12-01.04.01 � Of Protestant Creeds

C H A P T E R I V. OF PROTESTANT CREEDS.

SECTION I.

FEW subjects perhaps have given birth to more grave and earnest discussion than that which is now to claim our attention. And so much extravagance has been indulged in by the respective advocates of the two extreme positions--the friends and the enemies of human creeds--that it is with reluctance I venture to record my judgment on the premises. But bearing so palpably as the question does upon the grand design of the present treatise, its consideration could not be wholly disregarded without exhibiting a manifest deficiency, while the work perhaps would fail thereby to accomplish its principal object. I shall, therefore, disregard the considerations which have tempted me to confine my remarks to the most general aspects of the subject, and endeavor to bring out somewhat prominently its specific characteristics, in so far as they are connected with exegetical science. We have seen that the Augsburg Confession of Faith was a practical repudiation of the principles of Protestantism; that it introduced the most uncompromising and intolerant dogmatism; that it established a precedent which, with here and there an exception, has, been followed by the founders of all Protestant sects; and that it superinduced the dogmatic method of interpretation--the necessary result of dogmatic creeds. It must now be determined, to the satisfaction of those interested, whether the principle that private judgment is the right of all, that upon which Luther and his compeers acted, was right or wrong; for if it was right then, it is right now; and if wrong now, it was always wrong. It must be either right or wrong;--let us try the creeds upon each of the suppositions:-- 1. First, then, we take the ground that the principle is absolutely right; then it follows that all Protestants who have departed from it by making a "positive creed" which determines beforehand what the interpretation of a large part of revelation shall be, and which inflicts penalties and disabilities for departing from that interpretation, are standing out in opposition to the right; for if the principle be right, to make a creed which violates it must be wrong. I am aware that when this point is pressed, the advocates of creeds reply that they are not authoritative, not positive and dogmatic, and do not control the judgment. But this is as much as to say that they are mere useless lumber. What good is there in a creed which is not enforced? What benefit in rules which do not bind? Why retain a confession which is but a dead letter? Such questions always bring out in one form or another the confession that creeds are "necessary as standards of orthodoxy;" that they are "indispensable to keep out heresy;" that they are "essential to maintain uniformity!" But if they do all this, then they have life, influence, power, authority; then they control the judgment; then they violate the principle of Protestantism; then they are wrong, if that principle is right! 2. They are forced, therefore, in consistency, to flee to the other hypothesis, and to take hold of the other horn, that the principle itself is wrong. Let us admit, then, for the sake of the argument, that it is wrong; that it is not adapted to the use of men in their present condition; that men have not the right to exercise private judgment, and to interpret Scripture for themselves. Then it follows that the whole Protestant movement was wrong from its inception; because neither Luther, nor Calvin, nor Melanchthon, nor Zwingli, had the right to interpret Scripture contrary to the canons and decretals of the church. They based their right of forming an independent judgment upon the correctness of the general principle, and if that principle was wrong, then their action was wrong. But if the principle was right, then all the subsequent development of Protestantism was wrong in not carrying it out. Whether, therefore, the principle is right or wrong, Protestant creeds are left wholly without defense. But the other distinguishing principle of Protestantism--the Bible alone--has been shown in a previous chapter to be also inconsistent with the various rules of faith and practice which are enforced along with it; hence, looking at the subject only in the light of these two principles, our course is plain: we must, to be consistent, either give up our creeds or our principles. If we give up the creeds, we shall retain all the wisdom and truth, all the precepts and promises, all the hopes and enjoyments, and all the instruction and consolation, which God has furnished us in his word. We lose nothing but our inconsistency, while we place ourselves in the attitude most favorable to the reception of the communications of the Bible, in their true and consistent sense. Whereas, if we give up our principles, we prove our creeds to be wrong in the very making of them, while we perpetuate in society the false interpretations to which they have given birth. A revolution of some kind must sooner or later take place; for whether the fundamental principles of Protestantism be true or false, they imperatively demand a radical change in the constitution of Protestant society. If true, they must be carried out--if false, we must go back to Romanism.