148. Chapter 2: Doctrinal Issues.

Chapter 2 Doctrinal Issues. The question of the conditionality of salvation involves the leading doctrinal issues between Arminianism and Calvinism. The conditionality is central to the former, and carries with it the universality of the atonement, moral freedom, the resistibility of grace, and the possibility of final apostasy. The counter doctrines of the latter are: predestination, limited atonement, moral necessity, irresistibility of saving grace, and the absolute final perseverance of believers.

These are the notable “Five Points,” long in issue between the two systems. On the Calvinistic side, their more exact formulation was the work of the Synod of Dort, year 1619.^[765] In substance they are common to Calvinistic creeds, and must be, since they are intrinsic to the system. They are also common to works of Calvinistic authorship on systematic theology. The opposing tenets of Arminianism were formulated by the Remonstrants, a body of leading Arminian divines, year 1610.^[766] In these articles there is some lack of decision on the question of free agency, and notable reservation respecting final perseverance. Indeed, Arminius himself never reached a dogmatic position on this question. There is, however, no such indecision or reservation in the Wesleyan Arminianism. Nor should there be any, since free agency and the possibility of final apostasy are intrinsic to the system.

^[765]Schaff:Creeds of Christendom, vol. iii, pp. 581-595 ^[766]Ibid., pp. 545-549 The issues respecting the extent of the atonement and free agency are of chief importance. If on these two the truth is with Arminianism, so must it be on all the others. The former of the two was sufficiently discussed in our treatment of the atonement. The latter will receive a like treatment in the proper place. With such attention to these leading issues a brief treatment of the others will suffice.

I. Doctrine Of Predestination.

1. Divine Decrees.—Predestination is a specific part of the broader doctrine of decrees. While the former relates particularly to the destiny of angels and men, the latter embraces all events in the history of the universe. The doctrine is thus formulated: “God from all eternity did by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass.”^{[767] [767]} Westminster Confession, chap. iii. In the interpretation of the decrees various attributes are definitely affirmed of them. They are eternal and immutable. Their immutability means that events in time must answer to them exactly and absolutely. They are unconditional and absolute. One thing may be a means to another, and so be necessarily prior in the process of divine effectuation, but must be without any contingency. The event decreed must come to pass. “The decrees of God are certainly efficacious.” Dr. Hodge maintains this proposition, yet in a manner which seeks to avoid its inevitable implications. “All events embraced in the purpose of God are equally certain, whether he has determined to bring them to pass by his own power or simply to permit their occurrence through the agency of his creatures. “ An efficacious decree must be causal to the event decreed. A permissive decree cannot be thus efficacious. The two ideas of causation and permission cannot stand together respecting the same event. The mere permission of events through human agency lets in the contingency of free agency, which yet can have no place in the system. If the decrees of God are efficacious in any proper sense of the term, they must be causal to the things or events decreed, and to the sins of men as really as to anything else. They embrace all events, every thing that comes to pass in the entire history of the universe. Here there is no distinction between the physical and moral realms; between divine acts and human acts; between righteous acts and sinful acts.^[768]

^[768] Hodge:Systematic Theology, vol. i, pp. 540-545; Shedd:Dogmatic Theology, vol. i, pp. 399-405; Henry B. Smith:System of Christian Theology, pp. 117-119. The alleged proofs of the doctrine of decrees are certainly inconclusive. There is an analogical argument, that, as there is a fixed order of things in the physical realm, so should there be a fixed order in the moral realm. “There is the same God working in natural and moral government.” Doubtless: but does he work in the same mode in the two? If he does, the moral must be subject to an absolute necessitation. The repudiation of this consequence is the abandonment of the analogical argument. There is a rational argument, that it is best that all events should be embraced in the divine plan. But the divine omniscience can embrace all things, even the free volitions of men. If this be impossible, then the only alternative is their absolute necessitation. This consequence refutes the argument.

Arguments are drawn from the divine attributes. Omniscience requires the certainty of all futurities. Certainty can arise only from an interior necessity or from a divine decree. Therefore, as human volitions have no interior necessitation, they must be made certain by such a decree. But how can the decree give the necessary certainty? In itself it can have no influence upon any future event. The certainty can be attained only by an absolute purpose of God to give effect to the decree. But there could be no freedom in any human volition so caused. Either this argument from the divine omniscience is groundless or absolute necessity is the consequence. An argument is drawn from the immutability of God. It must assume that the contingency of human freedom is inconsistent with his immutability. If there be truth in this assumption there is no place for a moral system, which is possible only with freedom. But there is no such inconsistency; and the immutability of God, which lies in his own absolute perfections, is just as complete with a moral government over free subjects as it could be with one over subjects under moral necessity. Another argument is drawn from the holiness of God. As a holy being, he must purpose the triumph of holiness. But with the contingency of human freedom the future could not be foreknown, and the divine purpose might be thwarted; therefore God must subject all volitions to his decree. Now it is certain that he does foreknow all evil volitions just as he foreknows the good ; hence, if his foreknowledge is conditioned on his decree, he must decree the evil just as he does the good. But, as we said before, such a decree is powerless in itself, and can be made efficacious only by the divine agency. A doctrine which means, not only that God decrees evil volitions, but causally determines them, cannot be true. The divine decrees are held to be of two kinds: one kind efficacious; the other, permissive. The former are rendered efficacious by the divine agency m physical nature, and in the sphere of the ethically good, particularly in the salvation of the elect. The latter have relation only to sin. All sin is permissively decreed; all else is efficaciously decreed. Much is made of this distinction in the Calvinistic treatment of the doctrine. It is assumed that our free agency is thus secured, and that God is thoroughly cleared of the authorship of sin. These assumptions constitute a part of the formulated doctrine of God’s eternal decree: “Yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin; nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established.”^[769] Calvinists must have full credit for these positions, but the positions themselves are fairly open to criticism.

^[769]Westminster Confession, chap. iii.

If the permissive decree, as distinguished from the efficacious, provides for a responsible freedom in sinning, and is necessary to such freedom, it follows that the efficacious decree in respect to the salvation of the elect must preclude their free agency. Indeed, it must preclude all such agency within the sphere of the ethically good. Yet the formulated doctrine broadly asserts the liberty or contingency of second causes, without any distinction between the evil and the good. Further, in the Calvinistic exposition of the doctrine, free agency in the good is as fully maintained as in the evil. Now, if free agency in the good is consistent with the efficacious decrees, free agency in evil must be consistent with the same kind of decrees. This means that God might decree sin and efficaciously determine its commission, while yet it should be committed in responsible freedom, and himself be clear of its authorship. Here are serious perplexities for the doctrine.

Other points are yet more perplexing. The decrees are held to be the ground of the foreknowledge of God, the necessary and only ground of his certainty of any futurity, For instance, he could not have foreknown the sin and fall of Adam, nor the sin of Judas in the betrayal of our Lord, nor the manner of his crucifixion, with all the sin therein, if he had not decreed it. My first point of criticism is, that the doctrine is inconsistent with the divine omniscience. The knowledge of God is conditioned on his decree. A conditioned knowledge is an acquired knowledge; and an acquired knowledge never can possess the plenitude of omniscience. It may be said that both the decree and the knowledge are eternal, and therefore the latter cannot be acquired. It is true that we cannot go back of eternity in any order of time; but there is a logical priority among things declared to be eternal. In the order of nature the decree must be prior to the knowledge which it is held to condition. Moreover, the decree is a personal act of God, and there must have been an eternity back of it wherein he could know nothing of any futurity. However, the ground of the present criticism was sufficiently considered in our treatment of omniscience.

Further, permissive decrees cannot furnish the ground assumed to be necessary to the divine certainty of the future. A permissive decree is simply a decree not to prevent this or that sin. It respects simply the divine agency, and is powerless over the human, which is thus left to the contingency of freedom. How can such a decree furnish the necessary ground of the divine foreknowledge? If God decreed the deep repentance of David and the decree included its divine effectuation, then there was the requisite ground of certainty; but could a decree simply to permit the heinous sin of David be such a ground?

Some puzzling questions arise just here. How could God permissively decree the sin of David while as yet, according to this doctrine, he could know nothing of its commission? and how could he efficaciously decree the repentance of David while as yet he could know nothing of the sin for which he should repent? The first question is equally pertinent respecting all other sins. A leading argument for the divine decrees is that future volitions, if left to the contingency of free agency, are pure nothings, and therefore are not foreknowable, not even to God. Hence it is that they must be decreed in order to be foreknown. Such are the declared facts respecting all sins. Then, again, the question is. How could God permissively decree all those sins, when he could know nothing of them until they were decreed?

We here emphasize a point previously stated, that a decree made in eternity cannot in itself be determinative of any event in time. Only the divine agency as operative in time can make it efficacious: but such agency has no place in a permissive decree. How, then, shall such a decree make certain to the divine mind the volitional futurities of free agency? “In the instance of sin, the certainty of the self-determination is inexplicable, because we cannot say in this case that God works in man ‘to will and to do.’” So says Dr. Shedd. But it is more than inexplicable; it is impossible, according to the doctrine of decrees. The sinful volition or deed has back of it simply a permissive decree which, as we have seen, is utterly powerless for its determination. Nor can the divine agency go forth to its determination; for this would make God the author of sin, which the doctrine repudiates. Yet it is only by the purpose of such a mode of effectuation that the divine decree can make certain the futurities of sin. An argument is put in this manner: It is a truth of the Scriptures that in many instances the sins of men were foreknown to God; therefore they must have been decreed. The fact of such foreknowledge is not questioned. Its truth is manifest in the fulfillment of prophecies of sinful deeds. But the inference respecting decrees is denied. The argument assumes their necessity to the divine prescience; but we have shown, not only that this assumption is groundless, but that it is contradictory to the plenitude of the divine omniscience. The argument often proceeds with special reference to the sins committed against Christ in the execution of the divine plan of redemption. There was such a plan; and there were sinful deeds in its execution. These facts are clearly scriptural. “Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain.” “For of a truth against thy holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and the people of Israel, were gathered together, for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done” (Acts 2:23; Acts 4:27-28). These are the favorite texts. It is plain that such sinful deeds were to enter into the execution of the divine plan of redemption. The sin of Judas in the betrayal of our Lord must be included. We have stated the case in its greatest strength. The interpretation of the facts is now the question. My first point is this: While it was necessary that Christ should suffer and die in order to the redemption of the world, the precise manner in which he did suffer and die was not so necessary. Who shall say that the part of Judas in its precise form, and the parts of Herod, and Pilate, and the Gentiles, and the people of Israel, as severally acted, were essential to an atonement for sin by the incarnate Son of God? If so necessary there is no accounting for the fulfillment of the part of each except by a divine determination thereto. But there is no such determination in a permissive decree; and this is the only kind here allowed. The efficacious decree is excluded because it would make God the author of sin. My next point is, that the facts are open to an easy explanation without any resort to a determining decree. In the absolute prescience of God he foreknew the parts certain men would freely act under given conditions, and in his infinite wisdom he was pleased to appropriate such parts in the execution of the plan of redemption. Thus it was that, according to his determinate counsel and foreknowledge, God delivered his Son to be betrayed and crucified and slain, just in the manner that he was, by the free acts of men. This interpretation means all that a permissive decree of God can mean in this case. And predestinarians must accept this interpretation or replace their permissive decree by an efficacious decree. But this they cannot do, for by their own concession it would make God the author of sin.^{[770] [770]} The sending of Joseph into Egypt—Genesis 14:4-5—is easily explained in like manner.

2. Predestination.—As before stated, predestination respects the destinies of men and angels. It includes both election and reprobation: the unconditional election of a part to final blessedness, and an absolute reprobation of the rest to final misery. “By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting death.”^[771] In each case the number is unchangeably fixed, so “that it cannot be either increased or diminished.”

^[771]Westminster Confession, chap. iii.

3. Election.—Election, in its human application, means that all who are predestinated unto final blessedness God “hath chosen in Christ, unto everlasting glory,” without foresight of any thing in them as the reason of their election. There are in the Scriptures many instances of divine election; but the question is, whether they support this Calvinistic doctrine of an absolute election to final blessedness.

There are instances of personal election to special privileges and duties: of Abraham to be the progenitor of Christ, and the founder of a nation which should fulfill important offices in the accomplishment of the purposes of God; of Isaac and Jacob, instead of Ishmael and Esau, to the heritage of promises made to Abraham; of Cyrus to the work of restoring the Jews and rebuilding the temple; of the apostles to the preaching of the Gospel and the planting of Christianity; but in neither instance did the election include an unconditional predestination to final blessedness. And any assumption that these elections were wholly irrespective of any fitness in the persons chosen for their several offices is purely gratuitous. The Jews were elected as a nation to special religious privileges and blessings. Thus it “was that they came into the possession of a divine revelation and divinely instituted forms of worship, together with many other blessings and privileges (Romans 9:4-5). But final blessedness was not an unconditional benefit of this election. If it had been, then, according to the Calvinistic doctrine, all must have been brought into a gracious state in the present life. That many of them were not so brought is manifest in the Scriptures. Further, by the rejection of the Jews on account of their unbelief, their election was transformed into a reprobation (Romans 11:17-21). But an unconditional election to final blessedness could not be so transformed. Hence no such blessing could have been included among the benefits to which the Jews were originally elected.

There are some texts which, on a superficial view, seem to favor the doctrine of predestination; but a deeper insight finds them entirely consistent with Arminian doctrine. We shall consider two of these texts—the two of chief reliance on the Calvinistic side.

One is as follows: “For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the first-born among many brethren. Moreover, whom he did predestinate, them he also called: and whom he called, them he also justified: and whom he justified, them he also glorified” (Romans 8:29-30). What is the meaning of did foreknow—προέγνω)? The literal sense is to know beforehand. Some of the best authorities maintain that it never means any thing else. If the word is to favor the Calvinistic doctrine it must have the sense of choosing or electing. But it would thus have much the same meaning as predestinate; while the two terms, ποένω and προώισε, as here used, are plainly different. The element of knowledge cannot be eliminated from the former. It may include definite facts respecting the persons foreknown; as, for instance, that, on the divine call through the Gospel, they would freely accept the offered salvation in Christ, and that they would abide in the Christian faith and life. We thus preserve the sense of divine prescience, which cannot be eliminated from the meaning of προέγνω, and avoid the unwarranted meaning of election or choice which the Calvinistic doctrine must give to the term. With the sense of divine prescience which we now have, all parts of the texts fall into harmony. All who are foreknown of God as obedient to the divine call are predestinated to an ultimate blessedness. “Them he also called”—through the preaching of the Gospel. The purpose of God is the salvation of all who are so called; so that all such are called according to his purpose. In a yet deeper sense the calling is according to his purpose only when the offered salvation is freely accepted. Hence it is that those who freely accept the call and enter into a state of salvation are designated as the called—τοίσ κλητυοίς (1 Corinthians 1:24). “Whom he called, them he also justified: and whom he justified, them he also glorified.” But neither the justification nor the glorification is without respect to a free compliance with its divinely required terms. The preponderance of exegetical authority is in favor of such an interpretation as we have here given: “The best commentators, ancient and modern, are mostly agreed that προέγνω is to be understood ofprescience of character; and προέγω of determination founded on such prescience.”^{[772] [772]} Bloomfield:Greek Testament, in loc. The second text that we had in view is in these words: “According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love: having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will” (Ephesians 1:4-5). Here, then, is an election in Christ, before the foundation of the world, unto holiness; and a predestination unto a gracious sonship, according to the good will or pleasure of God. Do these facts, as here presented, prove the Calvinistic doctrine of election? A long and familiar use of terms in a given sense tends to the conviction that such must be their meaning. No doubt this is the case respecting the terms election and predestination. For many minds they mean, and must mean, absolute divine determinations. However, there is nothing decisive in such a conviction, and the question whether such is the meaning of these terms, as here used, is still fairly in issue. In the opening of this chapter St. Paul addresses the saints in Ephesus, and thanks God for the fullness of their spiritual blessings. Though mostly Gentiles, yet they suffered no restriction of Christian privilege on that account. They came into possession of all these blessings according to their divine election and predestination. So much is clearly in the meaning of St. Paul’s words. What is the subject of his ruling thought? Clearly this: The elective purpose of God, even from before the foundation of the world, to admit the Gentiles, equally with the Jews, to all the blessings of the Gospel of Christ. Great prominence is given to this thought in the progress of this epistle. Time and again it comes to the chief place. It is a most grateful subject to the mind of Paul, the apostle to the Gentiles. The accomplishment of this divine purpose in the evangelization of these Ephesians furnished the immediate occasion for the prominence here given it. The Gospel was preached to them in fulfillment of the elective purpose of God, and all who truly received it came into possession of its blessings according to that same purpose. But there is nothing in all this which either expresses or implies an absolute personal election to salvation. If we should even concede the personal election of these Ephesians to an actual salvation, it is still open for us to maintain that it was on the divine foresight of their free compliance with its required terms. There is nothing in the text at all contradictory to this view; and it is in such full accord with the Scriptures respecting the actual conditionality of salvation, that it may be successfully maintained against all the alleged proofs of an absolute personal election. Without such an election, these Ephesians could still be saved according to the elective purpose of God. His supreme purpose in the election of the Gentiles to the full privileges of the Gospel was their salvation. Indeed, this election is a part of his great plan in sending his Son to be the Saviour of the world (John 3:17; 1 Timothy 2:4; 1 John 4:14). Who, in the face of the texts here given by reference, can hold it to be the good pleasure of God to save only an elect part of mankind? With the gracious preference of a universal salvation, every soul might be saved according to his eternal purpose in the mission of his Son. So these Ephesians were saved according to their divine election, in the fulfillment of which the Gospel was preached unto them, and, being freely and truly accepted, was efficacious in their salvation. Indeed, the purpose of God in their election to the privileges of the Gospel was fully accomplished only in their actual salvation; so true it is that they were saved according to the purpose of their divine election. But there is nothing in all this contrary to the truest conditionality of salvation; nothing in proof of an absolute predestination of a definite part of mankind to final blessedness, with the consequent reprobation of the rest to an inevitable penal doom. On the other hand, there are the very many texts which clearly mean the conditionality of final blessedness, which are not else open to any satisfactory interpretation, and which therefore disprove the doctrine of an unconditional predestination. Arminianism is entirely satisfied with this position of the issue.

4. Reprobation.—Reprobation is a part of the doctrine of predestination, and means the decree of God respecting the final destiny of the non-elect. As the decree of election absolutely determines the future blessedness of a definite part of mankind, so the decree of reprobation absolutely determines the future misery of the rest.^{[773] [773]} Westminster Confession, chap, iii, secs, iii, vi, vii. The word preterition is in favor with some Calvinists. It is preferred as a softer term than reprobation, and as affording some relief from the severer aspects of the doctrine. It is true that in a formula of the doctrine we have the words “to pass by;” but these words do not express the whole of the doctrine: “The rest of mankind, God was pleased . . . to pass by, and to ordain them to dishonor and wrath for their sin.” They were passed by simply in the sense that no atonement was made for them; but this was only a part of the decree of reprobation. The strong word fore-ordained is used. All others than the elect are “foreordained to everlasting death.” No stronger word is used respecting the elect. The election of a part means the reprobation of the rest; otherwise, God must have been blankly indifferent to their destiny. Nothing, however, could be more unreasonable than such a notion. Hence the true position is with the Calvinistic theologians who adhere to the term reprobation, and to all that it here means. This was the position of Calvin himself: “Many, indeed, as if they wished to avert odium from God, admit election in such a way as to deny that any one is reprobated. But this is puerile and absurd, because election itself could not exist without being opposed to reprobation. God is said to separate those whom he adopts to salvation. To say that others obtain by chance, or acquire by their own efforts, that which election alone confers on a few, will be worse than absurd. Whom God passes by, therefore, he reprobates, and from no other cause than his determination to exclude them from the inheritance which he predestines for his children.”^[774]

^[774] Institutes, vol. ii, p. 163. Such is the view of Dr. Dick:Theology, vol. i, pp. 367, 368; also of Dr. Shedd:Dogmatic Theology, vol. i, pp. 429-431. Many authorities could easily be added.

Reprobation is contrary to the divine justice. Of course the reply is, that it means simply the ordaining of sinful men to the dishonor and wrath which they deserve, and hence that it cannot be opposed to the justice of God; that it is in fact “to the praise of his glorious justice.” It is readily conceded that there can be no injustice in the infliction of deserved penalty. This, however, does not close the question. It is still open to inquire whether the subjects of reprobation really deserve the penal doom to which they are fore-ordained. The desert of an eternal penal doom is not in the subjects of the reprobation. What is the nature of the sin which is assumed to have such desert? The answer is obvious: That with which they are born. Whether it is an inherited guilt of Adam’s sin or the sin of an inherited depravity of nature, it concerns us not here to inquire. It suffices, that native sin is held to be a sufficient ground of reprobation. That it is so held cannot be disputed. The very familiar position is, that, as original or birth sin constitutes in all men the desert of damnation, God might graciously elect a part to final blessedness and justly reprobate the rest to eternal misery, since the reprobation would simply determine for them the penal doom which they deserve. This, then, is the form of sin on which it is attempted to justify the doctrine of reprobation. But the justification cannot be thus attained. The alleged sin lies wholly apart from the personal agency of the reprobate, and therefore cannot constitute in them any desert of punishment. Hence their reprobation would be an injustice.

If it should be said that reprobation has respect to foreseen actual sin, the charge of injustice would still remain in all its force. It would so remain because the actual sin of the reprobate would be as thoroughly necessitated as their inherited sin. It is here that the “passing by” means so much. In the work of redemption it pleased God “to pass by” the reprobates. This is a part of the doctrine. No atonement was made for them; no helping grace sufficient for a good life, or even for the avoidance of sin, was provided’ for them. Sin is to them a necessity. Such it is according to the doctrines which underlie the decrees of election and reprobation. But a reprobation for unavoidable sin must be contrary to the divine justice. The doctrine of reprobation is disproved by the universality of the atonement; by the divine sincerity in the universal overture of salvation in Christ; by the universal love of God. It suffices that we here merely state these great facts, as they were sufficiently discussed in our treatment of the extent of the atonement. The decree of election and reprobation, even in its most vital facts, must have been without any reason in the thought of God. An absolute sovereignty can have no reason for its action except its own absoluteness. But that can be no reason for any one act rather than another. If God had any reason for the exact numbers respectively elected and reprobated, then his decree, which unchangeably fixed these numbers, could not have been an act of absolute sovereignty. If in that decree he had reprobated those whom he elected, and elected those whom he reprobated, his sovereignty would have been just as complete as it was with his actual fore-ordinations. To deny this is to deny that his decree of predestination was an act of absolute sovereignty; for the denial must assume a reason for the act apart from that sovereignty. The doctrine can admit no such a reason.

It is in the doctrine of predestination that God did sovereignly elect A, B, C, a part of mankind, to everlasting life, and that he did reject and ordain D, E, F, the rest, to everlasting misery. It is also in the doctrine that there was no reason in his thought why he should so elect A, B, C, instead of D, E, F, or why he should reprobate D, E, F, instead of A, B, C. The fact is definitely expressed in the formulation of the doctrine, that the election of A, B, C, was without foresight of any thing in them as the reason why they were chosen instead of D, E, F. Here, then, is a decree of predestination so arbitrary in itself, so vast in the sweep of its absolute determination of eternal destinies, that it well might daze even celestial intelligences, and yet a decree for which, in its most vital facts, there was no reason in the thought of God. The very nature of election and reprobation, as thus disclosed, suffices for their utter refutation.

II. Other Points In Issue.

1. Limitation of the Atonement.—It is true that not a few who hold the Calvinistic system hold also the universality of the atonement. Whether they so modify the system as to bring it into harmony with this universality we are not here concerned to inquire. A limitation of the atonement is a requirement of the system in its regular form, and mostly has a place in Calvinistic creeds. With a decree of predestination which absolutely determines the salvation of the elect, and an atonement which, in the very nature of it, must save all for whom it is made, its limitation to a part of mankind must be intrinsic to the system. However, we have here only to state the issue, having sufficiently considered the question of the extent of the atonement in our discussion of that subject.

2. Moral Necessity.—The doctrine is really the same whether we use the word necessity or the word inability, though the latter seems now more in favor with Calvinistic authors. If we are in a state of moral necessity, then there is for us no free moral agency. Our volitions must be determined by influences over which we have no control. The choice of the good is not within our power, not even within the power of the elect. Only an absolute sovereignty of grace can turn them unto the good. In such a state sinning is a necessity, and to the elect just as to the reprobate. A state of moral inability involves precisely the same consequences. The inability alleged is definitely a moral inability to the choice of the good. The further consequence is that of an unavoidable sinning.

It is easily seen that such a doctrine, whether expressed as moral necessity or moral inability, is openly contrary to all conditionality of salvation. But the question of free agency is so cardinal in a system of theology that it requires a fuller and more formal treatment than can properly be given it under the present heading.

3. Irresistibility of Saving Grace.—When it is the pleasure of God to bring any one of the elect into a state of salvation he is effectually called. The call is made efficacious through a sovereign power of grace. The initial work is that of regeneration. No act of repentance or faith is conditional thereto; no manner of resistance can prevent it when the hour of God’s pleasure has come for its accomplishment. Such is the doctrine as it is formulated in Calvinistic creeds;^[775] and such it is as maintained in the ablest theological works of Calvinistic authorship.

^[775]Canons of the Synod of Dort, Of the Corruption of Man, etc., articles x-xii;Westminster Confession, chap, x, secs, i, ii. This doctrine, just as the whole system, is grounded in an absolute divine sovereignty. It follows that the delays in the salvation of the elect, however long, are purely from God’s own pleasure: that is absolutely determining. No faithfulness nor unfaithfulness of the minister, nor any act of the elect, can either hasten or hinder their salvation for even a single hour. The all-pervasive sense of Scripture is in open contradiction to this doctrine.

Here again there is serious perplexity for the doctrine respecting the non-elect. The Gospel is preached to all alike, It is so preached in obedience to the divine behest. The preaching is a divine proffer of salvation to all, and a call to repentance and faith, with the promise of salvation to all who comply. But it cannot be the pleasure of God to save the non-elect, since in his own good pleasure he has unconditionally fore-ordained them to an eternal penal doom and excluded them from the covenant of redemption. They were not given to the Son to be redeemed, because it was not the pleasure of the Father that they should be saved. How then can the offer of salvation be made to them? And how can they be required to repent and believe unto salvation, under penalty of damnation for disobedience, when for them there is no salvation in Christ? The futile attempts of the doctrine to extricate itself from such perplexity really concedes the impossibility. But these attempts were considered and their fallacies exposed in our treatment of the extent of the atonement.

If this doctrine of effectual calling be true it cannot be the pleasure of God that the non-elect should accept the proffer of salvation made to them. The decree of predestination which excluded them from the covenant of redemption and unconditionally fore-ordained them to a penal doom is conclusive of this fact. Further, if in this case God’s only law of action is his own absolute sovereignty, the non-elect would certainly be efficaciously called, just as the elect are, if their compliance were his pleasure. Hence we are shut up to the fact that, however God may call the non-elect, or with whatever intensity of words or pathos of compassion entreat their acceptance of his proffered salvation, such acceptance is still not his pleasure. This result is openly contradictory to the divine sincerity.

It is the pleasure of God that all who are called to repentance and faith should obey and be saved. It is, indeed, his good pleasure that all should be saved. The proof is in the Scriptures: “For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life.” “Who will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth” (John 3:16; 1 Timothy 2:4). Here is God’s gracious asseveration and appeal: “As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked ; but that the wicked turn from his way and live: turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways ; for why will ye die” (Ezekiel 33:11)? Here are words of yearning compassion: “How shall I give thee up, Ephraim? how shall I deliver thee, Israel? how shall I make thee as Admah? how shall I set thee as Zeboim? mine heart is turned within me, my repentings are kindled together” (Hosea 11:8). Yet, if the doctrine of an absolute sovereignty of grace be true, God cannot wish the salvation of any who are not efficaciously called. How, then, could he sincerely utter such words? “We listen to the pathetic words of our Lord: “O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets, and stonest them which are sent unto thee, how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not!” (Matthew 23:37). Yet, if the doctrine of an absolute grace be true, these words mean no pleasure of the Son to save them; for with such a pleasure they must have been saved. Nothing could have prevented it. There could be no hinderance to an absolute power of grace in that “ye would not.” A doctrine which is so openly contradictory to such texts as we have here adduced cannot be a truth of the Scriptures.

4. Absolute Final Perseverance.—The doctrine is that, however believers may fall into sin, sovereign grace must finally recover and save them. It is a part of the system constructed upon the ground of an absolute divine sovereignty. If the other parts are true this must be true. If the decree of election is true; if the atonement is for the elect only, and of such a nature that it must save all for whom it is made; and if grace is irresistible in its saving work, then the doctrine of final perseverance must be true. Nothing, however, is thus gained for its truth, but, rather, much is lost. The disproof of the other parts is really the disproof of this; for, as an intrinsic part of the system, it falls with the other parts.

Alleged proofs of the doctrine, while plausible, are inconclusive. Some texts of Scripture seem, on the face of them, to favor it, but a deeper insight finds them entirely consistent with the conditionality of final perseverance. “My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me: and I give unto them eternal life; and they shall never perish, neither shall any man pluck them out of my hand” (John 10:27-28). Such is the assurance from the divine side; but it is entirely consistent with a conditioning fidelity on the human side. The case of Judas is an illustration. From the divine side these words pledged to him all that they pledged to the others given to the Son by the Father; yet there was in him, and therefore in them, the possibility of apostasy. “For the gifts and calling of God are without repentance” (Romans 11:29). This is utterly without proof of an absolute final perseverance, except on the assumption of an absolute sovereignty of grace in every instance of a personal salvation. But we have shown that this assumption is groundless. “Being confident of this very thing, that he which hath begun a good work in you will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ” (Php 1:6). This text is dependent upon the same false assumption as the preceding one for any proof of an absolute final perseverance, and therefore furnishes none. An Arminian can freely use these words of assurance to the doubting, and without any thought of this Calvinistic sense. “Who are kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation” (1 Peter 1:5). Yes, every trusting soul is so kept. But the faith is conditional to the keeping; and as it involves a free personal agency there is here no doctrine of an absolute perseverance. Indeed, so far as this question is concerned, the text is really Arminian, not Calvinistic. The grouping of a few texts will suffice for the proof of a possibility of final apostasy. A righteous man may turn away to sin, and die therein (Ezekiel 18:24-26). The branch may perish from the living vine (John 15:4-6). Judas, one of those given to the Son, was lost (John 17:12). St. Paul, even with his full assurance of a state of salvation, apprehended the possibility of his own apostasy, and strenuously wrought against it (1 Corinthians 9:26-27). Christians are exhorted to diligence in order to make their calling and election sure; for in so doing they should never fall (2 Peter 1:10). Such texts as we have here adduced must mean the possibility of a final apostasy.

Arminius: Writings, vol. iii; Wesley: Predestination, Works, vol. vi, pp. 24-63; Fletcher: Checks, Works, vols, i, ii; Whitby: On the Five Points; Tomline: A Refutation of Calvinism; Watson: Theological Institutes, part ii, chaps, xxv-xxviii; Copleston: Doctrines of Necessity and Predestination; Fisk: The Calvinistic Controversy; Foster: Objections to Calvinism; Lacroix: “Wesleyan Synergism,” Methodist Quarterly Review, January, 1880; Whedon: Freedom of the Will, part ii, § 3; Calvin: Institutes, book iii, chaps, xxi-xxiv; Witsius: The Covenants, book ii; Toplady: Doctrine of Absolute Predestination; Scott: Remarks on Tomline’s Refutation of Calvinism; Edwards: Works, vol. ii, pp. 513-597; Copinger:Predestination, Election, and Grace; Howe: Oracles of God, part ii, “Decrees;” King: A Discourse on Predestination, with Notes by Whately; Mozley: Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination; Graves:Predestination, Works, vol. iii; Forbes: Predestination and Free Will.