083. CHAPTER 38 - IMMORTALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL- PHILOSOPHICAL OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED.

CHAPTER 38 - IMMORTALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL- PHILOSOPHICAL OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED. ARE we, as conscious beings, to survive the ravages of death? And if so, what will be the character of our future destiny? These are questions of the greatest importance, and the deepest interest. They lie at the foundation of all religion, and have engaged the most serious and earnest inquiry of the wisest and best of mankind in every age. A firm belief in the doctrines of a hereafter, inspires the mind with a deep sense of the importance and dignity of our nature, and is the most powerful incentive to the practice of moral and religious duty. For the establishment of this doctrine, the main reliance of the Christian is on the teachings of inspiration. We propose, however, in our investigation, to pursue the following order: first, to remove some objections; secondly, to consider some presumptive proofs, derived from the light of nature; thirdly, to exhibit the positive evidence of Scripture. The principal objections to the scriptural doctrine of the soul’s immortality have been founded upon that skeptical principle of philosophy, termed materialism. This peculiar phase of skepticism, with slight diversity of sentiment in reference to unimportant points, has had its advocates in almost every age, commencing anterior to the origin of Christianity.

Among the ancient Jews, the skeptical notions of the Sadducees were but a development of the theory of materialism. The same pernicious error, as early as the third century, had infested the Christian Church, as appears from its refutation in the writings of Origen. And although the system has never been countenanced by the great body of the Church, but viewed as an insidious and pernicious type of infidelity, yet up to the present time it has its advocates among some professing the Christian name. The materialism of the present day is substantially identical with the theory of infidel philosophers of all the past ages, and of all countries, whether Jewish, Pagan, Mohammedan, or Christian. It was advocated by Epicurus, Lucretius, and others of the atheistic school; and in more modern times, it has been zealously espoused by Spinoza, Hobbes, Hume, Volhey, Voltaire, and the mass of infidel writers.

1. The theory of materialism, in whatever minutiæ its patrons may differ, is substantially this: it teaches that man is not a compound being, consisting of two distinct parts - soul, or mind, which is immortal, and body, which is material; but that he is wholly material - the soul, or mind, being nothing but organized matter, a mere function of the brain; and that consequently, at the dissolution of the body, the mind, or soul, must cease to exist. That this whole theory is flatly contradictory to Scripture, we will show, in its proper place. At present, we examine it in the light of philosophy. From our own consciousness, we learn that man is not only possessed of a body, or material part, but of a soul, or immaterial part. We derive our knowledge of material things through the medium of sensation, and of immaterial things through the medium of consciousness. Of the essence of matter and of mind we are alike ignorant. All we know of them is what we learn of their properties through the mediums just named. By the exercise of external sensation, we know that we have bodies, or a substantive, material nature, possessing certain properties, such as impenetrability extension, divisibility, figure, inertia, attraction, and indestructibility. Of the existence of these properties the constitution of our nature will not allow us to doubt, for the evidence is direct through our own senses. Thus, by the senses of sight and touch, we know that we have a material nature, susceptible of division, and possessing a certain figure; we know that wherever there is division or figure, there must be something divided or figured. However ignorant, therefore, we may be of the essence of that substance, we cannot doubt its existence. By an analogous process, we arrive at a knowledge of the existence of our souls, or the immaterial part of our nature. What sensation is to the body, consciousness is to the soul. By an exercise of consciousness, We know that we are possessed of souls, or an immaterial nature, endued with certain properties, or faculties, such as understanding, memory, power of volition, self-determination, self-action, and the affections. Of the existence of these faculties, the constitution of our nature will not allow us to doubt; for the evidence is direct through our own consciousness. Thus we reason, remember, choose, love, etc., and therefore know there must be something which reasons, remembers, chooses, loves, etc. However ignorant we may be of the essence of that substance, we cannot doubt its existence. That substance, a knowledge of which is thus gained, is what we mean by the soul. Thus we think it clear that to doubt the existence of the soul is as unphilosophical as to doubt the existence of the body. To doubt, in either case, is to yield ourselves up to the absurdities of universal skepticism, and assume an attitude of hostility to both revelation and common sense. The materialist may be ready enough to admit the existence of the soul, as well as that of the body, provided only we allow his position that they are not two distinct things, but are both of the same material substance. Here is the point of controversy. Materialism, while admitting the existence of the soul, avers that it is not distinct from the body in its substance, but is nothing but matter in a peculiar state of organization.

Here, we undertake to say, is the grand blunder of materialism: it plants itself on the unphilosophical assumption, that two things - matter and mind - having no single property in common, are essentially the same. Whereas not the first property of matter can belong to mind, nor can the first property of mind belong to matter.

Impenetrability is a property of matter. By this we mean that such is the essential nature of every material substance, that it excludes all other matter from the space it occupies. Can this be also a property of mind? Unless it is, mind cannot be material. Take any given vessel and fill it with water, and the same vessel cannot, at the same time, be filled with wine. The water must be displaced before the vessel can receive the wine. Why is this the case? Simply because water and wine are both material substances, and impenetrability is a property of all matter. Now, if mind be not possessed of the same essential property, unless the plainest principle of natural philosophy be renounced, it cannot be a material substance. The attempt to conceive of mind as being restricted to a limited space, and so filling that space that nothing else can occupy it at the same time, shocks all common sense.

It is easy to conceive of any material substance so filling a given space as to exclude every thing else; but to conceive of mind as being subject to a similar law, is a task beyond our powers.

Extension is a property of matter. Does it pertain to mind? Matter has length, breadth, and thickness, and may be measured or weighed; but what meaning shall we attach to the phrase, a pound of mind - a square yard of mind - ten miles of mind? Indeed, it seems to us that no man can worship at the shrine of materialism, without renouncing common sense.

Figure is a property of matter. Is mind of a certain figure? Is it a circle, a square, a triangle, or a parallelogram?

Divisibility is a property of matter. But is it also a property of mind? Can you take a square foot. of mind, and divide it into a thousand distinct parts, each constituting a distinct and separate mental lump, having all the essential properties of the original square foot?

Inertia is a property of matter. Mere lifeless matter can only move as acted upon by extrinsic physical force. And for one material substance to act upon another, they must be in contact. Call this law pertain to mind? Paul, though absent in body from his brethren, was present in spirit. What material force impelled his mind to leap the bounds of space in a moment, and mingle with his brethren at a distance? If our own senses teach us that certain properties pertain to matter, does not our own consciousness teach us, with equal certainty, that those properties do not belong to mind? But let us look at the properties and faculties of mind, and see if they can be predicated of matter. Can matter think, reason, compare, and judge? Has it understanding? In all the researches of philosophy, where has a particle, or any portion, however great or small, of mere matter, given evidence to a common-sense observer that it was capable of thought, of reason, or of intellection, in any shape or form? In all the experiments of chemistry, and the inventions and operations of mechanics, where has been exhibited any combination, arrangement, adjustment, or juxtaposition of the particles of matter, making the least approximation toward the creation of a conscious thinking machine?

If our common sense teaches us that matter is possessed of properties that do not pertain to mind, and that mind is possessed of properties that do not inhere in matter, does not the same common sense teach us, with equal certainty, that matter is not mind, and that mind is not matter?

Now, we appeal to every man’s own consciousness, as evidence that he possesses a power capable of thought, reason, memory, choice, will, love, hatred, joy, and grief; and that this power is not a faculty of his material nature, Every one knows he does not think with his foot, nor reason with his hand, nor grieve with his muscles. I may will to move my hand or my foot, but at the same time I am sure I do not will with either.

Admit that the reasoning power resides in, or is connected with, the brain; that will not prove that the brain is that power. We may be conscious that the thinking process is carried on within the head, but farther than this consciousness cannot go. We are no more conscious that the brain thinks and wills, than that these operations are performed by the bones, the muscles, or the blood. The soul is unquestionably, in a way to us inscrutable, united with the body; and the brain is probably, not only the point of union, but the organ through which the process of intellection is conducted; but being matter, and nothing but matter, it is not the intelligent agent that works the machine. The brain can no more think or will of itself, than the locomotive can move the train without the steam. That the brain is mere matter, all admit; but is matter possessed of intelligence? This is the point in dispute. That intelligence is not an essential property of matter; that it does not pertain to matter as such, has been proved. If it be said that intelligence is the result of the organization of matter, we reply, that no arrangement or combination can add to any substance whatever essential qualities not inherent in it. Take from matter any one of its essential qualities, and it instantly ceases to be matter, and has become something else. In the same way, add any thing to matter which is not essential to it as matter, and whatever that added something be, it cannot be matter; for if you add the same to the same, it still can be nothing but the same. The same essential properties may be piled upon each other to any extent we please, but we cannot thereby add to the number of essential properties. Thus, we may take a lump of matter of any supposed dimensions, and divide it into ten thousand pieces, and each one of those particles will retain all the essential properties of the original lump; no more, and no less. Or if you take the same original lump of matter, and instead of dividing it, add to it ten thousand lumps of the same kind, and, however you may combine them, they can only possess the same essential properties which each lump possessed in itself before they were combined.

Among the millions of the modifications and combinations of material substances which have been effected by the skill, ingenuity, art, or labor of man, or which the world has ever witnessed, from the birth of creation to the present hour, no particle of matter, whether great or small, whether simple or compound, whether rude and misshapen, or refined and polished, has ever been known, which did not possess the same essential properties - no more, and no less - with every other particle of matter in the universe. If, therefore, any thing has been added to matter by which a property not essential to matter has resulted, that added something could not have been material. To suppose the introduction of a new essential property, without the addition of an essentially different substance, is thus seen to be contrary to the established principles of the philosophy of nature. If thought, reason, or intelligence, be not an essential property of matter, it cannot be made such. To suppose it had become such, would imply, either that matter, destitute of thought, reason, or intelligence, is not matter, or that matter, endued with thought, reason, or intelligence, is more than matter: either of which would be fatal to materialism. Hence, as thought, reason, and intelligence, are essential properties of the human soul, but are not essential properties of matter, it necessarily follows that the soul cannot be a material substance. But let us look still farther at the properties of mind, and see if common sense can allow that they pertain to mere organized matter.

How wonderful is the faculty of memory! What a vast store-house of knowledge may be treasured up by that power! If mind be a material substance, it must be a folded volume of almost an infinite number of leaves, to furnish a sufficient surface for so immense a record. And look, too, at the dimensions of those leaves. The flaming bounds of the universe cannot limit the flight of human thought, and yet upon the tablet of memory is recorded the speculations of the mind, and the flights of the imagination, throughout this immense range. Can so immeasurable a material fabric be inclosed within a human skull? And yet, stranger still, the mind knows how to call up these reminiscences at pleasure. What material hand lies concealed within the brain that can discern the proper time to touch the cord, to turn the key, or to sound the note that will summon up at the pleasure of the mind the slumbering remembrances of the past? Admit that the mind itself is an immaterial, intelligent, and self-active agent, and all is plain. This spiritual essence can sit upon its throne, and work the wonderful brain-machinery, guided by its own inherent and self-active powers. But deny this, and assume that all is matter, and nothing but matter, and we are overwhelmed with difficulty, mystery, and absurdity.

One of the most serious objections to materialism is, that it leads directly to atheism. Atheists have always defended their position on the ground of materialism; and materialists, to be consistent with themselves, must become atheists. The atheist argues against the existence of a personal, spiritual God, possessed of infinite intelligence and power, who created and upholds all things, by assuming that matter is eternal, and that it is possessed of all the intelligence and power requisite for its own government. Now, is it not clear that materialism occupies one important plank on the same platform? For, if a being endued with all the intelligence of man - with all his mental activity; his capacity of thought and reason; his ability to soar to the heavens above, and hold converse with the worlds and systems of worlds which roll amid the immensity of space; to measure their distances and trace their orbits; and then, descending to earth, to dive into the profound arcana of nature, and unfold her secret mysteries - if a being of such astonishing powers as these is nothing but an organized lump of matter, as the materialist asserts, how naturally and consistently may he take another step, and conclude that there may reside somewhere amid the immensity of space another body of organized matter of finer mold and texture, and more ingenious structure, that may control all things! How easily may he suppose an organism of mere matter, thrown together by chance or somehow else, as much superior to Newton as he was to the mere zoophyte! And if once we admit the possibility that mere matter may produce such an intelligence, how easy the transition to all the startling conclusions of atheism!

We might greatly enlarge upon the theme before us, but we deem it unnecessary. We have said enough to satisfy any candid person, who is willing to be governed by common sense, that the human mind, or soul, is not a material substance, and that, therefore, it will not necessarily perish with the dissolution of the body. We do not, however, infer the immortality of the soul merely from its immateriality. Whether it be immortal or not, depends on the will of the Creator, and not on its properties or phenomena.

2. We next consider the objection to the scriptural doctrine of man’s proper immortality, growing out of materialism, and bearing upon the state of man during the interim between death and the resurrection. The immortality of man taught in Scripture, and the only view of it which can imply any real substantial benefit, is that which contemplates the conscious personal being of each individual, as continuing without interruption from the commencement of his existence to all eternity.

Materialism teaches that the soul is dependent on the organization of the brain for its existence. Its theory is, that man is not a compound being composed of two distinct parts, the material and the immaterial, but that he is wholly material; and that what we term the soul is nothing but organized matter, or a function of the brain; and that from this organization all the phenomena of mind result as a necessary sequence. From this postulate it follows, as a necessary corollary, that when the body dies, the soul sinks into an eternal sleep; or, in other words, ceases forever to exist. It is clear that the admission of this doctrine would be a relinquishment of the correct view of the soul’s immortality.

It is true, some who hold to the materiality of the soul admit that there will be a resurrection of the body; and they contend that when that shall take place, and the new body be organized, then the soul also will be revived with it, as the necessary result of that organization. This theory, to a superficial observer, may seem to admit both the resurrection of the body and the immortality of the soul; but, in reality, it is inconsistent with both the one and the other. According to this theory, what might seem to be a resurrection of the old body and a restoration of the old soul, can be nothing but a new creation. The correctness of this position will appear, when we consider what is implied in the proper personal identity of man. This is really grounded, not in the body, but in the soul. We do not mean by this that the identity of man, both as to his soul and his body, will not be preserved on both sides of death and of the resurrection, including the interim between them - even from the commencement of his being to all eternity. But our position is, that we can have no evidence of this identity, nor can we conceive it to imply any thing real or substantial, unless the conscious existence of the soul be perpetuated during all the period between death and the resurrection. For if this be denied, by what chain, or ligament, can man this side of death be connected with man the other side of the resurrection?

It has been contended that man’s proper identity cannot be grounded on the consciousness of the soul, because this is often suspended, even in this life. To sustain this objection, the appeal has been made to the phenomenon of sleep; and it has been contended that during sleep the soul loses all consciousness of its identity. To this objection we reply, that there is no evidence that the soul loses this consciousness in sleep. A man in complete mental derangement may imagine himself a being that he is not; but that he does not, even then, connect this being with his former self, we have no means of proving, or even of knowing. It cannot be disputed that a sane man does, even in his dreams, connect himself with his former waking self; and on awaking from his slumbers, he is conscious that he is the same being that dreamed, as well as the same being he was before he slept. Were we to admit that the soul loses the consciousness of its identity in sleep, that admission could have no bearing in support of the objection we here oppose, because it cannot be denied that this consciousness is revived the moment we awake. Memory, so to speak, ties the knot between the end of the thread of our history which we drop when we fall asleep, and the end we take up when we awake; so that there is no break in the testimony of consciousness in reference to our personal identity. But there is no possibility of the soul that ceases to be, when the body dies, being connected by the chain of memory with another soul which commences its existence with the organization of the resurrection body. I am as fully conscious that I am the same person to-day that I was yesterday, as I possibly could be if I had lain awake all the while to prevent some one from stealing me away while I slept. But even if we were to suppose that God might endue the new soul, which commences with the organization of the resurrection body, with a remembrance of the entire history of the former soul, that memory could not connect the soul that had long been extinct with one newly born as being in fact the same. Memory may aid the soul, to some extent, in the exercise of the consciousness of personal identity, but it cannot produce that consciousness of itself. Memory may mirror to my vision the events of yesterday, so that I behold them again; but it is consciousness, not memory, that assures me that the actor of yesterday and the actor of to-day are the same person. If memory alone connects the person of to-day with the person of yesterday, there must be no hiatus in her record. She cannot be allowed to slumber, or withdraw her eye for a moment from the person in question. To show that the evidence of personal identity does not rest in memory, but in consciousness, we will use an illustration. Suppose a number of coins resembling each other so closely that the eye cannot distinguish the one from the other, how can I know from the evidence of memory that the one in my purse to-day is the same that occupied it yesterday? Is it not clear that I must have it under my surveillance all the time? My assurance of the identity of the coin will be in proportion to my evidence of the impossibility of its having been exchanged. If there be one hour in which it lay upon my table while I was asleep, I cannot know, from memory, that it may not have been exchanged. If assured that the coin has not been exchanged, because my door has been so strongly barred that it is impossible that the room could have been entered, then my evidence of the identity of the coin rests on that fact, and not on memory. To prove personal identity from memory, requires reflection and comparison; but the evidence from consciousness is instant and spontaneous. I know when I awake in the morning that I am the same person that I was the day before, not by remembering my former appearance and comparing it with my present appearance, but the conviction springs from consciousness sudden as the flash of thought. The man of seventy is conscious that he is the same being now that he was when a child, He derives this assurance, not by remembering his childhood appearance and comparing it with his present appearance, but this conviction rises as spontaneously as the emotion of joy from the reception of good news. But admitting that memory may assist consciousness in preparing her testimony to personal identity, our argument against the sleep of the soul with the body in death can lose none of its force by that admission. Memory, as well as consciousness, has its seat in the soul. Hence, if the soul ceases to exist at the death of the body, both memory and consciousness must then perish. If memory and consciousness are no more, all evidence of personal identity is destroyed. And if the evidence of personal identity be destroyed, we can attach no sensible import to the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, or the future state of the soul.

There is no fact in all the range of experimental knowledge, and of physiological science, of which we are more perfectly assured than this - that the consciousness of personal identity is preserved by every intelligent being, from the earliest to the latest period of his rational existence upon earth. And that this consciousness of personal identity is according to the truth and reality of things, no rational mind can doubt. But on the supposition that the soul ceases to exist from the dissolution of the body till the resurrection at the last day, what proof can there be establishing the position that a consciousness of personal identity can connect this life with the next?

If it be said that when the resurrection body is produced, and its fine-wrought materials organized, a new soul of a far more elevated character than the present one shall result from that organization, and that God can inspire that new soul with a consciousness that it is identical with the former soul whose existence ceased at the death of the body - if this position be taken, then the theory will be encumbered by insurmountable difficulties.

First, if the materials and organization of the new body be vastly superior in polish and refinement to those of the old body, how is it possible that what results from the two organizations can be the same? It is a principle in philosophy, that like causes produce like effects, and that different causes produce different effects. But here is a case in which different causes are supposed to produce the same effect.

Secondly, it is here supposed that God may inspire the new soul with the consciousness that it is identical with the former soul, when such a persuasion would, in point of fact, be untrue. There are some things too hard for Omnipotence. God cannot lie, nor do any thing wrong; neither can he do what implies a contradiction or an absurdity. Hence it is quite too much to require us to believe that God would, or could, inspire the new soul with a consciousness of the identity of what is not identical; or, in other words, that God should inspire a falsehood. If the mind is only the brain, or a function of the brain, at the death of the body it ceases to exist, and is nothing. Now, can that which is nothing be identical with that which is something? Can the soul which once existed, but which for centuries had ceased to exist, be identical with that which has just been produced, and which never did exist before? In the case of bodily sleep, when we wake from our slumber, we are conscious of the same personal identity which we had before we slept. But if the soul sleeps in non-existence from death till the resurrection, and is then reproduced as the result of a new organization, how is it possible it can have a consciousness of identity with the former soul? Can it be conscious of what is contrary to fact? Can that which has just come forth from nonentity have any memory connecting it with the past, and identifying it with something which had once existed, but which for centuries had ceased to exist? or can it have a memory of things that transpired centuries before its existence?

Allowing personal identity to consist in the consciousness of the soul, that it is the same person - the same conscious, self-active, and responsible agent it was in childhood - and allowing the soul still to continue to exist, preserving this same consciousness of personal identity and responsibility - allowing this, we can then recognize the import and consistency of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, and of the future conscious existence of the soul. By the identity of the body, we do not mean that the particles of matter from childhood to old age are precisely the same. These may all have been changed, including even the substance of the brain, some five or six times. Though decay and renewal, dilapidation and repairs, may have still been going on, yet we are not conscious of having changed our body for that of another person. On the contrary, we are conscious all the while that each day we possess the same body we had the day before. On the supposition that the soul still lives on through life, and from death till the resurrection, preserving a consciousness of its personal identity as the same responsible being - while this is the case, the identity of the body is still preserved. The moment we admit that during the interim from death to the resurrection there is no conscious being living on to connect the conscious being before death with the conscious being after the resurrection, there can, in the nature of things, be no resurrection. For if we admit that God should raise up the same material that once composed a body, how can a soul that has just sprung into being, on the organization of that new body, be conscious of that having once been its body, when it had not? And without this consciousness of receiving the identical body it had before inhabited, how can it realize a resurrection? If unconscious of ever having had a body, how can it be conscious of taking up the body it once laid down? And without this, how can it realize a resurrection?