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  OBJECTIONS TO CALVANISM
  by Randolph S. Foster
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Foster's theological critique of Calvinism, examining God's eternal decrees and
the doctrine of predestination. He emphasizes the importance of fairly stating
opposing views before critiquing them and presents arguments against Reformed
soteriology.

  Chapters: 5

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  TABLE OF CONTENTS
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    0. Objections To Calvanism
    1. 1. Origin and Design of the Work
    2. 2. God's Eternal Decrees
    3. 3. Election and Reprobation
    4. 4. The Atonement

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  CHAPTER 0: OBJECTIONS TO CALVANISM
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  CHAPTER 1: 1. ORIGIN AND DESIGN OF THE WORK
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STAY, READER, FOR A moment. The author would speak with you. Some explanations
may be of service before you commence the perusal of the following pages. They
shall be brief and few.

This book is the creature of circumstance. It had never existed, but for reasons
over which the author himself had no control. He wrote because it seemed
necessary to write--not because he had any ambition for authorship. He made a
book, not with "intention of forethought," but almost before he was aware of it
and without any pretense whatever. The church of which he is a humble and
obscure minister had been long and grievously assailed by one of the principal
organs of a sister denomination, her doctrines and usages held up to public
odium as perverted by the pen of misrepresentation, her influence for piety
questioned, and whatever was peculiar to her organization ridiculed and
calumniated. And this ungenerous course was commenced and pursued by an
accredited champion at a time when peace and Christian union had long existed,
against remonstrances on our part, and published deprecations of the
consequences which were certain to ensue.

We endured for a time. But this only seemed to whet the envenomed appetite of an
adversary who seemed intent to devour us. The greater our reluctance, the
greater his ferocity. It now seemed that to remain longer silent would not only
be a reproach to ourselves--a matter which, alone considered, gave us little
concern--but must also weaken the force, if not peril the interests, of truth
itself. It was under such circumstances that the substance of what is contained
in this volume was given to the public through one of the journals of our church
in a series of letters addressed to the reverend gentleman who seemed so anxious
to discuss our respective differences. This is our apology, if any is necessary,
for sending to the public a volume which, it may be, some unacquainted with the
facts might conclude was uncalled for. Truth and religion required it. The time
had come when the real issues needed to be stated, and truth vindicated.

The object of the author has not been to discuss fully the doctrines peculiar to
Calvinism, nor to present the counter views of Armenians--nothing of the kind.
It was simply to present a statement of Calvinism and objections thereto--not to
examine its defense, not to build up an opposite system, not to contrast it with
other schemes--simply to state it and deduce its consequences, believing that
these consequences are sufficient to overthrow and destroy it. Had it been our
plan to examine the arguments by which Calvinists are wont to defend themselves,
we could have desired no easier a task than their refutation. But this has been
so ably and so often done, that we find no occasion to repeat it. The scheme
falls under the weight of its consequences--it matters not what its defense is.
Its consequences prove that it is utterly false, and no argument can, therefore,
prove it true.

The statement herein made of Calvinism, you will find in the progress of your
examination, is in no single instance the prejudiced and ex parte statement of
the author himself, but always the statement of the Confession of Faith and the
renowned and distinguished advocates of the system in their own language, fully
and fairly quoted. No author has been at the pains to quote so largely and
variously. Having derived our statements from their own standards, we deduce the
consequences. You will judge whether the consequences are legitimate or not and
whether, if legitimate, they are fatal to the system. This is all you have to
do. If Calvinism is what its friends here represent it to be, and its
consequences what I show them to be, you must decide in your own mind upon the
merits of the system.

It may be that this volume will find its way into the hands of some who have
long cherished, and still do cherish, respect for the system it is intended to
expose. To such may I say a word. Read this book, if you shall be induced to
read it at all, candidly and without feelings of resentment or prejudice. Be
assured that, however plainly the author may have spoken, toward you he
entertains none but sentiments of kindliness; his object is not to wound and
afflict, but purely to defend the truth. Let not the charge of misrepresentation
blind you. You are men--judge for yourselves. You will find that the author has
made no representations at all--that these are all and wholly taken from your
own standards. He is only responsible for the construction he has given to them
and the consequences he has drawn. You will judge of these. I admit that you
have been taught different views, and you have heard these consequences denied;
but, will this satisfy you? Do you not see that, though disclaimed and denied,
they still stand against you, unanswered--unanswerable? The premises are
yours--the conclusions you cannot escape. Read as a Christian only desirous for
the truth, and dare nobly to follow the truth wherever she points the way.

Toward the Presbyterian Church, I have cherished sentiments of the profoundest
attachment from my early boyhood. These sentiments have grown up with me to
manhood--they remain to this hour. In her communion are many personal friends
and relatives, and among her ministers are some dear to me as my own brothers.
Despite her errors, I here record my firm persuasion that she has many
surpassing excellences--many which my own church may well and wisely emulate.
But her creed is essentially erroneous, and that in important points I have
always believed, and now believe more firmly than ever before, having examined
the subject more thoroughly. My reasons for this belief are hereafter given.
Because of this attachment, and lest it might wound some friend of the Savior, I
have regretted constantly the necessity of discussing the subject; but, still
believing that truth is better than error--more pleasing to God and more
beneficial to the world, however painful the process of quarrying it--I have
spoken plainly and, I trust, in the fear of God on its behalf.

If on examination you shall find Calvinism liable to the charges herein
preferred against it, and if your reason and conscience and religion and nature
itself revolt at it, then it becomes you to inquire whether, through the
pretense of not believing it yourself, of its not being taught by your ministers
generally, of its being greatly modified--whether, because of any or all of
these reasons, you can safely continue with your influence to bolster the system
and propagate its existence and influence among men. May the great Head of the
Church bless you with right views and feelings and bring you to a wise and
judicious conclusion!

The plan of this book, it is believed, is entirely new, at least so far as the
writer is informed; and so supplies a desideratum on the controverted questions
introduced. The subject is brought more directly before the reader by copious
quotations, and the objections presented in a more condensed and direct form
than in any other of the numerous and superior works written on it. The reader
is thus enabled to see what Calvinism is--without being confused and distracted
by prejudiced statements--as held and taught by its own expounders, and, at the
same time, what are the difficulties alleged by its opposers as sufficient to
discredit it, and, whether friendly or hostile to it, will be aided to come to a
candid conclusion on the merits of the question.

It will be found that the difficulties brought against the system in these pages
are mainly derived from the logical consequences resulting from it, and the
undoubted antagonism of such consequences to the Word of God, the nature of man,
and the universal persuasion and consciousness of mankind. This course was
preferred by the author because it was less trodden and, upon the whole as he
believes, more convincing and conclusive. It could have been shown, as it has
been triumphantly many times--confining the argument to the Scripture
limits--that Calvinism is not taught therein, and that an opposite system is;
but this was made incidental to our main object which was to show that
consequences so revolting inevitably result from it as to prove him guilty of
blasphemy who charges it upon the Word of God; or, rather, as to make it
impossible for any to believe or pretend anything so dreadful. It is assumed
that what is logically false cannot be scripturally true; and, therefore, that
by involving Calvinism in logical dilemmas, it is overthrown and proved to be
unscriptural, as the Scripture cannot teach what is logically false and
contradictory. Whatever may be the seeming, the text cannot teach what is
logically untrue; or teaching it, it teaches what is false and cannot be the
Word of God. Whoever, therefore, derives a system from the Bible which is false
and demonstrably so to human reason by the processes of conclusive logic, either
derives from the Bible what it does not authorize, or he proves it false: in
other words, he is mistaken, or the Bible is not true. We attempt in the
following pages to show that Calvinists do this; and if our reasoning is
conclusive, it will not be difficult for our readers to decide which horn of the
dilemma to choose.

It may be proper to state here that, to avoid repetition, we have been compelled
to leave off many strong objections bearing against each of the several points
discussed; and even after much care, there may seem to be some sameness. The
reason of this is manifest. I have singled out eight distinct points of the
Calvinistic creed as objectionable. Now, these points are related and, to a
great extent, are susceptible of the same proof and liable to the same
objections. Hence, in treating of them separately, I have necessarily in some
measure used the same or similar objections against each. If the same objection
disproves all the points separately, it is legitimate and proper to employ it
against each: the interest of truth requires that it should be repeated whenever
it bears against error. We have, however, varied the argument as much as
possible and have not repeated the same point except where it was absolutely
necessary.

To enable you to determine the force of our argument as a whole against the system we oppose, I make this additional suggestion: if one single point of the eight specified is disproved, Calvinism is irreparably injured. If one point is removed, the system is destroyed--it is proved false, not only in that particular point, but, also, in all correlative points; its dependencies fall with it. If, then, I have shown difficulties bearing upon any one point such as to convince you that it cannot be true, the system is irretrievably involved. But, I ask you, has not, not only one, but every point named, been successfully assailed? Is it not so? Can you see an escape, not for all, but for a single one? But, again: I have introduced a score of objections, or approximately this, upon each point. Now, one objection is sufficient. If nineteen out of twenty are worthless and a single one is good, the objection stands--the system falls. A proposition cannot be true against one valid objection any more than it can against fifty. If one resists successful assault, the proposition is ruined. But, I ask you in all candor, can a single one be assailed? I have no need of many of them; but can anyone take them from my support? You will readily perceive that I have introduced a great excess of proof. But this shows you how hopeless the system against which such weight of objection bears--how much it will have to do before it is saved. It must rescue every point against every separate objection. And I assert that it cannot rescue a single point from a single objection. Let my readers, as they proceed, attempt for themselves to find an escape from the consequences urged and abide the honest result, whatever it may be. If Calvinism is true, embrace it. If not, discard it. But, be not misled by the pretense that, notwithstanding its difficulties, it is found in the Word of God. This is a subterfuge to escape the necessity of examining logical consequences---a lesson which, you will perceive in the appendix, my friend of the defense has learned. Your own judgment convinces you that if the system is logically liable, it cannot be taught in the Word of God.

The references made to authors in quotations has, in every instance with few
exceptions, been taken by the writer himself directly from them; and to those
who cannot examine for themselves, he insures their correctness. Those charged
to Piscator and Twisse are taken from Mr. Wesley; but their correctness is not
questioned. I have sought in every instance to quote enough to give the full
meaning of the author and have never put a construction, knowingly, not intended
by him. The consequences deduced, I admit, have been disclaimed; but my readers
must judge whether this can be done or not. I give you the premises--you must
decide upon the correctness of the deductions.

It is not presumed by the author either that he has succeeded in finding all or
the strongest objections bearing against the system he attempts to refute.
Doubtless there are many other and stronger ones which a better mind could have
discovered and which, with more time and leisure, the author himself might have
found; but what is given will, we think, be sufficient; and we have no fear but
what the candid reader will agree with us when he shall have thoroughly perused
the work. The book was prepared amid the numerous and weighty labors of a large
pastoral charge, and that when ordinary duties were greatly exceeded by a season
of unparalleled affliction--during the prevalence of the cholera--at a time
when, from day to day and week to week, the author was ministering to many of
those who were dying with that most dreaded scourge, and when his own life, as
the life of all, seemed uncertain from hour to hour. This, with the fact that it
never was intended for publication in volume form, will serve to palliate its
defects and extenuate its faults.

The reader is now prepared to set forward with us in the discussion of the
following pages. If he shall be entertained for a few brief hours and profited
in any degree in his noble pursuit of truth, we shall be more than compensated
for all the toil we have bestowed in the preparation. And may God, the great
Father of us all, bring both writer and reader to that world of happiness and
glory where truth shall be no more invested with shade, but appear in its own
brightness, and all shall see eye to eye and know even as we are known!


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  CHAPTER 2: 2. GOD'S ETERNAL DECREES
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IF THE READER HAS not considered the previous chapter, he will do himself a
service to turn back and give it a perusal before he proceeds to read what
follows.

When one man proposes to discuss the opinions of another man or company of men,
it is of first importance that he understand the opinions which he thus proposes
to discuss, and, understanding them himself, that he clearly and distinctly
state them to his readers. In every discussion, the first thing to be settled is
the precise point in dispute; and if this be omitted, the controversy must needs
degenerate into a mere idle logomachy--an unprofitable strife of words.

And it is not always sufficient that the opinions of an opponent be clearly
stated when practicable, they should be stated in precisely his own language,
that the chances of misrepresentation may be as few as possible, and that the
reader may see the grounds upon which the particular construction is based. This
is due an opponent; it is due the reader; it is due the cause of truth.

In accordance with these views, I shall proceed at once to state the point in
Calvinian theology to which I am about to object and to give the system and its
advocates the benefit of a candid and unprejudiced statement. I shall first
quote the sections of the Confession of Faith which regard it, and then the
interpretations given thereto by the most eminent and accredited of its de
fenders. If the reference to authors shall be large, it will be that we may gain
the very best possible light upon the point in question. The subject to be
treated of in this chapter is God's Eternal Decrees; and upon this subject the
Confession of Faith, chapter three, sections one and two holds the following
language:

God, from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will,
freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so as thereby
neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the
creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but
rather established. Although God knows whatsoever may or can came to pass upon
all supposed conditions, yet hath he not decreed anything because he foresaw it
as future, or as that which would come to pass upon such conditions.

This is the article of faith. In corroboration and exegesis of it, I read from
the Larger Catechism:

What are the decrees of God?

God's decrees are the wise, free, and holy acts of the counsel of his will,
whereby, from all eternity, he hath, for his own glory, unchangeably
foreordained whatsoever comes to pass in time, especially concerning angels and
men. In the exposition of the Confession of Faith by Rev. R. Shaw, "revised and
published by the Presbyterian Board of Publication," I read treating of the
article of faith,

That God must have decreed all future things, is a conclusion which necessarily
flows from his foreknowledge, independence, and immutability. The foreknowledge
of God will, necessarily, infer a decree; for God could not foreknow that things
would be, unless he had decreed they should be. If God would be an independent
being, all creatures must have an entire dependence upon him; but this
dependence proves, undeniably, that all their acts must be regulated by his
sovereign will.

If God be of one mind, which none can change, he must have unalterably fixed
everything in his purpose which he effects in his providence.

The decree of God relates to all future things without exceptions. Whatsoever is
done in time was foreordained before the beginning of time.

The decrees of God are absolute and unconditional: he has not decreed anything
because he foresaw it as future, and the execution of his decree is not
suspended upon any condition which may or may not be performed.

Nothing can happen but what is subject to his knowledge and decreed by his will.

If God simply foresaw the fates of men and did not also dispose and fix them by
his determination, there would be reason to agitate the question whether his
providence or foresight rendered them at all necessary. But, since he foresees
future events only in consequence of his decree that they shall happen, it is
useless to contend about foreknowledge, while it is evident that all things come
to pass rather by ordination and decree.

But what reason shall we assign for his permitting it, but because it is his
will? It is not probable, however, that man procured his own destruction by the
mere permission and without the appointment of God, as though God had determined
what he would choose to be the condition of the principal of his creatures.

I shall not hesitate, therefore. to confess plainly with Augustine that the will
of God is the necessity of things, and that what he has willed will necessarily
come to pass.

All things, both being, and events, exist in exact accordance with the purpose,
pleasure, and what is commonly called the decree of God.

The decrees of God relate to all future things without exception. Whatsoever is
done in time was foreordained before time.

Decrees of God are his settled purpose whereby he foreordained whatever comes to
pass. The opinion that whatever occurs in the world at large, or the lot of
private individuals, is the result of previous and unalterable arrangement by
that supreme Power which presides over nature, has always been held by many of
the vulgar, and has been believed by speculative men. The ancient Stoics, Zeno
and Chrysippus, whom the Jewish Essenes seem to have followed, asserted the
existence of a Deity, that, acting wisely, but necessarily, contrived the
general system of the world; from which, by a series of causes, whatever is now
done in it, unavoidably results. Mohammed introduced into his Koran the doctrine
of absolute predestination of the course of human affairs. He represents life
and death, prosperity and adversity', and every event that befalls a man in this
world, as the result of a previous determination of the one God, who rules over
all. Augustine, and the whole of the earliest reformers, but especially Calvin,
favored this doctrine.

The characteristical feature of the Calvinistic system is that entire dependence
of the creature upon the Creator, which it uniformly asserts, by considering the
will of the supreme Being as the cause of every thing that now exists or that is
to exist at any future time. The supreme Being selects those single objects and
those combinations of objects which he chooses to bring into existence; and
every circumstance in the manner of the existence of that which is to be thus
depending entirely on his will, is known to him, because he decreed it should
be.

Every action and motion of every creature is governed by the hidden counsel of
God, so that nothing can come to pass, but was ordained of him.

All things come to pass by his ordination and decree.

But, since he foresees future events only in consequence of his decree that they
shall happen, it is useless to contend about foreknowledge, while it is evident
that all things come to pass rather by ordination and decree.

Reason and revelation are in perfect unison in assuring us, that God is the
supreme, independent, first cause, of whom all secondary and inferior causes are
no more than the effects.

In this, and the following quotations from Toplady, we have also the sentiments
of Zanchius, as Toplady but translates Zanchius.

It may seem absurd to human wisdom, that God should harden, blind, and deliver
up some men to a reprobate sense--that he should first deliver them over to
evil, and then condemn them for that evil; but the believing, spiritual man sees
no absurdity in all this, knowing that God would be never a whit less good, even
though he should destroy all men. Though he (God) may be said to be author of
all the actions done by the wicked, yet he is not the author of them, in a
moral, compound sense, as they are sinful, but physically simply, and sensu
diviso, as they are mere actions, abstractly from all consideration of the
goodness or badness of them.

Hence, we see that God does not immediately and per se infuse iniquity into the
wicked, but powerfully excites them to action, and withholds those gracious
influences of his Spirit, without which every action is necessarily evil.

Every action, as such, is undoubtedly good, it being an actual exertion of those
operative powers given us by God for that very end. God may, therefore, be the
author of all actions, and yet not be the author of evil.

Whatever things God wills or does, are not willed and done by him, because they
were, in their own nature, and previously to his willing them, just and right,
or because, from their intrinsic fitness, he ought to will and do them; but they
are, therefore, just, right, and proper, because he is holiness itself, wills
and does them.

We make God the arbiter and governor of all things, who, in his own wisdom, has,
from the remotest eternity, decreed what he would do, and now, by his own power,
executes what he has decreed. Whence we assert, that not only the heavens, and
the earth, and inanimate creature, but also, the deliberations and volitions of
men, are so governed by his providence as to be directed to the end appointed by
it. It should be considered as indubitably certain, that all the revolutions
visible in the world proceed from the secret exertion of the divine power. What
God decrees must necessarily come to pass.

I admit more than this: even that thieves, homicides, and other malefactors, are
instruments of divine providence, whom the Lord uses for the execution of the
execution of the judgments which he has appointed.

They consider it absurd [they whose views Calvin opposes that a man should be
blinded by the will and command of God, and afterward by punished for his
blindness. They, therefore, evade the difficulty, that it happens only by the
permission, and not by the will of God; but God himself, by the most unequivocal
declarations, rejects this subterfuge. That men, however, can effect nothing,
but by the secret will of God, and can deliberate on nothing, but what he has
previously decreed, and determined by his secret direction, is proved by express
and innumerable testimonies.

The whole may be summed up thus: that, as the will of God is said to be the
cause of all things, his providence is established as the governor in all the
counsels and works of men; so that it not only exerts its power in the elect,
who are influenced by the Holy Spirit, but also compels the compliance of the
reprobates.

God's sovereign decree is the first link, his unalterable decree the second, and
his all active providence the third in the great chain of causes. What his will
determined, that his decree established, and his providence, either mediately or
immediately, effects. His will was the adorable spring of all, his decree marked
out the channel, and his providence directed the stream. If so, it may be
objected that whatever is, is right. Consequences cannot be helped.

But does not this doctrine tend to the establishment of fatality? Supposing it even did, were it not better to be a Christian fatalist than to avow a set of loose Arminian principles which, if pushed to their full extent, will inevitably terminate in the rankest Atheism? For without predestination there can be no providence; and without a providence, no God. After all, what do you mean by fate? If you mean a regular succession of determined events, from the beginning to the end of time---an uninterrupted chain without a single chasm, all depending on the eternal will and continued influence of the great first cause--if this is fate, it must be owned that it and the Scripture predestination are, at most, very thinly divided or, rather, entirely coalesce.

God's foreknowledge, taken abstractly, is not the sole cause of beings and
events, but his will and foreknowledge together.

Whatever comes to pass, comes to pass by virtue of the absolute, omnipotent will
of God, which is the primary and supreme cause of all things.

The will of God is so the cause of all things as to be itself without cause; for
nothing can be the cause of that which is the cause of everything, so that the
divine will is the ne plus ultra of all our inquiries. When we ascend to that,
we can go no further. Hence, we find every matter resolved, ultimately, into the
mere sovereign pleasure of God, as the spring and occasion of whatsoever is done
in heaven and earth. And no wonder that the will of God should be the mainspring
that sets all inferior wheels in motion, and should likewise be the rule by
which he goes in all his dealings with his creatures, since nothing out of God,
exterior to himself, can possibly induce him to will or nill one thing rather
than another.

God is a being whose will acknowledges no cause; neither is it for us to
prescribe rules to his sovereign pleasure, or call him to account for what he
does. He has neither superior nor equal; and his will is the rule of all things.
He did not will such and such things because they were, in themselves, right,
and he was bound to will them; but, therefore, equitable and right, because he
wills them.

Whatever man does he does necessarily, though not with any sensible compulsion;
and we can only do what God, from eternity, willed and foreknew we should.

That man fell in consequence of the divine decree. we prove thus .... Surely, if
God had not willed the fall, he could, and no doubt would, have prevented it.
But he did not prevent it: ergo, he willed it. And if he willed it, he certainly
decreed it; for the decree is nothing else but the seal and ratification of his
will. He does nothing but what he decreed, and he decreed nothing which he did
not will; and both will and decree are absolutely eternal, though the execution
of them both be in time.

Now, it is self-evident that if he [God] knows all things beforehand, he either
doth approve of them, or he doth not approve of them; that is, he either is
willing they should be, or he is not willing they should be. But to will that
they should be is to decree them.

The Arminians ridicule the distinctions between the secret and revealed will of,
or more properly expressed, between the decree and law of God, because we say he
may decree one thing and command another. However, if they will call this a
contradiction of wills, we know that there is such a thing; so that it is the
greatest absurdity to dispute about it. We know that God willed that Pharaoh's
heart should be hardened, and yet that the hardness of his heart was sin.

All the actions of men, even those which the Scripture holds forth to our
abhorrence, are represented as being comprehended in the great plan of divine
providence. I do not mean merely that all the actions of men are foreseen by
God--if this the predictions in Scripture offer evidence which even the
Arminians admit to be incontrovertible--but I mean that the actions of men are
foreseen by God, not as events independent of his will, but as originating in
his determination and fulfilling his purpose.

Any number almost of similar quotations might be added to the list, but it is
unnecessary: all the standard Calvinistic authors since the days of Augustine,
some with greater and others with less caution, express themselves upon this
point in about the same manner. We cannot say so much for their uniformity when
it comes to the details of explanation and defense--here, indeed, truth
constrains us to say, we find what appears to our mind great confusion,
perplexity, and contradiction arising out of the difficulties of the doctrine;
and if we should be unfortunate in not precisely apprehending it, I hope it will
not be ascribed to willful blindness, seeing that its friends differ so much in
regard to it.

If I understand the meaning of the above quotations at all --and the language is
so plain and unambiguous that it would certainly be difficult to misunderstand,
particularly when taken in connection with other parts of the Calvinistic
system--it may thus be summed up:

(1.) Whatsoever comes to pass in time was decreed unconditionally and
unalterably before.

(2.) Whatsoever comes to pass in time, comes to pass because it was decreed
before time.

(3.) Nothing can be, but what was decreed; and what was decreed cannot fail to
be; and it cannot fail to be, because decreed.

Having defined what we understood to be the doctrine of decrees as held by
Presbyterians--a definition derived from their own Confession of Faith, and
numerous Calvinistic authors of great respectability and authority--I shall now
proceed to allege objections thereto.

1. And, first, I object: it renders the conclusion inevitable that God is the
author of sin. I employ the term author in the sense of originator or cause.

Do not, I pray you, turn away from this point. I know it has been often urged. I
know you have as steadily denied it. I know, indeed, that you have expressly
incorporated your protest in the article of faith itself. "God, from all
eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and
unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; [and now your disclaimer] yet so
as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will
of the creature." But this disclaimer by no means relieves my embarrassment; it
greatly increases it by placing you in the attitude, to my mind, of believing a
palpable contradiction--namely, that God did cause all things, sin included, yet
in such a way that he did not cause sin. It is as though you should say,
Lycurgus made all the laws of Sparta, yet in such a way that there were many
laws of Sparta which Lycurgus did not make. But supposing that the absurdity
does not strike your mind with the same force it does mine--or of course you
could not embrace it--I shall more particularly present the reasons; and perhaps
you can assist me in my conclusions.

I reason thus, and the process is exceedingly brief and simple: "God decreed
whatsoever comes to pass;" but sin comes to pass. Therefore, God decreed sin.
"What God decrees must necessarily come to pass;" but he decreed sin. Therefore,
sin necessarily comes to pass. "God's decree is the necessity of things;" but
sin is something. Therefore, God's decree is the necessity or necessitating
cause of sin. "God's decree, being from eternity, precedes all things, and
whatever is in time results from God's decree as its cause;" but sin is in time.
Therefore, sin results from God's decree as its cause.

Let me particularize now. The doctrine is that God decreed from eternity
whatsoever comes to pass in time, and that according to his own good
pleasure--every particular thing, event, and act. I must insist, according to
this, that he decreed the sin of every sinful man--nay each particular sin of
each particular man, and all the sins of all men, long before the human race was
created. For if there be any sin which was not decreed, then something has come
to pass in time which was not decreed from eternity: but then your system is in
error, when it says whatsoever comes to pass in time was decreed from eternity.

Do men murder, rob, blaspheme, commit adultery, incest, idolatry? It was so
decreed before they were born. They could no more avoid it than they could
resist the fiat of Omnipotence, or subvert the purpose of the Almighty. Indeed,
the decree to create them was connected with a decree that when, and as
certainly as, created, they should commit these sins, and their creation was in
order to their sins.

Shall I be told that, though all things come to pass by decree, yet that the
decree is not the cause of their occurrence--not the efficient reason why they
occur? Then I desire to know precisely what Calvinists mean by the terms decree,
predestinate, foreordains whether anything can or could possibly come to pass
without being decreed--whether, after being decreed, anything can fail to come
to pass--whether decree proceeds upon foreknowledge that certain things will
come to pass and are, therefore, decreed simply as certain because
foreknown--whether, in a word, there is any connection between God's decree and
the thing decreed, and what that connection is. I understand from the most
respectable Calvinistic authorities already quoted, that the decree of God and
the event decreed stand related as cause and effect--that the event necessarily
answers the decree--that the whole universe, indeed, including all beings,
events, and acts, arises out of the decree or predetermination of God. This
being the case, it will be perceived, inevitably, by the simplest process of
reasoning, that sin results as an effect from the divine decree as its cause.

Shall I be told that, though God by his decree is the cause of sinful acts, yet
he causes not the sin of the act? This seems to be the view of the expositor of
the Confession. He says, "The decree of God is either effective or permissive."
He does not tell us in what sense he employs the term permissive--a point I
should like to have explained--but he proceeds to tell what his permissive
decree respects. "His effective decree respects all the good that comes to
pass--his permissive decree all the evil that is in sinful actions." Now
observe: "We must distinguish between actions purely as such, and the sinfulness
of the actions. The decree of God is effective (causal) with respect to the
action itself, abstractly considered; it is permissive with respect to the
sinfulness of the act as a moral evil." The same sentiment I find in various
other authors; and, indeed, I find it a common and favorite mode of explanation.
It is thus stated by Hermin Witsius, a learned German, in an elaborate defense
of his favorite tenets:

As these things are universally true, they may be applied to those free actions
of rational creatures in which there is a moral evil inherent, namely, that
creatures may be determined to their actions by the efficacious influence of
God, so far as they are actions according to their physical entity. What am I to
understand by all this? There is a discrimination between the sinful act and the
sin of the act. This is correct: an act and its sinfulness are certainly
distinct. Sin resides in the intention, not in the act. A man ruins his friend,
or murders his father: the question of his guilt turns upon his intention. Well,
then, is this the meaning of our Calvinistic brethren, that, though God's decree
is the efficient cause of the sinful act as an act, it is not the cause of its
sin, for the sin is in the sinner's intention in committing it? But, then, a
question arises right here. Was not the sinner's intention decreed, also, as
well as the act? If you answer, "No," then here is something which comes to pass
in time which was not decreed before time. If you answer, "Yes," and the sin was
in the intention, then God, who was the author of the intention, was the author
of the sin; for the sin and the intention are the same.

Again: did not God decree that certain acts, if committed with certain
intentions, should be sinful? But did he not also decree that those very acts
and intentions should exist? If so, is he not the author of the sin, both with
respect to the act and intention? If not, is not here something coming to pass
in time which was not decreed before time? There may be some way of escape from
this difficulty. I cannot myself perceive it, and must wait patiently for
further light.

And again: is not intention an essential part of a moral act? Can there be a
moral act without intention as an element of it? If not, then God did not decree
moral acts, or he decreed the intention with all else that constitutes them
moral acts. If he did not decree all moral acts, then here is a class of acts
which he did not decree; and so your doctrine is in error when it asserts that
he decreed all things. But if he did decree all moral acts, then he decreed all
sins, without exception, and as sins, essentially with all that constitutes
their sin--the sin itself.

Still again: am I told that God is not the author of sin, because he cannot
sin--he is under no law, and, therefore, he cannot transgress? Is this the idea?
I believe some learned Calvinists take this course to escape the difficulty. If
this means anything, it must mean to discriminate between God's proper, personal
acts, and those acts which he causes other beings to put forth. In regard to the
first, it is not pretended that God breaks the law personally, by himself
personally transgressing it; but this is meant, God is the author of sin in this
sense:

(1.) He makes a law, the transgression of which is sin.

(2.) He places creatures under the law.

(3.) He impels them to those acts of transgression which are sinful. Thus he
causes sin by causing his creatures to transgress the law under which they were
placed. The act of transgression, in this case, is God's own proper, though not
personal, act; and if there be any sin, he is not only the author of the sin,
but the sinner himself. This is so palpable I hesitate to dwell upon it, lest it
might seem an imputation upon the good sense of my renders.

Will you be so kind then, dear sir, as to tell me how you escape the conclusion
to which I am thus impelled--that God is, in the true and proper sense, the
author of sin?

All Calvinistic authors with whose writings I am conversant perceive and admit
the liability of their scheme to this objection and do their utmost to escape
it; and, I will add, they certainly display great genius and skill in contending
with the difficulty, and do as much to make error seem like the truth as the
most gifted intellects can do.

The argument may be summed up thus: Whatsoever comes to pass in time was
unconditionally and unalterably decreed before time. But sin comes to pass in
time; therefore, sin was unconditionally--and of course purely of the pleasure
of God and for its own sake--and unalterably decreed before time. God's decrees
are the cause of all things that come to pass in time; but sin comes to pass in
time. Therefore, God's decrees are the cause of sin.

What results from a decree as a necessary sequence, results from the author of
the decree. But sin results from the decree of God as a necessary sequence;
therefore, sin results from himself.

According to this dogma, no man ever did or ever can do anything but what it was
ordained he should do from eternity; to avoid which is as impossible as to
overthrow the decree of God, and which, if possible, would be rebellion against
God, punishable with death. When I sin, I am instrumentally doing what God chose
should be done before I was born. The thing I do was his choice, and he made me
for no other purpose but to accomplish it--decreed it for me, and me for it.

From the foregoing argument I can conceive of no escape, unless it be by one of
the following methods:

(1.) A denial of the premise, "God decrees whatsoever comes to pass." Will Dr.
Rice deny?

(2.) A denial that God's decree necessarily procures the thing decreed. Will Dr.
Rice deny?

(3.) A denial that God is author of that which is solely procured by his decree.
Will Dr. Rice deny?

For it is undeniable; no skill can escape the conclusion. If whatever comes to
pass was decreed beforehand, and if this preceding decree was the sole
necessitating cause of things so decreed, then the author of the decree is the
author of all things included therein. And as all things that occur in time are
included in the decree and caused by it, so sin, which occurs in time, was
included in and caused by the decree. It is by a process of reasoning of the
foregoing description that we are impelled to the conclusion that the
Calvinistic system renders God the author of sin. If we have misunderstood the
system, will the Doctor point out in what particular? If our reasoning is
illogical or unfair, will he show us in that respect?

I am only conscious of a desire to ascertain the truth, and would not, if I
could, resort to unfairness to criminate the system I oppose. And if I were
capable of so unchristian a disposition, I certainly could not do it
successfully, observed as I am. May the great Head of the Church himself give us
light and lead us into the unity of the faith and the truth, as it is in Jesus!

2. I object to the doctrine of decrees, as held by Calvinists, in the second
place because it is inconsistent with and destructive to the free agency of man.

The opposers of Messrs. Wesley and Fletcher violently assailed them on this
subject. Mr. Southey informs us in his Life of Wesley that the Calvinists called
the doctrine of free-will "a cursed doctrine"--"the most God-dishonoring and
soul-destroying doctrine"--"one of the prominent features of the beast"--"the
enemy of God"--"the offspring of the wicked one"--"the insolent brat of hell."

But if they had nowhere admitted it, but in all cases strongly denied it, as I
suppose you do, still the difficulty would remain; for it grows out of your
doctrines inevitably, and is in no sense affected by your admissions or denials.
It is to no purpose that you tell me, "God from eternity unconditionally and
unalterably decreed whatsoever comes to pass, yet so as thereby violence is not
offered to the will of the creature," because this again strikes my mind only in
the light of a contradiction. It is as though you told me God determined what
each distinct volition should necessarily be, yet in such a sense that any
volition might have been different from what it is--it is necessarily what it
is, it is not necessarily what it is.

But, not to consume your time with what may be considered my own representations
of your views upon this point, let me refer to authorities high in your esteem
and of unquestionable information.

Neither does God only excite and predetermine the will of men to vicious
actions, so far as they are actions, but he likewise so excites it, that it is
not possible but thus acted upon, it shall act. Moreover, as a second cause
cannot act unless acted upon and previously moved to act by the predetermining
influence of the first, so, in like manner, that influence of the first cause is
so efficacious as that, supposing it, the second cause cannot but act.

It would certainly be very inexcusable to misunderstand these quotations, so
clearly and definitely expressed as they are; and scarcely less inexcusable not
to admire the sturdy candor of their learned author in so plainly delivering
himself upon such a point.

Second causes, among which he reckons the human will, cannot act unless and only
as acted upon--when acted upon, they must act. This was saying much; but, to let
us know that he was fully apprised of the consequences, he goes still further.
Not only does God excite the will of men to vicious actions, but, thus excited,
it is not possible it shall fail to act--it is under inexorable necessity.

In the Old and New Divinity Compared, I read,

For if God does not possess such absolute control over his creatures that he can
govern them according to his pleasure, how could he have decreed anything
unconditionally concerning them, since it might happen that, in the exercise of
their free agency, they would act contrary to the divine purpose? If this
paragraph means anything, it plainly means that unconditional decrees and free
agency are irreconcilable; and as all things are unconditionally decreed,
according to the system, there can, of course, be no free agency.

In the trial of Dr. Beecher, Dr. Beecher accuses Dr. Wilson as follows: "Dr.
Wilson has made a distinct avowal that free agency and moral obligation to obey
law do not include any ability of any kind." To which Dr. Wilson replied
directly in so many words, "With respect to fallen man I do!" Says Dr. Wilson,

Now let us look at the doctrine of the Confession with this principle in view.
that the state of the man determines the will. The will is always at liberty:
choice is an effect always, and not a cause: It is always produced freely. There
is no such thing as bound will. Hence. all do what is good or evil voluntarily,
in view of a motive, and according to the state of mind in which they are.

Take man in a state of innocence. God made him upright in his own image; his
choice is free, and he chooses what is right, but not from any power in the
will. The will, as I have said, has no power to operate on anything but the
body. His uprightness was in the right state of the affections and the luminous
state of the understanding--in the correct state of the memory and in his entire
moral rectitude in the divine image. His will was free to do good while no
temptation was presented to it. He had no motive but his accountableness to God
and his love to God.

But now look at him in another state--the state of temptation. Motives are now
presented to him by the arch tempter, but not to his will at all; they are
presented to his understanding and appetites--to his taste for beauty. The fruit
is pleasant to the eye; and what was the effect? The will was not trapped in any
other way than this: the temptation addressed to these powers was so strong,
that it overcame the dictates of judgment, and the man chose wrong. Volition
moves the body; the mind moves the will; and the mind is is moved by that
without, which is adapted to its constitution.

Now who moved that without and made the constitution?

The foregoing is the language of Dr. Wilson, who for forty years occupied the
First Presbyterian Church in this city, and during his long life was a prominent
man in the church of the west: certainly for ability and opportunity inferior to
none of his school and, therefore, as reliable an exponent as any other. But now
observe his honest and candid admission on an occasion when, of all others, he
would be most accurate, and on a point where he would be most critically
prepared: "Free agency and moral obligation to obey law [with respect to fallen
man] do not include any ability of any kind!" According to this, free agency, as
held by Calvinists, does not include ability of any kind. A man is a free agent
though he have no power at all! He is also responsible to obey law though he
have no ability of any kind to do so!

But he more fully unfolds his view as above, and no one can read the quotation,
it seems to me, without sympathizing with the sincere and able author in the
manifest confusion and self-contradictions in which he involves himself. "The
will is always at liberty;" yet its choice is always caused by a foreign agent!
"When the mind chooses it always chooses freely;" yet it has no kind of ability
whatever, but is ruled by the motives in every case! "There is no such thing as
bound will;" but it is always an effect and not a cause! Observe, further, his
philosophy of the will. Dr. Wilson carries back beyond or behind the fall. Of
man in innocence he says, "His will was free to do good while no temptation was
presented to it;" but what is implied in this? When temptation came, the will
was not free to do good, but bound to do evil or to yield! This, indeed, he does
not leave us to infer, but expressly states that the temptation presented to the
first pair was such that it overcame by its strength the mind "the mind moves
the will and was itself moved by that without;" and thus man fell under the
force of a temptation which he had no power to resist. He fell, therefore, when
under the circumstances he had no power to stand! And yet he was free in doing
what he had no power to avoid!

The expositor of the Confession, in his notes on the article respecting the
will, holds this language:

According to Calvinists, the liberty of a moral agent consists in the power of
acting according to his choice; and those actions are free which are performed
without external compulsion--physical compulsion--in consequence of the
determination of his own mind. The necessity of man's willing and acting,
according to his apprehension and disposition, is in their opinion fully
consistent with the highest liberty, which can belong to a rational nature ....
As nothing can ever come to pass without a cause, the acts of the will are never
without necessity--understanding by necessity an infallible connection with
something foregoing. This I understand to be the doctrine of all Calvinists
respecting the will of man, as well before as since the fall; it is often
expressed in stronger language.

Now, this view of the will utterly discards this idea of liberty--power to
choose either of two alternatives. Here is the real point of difference between
us and them: with them liberty is necessity to choose one way according to the
motive, but not power to make an opposite choice. With us it is a power to
choose either of the various alternatives presented to the mind. Now, upon their
doctrine of the will, I base an argument that its decisions are necessitated and
not free and, hence, that it is absurd for a Calvinist to contend for freedom.
Take a man in a state of innocence for we desire to give the advocates of the
system the most favorable opportunity to defend themselves. The question is,
"Was man capacitated with freedom to stand or fall in the circumstances?" And,
according to the Calvinian system, the answer must be, "He was not; for he was
so constituted that he must yield to the prevailing disposition or strongest
motive. He could not avoid this--it was his nature. He had no control of these
motives, and when they came upon him, he as necessarily was moved by them as the
needle is moved to the pole. It matters not that he chose to move with the
influence; for the want of liberty and the fact of necessity were found in the
circumstance, that he had no control of his choice. He made his choice
necessarily."

Now I ask Dr. Rice, "What does control the choice?" He must answer, "Whatever
goes to constitute the prevailing motive." But then I ask who controls and
governs these motives. And he must answer that all things are arranged and
governed by God himself and controls the motives, the motives control the man.
He sins, necessitated by the motive. And, now, where do we find the first cause?
Not in the choice, for it was an effect. Not in the motives, for they were under
the government and control of God. Here, then, we trace the operations of man's
will back to God, not as permitted, but procured. If the Calvinists can trace it
beyond God, they may free their system from making God the first cause of sin!

Thomas Aquinas, quoted with approval by Witsius, says,

It is essential to the first principle that it can act without the assistance
and influence of a prior agent; so that, if the human will could produce any
action of which God was not author, the human will would have the nature of a
first principle .... Nor does God only concur with the actions of second causes
when they act, but, also, influences the causes themselves to act. Calvinists
contend that, as nothing can ever come to pass without a cause, the acts of the
will are never contingent or without necessity--understanding by necessity, a
necessity of consequence, or an infallible connection with something foregoing.

This is plain language. The will never acts but as necessitates by a foregoing
cause, infallibly producing the act. That foregoing cause was decreed by the
divine Being to produce that precise volition; and it produced it with all the
certainty of a necessary effect. That is, the will is free to act in agreement
with the irresistible bias of a necessitating cause.

This is the same scheme, if I understand them, taught by Mr. Edwards and his
numerous admirers in their fruitless effort to reconcile freedom and necessity.
"The plain and obvious meaning of the words freedom and liberty," says Edwards,
"is power, opportunity, or advantage that anyone has to do as he pleases." But
he also teaches us that the volition is necessary. His will or particular
choice, whatever it may be, is necessarily determined by motive, and the motive
is fixed by decree so that, though a man do as he pleases, he is not free,
because he cannot please to do otherwise and, by necessity as stern as the most
absolute compulsion, chooses as he does.

This doctrine is identical with fatalism in its worst form. All that fatalism
ever has maintained or now maintains is that men, by a power which they cannot
control or resist, are placed in circumstances in which they cannot but pursue
the course of conduct which they actually are pursuing. This doctrine never has
assumed that in the necessitarian sense men cannot do as they please. All that
it maintains is that they cannot but please to do as they do. It is altogether
futile, then, to talk about free agency under such a constitution. The very
spring of motion to the whole intellectual machinery is under the influence of a
secret, invincible power. And it must move as that power directs, for it is the
hand of Omnipotence that urges it on. He can act as he wills, it is true; but
the whole responsibility consists in the volition, and this is the result of
God's propelling power. He wills as he is made to will. He chooses as he must
choose; for the immutable decree of Jehovah is upon him.

And can a man, upon the known principles of responsibility, be accountable for
such a volition? It is argued, I know, that man is responsible because he feels
that he acts freely, and that he might have done otherwise. To this I reply that
this is a good argument on our principle to prove that men are free; but on the
Calvinistic ground, it only proves that God hath deceived us. He has made us
feel that we might do otherwise, but he knows we cannot--he has determined we
shall not so that in fact this argument makes the system more objectionable.
While it does not change the facts in the case, it attributes deception to the
Almighty. It is logically true, therefore, from this doctrine that man is not a
free agent and, therefore, not responsible.

Mr. Dick says,

A man chooses what appears to be good and he chooses it necessarily, in this
sense, that he could not do otherwise. The object of every volition is to please
himself; and to suppose a man to have any other object, that is, to will
anything that does not please him in itself or in its circumstances, is
absurd--it is to suppose him to will and not to will at the same time. He is
perfectly voluntary. in his choice; but his willingness is the consequence of
the view which his mind takes of the object presented to it or of his prevailing
disposition. Those actions are free which are the effect of volition. In
whatever manner the state of mind which gave rise to the volition has been
produced, the liberty of the agent is neither greater nor less. It is the will
alone which is to be considered, and not the means by which it has been
determined. If God foreordained certain actions and placed men in such
circumstances that the actions would certainly take place. agreeably to the laws
of the mind, men are, nevertheless, moral agents because they act voluntarily
and are responsible for the actions which consent has made their own. liberty
does not consist in the power of acting or not acting, but in acting from
choice. The choice is determined by something in the mind itself or by something
external influencing the mind; but whatever is the cause, the choice makes the
action free and the agent accountable.

If this definition of liberty be admitted, you will perceive that it is possible
to reconcile the freedom of the will with absolute decrees; but we have not got
rid of every difficulty. By this theory, human actions appear to be as necessary
as the motions of matter, according to the laws of gravitation and attraction;
and man seems to be a machine, conscious of his movements and consenting to
them, but impelled by something different from himself.

This is the deplorable conclusion to which Mr. Dick himself comes. And his only
effort to extricate himself is this: "Upon such a subject no man should be
ashamed to acknowledge his ignorance." Several things are remarkable in this
paragraph.

(1.) Liberty and necessity are the same thing.

(2.) Man is accountable for his actions, though he is a machine and is under a
necessity, as that of matter to obey gravitation.

The honesty of the reasoner must be admired while his sophistry is a matter of
marvel.

Of the same import is the following, which I quote from an author admired more
than any other, perhaps, as the present time--Dr. Chalmers:

Every step of every individual character receives as determinate a character
from the hand of God as every mile of a planet's orbit, or every gust of wind,
or every wave of the sea, or every particle of flying dust, or every rivulet of
flowing water. This power of God knows no exceptions; it is absolute and
unlimited. And while it embraces the vast, it carries its restless influences to
all the minute and unnoticed diversities of existence. It reigns and operates
through all the secrecies of the inner man. It gives birth to every purpose; it
gives impulse to every desire; it gives shape and color to every conception; it
wields an entire ascendency over every attribute of the mind; and the will, and
the fancy, and the understanding, with all the countless variety of their hidden
and fugitive operations, are submitted to it. It gives movement and direction
through every point of our pilgrimage. At no moment of time does it abandon us.
It follows us to the hour of death, and it carries us to our place and to our
everlasting destiny in the regions beyond it! I confess I cannot conceive of a
stronger assertion of fatalism, with respect to man and things, than is
contained in the foregoing remarkable quotations. All mental and physical
processes from the first link to the end of the chain are connected together in
the relation of cause and effect.

No man can choose differently from what he does; and as he acts from his
volitions, he cannot act differently from what he does--it is all fixed by
inexorable necessity. Is such a being free? Is this the liberty of man? If this
be moderate Calvinism, what must it be in the ultra, high-toned type?

If anything further should be esteemed necessary upon this point, a few
selections from Dr. Emmons, a distinguished divine of New England and author of
an elaborate work on theology, may supply the demand. He says,

Since the Scriptures ascribe all the actions of men to God, as well as to
themselves. we may justly conclude that the divine agency is as much concerned
in their bad as their good actions. Many are disposed to make a distinction here
and to ascribe only the good actions of men to the divine agency, while they
ascribe their bad ones to the divine permission. But there appears no ground for
this distinction in Scripture or reason. Men are no more capable of acting
independently of God in one instance than another. If they need any kind or
degree of divine agency in doing good, they need precisely the same kind and
degree of divine agency in doing evil. But there was no possible way in which he
could dispose them to act right or wrong, but only by producing right or wrong
volitions in their hearts. And if he produced their bad as well as good
volitions, then his agency was concerned in precisely the same manner in their
wrong as in their right actions. His agency in making them act necessarily
connects his agency and theirs together and lays a solid foundation for
ascribing their actions either to him, or them, or to both.

But, since mind cannot act any more than matter can move without a divine
agency, it is absurd to suppose that men can be left to the freedom of their own
will to act or not to act independently of divine influence. There must,
therefore, be the exercise of divine agency in every human action.

By this invisible agency upon the minds, he governs all their views, all their
thoughts, all their determinations, and all their volitions, just as he pleases
and just according to his secret will, which they neither know beforehand, nor
can resist, evade, or frustrate.

Thus we prove upon the system both that it makes God the author of sin, and
destroys the free agency of man.

These quotations show what Calvinists themselves teach upon the subject in
dispute. They are not our deductions, but their own propositions--not our
misrepresentations of their views, but their own carefully-studied and
well-considered declarations. They are precisely the inferences we should have
made from the premise work of their system; but they have saved us the trouble
and responsibility by candidly acknowledging themselves.

And now the argument stands thus: Man can only will as he is moved by divine
agency. And when moved by divine agency, he cannot but will. So, therefore, when
man wills it is not a free, but a necessitated act. What a man wills, he wills
not freely, but he wills because another, by invisible power, irresistibly
compels him to will. It is not his own act, but it is an act of which he is made
the passive subject by another operating through him, and a power entirely
separate from himself.

He chooses as he does as necessarily as matter yields to the law of gravitation,
and he is no more free in his choice than the earth is in its revolutions. The
choice he makes is no more his free act than the tendency of the needle to the
pole is its free act. It makes no difference that choice is supposed in one case
and not in the other, because choice is an effect of a cause entirely out of the
man and independent of him, and so, of course, cannot be his act.

Doctor, I wish you would help me here. My difficulty, as you will perceive, is
at this point, to know how a man is free in willing when at the same time his
particular exercise of will is an effect of which he is the coerced instrument.
Will you tell me how this is?

3. I object to the doctrine in the third place because it destroys the
accountability, and hence the well-grounded apprehension, of our Calvinistic
brethren at the imputation that their doctrine is destructive to freedom of
agency.

Says Dr. Fisk,

To conceive of beings deserving praise or blame for volitions or actions which
occurred under circumstances over which they had no control, and under which no
other volitions or actions were possible, and in which these could not but
happen is an absolute impossibility. To conceive them under obligation to have
given existence under such circumstances to different consequents is equally
impossible. It is to suppose an agent under obligation to perform an absolute
and intrinsic impossibility. Let any individual conceive of beings placed by
divine Providence in circumstances in which but one act or series of acts of
will can arise, and these cannot but arise--let him then attempt to conceive of
these creatures as under obligations, in the same circumstances over which they
have no control, to give existence to different and opposite acts and as
deserving of punishment for not doing so. He will find it impossible to pass
such a judgment--human intelligence is incapable of affirming such
contradictions. Thus, by sapping the foundations of free-agency, it at the same
time destroys human accountability, releases man from all obligation, and
renders God the only responsible being in the universe.

I would not press illegitimate results upon your system, to give you the trouble
of examining and the unpleasant task of refuting and correcting them; but these
which I present strike me as so plain and inevitable and of such force, that you
must excuse me for urging them upon your notice. This point--how am I to escape
it?

You tell me that whatever I do during my whole existence comes to pass by a
decree of God--which decree is the necessitating cause of things. Now, a
question here: Am I accountable for doing what, by decree, I am compelled to do?
Or is the author of the decree accountable? That is, is the agent or instrument
responsible? It will not do, Doctor, to tell me that, though the decree must be
complied with, yet that I comply freely inasmuch as I of choice do the thing
decreed; because you have told me before that my choice is also wrought in me,
directly or indirectly, by the same great Being whose decree binds me--I am not
the author of the choice, but the passive instrument of it. Am I accountable
when I do nothing but what I am caused to do by omnipotent agency exerted upon
me?

Do I sin against God when I make the very choice which he works in me, when I do
the act which that choice dictates? And, when I could not have made another
choice or performed another act to save the universe, must I be damned forever
for doing a thing I could not help but do? And must I thus be damned by the very
being who made me and necessitated the act for which he thus destroys me? I
desire a plain answer upon these points. You cannot fail to perceive where my
difficulties lie with respect to your system; and you can easily show either how
they do not bear on the system, or how I may escape the inference, or that the
inference is not objectionable.

If Dr. Rice denies that God decreed the existence of sin, then he abandons and
denies his Confession which declares that "God from all eternity did, by the
most wise and holy counsel of his own free-will, freely and unchangeably ordain
whatsoever comes to pass." If he denies that the decree is the efficient cause
of the thing decreed, he antagonizes various authors quoted in the commencement
of this chapter, and particularly Calvin who says with Augustine, "The decree of
God is the necessity or necessitating cause of things." And, in that case, we
hope the Doctor will explain to us what he means by decree--what relation it has
to the thing decreed. For the arguments sustaining this objection against the
Calvinistic system, I refer Dr. Rice to my preceding remarks, to which I desire
him to give a careful consideration, and then, to point out to me wherein they
fail to sustain the conclusion. He admits equally with myself, if the objection
is made good, his system is false; for he alleges precisely the same objection
against another system as an insuperable difficulty, as an entirely sufficient
reason for discarding it as utterly false. Now, either he and I are at fault in
employing the objection against Universalism, or, if sustained against Dr.
Rice's system, he is equally bound with myself to discard the system so
embarrassed; and if not sustained, he will, by so much as he loves truth and
deprecates error, point out in what respect it fails.

It will not answer to tell me these things have been often explained, nor yet to
deny or refer to antagonistic professions and disclaimers--the thing we demand
is to have it pointed out how the system can escape the logical consequences we
have produced against it. If our logic is good, the system is bad; if the system
is good, our logic is bad. It is a plain point, will the Doctor make his
election?

Dr. Rice alleges as an objection to Universalism that its advocates "are forced
to deny the free agency of man and to maintain that all his actions are
necessary." In proof that this is the case, he quotes from Mr. Ballou, "Man is
dependent in all his volitions, and moved by necessity" This he esteems a
sufficient objection against Universalism, and I agree with him. But I charge
Calvinism with including precisely the same doctrine, and refer for the proof of
this charge to the evidence already adduced. Will Dr. Rice extricate his system?

This same objection he urges against phrenology, in his work upon that subject.
He says this system "denies his [man's] free moral agency, and makes him alike
incapable of virtue or vice." This objection is argued at length, and insisted
upon as an insuperable difficulty. He is right. But I charge precisely the same
difficulty, upon his system--both that it "denies free moral agency," and
destroys the distinction between "vice and virtue." He says of man in the light
of this system, "He is under a physical necessity to act in accordance with the
promptings of his cerebral organization, and is incapable of either virtue or
vice." Now I charge his system with placing man under a necessity, as stern as
that which phrenology teaches, and, consequently, as certainly destroying both
his agency and accountability. I have been astonished to find that free agency
is a favorite doctrine with Dr. Rice; and I now ask him to reconcile it with his
system. And if it cannot be done, admit either that he believes a palpable
contradiction, or set aside his system or this doctrine.

4. By destroying the agency and accountability of man, I charge the system
further with destroying the moral character of human acts and volitions--with
rendering the terms vice and virtue, good and bad as conveying the idea of moral
quality--not predicable of man. If the system be true, man is no more a moral
being. Do what he may, he is not vicious; he is incapable to be virtuous; he
never sins--he cannot; nor the opposite.

This is so plain to my own mind that I do not see how it can escape your
observation. To argue it would almost be a reflection upon my readers. It would
be to attempt to produce conviction by argument of a truth which I firmly
believe no human mind can deny, namely, that a person cannot be worthy of praise
or blame for an act over which he has not and never had, any control whatever.
Now sir, I do not believe that any human intelligence can affirm such a
proposition. Morality supposes agency--the system, by inevitable deduction,
denies it; and the two fall together. A greater absurdity can scarcely be
imagined than to affirm a man to be virtuous for an act, the choice and
performance of which were coerced upon him--the contrary of which he could not
have performed any more than he could usurp the place of the Almighty, and the
thing itself he performed only as a passive instrument, operated upon and
compelled by Omnipotence. Vice and virtue, which can only be predicated of the
free original cause, cannot be affirmed of man; but all vice and all virtue, if
there be any such thing according to the system, have God as their centre, or
that fate which the system, as we shall show in due time, more than intimates is
above Jehovah.

I find in casting my eye over Dr. Rice's discussion with Mr. Pingree, several
things bearing directly on the points to which I have invited his attention.

His fifth article against Universalism is, "That it makes God the author or
cause of all the sin in the world." He alleges this is a sufficient reason for
discarding the system. In this I perfectly agree with him. I also admit that he
sustains the objection with unanswerable arguments against Universalism. But now
I object precisely the same thing to Dr. Rice's system. I think I have sustained
the objection with unanswerable arguments. Will the Doctor show me wherein, if
at all, my argument is at fault? And, if not at fault, will he show why he
allows the objection to be of sufficient force to set aside one system, and not
another equally involved?

The proof he adduces, that Universalism renders God the author of sin, is thus
stated: "Universalism maintains that sin proceeds from physical causes, inherent
in the human constitution as it came from the hand of God." This Dr. Rice
denounces as "a revolting and blasphemous doctrine." But why so? Why revolting
and blasphemous? Simply, because it renders God the author of sin--in this
sense, that sin proceeds from physical causes inherent in the human
constitution, which constitution God made.

Now, I ask Dr. Rice, does not he maintain that God as absolutely created or
caused sin as the system he discards? That system attributes the authorship of
sin to God by asserting that sin inheres in the nature of man; and created the
nature, and so caused sin. Dr. Rice maintains that God actually decreed the
existence of sin, and that his decree was the cause of its existence- so much
so, that it could not but be, being decreed, and could not have been without
being decreed.

Dr. Rice says,

One of the clearest truths in mental philosophy is that man is a free moral
agent, and, therefore, an accountable being. It is a truth to which the
consciousness of every individual bears testimony the most unequivocal. With
this sentiment I fully accord; but I charge upon Dr. Rice that he has embraced a
system which denies this clearest and most important of truths to which human
consciousness bears unequivocal testimony; and my reason for so charging his
system have been heretofore presented. Will he show me how to escape the force
of these reasons?

I beg the Doctor to believe me sincere in asking for light upon these points. I
find him discarding two systems of opinions for the reasons that they make God
the author of sin and that they are inconsistent with the free agency and
accountability of man. These he esteems sufficient reasons for rejecting; so do
I. But now I find that he, after all, embraces a system which I firmly believe
is beset with the same difficulties; my reasons for this belief are already
given. If I am right in my view of his system, he is guilty of inexcusable
inconsistency; if I am wrong, in error, my reasonings are incorrect. And now I
ask the Doctor to set me right.

5. I object further: if this doctrine be true, at the final judgment the
conscience and intelligence of the universe will and must be on the side of the
condemned.

Suppose that when the conduct of the wicked shall be revealed in that day,
another fact shall stand out with equal conspicuousness, namely, that God
himself hath placed these beings where but one course of conduct was possible to
them, and that course they could not but pursue; and that, for having pursued
this course--the only one possible--they are now to be punished with everlasting
destruction, from the presence of God and the glory of his power. Must not the
intelligence of the universe pronounce such sentence unjust? Heaven and hell
would equally revolt at it and all rational beings conspire to execrate the
almighty monster capable of such a procedure. Convince the universe that such is
the character and will ultimately be the conduct of God, and he can no more be
worshipped but with hypocrisy, or even contemplated but with dread, detestation,
and abhorrence. I appeal to the consciousness of man--to the philosophy of our
nature--to all known processes of thought and feeling--if such would not
necessarily be the verdict of humanity. They that enter into heaven and they
that depart to hell from a judgment-seat where such a principle determines
destiny must go bearing the same sentiment, the same feeling of disgust and
horror of the gigantic tyranny ruling over them. Hell would be a refuge from the
presence of such a being--its woes a respite from the deeper alarms of his
hatred and dreaded intercourse.

In the name of Christianity, I protest against a principle involving such
blasphemy. It is impossible that the ever-blessed God should be remotely liable
by anything he has done, by anything discoverable in his works, by any
revelations he has made either of his character or plans, to such an imputation.
Thou glorious Ruler of the universe, what blasphemy of thy blessed name can
equal this for enormity, to charge that for the glory of thy sovereignty and to
manifest thy power, thou art now damning millions of helpless creatures in hell
forever for no cause but doing precisely what thou didst compel them to do, and
what they could not possibly avoid!

6. Nay, more: I charge the doctrine not only with putting a plea in the sinner's mouth at the day of judgment, but also with furnishing him with a plea when he is brought before earthly courts to answer for his crimes. These, indeed---earthly courts--if Calvinism is true, are only lesser parts of the stupendous economy of tyranny. What justice is there in any power on earth, what right to try, condemn, and punish men for any of their acts if they could not, by any possibility, avoid them--if they were impelled thereto by almighty fate? You do not condemn the gun for shooting the man, the avalanche for burying the city, the falling tree for crushing the traveler; but, according to Calvinism in Mr. Dick's own language, man is as merely passive in the hands of over-ruling power. Why punish him for murder, for arson, or any grade of crime? He is the author of no choice, the sovereign of no act; he is but the instrument of an invisible agent, moving as moved upon without power of resistance. He is the original in no movement of this life from the cradle to the grave. Why, in the name of humanity, punish him?

7. I object to the system further as involving, by inevitable consequence, a
most dreadful aspersion of the character of God. It gives me no pleasure to
prefer such a charge as this against a system, many of whose advocates I dearly
love and greatly admire; and I will say, much less does it give me pleasure to
find so much evidence that the charge is well founded. But I do so, Doctor, that
you may see how other minds view your system, and that you may disabuse them if
in error.

(1.) The system holds, as I think has been clea


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  CHAPTER 3: 3. ELECTION AND REPROBATION
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WE SHALL NOW PROCEED to consider the doctrine of decrees with relation to
election and reprobation particularly. And, as in the former case, we shall
appeal to the Confession of Faith and to accredited Calvinistic authors. Our
object is to know precisely what our Presbyterian brethren do believe. We
appeal, therefore, to their own statements and explanations. From the Confession
of Faith, chapter 3, I read:

Section 3. By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his glory, some men
and angels are predestinated and foreordained--are particularly and unchangeably
designed--and their number is so certain and definite that it cannot be either
increased or diminished. Section 5. Those of mankind that are predestinated unto
life, God, before the foundation of the world was laid, according to his eternal
and immutable purpose and the secret counsel and good pleasure of his will, hath
chosen in Christ unto everlasting glory out of his mere free grace and love,
without any foresight of faith or good works or perseverance in either of them,
or any other thing in the creature as conditions or causes moving him thereto,
and all to the praise of his glorious grace.

Section 6. As God hath appointed the elect unto glory, so hath he, by the
eternal and most free purpose of his will, foreordained all the means thereunto.
Wherefore, they who are elected, being fallen in Adam, are redeemed by
Christ--are effectually called unto faith in Christ by his Spirit working in due
season--are justified, adopted, sanctified, and kept by his power through faith
unto salvation. Neither are any other redeemed by Christ, effectually called,
justified, adopted, sanctified, but the elect only.

Section 7. The rest of mankind God was pleased, according to the unsearchable
counsel of his will whereby he extendeth or withholdeth mercy as he pleaseth for
the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures, to pass by and to ordain
them to dishonor and wrath for their sins, to the praise of his glorious
justice.

Of effectual calling:

Section 1. All those whom God hath predestinated unto life, and these only, he
is pleased in his appointed and accepted time effectually to call by his Word
and Spirit out of that state of sin and death in which they are by nature to
grace and salvation by Jesus Christ, enlightening their minds spiritually and
savingly to God, taking their hearts of stone and giving them a heart of flesh,
renewing their wills, by his almighty power determining them to that which is
good, and effectually drawing them to Jesus Christ, yet so as they come most
freely, being made willing by his grace. Section 2. This effectual call is of
God's free and special grace alone, not from anything at all foreseen in man,
who is altogether passive therein until, being quickened and renewed by the Holy
Spirit, he is thereby enabled to answer this call and to embrace the grace
offered and conveyed in it.

Section 3. Elect infants, dying in infancy, are regenerated and saved by Christ
through the Spirit who worketh when, and where, and how he pleaseth. So, also,
are other elect persons who are incapable of being outwardly called by the
ministry of the Word.

Section 4. Others not elected, although they may be called by the ministry of
the Word and may have some common operations of the Spirit, yet they never truly
come to Christ and therefore cannot be saved. Much less can men not professing
the Christian religion be saved in any other way whatsoever, be they never so
diligent to frame their lives according to the light of nature and the law of
that religion they do possess; and to assert and maintain that they may is very
pernicious and to be detested.

Of the perseverance of the saints:

Section 1. They whom God hath accepted in his beloved, effectually called and
sanctified by his Spirit, can neither totally nor finally fall away from the
state of grace, but shall certainly persevere therein to the end and be
eternally saved. Section 2. This perseverance of the saints depends not upon
their own free will, but upon the immutability of the decree of election,
flowing from the free and unchanging love of God the Father upon the efficacy of
the merit and intercession of Jesus Christ, the abiding of the Spirit, and of
the seed of God within them, and the nature of the covenant of grace, from all
which ariseth the certainty and infallibility thereof.

I have quoted thus largely from the Confession of Faith that my readers may have
the benefit of a full view of the whole scheme of unconditional salvation as
taught by Calvinists--all that enters into and renders effectual the decree of
election and reprobation. I shall now proceed to quote, as corroborative and
explanatory of these articles of faith, from various authors who are supposed to
understand the system and who have proved their friendship for it by giving
their lives to its support. But a quotation or two from the Larger Catechism:

What is effectual calling?

Effectual calling is the work of God's almighty power and grace whereby, out of
his free and especial love to his elect and from nothing in them moving him
thereunto, he doth in his accepted time invite and draw them to Jesus Christ by
his Word and Spirit, savingly enlightening their minds, renewing and powerfully
determining their wills, so as they, although in themselves dead in sin, are
hereby made willing and able freely to answer his call and to accept and embrace
the grace offered and conveyed therein. Are the elect only effectual called? All
the elect and they only are effectually called, although others may be and often
are outwardly called by the ministry of the Word and have some common operations
of the Spirit, who for their willful neglect and contempt of the grace offered
to them, being justly left in their unbelief, do never truly come to Jesus
Christ.

There is no doubt but the preparation of them both--elect and reprobate--doth
depend upon the secret counsel of God; otherwise, Paul had said the reprobates
give or cast themselves into destruction; but now he giveth to wit that before
they are born they are addicted to their lot.

I quote further from the exposition:

The decree of God with respect to the everlasting state of men and angels is
known by the name of predestination; and this consists of two branches,
generally distinguished by the name of election and reprobation. Our Confession
teaches that God made choice of and predestinated a certain and definite number
of individuals to everlasting life--that he predestinated them to life before
the foundation of the world was laid--that, in so doing, he acted according to
his sovereign will and was not influenced. by the foresight of their faith, or
good works, or perseverance in either of them; and that this purpose is
immutable, it being impossible that any of the elect should perish.

Christ died exclusively for the elect and purchased redemption for them alone;
in other words, Christ made atonement only for the elect, and in no sense did he
die for the rest of the race. Our Confession first asserts positively that the
elect are redeemed by Christ, and then negatively that none other are redeemed
by Christ but the elect only. If this does not affirm the doctrine of particular
redemption or of a limited atonement, we know not what language could express
that doctrine more explicitly. Some who allow of personal and eternal election
deny any such thing as reprobation. But the one unavoidably follows from the
other; for the choice of some must unavoidably imply the rejection of others.
Election and rejection are correlative terms; and men impose upon themselves and
imagine they conceive what it is impossible to conceive when they admit election
and deny reprobation.

From the Larger Catechism:

What hath God especially decreed concerning angels and men? God, by an eternal
and immutable decree out of his mere love, for the praise of his glorious grace
to be manifested in due time, hath elected some angels to glory and in Christ
hath chosen some men to eternal life and the means thereof and, also, according
to his sovereign power and the unsearchable counsel of his own will, hath passed
by and foreordained the rest to dishonor and wrath to be for their sin
inflicted, to the praise of the glory of his justice. Many, indeed, as if they
wished to avert odium from God, admit election in such a way as to deny that
anyone is reprobated. But this is puerile and absurd, because election itself
could not exist without being opposed to reprobation. Whom God passes by,
therefore, he reprobates; and from no other cause than his determination to
exclude them from the inheritance which he predestines for his children.

Though it is sufficiently clear that God, in his secret counsel, freely chooses
whom he will and rejects others, his gratuitous election is but half displayed
till we come to particular individuals to whom God not only offers salvation,
but assigns it in such a manner that the certainty is liable to no suspicion or
doubt.

Predestination we call the eternal decree of God by which he has determined in
himself what he would have to become to every individual of mankind; for they
are not all created with a similar destiny, but eternal life is foreordained for
some and eternal damnation for others. Every man, therefore, being created for
one or other of these ends, we say he is predestinated either to life or death.

The term predestination includes the decree of election and reprobation. Some,
indeed, confine it to election, but there seems to be no sufficient reason for
not extending it to the one as well as the other, as in both the final condition
of man is preappointed or predestinated. When a choice is made, we must conceive
that of a number of persons, some are taken, others are left. Election is a
relative term and necessarily involves the idea of rejection.

There seems to be no reason, therefore, for denying that what is called
reprobation was a positive decree, as well as election.

But, although the fall is presupposed to their reprobation, it will appear that
the former was not the reason of the latter, if we recollect that those who were
chosen to salvation were exactly in the same situation. If there was sin in the
reprobate, there was sin, also, in the elect; and we must, therefore, resolve
their opposite allotment into the will of God, who gives and withholds his favor
according to his pleasure.

A decree respecting the condition of the human race includes the history of
every individual: the time of his appearing upon earth; the manner of his
existence while he is an inhabitant of earth, as it is diversified by the
actions which he performs; and the manner of his existence after he leaves the
earth, that is, his future happiness or misery. Whence it followeth that this
knowledge--foreknowledge of the elect dependeth upon the good pleasure of God,
because God foreknew nothing, out of himself, touching those he would adopt, but
only marked out whom he would elect.

Now he doth refer the whole cause unto the election of God, and the same free
and such as doth not depend upon men; that, in the salvation of the godly,
nothing might be sought for above the goodness of God, and in the destruction of
the reprobate nothing above his just severity.

Moreover, although the corruption of nature, which is dispersed over all mankind
before it come into action, is available enough unto condemnation--whereby
followeth that Esau was worthily rejected, because naturally he was the son of
wrath--yet, lest any doubt should remain, as though through respect of any fault
or sin his condition was the worse, it was necessary that as well sins as
virtues should be excluded! Surely, true it is that the next cause of
reprobation is for that we are all accursed in Adam. Yet to the end we might
rest in the pure and simple will of God, Paul did lead us aside from the
consideration thereof for so long until he had established this doctrine,
namely, that God hath a sufficient, just cause of election and reprobation in
his own will or pleasure.

And, therefore, that doctrine is false and contrary to the Word of God, namely,
that God doth choose or reject as he foreseeth every man worthy or unworthy of
his grace.

God hath elected some and rejected other some, and the cause is nowhere else to
be sought for than in his purpose.

To all those for whom Christ hath purchased redemption, he doth certainly and
effectually apply and communicate the same.

Either Christ applies and communicates redemption to all and then Universalism
is true, or he did not purchase redemption for all and so the reprobates never
were redeemed.

Upon this point the expositor says:

This section relates to the extent of Christ's death with respect to its
objects; and, in opposition to the Arminian tenet that Christ died for all, it
affirms that the purchase and application of redemption are exactly of the same
extent. In the fifth section we were taught that Christ purchased redemption
only for 'those whom the Father hath given unto him;' and here it is asserted
that 'to all those for whom Christ hath purchased redemption, he doth certainly
and effectually apply and communicate the same.' What language, then, could
affirm more explicitly than that here employed that the atonement of Christ is
specific and limited; that it is neither universal nor indefinite, but
restricted to the elect? This view of the atonement is sustained with elaborate
argumentation by Mr. Shaw, showing how well and thoroughly he had considered the
doctrine. As a specimen of his logic in this case, and I regret to say I find
such specimens abounding throughout the system and in the writings of those
eminent men who have so strangely enlisted in its advocacy:

Universal terms are sometimes used in Scripture in reference to the death of
Christ; but reason and common sense demand that general phrases be explained and
defined by those that are special! God chose, of the whole body of mankind whom
he viewed in his eternal decree as involved in guilt and misery, certain persons
who are called the elect, whose names are known to him and whose number, being
unchangeably fixed by his decree, can neither be increased nor diminished; so
that the whole extent of the remedy offered in the Gospel is conceived to have
been determined beforehand by the divine decree. As all the children of Adam
were involved in the same guilt and misery, the persons thus chosen had nothing
in themselves to render them more worthy of being elected than any others; and
therefore the decree of election is called, in the Calvinistic system, absolute,
by which word is meant that it arises entirely from the good pleasure of God,
because all the circumstances which distinguish the elect from others are the
fruits of their election.

For the persons thus chosen, God from the beginning appointed the means of their
being delivered from corruption and guilt, and by these means, effectually
applied in due season, he conducts them at length unto everlasting life. From
the election of certain persons, it necessarily follows that all the rest of the
race of Adam are left in guilt and misery,. The exercise of divine sovereignty
in regard to those who are not elected is called reprobation; and the condition
of all having been originally the same, reprobation is called absolute in the
same sense with election.

I say with Augustine that the Lord created those who he certainly foreknew would
fall into destruction, and that this was actually so because he willed it.

Observe, all things being at God's disposal and the decision of salvation and
death belonging to him, he orders all things by his counsel and decree in such a
manner that some men are born devoted from the womb to certain death, that his
name may be glorified in their destruction.

It is an awful decree, I must confess; but no one can deny that God foreknew the
future, final fate of man before he created him, and that he did foreknow it
because it was appointed by him or decreed. Nor should it be thought absurd to
affirm that God not only foresaw the fall of the first man and the ruin of his
posterity in him, but also arranged all by the determination of his own will.
For as it belongs to his wisdom to foreknow things future, so it belongs to his
power to rule and govern all things by his hand.

But I mean that the actions of men are foreseen by God, not as events
independent of his will, but as originating in his determination and as
fulfilling his purpose.

Foolish mortals enter into many contentions with God, as though they could
arraign him to plead their accusations. In the first place, they inquire by what
right the Lord is angry with his creatures, who have not provoked him by any
previous offense; for that to devote to destruction whom he pleases is more like
the caprice of a tyrant than the lawful sentence of a judge; that men have
reason, therefore, to expostulate with God, if they are predestinated to eternal
death without any demerit of their own merely by his sovereign will. If such
thoughts ever enter the minds of pious men, they will be sufficiently enabled to
break their violence by this one consideration--how exceedingly presumptuous it
is only to inquire into the causes of the divine will, which is in fact and is
justly entitled to be the cause of everything that exists. For if it has any
cause, then there must be something antecedent on which it depends which it is
impious to suppose. For the will of God is the highest rule of justice; so that
what he wills must be considered just for this very reason--because he wills it.
When it is inquired, therefore, why the Lord did so, the answer must be because
he would.

He directs his voice to them, but it is that they may become more deaf; he
kindles a light, but it is that they may be made more blind; he publishes his
doctrine, but it is that they may become more besotted; he applies a remedy, but
it is that they may not be healed. Nor can it be disputed that to such persons
as God determines not to enlighten, he delivers his doctrine in enigmatical
obscurity that its only effect may be to increase their stupidity.

That the reprobates obey not the Word of God when made known to them is justly
imputed to the wickedness and depravity of their hearts; provided it be, at the
same time, stated that they are abandoned to this depravity, because they have
been raised up by a just but inscrutable judgment of God to display his glory in
their condemnation. So when it is related of the sons of Eli that they listened
not to his salutary admonitions 'because the Lord would slay them,' it is not
denied that their obstinacy proceeded from their own wickedness but it is
plainly implied that though the Lord was able to soften their hearts yet they
were left in their obstinacy because his immutable decree had predestined them
to destruction.

The term election most commonly signifies that eternal, sovereign,
unconditional, particular, and immutable act of God whereby he selected some
from all mankind and of every nation under heaven to be redeemed and
everlastingly saved by Christ. It sometimes and more rarely signifies that
gracious and almighty act of the divine Spirit whereby God actually and visibly
separates his elect from the world by effectual calling.

Reprobation denotes either God's eternal preterition of some men when he chose
others to glory, and his predestination of them to fill up the measure of their
iniquities and then to receive the just punishment of crimes, even 'destruction
from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his power.' This is the
primary, most obvious, and most frequent sense in which the word is used.

(Predestination) may be considered as that eternal, most wise, and immutable
decree of God whereby he did from before all time determine and ordain to
create, dispose of, and direct to some particular end every person and thing to
which he has given or is yet to give being, and to make the whole creation
subservient to and declarative of his own glory. Of this decree, actual
providence is the execution.

Consider predestination as relating to the elect only, and it is that eternal,
unconditional, particular, and irreversible act of the divine will whereby in
matchless love and adorable sovereignty God determined within himself to deliver
a certain number of Adam's degenerate offspring out of that sinful and miserable
estate into which, by his primitive transgression, they were to fall and in
which sad condition they were equally involved with those who were not chosen;
but being pitched upon and singled out by God the Father to be vessels of grace
and salvation, they were in time actually redeemed by Christ--are effectually
called by his Spirit, justified, adopted, sanctified, and preserved safe to his
heavenly kingdom.

We assert that all men universally are not elected to salvation; so neither are
all men universally condemned to condemnation. The Deity from all eternity and,
consequently, at the very time he gives life and being to a reprobate certainly
foreknew and knows in consequence of his own decree that such a one would fall
short of salvation. Now, if God foreknew this, he must have predetermined it,
because his own will is the foundation of his decrees, and his decrees are the
foundation of his prescience. He, therefore. foreknows futurities, because by
his predestination he hath rendered these futurities certain and inevitable.

All things whatever arise from and depend upon the divine appointment, whereby
it was preordained who should receive the Word of Life and who should disbelieve
it, who should be delivered from their sins and who should be hardened in them.

We assert that the number of the elect and also of the reprobate is so fixed and
determinate that neither can be augmented or diminished.

As the future faith and good works of the elect were not the cause of their
being chosen, so neither were the future sins of the reprobate the cause of
their being passed by; but the choice of the former and the decretive omission
of the latter were owing merely and entirely to the sovereign and determining
pleasure of God.

Notwithstanding, God did from all eternity irreversibly choose out and fix upon
some to be partakers of salvation by Christ and rejected the rest, acting in
both according to the good pleasure of his own sovereign will. Yet he did not
herein act an unjust, tyrannical, or cruel part, nor yet show himself a
respecter of persons.

Now he [Paul] beginneth to ascend higher, namely, to show the reason of this
diversity which he teacheth doth not consist in anything else than the election
of God. He doth plainly refer the whole cause to the election of God, and the
same free and such as doth not depend upon men; that, in the salvation of the
godly, nothing might be sought for above the goodness of God, and in the
destruction, nothing above his just severity. The Lord in this, his free
election, is at liberty and free from that necessity that he should
indifferently impart the grace unto all; but, rather, whom he will, he passeth
over and whom he will, he chooseth.

Although the corruption of nature, which is dispersed over all mankind before it
come into action, is available enough unto condemnation--whereby followeth that
Esau was worthily rejected because naturally he was the son of wrath--yet, lest
any doubt should remain as though, through respect of any fault or sin, his
condition was the worse, it was necessary as well sins as virtues should be
excluded. Surely, true it is that the next cause of reprobation is for that we
are all accursed in Adam. Yet to the end we might learn to rest in the bare,
simple will of God, Paul did lead us aside from the consideration thereof for so
long until he had established this doctrine, namely, that God hath a sufficient,
just cause of election and reprobation in his own will or pleasure.

God hath elected some and rejected other some, and the cause is nowhere else to
be sought for than in his purpose. For if the difference were grounded on the
respect of works, in vain had Paul moved the question of the righteousness of
God whereof there could be no suspicion, if he handled everyone according to his
desert .... Before men are born, everyone hath his lot appointed by the secret
counsel of God.

There are vessels prepared for destruction, that is, bequeathed and destinated
to destruction; there are also vessels of wrath, that is, made and formed to
this end, that they might be testimonies of the vengeance and wrath

There is no doubt but the preparation of them both [elect and reprobate] doth
depend on the secret counsel of God. Otherwise, Paul had said the reprobates
give or cast themselves into destruction; but now he giveth to wit that before
they are born they are already addicted to their lot.

God from all eternity decreed to leave some of Adam's fallen race in their sins
and to exclude them from the participation of Christ and his benefits.

Some men were from all eternity not only negatively excepted from a
participation of Christ and salvation, but positively ordained to continue in
their natural blindness and hardness of heart.

Such is the doctrine of predestination with respect to election and reprobation
of men as held by the Presbyterian Church. It would be easy greatly to increase
quotations from their authorities upon this point; but the foregoing are
sufficient. And from these, together with the former quotations, we deduce the
following as the sum of their faith:

1. God decreed from eternity, the fall of Adam and the ruin or fall of his
posterity in him.

2. That, regarding man as fallen, he elected some men, whose names and number
were designated, unto everlasting life.

3. That those thus predestinated were so predestinated, unchangeably and
unconditionally, without any reference whatever to their works or character.

4. That for these, and these only, he provided a Savior and all the means
necessary to procure their salvation without any conditions on their part.

5. That the persons thus unchangeably designed cannot possibly perish, do what
they may, but will be irresistibly drawn to Christ and to justification,
adoption, and sanctification.

6. With respect to the rest, whose names and number are also definitely fixed,
that he passed them by in their sins and predestinated them unto destruction.

7. That they were thus passed and predestinated from eternity, and so were
ordained to destruction before they were born, of the good pleasure of God and
to the glory of his sovereign justice.

8. That for these he never did provide a Savior, and that consequently they
could not be saved, do what they might.

9. That those reprobated in no respect differed from those elected, and the one
class were elected and the other class reprobated of the mere sovereign pleasure
of God without any respect to any difference in them whatever.

To sum it all up in a few words, we understand the above to teach that a
certain, definite number of the human race are elected, unconditionally and
unalterably, without reference to anything in them or to be performed by them,
and of the mere good pleasure of God, unto everlasting life so that they cannot
perish; that the rest are so predestinated to eternal damnation that they cannot
be saved, no Savior ever having been provided for them.

To the doctrine thus stated I object, generally, all that has been already urged
against the doctrine of decrees, and, particularly, much more which I shall now
immediately proceed to state.

1. I object to the system that it makes God the author of man's fall from
holiness into sin. This is a point I desire all my readers to give particular
attention to, as it has important bearings on subsequent reasonings. The
argument upon which this deduction is founded is very brief and exceedingly
plain. It is this: "God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel
of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass.

But man's fall came to pass; therefore, God from all eternity did ordain man's
fall.

"The decree of God is the necessity of things." But man's fall is necessitating
cause of man's fall. But I need hardly be at the pains of arguing out a
conclusion so palpable that a child could not fail to perceive it, and, withal,
a conclusion admitted by the great projector of the system I antagonize.

Mr. Calvin says,

I confess, indeed, that all the descendants of Adam fell by the divine will into
that miserable condition in which they are now involved; and this is what I
asserted from the beginning, that we must always return at last to the sovereign
determination of God's will, the cause of which is hidden in himself. Having
thus delivered himself, and anticipating objections to his candid statement from
his opponents, he thus enters his defense and explanations: "For we will answer
them thus in the language of Paul: 'O man, who art thou, that thou repliest
against God?'" Certainly a most lucid and satisfactory mode of escaping
difficulties!

Let it not be pretended that the fall, though ordained, was ordained as
foreseen--decreed because it was perceived as an event that would take
place--for this would oppose the system to itself, which teaches that things are
not decreed because foreknown, but foreknown because decreed. Also, it would
oppose the system where it teaches that the decree is itself the cause of all
things, the cause without which they could not be.

Shall I be told that, though Adam fell, it was freely by voluntarily eating the
inhibited fruit--in the language of the Confession itself, that,

Our first parents being seduced by the subtle and temptation of Satan, sinned in
eating the forbidden fruit. This their sin God was pleased, according to his
wise and holy counsel, to permit, having purposed to order it to his own glory.
All this seems plausible enough; but the slightest scrutiny detects a meaning
here not discoverable upon the surface. It would seem to represent that man's
fall was his own free and unnecessitated act. But that this is not the meaning
will appear in a variety of ways. If you ask, "Could he have done otherwise than
as he did?" they must answer you, "God had decreed it thus. He could no more
avoid taking the forbidden fruit than he could resist the decree of the
Almighty. Fall he must, for Omnipotence urged him on to the catastrophe." If you
ask them what, then, they mean by man's falling freely, they will answer in the
language of the Confession again:

Man in his state of innocency had freedom and power to will and to do that which
is good and well-pleasing to God, but yet mutably, so that he might fall from
it. This again is plausible enough and would seem to teach that our first
parents had power to stand or fall; but a more narrow and careful examination
shows that this is not their meaning. For they admit that they could not help
but fall, or else they believe that they had power to overcome the decree of
God--they may select their own alternative. All they mean when they speak of
freedom before or since the fall is simply the power man has to do as he
pleases--to follow his choice.

But now, observe, they insist that when man chooses one thing, he has no power
to choose its opposite; for his particular choice was fixed by decree. Adam,
when he chose to take of the forbidden fruit, could not have chosen to decline
taking it any more than he could overcome a decree of God which fixed his choice
as it was. "He was free," I am told, "because he did as he pleased." I answer,
"He had no power to please otherwise--therein is his want of freedom. His
choice, according to the system, was forced upon him by placing him in
circumstances where another choice was impossible." "He fell himself," I am
told, "by his own act, dictated by his own choice." I answer, "The act was
decreed from eternity; and the choice which dictated the act was also decreed
from eternity. And the man was created and placed in the circumstances that the
choice and act and consequent fall should necessarily take place. Thus, neither
the act, nor the choice, nor the fall, were free, but all necessitated by
unavoidable fate or decree. God's decree was the sole, original cause of man's
fall." I may have occasion to say more upon this point to show other revolting
aspects of it; but for the present, I pass it to the presentation of other
consequences and involvements of the system.

2. I object to the system, in the second place, that it teaches that when man
was thus involved in the sin and miseries of the fall, by God's own agency he
elected a part of the race--whose names and number were definitely fixed--unto
everlasting life without any respect whatever either to their character or
deeds, and reprobated or predestinated the residue--whose names and number were
also definitely fixed from eternity--unto eternal damnation, and this also
without reference to their character or deeds. The one part were decreed to be
saved, not of anything in them; the other part were preappointed to damnation,
not as being wicked. But in both cases eternal destiny was fixed, without
respect to anything in the creature. Do not, I pray you, Dr. Rice, turn away
from this appalling proposition. Do not say in your haste it is slanderous. Hear
my reasons for attributing it to your system.

The argument upon which I base this statement is as follows:

Although God knows whatever may or can come to pass upon all supposed
conditions, yet hath he not decreed anything because he foresaw it as future, or
as that which would come to pass upon such supposed conditions. This clause, as
I understand it, teaches that God's decree that any event shall come to pass was
entirely without respect to foreknowledge that such would be the case, and,
also, without respect to conditions as a cause moving to the decree. If I am
correct in this, and I think I am, then when God decreed the salvation of the
elect, it was entirely without foresight of faith or good works in them--this
you admit, and your Confession expressly asserts. And so, when he willed the
damnation of the rest, it was also without foresight or consideration of sin as
a cause thereto--this you deny, and no doubt you will esteem it a
misrepresentation of your system. But, if I am mistaken here, all I ask is that
you will point out the mistake in my reasonings. A disclaimer will do no good,
unless you can show that it does not result from your system.

First, you tell me that God from eternity unconditionally decreed whatsoever
comes to pass; but the damnation of the reprobate comes to pass. Therefore, the
damnation of the reprobate was unconditionally decreed. But if it was
unconditionally decreed, then it could not have been decreed because of sin, for
that would make sin the condition; and so your doctrine would be found at fault
when it asserts that the decrees are unconditional.

But it is a necessary conclusion that the decree of reprobation is without
respect to sin for another reason. To suppose it to be upon the foresight of sin
is to abandon your system which teaches that the decrees of God do not proceed
from foreknowledge, but foreknowledge proceeds from decree. For if the
reprobates are decreed to reprobation because of foreseen sin, then is
foreknowledge the ground of decree. But, not to take up the time of our readers
in reasonings here, it may be shown by numerous references to Calvin himself
that this was his doctrine--that neither the salvation of the elect, nor
damnation of the reprobate, were ascribable to anything in the creature, but
equally and both to the mere will and pleasure of God, the one part elected to
life and the other to death simply because God willed it. He says, and I give
one quotation as a specimen:

For this he goeth about to bring to pass among us, that concerning the diversity
that is between the elect and reprobate, our minds might be content with this:
namely, that it hath so pleased God to illuminate some unto salvation and blind
other some unto death, and not seek any cause above his will for all external
things which make to the execration of the reprobate are the instruments of his
wrath; and Satan himself, which inwardly worketh effectually, is so far forth
his minister that he worketh not but at his commandment. Therefore, that
frivolous evasion or refuge which the schoolmen have of foreknowledge doth fall
down. For Paul doth not say that the ruin of the wicked is foreseen of the Lord,
but is ordained by his counsel and will. As Solomon also teacheth, that the
destruction of the wicked was not foreknown, but that the wicked ones themselves
were purposely created that they might perish.

God hath elected some and rejected other some, and the cause is nowhere else to
be sought for than in his purpose; for if the difference were grounded upon the
respect of works, in vain had Paul moved the question of the unrighteousness of
God, whereof there could be no suspicion, if he handled everyone accord to his
desert.

It is manifest that Calvin finds the cause of reprobation, as well as election,
in the will of God alone, irrespective of works. The decree of election involves
the decree of reprobation. This is clearly and repeatedly admitted by your own
authors and by your Confession itself.

By the decree of God for the manifestation of his glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life and others foreordained to everlasting death. These angels and men thus predestinated and foreordained are particularly and unchangeably designated; and their number is so certain and definite that it cannot be either increased or diminished.
I need not reinsert the quotations full upon this point given heretofore--it is admitted, and, if not, it is unavoidably involved. There can be no election of a part without an implied and actual rejection of the other part not elected. To present the case in the most favorable aspect for Calvinism, it stands thus: the human race appear before God as a race of miserable sinners, all under sentence of condemnation. God so beholding them, selects a portion--say. less than one-half---without any reference to character or anything else in them, for they are all precisely alike. These he determines to save, or elects them unconditionally unto life--sets them apart for himself. The others he passes by and makes no provision for them whatever, but leaves them, by his sovereign disposal, to eternal damnation. Now this election of a part is, to all intents and purposes, a rejection of the other part. I state it in a manner certainly the least objectionable to a Calvinist. And now I object to it, even in this favorable aspect, as involving the divine Being in the grossest injustice and criminal partiality.

My reasons for this charge shall be given in a moment. In the meantime, I hear
you say, "Had not God a right to extend mercy to a part without bringing him
under obligation to extend it to all? He might in justice have passed all by: he
did those no harm, therefore, whom he passed by because they deserved it; and
that he saved any was a mere act of grace." I am familiar with your eloquent
declamation on this point; but it falls powerless upon my mind for this reason.
How came these miserable creatures in their condition of sin and wretchedness?
You must answer me, "They were put there by the decree of God. First, he put
them all in the consequences of the fall that he might have an occasion to
display his grace in saving some and to glorify his justice in damning others!
He made them sinners that he might have a pretense to torment them forever, to
the glory of his sovereign justice." If you can reconcile this to justice, I
should be happy to have the benefit of your assistance here.

Upon this point, Dr. Fisk says,

The doctrine of unconditional election of a part necessarily implies the
unconditional reprobation of the rest. I know some who hold to the former seem
to deny the latter; for they represent God as reprobating sinners in view of
their sins. When all were sinners, they say, God passed by some and elected
others. Hence, they say, the decree of damnation against the reprobate is just,
because it is against sinners. But this explanation is virtually giving up the
system, inasmuch as it gives up all the principal arguments by which it is
supported. In the first place, it makes predestination dependent on
foreknowledge; for God first foresees that they will be sinners, and then
predestinates them to punishment. Here is one case, then, in which the argument
for Calvinian predestination is destroyed by its own supporters. But, again, if
God must fix by his decree all parts of his plan in order to prevent
disappointment, then he must fix the destiny of the reprobates and the means
that lead to it. But if he did not do this, then the Calvinistic argument in
favor of predestination, drawn from the divine plan, falls to the ground. Once
more: this explanation of the decree of reprobation destroys the Scripture
argument which the Calvinists urge in favor of unconditional reprobation to
eternal death. But if there is any explanation by which these are shown not to
prove unconditional reprobation to eternal death, the same principle of
interpretation will and must show that they do not prove Calvinistic election.
But I have not done with this objection yet. Whoever maintains that "God
foreordained whatsoever comes to pass," must also hold to unconditional
reprobation. Does it come to pass that some are lost? Then this was ordained.
Was sin necessary as a pretense to damn them? Then this was ordained. From these
and other views of the subject, Calvin was led to say that "election could not
stand without reprobation;" and that it was "quite silly and childish" to
attempt to separate them. All, therefore, who hold to the unconditional election
of a part of mankind to eternal life must, to be consistent with themselves,
take into their creed the "horrible decree of reprobation." They must believe
that in the ages of eternity, God determined to create men and angels for the
express purpose to damn them eternally!--that he determined to introduce sin and
harden them in it that they might be fit subjects of his wrath!--that for doing
as they are impelled to do by the irresistible decree of Jehovah, they must lie
down forever under the scalding vials of his vengeance in the pit of hell!

To state this doctrine in its true character is enough to chill one's blood; and
we are drawn by all that is rational within us to turn away from such a God with
horror as from the presence of an almighty Tyrant. And yet, I charge upon Dr.
Rice and all consistent Calvinists this appalling dogma.

3. I object to the decree of election and reprobation, still further, that it at
the same time renders God a partial being and destroys entirely the foundation
for the doctrine of grace. If it be true there is no grace in the salvation of
the elect, there is great cruelty in the damnation of the reprobate, and God is
a most partial being; and in all these respects the system is opposed to the
Scriptures.

To the reprobates there is certainly no grace or mercy extended. Their very
existence, connected as it necessarily is with eternal damnation, is an infinite
curse. The temporal blessings which they enjoy, the insincere offers which are
held out to them, and the Gospel privileges with which they are mocked, if they
can be termed grace at all, must be called damning grace; for all this is only
fattening them for the slaughter and fitting them to suffer to a more aggravated
extent the unavoidable pains and torments that await them. Hence, Calvin's
sentiment 'that God calls the reprobate that they may be more deaf, kindles a
light that they may be more blind, brings his doctrine to them that they may be
more ignorant, and applies the remedy to them that they may not be healed,' is
an honest avowal of the legitimate principles of the system. Surely no one will
pretend that according to this system there is any grace in the reprobate. And
perhaps a moment's attention will show that there is little or none for the
elect. It is said that God, out of his mere sovereignty, without anything in the
creature to move him thereto, elects sinners to everlasting life. But if there
is nothing in the creature to move him thereto, how can it be called mercy or
compassion? He did not determine to elect them because they were miserable, but
simply because he pleased to elect them. If misery had been the exciting cause,
then, as all were equally miserable, he would have elected them all. Is such a
decree of election founded in love to the suffering object, or is it not the
result of the most absolute and omnipotent selfishness conceivable? It is the
exhibition of a character that sports most sovereignly and arbitrarily with his
almighty power to create, to damn, and to save.

Shall it be insisted that the salvation of miserable, perishing sinners is an
act of grace? Then we continue in the language of Fisk to ask,

Who made them miserable, perishing sinners? Was not this the effect of God's
decree? And is there much mercy displayed in placing men under a constitution
which necessarily and unavoidably involves them in sin and suffering, that God
may afterward have the sovereign honor of saving them? Surely the tenderest
mercies of this system are cruel; its brightest parts are dark; its boasted
mercy hardly comes up to sheer justice even to the elect, since they only
receive back what God had deprived them of and for the want of which they had
suffered perhaps for years. And as to the reprobates, the Gospel is unavoidably
a source of death unto death. To them Christ came that they might have death and
have it more abundantly, to the praise of his glorious justice. In the language
of Mr. Wesley,

How is God good or loving to a reprobate or one that is not elect? You cannot
say he is an object of the love or greatness of God with regard to his eternal
state whom he created, says Mr. Calvin, plainly and fairly, "to live a reproach
and die everlastingly." Surely no one can dream that the greatness of God is at
all concerned with this man's eternal state, however God is good to him in this
world. What! when by the reason of God's unchangeable decree it had been good
for this man never to have been born? When his very birth was a curse, not a
blessing! "Well, but he now enjoys many of the gifts of God both gift of nature
and of providence. He has food and raiment, and comforts of various kinds; and
are not all these great blessings?" No, not to him. At the price which he is to
pay for them, everyone of these is also a curse. Everyone of these comforts is,
by an eternal decree, to cost him a thousand pangs in hell. For every moment
pleasure which he now enjoys, he is to suffer the torments of more than a
thousand years; for the smoke of that pit which is preparing for him ascendeth
up forever and ever. God knew this would be the fruit of whatever he should
enjoy before the vapor of life fled away. He designed it should. It was his very
purpose in giving him those enjoyments so that by all these, he is in truth and
reality only fattening the ox for the slaughter.

"Nay, but God gives him grace, too." Yes, but what kind of grace? Saving grace,
you own, he has not; and the common grace he has was not given with any design
to save his soul, nor with any design to do him any good at all, but only to
restrain him from hurting the elect. So far from doing him good, that this grace
also necessarily increases his damnation.

"And God knows this," you say, "and designed it should: it was one great end for
which he gave it!" Then I desire to know how is God good or loving to this man,
either with regard to time or eternity.

Let us suppose a particular instance: here stands a man who is reprobated from
all eternity or, if you would express it more smoothly, who is not elected, whom
God eternally decreed to pass by. Thou hast nothing, therefore, to expect from
God after death, but to be cast into the lake of fire burning with
brimstone--God having consigned thy unborn soul to hell by a decree which cannot
pass away. And from the time thou wast born under the irrevocable curse of God,
thou canst have no peace; for there is no peace to the wicked such as thou art
doomed to continue, even from thy mother's womb. Accordingly, God giveth thee of
this world's goods on purpose to enhance thy damnation. He giveth thee more
substance or friends in order hereafter to heap the more coals of fire on thy
head. He filleth thee with good; he maketh thee fat and well-looking to make
thee a more specious sacrifice to his vengeance. Good-nature, generosity, a good
understanding, various knowledge, it may be, or eloquence are the flowers
wherewith he adorneth thee, thou poor victim, before thou art brought to the
slaughter.

Thou hast grace, too! But what grace? Not saving grace. That is not for thee,
but for the elect only. Thine may be termed damning grace, since it is not only
such in the event, but in the intention. Thou receivedst it of God for that very
end, that thou mightest receive the greater damnation. It was given not to
convert thee, but only to convince; not to make thee without sin, but without
excuse! not to destroy, but to arm the worm that never dieth and blow up the
fire that shall never be quenched. Now, I beseech you, how is God good or loving
to this man? Is not this such love as makes your blood run cold?

4. I object to the doctrine further that it not only teaches the unconditional
reprobation of a part of mankind, who in the language of Mr. Calvin were created
for destruction, but it also teaches in harmony with the foregoing that Christ
never died for the lost--never in any sense made salvation possible. This is not
only an inference deducted from the decree of election and reprobation--though
it is unavoidably inferable from that decree, because it is manifest, if a man
is eternally and unconditionally decreed to be damned, he never had a
possibility of salvation. But our proposition is not a mere inference--it is an
express statement of Calvinists themselves. Two authorities will answer upon
this point.

The Confession of Faith shall be my first reference--it is very explicit. Its
language is: "Neither are any other redeemed by Christ, but the elect only."

Mr. Shaw, the expositor of the Confession, in his work revised and published by
the Presbyterian Board of Publication and received as a true exposition of their
doctrines, says,

In this section we are taught that Christ died exclusively for the elect and
purchased redemption for them alone; in other words, that Christ made atonement
only for the elect, and that in no sense did he die for the rest of the race.
Our Confession first asserts positively that the elect are redeemed by Christ;
and then negatively that none other are redeemed by Christ but the elect only.
If this does not affirm the doctrine of particular redemption or of a limited
atonement, we know not what language could express that doctrine more
explicitly. These authorities are sufficient for my purpose at present, though a
large number equally explicit might be adduced, showing that it is the common
opinion of Calvinists and certainly the only opinion at all consistent with
their system.

Well, now, in view of this doctrine, I allege the following objections:

(1.) It renders the conclusion unavoidable that the sinner is absolutely damned,
not only without the possibility of salvation, but without any fault of his
whatever.

For, first, it was certain he was involved in guilt without his consent by the
sin of Adam, thousands of years before he was born. It will not be pretended
that he was to blame for this, unless it can be shown that a man is blameworthy
for an act which occurred thousands of years before he had an existence.

Well, as he was involved in guilt without his consent, so no plan was ever
devised by which it was possible for him to escape from his guilt. He is,
therefore, shut up to be damned in hell torments forever on account of guilt
which he had no part in procuring to himself and from which it was never
possible for him to escape. Sir, is not this dreadful?

(2.) I object to this doctrine further, because it finds the cause of the
sinner's reprobation and damnation in his corruption of nature alone.

The doctrine is that mankind were viewed as fallen in Adam, and all of them
under condemnation and deserving of death; whereupon, God, out of his mere good
pleasure, elected a certain definite number to life, and passed by the other
definite part and left them under sentence of death on account of their sin. Of
what sin! Why, their sinful estate in Adam. This then was the cause of their
reprobation and damnation--Adam's sin and not their own!

It will be no relief to this to insist that the reprobates are also punished for
their actual transgressions; for there stands the fact, first, that the
sufficient cause of their reprobation was their sinful state; and if this was
the sufficient cause, they might, they would have been damned if they had never
committed one single actual sin! They were damned before ever they committed a
sinful act themselves! Nay, I go a step further and say that the actual sins of
the reprobates form no juster ground of their damnation than their natural
corruption, even if we should admit that their actual sins were taken into
account in their reprobation; for they were brought into existence with a
corrupt nature from which it never was possible for them to free themselves,
which they had no consent in bringing upon themselves; and with it their actual
sins were absolutely unavoidable, and so could no more constitute a just ground
of damnation than would their inherited depravity.

(3.) And here again let me ask, why shall Calvinists demur when we charge them
with holding to infant damnation? The fact is, they hold to no other kind of
damnation! Every reprobate was reprobated for that which he possessed as soon as
he came into the world! He was damned in the purpose of God for his natural
depravity before he was born, and his after actual transgressions were only the
fruits of his reprobation! I can see no difference between consigning an infant
to hell as soon as born and actually sentencing it as soon as born for its then
state, and permitting it to live a hundred years to commit actual sins that a
pretense may be actually created for rendering its damnation doubly deep--only
that the latter seems worse than the former!

(4.) I object to the doctrine that God really preferred the damnation of a part
to the salvation of all--he chose it as more agreeable to himself, not to meet
the ends of justice or promote good government, but purely for his own
gratification, that a part should be lost to the glory of his justice, than that
all should have an opportunity to be saved!

This is apparent in the fact that Calvinists admit that there was merit enough
in the death of Christ to secure the salvation of all; but God, by a sovereign
act, limited it to a part. He could have saved all as well as a part, but he
preferred not to do it! It will not do to reply, he must damn some to vindicate
his justice, for it is contended that the death of Christ was ample, entirely
sufficient to satisfy the claims of justice for the whole race: but God, by a
sovereign prerogative, chose to limit it to a part. He must, therefore, have
preferred the damnation of a part, the reprobates, or he would at least have
made their salvation possible. Can Dr. Rice assign any reason for the damnation
of the reprobate, but the mere good pleasure of God? He could have saved them,
but he chose not to do so,

And why did he choose not to do so? Is it answered, "On account of their sins."
But why on account of their sins? Could he not have saved all, as well as a
part, when there was a sufficient ransom, and the application of it depended
upon his mere sovereign will? That the application was not made, therefore, can
be ascribed to nothing else but the good pleasure of God, or he damns a large
part of mankind simply because he had rather damn them than save them. Is not
this blasphemous?

5. To the Calvinian doctrine of eternal reprobation I further object as being
inconsistent with the Scriptures:

(1.) To all those passages which teach that "Christ died for all men," for "the
whole world," &c. This class of Scripture texts is quite numerous and very
unequivocal.

"Behold the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world." "God so loved
the world that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him
should not perish, but have everlasting life." "This is indeed the Christ, the
Savior of the world." "For the love of Christ constraineth us, because we thus
judge, that if one died for all, then were all dead." "That he by the grace of
God should taste death for every man." "And he is the Propitiation for our sins,
and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world." "...Who is the
Savior of all men, especially of those that believe." "...Who gave himself a
ransom for all, to be testified in due time."

We give the above as a selection of texts asserting that the death of Christ was
for all men, for every man, for the whole world. The list might be greatly
extended; but, for the present, these are sufficient.

(2.) The same fact is clearly taught in all those passages where a parallel is
run between the death of Christ and the fall of our first parents.

For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive.

But not as the offense, so also is the free gift. For if, through the offense of
one, many be dead, much more the grace of God, and the gift by grace, which is
by one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many. Therefore, as by the offense
of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness
of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life.

(3.) The idea that Christ died for the elect only is contrary to those
Scriptures. which teach that some for whom Christ died may perish. "And through
thy knowledge shall the weak brother perish, for whom Christ died." "False
teachers ... who privily shall bring in damnable heresies, even denying the Lord
that bought them, and bring upon themselves swift destruction." "Of how much
sorer punishment, suppose ye, shall he be thought worthy, who hath trodden under
foot the Son of God, and hath counted the blood of the covenant, wherewith he
was sanctified, an unholy thing, and hath done despite unto the Spirit of
grace." "Destroy not him with thy meat for whom Christ died."

(4.) A further argument is deducible from those passages which make the offers
of the Gospel to all men, and require all men to repent and believe, condemning
them to death for rejecting the offer and refusing to comply. "He that believeth
on the Son hath everlasting life: and he that believeth not the Son, shall not
see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him." "But these are written that ye
might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing ye
might have life through his name." "He that believeth not is condemned already,
because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God." "And
he said unto them, Go ye into all the world and preach the Gospel to every
creature. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that
believeth not shall be damned." "How shall we escape, if we neglect so great
salvation?"

(5.) In all those passages in which men's failure to obtain salvation is placed
to the account of their own will, this doctrine of limited atonement. of
election and reprobation, is disallowed. "How often would I have gathered thy
children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye
would not." "And ye will not come to me that ye might have life." "...Bring upon
themselves swift destruction." "Whosoever will, let him take the water of life
freely."

It is useless to multiply quotations, since the New Testament so constantly
exhorts men to come to Christ, reproves them for neglect, and threatens them
with the penal consequences of their own folly, thus uniformly placing the
obstacle of their salvation just where Christ places it in his parable of the
supper--in the perverseness of those who, having been bidden to the feast, would
not come.

Thus the idea that Christ did not die for all men is contrary to all those
Scriptures in which the atonement is represented as universal--in which it is
contrasted with the fall--in which it is represented as possible for those for
whom Christ died to perish--in which all men are required to believe, and
condemned for not believing--in which failure to obtain salvation is charged to
the will and folly of the lost--in which invitations are made to sinners,
warnings given to saints, as though the former might be saved, the latter
lost--in which conditions are expressed, the volition of the creature is
addressed, and final destiny is suspended upon their actions with a great
variety of classes of Scriptures needless to mention.

6. If Christ only died for a part of mankind, and if only a definite number may
come to him and be saved, I ask Dr. Rice in the name of all reason and
consistency with what propriety can he invite persons not of the elect to come
to Christ, to turn that they may have life, to seek the favor of God? &c. Why
does he make such invitations? He knows they cannot comply, that it is
absolutely impossible, that they have no more power to do so than they have to
make a world. Is it not mocking, then, to ask them? Are not all such invitations
sheer trifling with interests the most awful and tremendous? Invite a sinner to
come to Christ when he cannot--when he dare not! In the name of consistency, how
is this to be reconciled with human candor, to say nothing of divine sincerity?

7. But again: if Christ only died for the elect, why are reprobates commanded to
believe? What are they required to believe ? Are they required to believe in
Christ for salvation! If so, they are either able to believe, or they are not.
If not able, they are required to perform an absolute impossibility. If they are
able, then they may believe; and as salvation is by faith, a reprobate may be
saved; and if saved, he will be saved by believing a lie--that Christ was his
Savior, when in fact he was not. He will also be saved without a Savior. But if
he believes and is not saved, he will falsify the Scriptures and the Confession
which teach that whosoever believeth shall be saved.

8. But again: why is the unbelief of the reprobate made the ground of his
condemnation--of his final destruction? He is damned for not believing on
Christ, that is, for not believing a lie. Had he believed on Christ, if the
thing were possible, he would have believed a lie; but for not believing a lie,
he is damned forever. Sir, is not his state dreadful! Yet these and many more
such consequences are the unavoidable results of your system.

9. The sinner's damnation is ascribed to his rejection of Christ, to his
resistance of proffered mercy, to his willful distance from God. But, according
to this system, he does not reject Christ, for Christ never was offered to him;
he could not accept him. He did not refuse mercy, for mercy never was held out
to his acceptance. His own will did not keep him in sin, for there never was a
way of escape.

10. The Scriptures ascribe the sinner's ruin to his own choice, to his own will;
but, according to this system, his will has nothing whatever to do with it. For
either it was possible for him to will to come to Christ and be saved, or it was
not. If it were possible for him to will to come to Christ and be saved, a
reprobate might be saved by Christ, who never died for him. If he could not will
to come to Christ and is damned for not willing it, then he is damned for not
performing an impossibility. His destruction is not assignable to the perversity
of his own will, but to the fact that no possible chance of salvation was ever
given to him.

11. Why do Calvinists demur and complain of us when we say, the reprobate must
be damned, do what he may or can? Do they not know this is true? He cannot be
saved! It is eternally out of the question and impossible, for a cause with
which he had no consenting or personal connection any more than Gabriel had.

12. Why do Calvinists complain when we say, the elect must be saved, do what
they may or can? Do they not know that this is so? One of the elect cannot be
lost--no sin in his power will ever peril his salvation. He cannot, though he
exert himself to that end, endanger his soul in the slightest degree. And this
Dr. Rice will be compelled to admit. I say not now that he will not endanger his
salvation, but I say he cannot. He is now saved and never can be lost. The poor
reprobate cannot be saved, do what he may. Tell me not that he might if he
would; it is sinning to pretend anything of the kind. If he willed ever so much,
he has no Savior! He is


========================================================================
  CHAPTER 4: 4. THE ATONEMENT
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IN THIS CHAPTER WE shall take up the Calvinian view of the atonement. What do
Calvinists believe on this point? This question shall be answered by their
Confession of Faith and their standard authors. The Confession of Faith says:

Wherefore, they who are elected, being fallen in Adam, are redeemed by
Christ--are effectually called unto faith in Christ by his Spirit working in due
season--are justified, adopted, sanctified, and kept by his power through faith
unto salvation. Neither are any other redeemed by Christ, effectually called,
justified, adopted, sanctified, and saved, but the elect only. Upon this section
the expositor of the Confession, indorsed by the board of publication, makes the
following remarks:

In this section we are taught that Christ died exclusively for the elect and
purchased redemption for them alone; in other words, that Christ made atonement
only for the elect and that in no sense did he die for the rest of the race. Our
Confession first asserts, positively, that the elect are redeemed by Christ and
then, negatively, that none others are redeemed by Christ, but the elect only.
If this does not affirm the doctrine of particular redemption or of a limited
atonement, we know not what language could express that doctrine more
explicitly. Hear the Confession again: "To all those for whom Christ hath
purchased redemption, he doth certainly and effectually apply and communicate
the same."

Upon this section the expositor of the Confession remarks:

This section relates to the extent of Christ's death with respect to its
objects, and in opposition to the Arminian tenet that Christ died for all men
for those who shall finally perish, as well as for those who shall be eventually
saved; it affirms that the purchase and application of redemption are the same
extent. In the fifth section, we were taught that Christ purchased redemption
only for those whom the Father hath given him, and here it is asserted that to
all those for whom Christ hath purchased redemption, he doth certainly and
effectually apply and communicate the same. What language, then, could affirm
more explicitly than that here employed that the atonement of Christ is specific
and limited, that it is neither universal nor indefinite, but restricted to the
elect who shall be saved from wrath through him? The sacrifice of Christ derived
infinite value from the divinity of his person: it must, therefore, have been
intrinsically sufficient to expiate the sins of the whole human race, had it
been so intended: but in the design of the Father and in the intention of Christ
himself it was limited to a definite number who shall ultimately obtain
salvation.

The interpretation thus given to the Confession is sustained by the author
quoted with eleven arguments in support of limited atonement. I think all will
admit that he has fairly and correctly expressed the sense of his Confession and
the doctrine of all consistent Calvinists. His language is explicit; and I
embrace his definition as the best I have seen of the Calvinian view of the
atonement.

Christ died exclusively for the elect, and purchased redemption for them alone;
in other words, Christ made atonement only for the elect; and in no sense did he
die for the rest of the race. Corroborative of this statement, I shall proceed
to quote from many other distinguished Calvinists that there may be no mistake
as to the meaning of the system as understood by its friends.

We shall now consider the persons for whom, as a priest, Christ offered himself,
and so enter on that subject which is so much controverted in this present
age--namely, whether Christ died for all men or only for the elect whom he
designed hereby to redeem and bring to salvation. And here let it be premised,
1. That it is generally taken for granted by those who maintain either side of
the question that the saving effects of Christ's death do not redound to all
men, or that Christ did not die in this respect for all the world, since to
assert this would be to argue that all men shall be saved, which everyone
supposes contrary to the whole tenor of Scripture.

2. It is allowed, by those who deny the extent of Christ's death to all men as
to what concerns their salvation, that it may truly be said that there are some
blessings redounding to the whole world, and more especially to those who sit
under the sound of the Gospel as the consequence of Christ's death: inasmuch as
it is owing hereunto that the day of God's patience is lengthened out and the
preaching of the Gospel continued to those who are favored with it; and that
this is attended in many with restraining grace and some instance of external
reformation, which has a tendency to prevent a multitude of sins and a greater
degree of condemnation that would otherwise ensue. These may be called the
remote or secondary ends of Christ's death, which principally and immediately
designed to redeem the elect and to purchase all saving blessings for them,
which shall be applied in his own time and way. Nevertheless, others, as a
consequence hereof, are made partakers of some blessings of common providence so
far as they are subservient to the salvation of those for whom he gave himself a
ransom.

3. It is allowed on both sides, and especially by all who own the divinity and
satisfaction of Christ, that his death was sufficient to redeem the whole world,
had God designed that it should be a price for them, which is the result of the
infinite value of it; therefore,

4. The main question before us is whether God designed the salvation of all
mankind by the death of Christ, or whether he accepted it as a price of
redemption for all, so that it might be said that he redeemed some who shall not
be saved by him? This is affirmed by many who affirm universal redemption which
we must take leave to deny. And they further add as an explanation hereof that
Christ died that he might put all men into a salvable state or procure a
possibility of salvation for them, so that many might obtain it, by a right
improvement of his death, who shall fall short of it, and also that it is in
their power to frustrate the end thereof and so render it ineffectual. This we
judge not only to be an error, but such as is highly derogatory to the glory of
God, which we shall endeavor to make appear and to establish the contrary
doctrine--namely, that Christ died to purchase salvation for none but those who
shall obtain it.

Says Witsius,

We therefore conclude that the obedience and suffering of Christ, considered in
themselves, are, on account of the infinite dignity of the person, of that value
as to have been sufficient for redeeming not only all and every man in
particular, but many myriads besides, had it so pleased God and Christ that he
should have undertaken and satisfied for them.

The suretyship and satisfaction of Christ have also been an occasion of much
good even to the reprobate; for it is owing to the death of Christ that the
Gospel is preached to every creature--that gross idolatry is abolished in many
parts of the world--that wicked impiety is much restrained by the discipline of
the Word of God--that they obtain at times many and excellent, though not
saving, gifts of the Holy Spirit--that they have escaped the polutions of the
world through the knowledge of the Lord and Savior Jesus Christ. And who can in
short enumerate all those things which they enjoy, not through accident only and
beside the intention of God and Christ, but by the appointment of God? Not,
indeed, with a design and purpose of saving them according to the testament, but
from a view to make known his long-suffering toward the vessels of wrath, that
is, those who are to perish, who dwell among those who are to be damned; for
nothing falls out by accident with God, everything being according to his divine
counsel.

That the obedience and suffering of Christ are of such worth that all without
exception who come to him may find perfect salvation in him; and it was the will
of God that this truth should without distinction be proposed both to them that
are to be saved and to them that are to perish, with a charge not to neglect so
great salvation, but to repair to Christ with true contrition of soul; and with
a most sincere declaration that all who come to him shall find salvation in him.

That, nevertheless, Christ, according to the will of God the Father and his own
purpose, did neither engage nor satisfy, and consequently in no manner die, but
only for all those which the Father gave him and who actually are to be saved.

If we search the matter to the bottom, we shall learn that it never was Christ's
intention to satisfy for all in general. Certainly he satisfied only for those
he engaged for. But he engaged to do the will of his Father. But this is the
will of his Father, not that every man should be saved, but those that were give
him, that is, the elect out of every nation who are to receive the gift of
faith.

The two sides of this question [Arminian and Calvinian] do not imply any
difference of opinion with regard to the sufferings of Christ's death, or with
regard to the number and character of those who shall eventually be saved. They
who hold the one and the other side of the question agree that although the
sufferings of Christ have a value sufficient to atone for all the sins of all
the children of Adam from the beginning to the end of time; yet those only shall
be saved by this atonement who repent and believe. But they differ as to the
destination of the death of Christ--whether, in the purpose of the Father and
the will of the Son, it respected all mankind or only those persons to whom the
benefit of it is at length to be applied.

After many remarks highly eulogistic of the doctrine of general or universal
redemption, the author remarks of his own, the Calvinistic system:

The Calvinistic system gives a very different view of the application of the
remedy; and the difference may be traced back to its fundamental principle, that
Christ did not die for all men, but for those in every nation who in the end are
to be saved. Them only he delivers from the curse, and for them only he
purchases those influences of the Spirit by which faith and repentance are
produced. Nor do we hesitate to admit that all mankind, as well as those who
live under the Gospel's light, have been benefited by the Redeemer's death.
Blessings have flowed from this precious fountain of mercy to our sinful world
that would, if Christ had not died, been withheld. But when the question is
proposed, "What is the extent of the Savior's atonement? For whom did he satisfy
divine justice? In whose place did he lay down his precious life?" we answer,
"For all to whom his agreement shall be applied; for to whom his Father gave him
to redeem.

Not so the advocates of indefinite atonement. They affirm that Christ died for
all and every man. This we cannot believe.

On the extent of Christ's atonement, the two opinions that have long divided the
church are expressed by the terms, definite and indefinite. The former means
that Christ died, satisfied divine justice, and made atonement only for such as
are saved. The latter means that Christ died, satisfied divine justice, and made
atonement for all mankind, without exception. The former opinion, or what is
called definite atonement, is that which we adopt. It may be thus stated: that
the Lord Jesus Christ made atonement to God by his death only for the sins of
those to whom, in the sovereign good pleasure of the Almighty, the benefits of
his death shall be finally applied. By this definition, the extent of Christ's
atonement is limited to those who ultimately enjoy its fruits; it is restricted
to the elect of God, for whom alone we conceive him to have laid down his life?

Redemption is certainly applied and effectually communicated to all those for
whom Christ has purchased it.

And here we believe, after all, lies the main point of dispute in regard to the
atonement. Among those who agree as to its nature, the chief question in dispute
is, "What is its design? What was it intended to effect?" This question was
briefly discussed in the former discourse, and we endeavored to point out some
of the consequences which would flow from the belief that Christ died
intentionally to save all mankind. Such a belief must inevitably lead to
Socinianism on the one hand or Universalism on the other.

The advocates of a limited or definite atonement [Calvinists], on the other
hand, maintain that the atonement cannot be considered apart from its actual
application--that, in strictness of speech, the death of Christ is not an
atonement for any until it be applied--that the sufferings of the Lamb of God
are truly vicarious, or in other words that Christ, in suffering, became a real
substitute for his people, was charged with their sins, and bore the punishment
of them, and thus was made a full and complete satisfaction to divine justice in
behalf of all those who shall ever believe on him--that this atonement will
eventually be applied to all for whom, in the divine intention, it was made, or
to all whom God in his sovereignty has been pleased to decree its application.

They believe, however, notwithstanding, the atonement is to be considered as
exactly commensurate with its intended application, that the Lord Jesus Christ
did offer a sacrifice sufficient in its intrinsic value to expiate the sins of
the whole world, and that if it had been the pleasure of God to apply it to
individual, the whole human race would have been saved by its immeasurable
worth. They hold, therefore, that on the ground of the infinite value of the
atonement, the offer of salvation can be consistently made to all who hear the
Gospel, assuring them that if they will believe they shall be saved; whereas, if
they will reject the overture of mercy, they will increase their guilt, and
aggravate their damnation. At the same time, the Scriptures plainly teach that
the will and disposition to comply with this condition depends upon the
sovereign will of God, and that the actual compliance is secured to those only
for whom, the divine counsels, the atonement was specifically intended.

It [the Confession of Faith, chapter 3, section 6] is diametrically opposed to
the system of the Arminians, who hold that Jesus Christ by his death and
suffering made an atonement for the sins of all mankind in general and of every
individual in particular. It is not less opposed to the doctrine maintained by
many that though the death of Christ had a special reference to the elect and,
in connection with the divine purpose, infallibly secures their salvation, yet
that it has also general reference and made an equal atonement for all men. The
celebrated Richard Baxter, who favored general redemption, makes the following
remark upon this and another section of our Confession [chapter 3, section 6 and
chapter 8, section 8] which speak against universal redemption: 'I understand
not of all redemption and particularly not of the mere bearing the punishment of
man's sins and satisfying God's justice, but of that special redemption proper
to the elect which was accompanied with an intention of actual application of
the saving benefits in time. If I may not be allowed this interpretation, I must
hence dissent.' The language of the Confession, in my opinion, will not admit of
this interpretation; and what is more, the Bible is silent about this general
redemption or the general reference of the death of Christ.

It was the will of God that Christ, by the blood of the cross, should
efficaciously redeem those and those only who were from eternity elected to
salvation and given to him by the Father.

It was the most free counsel and gracious will and intention of God the Father
that the quickening and saving efficacy of the most precious death of his Son
should exert itself in all the elect to give unto them only justifying faith,
and by it to conduct them infallibly unto salvation; that is, it was the will of
God that Christ, by the blood of the cross whereby he confirmed the new
covenant, should efficaciously redeem those and those only who were from
eternity elected to salvation and given to him by the Father.

The foregoing quotations contain what we understand to be the Calvinian view of
the extent of the atonement. It would be an easy thing greatly to extend the
list of authorities and also the amount of quotation from each; but this is not
deemed necessary as it is presumed there will be no dispute upon the point now
in question.

From the authorities cited, we make the following deductions:

1. Calvinists believe that the death of Christ is of sufficient value,
intrinsically, to make atonement for all the sins of the whole world had it been
so intended.

2. That resulting from his death are many benefits and blessings to all men--the
reprobate in common with the elect.

3. That though his death is thus sufficient to be an atonement for the world,
yet it is not an atonement for all because he did not die for all, but simply
and only for the elect.

The limitation of his death to a part, therefore, in their estimation did not
proceed from the fact that his death had only value sufficient to atone for a
part, but from the fact that he did not choose to die and his Father did not
choose that he should die for all, but only for the elect. The death itself was
sufficient to satisfy for all to divine justice; but in the design of the Father
and the Son, there were some for whom it was not so intended, for whom it did
not in any sense atone, and who, whatever common temporal benefits they receive
through the operations of the plan, never did and never could receive salvation
because, though the death of Christ was a sufficient sacrifice, they were
sovereignly excluded from having any part therein by the purpose of God, who
intended it for the elect alone and in no sense for the reprobate.

That these deductions are legitimate is so palpable as to need no further
vindication; they are indeed distinctly made in the quotations from Witsius,
Ridgley, and Hill already given. With the first, of course, we make no issue;
and with the second only as it stands connected with the third.

It is with the third we shall contend in what follows. And it is presumed that
Calvinists will not find fault with our statement of their faith. We certainly
have represented it in the least objectionable light or, rather, we have allowed
its friends so to represent it. If anything is to be gained by expletives and
mitigated statements, we have allowed them this advantage--blending the terrible
feature of limited atonement with the benign history of Providence toward those
who are so unfortunate as to be sovereignly excluded from any possible interest
in it--the fact that Christ's death is restricted in the intention of the Father
and Son to a part, with the acknowledgment that it was ample and sufficient for
all in its own value--the fact that if any fail to be saved by Christ, it is not
because he had not ability to save them, but simply because, in his infinite and
inscrutable mercy, he thought best that it should not apply to some--that though
these cannot possibly be saved by Christ, but must, necessarily, be damned
forever and damned a thousand-fold worse than if he had never died, yet, in lieu
thereof, he has given them many temporal benefits, and if he had so chosen, he
could have done more for them, but he did not so choose. May God conduct us into
all truth!

Having thus given the Calvinian view of the extent of the atonement--namely,

That the Lord Jesus Christ made atonement to God --his death only for the sins
those to whom, in the sovereign good pleasure of the Almighty, the benefits of
his death shall be finally applied. Neither are any other redeemed by Christ but
the elect only. Christ died exclusively for the elect and purchased redemption
for them alone: in other words, Christ made atonement only for the elect and in
no sense did he die for the rest of the race. Having thus presented their view
of the atonement in their own language, we shall now proceed to name some
objections to it.

1. And, first, we object to it in general terms--all that has been objected to
the decree of election and reprobation in the former chapter; for the doctrines
are so kindred that much that is applicable to the one may also be applied to
the other. What supports the one, supports the other; and what opposes the one,
antagonizes the other to a great extent.

2. Particularly I object to the doctrine of a limited atonement that it has no
foundation in Scripture. Not a solitary passage from Genesis to Revelation
asserts the doctrine that Christ died for only a part of mankind. No passage
implies it; it finds no countenance in any fact or principle of revelation. That
it is repeatedly said that Christ died for particular persons and classes is not
disputed, but it is nowhere said, it is nowhere implied that he did not die for
others. This, then, is one great objection I bring to bear against this
doctrine: it is nowhere revealed in the Word of God.

3. I object to it that it is not only nowhere taught in the Word of God, but is
directly contrary to multitudes of express declarations of revelation and to the
whole tenor of divine teaching.

(1.) It is contrary to those passages which teach that Christ died for all men,
for every man, for the whole world.

(2.) It is contrary to those Scriptures which contrast the death of Christ with
the fall of Adam.

(3.) It is contrary to those Scriptures which represent those who are lost as
purchased by Christ.

(4.) It is contrary to those Scriptures which make offer of the benefits of
Christ's death to all men.

(5.) It is contrary to those Scriptures which require all men to believe on and
accept Christ.

(6.) It is contrary to those Scriptures which represent the cause of the
sinner's damnation as being his rejection of Christ and unbelief in him.

(7.) It is contrary to those Scriptures which represent that those who are
finally lost might have been saved.

(8.) It is contrary to those Scriptures which represent the Lord as not willing
the destruction of sinners, but as regretting their folly and desiring them to
turn and live.

(9.) It is contrary to those Scriptures which represent God as a being of
universal love.

(10.) It is contrary to those Scriptures which represent him as impartial.

(11.) It is contrary to those Scriptures which represent him as just.

4. I object that not only is not the doctrine of a limited atonement nowhere
taught in the Scriptures, and not only is it diametrically contrary to the whole
tenor of revelation and many express passages thereof, but it is also
adversative to all our conceptions of the character of God as the universal
parent. In the light, or rather in the darkness of its consequences, we are
compelled to change all our views of his character and nature. Shorn of all his
glorious perfections of infinite benevolence, and impartiality, and truth, and
sincerity, he is presented to us as a hideous compound of cruelty, and caprice,
and duplicity, and falsehood. I know these are severe charges; and it is their
indisputable truth, as everyone who will be at the pains of a faithful
examination will be compelled to admit, that makes them severe.

Can any man believe, is it in the power of the human mind that God is a being of
infinite love when he damns millions of souls eternally with the most
excruciating tortures for that which they could not avoid, and this, too, when
it was in his power to save them, but he chose not to do it? Can this be
believed?

Can any man believe God is impartial when he, by a sovereign act, takes some men
to heaven and consigns others to hell, when there was no difference between them
whatever, but some were chosen and others rejected for pleasure alone? No
partiality--no caprice here!

Can any man believe in the truth and sincerity of God when he proclaims himself
ready to save all and not willing any should perish--when he goes to all with
invitations, and promises, and exhortations, and yet the truth is that many of
those thus invited he has damned for his own pleasure before they had an
existence? Is this in your idea of sincerity?

5. I object further: if it is true that Christ did not die for those who shall
finally be lost, then there never was a possibility of their salvation. Either
this must be admitted, or it must be assumed that a soul might be saved for whom
Christ did not die. There is no other alternative; and our Calvinistic brethren
may select either horn of the dilemma. If they select the latter, then they will
do away with the necessity of the death of Christ and find some other name for
means whereby to be saved. If they admit the former, then they damn the sinner
when it was eternally impossible for him to escape damnation; and this his
damnation is for a cause with which he never had any consenting connection.

But if it was eternally impossible for the sinner to escape damnation, then he
is in no way to blame; nor can he in any sense reflect upon himself for being
lost, seeing it was eternally impossible for him to be saved. He cannot blame
himself--no man, no angel, not God can blame him. It is no fault his that he is
damned, for he could not be saved. Let it not be said he brought himself into
this miserable condition from which there is no reprieve, for the truth is, he
had nothing whatever to do with it unless he personally acted before he had an
existence. For his damnation was fixed before he had an existence, and the
pretended causes were engendered with him in the womb. Look at the facts,
stripped of all mysticism. There stands a man for whom Christ did not die. Now,
that man must be lost! But why? Because when he was conceived, he became a
partaker of a corrupt nature which, if not regenerated, must eventuate in
damnation. But Christ never died for him, and so his nature cannot be
regenerated. And he must, therefore, necessarily be damned eternally for that
which was given to him with his existence. In Calvin's words, "Yea, and very
infants themselves bring their own damnation with them from their mother's
womb."

6. Still further, I object: if there are any for whom Christ did not die, such
persons not only cannot avoid damnation and are not therefore to blame for being
finally destroyed, but, moreover, they cannot avoid sinning on as long as they
live and without any cessation or mitigation. They cannot avoid this. Mark well
this proposition! Human nature is depraved and, unless changed by the grace of
God, it must sin on--it must sin ever. This is admitted by Calvinists. But there
is no grace out of Christ. If there is a man for whom Christ did not die, there
is, therefore, no means whereby he can be changed; he must, therefore,
necessarily, continue to sin. It is useless to remonstrate with him; he must
sin--it is his nature and his nature cannot be changed. For the only Being in
the universe who could effect the change has withheld the means. He sins as
necessarily as the planet revolves, as water descends to its level, as the stone
projected to the heavens must descend to the earth.

But if he must sin and cannot avoid it, if the thing is absolutely and entirely
beyond his power and all other available power, the man cannot be to blame for
it, can he? Let it not be said he brought the disability upon himself. If this
were so, it would relieve the case. But this, you know, is not the fact. His
disability came with him into the world; it was communicated as a part of his
existence; it was his very and essential nature. And now was he to blame for an
existence and nature which were forced upon him, which never at any period he
consented to and which he never could avoid? His first parent may be to blame,
but surely he cannot be responsible; for he not only did not bring the
disability upon himself, but it was imposed on him without the possibility of
its removal. Let him sin; no being in the universe can censure him; he is not to
blame. It is his nature, unavoidable to his being. You say he ought not to sin.
I answer, "He cannot help it." You say he ought to help it. I ask, "Ought he to
do an impossibility? Can you affirm this?" But you say he can help it if he
will. But can he will? If so, by what power? His own? You will not pretend so
much. The power of God? But God will not communicate the requisite assistance.
But does God require men to avoid sinning? Then Calvinism is false, or God is
unjust.

Take a similar case. There is a man of scrofulous habit--the disease is
destroying his life, and no remedy can cure it. You find on inquiry that the
disease has been in his family for a succession of generations; it is
transmitted from father to son. Now is the man to be blamed for being
scrofulous; is he responsible? It was communicated in his conception. Is he to
blame for remaining under the influence of the disease? He has tried every
remedy in vain and has found none to cure him. He cannot be cured.

But I object, further: if it is impossible for the sinner to avoid sinning and
if this disability of his was not brought upon himself by his own act, then not
only is he not to blame for his sins, but he cannot be required to do right. He
is under no obligation to do right. No being in the universe can create such an
obligation. This must be so, unless it can be shown that a being can be brought
under obligation to perform an absolute impossibility. Will any man in his
senses pretend so much! Suppose God were to command me this moment to annihilate
the sun, and yet give me no more power than I now possess. Would unrighteous
command create an obligation? Yet, when he commands that sinner for whom Christ
did not die to do right, he commands as absolute an impossibility as in the
former case. Does this command create an obligation? No mysticism can escape
this plain matter-of-fact statement. But does God require men to do right? Then
Calvinism is false, or God is a despot! Calvinists may determine which horn to
choose. Let not our opponents refer to the condition of fallen angels and lost
sinners as proof that obligation to do right may remain when the ability is
gone. The cases are not analogous. In the former case, the sinner required to
perform what it never was possible for him to do, and the inability was
communicated with his existence, and he never could have got clear of it.

8. But I object, further: if the sinner cannot avoid doing sin and has no
available power to do right, then not only is he not to blame for his sins and
absolutely under no obligation to do right, but, moreover, he cannot be punished
either in this world or the world to come for his delinquencies without the
grossest injustice and sheerest tyranny. He is a fool for inflicting upon
himself the torture of remorse, the pang of regret, or as he gives himself any
sorrow, any uneasiness about his state. The God who made him and who punishes
him, universal intelligence must pronounce a monster of cruelty! Punish him! For
what, I pray you? Is not his very being curse enough? Must other tortures be
added? And for what? For his sins? He never could avoid them. For not doing
right? He never had the power. Damn him in hell torments forever for this!

O sir, is not this dreadful! Do you believe our heavenly Father is such a being
as this! Does not your blood shiver in your veins at the thought! Is being bad
enough! Must he suffer on forever, the victim of insatiable malevolence! What
should be thought of a human tyrant who, supposing a certain family of his
slaves by birth, were disqualified for his service so that was absolutely
impossible for a cause connected with their conception for them to do what he
required of them, should, nevertheless, appoint them the usual task and yet,
because they failed to perform it, at the close of every day strip them and
inflict upon their naked persons inhuman tortures, and this because they did not
perform absolute impossibilities--what would all men think of such a monster?
Would not the mute earth open her dumb mouth and curse him? Would not the
heavens execrate the abhorrent wretch? But shall a thousand-fold worse conduct
be charged upon the glorious God, and no one resent the indignity? Under the
sanctity of religion, shall the revolting slander be made that he will torture
through all eternity men for not performing impossibilities and the
representative go unrebuked? It must not be.

9. But I object, further: if Christ did not die for all, then is it inconsistent
and insincere to invite all to come to him and be saved. This is so manifest
that I cannot express my astonishment that Calvinists do not perceive it. Look
at it. There stands a man for whom Christ did not die--he never died for him
that he might live. Now, I ask in all consistency, how can that man be invited
to come to Christ for life? He cannot come; and if he could, Christ has no life
for him. Look at the invitation in the light of these facts. Is it not horrible?
Can you present Christ in this attitude without alarm at the blasphemy? What
pretense justifies this invitation, this entreaty? What excuse is there for that
Calvinistic preacher who stands and entreats all sinners to come to Christ, when
he professes to believe, first, with respect to the persons for whom Christ
died, that they must come in the day of God's power and cannot come until that
time--next, with respect to the reprobate, that he never can come, that the
thing is impossible--what must be thought of such a preacher? What would you
think of a man who should go into a grave-yard and address himself in the same
way to a congregation of tomb-stones?

Is it pretended that all may be invited to come to Christ because his death is sufficient for all? What a miserable evasion! Admit that the death of Christ is sufficient for all, yet there stands the fact, it was not made for all. Some men were eternally excluded from it. Here is a table sufficient to accommodate all the citizens of a city; but it is surrounded by an army who are instructed to admit only the white portion of its citizens and to prevent all colored persons from approaching, so that it is absolutely impossible for such to reach that table. Now, I ask, with what consistency could these colored persons be invited and entreated to come to the table and eat by the same authority that placed an army to prevent their approach under the pretense that there is enough for all? Would not all men pronounce such a procedure miserable duplicity---abominable, shameless hypocrisy? If there be enough, they have no share in it. But do you say, to justify a universal invitation of sinners to Christ, that not only is there a sufficiency in him for all, but, likewise, all who will may come--there is no let or hindrance but in the sinner's will only? There is no army prevent him. If he will come, he may; and if he will not, whose fault is it?

But, now, look at this. The very reason why the sinner will not come is this--he
has no power to will to come. Here is where the army is planted to prevent--an
army of irresistible motives to prevent him from willing. He cannot will and the
reason is, the will must be given of God, but it can only be given to those for
whom Christ died; but for this sinner he did not die, and, hence, it is
impossible for him to have the will. So that to say if he will come, he may, and
make this the ground of the offer is arrant trifling. He cannot will to come to
Christ, and the reason why he cannot will is that Christ did not die for him to
make the will possible so that the obstacle is not in his will, but in the fact
that Christ did not die for him. And hence the hypocrisy of inviting him when
the fact is he is prevented from coming. And if he could come, Christ has not
the thing for him which he is invited to receive.

10. 1 object: if Christ died not for all, then unbelief is no sin in them that
finally perish, seeing that there is not anything for those men to believe unto
salvation for whom Christ died not. Their unbelief is no sin, for three reasons:
First, their unbelief is true--Christ did not die for them, and they believe the
truth when they believe he did not. Second, they cannot believe without divine
aid, and are not, therefore, sinful for not doing what is impossible. Third,
they cannot be required to believe a lie; but if they believed on Christ, they
would believe a lie. Therefore, in not believing, they violate no requirement
and so commit no sin.

11. But if Christ did not die for all men, then it would be a sin in those for
whom he did not die to believe he did die for them, seeing it would be to
believe a lie. But God commands all men to believe--he therefore commands some
men to believe a lie. If he wills them to do what he commands, he wills them to
believe a lie. If he does not will them to believe, then he commands them to do
what he does not wish them to do!

12. If Christ did not die for those who are damned, then they are not damned for
unbelief. Otherwise, you say they are damned for not believing a lie!

13. If Christ died not for all, then those who obey Christ by going and
preaching the Gospel to every creature as glad tidings of grace and peace, of
great joy to all people do sin thereby in that they go to most people with a lie
in their mouth. For if Christ did not die for all, the Gospel cannot be glad
tidings of great joy to all. To many it must be a message of unmingled terror
and grief, for it only announces that they are hopelessly lost and that the
death of Christ itself is, in its very design, an infinite and everlasting curse
to them for it will unavoidably enhance their damnation a thousand-fold.

But not only does it make those to sin by publishing absolute falsehood who
publish the glad tidings to all, but, also-and what cannot be written without
trembling--it represents our Lord Jesus Christ himself, in the language of Mr.
Wesley,

as a hypocrite, a deceiver of the people, a man void of common sincerity. For it
cannot be denied that he everywhere speaks as if he were willing that all men
should be saved, and as if he had provided the possibility. Therefore, to say he
was not willing that all men should be saved, that he had provided no such
possibility, is to represent him as a hypocrite and dissembler. It cannot be
denied that the gracious words which came out of his mouth are full of
invitations to all sinners. To say, then, he did not intend to save all sinners
upon proffered and possible conditions is to represent him as a gross deceiver
of the people. You cannot deny that he says, "Come unto me, all ye that are
weary and heavy-laden." If, then, you say he calls those that cannot come--those
whom he knows to be unable to come--those whom he can make able to come, but
will not--how is it possible to describe greater insincerity? You represent him
as mocking his helpless creatures by offering what he never intends to give. You
describe him as saying one thing and meaning another--as pretending a love which
he had not. Him "in whose mouth was no guile," you make full of deceit void of
common sincerity. Then, especially, when drawing nigh the city, he wept over it
and said, "O Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets and stonest them which
are sent unto thee, how often would I have gathered thy children together,
...and ye would not." Now, if you say that he would not, you represent
him--which who can hear?--as weeping hypocritical tears over the prey which
himself of his own good pleasure damned to destruction.

Such blasphemy as this one might think might make the ears of a Christian to
tingle. But there is yet more behind; for just as it honors the Son, so it
honors the Father. As alleged, it destroys all his attributes at once. It
overturns his justice, mercy, and truth. Yea, it represents the most holy God as
worse than the devil can be--as more false, more cruel, and unjust. More false,
became the devil, liar as he is, hath never said, "He willeth all men to be
saved:" More unjust, because the devil cannot, if he would, be guilty of such
injustice as you ascribe to God when you say that God condemns millions of souls
to everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels, for continuing in
sin which, for the grace he will not give them, they cannot avoid. And more
cruel, because that unhappy spirit seeketh rest and findeth none, that his own
misery is the occasion of his tormenting others.

But God resteth in his high and holy place so that to suppose him, of his own
mere motion, of his pure will and pleasure happy as he is to doom his creatures,
whether they will or no, to endless misery is to impute such cruelty to him as I
know of no warrant to impute to the great enemy of God and man. It is to
represent the most high God as more cruel, false, and unjust than the devil. Who
hath ever said worse of the devil? who can say worse of him than this, that he
is a heartless dissembler, ever deceiving with empty pretenses--that he delights
in the misery of his wretched victims? But here it is said of God that he
pretends to desire the happiness of his creatures--that he even comes and
implores them to live, weeping over them while he entreats--at the same time
that he has doomed them to eternal hell torments of his own pleasure in such a
way as that it is absolutely and forever impossible for them to escape, and this
for sins they never could avoid! If this be the God of the Bible, in what does
he differ from its devil? Only in his larger growth!

14. If Christ did not die for all men, then God is not sincere in requiring all
men to repent, nor can he equitably make the requisition. For what could this
repentance do them? What remission of sins could it procure for those for whom
Christ did not die? Manifestly none. If it were possible for them to comply with
the requirement, it could do them no good; but they cannot comply, if it would
be a means of their salvation. And hence it follows, as has been well said by
Whitby,

that no impenitent person can justly be condemned for dying in his impenitent
estate, For on this supposition he may fairly plead that, Christ not dying for
him, his repentance, had he been ever so careful to perform it, must have been
in vain since it could not procure the remission of his sins. If here say that
it is an impossible supposition that anyone for whom Christ did die should
repent, you only strengthen this his plea, enabling him to say he condemned and
perisheth for want of that repentance which, from his birth to his dying day, it
was utterly impossible for him to perform. Hence, further. it must follow that
God could not equitably require of them for whom He died not obedience to the
laws of Christ, since that obedience, could they be ever so willing or
industrious to perform it, could not avail for the remission of their sins--it
being only the blood of Christ which cleanseth from which blood never was given
for them. If it were possible for those for whom Christ died not to obey every
requisition of the Bible, it would not contribute a particle to their salvation;
but if it is impossible, then they are finally to be damned for not performing
impossibilities, and then for not complying. At the same time, if they did and
could comply, it would not, could not bring them the salvation which is promised
to all who comply. Is not this creditable to God and the Bible?

15. If Christ did not die for all, then why does he say he is not willing any
should perish? Surely, he is willing that the greater part should perish, or he
would have permitted his death to extend to them. Why do any perish, but that it
is his sovereign will to limit his death to a part? Indeed, if Calvinism be
true, the will of God is the only original cause of the sinner's damnation! Not
merely is it the will of God that they should be damned as sinners, but it is
because of his will that they are sinners that they might be damned.

This charge, fearful as it is--and I confess it is startling--is based upon what
has been abundantly and irrefutably proved in a former place--namely, that God
willed the fall of Adam--that he willed that reprobates should come into the
world with a necessity to sin--and that, indeed, he is the first and only
original cause of all things, sin included. And since he could not cause what
was contrary to his will, he must therefore will both the sin and damnation of
the reprobate. This is also to be argued from the fact that he, according to
Calvinism, limited the death of Christ to a part, when he might have extended it
to all, and this for his own pleasure. He did not will that all should be saved
from sin and hell, or he would not have limited the death of Christ to a
part--he must, therefore, have willed, contrary to his own declaration, that
many should die.

Look at it. Calvinists believe that all for whom Christ died must inevitably be
saved. They believe, also, that his death was sufficient for the sins of the
whole world. Well, now observe, the only reason why this sufficient atonement
does not save the whole world is this: God the Father and God the Son, of their
own good pleasure, limited it to a part. It was their good pleasure, therefore,
that the residue should be left in their sins and perish, and his sovereign
pleasure is the cause of their damnation! Dreadful! dreadful! dreadful! The
atonement was ample to satisfy the demands of justice--here there was no limit.
The condition of all the race was precisely the same--here there was no limit.
But in the will of God there was a limit; as a sovereign, for his own pleasure,
he limited the remedy which was sufficient for all to a part and left the others
to perish! If this be so, and Calvinists say it is so, are we not shut up to the
conclusion that all who are left in sin and damnation are so left because God
preferred this to heir holiness and salvation!

16. But Calvinists tell the poor reprobates, as a kind of palliation of their
cruel treatment, that, though God has sovereignly excluded them from salvation
in Christ, yet he has done a great deal for them. The death of Christ, it is
true, has not made it possible for them to escape the vengeance of eternal
fire--for they were created for this--to obtain a mansion in heaven, but it has
procured them many temporal blessings, such as the ministry of the Word, common
operations of the Spirit, invitations of the Gospel, and many other great
privileges, for which they, as in duty bound, ought to be very grateful.

Ought the reprobates to be grateful for these? Are these blessings? Are they
blessings in their design, in their result? Or is it not true, on the contrary,
in their very nature and design they are the greatest curse that ever befell the
poor miserable victims of almighty wrath? Did not the honest Calvin himself say
they were intended to fatten them for the slaughter, that "God calls them that
they may be more deaf--kindles a light that they may be more blind--brings his
doctrines that they may be more ignorant--applies the remedy that they may not
be healed!"

For any one of these blessings they are destined, in the purpose of when he
bestows them, to suffer the keenest, deepest pangs of hell forever. They come to
them as angels of light, but infix in the inmost soul a thousand arrows of
remorse and anguish which shall never be extracted through eternity. Blessings!
designed and destined to eventuate in eternal woe! God of universe, protect thy
hapless creatures from such blessings as these! Blessing! Sent upon the
reprobates that their condition may be rendered more intolerable than that of
Sodom and Gomorrah in the day of judgment--that a pretense may be furnished for
heightening the horrors of perdition to utmost excess to the praise of his
glorious justice!

17. If Christ did not die for all, and if only those for whom he did die can be
saved, then all for whom he did not die come into the world with the necessity
of their damnation, because they come into the world under an arrangement by
which their damnation is unavoidable. They must necessarily be damned because
there is no salvation out of Christ, and Christ did not die for them. Now, with
the question whether they will be lost or not, they have nothing to do whatever
because it was settled from eternity when it was settled that Christ should not
die for them. But do you say, the first cause of their destruction was their
corruption of nature, and God only passed them by in their leaving them to
suffer just punishment? Very well; let us take your explanation. Then it amounts
to this: these persons were left to damnation because of their corrupt nature.
But had they anything whatever to do in making that corrupt nature? If they had,
they must have acted before they existed. But if they had not, then they were
assigned to eternal damnation for an act with which they had nothing to do
whatever. But, again: if they were assigned to damnation for their corruption of
nature, then they were damned for a cause existing in their conception--then
they were damned, all of them, when they were unborn. So here we have not the
damnation of a few children a span long, but of all who finally perish before
they have attained that stature.

But, to escape these horrible consequences, do you adopt this evasion, that they
were only passed by because of their corruption and left in a state in which,
when they should attain to personality, they would inevitably sin? And then, on
account of these actual sins, they would be condemned and punished? Well, let us
look at this for a moment. You say they were only passed by because of their
corruption of nature. What do you mean by this? That it was determined Christ
should not die for them? Then I ask, "What was their state thus passed by? Could
they be saved?" If they could, then they could be saved without the death of
Christ. If they could not be saved, must they not necessarily be damned? Or is
there some intermediate state between salvation and damnation to which they
would be assigned?

But, leaving this, let us admit that the final damnation of those passed by, for
whom Christ did not die, is on account of their actual sins. The charge still
stands true that they brought with them into the world the necessity of their
damnation, and its final infliction is without any fault of theirs whatever. The
facts are precisely these: These unfortunate--for they are not guilty, if
Calvinism is true--persons came into the world with a corrupt nature which was
forced upon them with existence. This nature just unavoidably involves them in
actual sins because, being evil, it can only produce evil. From this corruption
there is no escape: Christ did not die for them, and his death is the only means
of escape from corruption. They are, therefore, born into the world with a
necessity to sin; and if they are to be damned for these sins, they are born
with a necessity of damnation! Who has nerves sufficient for these things? Who
is the man who can indulge such thoughts of the Ruler of the universe and the
moral government thereof without feelings of unmingled consternation! Who can
believe that a God of infinite love has brought millions of beings into
existence with the unavoidable necessity of eternal damnation, and this
necessity ascribable to nothing in the creature over which he had control, but
merely to the good pleasure of God!

18. I must add finally upon this point, before passing to others immediately
connected therewith, that if it be true that Christ died but for a part, then it
is certain if the devil knows this, he is the greatest fool in the universe and
Christians next in the dimensions of folly. What has the devil to do any more?
Why shall he walk through the earth seeking prey? Why shall he hunt for the
souls of men? He already has his portion! They are counted out, every soul of
them. Their names and numbers are designated! He cannot get one more though he
move heaven and earth--though he employ every emissary in hell. He cannot come
short of one--the thing is forever impossible. For God is pledged--he has given
them to the devil in an everlasting covenant--they were created for him--his
they must be! He need not watch and diminish his rest, for God will bring them
all safe to him, and no being has power to pluck one of them out of his hand!
Let the devil rest and hell hold jubilee, for God has given them a large part of
the human race for his own glory and of his own sovereign pleasure.

And what shall be said of the folly of Christians? Know you not that all for
whom Christ died must be brought in, in the day of his power? Not one can
fail--the Lord will hasten it in its time. Why shall you labor? You cannot make
one hair white or black. Why do you take trouble about those whom God has given
to the devil? Would you rob him? It is impossible! What folly you are guilty of!
Pray, preach, mourn, weep, make yourselves sad--for what? Know you not it is all
in vain? None can perish for whom Christ died; none can escape for whom he did
not die. Let the devil and Christians quit their devilish warfare and be at
peace. Let the world have rest. For God will not defraud the devil of one soul
that is his, and he cannot steal one that is Christ's. And Christians can do
nothing by interference! Let the foolish strife come to an everlasting end.

Such are some of the consequences flowing unavoidably from the proposition that
Christ died but for a part of mankind. That they are terrible, I readily
admit--so appalling, that I cannot mention them against you without seeming to
pervert and persecute you, because it must ever seem unaccountable to all men
how rational beings can embrace such absurdities, not to say wicked.
blasphemies. I have found no pleasure in pointing them out; on the contrary, it
has given me unmingled pain. God is my witness, I am sincerely sorry for you. I
regard you with commiseration as the victim of a miserable system whose
frightful errors I must suppose you believe and, by some fatal infatuation,
refuse to renounce. As I have waded through the pages of your divines, I have
involuntarily regretted that I found myself under the necessity of becoming
acquainted with their unaccountable and horrid teachings--much more, that it
became my duty to expose them. Would that you had been content to enjoy peace
and left your neighbors to pursue their own salvation and not, by your
unprovoked intermeddling, rendered it necessary to uncover your revolting and
shameful deformities to the observation of our common enemies. And now, what may
seem almost as paradoxical as many things in your creed after all that I have
said, I must be allowed to cherish love for your church in despite of all her
blemishes, and for yourself also as a professed follower of my Savior. May the
Spirit itself lead us into all truth.

In addition to the foregoing objections to a limited atonement are several
others resulting from the Calvinian view of the nature of the atonement, and the
method by which those interested therein become partakers of its benefits.

If Calvinists hold to a limited atonement, as has been seen in the citations
already made, they further hold, as growing out of the nature of the atonement
itself, that all those particular persons for whom it was made must, in
consequence thereof, not only infallibly, but necessarily and unconditionally,
be saved.

It may be proper to make a few quotations bearing directly on this point: "To
all those for whom Christ hath purchased redemption, he doth certainly and
effectually apply and communicate the same."

This clause at the same time necessarily limits the atonement to those who are
finally saved because it says all for whom it was made will be saved; and it
asserts that all for whom it was made must infallibly have its application--they
must necessarily be saved by it.

The Lord Jesus, by his perfect obedience and sacrifice of himself, which he
through the eternal Spirit once offered up unto God, hath fully satisfied the
justice of his Father and purchased not only reconciliation, but an everlasting
inheritance in the kingdom of heaven for all those whom the Father hath given
unto him. We are further taught that the atonement shall be effectually applied
by the Holy Spirit to all those who were chosen of God and redeemed by Christ,
and that it shall be effectually applied to them alone.

The Father from all eternity gave to Christ a people to be his seed and be by
him brought to glory. He was not merely to procure for them a possibility of
salvation, but to secure for them a full and final salvation; and none that were
given to him shall be lost.

The intention of Christ in laying down his life was not merely to obtain for
those for whom he died a possibility of salvation, but actually to save them--to
bring them to a real possession and enjoyment of eternal salvation. From this it
inevitably follows that Christ died only for those who shall be saved in him
with an everlasting salvation.

Christ, therefore, is called our surety because he engaged to God to make
satisfaction for us, the elect--which satisfaction consists in this, that
Christ, in our room and stead, did, both by doing and suffering, satisfy divine
justice, both the legislative, the retributive, and the vindictive, in the most
perfect manner, fulfilling all the righteousness of the law which the law
otherwise required of us in order to impunity and to our having a right to
eternal life.

But we must proceed a step further and affirm that the obedience of Christ was
accomplished by him in our room, in order thereby to obtain for us a right to
eternal life. The law which God will have secured inviolable admits none to
glory but on conditions of perfect obedience, which none was ever possessed of
but Christ, who bestows it freely on his own people?

But, besides, Christ satisfied the vindictive justice of God not merely for our
good, but also in our room, by enduring those most dreadful suffering both in
soul and body which we had deserved and from which he, by undergoing them, did
so deliver us that they could not, with the wrath and curse of God as the proper
punishment of our sins, be inflicted on us.

The Lord Jesus obtained for the elect, by his satisfaction, an immunity from all
misery and a right to eternal life .... A right to all the benefits of the
covenant of grace is purchased at once to all the elect by the death of Christ,
so far as that consistently with the truth and justice of God and with the
covenant he entered into with his Son, he cannot condemn any of the elect or
exclude them from partaking in his salvation; nay, on the contrary, he has
declared that satisfaction being now made by his Son and accepted by himself,
there is nothing for the elect either to suffer or to do in order to acquire
either impunity or a right to life, but only that each of them in their
appointed order and time enjoy the right purchased for them by Christ and the
inheritance arising from it.

Before actual conversion, the elect are favored with no contemptible privileges
above the reprobates in virtue of the right which Christ purchased for them such
as, first, that they are in a state of reconciliation and justification,
actively considered, Christ having made satisfaction for them, etc.

For since Christ did, by his engagement, undertake to cancel all the debt of
those persons for whom he engaged as if it were his own, by suffering what was
meet, and to fulfill all righteousness in their room, and since he has most
fully performed this by his satisfaction as much as if the sinners themselves
had endured all the punishment due to their sins and had accomplished all
righteousness, the consequence is, he has engaged and satisfied for those, and
those only, who are actually saved from their sins.

Whoever makes a purchase of anything has an unquestionable right to it; and it
not only may, but actually does become his property in virtue of his purchase
upon paying down the price. And herein consists our liberty and salvation, that
we are no longer our own, nor the property of sin, nor of Satan, but the
property of Christ.

Divines explain themselves differently as to the conditions of the covenant of
grace. We, for our part, agree with those who think that the covenant of grace,
to speak accurately with respect to us, has no conditions.

Jesus Christ was ordained of God to be the Savior of those persons, and God gave
them to him to be redeemed by his blood, to be called by his Spirit, and finally
to be glorified with him. All that Christ did in the character of mediator was
in consequence of this original appointment of the Father, which has received
from many divines the name of the covenant of redemption--a phrase which
suggests the idea of a mutual stipulation between Christ and the Father in which
Christ undertook all the work which he executed in human nature and which he
continues to execute in heaven in order to save the elect; and the Father
promised that the persons for whom Christ died should be saved by his death.
According to the tenor of this covenant of redemption, the merits of Christ are
not considered the cause of the decree of election, but as a part of that
decree. In other words, God was not moved by the mediation of Christ to choose
certain persons out of the great body of mankind to be saved, but, having chosen
them, he conveys all the means of salvation through the channel of this
mediation.

Christ engaged to pay the debt of his people and satisfy for the wrongs and
injuries done by them. There is a two-fold debt paid by Christ as a surety of
his people--the one is a debt of obedience to the law of God. Another thing
which Christ as a surety engaged to do was to bring all the elect safe to glory.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth chapters of the second book of Calvin's
Institutes, it is elaborately taught that Christ has suffered and obeyed for his
elect so that their salvation is positively secured--their debt being paid, and
they being entitled to salvation.

If Christ has satisfied for our sins--if he has sustained the punishment due to
us--if he has appeased God by his obedience, then salvation has been obtained
for us by his righteousness. Justification is an act of God's free grace unto
sinners in which he pardoneth all their sins--accepteth and accounteth their
persons righteous in his sight--not for anything wrought in them or done by
them, but only for the perfect obedience and full satisfaction of Christ, by God
imputed to them, and received by faith alone.

Although Christ by his obedience and death did make a proper, real, and full
satisfaction to God's justice in the behalf of them that are justified, inasmuch
as God accepteth the satisfaction from a surety which he might have demanded of
them and did provide this surety, his only Son, imputing his righteousness to
them and requiring nothing of them for their justification but faith, which also
is his gift, their justification is to them of free grace.

Faith justifies a sinner in the sight of God not because of those other graces
which do always accompany it or of good works that are the fruits of it, nor as
if the grace of faith, or any act thereof, were imputed to him for
justification, but only as it is an instrument by which he receiveth and
applieth Christ and his righteousness.

The imputation that respects our justification before God is God's gracious
donation of the righteousness of Christ to believers, and his acceptance of
their persons as righteous on the account thereof. Their sins being imputed to
him and his obedience being imputed to them, they are, in virtue hereof, both
acquitted from guilt and accepted as righteous before God.

The Calvinists say that the faith and good works of the elect are the
consequence of their election. God having from all eternity chosen a certain
number persons, did in time give his Son to become their Savior. He bestows
them, through him (unconditionally) that grace which effectually determines them
to repent and believe, and so effectually conducts them by faith and good works
unto everlasting life. These are--faith and good works--not conditions, but the
fruit of election, and they were from eternity known to God because they were in
time to be produced by the execution of the divine decree.

The atonement was a satisfaction made for the sins of the elect which had
respect to them personally and secures the pardon of all their iniquities.
Christ was substituted for the elect to obey and suffer in their stead and was,
by imputation, legally guilty, so that the law could demand his death. In the
decree of election, the sinners who will be saved were given to Christ to be
justified. They were given when ungodly, and not from any foreseen faith and
repentance. The ground of pardon is the mystical union with the Lord Jesus
Christ.

Christ being a propitiation for us does also imply that God did also accept of
the passive obedience of Christ, together with his action, as sufficient
satisfaction to the demands of justice. So that the imputation of the obedience
of Christ does fully and perfectly ac


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