12 Of Believing

OF BELIEVING.

CHAPPER XII. 

FAITH is the name of a mental exercise. It is so employed, sometimes, in what may be designated an untrue, a true, and in an incomplete, and a complete sense. In the untrue sense a man is sometimes said to believe something that he merely desires, the wish begetting the thought. Sometimes, on a balance of probabilities in his mind, he is said to believe what he thinks to be likely relative to anything past, present, or future. At other times he is regarded as believing what he does not positively disbelieve. Perhaps the most pernicious example of what we are calling the untrue use of this word is the most widely extended, and it certainly is not employed about anything else of equal importance. We allude to the fact, everywhere to be observed, of persons taking the truth of the gospel for granted, while they remain utterly ignorant of its most elementary principles, and, consequently, exercise no trust at all in its testimonies, or a blind one only, and suppose that this is believing. In any one of the cases mentioned there is, indeed, no faith at all, in any true sense. But the word may be used in what may be termed a true, although it be only in a more or less incomplete sense. As when a man is said to believe things of common credit, although he may have no concern in them, nor may interest himself at all about them. Or as when he is said to believe some testimony about something which does concern such as he is, though he himself never takes any interest in the matter. For it seems certain that a man may most confidently believe the truth of a testimony of fact, of a threatening, and of a promise to such as he is, and that he may still pay no practical regard to the counsel of the first, nor heed the danger of the second, nor care for the good of the third. Now just as unbelieving may be most truly predicated when more or less complete ; so, in calling these and similar exercises believing, as we truly may, we yet do so only as in a very imperfect sense. Perhaps one of the most subtle delusions associated with the use of this word in a true, but incomplete, sense, is that which arises from an acceptance of testimony upon the decision of the judgment, after evidence has been investigated and weighed by the understanding. A testimony of the gospel, or the gospel itself, is laid before the mind. On this the understanding is brought to bear. Evidence of the truth is taken and examined. On the completion of the examination the Judgment decisively gives a favourable verdict, and on this decision the man is said to believe the testimony. So he, very truly, does believe; but it will be a ruinous mistake if he concludes that, therefore, he is a believer in the complete sense of the word. Properly, complete belief follows upon this reception of testimony. "" We have known and believed," says the apostle John.1 John 4:16. This intelligent reception of the testimony of the gospel, unconnected with any further believing action, is what we designate incomplete faith. The gospel is intelligently received as so much testimony of fact and truth, but nothing further. No important persuasion, in this case, is conveyed in the testimony of fact and truth, and no procedure of trust follows. The mind is possessed of a new and assured fact and truth, and that is all. Thus, as we hold, belief may be true so far as it extends, when it may yet be very incomplete. He that believes the gospel is true may very truly believe; but if he proceeds no further, his belief will be very incomplete. In its complete sense, faith will be the name of a complex mental exercise embracing belief and trust with a view to advantage. If, therefore, a man believes in this sense a simple testimony of fact that concerns him, he will act in a manner corresponding with the instruction which the truth of this affords him. If in pursuing any particular line of action he believes a threatening stands against him, he will alter his conduct accordingly. If lie believes a promise made to him, he will desire and aim to become possessed of the promised good. But where the exercise of faith is found in its complete sense, there also will be found certain requisite conditions. There will be, for instance, a testimony of some kind to be believed, and this will bring with it, or bear in itself, evidence of its truth. That is, there will be some scheme of faith revealed, containing provisions of good, concerning which testimony will be made with sufficient evidence to justify and encourage belief. Moreover, the testimony to be believed, whatever may be its specific character, will relate to him that believes; he, too, will apprehend this relation, and will understand that the matter concerns him; for it is clear that, where these conditions are wanting, no man can have any sufficient warrant to exercise a trust in any testimony with reference to himself. Another thing will be a consciousness of a need of the good of the testimony to be believed. For as it is certain that every scheme of faith will be remedial in its provisions, and that what is to be believed according thereto will be to meet a necessity ; so also it is equally certain that it will be an essential element of belief to be able to appreciate the good provided and made known by the testimony. By these we are conducted to a fourth particular, namely, that every exercise of faith, therefore, will be an act of trust with a view to advantage. The whole may be put thus; " With the heart man believeth unto (eis, in order to, with a view to,) righteousness," or to some other good, of which he is conscious that he is in need, the provision of which he understands has been made, and made, as he learns from testimony, for such as he is. These conditions are essential to the exercise of faith in the true and complete sense. For if a man speaks of believing without having a positive testimony to believe, he is ignorantly practicing an illusion on himself. If what he is said to believe bears no relation to him, according to testimony, he is presuming rather than believing. If he has no consciousness of need of the good of the testimony that he is said to believe, lie fails to understand a first requisite to believing, and is as the fool with a price in his hand to get wisdom who has no heart to it. If he has no view of, and exercises no trust in order to, a promised advantage, he fails to appreciate the scheme of faith, and his belief is a mere empty conceit. Although he may have a creed, and this be of unimpeachable orthodoxy, and though he may repeat its terms ever so devoutly and frequently, he never believes in the complete sense. Not only because he is not a disbeliever is he therefore not a believer, but his mind may be in a state of non-belief although it be not in that of disbelief; and, whether ignorantly or intelligently, simply crediting the truth of a testimony is not faith in the complete sense, and will never constitute him a believer in the full meaning of the word. Many entertain no sentiment or thought of disbelief about the testimony concerning Christ in the Scriptures; yea, there are, it may be, not a few that would repel in the most scornful terms, and be prepared to disprove by cogent arguments, anything that might be advanced against the credit of the truth of the Word concerning Christ, although they themselves never dreamed of exerting any trust in him. Altogether persuaded these are, and that intelligently, of the verity of the testimony of Christ, yet have they none the more ever at any time committed anything to him. Herein all such are broadly distinguished from Paul,2 Timothy 1:12, and all other believers, in the full sense of the word, and this distinction arises out of a radical difference of state.

We are now brought to a question of considerable importance and some difficulty; namely, whether there are different kinds of faith. This question is strongly affirmed and denied. So far as our observation has extended, no one has more elaborately discussed this question, nor more strongly defended the negative side of it, than the late Mr. Binney, in his Discourses on the Practical Power of Faith. Reduced to a sentence his whole argument would stand thus: As the nature of the testimony of the gospel is God’s promise and provision of mercy for man, or the conveying to him assurances of good through the medium of intelligible facts; and as faith, all faith, is the simple reception of testimony as what it is, or according to its nature; so, therefore, every man that believes the gospel must necessarily believe it to be God’s promise and provision of mercy to him. If there are any, therefore, who are said to believe the gospel, but who at the same time do not feel such impressions, nor experience such consequences, as correspond with the receiving a testimony of such a nature, " such persons," he says, " properly speaking, have no belief at all. Not because they believe nothing, but because they believe not that which God intended they should." Respecting the objections that might be raised against this view in reference to un-fallen and fallen angels; these, he says, believe the gospel as what it is to them, namely, a testimony of mercy to man ; and they are impressed by their belief in a manner corresponding to their several states. Respecting the faith of a sinner and the faith of a saint; these, he says, are one and the same in nature, and differ only in extent. Respecting those who are said to assent to the gospel and systematically to understand it, those to whom it comes in word only, and who, if they do not deny, do not experience the power of it; these, he says, merely believe the proposition, "the gospel is true," while others, those to whom it comes in power, believe the truths of the gospel. Both, he says, have faith in the true meaning of the term, as the reception of what is really before the mind ; but that which is so is infinitely different in each; and hence the difference in their character and state. This is, and mostly in his own words, a concise representation of Mr. Binney’s argument; and, though brief, it comprehends everything in it that is material. No careful reader can fail to observe that Mr. Binney begins his argument with a radically faulty proposition. He says that the gospel is God’s promise and provision of mercy for man; meaning, without doubt, for the race indiscriminately. This is a fundamental error. As a testimony of fact and truth, the gospel is to be proclaimed the world over, without discrimination of nations or individuals; but the promises and provisions of the gospel are for persons that are everywhere and always, either in direct terms, or by plain and necessary implication, distinctly discriminated. Can the promise and provision of mercy be for the race when God says with a solemn distinctness in so many words, “I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy"? The testimony of the gospel is just "The record (testimony) that God gave (testified) of his Son. Substantially, this is all contained in the instructions which the angel of the Lord gave to Joseph about the name which he was to give to the Child of his espoused wife ; namely, "Thou shalt call his name Jesus ; for he shall save his people from their sins."Matthew 1:21. Every testimony of the gospel, concerning the Son of God is in conformity with this. This defines the extent of the Saviour’s relation, of his responsibility, the object of his advent, and the work which was given him to do and which he perfected. He is the Head of the church. He loved the church, and gave himself for it. He laid down his life for the sheep. He prayed for his disciples; and in doing so he made a solemn distinction between them and the world. Is there, then, any promise or provision of mercy in Christ beyond what is indicated in these and similar testimonies of his relation, responsibility, and work? If not, how then can the testimony of the gospel be a provision and promise of mercy to man indiscriminately? And how, indiscriminately, can men believe the testimony of the gospel to be a provision and promise of mercy to them? As no ingenuity of man can frame an unlimited saving result from the mediation of Christ; so, no man, whose mind is obedient to the truth concerning this great business, can find in the testimony that God has testified of his Son, an unlimited promise and provision of mercy; and he will be a very daring man that shall be bold enough to affirm that the accomplishment of salvation will not be commensurate with the purpose. The testimony of the gospel is a proclamation of intelligible facts and truths to all men indiscriminately; to some men only, who are distinctly discriminated, it is a promise and provision of mercy. The other leading proposition of Mr. Binney’s argument is open to much objection. He, in effect, says, that it is not "metaphysically just" to affirm that a man believes a testimony at all, if he fails to assimilate the object of his belief and act accordingly. Perhaps, among beings whose moral rectitude is unimpaired, we should always and uniformly find what is " metaphysically just" undisturbed by what has been called "the logic of facts;" but it is more than questionable whether we shall find this due order and sequence of things among fallen intelligences. Satan, Mr. Binney allows, is a true believer; but it would seem that, whatever he may feel from his belief, he very often does not act in a corresponding manner. The supposition that men always assimilate what they know and believe, and that they act correspondingly, is to give them a credit which no one of them that is sensible will take ; and to affirm that they do not believe at all such and such things because they do not always assimilate what they are said to believe, and to act correspondingly thereon, is to deny the plainest facts; and if this denial were carried to its legitimate consequences in cases of wrong-doing, it would go far to eliminate criminality from transgression. But men, and these none of the worst, are sometimes found confessing errors, which they cannot palliate by any consideration of ignorance or disbelief, in the well-known words, " I see the better, and I approve; I follow the worse :" and one of the most distinguished believers in Christ has said, "For that which I do I allow not ; for what I would, that I do not; but what I hate, that do I." Facts put the question beyond doubt that a man may be most certainly persuaded of a truth which he, nevertheless, may fail to assimilate, and may practically disregard. Who has not most certainly believed a testimony of instruction, of threatening, and of promise, that he has not, severally, not followed, not dared, not despised ? Shall it be said of a man that be did not at all believe the instruction, because he did not follow it ? Or the threatening, because he dared it? Or the promise, because lie despised it? Human corruption and weakness will account for the certain belief of many most important facts and truths which, nevertheless, may not be assimilated, and may be practically disregarded. Shall it he said of every man who sins that he disbelieves the threatening of the law? Is it because a man disbelieves that the wages of sin is death that he is not deterred from sinning? On the other hand, shall it be affirmed of every man who is said to believe the testimony God has testified of his Son, if he fails to assimilate what he believes, that he makes God a liar ? So monstrous a notion can surely find no acceptance in a same mind. It is more than admitted that belief, when complete, assimilates its object and induces a corresponding action; but if any one is pleased, in a case of what we call incomplete belief, to institute distinctions between belief and conviction, and to affirm that faith, in the incomplete sense, is not faith at all, we are content to leave hint to his disquisitionary wire-drawing. If any one is pleased to say that it is " metaphysically just " to affirm that a man does not believe at all what he does not in believing assimilate and act on, we appeal from metaphysics to facts.

Starting with the utterly unsound proposition that the gospel is a promise of mercy to man indefinitely, and the consequent mistake that every man ought to believe this promise for himself, Mr. Binney arrived at the conclusion that, as all faith is the reception of testimony as what it is, if a man does not believe the gospel as a promise of mercy to himself, he does not believe it at all. Consequently, according to him, there are not among men different kinds of belief of the gospel. For though he admits, that there are some men who systematically understand and assent to the truths of the gospel, and that these have faith in a true sense, he nevertheless denies that they believe the gospel, because they believe not that, as lie says, which God intended they should, and which they ought to believe. We, on the other hand, say, that the gospel is the testimony which God has testified of his Son; that this is a testimony of fact and truth concerning the Son of God to all men; that every man into whose hands the Scriptures may come is obliged to believe it as such; and that such belief is, to this extent, as truly a believing the gospel as was Agrippa’s believing the prophets. That, beyond this, the gospel is a promise of mercy to some men; that these are distinctly discriminated in direct terms in connection with, or by clear implication in, the promise made; that these are the only persons that are either able or entitled to believe the gospel as such; and that this belief only is that which is associated with, and issues in, salvation. Consequently, we say that the gospel forms two distinct objects of belief; and, further, that there are two distinct classes of believers, whose beliefs of the gospel are, and must be, as different from each other, as is the gospel severally to them, and as are the state and character of those that believe.

Substantially, Mr. Fuller had before advanced the same contradictory doctrine. He spoke of faith in the proper and improper sense, and designated the latter conviction. “It is true," he said, ’’this conviction is called believing; but it is only in an improper sense." That is, as he contended, in a sense in which there is, actually, no believing at all. But is not conviction an element of belief? Can a man be convinced that a testimony of fact is true without a corresponding belief? It is readily granted that a man may be convinced that a given testimony of fact is true without taking any procedure corresponding with his conviction; but can the mind be convinced that a testimony is true without believing it to be true? Does it not seem that, as a plain thoughtful man long ago said, to apply this reasoning to those passages of the word where some are said to believe in this sense, is to contradict the Scriptures rather than to expound them? It is more than granted that, in the complete sense of believing, there is a complex exercise of the mind; but may there not be, nevertheless, simple exercises of faith. For in stance, it is " A faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptation, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners." May not this word be accepted as a simple testimony of fact without being received as conveying an important truth to him who accepts it? Shall it be said that those who do receive this word as a testimony of fact, without any second element, do not believe it at all? Mr. Fuller would affirm this; but it ought to be known that he had a favorite opinion to serve, and it is unknown how far, when under the potent influence of a pet theory, any good man’s mind may be led astray. Only let it be granted that there is but one kind of faith, and taken as proved that all who have got the testimony of God in their hands ought to believe it, and the opinion that it is the duty of all men, universally, so circumstanced, to believe in Christ unto salvation-the fondly cherished notion of Mr. Fuller will be established at a stroke. But the establishment of this opinion about human duty would annihilate the principle of grace, and annul the law of faith in the salvation of sinners-so far, at least, as believing is concerned in it. Can anything more decisively prove the unsoundness of the opinion?