114. III. The True Arminian Doctrine.

III. The True Arminian Doctrine.

1. Native Depravity without Native Demerit.—We have previously shown that native depravity as a fact, and its sinfulness in a sense to deserve divine punishment, are distinct questions, and open to separate answers. The truth of the latter is no consequence of the truth of the former. We have maintained the reality of native depravity, but controverted the doctrine of its intrinsic demerit, and have no occasion to renew the discussion. The present aim is to point out the true position of Arminianism on the question of native sinfulness in the sense of penal desert, whether assumed to be grounded in a participation in the sin of Adam or in the corruption of nature inherited from him. That position, as we view it, is accurately expressed in the above heading: native depravity without native demerit. Native depravity is a part of the Arminian system, and entirely consistent with its principles; native demerit is discordant and contradictory.^[558]

^[558] Much of the Arminian treatment of original sin is unsatisfactory. Native desert of penal retribution cannot be reconciled with the determining principles of the Arminian system. Hence Arminians who accept such a doctrine of original sin, as not a few have done, are involved in confusion and contradiction in attempting its reconciliation with their own system. These facts call for a thorough review of the Arminian treatment of original sin. Such a review will be given in an appendix to our second volume. The question may be tested by the principle of freedom in Arminianism. There is no more fundamental principle. It occupies much the same position in this system that the divine sovereignty occupies in Calvinism. As this sovereignty underlies the predestination, the monergism, the irresistibility of grace, and the final perseverance, in the one; so freedom underlies the synergism, the real conditionality of salvation, and the possibility of apostasy in the other. In Arminianism freedom must include the power of choosing the good, as the necessary ground of a responsible probation. Repentance and faith as requisite to salvation must be possible; punishable deeds must be avoidable; responsible duties must be practicable. This is the meaning of Arminianism in the maintenance of a universal grace through a universal atonement; a grace which lifts up mankind into freedom, with power to choose the good. Such freedom is the condition of moral responsibility; and without it we could be neither sinful nor punishable, because our moral life could not proceed from our own personal agency. This is the doctrine of Arminianism, always and every-where firmly maintained. But if we could not be sinful and punishable in our actual life without free personal agency, or through morally necessitated evil deeds, how can we be sinful and punishable through the sin of Adam, or on the ground of an inherited corruption of nature? Nothing could be more utterly apart from our own agency than the one or the other. Nothing could be imposed by a more absolute necessitation. Native sinfulness in the sense of punitive desert is, therefore, openly contradictory to the deepest and most determining principle of the Arminian system. With the doctrine of native demerit there is confusion and contradiction in the Arminian treatment of original sin. This result is not from any unskillful handling of that doctrine, but from its intrinsic opposition to the ruling principles of this system. The attempted adjustment to these principles finds no resting-place until it reaches a free cancellation of that form of sin through the grace of a universal atonement. But this outcome is doctrinally much the same as the denial of original sin in the sense of demerit. It may remain in the theory, but must not be allowed to come into actuality. This is the usual outcome with Arminians who start with the doctrine of original sin in the sense of demerit. It is far better to start with the true Arminian doctrine than to reach it through so much doctrinal confusion and contradiction.

2. The Doctrine of our Seventh Article.—Articles of faith, whether formulated or appropriated by any particular Church, constitute the most definitive and authoritative expression of her doctrines. No exception can be admitted in the case of any doctrine so established. Peculiar doctrines, omitted in such articles, but grounded in approved teaching or in a common consensus, could be no exception. No diversities of interpretation can affect the principle; no improved formulation on the part of individuals can replace any established article. This principle is thoroughly valid for our seventh article, which defines our doctrine “of original or birth sin,” and will be of service in its interpretation. We must view it first in its terms, and then in its history.

“Original sin standeth not in the following of Adam, (as the Pelagians do vainly talk,) but it is the corruption of the nature of every man, that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and of his own nature inclined to evil, and that continually.”

Pelagianism went to the opposite extreme from the Augustinian anthropology, and not only denied all responsible participation of the race in the sin of Adam, but equally the corruption of human nature in consequence of his fall. We enter into life in the same moral state in which Adam began his. The consequence of his sin to the race is limited to the moral force of an evil example. First of all, the article repudiates this view. Its falsity we have previously shown.

Affirmatively defined, original sin “is the corruption of the nature of every man, that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and of his own nature inclined to evil, and that continually.” The doctrine we have maintained is in full accord with these definitive facts. We have fully asserted the loss of original righteousness, and the corruption of human nature, as consequences of the Adamic fall. We have maintained the common inclination to evil as the characteristic fact and the proof of native depravity. In maintaining the genetic transmission of this corruption of nature from Adam down through the race we are thoroughly at one with the article, which declares it to be “naturally engendered of the offspring of Adam.” The omissions of this article, as compared with other formulations of a doctrine of original sin, are worthy of special notice. There is not one word about a sharing of the race in the sin of Adam, or about the corruption of human nature as a judicial infliction on the ground of a common Adamic guilt. Nor is there one word which expresses or even implies an intrinsic sinfulness and damnableness of this inherited corruption of nature. Therefore we could controvert these special elements of the Augustinian doctrine, as we have done, without the slightest departure from our own doctrine as formulated in this article. The history of the article as a part of our own creed gives special doctrinal significance to this total absence of any sense of an intrinsic sinfulness of our native depravity. It is the ninth article of the Church of England, but greatly changed, especially by elimination. The change was made by Mr. Wesley, who, in 1784, prepared, and sent over by Bishop Coke, a set of articles for the American Methodists, then to be organized into a Church. These articles came before the notable Christmas Conference of 1784, which organized the Church. Nor were they passively accepted from Mr. Wesley, but were formally adopted by the Conference. So have they stood in our creed from the beginning. What is thus true of all the articles is true of the seventh. The doctrinal meaning of the change made in the original article appears in the light of these facts.^[559] If the article, just as it stands, had been an original formulation by Mr. Wesley or the Christmas Conference, the sense of an intrinsic penal desert of an inherited corruption of our nature could not be read into it. Much more is such a sense excluded by the formal elimination of every word which expressed it in the appropriated article. Every such word was so eliminated; not only the strong words, “it deserveth God’s wrath and damnation,” but the far softer word “fault,” as applied to this nature. It follows that native depravity without demerit or penal desert is the doctrine of our seventh article.^[560]

^[559] We here give so much of the original article as concerns the present question, and italicize the eliminations, that the change may be clearly seen: Original sin standeth not in the following of Adam (as the Pelagians do vainly talk), but it is thefault andcorruption of the nature of every man, that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to evil,so that the flesh lusteth always contrary to the spirit, and therefore in every person born into this world, it deserveth God’s wrath and damnation.

^[560]Such is our article “of original or birth sin;” and, so far as we know, it is the article of all the Methodist Churches of America. Hence, when Dr. Pope said, as we previously noted, that Methodism accepts the ninth article of the Church of England on original sin, clearly he was historically inaccurate.

It follows, further, that such is the doctrine of the Methodist Episcopal Church. There has been much questioning among divines of the Church of England respecting the terms of penal desert in their own article.^[561] Not a few have recoiled from their more obvious sense, and tried to soften their severer import. The complete elimination of these terms not only frees us from all such questioning, but wholly excludes from our doctrine the sense of demerit in native depravity. On a principle previously stated, our seventh article so determines our doctrine of original sin, that nothing contrary to it can have any authority on this question. For instance, in our second article the words still remain which set forth Christ as a sacrifice “for original guilt” as well as for “actual sins.” This recognition of native guilt should have been eliminated from the second article in order to bring it into harmony with the seventh. The simplest explanation of its remaining is through mere oversight in the revision of the articles.

^[561]Burnet, Lawrence, and Forbes severally on the Thirty-nine Articles, article ix.

Whatever the explanation, on this question of original sin the words can have no doctrinal weight against the specific seventh article. Any utterances in the writings of Wesley himself contrary to this article must yield to its doctrinal authority. “Wesley rejects the doctrine of our personal desert of damnation here affirmed, for the very good reason that it contradicts our intuitive sense of right and justice. That rejection removes a contradiction to the moral sense and to common sense from theology. Great were Wesley’s logical powers; greater his administrative powers; but greatest of all his intuitive powers. His primitive intuitive perceptions might for the time being be overborne by hereditary prejudices, or clamor of dogmas, or the temporary exigencies of argument; but when he hushed all these hinderances down, his intuitive faculties spoke with an almost infallible clearness. And undoubtedly the moment when he prepared these twenty-four articles was, if any moment of his life, the crisis when he looked at pure, absolute truth. Those articles were to be for all Methodism standard; and if ever, in sermon, essay, treatise, or commentary, he has expressed a different view, that different view is canceled before this one monumental work. Wesley himself would have to be over-ruled by his own twenty-four articles by us accepted ‘of faith.’”^[562] What is thus true of all the articles is specially true of the seventh,—specially, because of the profound doctrinal change made in it by elimination.^{[563] [562]} Whedon:Methodist Quarterly Review, 1882, p. 365.

^[563]In the earlier writings of Wesley there are utterances doctrinally contrary to this article, and which therefore must be canceled by its supreme authority. In his Southern Review, 1876, Dr. Bledsoe ably discussed the doctrinal significance of the change in this article, and maintained, as a sure implication, that in his later years Wesley repudiated his earlier views of original sin. Our theologians, who in the treatment of anthropology asserted a strong doctrine of native demerit, yet in the fuller discussion of the Arminian system, particularly in its issues with Calvinism, practically came into full harmony with the doctrine of our seventh article. Others, however, have denied the native demerit and from the beginning maintained the doctrine of the article. Respecting inherited depravity, Dr. Fisk says: “The guilt of depravity is not imputed to the subject of it until by intelligent volition he makes the guilt his own by resisting and rejecting the grace of the Gospel.”^[564] It has already appeared that such is the view of Dr. Whedon. Against the doctrine of reprobation, which grounds itself in the assumption that all men deserve an eternal penal doom simply on account of original sin, he says: “We hold, on the contrary, that though sinward tendencies exist in germ in the infant, yet there is no responsibility, and no damnability, until these tendencies are deliberately and knowingly acted in real life, and by that action appropriated and sanctioned.”^[565] The decisive doctrinal point in both citations is that, with the reality of native depravity, guilt can arise only on the ground of responsible personal volition.

^[564]Calvinistic Controversy, p. 183.

^[565]Commentary,Ephesians 2:3.

There is a special Arminian view of original sin which should not be passed without notice. While denying all sharing of the race in the guilt of Adam’s sin, it asserts a common guilt on the ground of inherited depravity, and then covers this guilt with the canceling grace of justification.^[566] This view is specially open to criticism, and for any consistency of doctrine should maintain a common infant regeneration as well as justification. If inherited depravity is intrinsically sinful, so as to involve us in guilt and condemnation, justification is impossible so long as it remains. It is the doctrine of some creeds that a portion of original sin remains in the regenerate, but that the guilt thereof is not imputed to believers.^[567] There is great perplexity even in this view. It is not claimed that this remnant of original sin is different in moral character from the prior whole; rather it is declared to be of the nature of sin, just as the prior whole. How then can we be justified from the guilt of a nature, though but a modicum of the original whole, but which is intrinsically sinful and still remains within us? Let anyone analyze this question and set it in the light of clear thought, and he will find the answer very perplexing. How then shall we explain the justification of infants who are born with the totality of this corrupt and sinful nature? There is no possible explanation. With such a doctrine of original sin infant regeneration must go with infant justification, for otherwise the latter is impossible. Further, if infants are born in a regenerate state, the ground of native guilt has disappeared, and there is no need of the justification. And, finally, with the disappearance of native depravity, the doctrinal outcome stands rather with Pelagius and Socinus than with Arminius and Wesley.

^[566]Summers:Systematic Theology, vol. ii, pp. 36-39. By the editor.

^[567]Articles of the Church of England, article ix; Westminster Confession, chap, vi, sec. v.

3. The Requirement of a True Definition of Sin.—There can be no true definition of sin which includes the guilt of an inherited nature. A mere nature cannot be the subject of guilt. No more can it be sinful in the sense of penal desert. Only a person can be the subject of guilt; and a person can be a responsible sinner only through his own agency. There can be no true definition of sin which omits a responsible personal agency. Arminianism can admit no definition which omits such agency or includes the guilt of an inherited corruption of nature. A prominent definition is given in these words: “Sin is any want of conformity unto, or transgression of, the law of God.”^[568] There is no objection to this formula, as it may be fairly interpreted consistently with a true definition. It does not exclude personal agency from any form of responsible sin. Yet it is often so interpreted and applied to the common inherited depravity. The meaning is, that this nature is out of conformity with the law of God, and therefore it is sin. This sense contradicts the imperative principles above stated, and means that simply on the ground of an inherited corruption of nature every infant is a responsible sinner and deserves an eternal penal doom. Any sinful non-conformity to the law of God must have respect to the law’s demands. It, however, lays no demands upon human nature, simply as such, and without personality. Hence there can be no sinful disconformity of an inherited nature to the law of God. The divine law lays its demands upon persons, and only upon persons. If these demands have respect to our inner nature, and even to our inherited depravity, still they are laid upon us in our personality, and with the recognition of our personal responsibility for oar present moral state. While not responsible for the corruption of our nature by genetic transmission, yet, with the grace of purification freely offered and at hand, we are justly responsible for its continuance. Still, the law makes its demands of us in our personality, and any sinful disconformity to these demands involves our personal agency. Another definition of the Westminster Confession gives the true principle, which really excludes such an erroneous interpretation: “Sin is any want of conformity unto, or transgression of any law of God, given as a rule to the reasonable creature.”^[569] The ruling principle of this definition is, that sin is some form of disobedience to a divine law imposed upon a rational subject. Such a subject must be a person, with the power of personal agency; and only through his own agency can he become a responsible sinner according to the terms of this definition.

^[568]Westminster Confession: Shorter Catechism, Q. 14 ^[569]The Larger Catechism, Q. 24.

Arminius gives, by appropriation, a good definition of sin: “Something thought, spoken, or done against the law of God; or the omission of something which has been commanded by that law to be thought, spoken, or done.”^[570] The sin so defined he calls, by general characterization, actual sin. In the details all the forms of actual sin may be included; and equally all the forms of responsible sin which an Arminian definition can consistently include. In replying to an objection assumed to contradict the possibility of salvation from all sin in the present life, Mr. Wesley gives a definition of sin: ‘‘I answer, it will perfectly well consist with salvation from sin, according to that definition of sin (which I apprehend to be the scriptural definition of it), a voluntary transgression of a known law.”^[571] It is entirely consistent with this definition so to broaden the sense of transgression as to include all forms of disobedience to the divine law, and even all the details given in the definition of Arminius. The voluntary element goes with all. In close connection with the definition the same sense of sin is asserted, and a contrary sense discarded. Both the definitions in this paragraph are in full accord with Arminian doctrine.

^[570]Writings, vol. i, p. 486 ^[571]Sermons, vol. ii, p. 172.

We add our own definition: Sin is disobedience to a law of God, conditioned on free moral agency and opportunity of knowing the law. In this view, law is the expression of the divine will respecting human duty, and the mode of the expression is indifferent to the principles of the definition. The disobedience may be either a transgression or an omission; in either thought or feeling, word or deed. It must be some doing or omission of doing; therefore, really some doing. An omission of duty is as really voluntary as any act of transgression. The specified free agency and opportunity of knowing the law are necessary conditions of moral responsibility, and therefore the necessary conditions of sin. Such disobedience, and only such, is sin in the sense of penal desert. Omit any specified element, or admit any contrary element, and there can be no true definition of sin. Native demerit excludes every element of the true definition. Therefore native depravity cannot be sin in the sense of penal desert.

4. Native Depravity a Reality and a Moral Ruin.—We previously pointed out that native depravity, as a subjective moral state, is the very same under a law of genetic transmission that it would be if a judicial infliction on the ground of a common Adamic guilt. So, we here point out that, as such a state, it is the very same without the demerit of sin that it would be with such demerit. It follows that the reality of native depravity is not affected by the disproof of its intrinsic sinfulness. The argument previously maintained in proof of native depravity fully remains in its conclusiveness. Nor is the common native depravity any less really a state of moral ruin. The evils attributed to it in our own articles are intrinsic to its nature. “It is the corruption of the nature of every man, that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and of his own nature inclined to evil, and that continually.” This is a state of alienage from the true spiritual life, and utterly without fitness for a state of holy blessedness. Nor have we any power of self-redemption. “The condition of man after the fall of Adam is such that he cannot turn and prepare himself, by his own natural strength and works, to faith, and calling upon God; wherefore we have no power to do good works, pleasant, and acceptable to God, without the grace of God by Christ preventing us, that we may have a good will, and working with us, when we have that good will.”^[572] Such is the doctrine of native depravity which we have maintained, while controverting the assumption of its intrinsic sinfulness.

^[572]Articles vii, viii.

How then is Christ the Saviour of infants, particularly of such as die in infancy? This question will not fail to be asked. “But if the infant is irresponsible, how can Christ be to him a pardoner of sin and a Saviour? We might reply, that it does not make Christ any pardoner of sin to imagine a factitious sin, or a guilt which has no foundation in the nature of things. The pardon will remain just as factitious, just as merely verbal, as the guilt to be pardoned. But Christ still stands a Saviour to the infant, as we hold, in the following respects: 1. We have elsewhere shown that had Christ not been given the race would, in all probability, not have been permitted to be propagated after the fall. . . . So the grace of Christ underlies the very existence of every human being that is born. 2. Between the infant descendant of fallen Adam and God there is a contrariety of moral nature, by which the former is irresponsibly, and in undeveloped condition, averse to the latter, and so displacent to him. By Christ, the Mediator, that averseness is regeneratively removed, and the divine complacency restored: so that the race is enabled to persist under the divine grace, 3. Christ, in case of infant death, entirely removes this sinward nature, so as to harmonize the being with the holiness of heaven. 4. Christ is the infant’s justifier against every accuser . . . whether devils, evil men, or mistaken theologians; asserting their claim through his merits, in spite of their fallen lineage, to redemption and heaven. Being thus purified, justified, and glorified by Christ, none are more truly qualified to join in the song of Moses and the Lamb.”^{[573] [573]} Whedon:Commentary,Ephesians 2:3.

Careful and candid students of historical theology, on the question of anthropology assign to Arminianism the doctrinal position which we have maintained—native depravity without native demerit.^[574]

^[574] Hill:Divinity, pp. 398-400; Cunningham:Historical Theology, vol. ii, p. 388; Muller:Christian Doctrine of Sin, vol. ii, p. 320; Shedd:History of Doctrines, vol. ii, pp. 178-186; Schaff:Creeds of Christendom, vol. i, p. 897.

5. Question of Practical Results.—The doctrine of native demerit is often commended on an assumption of practical value. The view is this: the deeper the sense of sin, the more thorough is the moral recovery and the intenser the spiritual life; the deepest sense of sin is possible only with the doctrine of native demerit; hence the practical value of the doctrine. The major premise is not questioned; but the minor is disputed. Besides, with the admission of practical benefit, the doctrine may have evil consequences which more than balance the good. The deepest sense of sin is possible only with the sense of personal culpability. No form of original sin can furnish this element. Even the higher realism does not assume that we can have any personal consciousness of a responsible sharing in the sin of Adam. The alleged ground of such sharing is purely speculative, and too shadowy for any real sense of culpability for that sin. The representative theory is quite as impotent. Indeed, in its own definitions it denies the culpability of the race for the sin of Adam. The demerit of that sin was personal to himself and untransferable to his offspring. So the doctrine asserts. Here is the difference between reatus culpae and reatus poenae. We are amenable to the- punishment of Adam’s sin, but not guilty of the sin itself—do not share its culpability or turpitude. The difference is profound, and must be profound for our moral consciousness. A mere guilt judicially imposed, and without any ground in personal desert, never can bring the soul into that deep sense of sin which is of special value in its moral recovery. There can be no true sense of responsibility for the derivation of a depraved nature from Adam. If on reaching a responsible age the stirrings of this nature trouble the conscience, let the experience be analyzed, and there will be found underlying the sense of responsibility the deeper sense of power in hand, or power at hand, to restrain these impulses and to prevent their ruling power in the life. It is only at the point where personal agency meets the activities of this inherited nature that the true sense of responsibility can arise. We do not find in the doctrine of native guilt the element of practical value assumed in its commendation. The doctrine tends to excess, and in its earlier history soon ran into great exaggeration; so much so as to absorb attention and quite dismiss the infinitely deeper turpitude of actual sin as a matter of comparatively little concern. Since the time of Augustine, and in the line of his following, native sinfulness in the sense of penal desert has been the great theme of doctrinal anthropology. It has dominated the view of the atonement and the interpretation of Scripture. The atonement meets its profoundest necessity in the enormity of native guilt. The question has even been raised whether Christ atoned for any other form of sin. After Paul proves by a great argument the universality of actual sin, and in that truth grounds the necessity for the atonement and justification by faith, his doctrine of sin is interpreted as having almost exclusive reference to original sin—that form of guilt and damnableness in which all are held to be born. The world of actual sinners is thus dismissed from the view of Paul, and the world of infants is put in their place as though the very worst of sinners. This appears in the interpretation of a popular statement of Paul (Romans 5:12-19) respecting the relation of the Adamic fall to the universal sinfulness, and the relation of the atonement in Christ to our justification and salvation. This exaggeration of native sinfulness, with the consequence of pushing men’s actual and personally responsible sins so much out of view, cannot be a practical good; indeed, must be a practical evil. The early history of the doctrine discloses very serious consequences of evil to the true Christian life. These evils appeared in baptismal regeneration and sacerdotalism. It is not meant that either had its inception with Augustine. Both appear in the high ecclesiasticism of which Cyprian was a chief representative. But there was already a strong doctrine of native guilt, as may be seen specially in Tertullian; and from their inception both baptismal regeneration and sacerdotalism will be found in close connection with this doctrine. The doctrine of Augustine fell in with those evil tendencies, and so was received with the greater favor.^[575] His doctrine of native sin not only fell in with these evils, but by its own exaggerated form greatly intensified them. The law of this consequence is easily disclosed.

^[575]Milman:Latin Christianity, vol. i, p. 172. The doctrine of Augustine carried with it the damnation of infants. This consequence was felt to be horrible. Augustine himself was appalled. No wonder that he cried to Jerome for help in this awful perplexity. There could be no rest. All the better feelings of pious souls cried out for relief. There were no eyes to see the assured blessedness of dying infants in the free grace of a universal atonement. Relief was sought in the sacrament of baptism. Baptism must have power to wash away sin—must have, because of the exigency of infant salvation. Baptism thus became a saving ordinance; and, naturally enough, very soon for adult sinners as well as for dying infants. Here was the source of infinite detriment to the spiritual life of the Church. But if the sacraments are saving we must have a priesthood for their proper administration. Sacerdotalism is the result. Sacerdotalism, like baptismal regeneration, has been a calamity to the Christian life. By legitimate consequence, Augustine’s exaggerated doctrine of native sin greatly strengthened and intensified both, and sent them down the centuries as a fearful heritage of evil. Moral paralysis and despair were in his doctrine. Within the moral and religious sphere, man was absolutely helpless; a mass of sin and perdition, with power only to sin, and under the absolute necessity of sinning. In the utter blackness and darkness of the doctrine no eyes could see the universal grace of a universal atonement. We are pleased to note that many who have inherited the substance of this doctrine have freed themselves from its more serious consequences. Yet it still widely nourishes and supports the deadly evils of baptismal regeneration and sacerdotalism. The doctrine we maintain is free from all such evil results, and yet carries with it the very best practical forces. It is well known that the Methodist doctrine of sin is greatly modified by her doctrine of the atonement and the universality of its grace. We have ever held the doctrine of a common native depravity; that this depravity is in itself a moral ruin; and that there is no power in us by nature unto a good life. But through a universal atonement there is a universal grace—the light and help of the Holy Spirit in every soul. If we are born with a corrupt nature in descent from Adam, we receive our existence under an economy of redemption, with a measure of the grace of Christ. With such grace, which shall receive increase on its proper use, we may turn unto the Lord and be saved. With these doctrines of native depravity and universal grace there is for every soul the profoundest lesson of personal responsibility for sin, and of the need of Christ in order to salvation and a good life.

General reference.—Augustine: On Original Sin, Works, vol. xii, Edinburgh, 1874; Calvin: Institutes, book ii, chaps, i-iii; Witsius: The Covenants, book i; Edwards: Original Sin, Works, vol. ii, part iv; Wesley: The Doctrine of Original Sin, Works, vol. v, pp. 492-669; Wiggers: Augustinism and Pelagianism; Hopkins: Doctrine of the Two Covenants; Straffen: Sin as Set Forth in the Scriptures, Hulsean Lectures, 1874; Persier: Oneness of the Race in its Fall and its Future, translated from the French; Wallace: Representative Responsibility; Dwight: Theology, sermons xxvi-xxxiii; Baird: The Elohim Revealed, chaps, vii-xviii; Fitch: The Nature of Sin; Princeton Essays, Original Sin, v; Doctrine of Imputation, vi-viii; Taylor: The Scripture Doctrine of Original Sin; Pond: Christian Theology, lects. xxix-xxxv; Shedd: The Doctrine of Original Sin, Theological Essays, pp. 211-264; Dogmatic Theology, Anthropology; Hodge: Systematic Theology, Anthropology; Laidlaw: The Bible Doctrine of Man; Tulloch:The Christian Doctrine of Sin; Boardman: The Scripture Doctrine of Original Sin; Flower: Adam’s Disobedience and its Results; Burgess: Original Sin; Landis: Original Sin, and Gratuitous Imputation; Glover: A Short Treatise on Original Sin; Muller: The Christian Doctrine of Sin; Fisher: Discussions in History and Theology, Augustinian and Federal Theories; Payne: The Doctrine of Original Sin, Congregational Lectures, 1845; Curry: Fragments, Religious and Theological, i-iii ; Raymond:Systematic Theology, Anthropology.