023. CHAPTER 9 - THE FALL OF MAN-THE DIVINE ADMINISTRATION VINDICATED.
CHAPTER 9 - THE FALL OF MAN-THE DIVINE ADMINISTRATION VINDICATED. THE Bible is a rich treasury of historic truth. In the first chapter of Genesis, we read an account of our own origin, and of the birth of creation. But scarcely have we time to pause and contemplate the beauty and grandeur of the handiwork of the Supreme Architect, till we are led by the inspired record to look upon one of the most melancholy scenes ever presented to the view of man. In the third chapter of Genesis, we are furnished with the history of the fall of man-the apostasy of the first pair from original purity and happiness. The Mosaic account of this event is substantially this: That man was placed in the garden of Eden to dress and to keep it. In this garden were two peculiar trees-the one called “the tree of life,” and the other “the tree of knowledge of good and evil.” Of the fruit of the latter, Adam was commanded not to eat, and the command was enforced by the announcement of the penalty-”In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die.” Through the temptation of the serpent, Eve, and, through her, Adam, were induced to disobey the command, by eating the fruit of that tree, in consequence of which they were expelled from the garden, and the sentence of death, together with other maledictions, was denounced against them.
I. In turning our attention to this scriptural account of the Fall, we inquire, first, Is this a literal account of events that really took place, or is it merely an allegorical representation? Infidels, who reject the Bible, of course look upon it as nothing but a fictitious story; but that professed Christians should view this solemn record as a painted allegory, is a matter of no little surprise; and yet some, at the same time that they express a reverence for the Bible, make thus free with its contents. That this history should be interpreted literally, we infer, first, from the fact that it is regularly connected with a continuous and plain narrative detail of facts, Now, to select from a regularly conducted narrative a particular portion as allegorical, when all the other parts in the connection are admitted to be plain narrative, is contrary to all the rules of interpretation.
If we may make thus free with the third chapter of Genesis, why not the first, and deny the reality of the creation? Why not make a similar disposition of the history of Noah, of Moses, or even of Christ? Indeed, if we are authorized to treat the plain historic record of the Bible thus unceremoniously, we can place little confidence in any thing it contains. But there is a second argument for the literal interpretation of the account under consideration. If we view it as an allegory, we must set aside the authority of the New Testament; for in several places it alludes to the history of the Fall as a real transaction. In Matthew 19:4-5, our Saviour says: “Have ye not read that he which made them at the beginning, made them male and female; and said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and they twain shall be one flesh?” Here, although our Lord does not quote immediately from the history of the Fall, yet he quotes a portion of the same continuous narrative; consequently he must have viewed it as real history. In 2 Corinthians 11:3, St. Paul says: “But I fear lest by any means, as the serpent beguiled Eve through his subtilty, so your minds should be corrupted from the simplicity that is in Christ.” Here the allusion is so plain, that we cannot resist the conviction that the apostle intended to refer to a real transaction. But there is another passage so positive and definite as to settle the question with all who will acknowledge the inspiration of St. Paul:-1 Timothy 2:13-14 : “For Adam was first formed, then Eve. And Adam was not deceived, but the woman, being deceived, was in the transgression.” Thus do we perceive that we are compelled to admit the literal history of the fatal lapse of man, as recorded in the third chapter of Genesis, or discard our confidence in the Bible.
II. In the second place, we inquire concerning the propriety of the divine administration, as connected with the circumstances of the fall of man.
1. It is asked, Could not the Almighty, who certainly foresaw the apostasy of man, have prevented it? And if so, how can we reconcile it with divine goodness that he did not thus interpose? I am persuaded that this difficulty has not only been tauntingly urged by the infidel, but it has presented itself to the mind of many a candid inquirer after truth; therefore it merits some serious consideration. In the first place, that God foresaw the Fall, we firmly believe; for he seeth “the end from the beginning.” In the second place, that he could have prevented it, we freely admit: for God can do any thing which does not imply an absurdity, and which is consistent with his own perfections. We do not suppose that Deity was necessarily compelled to create man originally. The fact that he did not perform this work till a few thousand years ago, is sufficient evidence that he might have suspended it, even till now, had he seen proper. If, then, he was not compelled to create man at first, but acted with perfect freedom, it would follow that he might still continue to exercise the same freedom, and unmake what he had made, or so change it as to constitute it something entirely different. So far, then, as the simple question of potentiality is concerned, the Deity could have prevented the Fall. He could have prevented it, by omitting to create man. He could have prevented it by making man a stock, or a stone, or any thing else, besides a moral agent. But that he could have prevented it, consistently with his own attributes, without destroying the moral agency of man, is what we believe never can be proved. Seeing, then, that the only way by which God could have rendered the apostasy of man impossible, was not to have made him a moral and accountable agent, the question then amounts to this: Was it better, upon the whole, that moral agents should be brought into being, or not?
Before the divine administration can be impeached, as improper or inconsistent with goodness, it must be shown either that it was improper to create moral agents, or that the possibility of transgressing is not essential to the character of a moral agent. That it was improper to create moral agents, is a position contradicted by the fact that God did create such beings. This must be admitted by all who acknowledge their own existence, and that they have been brought into being by a Creator, whether they believe the Bible or not. Therefore we are compelled to admit that, in the judgment of God, who alone is infinitely wise and capable of surveying the whole ground, more good than evil would result from the creation of intelligent, accountable beings; and that therefore it was better, upon the whole, that such beings should be created. In the next place, that the possibility of apostasy is essential to the character of a moral and accountable agent, is easily shown in the following manner.
1. A moral agent implies a capacity for performing moral action.
2. Moral action implies a law by which its character is determined.
3. A law for the government of moral action must necessarily be such as may either be obeyed or disobeyed by the subject; otherwise there can be no moral quality, no virtue or vice, no praise or blame, attached to obedience or disobedience; and this would destroy the character of the moral agent.
Thus it is clear that the power to obey or disobey is essential to the character of a moral agent; consequently God could not have prevented the possibility of the apostasy and fall of man without destroying his moral agency.
2. The nature of the prohibition made to Adam has been considered by some as a ground of serious complaint against the divine administration. That the fruit of one of the trees of paradise should be interdicted by the Almighty, has been represented as absurd, and treated with ridicule. This solemn transaction has been made the subject of many “a fool-born jest” by the captious and profane. It would be well for short-sighted and fallible creatures, before they launch forth with such presumptuous arrogance and audacious raillery, with much humility and honesty of heart, more carefully to examine so serious a matter. In reference to this prohibition, it may be observed that the objection is not that man was placed under a law-the propriety of this, all who acknowledge that he was constituted a moral agent must admit; but the ground of complaint is against the peculiar character of the law. “What harm could there be in eating an apple,” it is asked, “that our first parents should be placed under so strict and unreasonable a restraint?” To this we reply that we can see no just reason for complaint, because the prohibition was what has been termed, not a moral, but a positive precept. The chief difference in these is, that the reason of a positive precept is not seen by us, whereas, in a moral precept, we perceive, in the very nature of the command, something of its propriety. In reference to moral precepts, it must be admitted that the reasonableness of the duty is not in every case equally obvious. May we not therefore infer that, in positive precepts, a sufficient reason for them may exist in the mind of God, which, in consequence of the weakness of our understanding, we cannot perceive? That our minds do not perceive the reason upon which a command is founded, cannot possibly be an evidence that no such reason exists, with any who admit the finiteness of the human understanding.
Therefore to object to the prohibition as unreasonable, merely because we do not perceive the reason upon which it is founded, is seen to be fallacious.
Again, even were we to admit that there was no previous reason, in the nature of things, for the particular precept given to Adam, and that another precept might just as well have been substituted for it, how can we see any valid objection to the divine administration upon this supposition? Is not the ground of all obligation, whether connected with a positive or moral precept, founded upon the will of God? For instance, the duty of industry is said to be moral in its character, because we can perceive some propriety in it, even in the absence of a command. But is it not clear that our obligation to be industrious is founded upon the command of God? In the absence of the known will of God in the case, I might be led, from mere choice or policy, to the exercise of industry, but I could not feel that I was bound to be industrious, and that a failure would be a crime. Hence we conclude that, as obligation rests not on the nature of the duty itself, but on the fact that our Creator has commanded it, the obligation to obey is just as great in a positive as in a moral precept. In turning our attention to the law given to our first parents, so far from discovering any thing objectionable in the particular prohibition, we confess that it appears to us more reasonable and better adapted to the grand design for which it was given, than a moral precept could have been. It is evident that the law was given as a test of man’s fidelity and allegiance to God. He was created an intelligent being, and endued with free agency. As such, a law calculated to test his submission to God was perfectly suited to his condition, being designed to show forth, in the obedience of the creature, the supreme authority and glory of the Creator. The question for us to determine, therefore, is this: Was a positive precept, such as was given to man, calculated to test his obedience? It appears evident to us, that such a command as had nothing to influence its observance but the authority of God, was, of all that could have been given, the best test of obedience. Had the Almighty commanded Adam to speak the truth, or to be affectionate to his wife, his observance of a moral precept of this kind could not have been a proof of his allegiance to his Maker, for the simple reason that the understanding, unimpaired by sin, might have discovered such propriety and fitness in the very nature of the precept as to lead to obedience merely for the sake of its advantages. But God designed that man should acknowledge the supreme authority of his Creator; therefore he gave him a law affording no argument for its observance but the authority of God, that it might thus be evinced that if man kept the law, he did it for no other reason than because God had commanded it; thereby acknowledging the divine government and control under which he was placed. Again, the propriety of this precept, when considered as a test of obedience, may be seen in its simplicity. A law upon which so much depended, should be such as could easily be understood and remembered. Had an extended system of intricate forms been laid down, the offending subject might have pleaded as an excuse the difficulty of remembering or understanding every part of the command; but here there can be no plea of the sort-there is but one simple command: the fruit of one tree is interdicted, and that so specifically designated that there can be no mistake.
Once more: had the command imposed a heavy burden upon man, the offending subject might have pleaded as a paliation the severity of the requisition; but here we see no difficult task imposed. It is only abstinence from one out of the many trees of Eden; and the very manner in which the command is issued seems strongly to urge obedience, by a direct allusion to the divine goodness intermingled therewith: “Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die.” How appropriate this, as a test of obedience! It has nothing but the divine authority to sustain it. It imposes no oppressive burden; but, in its very presentation, is mingled with love.
3. The circumstances of the temptation have been caricatured with no sparing hand by men who have appeared determined to amuse themselves at all hazards. A little attention to this subject will be enough, we think, to satisfy the unprejudiced that there is no just ground here for arraigning the divine administration.
Some have thought it strange that God should permit man to be tempted at all. But a temptation to fall, either internal or external, seems to be essential to his character as a probationer. When every inducement is on the side of obedience, the subject must partake of the character of a machine, and there can be no reward for obedience. Perhaps there was this difference between the apostasy of man and that of the fallen angels-the latter originated the temptation within their own nature, whilst the former was tempted from without. It is not essential from what source the temptation originates, but a temptation appears to be necessarily connected with a state of trial. Without it, “what proof can be given of firm allegiance?” As it is impossible for us to know that man would not have originated a temptation within his own nature, even if Satan had not been permitted to attack him, we cannot assail the divine administration as cruel for permitting that attack. Of this much we may be well assured-the temptation was not irresistible. God required obedience; and he gave ability for the same. To have gone farther, would have destroyed the accountability of man, and deranged the principles of the divine government.
Against the literal account of the temptation, it has been said that it is unreasonable to suppose that a “serpent,” or any “beast of the field,” should be sufficiently malicious and sagacious to undertake and succeed in the seduction of man. It is a sufficient reply to this to know that, according to the Scriptures, the prime actor in this temptation was Satan, a fallen spirit. This we learn from various allusions. In Revelation 12:9, we read of “that old serpent, called the devil, and Satan.” And in evident allusion to the seduction of man, we read concerning the devil, in John 8:44 : “He was a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth.”
If an objection be made from the absurdity or impossibility of a serpent or beast of the field uttering articulate sounds, we reply, that although such creatures may not naturally possess this power, yet it is impossible for us to prove that God might not permit Satan to exercise it through them; and so the objection falls.
Again, it has been objected that the serpent, of all animals, is the most inappropriate to be selected as the instrument of this seduction. To which we reply that we know but little with regard to what the serpent originally was; but, from what the Scriptures inform us, we have good reason to believe that he was the most appropriate animal that could have been selected. He was not a creeping reptile, but a “beast of the field,” and the most subtle among them.
Upon this subject Mr. Watson says: “We have no reason at all to suppose, as it is strangely done almost uniformly by commentators, that this animal had the serpentine form, in any mode or degree at all, before his transformation. That he was then degraded to a reptile to go ‘upon his belly,’ imports, on the contrary, an entire alteration and loss of the original form-a form of which it is clear no idea can now be conceived.”
We may conclude from what has been said, that as a temptation of some kind was necessary to test the fidelity of man, there is no just ground for cavil at the account of this matter, as recorded by Moses.
4. The penalty annexed to the Adamic law has been made a ground of complaint, as being excessively rigorous, and entirely disproportionate to the offense. That we may understand this subject, it will be necessary to take into the account the true condition of man as an accountable being, the nature of the authority by which he was bound, and the true character of his offense. When these things are all duly considered, we think it will be apparent that the penalty of death, which has been referred to as so excessively severe, was truly appended to the law in mercy.
First, then, man, in order that he might be a proper subject of moral government, was made a rational, intelligent being, capable of understanding his duty and the reasons thereof. He was also endued with the capacity of perceiving and feeling the influence of motive. In a word, he had every attribute of a free moral agent. His duty was plainly prescribed. He was not left to feel his way amid the darkness of uncertainty or conjecture. Light flowed into his soul by a direct communication from God, with clearness and power, like the unobstructed rays of the sun. No dire necessity impelled him to transgress: for he had every faculty and ability necessary to enable him to obey. He was created “sufficient to have stood, though free to fall.” Such was the condition in which he was placed and such were the circumstances by which he was rendered accountable for his actions.
What, we inquire in the next place, was the nature of that authority by which he was bound, and to which he was held responsible? It was the authority of the infinite God, enforced by all the obligations of gratitude, as well as justice, truth, and holiness. An obligation thus high and sacred, and resting upon the authority of the infinite perfections of God, could neither be relinquished nor compromitted. The honor of the eternal throne forbade it. With this view of the subject, we ask, what was the character of the offense of man? Surely it could not have been the trivial thing supposed by those who speak so flippantly of the mere circumstance of tasting an apple. The eating of the forbidden fruit was the external act of transgression; but the seat of the crime lay deep in the soul. There, where all had been holiness and love, every evil principle reigned in triumph-unbelief was there; treason, rebellion, enmity, pride, lust, murder-in a word, the root of every evil passion which Satan could instigate, or which man has ever felt, was contained in the principle which actuated man in the first transgression. The authority of God was here cast off; the word of God was contradicted; allegiance to Heaven was relinquished; and the claims of gratitude were entirely disregarded. How exceedingly defective must be the view of this subject taken by those who represent the first sin as a venial impropriety-a slight aberration, of scarce sufficient magnitude to merit the notice of God! In view, then, of all these circumstances, can we complain that the penalty of death was annexed to the law? Is it an evidence of cruelty on the part of the Lawgiver? The whole history of the case, when properly understood, presents rather an evidence of the goodness of God. The object contemplated in the affixing of a penalty to a law, in all good governments, is not primarily the punishment of the subject, but the prevention of crime. So in the command given to Adam: that he might be deterred from transgression, and thereby preserved in his pristine state of bliss, the penalty was annexed-”In the day thou eat-eat thereof, thou shalt surely die.” If the prime object of the penalty was the prevention of crime, so also the severity of the penalty, if such it may be called, originated in the divine benevolence, which labored to make the inducements to obedience as strong as might be, without destroying the free agency and accountability of man.
Thus have we contemplated the history and circumstances of perhaps the most solemn and deeply important event connected with the history of our race, except that greater work of redemption, providing for our recovery from the miseries of the Fall. The full import of the penalty of death, together with the relation sustained in the transaction of the Fall by Adam to his posterity, will be considered when we investigate the doctrine of human depravity, or the effects of the Fall.
We now close this chapter by one observation in reference to the date of this melancholy event. It seems that sacred chronology has not been careful to gratify curiosity in this particular. How long the first pair maintained their integrity, and drank at the fountain of unmixed happiness, we know not; but it is probable that the time was short. The “fine gold” soon became “dim,” and the desolating curse soon fell, with its withering influence, upon the fair, and, till then, the smiling, face of nature. But while we cast a mournful retrospect upon the wide-spread ruin entailed upon his race by the first Adam, we may, through the second Adam, hope to gain a habitation in “the new heavens and the new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness.”