184. II. Erroneous Theories Of Inspiration.

II. Erroneous Theories Of Inspiration. So far, we have treated inspiration mainly as a fact and as to its modes, and the question of theory or doctrine chiefly remains. Preparatory to the direct treatment of this question we notice a few erroneous theories.

1. Inspiration of Genius.—It is only in a qualified sense that of insight and originality, but it is still only a human power. Poetic genius is creative in the sphere of the ideal, but is without any special originative power in the sphere of religious truth. The poets have given us no divine theology. Homer and Virgil rise not above the religious thought of their time. Neither Milton nor Dante lifts us into brighter skies. Plato was a genius in religious as in philosophic thought, but his theology is infinitely below that of John. The higher truths of Scripture could not originate in any inspiration of genius. Were this even possible, they would still lack the certainty and authority necessary to their special religious value.

2. Special Religious Consciousness.—There are instances of a specially intense and clear religious consciousness; but without divine inspiration its capacity is only human. Such a consciousness might be very receptive of inspiration, or of religious truth communicated from without, but could not be specially originative of such truth. The higher truths of Scripture could neither originate in such a mind nor receive from it their necessary certainty and authority.

3. Illumination and Elevation.—In this view the office of inspiration is fulfilled in the spiritual illumination and elevation of certain chosen minds. These terms, however, do not express really distinct offices of the Spirit, though sometimes distinctively used. Such a divine illumination of the mind must quicken its powers and clear its vision; and in this there is spiritual elevation. The same divine operation answers for both. But the defects of the theory are obvious. It answers for the preparation of the mind for the reception of the higher truths of religion, and hence contains so much of a true doctrine. This element we have previously recognized as necessary. But there is no provision for either the communication or the publication of the truth. The mediate agent is left to his own resources, simply with the advantage of a subjective illumination. This is utterly insufficient both for a knowledge of the higher truths of Scripture and for their trustworthy publication.

4. Divine Superintendence.—The idea is of an influence of the Spirit within the minds of the sacred writers which preserved them from serious error in teaching, and also secured through their agency a record of such facts and truths of religion as were important to be known. There is here one element of a true theory of inspiration, as we have previously explained. It might be so construed as to seem sufficient for the whole truth, but does not really admit of such an interpretation. If so intended, there is an unnecessary caution in the use of terms. If the facts of a true and sufficient inspiration are held, it is far better to use terms clearly expressive of the whole truth. This theory is really lower in some of its facts than the one just previously noticed. It makes no provision for the necessary illumination of the mediate agent. Nor does it provide for the supernatural communication of the truth, but leaves him to his own resources of discovery. It is halting and indefinite as to a sufficient divine guidance in the publication of the truth.

5. The Mechanical Theory.—This is the theory of verbal inspiration. The divine agency monergistically determines both the ideas and the words, while the mediate human agency is a mere passive instrument. If the very words are thus mechanically determined, so must the ideas be determined. Such an inspiration must thoroughly dominate the mediate agent and deprive him of all mental self-action. Further, there must be the same determining influence of the Spirit for the whole Bible; the same for the most incidental and familiar facts of history and personal experience as for the profoundest mysteries of revelation; the same for the friendly salutations of Paul as for the deepest and most vital moral and religious truths of his epistles. The theory of a common verbal inspiration is beset with very serious difficulties—enough, indeed, to disprove it. We notice a few. The theory cannot be reconciled with the manifest human element in the structure of the Scriptures. Such an element is pervasive of the whole. The mental cast and culture, the peculiar temper and style of each sacred writer are wrought into his composition. These facts are as real and obvious in the Scriptures as in any purely secular writings. They cannot be explained except on the ground of the proper mental agency of the sacred writers. While divinely inspired they must still have been in the possession and conscious use of their own faculties. With such personal agency they could not have been the subjects of an inspiration which reduced them to the passivity of mere instruments.

There are differences of Scripture statement which the mechanical theory can neither account for nor reconcile with itself. Different writers state the same things with verbal differences. We may instance so definite a thing as the inscription on the cross. There are four statements of its form: “This is Jesus, the King of the Jews” (Matthew 27:37); “The King of the Jews” (Mark 15:26); “This is the King of the Jews” (Luke 23:38); “Jesus of Nazareth, the King of the Jews” (John 19:19). The differences are slight, but real. The verbal theory cannot account for them; certainly not on any reasonable ground. Hence, on the acceptance of that theory, we should have to reject at least three of these statements as lacking either in inspiration or in textual integrity; and with the further consequence of entire uncertainty as to which account, if any one, consisted of inspired and true words. Such instances of variation, of which there are many, are quite indifferent to a real and sufficient inspiration, but utterly inexplicable on the verbal theory. The logic of the theory must deny the present and future possession of a divine revelation. It requires for such a revelation the determining inspiration of the very words of Scripture. If this be necessary, then only an exact set of words, and the very words originally inspired, can constitute a revelation. But they are not in our possession. The autographs of the sacred writers no longer exist. The most trustworthy versions and manuscripts are without exact verbal agreement. The most learned in the question are not always agreed as to the true text. Further, the great multitudes of the race must always be dependent upon translations, which cannot be the exact verbal equivalents of the originals. These facts are entirely indifferent to a real and sufficient inspiration; but on the verbal theory they deny us the possession of a revelation.

Nothing can be necessary to a divine revelation which is not necessary to a truthful expression of the divine mind. Neither a common verbal inspiration nor an exact and set of words is so necessary. This is manifest in the fact that the Scriptures, just as other writings, would admit verbal changes without affecting the sense. Facts of Scripture are conclusive against that necessity. Such are the differences in the statements of the same events and truths. Such also is the fact that when Christ and his apostles referred to the Scriptures as the word of God and of divine authority they often had in view the Septuagint version, which is far from being a literal rendering of the Hebrew. There is this further decisive fact, that their Scripture citations were often from the same version, and without any attempt at exact verbal accuracy.

Still, it need not be questioned that sometimes inspiration was such as to determine the very words of Scripture. Yet it is not important that we be able to identify such instances. The assertion of such importance would concede a superior excellence to such instances of inspiration. We should thus discriminate against the more common mode, and also return to the necessity for an exact set of words, with all its insuperable difficulties.