F 02 The, Origin of Evil
2. The, Origin of Evil.
Passing on to the consideration of the origin of evil, we come to a question the most perplexing of all connected with the subject of evil. Tlodev TO KCLKOV; this is an inquiry which from the dawn of speculation has excited the curiosity and exercised the ingenuity of philosophic thinkers. 1 The hypotheses which have been advanced for the solution of this problem may be classed under two heads, as the Dualistic and the Monoistic. The Pantheistic hypothesis does not come into consideration here; for on it the distinction between good and evil virtually disappears, both being viewed as only varied applications or manifestations of the One original, infinite, and eternal substance. We may also pass over the hypothesis of pre - existence a hypothesis which was favoured by Plato, who thought that our present knowledge is but a reminiscence of what we experienced in a previous state of being, and who imagined he was furnished by this with an argument in favour of the immortality of the soul, inasmuch as the soul having passed from a previous state into the body without suffering dissolution, might be presumed capable of passing out of the body into a future state without being thereby destroyed. 2 This notion of Plato, which he probably derived from Pythagoras, 3 was adopted by some of the Christian Fathers, especially by Origen, whilst by others it was sternly repudiated. 4 Some such notion seems to have been in the mind of Wordsworth when he wrote his splendid ode, entitled, " Intimations of Immortality from recollections of early childhood." 5 Strange to say, this notion has been of late revived in theology by some who imagine it helps to account for the fact
1 " Eaedem materioe apud hsercticos et pliilosophos volutantur, iidem retractatus implicantur: Unde malum et quare? " Tertullian, De Prcescr. Hceret., C. 7. vripl TOU vi>}.tj6pvXXvirou VKpot, Romans 7:1-25$ etiptffiturons & TV par as, rou Uofov xetxia.
Euseb. Hist. Eccl., v. 27. Comp. also Epiplian. Hcvr., xxiv. 6.
2 See Plato’s Phcedo, c. 18, p. 73 A; Meno, p. 81 B; PJwedrw, p.
2-19 C; cf. Cicero, Tu.sc. Qucest., i. 24.
3 Diog. Laert., 1. viii. c. 4; Tkeodoret, Epitom. Div. Decret., 1. 9, p. 272, quoted by Suicer, Thes. Ecdes., s.v. -^v^x.
4 Epiphan., Hceres., Ixiv.; Photius, Epist., i. p. 11, etc.; Cyrill. Alex., In Johan., \. i. c. 9; comp. Davis’s note to Cicero, Tusc. Qu., i. 24.
5 See ante, p. 176. of original sin. It is a hypothesis, however, wholly imaginary; it rests upon no evidence of any kind; and as related to the question of the origin of evil, it is wholly worthless; for even were we to admit it, it merely "removes," as Stewart remarks, "the difficulty a little out of sight, without affording any explanation of it." To the question, Whence is evil? it is no answer to say, It came with man from a previous state of being; for this only provokes the inquiry, How came it into that previous state of being?
(i.) The Dualistic hypothesis is the earliest of which we have any knowledge, and it is that which, we may say, would most naturally occur to those who, without the knowledge of the one living and true God, sought to follow up the sequence of good and evil in the universe to a primal source.
1. The oldest form in which this hypothesis appears is that of Zoroastrianism, of which the more recent Parseeism is a product. In the Zend-Avesta, which, if not the production of Zoroaster himself, is the authentic record of his teachings, and is of great antiquity, it is taught that infinite, boundless Time, of the origin of which no wise man inquires, brought forth fire and water, from the union of which came Ormuzd (the Oromasdes of the Greek writers), the luminous, pure, fragrant, the lover of all good, and capable of all good. As he looked into the abyss, he saw at a vast distance Ahriman (the Arimanes of the Greeks), black, impure, of evil savour, and wicked. Ormuzd, startled by the sight of this terrible foe, set himself to endeavour his removal, considered how this might be accomplished, and gave himself to this work. Thus arose conflict between the two, between the supremely good and the supremely evil principle, between light and darkness, of which the universe is the theatre. This conflict, the idea of which is the general formula of the universe, is symbolized in the natural world by the succession of day and night, which dispute the empire of Time, and alternately put each other to flight. Man also is the subject of this conflict. From Ormuzd he has received a soul, understanding, judg ment, the principle of sensation, and the five senses. 1 From Ahriman come to men lust, want, envy, hatred, defilement, falsehood, and wrath. Thus it is that there is evil in the 1 Anquetil du Perron-, Zend-Avesta, Paris, 1771. world, and that the evil constantly strives against the good.
Whatever else may be said of this speculation, it must, as an attempt to explain the origin of evil, be pronounced wholly inadequate. For whilst, on the one hand, it starts from the assumption of a primal unity as the source of good, it, on the other, leaves the origin of the evil principle immersed in obscurity. If Ahura Mazda, the Eternal Time, produced Ormuzd, how or by whom was Ahriman produced? As to this opinions differ among the Parsees. Some say that Time produced Ahriman in order that Ormuzd might know that it is omnipotent; others say Time produced both Ormuzd and Ahriman, that the bad might be mingled with the good, and diversified things be produced; others, that Time did not produce Ahriman, though able to do this had it so pleased; and others, that Ahriman is a fallen angel, cursed because of disobedience. 1 These, it will be seen, are not answers to the question, Whence is evil? but rather mere evasions of it. The whole remains in darkness, unless it be said that the primal unity, Infinite Time, produced the evil as well as the good.
2. Among the Greeks the Dualistic Hypothesis assumed a different form. Whilst they held the existence of an eternal deity (TO Oeiov), they also taught that there is an eternal matter (vj), the material cause of things. This Hyle they "represented under various images as the darkness that exists along with the light; as the void (rceva)fj,a, xevov) in opposition to the fulness of the divine life; as the shadow that accom panies the light; as the chaos, the stagnant, dead water." This Hyle is thus essentially evil; and as it has acquired a sort of life and energy, there has arisen an active opposition to the godlike, and hence, as products of the Hyle, all evil things and beings have come into existence. This hypothesis may be regarded as in a way accounting for the origin of evil; but it rests on a basis which is purely imaginary, the existence of an eternal Hyle being assumed without a shadow of evi dence. It may be therefore relegated to that limbo where rest so many idle fancies with which speculative thinkers have 1 Vullers, Frar/mente ub. die Religion des Zoroasters, p. 50.
2 Neander, Hint, of the Church, vol. ii. p. 13, Eng. Tr. amused or deceived themselves when seeking to account for what lies beyond the bounds of human knowledge. This Hyleistic hypothesis was revived among the Gnostics, by certain of whom it was mixed up with and modified by opinions and notions borrowed from Christian sources. Such was the doctrine taught by Basilides and Valentinus and their followers. Others among the Gnostics adopted the Persian hypothesis, " a doctrine," as Neander remarks, "which it would be natural, especially for those Gnostic sects which originated in Syria, to appropriate to themselves." Of these sects, that best known is that of the Maniclueaiis, so called from their founder, Manes or Manis, a Persian sage, who, falling under the displeasure of the Magi, was persecuted by them and obliged to flee, and who, alienated from the tenets which they favoured, sought, by combining Christianity with the unquali fied dualism of the ancient Parsee faith, to construct a religious system that should satisfy human reason and account for the facts of the world. Of this system the following account given by Gieseler:
" His system of religion rests on the assumption of two everlasting kingdoms coexisting and bordering on each other, the kingdom of light and the kingdom of darkness, the former under the dominion of God, the latter under the demon, or Hyle. After the borders had been broken through by a war between the two kingdoms, and the material of light had been mixed with the material of darkness, God caused the world to be formed by the living spirit (&v irvev^a, spiritus vivcns) out of this mixed material, in order that by degrees the material of light here captured (anima and Jesus patibilis) might be again separated, and the old boundaries restored. Two exalted natures of light, Christ (whom Mani calls in preference dextm luminis, TOV aiSiov <a>T V o<? ino?, etc.) and the Holy Spirit, the former dwelling in the sun and moon (naves), the latter in the air, conduct this process of bringing back the material of light, while the demon and the evil spirits, fettered to the stars, endeavour to hinder them. In every man there dwells an evil soul besides the soul of light; and it is his commission to secure to the latter the sway over the former, to unite with it as many as possible of the elements of light which are scattered in nature, especially in certain plants, and thus to free it from the fetters of the evil principle, and prepare the way for its return to the kingdom of light." 1 This curious compound of Oriental theosophy with Christian ideas found many to accept it, though it was vehemently opposed by the Catholic Church and the most eminent of the Christian Fathers. In the early part of his career it was espoused by Augustine; but he soon after renounced it, and became one of its most determined, as he was one of its ablest, opponents. After having apparently died out, it suddenly sprang up again in the East in the 12th century, in the sect of the Paulicians, and rapidly spread through many parts of Europe. " It was soon discovered," says Gibbon, " that many thousand Catholics of rank, and of either sex, had embraced the Manichaean heresy, and the flames which consumed twelve canons of Orleans was the first act and signal of persecution." 2 This was followed by many other such acts, directed chiefly against the Albigenses in the south of France, who united with the Paulicians in their opposition to Home, and in their attachment to a simpler polity and a purer worship than that which Rome upheld, though to what extent they had embraced the peculiar doctrine of Manichaeism does not clearly appear.
Strange to say, this doctrine found favour with a philosopher of our own age. Writing of his father, Mr. John Stuart Mill says, " He found it impossible to believe that a world so full of evil was the work of an author combining infinite power with perfect goodness and righteousness, and he was not dis inclined to the Sabaean and Manichsean theory of a good and an evil principle struggling against each other for the govern ment of the universe." " In this system it is evident that the Christian elements are wholly subordinated to the old Pagan hypothesis of an eternal good and an eternal evil principle; it is simply a reproduction of the Zoroastrian doctrine, and is exposed to the same censure
1 Compendium of Eccles. Hist. , translated "by Davidson, vol. 1. p. 224, Clark s Series. A very fiill account of the Manichsean system is given by Meander, Gen. Ch. Hist., vol. ii. p. 157 ff., Torrey’s translation. He describes it as a " Buddhist-Zoroastrian-Christian system." See also Bayle, Dictionnaire, arts.
Manichee and Paulicien.
2 Decline and Fall, vol. x. p. 177, Milman’s edition.
3 Autobiography t by J. S. Mill. which the all but unanimous judgment of mankind has pro nounced upon it.
(ii.) Turning now to the Monoistic hypothesis, we shall at once dismiss, as not deserving consideration, the Pagan doctrine that the one infinite and eternal God is the author of evil as well as good. 1 Such a doctrine not only contradicts all the laws and facts of man’s moral consciousness, but is in fact suicidal; for if God be the author of evil as well as of good, there must be a duplicity in His essence, or He must be liable to change, and in either case He ceases to be eternal and infinite. There can be no just conception of God which does not regard Him in relation to evil as simply permitting it, not causing or originating it. But assuming that God simply permits evil, the question remains, Whence did it originate? and with this comes up another question, How is it that evil has been permitted by God? To the first of these questions an answer has been given which has come down from Plato, through St. Augustine, Leibnitz, 2 and others to our own time. This answer founds upon the position that evil is not something positive, but something negative, and arises from a negative cause, viz. the necessary limitation and imperfection of the creature.
" Where shall we find the source of evil? " says Leibnitz.
" The answer is, It must be sought in the ideal nature of the creature in as far as that nature is shut up in the eternal verities which are in the understanding of God, independent of His will. It must be considered that there is an original imperfection in the creature previous to sin, because the creature is limited essentially; whence it comes that it cannot know all, and that it can be deceived and commit other faults." In later times one of the ablest expounders and defenders of this theory was Dr. Edward Williams, theological professor in liotherharn College. It is set forth by him in his Essay on Equity and Sovereignty, and also in his notes to Edwards On
" Pagan i bona et mala, tetra et splendida, pcrpetua et caduca, mutabilia et evta, corporalia et divina unum habere principium dogmati/aiit." Augustin, Contr. Faunt. 1:20:100:3.
2 See Cudworth, Intell. Syxt., vol. 1. p. 448 ff., Harrison’s ed.; Augustin, De, Civitate Dei; Leibnitz, Theodicee, 1:20, etc. the Will, in the edition of Edwards Works edited by him and the Eev. Ed. Parsons. 1 From the latter source I borrow a statement of his view as to the origin of evil. " The entrance of sin into the world, or the true and precise origin of moral evil, may be found in two causes united, the one positive, the other negative, but neither of which is morally good or morally evil. If the cause were morally -good, the effect could not be morally bad; and if morally evil, it would be contrary to the third axiom [that the origin of moral evil cannot be moral evil, which would make a thing the cause of itself] and to common sense. These two causes are, first, liberty a cause naturally good; secondly, passive power a cause naturally evil. And these two causes are as necessary for the production of moral evil as two parents for the produc tion of a human being according to the laws of nature." On this it is obvious to remark that one does not see how liberty, which is merely freedom to act, can be properly regarded as a cause. Without liberty, it is true, there can be no action and no effect; but the liberty merely furnishes the opportunity or sphere of action: it is in no sense a cause from which the effect flows. The sole cause, then, of moral evil is, according to this theory, what Dr. Williams calls passive power; and this he defines to be " that natural defect which exists in a created nature as a contrast to the natural (not the moral) perfections of God " (p. 249). It thus appears that his theory is substantially the same as that of Leibnitz.
Dr. Wardlaw has devoted one of his lectures to an examina tion of Dr. Williams theory; 2 and to this I refer you for a full discussion of the question. I content myself here with remarking on this hypothesis generally: 1. That it seems utterly incongruous to suppose that a cause which is not itself moral should produce a moral result. According to the hypothesis what Williams calls " passive power," and Leibnitz " original imperfection in the creature," is a purely natural power having no moral quality whatever. By what possi bility then, we may ask, can it of necessity produce in a creature not already evil a bad moral effect? As Dr. Wardlaw has observed, " If there be no unholiness and no guilt but what is the result of choice, it is anything but self 1 Vol. 1. p. 398 ff. - Theoloyy, vol. ii. p. 93. evident tliat what is good (without any evil tendency) should necessarily prefer evil; what is holy, sin; what is innocent, guilt." 2. In this hypothesis it is assumed that defect in the creature necessarily leads to evil. But if by defect is meant faultiness or vitiosity, the proposition that there is evil in the universe because of defect in the creature, becomes a purely identical one, tantamount to the assertion that there is evil because there is evil. If, on the other hand, by defect is meant mere limitation, then the assertion simply affirms that the creature is potentially evil; it in no way explains how that potentiality becomes an actuality, which is the real question at issue. The creature because of limited powers may be liable to sin; but it by no means follows from this he must of necessity sin. 3. On this hypothesis it seems impossible either to vindicate the divine equity or to maintain the moral responsibility of the creature. For the creature, being created by God, is as God has made him. But if God has made him so that he cannot but fall into evil if left to himself, how can the creature be held justly responsible for obeying this necessary tendency, or how can God be said to deal equitably if He first make a creature with a rational and necessary tendency to evil, and then treat him as guilty and punishable if he yield to this tendency? Dr. Williams has struggled hard to get over this objection and difficulty, but, as Wardlaw has, I think, conclusively shown, without success.
(iii.) In setting aside this hypothesis, we set aside the only one for which any show of reason can be adduced. We are therefore reduced to the necessity of admitting that the question, How came evil into the world? is by us insoluble.
All we can say is that evil exists, and that God, for purposes known to Himself, permitted it somehow to enter His universe. That this conclusion is burdened with serious difficulties it would be vain to deny. The question cannot but rise up in the mind, Why has God permitted evil if He is not the Author of it? The Epicureans of old propounded this dilemma :
"Aut non vult, aut non potest tollere malum." Evil is here either because God does riot will to remove it or because He is impotent to remove it; and men may say the same as to His permitting it to originate. In either case we lose the true thought of God. If He has willed evil to exist, how can He be good and holy? If He was unable to prevent it, how can He be omnipotent? This is a difficulty which human reason is unable to remove; nor does the Bible help us here by any of its revelations. The Bible, however, fully authorizes the only positive con clusions to which we can come on this dark subject. It certifies us that God is not the author of evil in any sense; that though able to prevent it, He has nevertheless permitted it to exist; and that though He has permitted it to exist, He neither directly wills it, nor regards it otherwise than with abhorrence. It is true we meet in the Bible with such utterances as, " Shall there be evil in the city, and the Lord hath not done it? " (Amos 3:6). " I am the Lord, and there is none else. I form light, and create darkness; I make peace, and create evil: I, the Lord, do all these things " (Isaiah 45:7); and there are some who lay hold on these, and are bold to affirm that " the older prophets and prophetic historians had not hesitated to derive even evil, moral evil not excepted, from Jahveh." l But in the Bible God is often said to do what He only permits to be done, or what comes to pass through His providential arrangements; and such statements as those above quoted are to be interpreted in accordance with the general teaching of Scripture, which invariably sets forth that though it is by God’s will that evil is permitted, the evil itself is ever what is wholly unauthorized by Him, and wholly opposed to Him. He permits evil to exist, and He makes use of the evil that exists to accomplish His own purposes; but the evil does not originate with Him, and He ever regards it with abhorrence. From the Bible also we learn that the evil permitted in the universe is not only less than the good directly willed by God, but is characterized as something intrusive and transitory, while the good is real, fundamental, and permanent. Further, the Bible assures us that in permitting evil God has not left it uncontrolled or at the disposal of any evil power, but ever holds it in His own power, and will make it subservient to His purposes, so that ultimately a larger amount of good will be evolved than if 1 Kucnen, Religion of Israel, 3:40, E. Tr. evil had not been permitted. In fine, we may rest assured that what is perplexing to us in the existence of evil arises out of the limitation of our faculties and imperfection of our knowledge; and that, as in the natural world many phenomena which to the untutored mind appear anomalous and inexplicable are by the philosophers seen to be in accordance with law and with the order of the universe, so the phenomenon of evil, which to us is so full of difficulty, may by higher intelligences must by the Highest be seen to be in full accordance with the noblest order and the purest rectitude. " If it be asked," says Dr. Eeid, 1 " Why does God permit so much sin in His creation? I confess I cannot answer the question, but must lay my hand upon my mouth. He giveth no account of His conduct to the children of men. It is our part to obey His commands, and not to say unto Him, Why dost Thou thus? " " Great," says Lord Brougham, 2 " as have been our achievements in physical astronomy, we are as yet wholly unable to understand why a power pervades the system acting inversely as the square of the distance from the point to which it attracts, rather than a power acting according to any other law; arid why it has been the pleasure of the Almighty Architect of that universe that the orbits of the planets should be nearly circular instead of approaching to or being exactly the same with many other trajectories of a nearly similar form, though of other properties; nay, instead of being curves of a wholly different class and shape. Yet we never doubt that there was a reason for this choice; nay, we fancy it possible that even on earth we may hereafter understand it more clearly than we now do; and never question that in another state of being we may be permitted to enjoy the con templation of it. Why should we doubt that, at least in that higher state, we may also be enabled to perceive such an arrangement as shall make evil wholly disappear from our present system, by showing us that it was necessary and inevitable even in the works of the Deity; or, which is the same thing, that its existence conduces to such a degree of perfection and happiness upon the whole as could not even by omnipotence be secured without it; or, which is also the same 1 Essays on the Active Powers, Ess. iv. ch. xi. "Works by Hamilton, p. 634.
" Dissertations appended to Paley’s Natural Theology, vol. ii. p. 73. thing, that the whole creation as it exists, taking both worlds together, is perfect, and incapable of being in any particular changed without being made worse and less perfect? "