022. II. Denial Of Divine Cognoscibility.

II. Denial Of Divine Cognoscibility.

1. The Infinite Declared Unthinkable.—It is the doctrine of Hamilton and Mansel, as also of others, that the Infinite is unknowable and unthinkable. As in relation to God, this is the doctrine of theistic nescience. God may be the object of faith, but is beyond the reach of cognitive thought. This consequence is inevitable, if the principles of the doctrine be true. Religious thought, just as thought in any other sphere, is conditioned by the mental capacity. There might be a revelation of truths undiscoverable by the mind itself, or a divine illumination which should raise the power of thought to its highest capacity, but this power would still be conditioned by the mental capacity. Nor is there for us any immediate vision of God wherein we may grasp him in a comprehensive knowledge. These facts disprove the transcendentalism which Hamilton controverted, but they neither imply nor prove the nescience of God which he maintained. The analysis of this doctrine will place it in a clearer view. Thought is finite and relative; therefore it can have no cognitive apprehension of the infinite and absolute. The only movement of thought toward the infinite is in thinking away the finite. The thinking is thus purely negative, and the infinite forever reachless. In denying the qualities of the finite to the infinite the finite supplies the whole content of thought. The absolute is both unrelated and infinite, while thought is conditioned by relations or a distinction of qualities, both of which are declared to be contradictory to the absolute. With such elements of the doctrine, it follows that, if God is such an infinite and absolute, he is unknowable and unthinkable.

Such a doctrine of theistic nescience is spread widely upon the pages of Hamilton and Mansel in the treatment of this question. The culmination of the doctrine is in these words: “The Divinity, in a certain sense, is revealed; in a certain sense is concealed: He is at once known and unknown. But the last and highest consecration of all true religion must be an altar — Αγιώστώ Θεώ — ‘To the unknown and unknowable God.’”^{[203] [203]} Hamilton:Discussions, p. 22.

Such an altar Paul found in Athens. Was this the last and highest consecration of all true religion? It was such in style, if not in truth. However many and great the errors and superstitions of the Athenians, it seems that this altar signified no defect of either truth or worship. Yet Paul assumes a very serious defect in both. Plainly in his mind the ignorance of their worship was in their ignorance of the true God. Him therefore he would declare or make known, that they might worship him in truth. Paul had not attained to this theistic agnosticism. Hence in the declaration of the true God there is not a word about an unthinkable infinite, or an absolute blank for thought; there is the declaration of a personal God, Creator and Lord of all, and whoso offspring we are’ (Acts 17:23-31).

2. Concerning the Limitation of Religious Thought.—As previously stated, religious thought, just as thought on other questions, is conditioned by the mental capacity and the laws of thinking. The mind does not become divine by the study of divine things. The thinking is still human, however divine the subject, or whatever the divine revelation or illumination. Christianity makes no pretension to a comprehensive knowledge of God. Such a pretension is the extravagance of the transcendentalism which professedly grasps the Infinite in the mode of an immediate vision, but mostly loses the divine personality in the pretended knowledge. Along the Christian centuries it has been the wont of theologians to confess the inadequacy of thought to the full comprehension of God. It was very easy, therefore, for Hamilton, as for others, to array such eminent Christian authors—Tertullian, Cyprian, Augustine, Chrysostom, Grotius, Pascal, and others—as witnesses to this limitation of religious thought. He could hardly claim their authority for his own doctrine of theistic nescience. Surely such a doctrine was far from their thought. Their meaning was simply the divine incomprehensibility—a very familiar truth in Christian theology. Hence their utterances are valueless for the doctrine of theistic nescience as against the doctrine of a true knowledge of God in religious thought.

3. God Truly Knowable.—There may be a true knowledge—true in the measure of it—which is not fully comprehensive of its subject. It is easy to embody the contrary doctrine in a definition of thinking. If such definition be true, God must be unthinkable and unknowable. Cognitive thought must fully compass the subject. But human thought can not compass the infinite. Thinking is possible only under conditions of limitation, which must place the infinite beyond the reach of thought. Such is the summary method of this doctrine. “To think is to condition; and conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the possibility of thought.”^[204] Mansel^[205] and Spencer^[206] hold the same doctrine. The meaning is that only the conditioned and limited is thinkable. The law may be valid against the comprehension of God in thought, but is not valid against all cognitive thought of God.

^[204]Hamilton:Discussions, p. 21.

^[205]Limits of Religious Thought, pp. 98, 99.

^[206]First Principles, pp. 81, 82. The central position of this doctrine is that all thought of the infinite is purely negative, and only of the finite which is denied to the infinite. “The unconditioned is incognizable and inconceivable; its notion being only of the conditioned, which last can alone be positively known or conceived.”^[207] If this be true, the terms infinite and unconditioned have no positive meaning, signify no positive content of thought. Yet, while negative in form, they are predicates in fact, and therefore must have a positive sense. There can be no predication without a subject, and no subject except in positive thought. The full comprehension of a subject in thought is not necessary to predication, but the cognitive apprehension of it is absolutely necessary. We cannot affirm the infinity and absoluteness of God without the apprehension of God in thought; for this would be predication without a subject, which the laws of thought render impossible. Such is the fallacious outcome of the doctrine which places God beyond the reach of cognitive thought.

^[207]Hamilton:Discussions, p. 19.

It is not true that the notion of the unconditioned or infinite is “only negative” of the finite, and the finite the only content of thought. We appeal the question to consciousness it self. Infinite space and infinite duration are more for thought than the mere negation of finiteness. Consciousness is indeed witness that we cannot comprehend either in thought; but consciousness is equally witness of a form and content of thought which are not merely of the finite. The same is true in our thought of God. We cannot indeed fully comprehend God, but our thinking is not purely negative, with only the finite for content. The Infinite is reached in cognitive thought. We rest this issue on the testimony of consciousness.^{[208] [208]} Calderwood:Philosophy of the Infinite, pp. 266-268; Martineau : Essays, vol. i, pp. 395-298. So far, we have maintained the issue against the nescience of the Infinite as it is interpreted in this antitheistic agnosticism. In this view of the question the result is entirely satisfactory. Our position is much clearer and stronger with the true notion of God as the Infinite. We have previously shown the erroneousness of the doctrine which denies the knowableness of the Infinite; that there is no such an Infinite as this agnosticism maintains; no demand for it in reason; no proof of its existence; no use for it in the universe. Most of all is God not such an Infinite. God, the true Infinite, is a personal being, with the attributes of personality in absolute perfection. The essential attributes of all personality, intellect, sensibility, and will are realities known in our own consciousness. That these attributes are infinite in God does not render them unthinkable or unknowable. Through his moral government and providential agency God is truly knowable. In the view of Spencer, the Absolute is too great for any apprehension in cognitive thought. The real difficulty for knowledge in his Absolute is in its utter blankness, not in its greatness. When the false Infinite is replaced with the true, the personal God, the Infinite is manifestly thinkable and knowable. In the results of this discussion it is clearly seen that this form of antitheistic agnosticism is without force against the truth of theism.^[209]

^[209] Calderwood:Philosophy of the Infinite; Fisher:Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief, pp. 85-102; Harris:The Self-Revelation of God, pp. 172-182; Porter:The Human Intellect, part iv, chap, vii; Martineau:Essays, Philosophical and Theological, vol. i, pp. 224-243; Bascom:Philosophy of Religion, chap, iv; Herbert:Modern Realism, pp. 430-441.

General reference.—Theistic literature has become so voluminous that only a selection can be given in such a reference. We shall not be careful to omit all works previously referred to, or from which citations have been made.

Cudworth: The Intellectual System of the Universe; Howe: The Living Temple, part i; Paley: Natural Theology; The Bridgewater Treatises; Hickok: Creation and Creator; Saisset: Modern Pantheism; Diman: The Theistic Argument; Argyll: The Reign of Law; Chadbourne: Natural Theology; Randies: First Principles of Faith; Harris: Philosophical Basis of Theism; The Self-Revelation of God; Tulloch: Theism; Bowne: Studies in Theism; Philosophy of Theism; Thompson: Christian Theism; Buchanan: Modern Atheism; Blakie: Natural History of Atheism; Flint: Theism; Antitheistic Theories; Cocker: Theistic Conception of the World; Janet: Final Causes; Bishop Foster: Theism.