086. IV. Sinning Of Holy Beings.
IV. Sinning Of Holy Beings.
Whatever the perplexities of this question, they are not peculiar to revelation, but must equally concern, every philosophy or religion which admits the reality of moral evil. The Mosaic narrative of the sin and fall of man is not the cause of the prevalent moral evil, but simply the account of its origin in the human race. There is no more rational account. The denial of this account abates nothing of either the reality or the magnitude of moral evil.[465] Either man was originally constituted evil, or he has lapsed into evil from a higher and better state. Such a state must have been one of primitive holiness, as previously set forth. As morally constituted in his creation, man could not have been indifferent as between good and evil. A moral nature must have moral tendencies. There is surely no relief of perplexity in the supposition of original evil tendencies. On the rejection of this view, we must accept the only alternative of an origin of moral evil in a race primarily holy. This implies the sinning of holy beings.
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1. The Question in the Light of the Facts.—Conceivably, a primitive state might be such that sinning would seem to be a moral impossibility. With entire freedom, not only from inner tendencies, but also from outward solicitation toward evil, with strong inner tendencies toward the good, and with all exterior influences acting in full harmony with the inner tendencies, holy action would seem to be thoroughly assured. The origin of sin in such a state could have no rational explication. Even the moral possibility of it is beyond the grasp of rational thought. Such, however, was not the primitive state of man. While Adam and Eve were constituted holy in their moral nature, the spontaneous tendencies of which were toward the good, yet in their complete constitution there were susceptibilities to temptation which might be followed into sinful action. The present question concerning the sinning of holy beings must be treated in the light of these facts.
2. Primitive Susceptibilities to Temptation.—In the sensibilities of primitive man there was a ground of temptability. Through these sensibilities there could be solicitations, awakened appetencies, not directly toward sinful action as such, but toward forms of action which might be sinful, and even if known to be such. We have an illustration in the case of Eve. Appetencies are awakened for the forbidden fruit as it is set forth in the false light of the temptation. So far as purely spontaneous, these active sensibilities were innocent and entirely consistent with the primitive holiness. Sin could arise only as their solicitations were unduly entertained or followed into some voluntary infraction of the law of probation. But as purely spontaneous, and while yet within the limit of innocence, they could act as an impulse toward a voluntary infraction.
3. Moral Forces Available for Obedience.—In the constitution of primitive man there were certain moral forces which might act as a restraint upon any tendency toward evil-doing. If these forces were sufficiently strong, and exerted their full strength in a purely spontaneous mode, they would so fully counteract all tendency toward evil, and so enforce obedience, that sinning might still seem to be a moral impossibility. They were sufficiently strong, and spontaneous under proper conditions, but not irrespective of such conditions. It follows that they were not in any purely spontaneous mode determinative of obedience. The whole question can be set in a clearer light by application to two leading forces in support of obedience—love and fear. The love of God, for which the soul was originally endowed, is a practical power of obedience. It is an impulse to ward obedience, and, unless in some way counteracted, must secure obedience (John 14:23). Hence it might fully restrain all tendencies toward disobedience. It was so available against the primitive temptation. But love is so operative only when in an active state. This state is conditioned on a proper mental apprehension of God. No object can quicken the correlate affection into an active state except when livingly in the grasp of thought. The constitution of primitive man did not necessitate such a constant apprehension of God. A temporary diversion of thought was possible, and without sin. The temptation led to such a diversion, and so clouded the vision of God as to prevent the practical force of love. In this state love could no longer counteract the impulses of awakened appetence, and disobedience might follow.
We named fear as another leading practical force. It is here viewed, not in the sense of religious reverence, but as the apprehension of penalty. The fear of penalty may act as a restraint upon any tendencies toward evil. But its practical force is conditioned on the same law as love, and hence in the same manner may fail of practical result. This is illustrated in the case of Eve. The temptation first engendered doubt of the penalty, and then occupied the attention with the attractions of the forbidden fruit. In this mental state fear could not act as an effective restraint upon the impulses of awakened appetite. Even a partial doubt or forgetting would void its practical force. In such a state the solicitations of temptation might be followed into disobedience.
4. The Sinning Clearly Possible.—The sinning of Adam and Eve is a truth of the Scriptures. The facts presented in this section clearly show the possibility of this sinning, notwithstanding the original holiness of their nature. We thus have in the Scriptures a thoroughly consistent account, and the most rational account of the origin of sin in human history.[466] [466]