CHAPTER VI: § THE FRUIT OF THE MORAL LIFE AS MORAL END.

THE MORAL ACTIVITY, § 89.

SUBDIVISION FIRST: THE MORAL ACTIVITY per se IN ITS INNER DIFFERENCES,
§ 99
180

I. MORAL SPARING, § 100
182
II. MORAL APPROPRIATING, § 101
186

(a) IN RESPECT TO WHAT ELEMENT OF THE OBJECT IS APPROPRIATED, § l01 186

§ 102. (1) NATURAL APPROPRIATING
187
§ 103. (2) SPIRITUAL APPROPRIATING
190

(b) IN RESPECT TO HOW THE OBJECT IS APPROPRIATED, § 104 191

(1) GENERAL (UNIVERSAL) APPROPRIATING, COGNIZING, § 104. 192

(2) PARTICULAR (INDIVIDUAL) APPROPRIATING, ENJOYING, § 105 194

III. MORAL FORMING, § 106
198

(a) IN RESPECT TO WHAT ELEMENT OF THE OBJECT IS FORMED, § 107 200

§ 107. (1) NATURAL FORMING
200
§ 108. (2) SPIRITUAL FORMING
201
(b) IN RESPECT TO HOW THE OBJECT IS FORMED, § 109
203
§ 109. (1) PARTICULAR FORMING
203
§ 110. (2) GENERAL FORMING, ARTISTIC ACTIVITY
205

§§ 111, 112. APPROPRIATING AND FORMING AS MORALLY RELATED TO EACH OTHER 210-212

SUBDIVISION SECOND: THE MORAL ACTIVITY IN RELATION TO ITS DIFFERENCES AS RELATING TO ITS DIFFERENT OBJECTS:

I. IN RELATION TO GOD, § 113
214

(a) THE MORAL APPROPRIATING OF GOD, FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE, § 113 214

§§ 114-117. PRAYER AND SACRIFICE
218-221
(b) THE MORAL SPARING OF THE DIVINE, § 118
232

II. IN RELATION TO THE MORAL PERSON HIMSELF, § 119 236

(a) MORAL SPARING, § 119
236
(b) MORAL APPROPRIATING AND FORMING, § 120
237
§§ 120, 121. (1) OF THE BODY BY THE SPIRIT
238-242
§ 122. (2) OF THE SPIRIT ITSELF
247
III. IN RELATION TO OTHER PERSONS, § 123
252
(a) MORAL SPARING, § 123
252
(b) MORAL APPROPRIATING AND FORMING, §§ 124-126
254-262
IV. IN RELATION TO OBJECTIVE NATURE, § 127
264
(a) MORAL SPARING, § 127
261
(b) MORAL APPROPRIATING.
§ 128. (1) SPIRITUAL
266
§ 129. (2) ACTUAL
267
(c) MORAL FORMING, § 130
271
§ THE FRUIT OF THE MORAL LIFE AS MORAL END.
§ 131. GOOD
274
§ 132. THE HIGHEST GOOD
275

I. THE PERSONAL PERFECTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL, § 133 277

(a) OUTWARD POSSESSIONS, § 134
270
(b) INNER POSSESSIONS, § 135
280
§ 135. (1) WISDOM
280
§ 136. (2) BLISS
283
§ 137. (3) HOLY CHARACTER
284
(c) THE GOOD AS POWER, § 138
289
§ 138. VIRTUE
289
§ 139. THE VIRTUES
291
§ 140. THE PIETY-VIRTUES
297

II. MORAL COMMUNION AS A FRUIT OF THE MORAL LIFE, § 141 302

(a) THE FAMILY, § 142
304
§ 142. SEXUAL COMMUNION
304
§§ 143. 144. MARRIAGE
304-306
§ 145. PARENTS AND CHILDREN
313
§ 146. BROTHERS AND SISTERS, AND FRIENDS
318
§ 147. BLOOD-RELATIONSHIP AS BEARING ON MARRIAGE
319
§ 148. FAMILY PROPERTY AND FAMILY HONOR
323
(b) MORAL SOCIETY, § 149
324
§ 150. HONOR, THE MORAL HOME
330
(c) THE MORAL ORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY, § 151
332
§ 151. RIGHT AND LAW
332

§ 152. CHURCH AND STATE, THEOCRACY 334 __________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________

CHRISTIAN ETHICS. __________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________

SECTION L.

THEOLOGICAL Christian ethics, as distinguished from philosophical ethics, has an historical presupposition--the redemption accomplished in Christ. But redemption presupposes sin, from the power of which it delivers man; and sin presupposes the moral idea per se, of which it is the actual negation. Hence the knowledge of Christian ethics, as resting on the accomplished redemption, presupposes a knowledge of the moral state of man while as yet unredeemed, as in turn this knowledge presupposes a knowledge of that ideal state of being from which man turned aside in sin. Christian ethics has therefore a threefold state of things to present:

(1) The ethical or moral per se irrespectively of sin,--the moral in its ideal form, the proto-ethical, that which God, as holy, wills.

(2) The fall from the truly moral, namely, sin, or the guilty perversion of the moral idea in the actual world,--that which man, as unholy, wills.

(3) The moral in its restoration by redemption, that is, the regeneration of moral truth out of sinful corruption,--that which is willed by God as gracious, and by man as repentant.

These three forms of the moral or ethical stand, in relation to humanity, not beside but before and after each other,--constitute a moral history of humanity: the first stage is pre-historical; the second is the substance of the history of humanity up to Christ; the third is the substance of that stream of history which proceeds from Christ and is embodied in, and carried forward by, those who belong to Christ.

As in Christianity all religious and moral life stands in relation to the redemption accomplished in Christ, that is, to an historical fact, hence Christian ethics must also, under one of its phases, bear an historical character. Man is Christianly-moral only in so far as he is conscious of being redeemed by Christ; hence in this Christianly-moral consciousness the above-stated three thoughts are directly involved. Only that one can know himself as redeemed who knows himself as sinful without redemption; and only he can know himself as sinful who has a consciousness of the moral ideal. The classification of ethics here presented is based therefore in the essence of Christian morality itself. The first division presents ideal morality as unaffected as yet by the reality of sin,--morality in the state of innocence; the second presents the actual morality of man as natural and spiritually-fallen,--morality in the state of sin; the third presents the Christian morality of man as rescued from sin by regeneration, and reconciled to and united with God,--morality in the state of grace. The first part is predominantly a steadily-progressive unfolding of the moral idea per se; the second belongs predominantly to historical experience; while the third, as a reconciling of reality with the ideal, belongs at the same time to both fields. The historical person of Christ is, for all three spheres of the moral, a revelation of the truth that is to be embraced; in relation to ideal morality Christ is the pure moral prototype per se--the historical realization of the moral idea; in relation to the moral state in the second sphere, he manifests the antagonism of sin to moral truth, in the hatred of which he is the object; in relation to the third sphere, he is the essentially founding and co-working power, and manifests the antagonism of holiness to sin.

To present distinctively-Christian morality alone would be scientifically defective, as, without the two antecedent forms of the moral, it cannot be properly understood. To present ideal morality alone is the task of purely philosophical ethics,--usually, however, instead of the proposed pretendedly ideal ethics, the result is simply an artfully disguised justification of the natural sinful nature of unredeemed man. The ideal morality of our first division is in itself fully sufficient only for such as do not admit an antagonism between the actual state of humanity and the requirements of the moral idea, or who explain it into a mere remaining-behind the subsequently to-be-attained perfection, instead of conceiving of it as an essentially perverted state. The fundamental thought of Christian morality is this, namely, that the natural man is not simply normally imperfect, but that he is, guiltily, in an essential antagonism to the truly good, and that he is in need of a thorough spiritual renewing or regeneration. That this is the case is not to be proved à priori, not to be developed scientifically, but to be recognized as a fact. With the reality of sin the moral life becomes essentially changed, and an ethical treatise which should make reference to sin only as a mere possibility, as is the case with purely philosophical ethics, would, for this reason, be insufficient for the actual state of humanity. The history of humanity has become in all respects other than it would have been without sin, and hence a complete system of ethics cannot have merely a purely philosophical, but must have also an historical character,--must grapple with the entire and dread earnestness of real sin. If it ended at this stage, however, it would present but a dismal panorama of woe, utterly unrelieved by a gleam of comfort. But divine love has interrupted the history of sin by an historical redemption-act, and founded a history of salvation inside of humanity,--has given to man the possibility and the power to overcome sin in himself, and to rise up from his God-estrangement toward the moral goal. This is the third sphere, that of distinctively Christian morality, which, while it has indeed its prototype in the ideal ante-sinful form of morality, is nevertheless not identical therewith, inasmuch as its actual presuppositions and conditions are entirely different,--namely, no longer a per se pure, and spiritually and morally vigorous, subject, and no longer a per se good, and, for all moral influences, open and receptive, objective world, but, on the contrary, in both cases an obstinate resistance; it is in both respects therefore a morality of incessant struggle, while that of our first division is rather the morality of a simple development;--it is also not a mere pressing forward out of an, as yet, incomplete and in so far, imperfect state, but a real overcoming of actual immoral powers; and the earnestness of the morality, as well as of the ethical system, rises in proportion as we more deeply comprehend the inner and essential difference between the above-given three divisions of the subject-matter of ethics, as well as at the same time their inner and historical connection.

This our distribution of the subject-matter of ethics, though manifestly very accordant with the Christian consciousness, has been assailed on many sides; and especially have some writers manifested great concern as to whence in fact we could have any knowledge of this ideal and strictly-speaking non-realized morality. Such an objection ought at least not to be urged by those who think themselves able to construct a system, even of Christian ethics, upon the mere facts of the consciousness, or indeed upon a basis purely speculative. But certainly all who conceive of sin as a something absolutely necessary, will of course have to regard our first division as a pure product of a dreamy imagination; we contest, however, to writers holding such an opinion; the right to deny to a system of Christian ethics--which is throughout inspired with the thought that sin is the ruin of men [Prov. xiv, 34] and an abomination to the Lord [xv, 9]--the privilege of treating upon and discussing that which God, as holy, requires of his good-created children. As to whether for such discussion we have also a source of knowledge, will appear as we proceed. __________________________________________________________________

PART FIRST.
THE MORAL PER SE IRRESPECTIVELY OF SIN.

Introductory Observations. __________________________________________________________________

I. NOTION AND ESSENCE OF THE MORAL. __________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________

SECTION LI. The Good.

THE moral idea rests upon that of purpose or end. An end is an idea to be realized by a life-movement. Whatever answers to an idea is good relatively to that idea. Whatever answers to, and perfectly realizes, a rational, and hence also a divine, idea, is good absolutely. All divine life and activity has a divine purpose; whatever God brings to realization is therefore absolutely good,--is in perfect harmony with the divine will.--A nature-object is good per se and directly, in virtue of the creative act itself; and whatever is implied in it, as an end to be attained to by development, is actually realized in fact by an inner divinely-willed necessity. The essence of a rational creature is per se likewise good; but its full realization as that of a truly rational being, that is, its rational end, is not directly forced upon it by natural necessity, but is proposed to it as to be realized by its own rational, and hence free, activity. The goodness of a merely natural being lies in the necessarily self-fulfilling purpose of God in the creature; that of a rational creature lies in the free, self-fulfilling, through it, of the will of God to the creature. The divine will is, in the latter case, not merely an end for God, it is also a conscious end for the rational creature. The good in general, in so far as it is a conscious end for a rational creature, is a (concrete) good. In as far as this good is unitary and perfect, and hence perfectly answering to the divine will as to the creature, it is the highest good,--which consequently must also be absolutely one and, for all rational creatures, essentially the same, namely, their fully attained rational perfection. Hence all rational development of a rational creature aims at the realization of the highest good.

As far back as in ancient Greece, philosophers have engaged in the discussion of the notion of the good, and of the highest good, and have proposed various definitions thereof,--those of Aristotle being in the main correct. In and of itself the question is quite simple; it becomes difficult only when we look upon the actual condition of man without fully taking into account the antagonism of his reality with his ideal, and are for that reason unable clearly to distinguish in human aspirations the abnormal from the normal. As to the notion of the relatively good, there is no dispute; it is always the. agreement of a reality with an idea or with another reality, and hence is based on the thought of a mutual congruity of the manifold.--The simple and true notion of the good is indicated in Gen. i, 3, 4, 31; [comp. 1 Tim. iv, 4]. God speaks and it comes to pass; the reality is the perfect expression of the divine thought and will, and hence, of its own ideal. We have here the notion, not merely of the relatively good, but of the absolutely good; relatively good is every harmonizing or congruence of the different; absolutely good is a harmonizing with God. Hence, first of all, God himself is good and the prototype of all good [Psa. xxv, 8; lxxxvi, 5; Matt. xix, 17],--good relatively to himself, as being in perfect harmony with himself,--good relatively to his creatures, in that He sustains them in the form of life which He gave them, that is, in their true peculiarities and autonomy, and constantly manifests himself to them as their loving God and Father [Psa. xxxiv, 9]. A creature is good in so far as it is an image of God,--namely, such a revelation of the divine as is conditioned by the normal peculiarity of the creature,--and, from another point of view, in so far as its actual state is in harmony with its essence, its ideal, and hence also (since all creatures are created for each other) with the totality of creation. Every thing that God created was "very good" also in this respect, namely, that the different creatures constituted among themselves a perfectly concordant and harmonious whole; "it was not good that the man should be alone," seeing that a finite creature is, in its very essence, not a mere isolated individual, but should constitute a member of a community. Hence the expression tvv has also the signification of kalos, gratus, jucundus, suavis; we attribute this quality to an object as bearing upon ourselves in so far as it harmonizes with and reflects our own peculiarities,--in so far as we feel an affinity for it and are enriched and furthered by it in our life-sphere and activity. Hence, that is truly good for man which contributes to the attainment of his true, divinely-intended perfection, and hence, in the last instance, this perfection itself. Now, a mere nature-object possesses the good within itself as a necessary law, and cannot but realize it; but a rational creature has it within itself as a rational consciousness, as a free law, as a command, and it may decline to realize it. In a nature-object the end fulfills itself; in a rational creature it is fulfilled only by the free will of the same. Nature-objects are, in and of themselves, an image of God; but man was created not only in accordance with the image of God, but also unto it,--has this image before him as a goal to be attained to by free action, as a rational task.

Whatever is good is good for some object, and is for the same, in so far as actually appropriated by it, a good. That only can be a true good which is good absolutely, that is, divine; all true goods are front God [James i, 17], and lead to God. The idea of the highest good we propose here to determine, preliminarily, not as to its contents, but simply as to its form. It cannot belong exclusively to any one phase of man's being, but must consist in the symmetrical completion of his life as a whole; hence it cannot be simply the perfection of his isolated individuality as such, but only as a living member of the living whole. Nor is the highest good a merely relatively higher among many other less high goods, otherwise the sum total of the former together with these latter would amount to something higher still; on the contrary all goods collectively, as far as they are really such, must be single elements of the highest good; and the simple fact that a particular object which I desire, and which hence seems to me as a good, is adapted to be a manifestation or an element of the highest good, is clear proof that it is a real, and not a merely seeming, good. Whatever a man aims after appears to him as a good; whatever he shuns, as an evil; and rationality consists in the fact that he aim not at the seemingly, but at the really, good, and, in each single good, at the highest good; and this aiming is itself good. The highest good is, consequently, the highest perfection of the rational personality, or the perfect development of God-likeness, or, in other words, the perfect agreement of the actual state of man's entire being and life with his ideal, that is, with the will of God,--which all are, in fact, only so many different expressions for the same thing. Whatever contributes to this highest end is good; whatever leads from it is evil. __________________________________________________________________

SECTION LII. The Moral.

In so far as a rational creature realizes the good rationally, that is, with a consciousness of the good end, and with a free will, it is moral. The moral is the good in so far as it is realized by the free will of a rational creature; and. in this manifestation of rational life, both the will, and also the action and the end, are moral; and true morality consists in the complete harmony of these three elements. Morality is therefore the life of a rational being who accomplishes the good with conscious freedom, and, hence, works the harmony of existence,--as well the harmony of its own being with God as also (and in fact thereby) the harmony of the being in and with itself and with all other beings, in so far as they themselves are in harmony with God. Morality, therefore, embraces within itself two phases of rational life: on the one hand, it preserves and develops the normal autonomy and peculiarity of the moral subject,--does not let it vanish into, or be absorbed by, God or the All,--for there is harmony only where there is a distinctness and individuality of the objects compared; on the other hand, it does not permit this difference to become an antagonism or contradiction, but preserves it in unity,--shapes it into rational harmony. The moral is therefore the beautiful in the sphere of rational freedom,--is rationally self-manifesting freedom itself. To be rational and to be moral is, in the sphere of freedom, one and the same thing.

Moralness bears the same relation to the goodness of mere nature-objects, as conscious freedom to unconscious necessity. The goodness of creatures is not their mere being, but their life, for God whose image they are, is life; God is not a God of the dead but of the living. Hence the goodness of rational creatures is essentially life also, and in this life morality realizes the good. With this view of morality we may properly enough speak also of a morality of God; the fact that human morality is really a progressive development of the image of God, even presupposes this; moreover the Scriptures positively express this thought, and there is no good ground for explaining it away. God is good [tvv] and upright; [ysr; Deut. xxxii, 4; Psa. xxv, 8]; hence our German hymn: "O God, thou upright God!") is strictly Biblical. God, as the absolutely holy will, is perfect morality itself, inasmuch as his entire being and activity are in perfect accord with his will and essence, and inasmuch as his infinite justice and love establish and uphold the harmony of life in the created universe. God's morality is his holiness. For this reason God is also the perfect prototype and pattern of all morality; "ye shall therefore be holy, for I am holy" [Lev. xi, 45]; also virtue, arete, in the strict sense of the word, is attributed to God [1 Pet. ii, 9; 2 Pet. i, 3]. Hence, man is moral not merely in general, in that he makes God's will the law of his life, but more specifically, in that he makes God's morality his pattern. In God all good is also moral or holy; in the creature; all that is moral is also good, but all that is good is not also moral.

Rothe objects to the more common notion of the moral, because it embraces only the idea of the morally-good, but not that of the moral in its secondary sense; in his view a definition of the moral should include also the morally-evil. It is evidently proper, however, to confine a notion primarily to the normal manifestation of its contents, and to treat the contrary manifestation as an abnormal perversion. Surely, for example, it would be too much to ask that the notion of the rational be so conceived as to embrace also the irrational,--that of organism, so as to include also disease. In fact the objection of Rothe has weight with him, chiefly for the reason that, in his system, evil is viewed not as a merely morbid phenomenon, but on the contrary as a necessary transition-state of development; in which case, of course, a definition of the moral would have to include also evil. __________________________________________________________________

SECTION LIII. The Moral. (Cont'd)

Though morality, as the free realizing of the good, appears essentially in the sphere of the will, yet as this will is a rational one,--the expression of a consciousness and of a love to the object of that consciousness,--hence, morality embraces the whole life and being of the spirit in all its forms of manifestation, as knowing, feeling, and willing. Moral knowledge is faith, not only religious, but also rational faith in general; moral feeling is pleasure in the good, and love of it, and, on the other hand, displeasure in the non-good; moral willing is a striving after the realization of the good. Morality itself, however, is not one of these three, but always and necessarily the union of all three of these phases of the spirit-life.

These three phases of the spirit-life are severally and collectively an expression of the union of the subject with objective being, with the All in general,--in the final instance with God. The subject itself becomes also to itself an object, and only thereby attains to its truth. The mere isolatedness of a being is per se evil, is the opposite of true existence and life, the ruin of life, that is, death,--is a dissolution of the unitary collective life into indifferent ultimate atoms. The individual exists in its truth only in so far as it comes into union with the All; this union is not its annihilation but its preservation, its recognition in the All as an organic member of the same; it is a mutual, vital relation, a unity in diversity; and this is in fact the essence of life, namely, that both the individual being and the collective whole, in all its parts, stand in relation to each other, and that, in this relation, the individual is, on the one hand, as a member, quite as fully at one with the whole, as, on the other, it is an integral being of itself.

In actively knowing, man brings the object into relation to himself,--takes it up, in its idea, spiritually into himself; in feeling, the subject brings himself in this spiritual appropriation into relation to himself,--embraces the appropriated object as in harmony or as in disharmony with his own being and character, that is, as pleasing or displeasing; in willing, the subject assumes an active determining relation toward the approvingly or disapprovingly received object; hence, the will rests on feeling, as in turn, feeling on knowledge, though the latter may be obscure and only half-conscious. In each of these three respects the spirit may be more or less free or unfree; in so far so it is free, it is also moral. It is true, knowing and feeling are primarily unfree,--they press themselves directly upon the essentially passive subject without his voluntary co-operation, and in so far as this is the case they are as yet extra-moral; but the moment they appear as freely willed they enter into the moral sphere, and this is their higher, rational form. Knowing is moral when we will to know rationally, that is, when we embrace isolated being, whether that of objective nature or of ourselves, as not existing for itself in its isolation, but on the contrary, when, passing beyond its isolatedness, we conceive it as having ultimately a divine ground,--in other words, when we associate all individual being with the infinite being and life of God, and thus conceive all existence as unitary and as established by God. Now, this passing beyond the individual object is not an unfree process; the object does not force us to do so, much rather it arrests us at its own immediate reality; but it is our rational nature that induces us to will to pass beyond. Knowing becomes moral when it becomes a pious consciousness,--assumes a religious character; and this pious associating of the finite with the infinite is faith, which is in its very essence religious. Faith can never be compelled by a presentation of arguments; in all its forms it is a voluntary matter; and from the simple fact that faith is a moral knowing, and hence includes within itself willingness and love, it is consequently not a mere knowing, not a mere holding-for-true; hence it may be, and is, a moral requirement. Without this willingness to find and acknowledge the divine in infinite objects, there is no knowledge of God, and hence no real rationality of knowledge. Though faith is essentially religious, nevertheless, springing forth from this source, it overflows and fructifies with its moral potency the entire field of rational knowledge. By virtue of this faith we have confidence in the truthfulness of the universe,--confidence that truth is discoverable, that the laws of our mind and the impressions made upon us by the external world are not untrue and defective, that divine order and conformity to law, and hence conformity to reason, pervade the universe, so that, consequently, we may rely on this order and this conformity to law. Without such a faith, without such a confidence independently of all presentation of evidence, there could be no knowledge--no possibility of a spiritual life in general. Without this confidence we would be unable to avoid suspecting poison in every cup of water, in every morsel of bread,--we would tremble lest, at every step, the ground might give way beneath our feet. Fondness of doubting presupposes depravity; skepticism proper, like the arts of sophistry, is an immoral dissolution of rational knowledge; under the skeptic's eye, both the spiritual world and the realm of nature fall apart into lifeless ultimate atoms.

In so far as feeling is simply a direct consciousness of such an impressed state of the subject, it is as yet extra-moral, because unfree; it becomes rational and moral through freedom on the basis of the religious consciousness,--namely, when I do not permit myself to be determined by finite things in an absolutely passive manner, but, on the contrary, when I subordinate all my states of feeling to the power of faith or of the religious consciousness,--in a word, when I rise so far into the sphere of freedom as to have pleasure only in that which is God-pleasing, and displeasure only in the ungodly,--when my love to finite things is only a phase of my love to God.

The will, the more immediate sphere of the moral, is in itself likewise not as yet moral, but must first become so. Free will, as distinguished from the unfree impulse of the brute, is primarily as yet devoid of positive contents,--is only the possibility, but not the actuality, of the moral. It becomes a really free and, hence, a moral will only by coining into relation to faith, namely, in that it ceases to be a merely individual will determined solely by the isolated personality of the subject,--for, as such, it is as yet simply irrational and animal,--and furthermore in that it imbues itself with a positive faith,--determines itself by its God-consciousness and by its love to God,--so that thus, passing beyond mere finite being, it bases its outgoings on a rational faith in the infinite. This is so wide-reaching a condition of the moral will, that even an evil will (which also lies within the sphere of the moral) is determined by a certain faith-consciousness, seeing that such a will is a rebelling against its God-consciousness; "devils also believe" in God's existence "and tremble" [James ii, 19]; the degree of guilt is strictly determined by the degree in which God is known. Hence the will is morally good when it rests on faith,--when it strives to realize the God-pleasing because of its God-consciousness and of its love to God; and it is morally evil when, despite its God-consciousness, it aims at the ungodly,--seeks to divorce finite beings, and especially its own, from its union with God. Hence in general terms, though morality has its essential sphere in the will, yet it also embraces, as intimately involved therein, the spheres of knowledge and of feeling. __________________________________________________________________

SECTION LIV. The Moral. (Concl'd)

As the life of a rational spirit is continuous, namely, a continuous free activity, hence it bears continuously a moral character. Morality is not simply a succession of single moral points, it is an uninterrupted life, and every moment of the same is either in harmony or in antagonism with the moral end,--is either good or evil. In the entire life of man there is not a single morally indifferent moment or state.

Man is God's image only in so far as he lives this God-likeness, for God is life, and all life is continuous; a real interruption of the same is its destruction,--is death. Sleep is only a change in the manifestation of life, arising from the union of the spirit with material nature, but not a real interruption of the same. Spirit sleeps not; also the slumbering spirit is moral,--may be pure or impure; the soul of the saint cannot have unholy dreams; dreams are often unwelcome mirrorings forth of impure hearts; when Jacob rebuked his son Joseph for his supposed ambitious dream [Gen. xxxvii, 10], his moral judgment was quite correct,--simply his hypothesis was erroneous. Ally assumption that there are morally indifferent moments in life is anti-moral. And that there are;, in fact, in the natural life of man middle states between life and death,--for example, swoons,--is of itself a fruit of depravity, and in the same sense that death is such. Morality is the health of the rational spirit; and every interruption of health is disease. God's will is incessantly binding; there is absolutely nothing conceivable which would not either harmonize with, or antagonize, it. __________________________________________________________________

II. RELATION OF MORALITY TO RELIGION.
SECTION LV. Relation of Morality to Religion.

The religious consciousness,--which expresses the conditionment of our being and life by God, and which, as a state of heart, is piety,--is necessarily and intimately connected with morality, so that neither is possible without the other; yet they are not identical. Religion and morality, both, bring man into relation to God. In religion, however, his relation is rather of a receptive character,--he permits the divine to rule in him; in morality he is more self-active, he reflects forth the God-pleasing from within himself. In religion he exalts himself to communion with God; in morality he evidences this communion by developing the divine image both in himself and in the external world. In religion he turns himself away from finite individuality and multiplicity, and toward the unitary central-point of all life; in morality he turns himself from this divine life-center as a basis, toward the periphery of created being,--from unity toward multiplicity,--in order to manifest the former in the latter. The two movements correspond to the double life-stream in every natural organism, and hence they are simply two inseparably united phases of one and the same spiritual life; and the very commencement of spiritual life involves the union of them both. In religion and in morality God glorifies himself no less than in creation,--in religion for and in man, in morality through man; and the moral man, in that lie fulfills God's will in and for the world, actually accomplishes the divine purpose in creation,--the free moral activity of man being, in fact, the divinely-willed continuation and completion of the work of creation.

The consciousness that we, as separate individuals, have no absolutely self-sufficient and independent existence and rights, as also that we are not simply dependent on other finite powers, but, on the contrary, on an infinite divine first cause, is of a religious character; and the spiritual life that develops itself on the basis of this consciousness is the religious life. In so far, however, as it is a disposition or state of heart, that is, in so far as it expresses itself in the feeling of love to God and in the thence-arising habit of will, it is piety,--in which form it assumes directly also the character of morality. A pious life is per se also a moral one; and morality is the practical outgoing of piety. Religion and morality are therefore most closely and inseparably associated; as morality rests on the recognition that the good is either the actual state or the final destination of all existence, and as this recognition, even in its rudest forms, is of a religious character (since the "good" can have no meaning save as the divine ultimate destination of creation), hence morality without religion is impossible, and its character rises and falls with the clearness and correctness of the religious consciousness. He who despises religion is also immoral; and the immoral man is also correspondingly irreligious; all immorality is a despising of God, since it is a despising of the good as the God-like. As now, on the other hand, religion is a believing, and hence a free, loving recognition of the divine, and as it places man in a living relation with God, hence all religion is per se also moral, and religion without morality is inconceivable.

Thus, whatever is moral is religious, and whatever is religious is moral; and yet these two are not identical; every religious life includes in itself a moral will, and every moral action contains a religious element,--implies religious faith; "without faith it is impossible to please God" [Heb. xi, 6]. This looks like a contradiction utterly irreconcilable save by making religion and morality absolutely one and the same thing. Things, however, that are indissolubly associated, as, for example, heat and light in the rays of the sun, need not for that reason be identical. In the religiously-moral life two things are always united: our individual personality as a relatively self-dependent legitimate entity, and the recognition of God as the unconditioned ground of our entire being and life,--that is to say, an affirming and also a relative negating of our separate individuality, an active and a passive element. Both are equally true and important; the one calls for the other, and either, taken separately for itself, would be untrue; the two must exist in harmony and unity. The passive phase--the emphasizing of the being of God in the presence of which individual being retires into the background and appears only as conditioned and dependent--is the religious phase of the spiritual life; the active phase--that is, the emphasizing of the personal element by virtue of which man appears, as an initiative actor with the mission, as a free personality, of carrying farther forward in the spiritual sphere the creative work of God--is the moral phase. The religious life is, so to speak, centripetal; moral life, as radiating out from the middle-point, is centrifugal; the former corresponds, in the spiritual life, to the functions of the veins of the body; the latter is more like the arteries, which, receiving from the lungs, through the heart, the vitalized out-gushing blood, distribute it nourishingly and productively through the body, and ramify themselves out toward the periphery, whereas the veins conduct it back from the outermost ramifications toward the center. In correspondence to this figure, the separate outgoings of the moral life are more manifold than are the center-seeking manifestations of the religious life. Hence piety, by its very nature, tends to a communion of pious life-expression, to the social worship of God; but in morality the person comes into prominence more in his self-dependent individuality: in the sphere of morality, moral communion rests more on the moral individuals; in that of piety, the pious personality rests more upon pious communion and upon the spirit which inspires this communion. In the moral sphere, Christ says to the individual: "Go thou and do likewise;" in that of religion he says: "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them." Secret prayer does not conflict with this, for it is only one phase of piety; the piety of the recluse is simply morbid.

Religious life is only then genuine when it is at the same time also moral,--when it does not in Pantheistico-mystical wise dissolve and merge the individual into God; the one-sidedly religious life which lightly esteems outward morality entangles itself inevitably in this quietistic renunciation of personality. Moral life is healthy only when it is at the same time also religious,--when the person does not assume to live and act as an isolated being from an unconditioned autonomy of its own independently of God; it is, however, as distinguished from the religious life, essentially a virtualizing of liberty. The one-sidedly moral life, that is, the attempt to virtualize personal freedom without religion, leads to the reverse of the morally-religious life--to haughtiness of personality as of an absolutely independent power, to an atheistic idolizing of the creature, and, in practice, to a throwing off of all obligation that conflicts with personal enjoyment. The moral life is therefore true and good only when the virtualization of the freedom and independence of the person is rational, that is, essentially religious; and it becomes morally evil so soon as it asserts its freedom as unconditioned and apart from God.

Piety and morality consequently mutually condition each other,--develop themselves in no other way than in union with each other. It is true, the first beginning of the religiously-moral life is, in so far; the religious phase, as all religion rests upon a revelation of God to man, that is, upon a receiving, and not upon a personal doing; but this revelation is only then our- own, the contents of our religious spirit, when we embrace it in faith, and this embracing is a free, a moral activity. Hence even the first incipiency of the rational, the morally-religious life includes in immediate and necessary union both phases of the same, so that, though in logic we may speak of the one as being; antecedent to the other, yet in point of reality we cannot so speak. Should this seem enigmatical to the understanding, still it is no more enigmatical than is the nature of all and every life-beginning; and just as little as we can deny the reality of the beginning of man's natural life, for the reason that it is absolutely hidden and mysterious--so that we can neither say that the material being of the same is antecedent to its spiritual power nor the converse,--even so little can we hope to solve the mystery of the beginning of the religiously-moral life, by assuming the one or the other of its phases as the first and fundamental one. The plant, in developing itself out of its embryo, grows upward and downward almost simultaneously; if it is insufficiently rooted it fades; if it cannot grow upward it decays; the sending out of roots corresponds to religion; the development into foliage and fruit, to morality. Also in the further development of the rational life these two phases are constantly associated, and in their associated unity and harmony consists the spiritual health of man. We are religious in so far as we recognize that God is the unconditioned ground of our being and moral life; moral, in so far as by our free life we confess in acts that God is for us the absolute rule of action,--that we are free accomplishers of the divine will. In religion, God is for us; in morality, we are for God; in the former God is manifested to us; in the latter God is manifested in and through us. "I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me" [Gal. ii, 20]; this is the essence of Christian morality. "As many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God" [Rom. viii, 14]; that is, religion is the vitality of morality, and morality the factive life-manifestation of religion, and consequently of divine sonship. "Fear God and keep his commandments, for this is the whole duty of man" [Eccl. xii, 13; comp. Deut. x, 12]; hence the fear of God is the ground and beginning of moral wisdom; "this is the fear of God, that we keep his commandments" [1 John v, 3]. According to the uniform tenor of Scripture, religion and morality go always hand in hand; this is aptly expressed by Luther in his Catechism: "We should fear and love God, in order that," etc.; the fear of God necessarily involves the keeping of the commandments, and this fear is itself of moral character, as is implied by the very word "should"; "if thou doest not well, sin lieth at the door" [Gen. iv, 7]. Hence the usual Scripture expression for morality is: "to walk before God" [Gen. xvii, 1; xxiv, 40], that is, to act out of a full consciousness of the holy and almighty One, in full trust and love to Him; or: "to walk with God" [Gen. v, 22, 24; vi, 9], to "keep the way of the Lord" and "do justice and judgment" [Gen. xviii, 19], "to walk in God's ways," "to serve the Lord" and "to keep his commandments and statutes" [Deut. x, 12]; and God's exhortation to the progenitor of the Israelites is: "I am the Almighty God, [therefore] walk before me and be thou perfect" [Gen. xvii, 1].

The glorifying of God in religion and morality is the completing of his glorification in nature. In religion, God permits the man who comes into living communion with Him, to behold his glory; in morality God permits men to show forth his glory--to let their light shine before others that they also may praise the Father in heaven. The will of God in creation was not as yet fulfilled at the conclusion of the creative act. "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness," --but this image is God-like, not in its mere being, but only in its rational, moral life. God created the world for rational creatures, in order that for them and through them his image might be manifested in creation,--that is to say, in the interest of moral development. Hence sin is treachery against God, an infringement on his honor. Morality looks to the honor, not of man, but of God; it is per se a serving of God, and all divine service or worship is a moral act.

The relation of religion to morality is often stated quite differently from the view here presented. The more important of these views are the following four:

(1) Religion and morality are totally identical. In developing this view, the one is necessarily reduced to the other. (a) Morality is entirely merged into religion--the view of all consistent mysticism; man has nothing to do but to give himself entirely over to God; and wisdom consists not in acting, but, on the contrary, in renouncing all practical activity (Eckart, Tauler, Molinos). (b) Religion is entirely merged into morality. Morality is directly in and of itself true religion; to be moral is identical with being pious; outside of virtue. there is no piety which is not only not simply associated with virtue, but which is not, in fact, itself virtue;--the view of the worldly-minded in general, and, particularly, of the "illuminism" of the eighteenth century.

(2) Religion and morality are in their entire nature radically different, and hence entirely independent of each other; the one may exist without the other. This is the view of all the naturalistic systems of recent date. It is at once refuted by the simple fact that the different religions have given rise to correspondingly different systems of morality.--In approximation to this view, Rothe affirms (Ethik, I, Seite, 191, sqq.) at least a predominant non-dependence of the two spheres on each other.

His position is as follows:--Morality and piety, while not entirely different, are yet relatively independent and self-based. Each has indeed a certain relation to the other, and there is no morality which is not, in some degree, also piety; both have the same root, namely, the personality; but the two form, nevertheless, independent branches strictly coetaneous. The consciousness of this relative independence of morality belongs among the inalienable conquests of recent culture,--namely, the consciousness that an individual human life may be relatively determined by the idea of the moral, nay, even by the idea of the morally good, or, more definitely, by the idea of human dignity and of humanity, without at the same time being determined by the idea of God,--and indeed in such a manner that it shall possess this idea of the moral as not derived to it from the idea of God. The Christian moralist cannot refuse to recognize this consciousness. The misconception, that morality can rest on no other basis than the religious relation, would at once vanish, could moralists determine to keep distinct the moral sensu medio, from the morally-good. For, that there can be moral evil on a basis other than a religious one, will of course be questioned by none. It is true, when strictly understood or comprehended, the idea of the moral cannot arise apart from the idea of God.--These last two statements of Rothe undermine his entire position; for the question here is not at all as to evil, but exclusively as to the morally-good; and it is hardly possible that any one would argue thus: Because evil can exist without religion, therefore also the good can exist without religion. Moreover, in admitting that without religion man can be morally-good only relatively, but not truly, Rothe implicitly admits also that morality is in fact not a something existing alongside of religion and in real independency of it; consequently the above-assumed morality that is independent of religion, is but mere appearance.

(3) Religion is the first, the basis, also in point of time; while morality is the second, the sequence. This is the most usual, also ecclesiastical, view; and as applied to Christian morality it is also undoubtedly correct, since here the question is as to being redeemed from a presupposed immoral state; in which case, of course, the religious back-ground forms the basis of the renewal, from which, as a starting-point, the moral will, in general, must rise to freedom. Where, however, the moral life does not presuppose a spiritual regeneration, there no moment of the religious life is conceivable in which it does not also contain in itself the moral element,--thus absolutely precluding the idea of a precedency of one to the other; moreover, even in the spiritual regeneration of the sinner, the process of being morally laid hold upon by the sanctifying Spirit of God, issues directly into a willing, and hence moral, laying hold upon the offered grace of God.

(4) Morality is the first, the basis, while religion is the second, the sequence, also in point of time; the moral consciousness of the practical reason is the ground upon which the God-consciousness springs up;--so taught the school of Kant, and in part, also, Rationalism. This view, in its practical application, coincides largely with that one which merges the religious into the moral. It is true, appeal is made to the passage in John vii, 7: "If any one will do his will," etc.; here, however, the question is not as to the religious consciousness in general, but as to the recognition of Christ as the Messenger of God. But whoever purposes to do the will of God, must have a consciousness of God already.

From the intimate unity of religion and morality, which we have insisted upon, results readily the solution of the question, as to how and whence we can have a knowledge of the moral condition of humanity as pure and unfallen. The sources of a knowledge of religion are at the same time, also, the sources of an acquaintance with morality; and religion throws light not only upon what has transpired and now is, since the fall, but also upon what preceded all sin. Thus we have for morality in general, as well as for the consideration of morality irrespectively of sin, the following sources of information:--l. The rational, morally-religious human consciousness, both as it is yet extant even in the natural man, and also, as it is enlightened by divine grace in the redeemed.--2. The historical revelation of God in the Old and New Testaments. Although as bearing upon the moral sphere Revelation relates predominantly to the actual sinful condition of humanity, yet it contains also, at the same time, the holy will of God to man per se. The moral law of Christ, "Thou shalt love thy God," etc., is in fact absolutely valid, not only for such as are as yet implicated in sin, but also for man per se, and irrespectively of sin; moreover, it is not difficult for the Christian who has become acquainted with the divine economy of grace to distinguish, in the divine precepts, that which is intended for the chastening and discipline of the sinner, from that which is morally binding per se.--3. From the personal example of Him who knew no sin, from the holy humanity of the Redeemer.--So much here merely preliminarily. __________________________________________________________________

III. SCIENTIFIC CLASSIFICATION OF ETHICS. __________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________

SECTION LVI. Scientific Classification of Ethics.

The usual distribution of the subject-matter of ethics into the doctrine of goods, of virtues, and of duties, does not answer the nature of this science, as these are not different parts of the whole, but only different modes of contemplating one and the same thing,--modes which are so intimately involved in each other, that such a classification inevitably involves, on the one hand, an unnatural severing of the subject-matter, and, on the other, manifold repetitions of the same thought. All the various articulations of this science into the mere discussion of virtues, duties, and goods, according to the different classes and subdivisions of particular virtues, duties, and goods, come short of exhausting the subject-matter, and must therefore involve the throwing of other important ethical considerations into an introduction or some other subordinate position.

Among the various classifications of the matter of ethics, the above-mentioned is in recent times the more usual; it is adopted by Schleiermacher, though only in his Philosophical Ethics, and it is applied by Rothe to Theological Ethics also. In both of these writers, the importance of such a classification lies in the thought of the working of reason upon nature, in which morality is by them made to consist. The goal of this working, namely, the positive harmony of nature and reason, is the good; the power of reason which works this good, is virtue; the mode of procedure for working the good, the directing of the activity toward it, is duty. [3] This view, irrespectively of the so-strongly emphasized thought of Rothe, of the good as a harmony of (material) nature and reason,--which is utterly inapplicable to Christian morality,--is in fact valid also for Christian ethics (Schwarz). In Christ's words: "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things [temporal goods] shall be added unto you" [Matt. vi, 33], are comprehended both the highest good and the single goods, duty and virtue,--the latter being embraced in "righteousness," though righteousness is indeed more than virtue. There is a difference between the goal to be reached, the way or movement toward it, and the power of the subject which conditions this movement; still it does not follow from this that the entire subject-matter of ethics can be organically and exclusively distributed on this basis. The antithesis of duties and goods could be most easily carried out, since the producing activity and the produced result are clearly distinguishable. But even here the difficulty arises, that true good, and hence, of course, also happiness (as Aristotle very justly remarks), is not an inert result but an activity; but every activity, if it is rational, must be the expression of a moral idea, the realizing of a duty; so that we are brought to the at first strange-seeming conclusion, that dutiful acting is itself a part of the being and essence of the good,--is in one respect itself a good. The family, the church, the state, etc., are goods; but these all are conditioned not merely on dutiful acting,--they themselves are a purely moral life,--consist, strictly speaking, in a collectivity of moral actions, although not solely therein. If we once abstract these actions, there remains neither family nor state nor church; these are not mere empty spaces in which moral acting takes place, but they are themselves incessantly generated by this acting, and without it would not exist,--just as the fiery ring of a revolved torch is not an entity per se, but exists alone by virtue of the motion. Hence the visible embarrassment of the ethical writers in question as to where they shall treat, for example, of family and political duties, whether under the head of duties proper or of goods.--Still more embarrassing is it in the discussion of the virtues. That virtue is per se a good, being an end to be acquired by moral effort, is perfectly evident, and is so admitted by Schleiermacher (Werke, III, 2, 459); also in the above-cited utterance of Christ, righteousness appears as a goal of effort, as an element of the essence of the kingdom of God [comp. Phil. iv, 8]; we aim at virtue, and we possess virtues; but every possession is a good. Now as goods are of course not merely objective,--as indeed the highest good of Christians, the possession of the kingdom of God, comes not with outward observation but is of a strictly inward character [Luke xvii, 20, 21],--hence it is plain that virtue is also a good; as indeed the kingdom of God consists "in power" [1 Cor. iv, 20], and hence by its very nature includes in itself virtue. Hence the doctrine of goods cannot be discussed without treating also of virtue. On the other hand, a merely dormant power is in reality nothing at all; the reality of a power is its outgoing,--the reality of virtue is moral action, that is, the fulfilling of duty. It is not possible, therefore, to discuss the virtues without at the same time treating of all the duties, and vice versa. Hence the distribution of ethics above-mentioned can be adhered to only so long as the discussion lingers in generalities and avoids the particular.

Schleiermacher and Rothe, in fact, admit that the three divisions, goods, virtues, and duties, are not, in reality, different parts of, but only a three-fold manner of viewing, the same object,--yet in such a manner that in each of the three the other two are included, if not expressly, at least substantially. The doctrine of goods, of virtues or of duties, embraces, either of them, according to Schleiermacher, when fully developed, the whole of ethics (Syst., p. 76 sqq.). The classification in question can therefore be carried out only by arbitrarily leaving some of the divisions imperfectly discussed. Particular goods, says Rothe, do not spring from the working of a particular virtue and through the fulfilling of a particular duty, but on the contrary no single one is realized otherwise than through the co-working of all the virtues and through the fulfilling of all the duties, and each single virtue contributes to the realization of all the goods, and is conditioned on the fulfilling of all the duties, and each particular virtue contributes in turn to every dutiful manner of action (i, 202). Irrespectively of the fact that the latter declarations are too sweeping,--seeing that, for example, the family may often exist as a good without the virtue of courage, of industry, etc., and that courage may exist apart from the fulfillment of the family duties, etc.,--still it is quite evident that if either of the three divisions in question were really and completely, and not merely in general, carried out, there would remain nothing for the other divisions save a few general observations. The family, for example, is a good only in so far as it has domestic love for its basis, and, in point of fact, Rothe treats of domestic love among the goods; but what remains then to be said of it in treating of the virtues and duties? The remarkable scantiness of Schleiermacher's discussion of duties is itself evidence of an erroneous classification. And Rothe obtains for his discussion of duties (in fact confessedly finds any occasion whatever therefor) simply because, as he says, reference is there to be had to sin, so that the discussion of duties becomes essentially the portrayal of struggle. But this admission destroys the very basis of the classification;--were it not for sin, a discussion of duties would not be possible, whereas the basis of this classification has not the least reference to sin. If Schleiermacher, after speaking, in his first part, of chastity and unchastity, had then in his second part spoken of chastity as among the virtues,--which his plan required of him, but which he does not do--and in his third part fully discussed the duties of chastity, then in order to carry out his classification he would have had to reiterate the same matter three times.--Rothe speaks in very strong expressions against those who do not adopt this classification, affirming that all previous ethical teaching and phraseology have been erroneous, and have ignored the fact that even every-day parlance makes a difference between being virtuous and acting dutifully;--as if common usage does not, just as frequently and just as correctly, speak also of acting virtuously and being true to duty! Oddly enough it seems, in the face of this so-deemed "imperishable desert" of Schleiermacher in regard to this classification, that Schleiermacher himself--clearer-sighted here than Rothe--does not apply it to his own Christian Ethics; and not only that, but he even declares it inadmissable here,--seeing that a description of virtue and a description of the kingdom of God as the highest good, cannot possibly be kept separate, inasmuch as virtue is simply a "habitus" generated by the Holy Spirit as indwelling in the kingdom of God; nor can Christian ethics, in his opinion, be treated under the-head of duties, seeing that no one duty can be discussed save in and with the totality of all the duties, and hence in connection with the idea of the kingdom of God (Chr. Sitte., p. 77 sqq.). And the same might also be said against the application of this classification to Philosophical Ethics.

If this classification of general ethics into the doctrines of goods, of virtues and of duties, is practically untenable, much more is it inapplicable to Christian Ethics, since it lacks one essential Christian thought, that of the divine law. Schleiermacher presented no discussion of the law, as he wrote wholly irrespectively of the idea of God; and for this reason alone his classification would be inapplicable to Christian Ethics. For duty is not identical with the law. The law is objective, duty subjective; the law is the moral idea per se in its definite form, as thought, as universally valid--the will of God in general; duty is the subjective realization of the law for a particular individual under particular circumstances,--relates per se always to the strictly particular, the actual. The law is valid always, and under all circumstances; duty varies largely according to time and circumstances; the very same mode of action which is to-day my duty, may be to-morrow, contrary to my duty;--to-day my duty is silence, to-morrow I must speak. The law is categorical, duty is usually hypothetical; the former is the expression of divine morality, the latter of human. So also is the relation of goods to virtue; the former are more the general, objective phase; the latter is more the particular, personal, subjective phase; virtue is the subjective possession of a moral power the product of which is objective good. In the Old Testament the moral life-movement went over from the divine objective will, namely, the law, to the human subject in order to bring the latter into possession of the highest good; in the Christian world the moral life-movement goes out from the subject as being already in union with God, and already in possession of the everlasting good, and directs itself to the objective realization of God-like being,--from the inward possession of the kingdom of God to the objective manifestation and realization of the same.

Of other scientific classifications, we will say but little. The older popular division of the subject-matter of ethics according to the Ten Commandments, was a form very well adapted for popular Christian instruction, and, indeed, by giving a large construction to the more immediate scope of these commandments, it admits of the treatment of all evangelically-ethical thoughts: it does not, however, suffice for a scientific development of Christian ethics, seeing that this series of commands was constructed primarily for merely practical purposes; very essential points, such as the moral essence of man and of the good, and (as parts of the latter) of the state and the church, would have to be thrown into introductory or collateral remarks.--The classification according to our duties to God, to our neighbor, and to ourselves, while in fact embracing the whole circle of duties, yet requires likewise too much of the essential matter to be thrown into an introduction.--Harless makes the divisions, the good itself, the possession of the good, and the preservation of the good; but by "good" he understands rather the antecedent condition than the goal of the moral life; by "possession," more the obtaining and preserving of the possession; and by "preservation," rather its actual manifestation. This, as well as Schleiermacher's theological classification, relates only to distinctively Christian ethics.--A very common classification is, into general and special ethics,--the latter treating of the special circumstances and relations of the moral life; but such a system can be carried out without violence only when the first division is reduced to a mere general introduction. __________________________________________________________________

[3] Schleirm. Syst., p. 71 sqq.; Grundlinien, 1803, p. 175 sqq; Üb. d. Begriff des höchsten Gutes, Werke III, 2, 447 sqq. Comp. §. 48. __________________________________________________________________

SECTION LVII. Scientific Classification of Ethics. (Concl'd)

Morality is life, and hence, activity or movement, and more definitely, rationally-free movement. Herein lie three things: the subject that moves, the end toward which the movement goes out, and the movement-activity itself. The subject goes out from its immediate condition of being per se, through movement, over into another condition which lies before it as an end. But the moral subject is not a mere isolated individual; on the contrary, it is the freely self-developing image of God as the primitive ground and prototype of all morality, and it lives only in virtue of constant inner-communion with God. The holily-ruling God becomes, as distinguished from man, the eternal, holy proto-subject of the moral life; and there is no moment of the moral life in which the human subject, strictly per se and without God's cooperation, works the good.--The goal toward which the moral movement directs itself is also of a twofold character. Man finds himself already in the presence of an objective world different from himself; and even where he makes himself his own object, this, his reality, is, primarily, a gift conferred upon him without any moral action on his own part; this conferred existence (world and self) is the working-sphere of his moral activity--the most immediate object and end of the same. But man is not, in his activity, to throw himself away upon this objective world-to merge himself into it--but he is to shape it by his own power, and in harmony with the moral idea,--to male the possibility of the good into real good, to realize a spiritual end in and through the objective world. Hence the goal of the moral activity is to be considered under two phases: (a) As a pure object untouched as yet by the moral activity,--as a mere platform, as material given for the moral activity in order to be spiritually dominated by this activity so as to become a spiritually and morally formed real good. (b) This object itself as morally fashioned, as having become a good,--existing primarily only as an idea, a rational purpose, but afterward as a result of moral activity, as a fruit realized,--that is the ideal goal proper, or the end of the moral activity. In the first case, the object is, for the moral activity, a directly-given reality, but it is not to remain as such; in the second case it is primarily not real, but exists only in thought, but it is ultimately to become a reality expressive of the thought.--The third phase of the moral movement, namely, the moral activity itself, is, as spiritually free, likewise of a twofold character; on the one hand, it is to be considered from its subjective side, that is, in respect to how it is rooted in the subject himself, and from him issues forth,--the subjective motive of the moral activity, the source of the stream; on the other hand, it is to be considered as a life-stream, sent forth from the subject and directed upon the object,--that is, the activity proper itself as having become real and objective in its progressive development toward the attained goal in which it ends.

The subject-matter of ethics falls, therefore, into the following subdivisions:

1. The moral subject, purely in and of itself considered.

2. God as the objective ground of the moral life and of the moral law, and also as the prototype of the moral idea, and as co-working in the moral life.

3. The given objective existence upon which, as material to be fashioned, the moral activity exerts itself.

4. The subjective ground of the moral activity, the personal motive to morality.

5. The moral working or acting itself, the moral life-movement toward the moral goal.

6. The conceived object of the moral activity, its goal or end,--the good as an object to be realized.

While Dogmatics sets out most naturally from the thought of God, Ethics takes its start from man, the moral subject, inasmuch as morality in its totality is simply the rational life-development of man,--God coming into consideration here not so much in his character as Creator as rather in that of a Lawgiver and righteously-ruling Governor. Should we, however, divorce Ethics entirely from Dogmatics, we would, of course, have to preface the moral discussion of man by a presentation of the doctrine of God.

The idea of the moral subject, of the rational personality, is the foundation-thought of ethics,--the root out of which all the other branches spring. But man is a morally rational person only in so far as he conceives of himself, not as an isolated individual, but as conditioned by the divine reason and the divine holiness. Hence the idea of the moral personality leads out beyond itself to the thought of God, as the eternal fountain and the measure of morality, as the holy and just Lawgiver; the prototypal relation of God to the moral has its personally-historical manifestation in Christ, the Son of God; the moral idea becomes in Christ an actually-realized ideal. The doctrine of the moral law belongs not in the sphere of the human subject, but in that of the divine, for the law is not man's but God's will.

In the notion of the moral subject considered as an individual being, there lies implicitly also the notion of an objective world different from the same. Morality, as active life, has this world before it as its theater of effort; the activity in its outgoing comes into contact with a reality independent of itself, which, though because of the unity of creation it is not antagonistic to the subject, is nevertheless primarily foreign to the same, and not in any wise imbued with or dominated by it. But to be a spirit, implies in itself the dominating of the unspiritual, the entering into harmony with all that is spiritual. It is the task of the moral subject to bring about this domination and this harmony. Moreover, in so far as man finds himself in a simply given, and not as yet spiritually-dominated and cultivated condition, he becomes to himself his own object, his moral activity being directed upon himself.

The modifying activity as exerted upon this given existence is not, however, of a purposeless character, but it has before it, in the rational end, an ideal object the realizing of which is to be effected by the activity as moral. In an ethical discussion which follows the actual order of the moral life, this moral activity will have to be considered first, although with constant reference to the moral end. This activity, as a spiritual outgoing from the subject, has, on the one hand, its fountain in the moral subject, on the other, it has also a development-course as a stream. Each is to be considered separately, so that we have here again two subdivisions. The consideration of the subjective origin or ground of the moral activity--its motive,--has to do with the why. The existence of the law and the encountering of an external world by the subject, do not suffice to explain why man should enter upon a course of moral activity; there must be found, as distinguished from these, a motive in the subject himself that prompts directly to moral activity,--that sets the subject into movement. The mere "should" is not enough to move us; we may remain indifferent and emotionless in the presence of every "categorical imperative" and of every, however well-grounded, command; if there is not some impulse to activity within us, all and every command will fall back powerless from us; and this impulse must be of a rationally-free, a moral character.

The moral activity itself, which is occasioned by this inner motive, is to be considered primarily only in its essence and in its general forms of manifestation, and it involves only the general, but not the special, discussion of the doctrine of duties. By far the largest scope of special activity comes under the last division of our classification; for the true essence and real worth of moral good lies in the fact that it is not a dormant possession, but that, on the contrary, it unfolds continuously new and richer life,--just as a natural fruit is not simply a product in which the life of the plant ends, but is also the germ of a new life;--with this difference, however, that the fruit of the moral activity is not merely the germ of a new life that simply repeats its former self, but rather of an enriched, spiritually-heightened life. In the attained moral good the moral life-movement rises to a new, higher circulation; the person in possession of this good has become richer,--is a spiritually higher-developed personality; the previously existing moral-subject has become more exalted and spiritualized,--is, in fact, the already attained moral good itself; and the moral activity gains thereby ampler and more ennobled contents; with the acquired good springs up new duty.

In elucidation of the classification we have given, compare the passages Deut. x, 12 sqq.; xi, 1 sqq.; xii, 1 sqq. Here we may consider as the moral subject the people of Israel,--the moral mission and activity of whom cannot possibly be understood save in the light of their historically-moral peculiarity. Jehovah is the sovereign, requiring moral obedience to his will; the people's sinful hearts [x, 16], the heathen country and inhabitants [x, 19; xi, 10 sqq.; xii, 2 sqq.], and the national life of the Israelites, form the sphere. the theater, of the moral activity; thankful love to the merciful, longsuffering God is the moral motive [x, 15, 21 sqq.]; willing obedience, the walking in the ways of God, is the moral activity; and the approbation of God and his blessings are the moral end [x, 13-15; xi, 8 sqq.; xii, 7 sqq.].

In consideration of the thought that there lies at the basis of all moral activity an end to which the activity directs itself, it might seem more correct to consider this end, namely, the good, before discussing the moral activity itself; however, on the other hand, as the realization of the good presupposes the moral activity, and as we are to consider the good not as simply conceived, but as realized, and, inasmuch as out of the realization of one good a new field of moral activity arises in turn before us, hence it is clearly more natural, in fact, to place the discussion of the end or the good (as being actually the last in the order of the moral development) in the last place; for, it is in fact quite evident, that we cannot speak of the family, the church, and the state, without having first examined the moral activity per se. To begin with the discussion of the good would be the so-called "analytical method," whereas ours, on the contrary, is the "synthetic;"--the course of the former is, so to speak, retrogressive; while the latter proceeds forward, more in the actual course of the moral development, and hence is the more natural.

The first three subdivisions of our classification embrace, it is true, only the antecedent conditions of the moral activity itself; but it does not follow from this that their subject-matter is to be thrown into an introduction. Free rational life, as an object of ethics, cannot be treated as a mere activity without taking into consideration also the active subject, as well as the law by which the subject is governed, and the field upon which it acts; he who describes vegetable life, must surely speak also of the organs of plants. In any case, a controversy as to whether this consideration forms only an introduction to the subject-matter, or is a part of the subject-matter itself, would be very unprofitable. __________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________