1. General View of the Moods.

Chapter I General View of the Moods.

[*] 1. The Mood of a verb shows the manner in which the assertion of the verb is made. The Greek verb has four moods, properly so called,—the indicative, the subjunctive, the optative, and the imperative. The infinitive, which is a verbal noun, and the participle and the verbal in -τέος, which are verbal adjectives, are so closely connected with the moods in many constructions, that they are discussed with them in Syntax. The four proper moods, as opposed to the infinitive, are sometimes called the finite moods. The subjunctive, optative, imperative, and infinitive, as opposed to the indicative, are sometimes called the dependent moods.

I. Indicative.

[*] 2. The indicative, in its most primitive use, makes a simple, absolute assertion, or asks a question which includes or concerns such an assertion. e.g. Γράφει, he is writing; ἔγραφεν, he was writing; ἔγραψεν, he wrote; γράψει, he will write. Γράφει;, is he writing? ἐγράψατε;, did you write? γράψετε;, will you write? τί ἔγραψεν;, what did he write?

[*] 3. The indicative may also express

(a) A dependent statement (or quotation) of such an absolute assertion or question. e.g., Λέγει ὅτιγράφει, he says that he is writing (he says γράφω); λέγει ὅτιγράψει, he says that he will write (he says γράψω); ἐρωτᾷ τί ἐγράψαμεν, he asks what we wrote; ἐρωτᾷ εἰ ἔγραψα, he asks whether I wrote.

(b) A distinct statement of an object aimed at or feared. e.g., Ἐπιμελεῖται ὅπωςτοῦτογενήσεται, he takes care that this shall be done (339); φοβούμεθαμὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἡμαρτήκαμεν, we fear that we have missed both (369, 2).

(c) A distinct supposition of an absolute statement, that is, a supposition that such a statement is, was, or will be true. E.g., Εἰ γράφει, if he is writing; εἰ ἔγραψεν, if he wrote; εἰ γέγραφε, if he has written; εἰ γράψει, if he shall write or if he is to write. What is supposed in each case could be expressed by γράφει, ἔγραψεν, γέγραφε, or γράψει.

[*] 4. The past tenses of the indicative may, further, express a supposition that some statement either had been or were now true, while it is implied that really it was not or is not true. E.g.

Εἰ ἔγραψα, if I had written; εἰ ἔγραφον, if I were now writing or if I had been writing; the context indicating that really I did not write or am not writing (410). These expressions originally always referred to the past, as they do in Homer.

[*] 5. Out of the form of unreal supposition (4) were developed after Homer the use of the past tenses of the indicative with εἴθε or εἰ γάρ in wishes (732); and also the Attic construction of the past tenses of the indicative to express an unaccomplished purpose (333), where there is an assimilation of the final clause to a preceding indicative. E.g. Εἰ γὰρτοῦτο ἐποίησα, O if I had only done this! Εἴθετοῦτοεἶχες, O if you only had this!

Εἴθε τότ᾽ ἀπέθανον, ἵνα μὴ τοῦτο ἔπαθον, would that I had then perished, that I might not have suffered this. For the indicative with ἄν or κέ, the potential indicative, see 243.

II. Subjunctive.

[*] 6.

(a) The subjunctive, in its simplest and apparently most primitive use, seen in Homer (284), expresses futurity, like the future indicative, and has οὐ for its negative. E.g.,

“Οὐ γάρπωτοίους ἴδον ἀνέραςοὐδὲ ἴδωμαι,” “for never did I see such men nor shall I ever see them,” Il. i. 262 ;

“καίποτέτιςεἴπῃσιν,” “and some one will some time say,” Il. vi. 459.

(b)

Though this primitive use disappears in the later language, the subjunctive still remains closely related in sense to the future indicative, and in most of its constructions can be interchanged with it.

[*] 7. The subjunctive in questions of appeal as to the future (287) has, even in Homer, developed the idea of propriety or expediency. E.g. “Αὖθιμένω ἦεθέω;” “shall I remain here or run?” Il. x. 62. So “πῇ ἴω;” “whither shall I go?” Od. xv. 509. But the future indicative can be used in the same sense; as τίδῆταδρῶμεν; μητέρ᾽ ἦ φονεύσομεν; “ what are we to do? shall we slay our mother?” EUR. El. 967.（See 68.)

[*] 8.

(a) In exhortations and in prohibitions with μή (250, 259) the subjunctive has an imperative force, and is always future; as in ἴωμεν, let us go; μὴ θαυμάσητε, do not wonder. The future indicative occasionally occurs in prohibitions with μή (70).

(b) The subjunctive with μή, especially in Homer, may express a future object of fear with a desire to avert it; as in μὴ νῆας ἕλωσι, may they not seize the ships (as I fear they will). (See 261.) From such expressions combined with verbs of fearing arose the dependent use of μή with the subjunctive expressing a future object of fear; as φοβοῦμαιμὴ ἀπόληται, I fear that he may perish.

[*] 9. In the constructions with οὐ μή (294) the subjunctive and the future indicative are used, without apparent distinction, in a future sense; as οὐ μὴ γένηται and οὐ μὴ γενήσεται, it will not happen.

[*] 10. The subjunctive may express a future purpose or a future object of care or exertion. E.g. Ἔρχεται ὅπωςτοῦτο ἴδῃ, he comes that he may see this (317); ἐπιμελεῖται ὅπωςτοῦτογένηται (or γενήσεται), he takes care that this shall be done (339). In clauses of purpose the future indicative is sometimes used (324), and in the construction of 339 it became the regular Attic form.

[*] 11. In conditional clauses the subjunctive expresses either a future supposition (444), or a general supposition which is indefinite (never strictly present) in its time (462).

(a) In the former it supposes such a future case as the Homeric subjunctive (6) states; as ἐάντιςεἴπῃ, if one shall say (the thing supposed being εἴπῃ τις, one will say); here the future indicative may be used in essentially the same sense (447). In the general condition it supposes an event to occur at any time, as we say if any one ever goes or whoever goes, with an apodosis expressing repetition or a general truth; as ἐάντιςκλέψῃ (or ὃς ἂνκλέψῃ), κολάζεται, if any one steals (or whoever steals), he is always punished.

(b) The subjunctive in general suppositions is the only subjunctive which does not refer to future time, and here the future indicative can never be used. In most other languages (as in English and generally in Latin), and sometimes in Greek, such a condition is expressed by the present indicative, like an ordinary present supposition; but the Greek, in its desire to avoid a form denoting present time, generally fell into one which it uses elsewhere only for future time. The construction, however, appears in Homer imperfectly established, except in relative clauses (468): this indicates that it does not belong to the primitive uses of the subjunctive. (See 17.) For the Homeric subjunctive with κέ or ἄν in independent sentences, which does not differ perceptibly in meaning from the future with κέ or ἄν, see 201, 1.

III. Optative.

[*] 12. The optative is commonly a less distinct and direct form of expression than the subjunctive, imperative, or indicative, in constructions of the same general character as those in which these moods are used.

[*] 13. This is seen especially in independent sentences, where the optative either expresses a wish or exhortation, or is used (regularly with ἄν or κέ) in a potential sense.

Thus ἴοιμεν, may we go, corresponds as a weaker form to ἴωμεν, let us go. Corresponding to ἐξελθώντις ἰδέτω, let some one go out and see, we have “ἐξελθώντις ἴδοι,” “may some one go out and see,” Od. xxiv. 491 . Ἕλοιτο ἄν, he would take or he might take, corresponds to the Homeric ἕληται or ἕληταίκε, he will take or he may take (201, 1).

We find in Homer a few optatives expressing concession or permission, which have a neutral sense and can hardly be classed as either potential or wishing. See Il. iv. 17, “εἰ δ᾽ αὖ πωςτόδεπᾶσιφίλονκαὶ ἡδὺ πέλοιτο, ἦ τοιμὲνοἰκέοιτοπόλιςΠριάμοιο ἄνακτος, αὖτιςδ᾽ Ἀργείην ἙλένηνΜενέλαος ἄγοιτο” , where we may translate the apodosis either let the city still be a habitation and let M. carry away Helen, or the city may still be a habitation and M. may carry away Helen. In iii. 72 we have γυναῖκάτεοἴκαδ᾽ ἀγέσθω, and in iii. 255 τῷ δέκενικήσαντιγυνὴ καὶ κτήμαθ᾽ ἕποιτο, where ἀγέσθω and ἕποιτόκε refer to essentially the same thing with ἄγοιτο in iv. 19. Following Il. iii. 255(above) we have οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοιναίοιμενΤροίην, τοὶ δὲ νέονται, i. e. the rest of us may remain dwellers in Troy, while they will return to Greece. From such neutral future expressions were probably developed the two distinct uses of the optative. In its hortatory sense as a form of wishing, the optative was distinguished by the use of μή as a negative; while in its potential sense it had οὐ as its negative (as in οὐ μὴνγάρτικακώτερον ἄλλοπάθοιμι, for really I can suffer nothing worse, Il. xix. 321), and it was soon further marked by the addition of κέ or ἄν. (See Appendix I.)

[*] 14. In dependent clauses expressing purpose or the object of exertion or of fear, the optative is never an original form; but it always represents a dependent subjunctive or future indicative (8, b; 10) in the changed relation in which either of them is placed when its leading verb is changed from present or future to past time.

We represent this change in English by a change from may to might, or from shall or will to should or would; as ἔρχεται ἵνα ἴδῃ, he comes that he may see, ἦλθεν ἵνα ἴδοι, he came that he might see; ἐπιμελεῖται ὅπωςτοῦτογενήσεται, he takes care that this shall be done, ἐπεμελεῖτο ὅπωςτοῦτογενήσοιτο, he took care that this should be done; φοβεῖταιμὴ τοῦτοπάθῃ, he fears that he may suffer this; ἐφοβήθημὴ τοῦτοπάθοι, he feared that he might suffer this. Here the original subjunctive or future indicative (especially the latter) is very often used in place of the optative.

[*] 15. In all forms of indirect discourse the same principle (14) holds, that the optative after past tenses represents (in a changed relation) an indicative or a subjunctive of the direct form, which original mood is always used after present and future tenses, and may be retained after past tenses (667, 1).

Here again we see what the change is, for we represent it by our change from is to was, have to had, shall and will to should and would, etc.; as λέγει ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστιν, he says that it is true; ἔλεξεν ὅτι ἀληθὲςεἴη (or ἐστίν), he said that it was true; λέγει ὅτιγράψει, he says that he will write; ἔλεξεν ὅτιγράψοι (or γράψει), he said that he would write. So οὐκοἶδατίεἴπω, I know not what I shall say; οὐκ ᾔδειντίεἴποιμι (or εἴπω), I knew not what I should say.

[*] 16. In future conditions the optative expresses the supposition in a weakened future form, as compared with the stronger future of the subjunctive and the future indicative.

Compare ἐὰν ἔλθω, if I (shall) go (444), with εἰ ἔλθοιμι, if I should go (455). Often the form of the leading sentence (the apodosis) decides whether a given supposition shall be expressed by a subjunctive or by an optative; thus in DEM. iv. 11 we have ἂνοὗτόςτιπάθῃ, if anything happens (shall happen) to him (Philip), depending on ποιήσετε; and in the next sentence, referring to precisely the same contingency, we have εἴ τιπάθοι, depending on two optatives with ἄν.

[*] 17. The only remaining form of dependent optative is that found in past general suppositions, as εἴ τιςκλέψειεν (or ὃςκλέψειεν), ἐκολάζετο, if ever any one stole (or whoever stole), he was (always) punished (462; 531).

Here the optative after a past tense represents an original subjunctive after a present tense (11), differing in this from the optative in future conditions (16), which is in an original construction. The late development of this optative appears from its almost total absence in protasis with εἰ in Homer (468), where the corresponding subjunctive in protasis is also infrequent. It may therefore be disregarded in considering the primitive uses of the optative. (See 11 b.） For a more full discussion of the relations of the optative to the other moods, see Appendix I.

IV. Imperative.

[*] 18. The imperative expresses a command, exhortation, entreaty, or prohibition (250 and 259). E.g. Φεῦγε, begone! Ἐλθέτω, let him come. Δόςμοιτοῦτο, give me this. Μὴ ποίει ἄδικα, do not do what is unjust.