043. II. Treatment Of The Trinity.
II. Treatment Of The Trinity.
1. Incipiency of the Doctrine.—In speaking of this incipiency we distinguish between a doctrine as formally wrought out in Christian thought and the elements of the doctrine which are given in Scripture, but given simply as elements, not in doctrinal synthesis. The cardinal doctrines of Christian theology are mostly the construction of Church councils—councils less or more general in their representation. But the incipiency of a doctrine ever anticipates the work of a council. Certainly this is true respecting all the leading doctrines of Christian theology. As the elements of such a doctrine are given in the Scriptures they must be taken up into the thought of the religious teachers, and through their ministry become the thought of the Church. There are always minds of such philosophic cast that they will study the elemental truths in their scientific relation, and seek to combine them in doctrinal form. Thus it is that leading doctrines of theology have ever taken form more or less definite in individual minds. Such is specially the case respecting the doctrine of the Trinity. The Scriptures are replete with truths respecting the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. These truths are specially central to the salvation in Christ and the life in the Spirit, and must therefore have been in the daily thought of the Church. Thus through the vital interest of its elemental truths the doctrine of the Trinity soon began to take form, especially in leading minds. Such a process is always hastened, and was specially in this instance, by the incitement of dissident opinions which are regarded as harmful errings from the truth. There was such a preparation for the work of the great council which constructed the doctrine of the Trinity. Indeed, in this case the groundwork had received a definiteness of form, as in the Apostles’ Creed, which scarcely appears in the preparation for any other leading doctrine.
2. The Great Trinitarian Creeds.—There are three creeds which may properly be designated as great: the Apostles’, the Nicene, the Athanasian. Formulations of the same doctrine follow in the symbols of different Churches, but mostly they are cast in the molds of these earlier creeds, which have continued to shape the doctrinal thought of the Church upon this great question. Yet only one of these creeds has a clear historic position in respect to its original formation. The Apostles’ is not an apostolic production, and must be dated from a later period. The Athanasian is later than the time of Athanasius, but doubtless received much of its inspiration and cast from his teaching on this great question. It is mostly an amplification of the Nicene Creed, in the formation of which Athanasius had so large a part, and was probably a work of the school of Augustine. This is the more prevalent opinion.[245]
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3. Content of the Creeds.—The position of these creeds in the history of doctrines, and their determinative work in this central truth of Christian theology, may justify a very free citation, particularly from the Nicene and Athanasian. In no other way can we place the doctrine of the Trinity more clearly before us. The Apostles’ Creed is so familiar that citations may be omitted, particularly as it contains nothing which is not equally or more fully expressed in the others. The Nicene: “We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, Maker of all things visible and invisible.
“And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, begotten of the Father, Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten, not made, being of one substance with the Father; by whom all things were made.
“And in the Holy Ghost.” The mere declaration of faith in the Holy Ghost made no advance beyond the Apostles’ Creed, and was quite insufficient for a doctrine of the Spirit either in the full sense of the Scriptures or as required for a doctrine of the Trinity. The question was thus left in a very unsatisfactory state. It was too great a question, and too intimately related to the doctrine of the Trinity, for the indifference of the Church. Agitation followed. Opposing views were advocated. Error flourished. The truth was not so definitely formulated or placed in such commanding position that the better thought of the Church might crystallize around it. It was needful, therefore, that a doctrine of the Spirit should be formulated for its own sake, and also for the completion of the doctrine of the Trinity. The Council of Constantinople was convened, A. D. 381, for this purpose. Some additions were made to the doctrine of the Son, which, however, it is not important here to note. The doctrine of the Spirit is given thus:
“And [we believe] in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and Giver of life, who proceedeth from the Father, and with the Father and the Son together is worshiped and glorified, who spake by the prophets.” This addition was held to complete the doctrine of the Trinity, and is often viewed simply as a part of the Nicene Creed. The Athanasian Creed, while not the formation of any Church council and of unknown authorship, has yet been quite as influential and authoritative on the doctrine of the Trinity as any other. Hence it is proper to cite from this creed also.
“And the Catholic faith is this: That we worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity; neither confounding the persons, nor dividing the substance. For there is one Person of the Father; another of the Son; and another of the Holy Ghost. But the Godhead of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, is all one; the Glory equal, the Majesty co-eternal. . . . So the Father is God: the Son is God: and the Holy Ghost is God. And yet there are not three Gods: but one God. . . . The Father is made of none: neither created, nor begotten. The Son is of the Father alone: not made, nor created: but begotten. The Holy Ghost is of the Father and of the Son: neither made, nor created, nor begotten: but proceeding. . . . And in this Trinity none is afore, or after another: none is greater, or less than another. But the whole three Persons are co-eternal, and co-equal. So that in all things, as aforesaid: the Unity in Trinity, and the Trinity in Unity, is to be worshiped.”
It would be easy to cite many highly appreciative views of this creed. Hagenbach says: “The doctrine of the Church concerning the Trinity appears most fully developed and expressed in its most perfect symbolical form in what is called the Symbolum quicunque (commonly, but erroneously, called the Creed of St. Athanasius). It originated in the school of Augustine, and is ascribed by some to Vigilius Tapsensis, by others to Vincentius Lerinensis, and by some again to others. By the repetition of positive and negative propositions the mysterious doctrine is presented to the understanding in so hieroglyphical a form as to make man feel his own weakness. The consequence was that all further endeavors of human ingenuity to solve its apparent contradictions by philosophical arguments must dash against this bulwark of faith, on which salvation was made to depend, as the waves against an impregnable rock.”[246] [246]
These great creeds give their own doctrinal contents. It would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to find words more definite or explicit for the expression of the same truths. The history of doctrinal expression on this great question confirms this view. Few subjects have more deeply engaged the thought of the Church. Not only have great synods profoundly studied and carefully formulated the doctrine, but all along the Christian centuries the most learned and gifted theologians have given to the subject the highest powers of discussion and expression which they could command. The success has been in the measure of accordance with the great creeds. Any thing less must lose some element of the doctrine; any thing more must bring the constituent truths into discord.
4. The Doctrinal Result.—The creeds are simply a careful statement and combination of the elements of truth which constitute the doctrine of the Trinity. There is no solution of the doctrine for our reason. This was not attempted, and could not have been attained. The human mind to which the whole subject of the Trinity seems clear surely does not see it at all. Difficulties must arise with any close study of the doctrine, and the more as the study is the profounder. We should no more disguise or deny them than attempt a philosophy of the Trinity. We previously pointed out the central difficulty of the question. It is in finding between unitarianism and tritheism sure and sufficient ground for the doctrine of the Trinity. However sure the several truths of the doctrine as given in the Scriptures, it must yet be admitted that for speculative thought this middle ground is seemingly but narrow and not very real. If we posit for the Trinity one intelligence, one consciousness, one will, seemingly we are very close upon unitarianism. If, on the other hand, we assume for each personal distinction all that constitutes personality as directly known to us, we seem equally close upon tritheism. The real difficulty is in finding the whole truth of the Trinity between these extremes ; and we have again brought it into notice, not for any solution, but rather as a caution against attempting a philosophy of the doctrine.
Such perplexities were present to the minds most active in the formation of the great creeds. This is manifest in the careful selection and use of terms for the expression of the truths combined in the doctrine of the Trinity; particularly in the qualified sense of personality, that it might be at the same time consistent with the unity of God, on the one hand, clear of tritheism, on the other, and yet sufficient for the trinal distinction of persons in the sense of the doctrine. This was their high aim; which, however, is far short of a philosophy of the doctrine. They sought to avoid contradictory statements; and to this they did attain. They neither denied the unity of God nor asserted three Gods, but did most explicitly deny the latter and assert the former. The trinal distinction of persons implies no division in the essential being of God. The unity of his being is guarded and preserved in most explicit terms. There is in the doctrine no distinct nature for each person of the Trinity. The distinction is of three personal subsistences in the unitary being of God.
“What then is this doctrine? It is that God is one being in such a modified and extended sense of the language as to include three persons in such a modified and restricted sense of the terms that he is qualified in a corresponding restricted sense, for three distinct divine personal forms of phenomenal action. Now what presumption is furnished by this doctrine against its truth? Does it assert that one God is three Gods, or that there are more Gods than one? It admits of no such construction, for it expressly affirms that there is but one God, and that the three persons, as persons, are not three beings or three Gods. Does the doctrine then exclude from the conception of God the ordinary, necessary phenomenal conception of a being? So far from it, that in asserting that God is one being, it includes this conception. Does the doctrine then include more in the conception of God as one being than is comprised in the ordinary, necessary phenomenal conception of being ? But allowing this, what presumption does it afford against the truth of the doctrine? What shadow of evidence can the mind of man discover that the eternal, self-existent God should not subsist in a mode peculiar to himself, and quite diverse from that of creatures? Rather, what evidence can man possess that nothing more enters into the full and true conception which is formed by his own infinite mind of himself than is comprised in the ordinary, phenomenal, and very limited conception which man forms of the same being? What evidence has man, or can he have, that this limited phenomenal conception of his own being comprises all that is true, and all that God, who made him, conceives and knows to be true? If there is nothing like evidence to his mind that more is not, in this respect, true of himself, what presumption can there be that more is not true of the self-existent God, even that which constitutes three persons in one God ?”[247] We have not cited this passage as an explication of the doctrine in the light of reason. This is not really its aim, though the author had more faith in such a possibility than we have. The passage is admirable as a defense against much of the hostile criticism which the doctrine encounters, and it is for this reason that we have cited it. It not only successfully defends the doctrine against the accusation of contradictory opposition in the facts which constitute it, but clearly points out the extravagant pretension to a knowledge of being, even of the divine Being, necessary on the part of any one who denies the possibility of the divine Trinity.
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