God, and
this consciousness to rest upon the sign of works. The concluding proposition in
1Jn 2:29, πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγένηται [“everyone also who
practices righteousness isborn of him”], is thus the argument of proof for the
main proposition in 1Jn 2:28. This last-adduced proposition is now developed in
two directions: first, in 1Jn 3:1-24, that he who is born of God must practise
righteousness; secondly, in 1Jn 4:1-21, that this practice of righteousness
(especially brotherly love) can only proceed from a divine new birth. For, as
chapter 4 expounds, all νικᾶντὸνκόσμον [“victory over the world”], and thus all
opposition to sin, as also all love, depends upon the infusion of the Divine
Spirit. Thus we may say that in 1Jn 3:1-24 it is demonstrated ὅτι
ὁγεγεννημένοςἐξαὐτοῦτὴνδικαιοσύνην ποιεῖ [“that everyone born of him practices
righteousness”]; in 1Jn 4:1-21, on ὅτι πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἐξ αὐτοῦ
γεγένηται [“that everyone who practices righteousness isborn of him”] Finally,
it is shown, especially in the resumé of 1Jn 2:13-16, how, in this communication
of the Holy Ghost, that μένεινἐναὐτῷ [“abide in him”] comes to perfection which
was spoken of in 1Jn 2:28. It remains now that the apostle should disentangle
the knot he created, by showing that thus the παῤῥησία [“boldness”] is attained
in the final judgment. He does this in the following verses. They are the quod
erat demonstrandum. footnotes

1It must not be unnoted that St. John has the expression σωτήρ [“Saviour”] only
twice (Jn 4:42, in the mouth of the Samaritans), but each time with the addition
τοῦ κόσμου [“of the world”]. Elsewhere the word occurs always as connected with
ἡμῶν [“of us”] (that is, Christians) or absolutely; St. Paul alone speaks of the
Father once as σωτὴρπάντωνἀνθρώπων [“Saviour of all people”] (1Tim 4:10). Even
in this otherwise insignificant peculiarity St. John shows his predominant
tendency to give prominence to the universality of the divine purpose of
redemption.


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  CHAPTER 65: 65 - 1JN 4:17
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1Jn 4:17

Ἐν τούτῳ τετελείωται ἡ ἀγάπη μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν, ἵνα παῤῥησίαν ἔχωμεν ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῆς
κρίσεως, ὅτι καθὼς ἐκεῖνός ἐστι, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τούτῳ. But this 1Jn
4:17 has its difficulties, by no means insignificant. First, as to the direct
meaning of the particles ἐν τούτῳ [“by this”], ἵνα [“so that”], ὅτι [“because”].
The ἐν τούτῳ [“by this”] which leads off in the verse may refer either to what
follows or to what precedes. In the former case it must receive its
specification of contents by a clause in the sequel; and this it might first
receive through the sentence with ἵνα [“so that”], which must in that case have
its telic meaning modified, or, secondly, through that with ὅτι [“because”].
This latter, however, is rendered intolerable by the extremely hard trajection
which it would assume. How could the apostle have in such a way rent asunder the
ἐν τούτῳ ὅτι [“by this because”] so strictly united? Much better than that would
it be to accept the former, which makes the clause with ἵνα [“so that”] the
substance or matter that the ἐν τούτῳ [“by this”] refers to. This would follow
the analogy of 1Jn 3:11, 1Jn 3:23, where the means through which love is brought
to perfection are at the same time the end to be attained. We should have then
presented to us two thoughts interpenetrating each other: the confidence as to
the end is the highest consummation of actual love; but it is at the same time
the goal to which that love aspires, and at which it aims. But with regard to
this we must observe, in the first place, that St. John, while he uses the
combination αὕτη ἵνα [“for this”], τοῦτοἵνα [“for this”], ταῦτα ἵνα [“for
these things”], gives us no other example than this of ἐν τούτῳ ἵνα [“by this so
that”]: Joh 15:8 has it, but it is obvious that the sense there decidedly
requires the ἐν τούτῳ [“by this”] to be referred to what precedes. Again, we
certainly find the combination ἐν τούτῳ ὅτι... ἐάν [“by this because ... if”],
1Jn 2:3, but never once that of ἐν τούτῳ ἵνα ὅτι [“by this because so that”].
All this of course does not prove that St. John could not have written thus.
Proof, however, that he did not, may be gathered from the connection of the
passage. If we refer ἐν τούτῳ [“by this”] to what follows,—that is, to the
clause with ἵνα [“so that”],—we absolutely take away the bridge between what has
gone before and the new section. The apostle had just been saying (1Jn 4:12),
that in brotherly love ἡ ἀγάπη αὐτοῦ τετελειωμένη ἐστὶν ἐν ἡμῖν [“his love is
made perfect in us”]; again, he here suddenly announces that it is perfected in
parrhesia or assurance: but as to how these two are related he suggests not a
word of explanation. Asain, if we translate it to the effect that love is
fulfilled in this, that we have confidence in the day of judgment, we obviously
defer its perfection to the future; but how does that accord with the
fundamental ἐσμενἐν τῷ κόσμῳτούτῳ [“we are in this world”]?

Now we escape from all these difficulties, and place our passage where it both
gives and receives light, if we refer the ἐν τούτῳ [“by this”] to what precedes,
following examples which abound in St. John; compare, for example, 1Jn 2:6; Joh
4:37; John 15:8, John 16:30. What ἐν τούτῳ [“by this”] means is then the μένειν
ἐν Θεῷ καὶ Θεὸνἐν ἡμῖν [“abide in God and God in us”] of 1Jn 4:16,—that is, the
“this” points to the conclusion of the entire preceding development of the
thought. The first half of our verse is therefore to be translated to this
effect: in the reciprocal relation of fellowship betwixt God and us, love
is—μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν [“with us”] may wait awhile for its examination—perfected, to the
end that—the goal which this earthly perfection arrives at—we may have
confidence in the day of judgment. This verse is thus, in fact, the precise
close or pendant of that beginning in 1Jn 2:28: there we have μένεινἐν αὐτῷ
[“abide in him”], ἵνα ὅταν φανερωθῇ [“so that when he appears”], ἔχωμενπαῤῥησίαν
[“we may have boldness”]; here, by the help of ἐν τούτῳ [“by this”], we have
again the abiding in God corresponding with that; to the φανεροῦσθαι [“to make
known”] there the ἡμέρατῆςκρίσεως [“day of judgement”] answers here; while the
ἔχεινπαῤῥησίαν [“to have boldness”] is common to the two passages in the very
letter, and, similarly, the reference to the end in the μένεινἐν αὐτῷ [“abide in
him”]. But, as befits the closing idea of a section, the abiding in God is no
longer here an exhortation as in 1Jn 2:28, but something assumed, already to
exist as a consummated reality ἐν τούτῳ τετελείωται [“by this is perfected”].
The words τετελείωται ἡ ἀγάπη μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν [“love is perfected in us”] are new in
this passage; they are wanting in 1Jn 2:28; in them lies the whole argument in
nuce which the apostle has been conducting. Why is the μένων ἐν Θεῷ [“abiding in
him”] full of confidence and joy? Answer: because this μένειν [“to abide”]
contains in itself the perfecting of love, and thus of itself renders possible
and actually produces a free uplifting of the eyes and a free opening of the
mouth even in the presence of God the Judge of all. That which is perfected,
which has reached perfection, is love. For the μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν [“with us”] which
follows must not be combined with the ἀγάπη [“love”]: not only on account of the
absence of the article, but, as we have seen in the similar combination of 1Jn
4:9, on account of the sense. What can ἀγάπημεθ᾽ ἡμῶν [“love with us”] be
supposed to mean? Love between us,—that is, God and men? But it need not be
again observed that God and men cannot be conjoined by ἡμεῖς [“we”]. Is it our
own mutual love? That would require the ἀλλήλων [“one another”]. Or is it the
love, scilicet, of God with us,—that is, again, the relation of love between God
and men? Apart from the harshness of such a contorted sentence, we should then
expect, of necessity, ἀγάπηαὐτοῦ [“his love”]. The only thing possible, and that
which is of itself the most probable, is to take ἀγάπη [“love”] in the same
meaning which, since 1Jn 4:9, has been demanded: as the divine love, the love
which God has, and which He sends down into the spirit of man. The μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν
[“with us”] is to be connected with the verb,—that is, with the τετελείωται
[“perfected”],—and testifies that the love among Christians, within the church,
has reached this perfection: the apostle does not, indeed, write to any
individuals as individuals, but to the members of the congregation as such. In
the midst of the church alone, but certainly there, is to be found such a
consummation of love, such a perfection of fellowship with God. Two things are
inseparably bound up in the text. The infusion of divine love in the heart of
man establishes the principle of this fellowship; the development of this
principle or germ in continued brotherly love brings this germinal fellowship
with God to its perfection; and this perfected fellowship with Him is again the
perfecting of love. Communion with God and love are reciprocal ideas; they
require each other, and are each the other’s condition; and the growth of the
one carries with it ever the growth of the other.

It being now clear in general, that perfected love must produce confidence or
parrhesia in the day of judgment, the apostle proceeds to unfold this connection
between the two in detail; first setting out with the clause which has its
argument of proof in the ὅτι [“because”]. The passage runs, καθὼς ἐκεῖνός ἐστι,
καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τούτῳ [“just as he is, we also are in this world”].
The words are obscure. Their explanation must start from the sure basis that the
concluding words ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τούτῳ [“in this world”] cannot refer to both parts
of the comparison, but only to the latter part. Otherwise, that is, the ἐστί
[“to be”] would have been found altogether absent; and, moreover, we cannot see
then how either generally or in the present connection it can be asserted that
Christ still is (for the ἐστίν [“to be”] is certainly not equivalent to ἦν
[“to exist”]) in this world in the same manner as we are. Precisely the converse
of this is the truth. Thus the apostle will affirm, as we gather at once, an
equality between Christ as He now is, that is, the glorified Christ, or as He
has ever been and still is—this is also possible—the Son of God, and us in our
condition below not yet made perfect. But how may we now more precisely
apprehend the tertium comparationis? The expression itself is so general, that
it can be understood only from the whole system of the apostle’s thinking, and
not from itself alone. Now, as there is hardly an important phrase in the whole
Epistle which does not rest upon the Gospel, and as, in particular, the matter
of the thought in the section just studied, 1Jn 4:9 ff., is based upon Joh 3:16,
so we shall find it in the present passage. The explanatory text in the Gospel
is Joh 17:21 ff.; the Lord declares there that He is no more in the world, but
that the disciples are in the world,—the same antithesis which we have now
before us,—and He asks the Father, who had hitherto kept them in fellowship with
Him, to keep them still, and with them all who should believe on Him through
their ministry: not taking them out of the world, but so ordering it that (Joh
17:21) καθὼς σὺ πάτερ ἐν ἐμοὶ, κἀγὼ ἐν σοὶ, ἵνα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν ἡμῖν ἓν ὦσιν [“even
as you, Father, are in me and I in you, that they also may be in us”]. Compare,
further, Joh 17:26, ἵνα ἡ ἀγάπη ἣν ἠγάπησάς με, ἐν αὐτοῖς ᾖ, κἀγὼ ἐν αὐτοῖς [“so
that the love with which you loved me may be in them, and I in them”], and Joh
17:23, κἀγὼ ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ σὺ ἐν ἐμοί [“I also in them and you in me”]. These
passages throw on our present one a clear and steady light: as Christ is one
with the Father, in inseparable fellowship with Him, so we are to be
indissolubly united with Him, although we are still in this world and while we
are still in this world. And this takes place, as in our passage through the
τελείωσις [“perfection”] of the ἀγάπη [“love”], so according to Joh 17:26
through the love wherewith God loves Christ dwelling in us. In this perfect
fellowship with the Father consisted the whole life, essence, and being of the
Lord upon earth, and in that it exists from everlasting to everlasting: hence
the absolute καθὼς ἐστιν [“just as he is”]. And as in this fellowship with God
(ἐν τούτῳ [“by this”]) our Lord becomes τετελειωμένη [“made perfect”], so in
virtue of the same the Lord’s love also was perfected (τελειωθεὶς ἐγένετο [“be
made perfect”], Heb 5:9). As He in Gethsemane subordinated all His own thinking,
feeling, and willing to that of the Father, as thereby His μένεινἐν τῷ Θεῷ
[“abide in God”] had reached its highest degree, thereby was His own love and
His work of love brought to perfection; thus was the ἀγάπη εἰςτέλος [“love to
the end”], which was at the same time the τετελειωμένηἀγάπη [“love made
perfect”], conquered and won by Him. Thus the apostle’s train of thought in our
passage is this: If we have perfect fellowship with God (ἐντούτῳ [“by this”]),
then have we already upon earth become like, or conformed to, the being and
nature of Christ; and when the day of judgment, that is, the day of His
manifestation (1Jn 2:28), comes, we shall on the ground of this conformity
freely and openly look Him in the face (παῤῥησίαν ἔχομεν [“we have boldness”]).
Fellowship with God is at the same time the perfected indwelling of the divine
love in us; both these, however, make us like Christ; according to this
conformity to Him shall we be finally judged; and if we have it, we have also
confidence at the last day.

Let it be further observed how affectingly our verse, thus understood, concurs
and coincides with 1Jn 3:1-4. There it was said that full and entire conformity
to Christ, which we saw to be comprehended in the idea of brotherhood, lay
before us still as the issue of the judgment; but that in order to attain it
(1Jn 3:3) we must have attained even here another kind of likeness or equality
to Him—we must have become ἁγνοί [“pure”] like Him. Then the following
exposition showed that this ἁγνεία [“purity”] consists in righteousness and
love, which on their part also again depended on the infusion of the Divine
Spirit. Comprehending all in one, we must abide in God and He in us. Now the
apostle returns back to the beginning: this fellowship with God, this perfected
love in us, is the likeness to Christ above indicated as necessary in the
judgment; in virtue of it we pass through the terrors of the judgment
unappalled, and then press onward to that higher thing, the καλὸς βαθμός [“good
degree”] of perfect equality with Christ. In the ἀγάπητετελειωμένη [“love made
perfect”] we have attained all that we may hope to attain ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τούτῳ [“in
this world”]; if, then, we have entered through the ἡμέρατῆςκρίσεως [“day of
judgement”] into the αἰὼνμέλλων [“age to come”], the further development will
not be found in arrear: φανερωθήσεταιτίἐσόμεθα [“it will be made manifest what
we will be ”].


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  CHAPTER 66: 66 - 1JN 4:18
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1Jn 4:18

Φόβος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ τελεία ἀγάπη ἔξω βάλλει τὸν φόβον, ὅτι ὁ
φόβος κόλασιν ἔχει· ὁ δὲ φοβούμενος οὐ τετελείωται ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ. The apostle’s
exposition in 1Jn 4:17 has shown that we have in the ἀγάπητετελειωμένη [“love
made perfect”], which involves in it the μένεινἐν τῷ Θεῷ[“abide in God”], the
parrhesia, because we are thus conformed to Christ the standard of the judgment.
But he has now another method of exhibiting the connection between love and
confidence, that is, by reference to the nature of love itself. To the
parrhesia, he says, fear is utterly opposed, I as this is incompatible with
love: where love is, there is not fear, but confidence. This is generally the
substance of 1Jn 4:18. That confidence and fear are opposed is a presupposition
of the verse which is not further demonstrated; the emphasis rests upon the
evidence that fear and love are not reconcilable with each other. “Fear is not
in love:” love is the feeling of internal union with another, the opening out my
person to that other; fear is the sense of wanting harmony, and therefore the
separation and shutting up of my person as it respects him. Love springs from
the feeling that God is for us; fear, from the feeling that He is against us.
Thus it is plain that the two ideas exclude each other. Yea, so little do they
agree together, that, on the contrary (ἀλλά [“but”]), love, where it exists, has
the power and tendency to drive out fear. But certainly it can do that only
where it is τελεία [“perfect”], that is, penetrates and fills the whole life and
being of man. That love must cast out fear, however, appears from this (ὅτι
[“because”]), that fear κόλασινἔχει [“has punishment”]. For the explanation of
this idea we are directed to Mat 25:46. There it is said that the ungodly
ἀπελεύσονται οὗτοι εἰς κόλασιν αἰώνιον, οἱ δὲ δίκαιοι εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον [“these
will go away into eternal punishment, but the righteous into eternal life”]. We
therefore perceive that κόλασις [“punishment”] is the punishment, the
condemnation itself, not merely the feeling of it; the objective condition, not
the subjective sense of it or pain. As this is required by the verb
ἀπέρχεσθαιεἰς [“to go away into”] itself, so still more is it demanded by the
antithesis to ζωὴαἰώνιος [“eternal life”]: as it would be highly forced to speak
of going away or entering into a feeling, so the state of eternal life is not
the description of a subjective feeling, but of a condition appointed.
Similarly, in our passage κόλασις [“punishment”] cannot be understood of a mere
painful feeling; for it was surely not necessary to emphasize that fear is in
itself a sentiment of distress. Rather, the pregnant thought of St. John is
this, that in fear, which has been shown to be fear of punishment, the
punishment itself is already included and involved. If we remember the saying of
the Gospel, that he who believeth not is condemned already; that the
condemnation consists simply in this, that light shineth into the darkness and
declares it to be darkness,—it will appear plain that in St. John’s thought
condemnation is consummate in separation from God. Now, as we have seen that
fear has its ground in the feeling of being sundered from God, while this
separation from Him is in St. John’s doctrine already the state of judgment or
condemnation, it is evident that fear contains in itself the element of
judgment: φόβοςκόλασινἔχει [“fear has punishment”]. The last clause of 1Jn 4:18,
which is linked by δέ [“moreover”], does not intend to introduce the antithesis
of φόβοςκόλασινἔχει [“fear has punishment”], that is, does not carry further the
argument brought in by ὅτι [“because”], but contains the inverse of the clause ἡ
τελεία ἀγάπη ἔξω βάλλει τὸν φόβον [“perfect love casts out fear”]. It is
perfectly clear that St. John might have exhibited this proposition, that where
fear is, love cannot be perfected, as the conclusion of the first clause itself;
but it is clear, at the same time, that the form of the antithesis is justified
as it is, and is more appropriate to the Johannaean genus dicendi.

Thus, then, the proposition which was laid down as a theme in 1Jn 2:28 has been
argued out on all sides and justified; while, at the same time, the end has been
reached which St. John, according to 1Jn 1:4, set before himself in this
Epistle, that the Christian church should attain the perfection of that joy,
which, according to 1Jn 1:3-4,[N] consists in fellowship with God and with the
brethren. For the τετελειωμένη [“made perfect”] or πεπληρωμένηχαρὰ [“fullness of
joy”] is nothing but the παῤῥησία [“boldness”], the feeling of perfect unity and
harmony with God, which will approve itself even before the rigours of the final
judgment. How, in fact, this consummate joy rests upon the two things which 1Jn
1:3 lays down, communion with God and communion with the brethren, it has been
St. John’s object throughout the whole Epistle to show. Every section of it is
based upon this double relation. But there is one thing yet wanting that had to
be evinced; and that St. John introduces supernumerarily in the paragraph from
1Jn 4:19-21, 1Jn 5:1-5: the exposition, namely, how these two aspects, which had
been hitherto viewed always as co-ordinate, the relation to God and the relation
to the brethren, form an internal and indissoluble organic unity, so that
neither of them can be conceived without the other. Our relation to God has been
presented by the apostle under various phrases: sometimes in act, as
ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”] positively, and negatively as
νικᾶντὸνκόσμον [“victory over the world”]; sometimes as the energizing potency
lying at the root of the act, the confession to Christ. In this last section,
which is to exhibit the unity of all these aspects by the ἀγαπᾶν τὸν ἀδελφόν
[“to love the brother”], we accordingly find all these expressions gathered up
again: the actual side by τηρεῖν τὰςἐντολὰς [“to keep the commandments”], 1Jn
5:2 ff., as also by νικᾶντὸνκόσμον [“victory over the world”], 1Jn 5:4-5; the
principle by πιστεύειν ὅτιἸησοῦς ἐστινὁΧριστός [“to believe that Jesus is the
Christ”]. In what preceded, the relation to God has been based upon the
acknowledgment of the mission of the Son of God; the relation to the brethren
upon the divine love infused into us. In order now to show the internal unity of
the two relations, the apostle begins by deriving both first from the idea of
love, and then from that of faith in the God-man. The former occupies 1Jn
4:19-21, the latter 1Jn 5:1 ff.


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  CHAPTER 67: 67 - 1JN 4:19
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1Jn 4:19

Ἡμεῖς ἀγαπῶμεν αὐτὸν, ὅτι αὐτὸς πρῶτος ἠγάπησεν ἡμᾶς. The nineteenth verse
resumes what was said in 1Jn 4:8 ff. From this it at once follows that we must
not read. ἡμεῖς ἀγαπῶμεν αὐτόν [“we love him”], but only ἡμεῖςἀγαπῶμεν [“we
love”]. Here primarily love is demanded in its universality: that we generally
must love follows from the anticipating love of God; that this our love must
have two directions, towards God and towards the brethren, is then explained in
what follows. Similarly, it is plain from the point of view in which we have
sought to place what follows, that ἀγαπῶμεν αὐτόν [“we love him”] is not in the
indicative, but in the conjunctive. The sense is: I have told you that we, as
the result of the love of God manifested to us, must ourselves also love.


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  CHAPTER 68: 68 - 1JN 4:20
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1Jn 4:20

Ἐάν τις εἴπῃ ὅτι ἀγαπῶ τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ μισῇ, ψεύστης ἐστίν· ὁ γὰρ
μὴ ἀγαπῶν τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ ὃν ἑώρακεν, τὸν θεὸν ὃν οὐχ ἑώρακεν οὐ δύναται
ἀγαπᾶν.

It is now unfolded that the love of God without the love of the brethren is a
thing impossible. Of love to God not a word had been hitherto said; only of the
divine love which is infused into us, and which must approve itself as brotherly
love. That we must love God enters here as a new thought, which, however, is so
self-understood that it is introduced simply as a matter taken for granted. The
emphasis lies only on the evidence that the love of God is not conceivable
without love of our brother. The form of the exposition has been made familiar
to us by 1Jn 1:1-10 and 1Jn 2:1-29 : here we have ἐάντιςεἴπῃ [“if someone
says”], there it was ἐὰνεἴπωμεν [“if we say” cf. 1Jn 1:6,1Jn 1:8,1Jn 1:10] or ὁ
λέγων [“the one who says” cf. 1Jn 2:4,1Jn 2:6,1Jn 2:9]; we may compare also the
ἀλλ’ἐρεῖτις [“but someone will say”] of Jas 2:18;[N]1Co 15:35; only that in
this last passage we have objections introduced, while here there is no
theoretical denial of the apostolical doctrine, but a delusive assertion of
being in the true state. Similarly the ψεύστηςἐστίν [“is a liar”] has been
familiarized by the first division of the Epistle, and this severe sentence the
apostle justifies by the clause with γάρ [“for”]. The question now arises, how
far the invisibility of God as such, for on it the stress is evidently laid,
demonstrates that we cannot love Him without loving the brethren. It is not to
be thought that the apostle should mean to deny the possibility of loving
generally what is invisible. This would not only contradict our experience that
we are capable of loving with all our hearts persons whom we have never seen,
but the consciousness of all true Christians who know that they love God
notwithstanding that He is unseen. If it be said that we at least know something
of the men whom we love without having seen them, and that this knowledge is the
ground of the love, then we say in reply that such a knowledge of God also we
may have in the fullest degree. The error of this explanation lies here, that
πῶς [“how”] is taken too hastily as rhetorically used; so that the clause is
made to express the simple affirmation οὐδύναται κ.τ.λ. [“not able, etc.”], as,
indeed, some codices have actually substituted this οὐ [“not”]. But the fact is
that the πῶς [“how”] has the emphasis in the sentence. “In what way can he love
God who loves not his brother?” Obviously the love of which St. John speaks is
the same of which he had said in 1Jn 3:18, that it consists not in words, but
ἐνἔργῳ [“in deed”]. Love in mere words is no love; all genuine love presses to
its demonstration in act. But the act requires, as we have been reminded in
another connection, a material on which it may exert itself. God, as in His
nature and being withdrawn from visibility, does not present in Himself
absolutely such a material on which we may work; but He has given Himself a
body, si verbis audacia detur, in man who is made after His image: that is then
the only material on which my love to God may show its energy and reality. If I
scorn that, πῶς [“how”], in what other way, in what other sense, can I then love
God, scilicet, ἐνἔργῳ [“in deed”]? But all this has not done full justice to the
tensefnἑώρακε[V-PAI-3S] [“he has seen”]: if the matter were of visibility or
invisibility in general, we should expect rather the present, or simply
ὁρᾶνδύναται [“able to see”]. But the point of view from which all is regarded
indicates the right sense: if the matter here is the demonstration or love in
any way whatever (πῶς [“how”]), it is clear that I can approve my love to my
brother only if I know the precise point in which he needs it; in short, love
requires for its exhibition a specific opportunity. Hence I must have seen, if
he is to present such an opportunity to me; without having seen him, I cannot
approve my love to him in act; whence naturally the ὁρᾶν [“see”] is to be taken
in so wide a sense that the hearing about him is involved in it also. Such
occasion for the expression of love, however, such stimulant to testify love to
God as if to His own person, is not possible without the medium of the brethren.
My deeds of charity to my neighbour may indeed and must spring from love to God;
but there are no means (πῶς [“how”]) of testifying our love to Him in act, to
Him as invisible, or to Him in and for Himself, without such a mediating
element.


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  CHAPTER 69: 69 - 1JN 4:21
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1Jn 4:21

Καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐντολὴν ἔχομεν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, ἵνα ὁ ἀγαπῶν τὸν θεὸν ἀγαπᾷ καὶ τὸν
ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ.

There is nevertheless one way, it might be thought, of loving God directly,
that, namely, of keeping His commandments—the way of obedience. But 1Jn 4:21
explains that this method of loving God ἐνἔργῳ [“in deed”] is not really a
second one; for it is God’s express commandment that we love the brethren.
Certainly the words do not indicate that this is the only commandment which we
have received; for if the apostle says ταύτηντὴνἐντολὴνἔχομεν [“we have this
commandment”], that does not hinder us from supposing that, besides the one in
question, we have many others. But yet, strictly speaking, the I precept of
brotherly love is actually the πλήρωμανόμου [“fulfillment of the law”]. If, for
example, we would reckon the νικᾶντὸνκόσμον [“victory over the world”], the
suppression of self, the subjection of pride, and so forth, as other
commandments, yet it is plain that every victory over the evil is utterly
impossible save through the might of the one principle opposed to them all, that
of love. If love consists in this, that I refer my life absolutely not to
myself, but altogether to others, then there can be no other commandment like
unto this; and this laying down or throwing away of our own life, as Christ
terms it, is possible as an act only in relation to man, not in relation to God:
or it is possible as towards God only through the mediation of brotherly love. A
passage literally expressing the commandment here given we certainly nowhere
find. Yet we need not fall back upon the fundamental text of the Old Testament,
“Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, and thy neighbour as thyself;” the apostle
himself will give us what we want. In Joh 14:15 we read,
ἐὰνἀγαπᾶτέμεκαὶτὰςἐντολάςμουτηρήσετε [“if you love me, you will also keep my
commandments”]. The plurality of the precepts here mentioned is reduced again,
according to the context, to the unity of the one commandment given in Joh
13:34: ἐντολὴν καινὴν δίδωμι ὑμῖν ἵνα ἀγαπᾶτε ἀλλήλους [“A new commandment I
give to you, that you love one another”]. That in the Gospel the love of Christ
is spoken of, while here it is the love of God, is of no moment; since the
apostle knows no love to Christ which is not love to God, and no love to God
which is not love to Christ.


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  CHAPTER 70: 70 - 1JN 5:1
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1Jn 5:1

Πᾶς ὁ πιστεύων ὅτι Ἰησοῦς ἐστιν ὁ Χριστὸς, ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ γεγέννηται· καὶ πᾶς ὁ
ἀγαπῶν τὸν γεννήσαντα, ἀγαπᾷ καὶ τὸν γεγεννημένον ἐξ αὐτοῦ. The synthesis of our
relation to God and to the brethren, which the apostle here perfectly sets
forth, he has thus educed primarily from the love of God supposed to exist in
us: the right relation to God is confirmed and corroborated only by the right
relation to the brethren. He now seizes the matter from the opposite side:
brotherly love is to be measured by the reality of our fellowship with God. This
thought, expressed in 1Jn 5:2, is the fundamental note of the verses which
follow, the first verse of the chapter forming only a transition to it. Several
new ideas enter here. First, instead of the ἀδελφὸς [“brother”], as the hitherto
usual designation of the neighbour, the phrases γεγεννημένοςἐκτοῦΘεοῦ [“having
been born of God”] and τέκνατοῦΘεοῦ [“Children of God”] (1Jn 5:2) are selected
to be reproduced. This is done in the service of the synthesis here brought out
perfectly: because we are to love our neighbour as the child of God, the
genuineness of our love to him is proved, as 1Jn 5:2 declares, by the
genuineness of our love to God; if this love to God is absent, I cannot love my
neighbour as a child of God, and therefore do not regard him with the right kind
of sentiment. For since, according to 1Jn 4:1-21, charity to the neighbour
depends upon the infusion of divine love, that is, of the divine Spirit, such
charity must be always absent where the right relation to God is not sustained.
The first verse of our new chapter asserts generally, that between our relation
to God and our relation to the brethren there must be a reciprocal influence;
1Jn 5:2 ff. then explains, as we have seen, how the approval of our relation to
God is a sure token of our right relation to the brethren. Similarly significant
is the introduction of the idea πιστεύειν [“to believe”]. It had twice before
occurred, 1Jn 3:23 and 1Jn 4:16, but on both occasions only in a certain sense
as signals for the future, without taking any definite place in the organic
train of thought in the Epistle. It does not take that place until this fifth
chapter. In other respects the beginning of the first verse is based upon 1Jn
4:2 and 1Jn 4:15; the question therefore arises, why in those passages ὁμολογεῖν
[“confession”] is the subject, while here it is πιστεύειν [“to believe”]. It is
clear that ὁμολογεῖν [“confession”] presupposes πιστεύειν [“to believe”] and
includes it. In the fourth chapter, as our investigation has shown us, faith in
Christ does not appear as a characteristic in man himself, or a property of his
own; but as the token by which he may be known to be a child of God, a partaker
of the Divine Spirit. But what is in man may be known only so far as it takes
outward expression; and the outward expression of faith is simply and only the
ὁμολογεῖν [“confession”]. Here, however, the question is not of an external, but
of an internal token of divine sonship; hence the word πίστις [“faith”] is
introduced. That πιστεύειν [“to believe”] in this place and generally expresses
primarily the acknowledgment of a truth is sufficiently obvious: as here, the
proposition that Jesus is the Christ is to be acknowledged. So, when we read of
πιστεύειντινί[“to believeinsomeone”], we acknowledge the trustworthiness of the
person generally. But this does not exhaust the idea: for, when in Joh 5:44 the
πιστεύειν [“to believe”] is opposed to the δόξανπαρ᾿ἀλλήλωνλαμβάνοντες [“you
accept praise from one another”], that is, to the egoism which seeks τὰἴδια
[“its own”], such a view of faith as that is seen to be insufficient; and when
in Joh 20:31 the end of the whole Gospel is laid down as being
ἵναπιστεύοντεςζωὴνἔχητε [“that by believing you may have life”], it is
impossible to suppose that a mere acknowledgment as truth could include the
whole ζωή [“life”], which is the state of the whole man as thinking, feeling,
and willing. In very deed, there lies in πιστεύειν [“to believe”] the idea of
the unio mystica; more strictly, the union and conjunction of the human with the
divine, which is effected fundamentally in the acknowledgment of the central
fact of salvation (Ἰησοῦς ἐστινὁΧριστός[“Jesus is the Christ”]). Now it is
certainly true that the πίστις [“faith”] is not in itself the sonship; for to
this belongs another element, the gift of God. Compare as to this two passages
of the Gospel, in which, as here, faith and sonship are placed in juxtaposition.
The first is in Joh 1:12: ὅσοι δὲ ἔλαβον αὐτὸν, ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίαν τέκνα
Θεοῦ γενέσθαι, τοῖς πιστεύουσιν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ. [“But as many as received
him, to them he gave the right to become children of God, to those who believe
in his name”]. If to believers the power is given to become sons of God, then
they are not such in virtue of their faith: there is necessary beyond this a
special gift of God (ἔδωκεν [“he has given”]). And as, in the immediately
following words, this divine sonship is explained as a γεγεννῆσθαιἐκ
τοῦθελήματοςτοῦΘεοῦ [“to have been born by the will of God”], it cannot be
regarded as simply equivalent to the human acting of faith; but the divine
causality is there brought prominently forward which makes us the children of
God. The second passage is in Joh 3:3-7. In the fourth verse the γεγεννῆσθαι
ἄνωθεν [“to have been bornagain” / “from above”fn] is described as a
γεγεννῆσθαιἐξὕδατος καὶπνεύματος [“to have been born of water and Spirit”]; it
is therefore marked out as an act of God, or rather as the communication of the
Divine Spirit. But then Christ answers the question of Nicodemus, πῶςδύναται
ταῦτα γενέσθαι; [“how can these things be?”],—which was by no means an
exclamation in the wondering rhetorical form of interrogation, but literally a
simple question: “In what way, through what means, is such a total renewal
possible?”—Christ answers it, we affirm, summarily by the requirement of faith:
“Dost thou, the celebrated teacher of the law, so little know the law?” As, in
the Old Testament, the people stung by serpents were saved by believing on the
sign divinely lifted up, so in the New Testament men are saved by faith in the
divine sign of the Son of man lifted up. Thus through faith δύναται ταῦτα
γενέσθαι [“these things can be”]; and still this ταῦτα [“these things”] is,
according to 1Jn 5:2-3, a divine act, the γεγεννῆσθαιἐκπνεύματος [“to have been
born of the Spirit”]. Between these two, the human faith and the divine act,
there is no contrariety, but a synthesis is necessary. In order to the
γεγεννῆσθαιἐκ τοῦΘεοῦ [“to have been born of God”] there must be, first of all,
an infusion of the σπέρμαΘεοῦ [“seed of God”], the divine germ of life, and
this represents the one element. As, however, the γεγεννῆσθαι [“to have been
born”] is not a new creation, but rather a renewal or transformation, the new
life can come to realization only as it stamps its impress on the original
elements of man’s nature, and makes that its organ; or, in other words, as the
subject under the operation unites himself and is conjoined with the divine
σπέρμα [“seed”]. Now this latter element is the πίστις [“faith”]. When, then,
our passage says that everyone who believeth is born of God, the ideas of
subject and predicate are not in themselves of equal comprehension, that of the
subject is narrower than that of the predicate; and it is only established that
where faith, the act demanded on the part of man, is present, there certainly
also the divine act, the impartation of the Spirit, may be found also; and thus
the existence of the former is a sufficient and satisfactory sign of the reality
of sonship. Where, however, a γεγεννῆσθαιἐκ τοῦΘεοῦ [“to have been born of God”]
is experienced,—this is the further meaning of the verse,—a relation is proved
not only to Him who begets, but also to those begotten of Him, that is, to the
brethren.

Textual note fnThe word ἄνωθεν (anōthen) has a double meaning, “again” and
“from above.” The meaning is determined by context. This word is used 5 times in
the Gospel of John (John 3:3, John 3:7, John 3:31, John 19:11 and John 19:23).
In the latter 3 cases the context makes it clear that it means “from above.” But
in John 3:3 and John 3:7 it could mean either. It seems the primary meaning
intended by Jesus is “from above,” in terms of a spiritual birth. But given
Nicodemus’ question in John 3:4, he thinks Jesus is talking about a second
physical birth. This gives Jesus the opportunity to explain more fully and in
more detail what he really meant. Both meanings seem to fit, as being born “from
above” is to be “born again” spiritually.


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  CHAPTER 71: 71 - 1JN 5:2
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1Jn 5:2

Ἐν τούτῳ γινώσκομεν ὅτι ἀγαπῶμεν τὰ τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὅταν τὸν Θεὸν ἀγαπῶμεν, καὶ
τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ τηρῶμεν. But it is not the apostle’s purpose to show that love
to God and love to the brethren must go hand in hand; this is only the basis of
the subsequent exposition, that our relation to God must lay down the standard
for our love to the brethren. The two verses, therefore, are connected as the
more general and the more particular. The thought presented by the new verse is,
however, in itself very striking. If it said that brotherly love rests upon the
divine love, and that the latter is the causa essendi of the former, this would
be perfectly clear. But what of the causa cognoscendi? Has not St. John at the
close of the former explained simply that brotherly love is the token of the
love of God, indeed the only evidence of it? First, it is to be observed that
not the love of God in itself is the approving mark of brotherly love, but as
connected with the addition καὶ τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ τηρῶμεν [“and we keep his
commandments”], while the relation between this love to God and obedience to His
commandments is laid down in the first clause of the third verse: herein
consists the love of God; there is no other than that which approves itself in
obedience. The same relation between love and practical obedience we find in Joh
14:31: ἵνα γνῷ ὁ κόσμος ὅτι ἀγαπῶ τὸν πατέρα, καὶ καθὼς ἐνετείλατό μοι ὁ πατὴρ,
οὕτω ποιῶ [“so that the world may know that I love the Father, I do just as the
Father commanded me.”], where certainly the clause with ὅτι [“because”] shows
how the world is to recognise the love of Christ to His Father. Compare also Joh
14:15: ἐὰν ἀγαπᾶτέ με, τὰς ἐντολὰς τὰς ἐμὰς τηρήσατε [“If you love me, you will
keep my commandments”]. But what does this mean, what the commandments which are
here spoken of? Do they mean brotherly love? Impossible, for then the sense
would be pure tautology: we know our brotherly love by this, that we keep the
commandment of loving the brethren; or, in other words, he that hath brotherly
love hath it. It is the following verse, rather, which specifies the contents of
the ἐντολαὶΘεοῦ [“commandments of God”], that is, in the νικᾶντὸνκόσμον
[“victory over the world”]. As the world is vanquished, the kingdom of God is
built up; these two are not separate and distinct factors; they are inseparably
bound up with each other. Accordingly, the ἐντολαὶΘεοῦ [“commandments of God”]
are no other than what St. John had laid down in chapter 3 as the
ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην [“to practice righteousness”]. And now we may take complete
survey of the apostle’s thought. Besides the genuine Christian brotherly love
there is another, a purely natural love, which, however, is in fact only a
sublimated egoism, and concerning which in its various forms the word of St.
James holds good, that it is in its gradation ἐπίγειος [“earthly”], ψυχική
[“natural”], δαιμονιώδης [“demonic”] [cf. Jas 3:15]. These may in their most
amiable and seductive aspects easily enough suggest the erroneous idea that in
them the commandment of the apostle is fulfilled. Now, whether the love is a
thoroughly Christian sentiment, a love towards the τέκνα Θεοῦ [“children of
God”], flowing from the γεγεννημένος ἐκτοῦΘεοῦ [“to be born of God”], we may
surely judge by the answer to the question whether we practise the δικαιοσύνη
[“righteousness”], or, negatively, whether we overcome the world. Every
imaginable exhibition of brotherly love approves itself as Christian, and
therefore genuine, by this, that it is a stone contributed to the house or
kingdom of God, a blow dealt to the kingdom of darkness; only as we are the
performers of the divine will and conscious of divine ends, can we recognize
ourselves as ἀγαπῶμεντὰτέκνατοῦΘεοῦ [“we love the children of God”]; for only
then has our deportment any reference to men as they are children of God. At the
close of the previous chapter it was said that brotherly love alone was the test
by which we must try our love to God; because, as we saw in 1Jn 4:21, there is
no obedience towards God possible which should not be at the same time and
equally a working and striving and living for the brethren. Here we have the
converse. If we build up the kingdom of God, the same thing as laying low the
kingdom of the world, then we give a plain token of true brotherly love; for
there is no genuine love to God’s children which has not in itself this mark or
this tendency. In sum, the love of God and charity to our fellow-Christians
confirm, corroborate, and approve each other reciprocally: the one idea cannot
be considered perfect without the supplement of the other. And here, then, we
have found the most absolute synthesis between the two leading thoughts or
aspects of truth which govern the whole Epistle, the κοινωνίαμετὰ τοῦΘεοῦ
[“fellowship with God”] and the κοινωνίαμετὰτῶνἀδελφῶν [“fellowship with the
brothers”]. As objects of thought, or ideas in the mind, we may hold these
apart; but in the reality of life they cannot be disjoined. And, looked at from
this point of view, our exposition of 1Jn 2:3 ff. receives a confirmatory light.
We perceived there, regarding only the context, that all the commandments of God
in the end are gathered up in that one focus of brotherly love; and the point we
have just been establishing must make that appear perfectly natural: in fact,
all other precepts are summed up in this; as, on the other hand, the presence of
obedience towards God in any other supposable respects must in the long run
react upon or lead up to brotherly love. But the form of the sentence in our
verse demands some further consideration. The construction ἐντούτῳ γινώσκομεν .
. . ἐὰν [“by this we know . . . if”] is common enough both in the Gospel and in
our Epistle; but we never find ἐντούτῳ γινώσκομενὅταν [“by this we know when”]
save in this place. That ὅταν [“when”] is never elsewhere used by St. John with
a conditional meaning, will make us hesitate about taking it so here. Ὅταν
[“when”] is primarily, just as ὅτι [“because”], a particle of time; the ἄνfn
added to this certainly introduces a conditional element, without interfering
with the idea of time in it: either its force is to define the action as
indefinite and often recurring, on each recurrence, however, having a specific
result (whenever); or it means that the time of its recurrence is to be expected
in the future (when once). Here the former is the case: in every such supposed
case (ἄνfn) there must concur simultaneously (ὅτι [“because”]) with brotherly
love obedience also; and it is precisely in the fact of the latter (ἐν τούτῳ
[“by this”]) that we are confident in discerning the former. Whether we are to
read at the close of the verb ποιῶμεν [“we practice”] or τηρῶμεν [“we keep”] is
essentially matter of indifference; yet the circumstance that Codex A omits the
next line down to the second τηρῶμεν [“we keep”], seems to indicate that the eye
of the transcriber might easily go astray and wander to the following clause,
and thus the τηρῶμεν [“we keep”] of the third verse was wrongly brought forward
into the second, in which originally the unusual ἐντολὰςποιεῖν [“to keep
commandments”] stood.


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  CHAPTER 72: 72 - 1JN 5:3
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1Jn 5:3

Αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἵνα τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ τηρῶμεν. καὶ αἱ ἐντολαὶ
αὐτοῦ βαρεῖαι οὐκ εἰσὶν. The first clause of the third verse has been made clear
so far as its meaning goes: the strict connection between love of God and
obedience, introduced before in passing, is here expressly established. This is
the substance (αὕτηἐστιν [“this is”]), and this is, at the same time, the
tendency (ἵνα [“so that”]) of love to fulfil the commandments of God. And that
follows, not only from the idea of love, but also from the way in which it was
brought into our hearts. If love is the reference of my I to another I, love to
God is the reference and subjection of my will to the will divine; and if the
genesis of love to God is the fact that His prevenient love has been infused
into my nature, then, again, the will of God must have become my will. And this
obedience to the divine precept, thus demanded, the apostle proceeds to say, is
easy; compare Mat 11:30. Assuredly, the expression βαρεῖαι [“burdensome”] means,
primarily, pressing or hard, not “easy to be fulfilled;” but as the commandments
are pressing or hard only from the fact that we cannot fulfil them, or fulfil
them only with pains, the two meanings come to one and the same thing. God’s
laws are not termed light in themselves, as if, that is, they did not require
anything heavy or difficult; for, strictly speaking, nothing is easy and nothing
difficult of itself; all difficulty lies simply in the relation between the
thing concerned and the power of the person concerned. Only to the Christian are
the divine commandments easy; because, in the power of faith, of that faith
which links him with Christ, there is the strength of union between his will and
the divine will. But in the spiritual domain the measure of the will is also
ever the measure of the power. Every sin rests not only on a deficiency of
power, but also on a deficiency of will.


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  CHAPTER 73: 73 - 1JN 5:4
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1Jn 5:4

Ὅτι πᾶν τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ νικᾷ τὸν κόσμον. καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ νίκη ἡ
νικήσασα τὸν κόσμον, ἡ πίστις ἡμῶν. The reason which makes the law of God become
easy is given in 1Jn 5:4a. The commandments are hard only through a certain
opposition which thwarts them and hinders their being obeyed. This depends upon
the power of the world, the κόσμος[“world”]. The world, as the kingdom of
darkness, pervaded through and through with powers of evil (compare on 1Jn
2:15), has evermore the tendency to act in opposition to the divine will; and
inasmuch as all that is earthly has in and for itself this tendency, so all
obedience towards God must be wrested, so to speak, out of the power of the
world. The manifold temptations which issue from the ἐπιθυμία [“lust”] and the
ἀλαζονεία [“arrogance”]; that dependence on the visible which is inborn in all
men; the sins also which predominate at any period and throw their influence on
all things accordingly, an influence purely of this earth: all these are the
issues and outgoings of the κόσμος[“world”]; which is by us to be renounced and
vanquished. But what is the power which shall gain the abiding victory in a war
like this, which shall in fact permanently conquer (present νικᾷ [“he
conquers”])? What is the might that is equal to this? πᾶν τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τοῦ
Θεοῦ [“everyone born of God”]. This phrase in the neuter, after the manner of
St. John in some other applications where persons are really meant (compare Joh
3:16; John 6:37, John 17:2), is, however, not to be at once regarded as
identical with πάντεςοἱγεγεννημένοι [“all those who have been born”]. The
distinction makes itself easily felt on consideration: this latter phrase would
make the person prominent; such and such men, so furnished, conquer; but St.
John’s expression places in the foreground the power by which they conquer, the
divine cause, working in the personality, which carries away the victory. The
divine energy, the power of light, wherever it truly works (πᾶν [“all”]), does
without exception (νικᾷ [“he conquers”]) win the cause and triumph over the
world as the seat of all darkness. Now, because this victory is so absolutely a
thing of necessity, therefore the divine commandments which require and enforce
this victory cannot be grievous.

What power is there that can successfully oppose the world, which is the sphere
of the transitory (compare 1Jn 2:17, ὁκόσμοςπαράγεται [“the world is passing
away”]) because it is the sphere of the visible (compare 2Co 4:18,
τὰγὰρβλεπόμεναπρόσκαιρα,τὰδὲμὴβλεπόμενααἰώνια [“for the things seen are
temporal, but the things not seen are eternal”]), save that power the nature of
which is, according to Heb 11:1, to have commerce with the invisible
(οὐβλεπόμενα [“things not seen”]), that is, the virtue of faith? The three
clauses, 1Jn 5:4a, 1Jn 5:4b, 1Jn 5:5, are so related to each other that this
victorious energy is in each case brought into clearer definition. First, we
have it in general that this victory depends upon regeneration; then, more
distinctly, it is so far as the divine birth evokes faith; finally, in 1Jn 5:5,
that this faith is, more particularly viewed, a faith in Jesus as the Son of
God. In the words νίκη νικήσασα [“the victory that has conqured”], two elements
of thought are combined,—that is to say, while the perfectfnνικήσασα[V-AAP-NSF]
[“has conqured”] leads us to think of the armour and stress of the combat that
wins the fight, νίκη [“victory”] gives simply the result of the contest. There
is no need to explain away one in order to make the other clearer: both should
have their full expression. In believing itself, the world is already virtually
overcome; and faith has ever vanquished from the beginning, being the armour or
the means to which victory is always attached. On the other hand, faith is also
the victory itself, for it is the result of the conflict: through believing I
vanquish the world, and win for myself as a prize the same faith; so that it can
now, as the result, unfold without fatal opposition all its force. But inasmuch
as faith involves in itself, germinally, a victory over the world, its
development takes place in actual life through a series of crises or stages; it
becomes gradually manifest in all its character. Even as Christ Himself had
already conquered and slain the world and its prince, while yet this victory has
to be brought out into external manifestation gradually in the history of the
kingdom of God, and through that history, which is no other than the more and
more perfect dying out of Satan’s power and the more and more nearly approaching
death-struggle of Satan himself: so also is our faith, as reflecting the whole
work of its Lord in itself, essentially and in germ the completed victory, while
yet this victory must find its external and full expression only through a
series of stages and processes. The γεγεννήσθαιἐκτοῦΘεοῦ [“having been born of
God”]—that is, the indwelling of the Divine Spirit in us—is the principle of the
victory, faith; as the union and conjunction of our own I with this Divine
Spirit, this principle becomes energetic and effectual in individual acts.

Note tn[[Actually νικήσασα [nikēsasa] is an Aorist Active Participle of νικάω
[nikaō], “conqure,” “overcome.” If it were a Perfect Active Participle here, it
would read νινικηκότες [nikēkotes]. The primary consideration of the tense of
the verb in biblical (koiné) Greek is not time, but rather the “kind of action”
the verb portrays. The Aorist tense points to an action that has happened—as a
simple “punctiliar” occurance—without making specific reference to progress or
result. The Perfect tense, on the other hand, points to a completed action with
continuing results. That said, the Aorist tense here supports Haupt’s argument
just as well as the Perfect tense would have. It is merely a grammatical error
on Haupt’s part—for which he may be excused— and not a theological point.]]


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  CHAPTER 74: 74 - 1JN 5:5
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1Jn 5:5

Τίς δέ ἐστιν ὁ νικῶν τὸν κόσμον εἰ μὴ ὁ πιστεύων ὅτι Ἰησοῦς ἐστιν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ
θεοῦ; And that faith is no other than faith in Jesus as the Son of God:
according to 1Jn 3:8, it was the work of Christ to destroy or undo the works of
Satan; and His work specifically as the Son of God. He could say θαρσεῖτε ἐγὼ
νενίκηκα τὸν κόσμον [“I have overcome the world”] (Joh 16:33); and faith in Him,
full fellowship with Him, reflects all His work even in us. Thus the close of
our section, 1Jn 5:5, most exactly returns again to its beginning, 1Jn 5:1.
Birth of God, faith, and the accomplishment of the divine will, which constitute
the victory over the world, are exhibited in their combination and
interdependence, and at the same time as evidence of brotherly love.


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  CHAPTER 75: 75 - 1JN 5:6-11
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1Jn 5:6-11

Οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἐλθὼν δι᾽ ὕδατος καὶ αἵματος, Ἰησοῦς ὁ Χριστός· οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι
μόνον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι καὶ τῷ αἵματι· καὶ τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστι τὸ μαρτυροῦν, ὅτι τὸ
πνεῦμά ἐστιν ἡ ἀλήθεια. ὅτι τρεῖς εἰσιν οἱ μαρτυροῦντες [ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, ὁ πατὴρ,
ὁ λόγος, καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα· καὶ οὗτοι οἱ τρεῖς ἕν εἰσι. καὶ τρεῖς εἰσιν οἱ
μαρτυροῦντες ἐν τῇ γῇ], τὸ πνεῦμα, καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ, καὶ τὸ αἷμα· καὶ οἱ τρεῖς εἰς τὸ
ἕν εἰσιν. Εἰ τὴν μαρτυρίαν τῶν ἀνθρώπων λαμβάνομεν, ἡ μαρτυρία τοῦ Θεοῦ μείζων
ἐστὶν, ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ μαρτυρία τοῦ Θεοῦ ἣν μεμαρτύρηκε περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὑτοῦ. Ὁ
πιστεύων εἰς τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἔχει τὴν μαρτυρίαν ἐν ἑαυτῷ· ὁ μὴ πιστεύων τῷ
Θεῷ, ψεύστην πεποίηκεν αὐτὸν, ὅτι οὐ πεπίστευκεν εἰς τὴν μαρτυρίαν ἣν
μεμαρτύρηκεν ὁ Θεὸς περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὑτοῦ· Καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ μαρτυρία, ὅτι ζωὴν
αἰώνιον ἔδωκεν ἡμῖν ὁ Θεὸς, καὶ αὕτη ἡ ζωὴ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ αὐτοῦ ἐστιν.

Thus, then, it appears that the section we have just been considering forms one
whole with that of 1Jn 4:19-21; but we observe that there is in it one distinct
element, which carries us back again to the beginning of the Epistle. In the
middle of its first sentence it was declared that the λόγος τῆς ζωῆς [“word of
life”] would form the contents of it; that St. John’s purpose was to give an
annunciation concerning Christ; and if not to exhibit His person, yet to exhibit
His work in us. He had then in his first main division described the interior
religious character of the Christian life in its relation to God and to the
brethren; in the second, the external confirmation of this as a token of a right
posture towards God and man, and as therefore a condition of true Christian joy.
But all this is subsumed under a higher aim: not for its own sake, but for the
sake of an annunciation περὶτοῦλόγου τῆς ζωῆς [“concerning the word of life”].
The relation to Him—that is, to Christ the Son of God—it was to which his final
aim was directed. But this relation is in the New Testament phraseology embraced
and expressed by the idea of πίστις [“faith”]; and in here introducing this, the
apostle rounds off the Epistle into unity; he seems to declare that the design
laid down in 1Jn 1:1 ff. was in this at length fulfilled. But there is one
element in the Introduction which has not yet had justice done to it, having
only once, 1Jn 4:14, been touched upon in passing: the idea of μαρτυρία
[“testimony”]. What other was the purport of the copious sentence of 1Jn 1:1
ff., with its so emphatic development of one idea, but the guarantee and witness
of the truth of the apostolic tendency? This element is now, in the section 1Jn
5:6-12, taken up again, although in another form than what it assumed in 1Jn
1:1. All that the apostle had aimed to teach he had now taught: luminous and
distinct, complete and self-contained, lies the full development of his thought
before us. He has established the true relation towards God and the brethren;
the παῤῥησία [“boldness”], as the result even in relation to the יוֹםגָּדוֹלוְנוֹרָא
[“awesome and terrifying day”]; the χαρὰ τετελειωμένη [“joy made perfect”] is
guaranteed and secured; while all this rests upon the outgoings of πίστις
[“faith”] in the divine Son of God. On this last, therefore, rests the
superstructure of the whole. This faith must accordingly in itself be a
spiritual possession, absolute and unconquerable; its object must have the
strongest possible confirmation and assurance. To show that this is so remains
now the apostle’s final problem. The idea of μαρτυρία [“testimony”], which,
apart from these explanations, must appear to the most superficial and external
observation the centre of all that follows, is one that has a remarkable
prominence throughout the Johannaean writings. This idea appears at the
beginning, and recurs at the end of all the three greater documents which we
have received from St. John. In the Apocalypse he commences, Rev 1:2, with the
vindication of his trustworthiness: ὃς ἐμαρτύρησε τὸν λόγον τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ τὴν
μαρτυρίαν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ὅσα τὲ εἶδεν [“who testified to the word of God and to
the testimony of Jesus Christ, as much as that he saw”]. It is matter of
indifference whether the ἐμαρτύρησεν [“he testified to”] referred to the work
itself which he was beginning, or to the earlier written Gospel, or to his
general and ordinary oral ministry: in any case, it is the drift of the apostle
to introduce a guarantee of his veracity by the mention of his eye-witness-ship
(ὅσατὲεἶδεν [“as much as he saw”]). So, again, at the close of the book, Rev
22:1-21, its contents are summed up again and again as a μαρτυρία [“testimony”]
of our Lord. The Gospel, in its turn, goes on, after the prologue, with the
μαρτυρία [“testimony”] of the Baptist, Joh 1:18 ff., and ends with that of the
evangelist himself, Joh 21:24. And, finally, our Epistle begins with the
personal testimony of the apostle, while it ends with that of God Himself. But
to return, the body of the Gospel gives the same prominent part to the idea of
the μαρτυρεῖν [“to testify”]: the valid and sufficient witness which the Lord
has to appeal to in His controversies with the Jews is a thought which is
constantly on His lips. In particular, He appeals in His own behalf again and
again—compare Joh 5:3; John 8:18, John 15:26 (strictly speaking, it is the Holy
Ghost who is referred to in this last)—to the witness of His God to His mission.
Now it is precisely this, as we have seen, which is spoken of in our present
passage. It is true that in 1Jn 5:6 the witness is that of the Spirit; in 1Jn
5:8, that of water, and blood, and the Spirit; but as from 1Jn 5:9 onwards THE
witness of God is spoken of (mark the article) without any kind of specification
as to the manner or the medium in which this testimony reaches us, it follows
from this last circumstance, as well as from the definite article, that the
water, and the blood, and the Spirit have no independent meaning of their own,
but are only the mediating representations of the divine testimony. They
together form, in fact, the μαρτυρίατοῦθεοῦ [“testimony of God”].

We have here, however, two things sharply to distinguish. First comes the
question as to the substance of the witness of God: what does it testify? This
question is fully and clearly answered in 1Jn 5:11, καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ μαρτυρία,
ὅτι ζωὴν αἰώνιον ἔδωκεν ἡμῖν ὁ Θεὸς, καὶ αὕτη ἡ ζωὴ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ αὐτοῦ ἐστιν [“and
the testimony is this, that God has given us eternal life, and this life is in
His Son”]; but it is also, in a more condensed form, contained in 1Jn 5:6.
However, if we are content for a time with the perfectly clear answer in 1Jn
5:11, we perceive that the object of the divine testimony is the eternal life
sealed for us in the Son of God: He is the possessor (ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστιν [“in him
is”]), and He is the mediator, of this life. The second question is this: by
what means does God bear His witness? And its answer: by water, blood, Spirit.
Now we have in the substance of the divine testimony, given to us in 1Jn 5:11, a
standard by which we may measure and ascertain the correctness of our
interpretation of these three witnesses. They must be such as can testify
concerning Jesus as the possessor of eternal life, and as the giver of eternal
life to us. In what sense, then, do the water, the blood, the Spirit furnish
this witness for Christ? In order to explain the water and the blood, we must
consider the twofold relation which they here assume. First, they are witnesses,
or media of the testimony, μεμαρτύρηκεν ὁ Θεὸς περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ [“the testimony God
has given concerning the Son”]: the water and the blood must therefore represent
some divine act, some divine institution, in virtue of which God appears in
behalf of Christ. Secondly, it is to be observed that Christ Himself is said to
have come δι᾽ὕδατοςκαὶαἵματος [“by water and blood”]. Now, as St, John uses
always the word “come,” or the ἔρχεσθαι [“to come”], concerning Christ, as a vox
solemnis which refers to the coming of Jesus as the Messiah,—not to His being
born generally, but to His manifestation as Saviour of the world,—the
proposition before us must needs signify that Jesus attained His Messianic
position through water and blood. These two are therefore not only the pledge of
His divine sonship, but at the same time the powers through which He was
constituted the Saviour: the water and the blood must, accordingly, be pointed
to as constitutive factors in the life oi the Redeemer. Before, however, we look
more closely at the sense in which this is true, we must first justify the
phraseology we have just used. We have, that is, described the testimony here
concerned, now as witnessing His divine sonship, and now as witnessing His
Messianic activity,—that is, as at once testimony to His person and as testimony
also to His work. For this double way of describing it we have the apostle’s own
warranty; for in 1Jn 1:1 he refers both to the gift of life and to the bringer
of life as the object of the divine witness. And, in fact, the one is involved
in the other: He who is to give the life must first have it in Himself; and He
who has it in Himself is thereby declared to be the Son of God, according to Joh
5:26, ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ ἔχει ζωὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οὕτως ἔδωκε καὶ τῷ υἱῷ ζωὴν ἔχειν ἐν
ἑαυτῷ [“For just as the Father has life in himself, even so he gave to the Son
also to have life in himself”] life is thereby demonstrated to be the Son of
God; and He who shall give life to others must ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχειν [“have in
himself”] that life. Thus in reality the divine sonship and the Messiahship of,
Jesus are bound up together. But what manner of water is that, concerning which
so great things are said? Primarily, we are led to think of the baptism which
Christ received at the hands of John the Baptist. In truth, He was by that
baptism inaugurated into His Messianic function: the three Synoptists make this
point of view abundantly prominent; and at the first glance it seems therefore
perfectly intelligible, when it is said δι᾽ὕδατος [“through water”], that He
came as the Messiah by this baptismal water, that this event was the medium of
His introduction to His Christly function, and fitted Him to enter on it. But we
must bethink ourselves to examine this closely. What prepared Jesus for His
office was not the baptismal water, but the communication of the Spirit
connected; with His baptism. In our sacramental Christian baptism, indeed, the
water and the impartation of the Spirit through the rite are so inseparably
united, that the one word water may well be used to signify the whole, including
the heavenly blessing: the earthly sign and the heavenly reality are in the
sacrament indissolubly one. But it was quite otherwise in the baptism of John.
That was assuredly no sacramental act, and certainly did not of itself confer
the Holy Ghost: whence, indeed, John himself could say that, in contrast with
his own baptism, Christ would baptize with the Holy Ghost: compare Joh 1:33, ὁ
πέμψας με βαπτίζειν ἐν ὕδατι, ἐκεῖνός μοι εἶπεν, Ἐφ᾽ ὃν ἂν ἴδῃς τὸ πνεῦμα
καταβαῖνον. . .οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ βαπτίζων ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ [“the one who sent me to
baptize in water said to me, ’the one upon whom you see the Spirit descending .
. . this is the one who baptizes with the Holy Spirit’”]. The communication of
the Spirit, of which our Lord at His baptism was the object, was not itself
connected by any means with that baptism as such; but it was an extraordinary
event, which was attached to it. John’s baptism and Christian baptism are in
antithesis to each other: in the former, man is, primarily, the giver; in the
latter, he is the receiver. He who submitted to John’s rite laid down this
confession: as the water cleanses my body, so will I henceforth dedicate my soul
to God in pure service. Anything like an extraordinary supernatural gift of God
to man was not by any means connected with this act. Thus, if the question here
is of the inauguration of Christ to His office, the designation of baptism by
ὕδωρ [“water”] would be altogether unsuitable; since the introduction to His
function was not by baptism in itself, but by the gift of the Spirit1not
necessarily connected with that rite. Moreover, the water of Christ’s baptism
cannot by any means be exhibited as a witness of His divine mission: this
external rite was in fact one common to the Lord and many besides, which
therefore did not involve of itself any such virtue of special testimony. The
voice which sounded from heaven, or the Spirit who ὡσεὶπεριστερά [“like a dove”]
descended on Jesus, might indeed have this virtue; but they would not be
designated by ὕδωρ [“water”], because, as we have seen, the baptism of John did
not necessarily include the gift of the Spirit.

We must therefore look about for another interpretation of the ὕδωρ [“water”].
Does it signify Christian baptism? It is clear that this, in contradistinction
to that of John, may well be described by ὕδωρ [“water”]; since that essential
and necessary interpretation of water and Spirit, form and matter, is found in
it which is absent from John’s baptism. And the phrase ὁἐλθὼνδι᾽ὕδατος [“the one
who came by water”] is thus perfectly intelligible. The Baptist himself
comprises the whole work of Christ in this, that He would baptize with the Holy
Ghost and with fire. Even the fact that the baptismal sacrament was instituted
only at the end of our Lord’s ministry would not stand obstinately in the way of
this explanation; for the proper unfolding of the Messianic activity of Christ,
to which the ἔρχεσθαι [“to come”] refers, actually attained its consummation
only at the end of His course upon earth. We should indeed expect to read
ἐρχόμενος [“the one coming”]; since the historically completed fact of the
manifestation of the Messiah in the world was not consummated by means of the
baptismal sacrament; rather in it He continuously comes as the Saviour and
Redeemer of men. Another reason for rejecting this view is suggested by the way
in which the ὕδωρ [“water”] and the αἷμα [“blood”] are here placed in
correlation or opposition: for Christian baptism itself includes a reference to
the death, and therefore to the blood of Christ, according to the Pauline
declaration of Rom 6:3, εἰςτὸνθάνατοναὐτοῦἐβαπτίσθημεν [“we have been baptized
into his death”]. Now, where it is said that Christ came not by water alone, but
by water and blood, there is ascribed to each of these elements a specific
matter: there is somewhat in the blood which is not found in the water. But, as
we have seen that in the baptismal sacrament water and blood are together
efficient, the interpretation which makes the water the sacrament of baptism is
not altogether suitable. And this objection is strengthened when we consider the
peculiar position which St. John assumes to the sacraments generally. We
certainly find in his Gospel passages which must be referred incidentally to the
sacraments, having in them their highest fulfilment and truth; but we find no
reference to the institution of these rites, nor indeed any mention of them as
such. In John chapter 6 our Lord speaks of the eating of His flesh and drinking
His blood, and the words in question doubtless allude also to the holy supper;
but the explanation of eating by the idea of faith itself shows that the
paragraph is primarily to be understood as a symbolic way of teaching the full
and living appropriation of Christ Himself ( ἐγώεἰμιὁἄρτοςτῆςζωῆς [“I am the
bread of life” cf. Joh 6:35,John 6:48,John 6:51]) and of His atonement (αἷμα
[“blood”]). Similarly, when John 3:1-36 speaks of regeneration of water and the
Spirit, the words certainly allude to the water of baptism; indeed they cannot
be read by Christian people without bringing this allusion to their
consciousness. But the very fact that there existed at the time no sacrament of
baptism, that therefore Nicodemus, to whom the words were applied, could not, if
this were their only meaning, have understood them, indicates that the water
also must primarily be accepted in its symbolical sense. Now, as we have seen
that our Epistle never in any passage goes beyond the circle of thought
prescribed by the Gospel, this of itself must make us suspicious of accepting a
reference to the sacraments as the direct and exclusive meaning of our present
passage.

Thus we are led to make the experiment, whether the same interpretation of ὕδωρ
[“water”] which applies everywhere to the Gospel may not be here also
applicable,—that is, in effect, the symbolical. A test of this method of
interpretation we have in the fact that the meaning of the water in our text
must be different from that of the blood: this latter must involve an element
which the former has not; while both must be available and equally valid as
witnesses for Christ. Now at the outset we find the symbolical use of the ὕδωρ
[“water”] in 1Jn 4:1-21, “he that drinketh of the water that I shall give shall
never thirst;” [Joh 4:14] and, further, in Joh 7:38, “he that believeth on me,
out of his body shall flow rivers of living water.” In these passages we must
understand by the water the new and saving life, which springs up fresh and
clear as from a fountain: compare the πηγαὶτοῦσωτηρίον [“springs of salvation”]
of Isa 12:3, and Psa 23:2. On the other hand, the washing with water is in the
Old Testament ritual the means of purification; and the water very frequently
elsewhere occurs with this meaning, apart from the legal observances. The two
symbolical applications must not be sundered, for they rest on the same
fundamental ideas: water is the symbol, not only of the attainment of
purification, that is, of holiness, but of the possession of it as the result.
Thus we find it in the passage, Joh 3:5, which is fundamental for the meaning of
our present text: the new birth of water and of the Spirit describes the
production of new and pure and saving life, ὕδωρ [“water”], through the Holy
Ghost, πνεῦμα[“Spirit”]. Thus the relation of the water and the blood is clear,
at least clear in general: in the blood lies the element of propitiation; this
is wanting in the water, which points rather to redemption. Regeneration is, in
fact, primarily not so much the expiation of the past, as the implanting of a
new nature, the establishing of salvation. That negative aspect, according to
which the λοῦτρονπαλιγγενεσίας [“washing of regeneration” cf. Tit 3:5]; becomes
at the same time βαπτισμός εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν [“a baptism for the forgiveness
of sins”] (Act 2:38), is introduced first by the above-mentioned reference to
the death of Christ. Accordingly, the ὕδωρ [“water”] would here be the symbol of
the new divine life, filled and replenished with purifying energies, which the
Redeemer has brought. In virtue (διὰ [“through”]) of this power existing in
Himself, as the source of the fountain (John 4:1-54). He came as the Messiah
(ἦλθεν [“he came”]): only because He had this life of salvation and could impart
it to us was He fitted to be the Messiah. And, at the same time, the fact that
the powers of a new and saving life came from. Christ, is the witness that
legitimates Him as the Son of God. For, as we unfolded at the outset of our
discussion, He who can impart life is thereby guaranteed as the possessor of it,
and, moreover, therefore attested to be the Son of God. So far we are led by the
principle of a purely symbolical interpretation; it must be admitted, however,
as the exegetical feeling of every one will suggest, that the Interpretation of
ὕδωρ [“water”] thus arrived at is not at all points satisfactory and sufficient.
But before we penetrate further, we must deal in a similar way with the αἷμα
[“blood”] for its preliminary symbolical exposition. That the αἷμα [“blood”]
is not to be understood, primarily at least, of the sacrament of the altar, is
shown—apart from what has been already said, which partly applies here also—by
the fact that there is in the New Testament no allusion to the Lord’s Supper,
which mentions only the blood. But we have in our Epistle itself one passage
which expresses to us the significance of the blood of Christ, and from which,
therefore, we must not in our interpretation of the present text without strong
necessity depart: it is in 1Jn 2:2 (also 1Jn 4:10), where the ἱλασμός[“atoning
sacrifice”], the propitiation, is described as the result of the death of the
Redeemer. And to this we must add 1Jn 1:7, to
τὸαἷμαἸησοῦΧριστοῦκαθαρίζειἡμᾶςἀπὸπάσηςἁμαρτίας [“the blood of Jesus Christ
cleanses us from all sins”]. Accordingly St. John says here that Christ, by
means of His propitiatory death, came forward as the Messiah; that in this lay
the realization of His work as the Saviour. And this atoning power, which
proceeds from Him and fills His being ἦλθεν ἐναἵματι [“he came with blood”], is
the second witness which God bears to Him. It demonstrates that He in whom such
power dwells is the Son of God. This symbolical interpretation of the ὕδωρ
[“water”] and αἷμα [“blood”] by no means excludes the possibility that the
sacraments are also included in these expressions. It is, in fact, not
fortuitous that in baptism the water, in the Eucharist the blood, assume so
prominent a place; it was so appointed, because in the former the renewal of the
power of life, the purifying and saving energy of the Spirit, is the main point;
in the latter, the appropriation of the atonement lying in the blood of Jesus.
Indeed, with baptism also is connected the forgiveness of sins, and therefore
expiation, and with the Eucharist renewal to pure life; but still in such a way
that with baptism the element of the implanting of new life comes into the
foreground, with the Eucharist the suppression of the sin indwelling in the
flesh by the diffusion and penetration of the glorified body of Christ. While,
therefore, the reasons already alleged forbid our thinking of the sacraments
primarily and exclusively, they are so far included as the symbolical meaning of
the water and the blood finds in them its application, indeed its culminating
application. Our passage, accordingly, ranks side by side with the third and
sixth chapters of the Gospel. It is even probable that the thought of the
sacraments, and the order in which they are received by Christians, prescribed
the order of the words ὕδωρ καὶαἷμα [“water and blood”].

But, as we said before, the interpretation thus reached does not perfectly
satisfy. For, though ὕδωρ [“water”] and αἷμα [“blood”] often occur in St. John
symbolically, or rather tropically, this does not explain how this tropical
expression finds its way here. Instead of saying that the powers of the new life
which Christ has brought testify for Him, to say that the water testifies for
Him,—is and must ever be thought inexpressibly hard. In addition to this:
granted that the blood is here a symbol of expiation, yet it is not as a mere
trope, or figurative style of speaking; actual and true blood was shed and
effected the propitiation, and therefore the expression αἷμα [“blood”] is
perfectly intelligible in this connection. The blood, that is, the expiating
blood of Christ poured out on the cross, witnesses to His divine sonship. But is
not this precise background of reality altogether wanting in the ὕδωρ [“water”]?
Is it not merely a purely figurative expression, and one that in this passage
has no foundation for it assigned? It would indeed be altogether different, if
in the life of Christ—apart from His baptism, which we have found to be
inapplicable for our purpose—there could be specified any point at which actual
water appears in the higher symbolical sense we have indicated, thus giving our
passage just such a concrete historical foundation as the blood has in it: such
an event as we now contemplate would assume in the mind of the apostle and of
his readers a place of peculiar prominence, so that the mention of the water
would at once and necessarily suggest it. Now such an event is found; and our
whole passage would receive a rich illumination if it could be shown that it
refers to Joh 19:34: a passage the reference to which is so obvious that it is
difficult not to point to it at once. It is not simply that in these two
passages of Scripture alone blood and water are thus placed in juxtaposition; in
both cases they are conjoined in an equally marked manner, with manifest
emphasis; and in both cases μαρτυρεῖν [“to testify”] is the idea under the light
of which the αἷμα [“blood”] and ὕδωρ [“water”] are introduced. Now, if it can
be shown that that water and that blood which are spoken of in the history of
the passion are to be typically understood, that is, that there an external fact
occurred which bore in it a deeper meaning; that, further, the interpretation of
the type, or rather of the typical ideas ὕδωρ [“water”] and αἷμα [“blood”], is
there the same as we have discerned to be true in our present passage: then
shall we be constrained to regard the passage in the Gospel as the foundation of
this; and similarly, the relation of these symbolical expressions, as well as
the meaning we have discovered in them, will be demonstrated afresh and more
fully illustrated. The only external reason which can be adduced in opposition
to our reference to John chapter 19 is this, that the blood comes first in the
Gospel, while here the water has precedence. But the force of this objection is
altogether neutralized by a consideration of two things. First, in the Gospel
the apostle observes the order in which the elements issued from the Lord’s
side, while here the water comes first on account of the reference, mentioned
above, to the sacraments. Secondly, the difference urged has the less
significance, because (presupposing the symbolical meaning of the water and the
blood in the Gospel, which we shall confirm presently) the difference between
redemption and propitiation is generally a fleeting one, the two ideas being
involved in each other.

Now let us examine Joh 19:34 ff. more carefully. First of all, it is an
altogether wrong view of the incident, that blood and water issued from the
Redeemer, which sees in it only a demonstration that Jesus had actually died. It
is not only the fact—often remarked—that Christian antiquity never had doubts
about the reality of Christ’s death, and that therefore so emphatic a
demonstration of it might appear quite without reason; but to attain such an end
the apostle is supposed to have adopted the worst possible means. At any rate,
it would have been much simpler to say that the soldier pierced the heart of our
Lord. Moreover, we can scarcely attribute to the evangelist so much
physiological knowledge as to be aware that the dissolution of the blood into
placenta and serum was a sure sign of consummated death: even granting that this
can be proved, which we do not believe. How could a fact of such special
peculiarity that its physiological explanation has not to the present day been
arrived at, have been used as a decisive evidence of the death of Jesus? Since
these elements do not usually flow from a corpse any more than from a living
body, the conclusion might have drawn with equal truth and un-truth to the life
of Christ, or His death not consummate. But the main point is this: the Old
Testament citations introduced by γάρ [“for”] in Joh 19:36-37 must, if it had
been the apostle’s design to confirm the fact of Christ’s death, stand in some
connection with that design. But we see no trace of such a connection. The
quotations are no more linked with the flowing of blood and water than they are
with the certainty of our Lord’s death. They furnish evidence that the piercing
with the lance, and the pretermission of the breaking the legs, were predicted
in the Old Testament: not, however, to establish the reality of these facts
themselves, but to point out that He, as to whom that took place and this did
not take place, was the Messiah. No bone of the paschal Lamb was to be broken;
Jesus therefore, by the circumstance that the crurifragum could not befall Him,
was marked out as the paschal Lamb. They were to look on Him as Jehovah whom
they pierced: the piercing of the lance, therefore, marked out Jesus as Jehovah,
as the Son of God. Thus all else that is recorded in this section was to
demonstrate Jesus to be the Messiah and the Son of God: the flowing of blood and
water from His side must be regarded from the same point of view. And that this
is the only right one, appears from Joh 19:35: καὶ ὁ ἑωρακὼς μεμαρτύρηκε, καὶ
ἀληθινὴ αὐτοῦ ἐστιν ἡ μαρτυρία, κᾀκεῖνος οἶδεν ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγει, ἵνα ὑμεῖς
πιστεύσητε, [“he who has seen has testified, and his testimony is true; and he
knows that he is telling the truth, so that you also may believe ...”] ὅτι ὁ
Ἰησοῦς ἐστιν ὁ Χριστὸς ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ [“that Jesus Christ is the Son of God”Joh
20:31]. St. John says, ὁἑωρακὼς [“he who has seen”]: in this he includes in one
whole all that he had related, the pouring out, therefore, of blood and water
included; and he declares all to be testimony that Jesus was the Son of God. If,
indeed, the words quoted in Joh 19:35 produce the impression that they record
something miraculous, something so wonderful that it might appear incredible to
the readers, this cannot refer so much to the piercing itself, which was not
such a matter of wonder, but to the water and blood which flowed from the side
of Jesus. For the fact of the piercing, and the pretermitted crurifragum, the
apostle can appeal to other witnesses, those of the Old Testament, which also
explain the facts as indicating the divine sonship of our Lord. But he has no
other witness for the water and the blood; instead, therefore, of that, he must
himself give the most confident assertion of his exact and true observation; and
he must himself explain what he saw. Accordingly, the facts adduced by the
evangelist receive a twofold illustration: first, the truth of each is attested
by the apostle’s eye-witness, with that of the Old Testament superadded;
secondly, their significance is confirmed, and this significance is declared to
be the same in all three, that is, the vindication of Christ as the Son of God.
But it is clear that the flowing of blood and water could not of itself attest
this truth; this it could do only if the two ideas are symbolically understood.
These symbols we must interpret according to the general usage of Scripture, and
especially that of St. John, and thus obtain for the passage in the Gospel the
same results which we have arrived at in the case of our text in the Epistle. As
the prophecy of Hosea [Hos 11:1], “Out of Egypt have I called my Son,” would
maintain its applicability to Christ even if He had never set His foot in Egypt,
though He was carried to Egypt that the prophecy might be set in a clearer
light; as the word of Zechariah concerning the meek King sitting on an ass would
maintain its truth even without its external fulfilment in the history of Palm
Sunday: so would the significance of the death of Jesus naturally be the same if
it had not been symbolically exhibited in the flowing forth of the blood and
water. But God so ordered it that the internal should become external; and the
apostle’s wonder approved and attested this divine and altogether miraculous
order of Providence. If we revert to our passage in the Epistle, this now
receives its most satisfactory and final elucidation. First, it is plain how the
powers of purifying renewal and reconciliation might be here expressed by ὕδωρ
[“water”] and αἷμα [“blood”]: they are used on the ground of the fact in the
Gospel, which is by St. John made prominent with such emphasis, and in which
water and blood occur with so symbolical a meaning. Whenever one acquainted with
the Gospel read this passage, and noted that the question was concerning a
witness borne, he must have recalled to his mind that historical event.
Secondly, it is clear how water and blood could be adduced as witnesses
appointed of God: for in a most marvelous way God had so ordered it that blood
and water should flow from the side of the Crucified, and thus symbolically seal
His vocation as a Saviour. But there is yet a third witness given by God, the
Spirit; and the matter of His testimony is guaranteed (ὅτι [“because”]), because
the Spirit is the truth. This clause must he considered well on all sides. It
needs no argument that πνεῦμα [“Spirit”] is the Spirit of God, the Holy Ghost,
without whom no man can call Jesus Lord, and who bears witness to Jesus as the
Christ in our hearts; but we must note the accordance with Joh 15:26, where in
like manner the μαρτυρεῖνπερὶΧριστοῦ [“to testify about Christ”] is exhibited as
the function of the Paraclete. In the paraphrase we have given, the clause with
ὅτι [“because”] is not regarded as the substance of the testimony, but as the
ground of its truth. If it is taken as the substance of it, and translated, “The
Spirit beareth witness that the Spirit is truth,” thus making the Spirit bear
witness to Himself, we have only to observe that He is certainly introduced here
only as a witness for Christ. Moreover, it would be a poor specification of the
matter of His testimony, that He witnesses His own truth, that is Himself: the
main idea. His testimony that His witness to Christ is true, would be wanting.
Or we should be obliged to understand the first πνεῦμα [“Spirit”] of the Spirit
as the third Person in the Godhead, and the second of the Spirit as dwelling in
man, or of the Spirit of Christ as blended with the human spirit. But, apart
from the question whether we may establish such a severance at all, we know
nothing generally of a testimony of the Holy Spirit of the Trinity in His
distinction from the Spirit of God as ruling in man. Finally, if we should
understand the second πνεῦμα [“spirit”] of the human spirit, and explain it
after the analogy of Rom 8:16, αὐτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα συμμαρτυρεῖ τῷ πνεύματι ἡμῶν [“the
Spirit himself testifies with our spirit”], we should then miss this precise
ἡμῶν [“our”] in our passage. On the other hand, the thought is perfectly clear
and truly Johannaean if we take ὅτι [“because”] as the causal particle: the
Spirit of God, who enters into man, is in Himself a πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας [“Spirit
of truth”] (Joh 15:26), and therefore the testimony which He bears for Christ in
our experience is true. But there yet remains one difficulty, and that is the
article before μαρτυροῦν [“one who testifies”]. The proposition, τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστι
τὸ μαρτυροῦν [“the Spirit is the one who testifies”], by means of this article
produces the impression that the Spirit is the only witness, while,
nevertheless, the apostle goes on, τρεῖς εἰσιν οἱ μαρτυροῦντες [“there are three
that testify”]. In this last clause the Spirit is mentioned co-ordinately with
the water and the blood: the three have all one office of witness. On the other
hand, our proposition in its formal construction exhibits the Spirit not as
conjoined with the water and the blood, but as conjoined with Christ. That is to
say, 1Jn 5:6a, οὗτός (scilicetἸησοῦς ὁ Χριστὸς) ἐστιν ὁ ἐλθὼν δι᾽ ὕδατος καὶ
αἵματοςκ.τ.λ. [“this (namely,Jesus the Christ) is the one who came by water and
blood, etc.”], manifestly corresponds with 1Jn 5:6c, τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστι τὸ μαρτυροῦν
[“the Spirit is the one who testifies”]. Accordingly, the Spirit assumes a
twofold position: one as parallel with Christ, who came by water and blood, and
another as parallel with this same water and blood themselves. As to the former,
Christ came as the Messiah by water and blood. He brought salvation and
propitiation; the Spirit’s office is to witness for this, and then to
appropriate and be the means of imparting in detail what was once accomplished
as a whole by the Redeemer. Thus we can explain the article in our text, τὸ
πνεῦμά ἐστι τὸ μαρτυροῦν [“the Spirit is the one who testifies”]: the Lord is
the bringer (ὁ ἐλθὼν διὰκ.τ.λ. [“the one who came. etc.”]), the Spirit is the
attester. The article does not therefore refer to the fact that the Spirit and
no, other attests, but to the fact that He in relation to Christ’s work has the
function only of witnessing, not that of any fundamental work of His own. Thus,
in a certain sense, Christ and the Spirit have their distinct offices in the
accomplishment of our salvation. As to the latter, the Spirit has also a
function running parallel with the water and the blood. If these last, to wit,
are the actual demonstrations that He is the Saviour, that is, because He
administers salvation, then they are also witnesses, μάρτυρες [“a witness”];
and, the Spirit being reckoned with them, whose specific office is that of
testimony, we have three witnesses. Thus we assign its rights to the telicὅτι
[“because”], as establishing the fact ὅτι τρεῖς εἰσιν οἱ μαρτυροῦντες [“because
there are three that testify”]. It must not be forgotten that in the very order
of the sentence the emphasis falls upon the τρεῖς [“three”]. It is not as if the
general proposition, firmly established to the apostle, concerning the threefold
witness, confirmed the correctness of the deductions drawn in 1Jn 5:6 as to the
fact of the three testimonies—for how should such a proposition be a priori
firmly established in his mind ?—but the ὅτι [“because”] refers also to the
second part of the clause, καὶ οἱ τρεῖς εἰς τὸ ἕν εἰσιν [“and the three are in
agreement”]; and what was to be established is not the immediately preceding
proposition, but οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ [“this is the Son of God”], the
statement whose demonstration was the chief question throughout. That three
witnesses give the same testimony is, according to Moses, the guarantee of the
truth of any matter; Jesus Himself appealed to this (Joh 8:17), and on this the
apostle here rests. The trinity of the witnesses, therefore, which furnish one
testimony, is the demonstration (ὅτι [“because”]) of the divine sonship of the
Lord. But all the three witnesses named were given by God (1Jn 5:9): He is in
the end the only Testifier. His witness, however, is by the perfect μεμαρτύηκεν
[“he has testified”] described as one that is closed and perfected. If the blood
and water were referred exclusively or even primarily to the sacraments, this
would be unintelligible; for their influence goes on perpetually. But if we are
to think first of the ἔρχεσθαι [“to come”] of Christ, and further of the event
that took place in His death, the perfect tense is explained clearly: this is
the witness of God, that He sent Christ filled with purifying and atoning
powers, that He provided an external authentication of this power given to
Christ in the issuing of blood and water from His side in death; and similarly,
that He sent the Spirit as a witness. The Spirit Himself μαρτυρεῖν [“to
testify”]; but God once for all witnessed in sending Him.

After we have thus generally elucidated the constitutive fundamental ideas, we
have the details to observe on; and pre-eminently to decide the question whether
1Jn 5:7 belongs to the text or not. If our decision invariably depended on the
testimony of manuscripts known to us, there could be no question about the
genuineness or spuriousness of this verse; for it is undeniable that no Greek
codex earlier than the sixteenth century contains it. If the text is defended in
spite of this, it must be on the ground of quotations from the Fathers; and then
it must be explained how it came to pass that the words vanished from the text
without leaving a trace. In both these respects the matter here is very
different from that involved in the reading of 1Jn 4:3, λύειν τὸνἸησοῦν [“to
dissolve Jesus”]. In this latter case a reading no longer extant at the
threshold of the third century was attested in the east and in the west by such
men as Irenaeus and Tertullian, while, as we saw, it cannot be proved that
Polycarp did not know it. But in the case now before us this 1Jn 5:7 is found
for centuries only in the west, while in the east there is no trace of it; and
it may be taken for granted that it could not have been known in the east, for
otherwise it would have been used in the Arian controversy. And this leads to
the other question, as to the possibility of its vanishing from the text. Let us
in this respect also compare 1Jn 5:7 with 1Jn 4:3. The phrase λύειν τὸνἸησοῦν
[“to dissolve Jesus”] might indeed, as Socrates shows, have been applied to
refute the heretics; but it was in itself too profound to put an end to the
controversy by one stroke; at any rate, it was not of such a kind that every
transcriber would at once perceive in it an ἑδραίωμαἀληθείας [“a pillar of
truth”]. But how different is it with 1Jn 5:7! No one can deny that in the whole
compass of holy writ there is no passage even approaching the dogmatic precision
with which, in a manner approximating to the later ecclesiastical definitions,
this one asserts the immanent Trinity. Such a verse could not have been omitted
by inadvertence; for, even supposing such a thing possible in a text of such
moment, the absence of the words ἐντῇγῇ [“in the earth”] of 1Jn 5:8 would still
be inexplicable. The omission must then have been intentional, and due to the
hand of a heretic. But would such an act have remained un-condemned; and were
all our manuscripts produced by heretics or constructed from heretical copies?
In spite of my subjective conviction of the genuineness of the λύειν τὸνἸησοῦν
[“to dissolve Jesus”], I could not decide to receive this reading into the text
of 1Jn 4:3; for our editions must, above all things, keep close to the substance
of the manuscripts. But to preserve 1Jn 5:7 cannot by any means be justified.
The most acute argument that has been adduced to this hour in its favour is
represented by the venerable Bengel, who asserts that here the analysis of the
Epistle is summed up in one point, the Trinity being the governing principle of
its arrangement. But we have found that an altogether different analysis is the
right one; and to us, therefore, this argument for the genuineness is
neutralized. As to the dogmatic shortsightedness which bewails in its loss the
removal of a prop for the doctrine of the absolute Trinity, this might be
expected in lay circles, but ought not to be found among theologians. A doctrine
which should depend on one such utterance, and in its absence lose its main
support, would certainly be a very suspicious one. Omitting the verse, we have
in this very section the doctrine of the Trinity just in the form in which
Scripture generally presents it: the Father, who witnesses, 1Jn 5:9; the Son,
who is attested, 1Jn 5:6 ff.; the Holy Spirit, through whom the Son is witnessed
by the Father, 1Jn 5:6b; the passage being thus very similar to the narrative of
our Lord’s baptism.

We have recognised that the leading idea of the entire section, 1Jn 5:6-12, is
that of the μαρτυρεῖν [“to testify”]. The whole Epistle rests upon faith in the
Son of God: He is to be exhibited in the fulness of His divine attestation; and
it is accomplished in such a way that 1Jn 5:6-9 present to us the witnesses, 1Jn
5:10-12 the effects of the witness. This and no other (hence the οὗτός [“this”]
at the outset, resuming the subject of the preceding proposition) is He who came
with the powers of a new life which overcomes the world; that is, the Jesus
Christ already named. He came: the aorist specifies His coming simply as an
historical fact; not marking it as one accomplished event, as if it were
ἐληλυθώς [“the one who had come”], nor as something continuous, as if it were
ἐρχόμενος [“the one coming”]. The words must be taken in their strict order and
meaning: it is not Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς [“Jesus Christ”], as if the person were
mentioned with a double nomen proprium, but Ἰησοῦς ὁ Χριστὸς [“Jesus the
Christ”]; the article before Χριστὸς [“Christ”], and only before it, makes it a
closer appellative definition of Ἰησοῦς [“Jesus”], Jesus who is the Messiah. The
Messiahship of Jesus is taken for granted; for nothing new concerning this is
asserted throughout the section, only the old is confirmed afresh. Moreover, we
do not read οὗτόςἐστινἐλθών [“this is the one who came”], after the manner of
Joh 1:9, τὸ φῶς ἦν ἐρχόμενον [“the light was coming”],—as if, for the sake of
more strongly emphasizing the verbal idea, the copula were separated from the
verb,—but οὗτόςἐστιν ὁἐλθών δι᾽ὕδατος [“this is the one who came by water”].

Thus the purport of the whole is this: You call Jesus the Messiah; and you are
right in this, for it is He who has in Himself the necessary and settled (mark
the article) sign of Messiahship: which is, that He has brought the powers of
renewal and atonement. By means (διά [“by”]) of the water and the blood He has
come; and His coming is comprehended in the water and the blood (ἐν [“in”]). If
we abidingly receive these powers of renewal and atonement, then is He no longer
ὁἐλθών [“the one who came”]: for here we must remember that ἔρχεσθαι [“to
come”], spoken of Jesus, does not signify a mere appearing or being born; but,
on the ground of the Old Testament, His manifestation as Saviour and Redeemer.
And, in very deed, He has the two necessary tokens of a Saviour in Himself: not
as it were only the one, that of water (οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι μόνον [“not by water
only”]). We saw above that in the symbol of water the element of atonement as
such is wanting. It refers to the establishment of a new life, and thus looks
forward to the future and not back to the past. Past sins are not washed away by
water, but only by blood; for χωρὶςαἱματεκχυσίαςοὐκἐστινἄφεσις [“without the
shedding of blood there is no forgiveness” cf. Heb 9:22]. It is true that this
seems to be contradicted by Mar 1:4, where the baptism of John is called
βάπτισμα μετανοίας εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν [“a baptism of repentance for the
forgiveness of sins”]. But it is not really contradicted. The baptism is
expressly termed βάπτισμα μετανοίας [“a baptism of repentance”], having its
character in the change of mind; and we have therefore to assume that the
forgiveness of sins also comes as the result of the change of mind. It is
therefore such a forgiveness of sins as took place in the case of David: viewed
as in the future, on the ground of an atonement hereafter to come. The expiatory
element was by no means involved in the baptism of John; it implied an act of
God’s grace standing in no necessary connection with this ordinance. Sins were,
in the baptism of John, as generally down to the manifestation of Christ, placed
under the ἀνοχῇτοῦΘεοῦ [“forbearance of God”]; but a propitiation was not
connected with it, save symbolically through the shedding of blood. Through that
propitiation itself was man’s sin done away in the sight of God; and hence it is
the sign of the true and only Saviour that He came οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι μόνον, ἀλλ᾽
ἐν τῷ ὕδατι καὶ τῷ αἵματι [“not by water only, but by water and blood”]. By the
side of this work of Christ, laying the foundation, comes in the attesting and
confirming work of the Spirit. Our Lord’s work had its own confirmation in its
power to renew and to abolish guilt; but it receives a new and most express
confirmation through the Spirit, whose only office is to witness (τὸ μαρτυροῦν
[“the one testifying”]), and who possesses the fullest adaptation to this
office, inasmuch as He is ἡ ἀλήθεια [“the truth”], the compendium of all truth.
But that which was to be attested is the subject of the first clause, the fact
which this testimony makes unassailably secure to faith: ἸησοῦςἐστινὁΧριστὸς
[“Jesus is the Christ”]. It is secure, for the condition is fulfilled to which
the Mosaic law attaches all security, the concurrence of three witnesses. These
are εἰςτὸἕν [“in the one”], converge to one goal, that is, the fact already
announced and the consequence deducible from it (1Jn 5:11-12), that we possess
in Jesus Christ eternal life. Inasmuch as this goal has been already named, and
is known to the readers, it is not said that they merely agree εἰςἕν [“in one”],
but εἰςτὸἕν [“in the one”], that particular end with which the whole was
concerned. The mighty force of conviction inherent in these testimonies rests
emphatically on this, that they are given not by men, but by God Himself, the
source of all truth, 1Jn 5:9. The comparison between human and divine witness is
suggested to the apostle by 1Jn 5:8, in which he had referred to the fact that
the testimony adduced by him fulfilled the conditions demanded by valid human
testimony. It not only furnishes valid human testimony; it does more than
that,—he goes on,—for it springs from God. A corresponding development,
fundamental for our passage, is found in Joh 8:17 ff. There, our Lord avers that
in His case the requirements were met which men are justified in demanding for
the guarantee of any truth; here. His apostle goes further, and. says that more
than this is furnished for Christ. Therefore, as men are wont to receive
attested facts without contradiction, and always thus to receive them
(Indicative Presentfn), so must we yet more heartily yield our assent to truth.
Thus the μείζων [“greater than”Joh 8:53] does not refer to the matter of the
testimony, as if the thing here attested were of greater and higher moment than
the things which men attest,—these latter being about ἐπίγεια [“earthly”], while
God vouches for ἐπουράνια [“heavenly”],—but simply to the trustworthiness of the
witness. For, the apostle says, the question is here essentially of nothing less
than a divine testimony (the emphasis falls on τοῦΘεοῦ [“of God”]); the witness
of the Spirit, the water, and the blood of which we speak (αὕτη [“this”],
scilicetἡμαρτυρία [namely,“the testimony”]) is only the means by which God
Himself testifies. The clause following these words with ὅτι [“because”] is not
to be attached to them by ἥν [“which”]: this appears certain from the evidence
of manuscripts, and is confirmed by internal arguments; for, in the first place,
we can easily understand the lapsus oculorum, which might take up the ἥν
[“which”] of the similar words of 1Jn 5:10 into our verse; and, secondly, this
ἥν [“which”] produces at once the impression of being an explanatory correction.
For it is not obvious at first sight whether the ὅτι [“because”] here means
“that” or “because.” If we take the former, ὅτι [“because”] is the unfolding of
the preceding αὕτη [“this”], and must be translated thus: “it is for us to
receive the testimony of God rather than the testimony of man, because (the
first ὅτι [“because”]) it consists in this, that God has witnessed concerning
His Son.” Then the contents or the object of the testimony would establish its
higher trustworthiness. But, as we have already remarked, it is impossible to
see what significance in that case there is in the contrast between the witness
of God and that of man. The divine testimony is for its own sake, and not
because it is given to this or that fact, more trustworthy than human testimony.
In fact, we might deduce from this view the inference that if God were to give
His witness to anything else, His witness would not be more strong than that of
man. Hence we must take the second ὅτι [“because”] as causal, and lay the
emphasis on the μεμαρτύρηκε [“he has testified”], to which, indeed, we are led
by its prominence in the order of the verse. The meaning then is, that we must
receive the witness of God as greater than the witness of men; for (the first
ὅτι [“because”]) the question is of a divine testimony, and God hath borne
witness concerning; His Son. The first clause of the verse thus has two reasons
assigned: the first confirms that the matter is of God’s testimony, the second
that it is of a testimony of God. When we go on to observe the injunction to the
readers to believe in this testimony, a difficulty arises from its appearing
that the witnesses mentioned speak only in the believer. For in whom but the
believer does the Spirit speak concerning the Lord, and, to use the Lord’s own
word, glorify Him? and to whom does the water, the renewing energies which
proceed and have proceeded from Christ, witness of Christ, but to him who finds
evidence in himself of these invigorating powers, and who is conscious that he
has received from Him every inspiration to a new life? The same may be said of
the witness of the αἷμα [“blood”], the atonement centred and rooted in Christ.
Ave not then these witnesses superfluous, witnessing only to those who already
believe? Now such a contradiction as seems here to emerge would not, apart from
other considerations, be intolerable; for it would not be greater in our passage
than in those which speak of our Lord being come as a light to those who sit in
darkness; while, on the other hand, those only can hear His voice who are of the
truth. But the case is different here. If the subject were, as we presumed, the
witness of God in believers, it would not be, as we read here, μεμαρτύηκεν ὁΘεὸς
[“God has testified”], but only μαρτυρεῖ [“he testified”]. As it is, the
testimony of God must be a definite and closed testimony, perfected in the past.
And such it is in very deed: that the powers of renewal and atonement lie summed
up and sealed in Christ, is indeed an historical fact. No one with open eyes can
possibly deny that all such energies as have been manifest in the world have
without exception resulted from the name of Jesus Christ. No man can gainsay
that the Spirit sent to the apostles witnessed to them on behalf of Jesus Christ
as the Son of God. Thus the testimony of God in its threefold direction is not
only one that lives in individual believers, but it stands before us as an
incontrovertible historical fact. It is with faith in this testimony of God as
it is with faith in the miraculous power indwelling in Christ and in
Christianity. He who has experienced the miracle of sinful man’s renewal needs
no other witness for the miracles which the Lord aforetime wrought. But has not
he to whom this is not a living experience historically before him the great and
undeniable miracle that a sunken, dying, ruined world has been awakened through
Christ to a new life? Thus, as this one great, undeniable miracle is even to the
unbeliever a real demonstration of the miraculous power of Christ generally, so
the historically undeniable witness of the water and the blood and the Spirit is
obligatory on all who have not as yet experienced it in themselves. In a word,
the witnesses here adduced are valid not only to believers, but also for
unbelievers; they stimulate and invite faith; for they are not only subjective
in men’s hearts, but objective also in history.

These observations make the progress of the thought between 1Jn 5:6-9 on the one
hand, and 1Jn 5:10-12 on the other, quite clear. 1Jn 5:6-9 treat of the witness
of God as of one that is historically present, completed, and closed
(μεμαρτύρηκεν [“he has testified”]). Then in 1Jn 5:10 the new thought enters,
that if we believe this objectively present testimony, it becomes a subjective
one which we find experimentally in ourselves (ὁ πιστεύων ἔχει τὴν μαρτυρίαν ἐν
ἑαυτῷ [“the one who believes has this testimony in himself”]). But he who
believes not (μή [“not”], for the participle is to be conditionally understood,
as it were, ἐὰνμή [“if not”]) makes God a liar: he charges the historically
present testimony of God with falsehood. We see at once how in this proposition
we can again expect only μεμαρτύρηκεν [“he has testified”], and not μαρτυρεῖν
[“to testify]; for the divine testimony, which has its realization in man, the
unbeliever has indeed not experienced.

Now follows the explicit statement of the substance of the witness, which 1Jn
5:6 indicated only in few words. That is to say, Jesus is generally attested as
the Son of God and the Messiah. At an earlier stage it was impressed on us that
these two ideas are regarded by St. John as involved in each other, so that if
He is said to be the Messiah, He must be the Son of God; if the Son of God, He
must also be the Messiah. The idea Son of God or that of Logos is not in our
apostle a mere metaphysical description of what Christ is in Himself or in
relation to the Father: the idea in both its terms stands in an immediate
connection with the created universe. In the first verses of the Gospel it is
said that all becoming and all being in the world proceed from the Logos,—the
former, the becoming, in 1Jn 5:3; the latter, the being, in 1Jn 5:4,—and it
follows from this that He who is the medium of ζωὴαἰώνιος [“eternal life”] to
the work must therefore be the Son of God; and that the Son of God, because it
is His to procure and accomplish all, must also be the mediator of
salvation,—that is, the Son of God and the Messiah are in St. John’s
consciousness interchangeable ideas which necessitate each other. Accordingly,
the testimony which God here bears concerning His Son cannot be a merely
theoretical proposition, Ἰησοῦς ἐστιν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ [“Jesus is the Son of
God”]; but it is a proposition in which there lies a thoroughly practical
element: to wit, that He, as the Son of God, is the Saviour of the world. Thus
it is accounted for that the two phrases are introduced quite promiseue, as
indicating the object of the testimony: in 1Jn 5:6, Ἰησοῦς ὁ Χριστὸς [“Jesus the
Christ”], the Messiahship of Jesus; in 1Jn 5:9-10, by the words περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ
αὑτοῦ [“about his Som”], His divine sonship. Finally, in 1Jn 5:11 both elements
are placed in correlation, and thus the whole is summed up.

Footnote

1It may seem strange that, according to the consentient narratives of the
evangelists, Jesus first received the Holy Ghost in connection with His baptism,
whereas He was filled with the Spirit in His mother’s womb. The solution of the
difficulty lies in the distinction between the Spirit as a principle filling His
personal life, and the Spirit as an official gift for communication to others.
This distinction finds a more distant analogy in the fact that among men the
knowledge of a matter does not involve either the vocation or the gift to appear
as a witness and teacher concerning it, which latter is wont to be matured by
definite experiences. A nearer analogy lies in the double impartation of the
Spirit to the disciples on the evening of the resurrection and on the morning of
Pentecost.


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  CHAPTER 76: 76 - 1JN 5:12
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1Jn 5:12

Ὁ ἔχων τὸν υἱὸν, ἔχει τὴν ζωήν· ὁ μὴ ἔχων τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, τὴν ζωὴν οὐκ ἔχει.
But the apostle does not only say that through Him, the source of life, life has
been brought to men generally, but that it has been brought to (ἡμῖνἔδωκενὁΘεὸς
[“God gave to us”]). For it is taken for granted in this verse that the witness
of God, the historically actual witness, has been received by us, and thus
become a μαρτυρία ἐνἡμῖν [“testimony in us”] (compare 1Jn 5:10); in other words,
that we have received our portion in the life brought by the Redeemer. The
connection between the Son of God and the life, declared in 1Jn 5:11, is then in
1Jn 5:12 evolved under two aspects: where the Son of God is, there is also life;
and it is to be found only where He is. And thus the apostle has come back to
the idea which he had laid down at the outset of his document; in 1Jn 1:1 he had
declared that His annunciation concerned the Logos, but as the λόγος τῆς ζωῆς
[“word of life”], that is, the divine and eternal life which is in the Logos,
and flows forth from Him. That Son of God and life are correlative terms, is
here obviously the conclusion of all his development. The conclusion it is; for
that which now follows is not a continuation of the discussion of 1Jn 5:6 ff.:
that it is not this is evident from the matter of what follows, in which the
μαρτυρεῖν [“to testify] no more appears; as well as from the emphasized
resumption of the twelfth verse in the thirteenth, a thing to be accounted for
only on the ground that something new is about to be entered on. Nor is what
follows a new train of thought, which stands co-ordinately by the side of the
previous development. We have rather only a recapitulation yet before us, in
which, indeed, the apostle expands one single thought, that of intercession,
under one aspect, intercession in regard to the sin unto death. That this close
of the whole Epistle falls again into two members is evident at the first
glance: 1Jn 5:13-17 and 1Jn 5:18-21 must be taken together; but it will require
a discussion of the details to show in what relation these two sub-sections
stand to each other.


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  CHAPTER 77: 77 - 1JN 5:13
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1Jn 5:13

Ταῦτα ἔγραψα ὑμῖν τοῖς πιστεύουσιν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἵνα εἰδῆτε
ὅτι ζωὴν αἰώνιον ἔχετε, καὶ ἵνα πιστεύητε εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ ὑιοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ.

First, we have to decide the reading of this verse. There are three various
forms which it assumes. The Textus Receptus reads: ταῦτα ἔγραψα ὑμῖν τοῖς
πιστεύουσιν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἵνα εἰδῆτε ὅτι ζωὴν ἔχετε αἰώνιον,
καὶ ἵνα πιστεύητε εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ ὑιοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ [“These things I have written
to you who believe in the name of the Son of God, that you may know that you
have eternal life, and that you may believe in the name of the Son of God”]. The
manuscript form most generally accepted is that of Codex A: ταῦτα ἔγραψα ὑμῖν
ἵνα εἰδῆτε ὅτι ζωὴν ἔχετε αἰώνιον οἱ πιστεύοντες τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ
[“These things I have written to you that you may know that you have eternal
life, those believing in the name of the Son of God”]. Finally, Codex B reads:
ταῦτα ἔγραψα ὑμῖν ἵνα εἰδῆτε ὅτι ζωὴν ἔχετε αἰώνιον, τοῖς πιστεύουσιν εἰς τὸ
ὄνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ [“These things I have written to you that you may know
that you have eternal life, ho those who believe in the name of the Son of
God”]. The decision between these readings, especially between the latter two,
is, as to external arguments, difficult. The most important question is here, of
course, as to which of the readings would most easily suggest the reason for the
origination of the others. Now, that is the third. If, namely, the
τοῖςπιστεύουσιν [“to those who believe”], according to Codex B, stood after the
telic clause with ἵνα [“so that”], we can easily understand how it was that it
came to be changed into the nominative,—that is, to refer to the εἰδῆτε [“you
may know”] (as in Codex A); and we can also see how those transcribers who
rightly viewed the grammatical connection placed it before the intermediate
telic clause, immediately after the ἔγραψαὑμῖν [“I write to you”] (as the Textus
Receptus). The second clause with ἵνα [“so that”], found in the Textus Receptus,
appears to have sprung from a gloss which the parallel definition of purpose in
the Gospel (Joh 20:21) contained. If we suppose the Textus Receptus genuine, we
cannot account for the origination of the two other readings; nor will the
second of the two readings help us to explain how the first and third arose.
Then, if the third reading is the right one, the closing words,
τοῖςπιστεύουσινκ.τ.λ. [“to those who believe, etc.”], may be compared with Joh
1:12, ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίαν τέκνα Θεοῦ γενέσθαι, τοῖς πιστεύουσινκ.τ.λ. [“gave
to them the right to become children of God, to those who believe, etc.”]. Thus
the aim of the Epistle is the firm assurance of the readers that they have
eternal life; and both the writing and the establishment of this assurance are
designed only for those who believe in the revelation (ὄνομα [“name”]) of the
Son of God.


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  CHAPTER 78: 78 - 1JN 5:14
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1Jn 5:14

Καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ παῤῥησία ἣν ἔχομεν πρὸς αὐτὸν, ὅτι ἐάν τι αἰτώμεθα κατὰ τὸ
θέλημα αὐτοῦ, ἀκούει ἡμῶν. This assurance, that we are partakers of a true and
divine life, produces in us παῤῥησία [“boldness”] as it respects God,—the
sentiment of unity with Him, and therefore of perfect freedom, or the
unrestrained and unreserved utterance of our whole thought. But the apostle has
not in view here, as in the second division of the Epistle he had, the approval
of this confidence at the day of judgment. Here, at the close of all, he points
rather to the fruit which this parrhesia already bears in our experience, in the
confirmation even now of our possession of the ζωὴαἰώνιος [“eternal life”]. It
takes the form of confidence in prayer, founded upon the assurance of being
heard. But prayer here comes into consideration only in its intercessory
character, as 1Jn 5:16 shows. This, however, is not an isolated thought which is
made prominent at this point for practical reasons; it will be seen to
correspond with the general tone of the Epistle, when we reflect that it regards
the whole life of prayer as finding its deep expression in prayer for others. We
have seen in previous expositions that St. John subsumes our whole religious
life under the one commandment of brotherly love; that he regards our entire
moral obligation as discharged in this precept; and hence it is plain that there
was to him no other prayer imaginable than that which in its issue should be
bound up with our brethren. If I pray for my own person, it is that I may become
a living member of the kingdom of God; but my place in the kingdom of God is
conditioned by this, that I am helpful to my brethren in that kingdom.
Accordingly, the final, at least the indirectly final, end of all prayer—viewed
from the point which connects our whole life with the service of the divine
kingdom—must be prayer for the salvation of our brethren. The
κοινωνίανμετ᾽ἀλλήλων [“fellowship with one another”], which it was the apostle’s
aim in 1Jn 1:4 to help to its perfection, is in its deepest principle fellowship
in prayer. It is remarkable that at the close of several of the catholic
Epistles we find an exhortation to intercession for sinful brethren. Compare the
close of the Epistle of St. James and 1Pe 4:8, πρὸ πάντων δὲ τὴν εἰς ἑαυτοὺς
ἀγάπην ἐκτενῆ ἔχοντες, ὅτι ἀγάπη καλύψει πλῆθος ἁμαρτιῶν [“above all, keep
fervent in your love for one another, because love covers a multitude of sins”].
We may appeal also to Rev 2:4, where it is the reproach of this very Ephesian
church ὅτι τὴν ἀγάπην σου τὴν πρώτην ἀφῆκας [“that you have left your first
love”]. Though, primarily, it is the love of God which there is spoken of as
grown cold, yet in our Epistle St. John establishes so close a connection
between the love of God and the love of the brethren, that the coldness of the
one must needs draw after it, or with it, the coldness of the other. Our
passage, and that of 1Jn 3:21 to which it refers back, are not the only ones in
which the most intimate connection is established between παῤῥησία [“boldness”]
and prayer. We may compare also Eph 3:12, παῤῥησίακαὶπροσαγωγή [“boldness and
access”]; and Heb 4:16, προσερχώμεθα μετὰ παῤῥησίας τῷ θρόνῳ τῆς χάριτος [“let
us approach the throne of grace with boldness”]. It must be carefully noted that
the apostle does not write that the parrhesia consists in our knowing that God
hears us, but that it consists in this, that God heareth us. And yet the
parrhesia is a subjective feeling, while God’s hearing is an objective fact: now
this pregnant juxtaposition of the two ideas is intended to make prominent the
indissoluble connection between the Lord’s hearing prayer and the joy of man in
offering it. In all cases in which God heareth, there is necessarily joyful
confidence in praying, and never otherwise; conversely, whenever there is this
joyful confidence, there is also the ἀκούειν [“to hear”] of God. It is obvious,
however, that supplication κατὰ τὸ θέλημα αὐτοῦ [“according to his will”] is the
presupposition both of the ἀκούειν [“to hear”] and of the παῤῥησία [“boldness”].
By this, indeed, the apostle does not so much mean to warn against carnal
requests, such as the sons of thunder addressed once to their Master and
received a rejecting answer; in the present connection, spiritual things alone
are concerned; the thought of external and temporal matters of desire are far
from the apostle’s mind; and to introduce them here would be to bring a
perfectly foreign element into the train of thought. 1Jn 5:6 sheds the true
light on our passage: there is a certain kind of prayer even in spiritual
matters which is not according to the divine will; which, therefore, is neither
heard by God nor offered with perfect confidence by man.


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  CHAPTER 79: 79 - 1JN 5:15
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1Jn 5:15

Καὶ ἐὰν οἴδαμεν ὅτι ἀκούει ἡμῶν ὃ ἂν αἰτώμεθα, οἴδαμεν ὅτι ἔχομεν τὰ αἰτήματα ἃ
ᾐτήκαμεν παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ.

We must, however, consider more carefully the idea of God’s hearing. Are we to
limit it to mere hearing, or to regard it as a hearing with approval and intent
to answer, hearing and granting being one? The fifteenth verse seems to plead
for the former; for there the hearing comes first, and afterwards the ἔχειν τὰ
αἰτήματα [“to have the requests”], or the granting of the request. But, on the
other hand, this general meaning of the ἀκούειν [“to hear”] has its difficulty:
in this sense the God ὅςγινώσκειπάντα [“who knows all things”] (1Jn 3:21) hears
all prayers, even those which are not according to His will; consequently this
indefinite kind of hearing could never impart confidence in the petitioner.
Moreover, it is remarkable that St. John, and he only, employs this very word
ἀκούειν [“to hear”] in the sense of hearing favourably or granting; compare Joh
9:31; John 11:41-42. As to the fifteenth verse, we have only to interpret it
rightly. It does not mean to indicate the unity of the hearing and the granting
of petitions; but the unity of the being heard with acceptance and the reception
of what is supplicated. Many petitions κατὰ τὸ θέληματοῦθεοῦ [“according to the
will of God”] are outwardly granted, it may be, after a long season; so granted
that their acceptance appears manifest. But—and this is the pith of the
apostle’s declaration—faith has the thing asked, which probably will not be
granted externally for a long time, already inwardly in possession at the moment
of asking: in the consciousness that God hears, there is to this believing
petitioner the actual ἔχειν τὰ αἰτήματα [“to have the requests”], the possession
of the thing asked, though it may be for a season only in internal experience.
As the Christian hope brings the Christian man immediately into possession of
the thing hoped for,—so that by virtue of the very hope itself he may inwardly
rejoice in the experience of the object hoped for as his own,—so the believing
petitioner needs not to wait for the time to come when the fulfilment of his
prayer will be an external reality: he has what he asks, he enjoys it already,
before he actually sees it. To sum up all: the parrhesia which, within the
limits of the present life, a Christian may have, is indeed primarily only a
confidence in prayer and an alacrity for prayer (1Jn 3:20),—that is, it does not
rest so much upon the having as upon the possibility of future having, upon the
fact that the door is opened into all the treasures of heaven. Nevertheless
there is, on the other hand, a present sense of having, though it be only in
faith and not in sight; for there is a full assurance of the absolutely
necessary attainment of the request, which is no other than an internal and
spiritual possession of it already. Believing, we have already eternal
life,—that is, fellowship with God (1Jn 3:13); in believing prayer we have—that
is, more particularly, in believing intercession—already perfect fellowship with
our brethren as members of the kingdom of God (1Jn 5:14 ff.).


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  CHAPTER 80: 80 - 1JN 5:16
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1Jn 5:16

Ἐάν τις ἴδῃ τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὑτοῦ ἁμαρτάνοντα ἁμαρτίαν μὴ πρὸς θάνατον, αἰτήσει, καὶ
δώσει αὐτῷ ζωὴν, τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσι μὴ πρὸς θάνατον. ἔστιν ἁμαρτία πρὸς θάνατον,
οὐ περὶ ἐκείνης λέγω ἵνα ἐρωτήσῃ.

What follows shows that intercession has for its aim the winning of our brethren
for the kingdom of God. But, before we look closely at the link between 1Jn
5:16-17 and what precedes, we must examine the meaning of the verses themselves.
What are we to understand by the ἁμαρτίαπρὸςθάνατον [“sin unto death”]? At the
outset it is clear that the apostle has in view sin which irrevocably shuts the
gates of eternal life, the consequence of which is death in its most awful
character. That there is such a sin, or that there are such sins, is affirmed by
the New Testament in other places (Mat 12:31 and parallels; Heb 6:4 ff.); and
this lies at the foundation of all such passages as proclaim an eternal
condemnation. What is peculiar and startling in our passage is this, that our
intercession is made to depend upon the question whether or not the sin is
πρὸςτὸνθάνατον [“to the death”], thus indicating that its character as such may
be and is discernible by us. Now our possible knowledge of this absolutely
mortal kind of sin may be fairly questioned. In Mat 12:1-50 our Lord sees the
Pharisees in the manifest act of committing a sin, or the sin unto death,
πρὸςθάνατον [“unto death”] (which of the two let us at present leave undecided),
because they would assign His works to the inspiration of Beelzebub; but, on the
other hand. He prays for His murderers, and therefore did not, according to our
present passage, regard the sin unto death as consummate in them: now in these
cases would not human eyes have judged the very opposite? Saul heard the
rejecting words of the prophet, while David’s sin was forgiven; but according to
appearances, and therefore so far as men could judge, was not David’s sin much
heavier than the sin of Saul? And, to speak generally, it is impossible to
decide confidently the greater or less alienation of a sinner from eternal life
on the ground of the more or less violent demonstration of his sin as an act.
For, even as a hardened sinner may be brought round by the divine grace and
saved from destruction, so may a man, devout in the eyes of his fellows, become
perfectly reprobate to everything divine. Or are we to assume that there is one
definite and definable sin which is absolutely πρὸςθάνατον [“unto death”]? But
would not the apostle, in that case, have taken care to warn against it, and to
mention it by name? Would he not at least have written ἔστινἁμαρτίατις [“there
is a certain sin”] or μίαἁμαρτίαπρὸςθάνατον [“only one sin unto death”]? These
difficulties can be solved only by observing what St. John elsewhere teaches
concerning the ideas lying before us: first, that of the sin; and, secondly,
that of the prayer. As to the former, it is demonstrable that St. John measures
all sin by the relation it assumes to Jesus Christ. In Joh 1:5 he describes sin
to the effect that the σκοτίᾳτὸφῶςοὐκατέλαβε [“darkness has not mastered the
light”], and thus places it in direct opposition to the light which appeared in
Christ. Our Lord says, in Joh 8:24, ἀποθανεῖσθε ἐν ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ὑμῶν· ἐὰν γὰρ
μὴ πιστεύσητε ὅτι ἐγώ εἰμι, ἀποθανεῖσθε ἐν ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ὑμῶν [“you that you
will die in your sins; for unless you believe thatI am,you will die in your
sins”]. He thereby assigns the real ground of death—that is, of eternal death—to
the state of unbelief towards Himself. Finally, in Joh 16:8-9,[N] He defines the
judgment or conviction of the Spirit to be this, that He ἐλέγξει τὸν κόσμον περὶ
ἁμαρτίας [“he will convict the world concerning sin”]; and what sin He has in
view appears plain from the subsequent words, ὅτι οὐ πιστεύουσιν εἰς ἐμέ
[“because they do not believe in me”]. In our Epistle, St. John defines the
nature of the Antichrist, who is, however, the Pauline ἀνθρωπος τῆςἁμαρτίας
[“man of sin” cf. 2Th 2:3], the incarnation of sin, as that of one who denieth
the Son, 1Jn 2:21; and also, in 1Jn 4:3, as that of one who λύειἸησοῦνΧριστὸν ἐν
σαρκὶ ἐληλυθότα [“to dissolve Jesus Christ has come in the flesh”]. From all
this we must infer that the essential sin, which makes all other sin to be sin,
is in the apostle’s estimation unbelief in our Lord. And no doctrine is more
firmly established in the New Testament than this, that we shall hereafter be
judged by the relation in which we stand to the Son. According to the measure in
which any act betrays the mark that tins relation subsists aright, or does not
yet subsist, or has ceased to subsist, according to the measure in which any
action confirms, or interrupts, or entirely dissolves this relation, is the
value of that action and its estimation before the divine judgment-seat.

Accordingly, the sin unto death can be no other than consummate enmity to
Christ. It is obvious how perfectly this thought is in accordance with the tenor
of our Epistle: the kingdom of the world and the kingdom of God, Christ and
Antichrist, life and death, are the fundamental ideas and inseparable antitheses
which govern it throughout. But however clear it is, that in harmony with his
general views St. John might have regarded unbelief in Christ as the conclusive
and consummate sin, yet this is not here expressly stated; the words have too
general a bearing to be a mere paraphrase of “Antichrist;” they lead our minds
rather to practical errors than to an intellectual ἀρνεῖσθαι [“denial”].
Moreover, while the antichrists, according to the second chapter, certainly
ἐξῆλθανἐξἡμῶν [“they went out from us”], they are at the present time sundered
from the church, and no longer are regarded as belonging to it; and those who
are the ἁμαρτάνοντες πρὸς θάνατον[“sinners unto death”]; are supposed to be
still living in the bosom of the community. The sinner is described as an
ἀδελφός[“brother”]; and we have seen that throughout the Epistle this name
indicates Christians alone. The world comes into St. John’s view in this
document only as to be avoided; the intercession which may be urged on behalf
also of the children oi the world is never alluded to here. Thus we have reached
the twofold result: first, that, on the one hand, St. John must, in harmony with
his whole system of thought, have regarded the determinate sin as apostasy from
Christ; and, on the other, that he here at least speaks not of any theoretical
denial of Him, and not of any external apostasy. We must not, therefore, accept
the sin unto death and the antichrist nature as ideas of the same exact import.

Let us, for the sake of a more thorough understanding of the matter, look at the
development of sin in men generally. If every man is consigned in biblical
teaching either to salvation or perdition according to his conduct during his
bodily life, it is clear that he must on earth have become ripe for one or the
other; that no man dies without being a child of heaven or a child of hell. The
latter case is then only possible when the accesses of the converting grace of
God are effectually closed, and every possibility of its influence cut off; for,
so long as this is not the case, the final decision and full maturity cannot be
predicated. In other words, every organ for the reception of the Spirit of
participation in the kingdom of God must have withered and died; and that moment
in which the decision follows, in which the evil principle attains the absolute
supremacy, is that which is the essentially condemning crisis. That act,
external or internal, which in this crisis is consummate, is the
ἁμαρτίαπρὸςθάνατον [“sin unto death”]: the sin, which finishes irrevocably the
soul’s death. It is involved in this, that no deed as such, in virtue of its
external character and quality, is the ἁμαρτίαπρὸςθάνατον [“sin unto death”];
for no sin—be it named what it may—is in itself too great for the mercy and the
might of the Lord; but a sin becomes the ἁμαρτίαπρὸςθάνατον [“sin unto death”]
in virtue of the interior quality out of which it springs and of which it gives
the fatal evidence. Such a central position, one that determines the whole life
of man through eternity, can be assumed by no sin of infirmity; only a sin of
presumptuous wickedness, that is, such a sin as is committed in spite of the
power to resist it,—such a sin as man commits not only in resistance to the
protest of conscience, but in contempt of the gracious power proffered to avoid
it,—such a sin as he is not seduced into, but commits in the pure love of
sinning: thus it is not simply a human sin, but sin that is essentially
devilish. The Old Testament analogue of our ἁμαρτίαπρὸςθάνατον [“sin unto
death”] is found in those passages where sins בְּיַדרָמָה [“with a high hand”fn]
are spoken of, on which rests the curse, נִכְרְתָ֛ההוֹּאנֶּ֥פֶשׁהַ [“that person
will be cut off”]. Excommunication from the people of God was in the old
covenant what now exclusion from the kingdom of God is. Thus every sinful act
may be an ἁμαρτίαπρὸςθάνατον [“sin unto death”], while no act is such in itself;
hence the apostle does not use the article, nor could he use it.
Ἔστινἁμαρτίαπρὸςθάνατον [“it is a sin unto death”]: in the domain of sin there
is such a kind as is absolutely mortal. But when Christ calls Himself the door
of the kingdom of God, ὁ ἔχων τὴν κλεῖδα τοῦ Δαβίδ, ὁ ἀνοίγων καὶ οὐδεὶς κλείει,
καὶ κλείει καὶ οὐδεὶς ἀνοίγει [“the one who has the key of David, who opens and
no one will shut, and who shuts and no one opens” cf. Rev 3:7], it is plain that
absolute death can be reached only when all relation to Him is broken off. If
the apostle, as we have seen, thinks here of members of the congregation, the
sin unto death can consist only in their having internally and in act—if it were
externally done, and by words, they would indeed be no longer members of the
congregation—burst the last bond of their fellowship with Christ. According to
Joh 1:14, Christ brought grace and truth. As truth the antichrists rejected Him,
as grace the sinners unto death: more precisely, the antichrists were introduced
by the apostle in the aspect of their rejection of Christ the truth; and the
sinners unto death in the aspect of their rejection of the grace. This extended
observation has demonstrated that sin unto death does not signify any definite
external form of sin, but the sin through which the internal link between God
and man is severed and the gulf fixed absolutely.’’ But this infers how
difficult it must be to discern whether any man can in such a sense have sinned
πρὸςθάνατον [“unto death”] or not. How then can it be introduced as a test for
the offering or the withholding of our intercessory prayer? If this question is
not solved by studying the idea of ἁμαρτίαπρὸςθάνατον [“sin unto death”], it may
be solved by studying the nature of the prayer. In His last discourses our Lord
exhibits prayer in His name as something that the disciples had never hitherto
exercised, but which must be unconditionally answered with acceptance. The
promise is perfectly unrestricted; if one single exception were possible, the
promise would be invalidated. On the other hand, Scripture testifies that many
men enter into the way of eternal death: is not a prayer ever to be offered up
to heaven on their behalf? According to the Lord’s word it stands eternally
fast, that if such prayer ever did go up ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι Ἰησοῦ [“in the name of
Jesus”], ἐνπαρρησίᾳ [“with boldness”], as our passage terms it, that is, if the
petitioner ceased to be the mere man, but were the Spirit of Jesus Christ
dwelling in him, and moving his heart to such intercessory prayer; thus, if his
petitions were like the petitions of the Lord Himself, already in their essence
thanksgivings,—these all being the signs of prayer in the name of Jesus,—then
must his supplication be heard and answered, and it were impossible that the
soul interceded for should perish.

It follows, conversely, that if a soul perishes, that soul has never been thus
prayed for, and never could have been thus prayed for. Many petitions, indeed,
in the ordinary and more general sense may have been offered for him,—such
petitions, for instance, as we offer for temporal things, uttering our wishes as
children to our heavenly Father,—but not prayers in the name or in the person of
Christ, in the full and inwrought consciousness that they are heard, not such
prayers as offer violence to the kingdom of heaven. Prayers of the higher order
like these are, however, the proper Christian prayers, and such are inwrought of
God alone; but He cannot inspire them in regard to men concerning whom He knows
that they will perish. Such considerations as these will help to make our verse
intelligible. The apostle says that if any man sees τὸνἀδελφὸναὑτοῦ [“his
brother”], his own brother bound to him by the bonds of the most interior love,
sinning,—ἁμαρτίανἁμαρτάνειν [“to sin sin”] is quite general, without limitation
to any particular kind of sin,—and has the conviction (the subjective μὴ [“may
not”] is used) that the sin is not unto death, then—and now follows not an
exhortation, but a declaration—he will pray, he will, simply because it is his
brother, feel himself constrained to pray for him. We must not interpret the
future αἰτήσει [“he will ask”], like the futures of the ten commandments, as the
strongest form of the imperative speech; for it must certainly be understood in
the same sense as the future δώσει [“he will give”] near at hand, and that would
not tolerate any such imperative meaning. A Christian, the apostle tells us,
cannot do otherwise than run by intercession to the help of an erring brother.
And, as definitely as this prayer will be offered, the result of it will also be
definite, δώσειαὐτῷζωὴν [“he will give to him life”]. The subject in δώσει [“he
will give”] cannot be God; that would be harsh, in immediate view of the
preceding αἰτήσει [“he will ask”], which has man for the subject, especially as
God is not mentioned anywhere else in the whole verse. Nor is the thought that
man may by his prayer give life to his brother a repellent one; in Jas 5:20, and
in a perfectly similar connection, we read that σώσειψυχὴνἐκθανάτου [“he will
save his soul from death”]. We have here, therefore, no direct contradiction to
the seemingly opposite statement that no man can redeem his brother; for
believing prayer, and consequently its result also, the δοῦναιζωὴν [“to give
life”], rests essentially on divine operation, and impulse from above. The
expression δώσειζωὴν [“he will give life”] shows, however, how the
ἁμαρτίαπρὸςθάνατον [“sin unto death”] must be taken; to wit, that a sin so named
is left to death irredeemable. In a sense, every sin must be exposed to death,
otherwise there would be no giving of life to be thought of. The explanatory
words that follow, τοῖςἁμαρτάνουσιμὴπρὸςθάνατον [“those sinning not unto
death”], introduce really nothing new, for the preceding conditional clause has
already brought forward the same element; but the repetition is intended to
impress more deeply on the readers two things: first, by means of the plural
τοῖςἁμαρτάνουσι [“those sinning”], that the result indicated will follow, not in
isolated cases, but in every one; and, secondly, that the limitation must be
ever remembered which is bound up with it, μὴπρὸςθάνατον [“not unto death”].


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  CHAPTER 81: 81 - 1JN 5:17
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1Jn 5:17

Πᾶσα ἀδικία ἁμαρτία ἐστὶ, καὶ ἔστιν ἁμαρτία οὐ πρὸς θάνατον.

What had been in the previous words indirectly said, that there are two
altogether different kinds of sin, sin unto death and sin not unto death, St.
John now in what follows directly declares, ἔστινἁμαρτίαπρὸςθάνατον
καὶἔστινἁμαρτίαοὐπρὸς θάνατον [“there is a sin unto death and there is a sin not
unto death”]. That these two clauses are thus connected is not generally
acknowledged; still less is it the common view that the words
πᾶσαἀδικίαἁμαρτίαἐστὶ [“all unrighteousness is sin”] are to be linked with what
precedes instead of with what follows. Nevertheless, this view is absolutely
necessary. That the two clauses just mentioned correspond to each other in their
entire construction, and are in thought fitted to each other, scarcely needs any
demonstration; it is, in any case, enforced upon us when we observe that the
proposition πᾶσαἀδικίαἁμαρτίαἐστὶ [“all unrighteousness is sin”] cannot belong
to what comes after. If it did so, we should scarcely see what induced St. John
to introduce here the idea of ἀδικία [“unrighteousness”]: this idea not only has
no organic connection with the proposition that all sin is not sin unto death,
but it is decisively foreign to it, and somewhat discordant. We should be
obliged to take it only in a concessive way: “it is true that all ἀδικία
[“unrighteousness”] is sin; do not think too tenderly concerning ἀδικία
[“unrighteousness”], it also is sin;” but we should expect to read, “it is not
sin unto death.” That, however, we do not read, but only that there is sin which
is not unto death. The idea of ἀδικία [“unrighteousness”] is therefore at once
dropped again; and it is entirely irrelevant to the proposition
ἔστινἁμαρτίαοὐπρὸςθάνατον [“there is a sin not unto death”]. Are we indeed to
suppose that the apostle felt himself called to occupy himself with teaching
here, in an incidental way and without any necessity, the relation of ἀδικία
[“unrighteousness”] to ἁμαρτία [“sin”]?

All is changed, if we connect the words with what goes before: there is sin unto
death, but to this (mark the emphatic περὶἐκείνης [“about these”] coming first)
my words do not refer; you cannot suppose it the design of my words (οὐλέγωἵνα
[“I am not saying that”]) to recommend intercession concerning it. There are
indeed other cases quite enough, he proceeds, to which your intercessory prayer
may find application, πᾶσαἀδικίαἁμαρτίαἐστὶν [“all unrighteousness is sin”];
wherever there is any measure of unrighteousness, there is sin, and the fit
occasion therefore for intercession. Thus the apostle really says that there are
sins unto death and sins not unto death. To the former of these two propositions
there are added two parenthetical explanations: concerning these sins unto death
St. John’s exhortation does not treat, he does not speak of them; and the range
of sin for which intercession may be valid is otherwise large enough. This is
the general bearing of the clauses; they can be fully understood only through a
close investigation of the idea involved in ἀδικία [“unrighteousness”].

Ἀδικία [“unrighteousness”] and ἁμαρτία [“sin”] are often regarded as synonyms
varied simply in order to define the nature of sin on all sides: for example, in
Heb 8:12, ἵλεως ἔσομαι ταῖς ἀδικίαις αὐτῶν, καὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν
ἀνομιῶν αὐτῶν οὐ μὴ μνησθῶ [“I will forgive their wickedness and will remember
their sins no more”], where obviously there is no consideration of the
distinction in the three expressions respectively. But there are passages where
this distinction comes into prominence. Ἀδικία [“unrighteousness”] is the
antithesis of δικαιοσύνη [“righteousness”], as well in the sense of justitia
distributiva as in that of justitia interna. The former antithesis we find in
Rom 9:14, μὴ ἀδικία παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ; [“is God unjust?”] and 2Co 12:13, χαρίσασθέ μοι
τὴν ἀδικίαν [“forgive me for injustice”],—that is, pardon me if in this I have
been unjust, and dealt with you in a manner not correspondent with justitia
distributiva. But we find ἀδικία [“unrighteousness”] much oftener used as the
antithesis to justitia interna, internal righteousness; and in this sense only
is it a synonym of ἁμαρτία [“sin”]: in the former sense it is only one species
of ἁμαρτία [“sin”] as a genus. As δικαιοσύνη [“righteousness”] is one of St.
Paul’s fundamental ideas, it is in his writings that we find ἀδικία
[“unrighteousness”] most frequently occurring. For its relation to ἁμαρτία
[“sin”] we may consult Rom 6:13, as a leading passage, μὴ παριστάνετε τὰ μέλη
ὑμῶν ὅπλα ἀδικίας τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ [“do not offer the members of your body to sin as
instruments of unrighteousness”]. Unrighteousness uses the body of man as the
means by which it declares itself: this is certainly the sense of ὅπλα
[“instruments”], even though we should leave undisturbed its proper
signification. And the end of this employment of men’s members, its result—thus
we accept the dative—is the ἁμαρτία [“sin”]. This latter, therefore, is the full
expression in fact of that former, the form under which the ἀδικία
[“unrighteousness”] in every particular case appears; ἀδικία [“unrighteousness”]
is the mind which suggests the meaning of ἁμαρτία [“sin”], and what it
presupposes.

We are carried one step further by the comparison of ἀδικία [“unrighteousness”]
and ἀνομία [“lawlessnes”]. Δικαιοσύνη [“righteousness”] is the ideal which man
should set before him, and ἀδικία [“unrighteousness”] is disharmony with that;
but ἀνομία [“lawlessnes”] is not simply the falling below a standard or ideal,
it is also a violation of right. The idea of obligation is wanting in the ἀδικία
[“unrighteousness”], but it is present in ἀνομία [“lawlessnes”]; the notion of
guilt inheres in ἀνομία [“lawlessnes”], but not in ἀδικία [“unrighteousness”].
This latter presents the condition of man as one opposed to perfection; ἀνομία
[“lawlessnes”] at the same time suggests that it is one of guilt, because it is
παράβασις [“transgression”]. If the νόμος [“law”] makes sin exceeding sinful,
then ἀνομία [“lawlessnes”] is the definition of this deepest and most aggravated
aspect of sin. From what has been said, it now appears that ἁμαρτία [“sin”]
marks out the individual act, or even the total character of the man, as evil;
while ἀδικία [“unrighteousness”] and ἀνομία [“lawlessnes”] indicate the point of
view from which it is thus evil,—that is, either as it is discordant with the
idea of δικαιοσύνη [“righteousness”], or as it is violation of positive law, the
νόμος [“law”]. When St. John teaches that πᾶσαἀδικία ἐστὶνἁμαρτία [“all
unrighteousness is sin”], he intends to say that every instance of declension
from the normal character of the Christian, from the Christian ideal, is
realized and condensed into ἁμαρτία [“sin”]. No man can be ἄδικος
[“unrighteous”] without doingἀδικία [“unrighteousness”]; and the doing of
unrighteousness is simply ἁμαρτία [“sin”]. The proposition here laid down is in
principle equivalent to saying that the corrupt tree must bring forth evil
fruits; only that here more emphasis is laid on the fact that all
unrighteousness, everything not right, that is in man, is at the same time
ἁμαρτία [“sin”] or positive sin. Every defect of righteousness is concurrently
absolute sin; every negative must suggest its corresponding positive; every
minus of righteousness employ a plus of sin. Thus the proposition
πᾶσαἀδικίαἁμαρτίαἐστὶν [“all unrighteousness is sin”] indicates how wide a range
the idea of sin has. While the definition of each sin as ἀνομία [“lawlessnes”],
1Jn 3:4, enlarges the meaning of the idea ἁμαρτία [“sin”], our present sentence
enlarges its comprehension or range. And thus this proposition is well adapted
to the purpose of showing how little the apostle, speaking of intercession,
could have thought of sin unto death: there are, indeed, so many sins with
regard to which intercession may be applied, that the sin for which it has no
validity may be left altogether out of notice.

If this, then, is the meaning of our two verses, it is plain that St. John
neither says nor purposes to say anything about the nature of these sins
πρὸςθάνατον [“unto death”]: all he emphasizes is, that intercession and its
fruit avail only for sins not unto death. Intercession has only to do with them:
that is the deeply important presupposition of the writer, never too much to be
considered. That is, when he says ἐάν τις ἴδῃ τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὑτοῦ ἁμαρτάνοντα
ἁμαρτίαν μὴ πρὸς θάνατον, αἰτήσει, καὶ δώσει [“if anyone sees his brother
sinning a sin not unto death, he shall ask and God will give” cf. 1Jn 5:16a],
this takes for granted that, while only in this case, yet certainly in this
case, he has confidence in the intercession being heard. If he had meant to say
that only in this case intercession would be heard, he must have written either
ἐάν τις ἴδῃ καὶ αἰτήσῃ, δώσει [“if anyone sees and asks, he will give”] or ἐάν
τις ἴδῃ τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἁμαρτάνοντα, αἰτήσει, καὶ δώσει ζωὴν τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσι μὴ
πρὸς θάνατον [“if anyone sees the brother sinning, he shall ask, he will give
life to those sinning not unto death”]; but, as he places the
ἁμαρτάνεινμὴπρὸςθάνατον [“to sin not unto death”] in the premiss and the αἰτήσει
[“he shall ask”] in the conclusion, his meaning can be only this, that prayer
must be offered only in case there is no sin unto death involved. The same
follows also from the proposition, οὐ περὶ ἐκείνης λέγω ἵνα ἐρωτήσῃ [“I do not
say that he should make request for this”]. If these words of the apostle do not
make prayer for sin unto death an end, it follows that there was no such prayer,
for an end always refers to the attainment of something not present; if he had
purposed to inhibit prayer that might be hesitating as to the sin unto death, he
must have said λέγωἵνα μὴ [“I am saying thatheshould not”] and not οὐλέγωἵνα [“I
am not saying that”].

After having thus discussed the details, let us once more glance at the general
connection. Supposing a right state of heart (1Jn 5:13), there may be confidence
in prayer (1Jn 5:14), in that prayer which has in itself the assurance that it
is heard (1Jn 5:15). And hence (as the future αἰτήσει [“he shall ask”] asserts)
that must and will be offered wherever it is possible, that is, in regard to
sins not unto death. How then, in the apostle’s meaning, is the sin not unto
death to be discerned? By this, that for it and only for it are we to pray,—that
is, in the sense of 1Jn 5:15, in the name of Jesus and μετὰπαῤῥησίας [“with
boldness”]. Such prayer as this is in the case of sins unto death impossible.
For as it is essential to this prayer that it has its energy in God, and accords
perfectly with His will, it can never be offered where a man has fallen
hopelessly into ruin; when, generally, a man is lost, while this takes place
undoubtedly through an act of self-determination, it is also according to God’s
will, and God cannot possibly by His Spirit prompt to prayer which is contrary
to His will. Presupposing that we have the true Christian feeling,—and this
presupposition impresses the whole of the conclusion of the Epistle,—I must feel
myself urged to intercede for an erring brother; and when I have this impulse,
this constitutes the assurance that his sin is not unto death: in regard to a
sin unto death, I may indeed entertain good wishes for a brother, but never
offer prayer ἐν ὀνόματι Ἰησοῦ,μετὰπαῤῥησίας [“in the name of Jesus, with
boldness”]. And where this strong confidence of petition is wanting to the
Christian, who as such is filled with vehement brotherly love, and is conscious
of freedom from every personal impulse, οὐλέγωἵναἐρωτήσῃ [“I am not saying that
he should ask”]: he must not think himself urged by the apostle’s words,
misunderstanding those words, to offer such a prayer; he must not stimulate his
heart to that. Thus our passage is made most aptly to accord with what we have
discerned to be the issue of the biblical teaching generally, and specially the
Johannaean. St. John gives no external mark of the sin unto death; for this it
cannot have, inasmuch as it is not the nature of the sin, but that of the
sinner, that stamps its signature on sin unto death. He says only that where
there is no sin unto death the Christian (the presupposal that he is a true
Christian must be made very emphatic) will offer the true and all-acceptable
intercession: wherever, then, such a prayer issues from the full heart there can
certainly be no sin unto death. But he says nothing positively as to our
relation to sinners unto death: he only declares that he does not exhort to
intercession for them; they are for the rest altogether left out of his
consideration. Nevertheless, it is plain, however indirectly plain, as well from
these words as from the nature of the case, that for such sinners the prayer of
acceptance is utterly out of the question.1 footnote

1So far as concerns the general apprehension of our text, comparison with the
passages of the Gospels respecting the sin against the Holy Spirit, and that of
the Epistle to the Hebrews respecting those who cannot be renewed to repentance,
is, strictly speaking, irrelevant. Nevertheless it is an interesting question
whether the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit and apostasy from grace received
are of the same import, and of the same import and comprehension as the sin unto
death; or whether this last is the genus of which the others are species. For,
that all blasphemy against the Holy Ghost is an ἁμαρτίαπρὸςθάνατον [“sin unto
death”] seems certain, because the impossibility of forgiveness certainly
involves everlasting death; and the same may be said of Hebrews chapter 6. But
the sins marked out in these passages might be individual expressions of the sin
unto death by the side of others. It is not so, however; but we have in all
three places only diverse expressions of one thing; they all have the same range
and extent. As it respects Mat 12:31 and the parallels, this is proved by the
circumstance that these passages and our present one look back to the same Old
Testament fundamental declarations concerning the sins בְּיַדרָמָה [“with a high
hand”fn] which are followed by excision. More exactly, Mat 12:31 refers back to
Num 15:30. The Septuagint translates גַּדֵּףּ [“blaspheme”] there by βλασφημεῖν
[“to blaspheme”];fn and the Peschito gives for the βλασφημία [“blasphemy”] of
Mat 12:31 the word standing in Num 15:1-41 in the form of גּוּדוֹפִין [“reviling
words”]. Now, if Num 15:1-41 is the original text for Mat 12:1-50, that is very
important for the meaning of βλασφημεῖν [“to blaspheme”] in the latter. That is
to say, in Numbers, sins not of word but of act are alluded to, and we must
therefore take βλασφημεῖν [“to blaspheme”] in the wider sense; accordingly in
Mat 12:1-50 also the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost is intended not of words
only, but also of actions. Indeed, it follows from this passage itself that the
βλασφημία τοῦ πνεύματος [“blasphemy the Spirit”] is possible without the Spirit
being mentioned: the Pharisees were in danger of committing this in the words
they had spoken before, in which the Holy Ghost does not occur. To blaspheme the
Spirit means to ascribe to the evil spirit that which men might and must
acknowledge to be the work of the Holy Ghost; to ascribe it to the evil spirit
against their knowledge and conscience, and thus deliberately to harden
themselves against the operation of the Spirit. And this very sinning in spite
of the knowledge of the truth and the power to follow it, this hardening, is
meant in Heb 6:1-20. But all this is essentially the same which, as we have
seen, St. John here signifies by the ἁμαρτίαπρὸςθάνατον [“sin unto death”]: for
he alone falls unsalvably and irremediably into death who refuses the power of
life brought near to him, and absolutely closes his heart against it.

Textual note

[[*Correction: In Num 15:30, the Septuagint actually translates גַּדֵּףּ
[“blaspheme”] as ἐνχειρὶὑπερηφανίας [“with a presumptuous hand”]. Perhaps Haupt
was using another version of the Greek OT. But I am unable to find any version
with this rendering. —Allan Loder]]


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  CHAPTER 82: 82 - 1JN 5:18
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1Jn 5:18

Οἴδαμεν ὅτι πᾶς ὁ γεγεννημένος ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐχ ἁμαρτάνει· ἀλλ᾽ ὁ γεννηθεὶς ἐκ
τοῦ Θεοῦ τηρεῖ ἐαυτὸν, καὶ ὁ πονηρὸς οὐχ ἅπτεται αὐτοῦ.

We have the close of the Epistle in 1Jn 5:13-17. What the Christian receives for
himself, the ζωὴαἰώνιος [“eternal life”] in faith, and what it confers on him
for the benefit of the brethren, that is, the power to bring them into the
kingdom of God by intercession, has been fully and conclusively exhibited. The
three verses that follow, which bespeak their internal connection by the
thrice-repeated resumption of the οἴδαμεν [“we have seen”] at the beginning of
the clauses, give a kind of recapitulation of the three constitutive elements
out of which the happy estate of Christians has been constructed, as in the
exposition of the whole Epistle so particularly in the summary of the three
previous verses. The first point of importance is to seize the relation of the
three clauses to each other. As the γεγεννήσθαιἐκτοῦΘεοῦ [“to have been born of
God”] of 1Jn 3:18 and the εἶναι ἐκτοῦΘεοῦ [“to be of God”] of 1Jn 3:19 mean
essentially the same thing, the element that distinguishes the two thoughts must
lie in the second half of the two clauses severally: as to the former, the
emphasis rests on this, that the child of God does not sin; as to the latter, on
this, that the world lieth in the wicked one. The substance of the first two
verses is therefore to this effect: that one born of God is as such withdrawn
from sin and the devil; and that one born of God as such stands in opposition to
the world subjected to the devil and sin. For the conjunction of the two
propositions οἴδαμεν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐσμὲν [“we know that we are children of
God”] and ὁ κόσμος ὅλος ἐν τῷ πονηρῷ κεῖται [“the whole world lies under the
evil one”] can yield no other meaning than that, in virtue of our assurance
touching our being born of God, we know ourselves to be in contrast and
opposition to the ungodly world. It would be more in formal harmony with the
phraseology of St. John to regard the second clause as not dependent on
οἴδαμενὅτι [“we know that”], taking it as an independent proposition; but as to
the thing itself, it is understood that the evil of the world is also known to
us. The first part of 1Jn 5:18 is both in substance and in form a resumption of
1Jn 3:9a. The apostle is not concerned about what the Christian may be at any
supposed period of his militant course, but about what he is according to his
vocation and the end of his development. The sinlessness and the perfect
antithesis in which he stands to the world are not found in the whole of his
history, but are the result of that history. As we during our stage of
development still have sin in us. so also the world is not at first wholly
surrendered to the power of darkness, but the power of light still more or less
works in it; it wall, however, finally come to this, that on its part there will
be total night, and on the part of the children of God absolute day and light.
Concerning this relation between us, which more and more clearly works itself
out, we have already the knowledge (οἴδαμεν [“we know”]), we know it as the true
and the right relation. The second part of 1Jn 5:18 does not form, like the
first, a resumption of a previous statement: it is true that τηρεῖν [“to keep”]
is common enough in our Epistle, but it has always had ἐντολή [“commandment”]
as its object; just as in the Gospel this word or λόγος [“word”] is the ordinary
object of the τηρεῖν [“to keep”]. A person is the object, as in our passage, in
Joh 17:12-16, as also in Rev 3:1; but in both cases there is a prepositional
definition connected with it: in the former ἐν [“in”] defines the sphere in
which, in the latter ἐκ [“out of”] defines the sphere against which, we are to
be defended. In our present passage there is no such closer definition: the
child of God keeps himself in the estate of a child of God simply. As to the
reflexive form of the sentence, we may compare 1Jn 3:3:[N]πᾶς ὁ ἔχων τὴν ἐλπίδα
ταύτην ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ, ἁγνίζει ἑαυτὸν [“everyone who has this hope on him purified
himself”]. Generally speaking, sanctification and preservation are elsewhere
regarded as God’s work in man; but here they are regarded as duty incumbent on
man himself: thus the ethical side, that of our freedom, is placed in all the
clearer light. This self-preservation is the hindering cause that the devil, ὁ
πονηρὸς, οὐχ ἅπτεται αὐτοῦ [“the evil one cannot touch him”]. Probably there
lies in the words a remembrancer of Genesis chapter 4, where sin is described as
a ravenous thing at the door; and watchful care of self appears to be the means
for securing ourselves against it. The seduction of the enemy is only admissible
to him who does not rightly guard his house. The ἅπτεται [“touch”] may be taken
in the strongest sense: the devil cannot even touch such a child of God, much
less carry him off as a prey. Or ἅπτεται [“touch”] may be taken in a broader
sense, like the corresponding בְּנָגַע [“stricken by”]: of Gen 26:11; Jos 9:13,
that of inflicting any harm on its object.


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  CHAPTER 83: 83 - 1JN 5:19
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1Jn 5:19

Οἴδαμεν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐσμὲν, καὶ ὁ κόσμος ὅλος ἐν τῷ πονηρῷ κεῖται·

Whilst we thus know ourselves, as the children of God, to be secure against any
contact with the evil one, we know, on the other hand, that the world is
perfectly under the power of this evil one. ἘκτοῦΘεοῦ [“from God”] and
ἐντῷπονηρῷ [“in the evil one”] are the representatives of the antithesis. It
follows from this collocation itself, as also from the analogy with ὁπονηρός
[“the evil one”] in the previous verse, that the dative is to be here taken as
masculine and not as neuter. Further, we are led to this by the fact that
πονηρός [“evil one”] never occurs as a neuter throughout the Epistle. But this
certainly makes the κεῖταιἐν [“lies in”] all the more difficult. There is no
instance in the New Testament of κεῖταιἐν [“lies in”] being connected with a
personal name; but Sophocles, Œdip. Col. 247-248,[N] seems to give an
illustration: ἐν ὔμμι γὰρ ὡςθεῷ κείμεθατλάμονες[LSJ] [“foron you, as on a god,
we depend in our misery”]. Antigone’s meaning is: In you Athenians we, with all
our life and hope and expectation, are perfectly bound up; on you depends not
only the specific gift which we would have of you, but we ourselves, with all
that we are and have, depend on you. So it is here. The world rests on Satan,
its whole being as world is constituted by its relation to him; devil and world
are ideas so interpenetrating each other, that the latter comes to its full
meaning only through the former. It is obvious that the world is to be
understood here, as in 1Jn 2:15, of the world as pervaded with sin. And ὁ κόσμος
ὅλος ἐν τῷ πονηρῷ κεῖται [“the whole world lies in the evil one”], which is more
pregnant than ὁ κόσμος ὅλος [“the whole world”]: it is not that the whole world
is subjected to Satanic influence; the apostle makes it emphatic that the world
as a whole, without any qualification or exception, all that is in it
absolutely, is under his sway.


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  CHAPTER 84: 84 - 1JN 5:20-21
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1Jn 5:20-21

Οἴδαμεν δὲ ὅτι ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἥκει, καὶ δέδωκεν ἡμῖν διάνοιαν ἵνα γινώσκωμεν
τὸν ἀληθινόν. καί ἐσμεν ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ, ἐν τῷ υἱῷ αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ. οὗτός ἐστιν
ὁ ἀληθινὸς Θεὸς, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ αἰώνιος. Τεκνία, φυλάξατε ἑαυτοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν εἰδώλων.
ἀμήν.

Since the two previous verses are opposed, as asyndeta, to the twentieth, which
is connected with them by δέ [“and”], we may at once infer that 1Jn 5:18-19
contain in some sense two parallel thoughts, to which 1Jn 5:20 presents one that
corresponds similarly to both of them. And so we find it. The previous verses
alleged that we know in what relation our divine sonship places us to sin and to
the world: here it is unfolded that we are conscious of the ground of this
relation to both. Christ by His manifestation has given us the knowledge of Him
that is true, and thereby furnished us with the right view of our relation to
God and the world. This we have in the διάνοια [“understanding”], and with it
the relation of 1Jn 5:20 to what has preceded. The word διάνοια
[“understanding”] comes most frequently before us in Old Testament quotations,
where it is, as generally or often in the Septuagint, the translation of לֵב
[“heart”] or קֶרֶב [“inward part”]. But in all instances of its occurrence,
apart from such an Old Testament foundation, it seems to have a narrower
signification, corresponding to its conjunction with διά [“through”], that of
the discerning and distinguishing thought, or the faculty of distinction. This
it is most clearly in 2Pe 3:1: the apostle would stimulate the
εἰλικρινὴςδιάνοιαν [“sincere mind”] of the church ἐνὑπομνήσει [“by way of a
reminder”], by means of its remembrance. The εἰλικρινὴς [“sincere”] itself
suggests the gift of discernment: it signifies that which approves itself pure
under the keenest test (κρίνω [“I judge”]), under the light of the sun
(εἴλη[LSJ] [“sunlight”], cf. ἥλιος [“the rays of the sun”]). And the same
meaning is confirmed by its connection with what follows: the church should
distinguish, by means of their discerning faculty, the teaching of the false
prophets from the true apostolical παράδοσις [“tradition”]. Similarly, in Eph
4:18,[N] the ἐσκοτισμένοιτῇδιανοίᾳ [“ones darkned in understanding”] are those
whose faculty of discernment was so obscured that they had lost any standard for
the distinction of good and evil, divine holiness and worldly corruption. The
ματαιότηςτοῦνοός [“futility of the mind”] consists in this, that the Gentiles
had absolutely no sentiment of the baseness of the change between the divine
life and utter impurity (ἀπηλγηκότεςτῇἀσελγείᾳ [“callousness of sensuality” cf.
Eph 4:19]). It is not otherwise in 1Pe 1:13, where the ἀναζωσάμενοι τὰς ὀσφύας
τῆς διανοίας ὑμῶν [lit. “gird the loins of your mind”] as predicate to
τελείωςἐλπίσατε [“set your hope completely”] indicates that the church must, by
a keen and sure discrimination (διάνοια [“understanding”]), sever all other
objects from their hope, and hold fast to that of the revelation of Christ. This
special meaning of διάνοια [“understanding”] comes out with less precision in
the two other passages, Eph 2:3 and Col 1:21. In the former, the plural permits
only a more general reference; it is obvious that the διάνοια [“understanding”]
must not be referred to the various individuals, as if the διάνοια
[“understanding”] were ascribed to each of them, but the plural διανοιῶν
[“understandings”] must be referred to each individual. In Col 1:21, however, it
should be observed that the pregnant expression ἐχθροὺςτῇδιανοίᾳ [“enemies in
the mind”] does not so much signify that the soul is the seat or sphere of the
enmity, as that the ground of the enmity lay in their own thinking and in their
own personal decision, so that the meaning we considered above glimmers through
this text also. But as to our passage in this Epistle the meaning of discerning
faculty admirably suits, and it alone suits. Christ has given us διάνοιαν
[“understanding”], not τὴνδιάνοιαν [“the understanding”]: not the fulness of all
spiritual ability had been imparted to man, but, as the absence of the article
shows, with reference to the particular point in question, the power to discern
the true God, and to recognise, as opposed to Him the true God, the false gods
(εἴδωλα [“those perceive”]). But this knowledge is also the ground of that
other, by which we know ourselves as God’s children to be separated from sin,
while the world on the other hand lies in the wicked one. Thus our verse
approves itself to be the foundation on which the two former rest. The central
and fundamental fact is by δέ [“and”] set over against them, as they are the
consequences of it; while at the same time the particle defines this to be the
supreme matter. This διάνοια [“understanding”] is, more closely examined, the
gift of the Son of God who has come: ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἥκει [“the Son of God has
come”]. Christ is here described as the Son of God, because He alone as
ὁἐκτοῦοὐρανοῦκαταβὰς [“the one who came down from heaven”] (Joh 3:13) can impart
the knowledge of the Father; which knowledge, however. He has imparted by the
very fact of His coming. He that knows Him who has come has received thereby the
gift of διάνοια [“understanding”]; for he acknowledges Jesus as the light, and
has come to a clear perception about light and darkness generally. The gift of
διάνοια [“understanding”] enables us to know τὸνἀληθινόν [“the true one”]. This
expression is an elect one of St. John, for we find it very seldom outside of
his writings. It is not synonymous with ἀληθής [“true”]. We have perceived in
ἀληθής [“true”] and ἀλήθεια [“truth”] an absolute property, but ἀληθινός
[“true”] is a relative idea, and signifies what corresponds to its name and the
nature that name expresses. The present passage refers back to Joh 17:3: αὕτη δέ
ἐστιν ἡ αἰώνιος ζωὴ, ἵνα γινώσκωσί σε τὸν μόνον ἀληθινὸν Θεὸν, καὶ ὃν ἀπέστειλας
Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν [“This is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true
God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent”]. Not only have we in our verse
ἀληθινόςΘεός [“true God”] again and His Son Jesus Christ, but also the
ζωὴαἰώνιος [“eternal life”], and that in both cases as the gift of the Son of
God. The Father is here termed ἀληθινός [“true”]; without the addition of Θεός
[“God”]: He is the Being who alone in the highest degree corresponds with His
name. But not only do we know to discern Him as the True from all dis ficticiis;
we are also in this only true God (καί ἐσμεν ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ [“and we are in him
who is true”]), and that in virtue of our being in His Son (ἐν τῷ υἱῷ αὐτοῦ
Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ [“in his Son Jesus Christ”]). For it is impossible on grammatical
and logical grounds to refer the second ἀληθινός [“true”] as it were to Christ,
and to interpret: “we are in Him that is true, that is, in His Son Jesus
Christ,” as if the second ἐν [“in”] were in explanatory opposition , to ἐν τῷ
ἀληθινῷ [“in him who is true”]. When we simply hear the two propositions, “we
know Him that is true, and we are in Him that is true,” it is the most obvious
thing to understand in both cases Him that is true of the same subject. And how
very harsh would be the apposition: “we are in Him that is true,—that is to say,
in His Son, the Son of Him that is true.” The same meaning, that we now in
fellowship with Christ have also fellowship with God, is obtained by our
interpretation; only that the clause is much more simple, if we take the second
ἐν [“in”] as a statement of the means through which we attain to the εἶναι
ἐντῷἀληθινῷ [“to be in him who is true”]. But the question whether Christ is
here called ἀληθινόςΘεός [“true God”] is not yet settled. It has to be
determined whether the οὗτός [“this”] of the next proposition refers to the
locally and immediately preceding subject, υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ [“Son of God”], or to
the more distant antecedent God. Taking the former view, there arises the
difficulty, never yet solved by any one, that Christ, after the Father has just
been called ὁἀληθινόςscilicetΘεός [“the true”namely,“God”], could be termed,
indeed, ἀληθινόςΘεός [“true God”], but not ὁἀληθινός[“the true one”]. Further, a
testimony to the one true God seems more in harmony with the final warning
against idols than a demonstration of the divinity of Christ: the former and not
the latter forms the true antithesis to idols. Against the reference of οὗτός
[“this”] to God, appeal has been made to the distance of this antecedent, as
well as to the tautology which would issue from three repetitions of the same
thought. This last reason in particular would have some weight if οὗτός [“this”]
were a simple resumption of the one idea ἀληθινός[“true one”]; for the idea then
resulting, “This true God is the true God,” is, in fact, tautological enough.
But it is otherwise if οὗτός [“this”] refers to all that had been said of God
before: “this God, whom Christ has taught us to know, and with whom through His
Son we have been brought into living union, is the true God.” Then the
proposition is not pure tautology; but it emphasizes at the close that only that
God has a claim to the name just assigned Him of true, who has been made known
in Christ to the world and to the individual Christian. This view is supported
by the fundamental text of Joh 17:3, where the knowledge of God and that of
Christ are exhibited as equal factors in eternal life, just as here; only that,
while there they are presented together as simply co-ordinate, here the internal
relation of the one to the other is indicated (ἐν τῷ υἱῷ κ.τ.λ. [“in the Son,
etc.”]). The connection is also distinctly in favour of it. Our Epistle is
directing its final address to Christians, and in its own way demands of them
what another author speaks of as ἀφεῖναι τὸντῆςἀρχῆςλόγον [“to leave the word of
the beginning”fn] and the φέρεσθαιἐπὶτὴντελειότητα [“to press on to maturity”
cf. Heb 6:1]: this being so, its last exhortation to keep themselves from idols
could not refer to gross idolatry; such a dehortation would most inharmoniously
fit the tenor of the whole document. The εἴδωλα [“those perceived”] are rather
the ideas entertained of God by the false prophets of whom the apostle has
spoken, the antichrists, who, because they have not the Son, have not the Father
also, without being therefore atheists in the common meaning of the word. But
the antithesis to their ειδώλοις [“idols”] is not Christ the Logos, but the
Father revealed in the Son. All the heretics of that time would serve God.
Against them is held up the proposition that οὗτός [“this”], that is, this God
revealed in Christ, is alone the true God, all else is an εἴδωλον [“idol”]. But
not only is God robbed of His honour; not only does man serve a false god when
he seeks another God than the God revealed in Christ; but he also trifles away
his own salvation, for this only is eternal life (the article before ζωὴαἰώνιος
[“eternal life”] must be struck out): he that hath Him hath thereby life. He
hath, according to John 5:1-47, the life in Himself; and the life which the Son
has and is, is πρὸςτὸνπατέρα [“before the Father” cf. Joh 5:45] as it is
παρὰτοῦπατρός [“from the Father” cf. Joh 6:45]. There is not the slightest
difficulty in the fact that the Father is here described as ζωὴαἰώνιος [“eternal
life”], whilst elsewhere the Son is so described; on the contrary, this is in
harmony with the close of the Epistle. In its beginning the apostle set out with
the ζωὴαἰώνιος [“eternal life”] which the λόγος [“word”] is, and which is in
Him; here all flows back to the primal source of all life, to whom the
ἀπαύγασμακαὶχαρακτὴρὑποστάσεωςαὐτοῦ [“radiance and exact representation of his
nature” cf. Heb 1:3] has opened the way of access, and with whom He has placed
us in fellowship, ἵνα ᾖ ὁ Θεὸς πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν [“so that God may be all in all”
cf. 1Co 15:28]. But this supreme end must be firmly maintained, there must be no
recession from it: every moment that we forget that only the God revealed in
Christ is ὁ ἀληθινὸς Θεὸς καὶ ζωὴ αἰώνιος [“the true God and eternal life”]
would place us in fellowship with the ειδώλοις [“idols”]. Hence the penetrating
word of the apostle is a warning to avoid them. The first glance shows that the
last verses (1Jn 5:18-21) are not designed perfectly to recapitulate the entire
contents of the Epistle. There is not in them any reference to brotherly love,
which has nevertheless made up half the substance of it down to the close. But
this, indeed, has come into consideration only as the expression of a true
relation to God and the means of obtaining it. From this last everything flows,
and to it everything leads. Hence we have in these last verses a final emphasis
laid on the fundamental principles on which the Epistle rests: that we through
the mission of the Lord Jesus Christ have fellowship with God; that this
fellowship protects us from sin, and establishes us in a relation of perfect
opposition to the world. But, indeed, the threefold plural οἴδαμεν [“we know”],
the consciousness of common relationship to God as His children, suggests the
principle and always energetic impulse to brotherly love; and thus this common
consciousness, as containing in itself the bond with God and with our brethren,
is the pledge of the χαρὰ τετελειωμένη [“joy made perfect”] which the apostle
promised in the beginning of the Epistle to bring to maturity, and to maturity
through the establishment of fellowship with God and the brethren.


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Source: https://sermonindex.net/books/haupt-erich-the-first-epistle-of-st-john/
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