093. II. Proofs In The Prevalence Of Sin.

II. Proofs In The Prevalence Of Sin.

1. Universality of Actual Sin.—Both sacred and secular history disclose the universal prevalence of sin. Of course it is not pretended that every person of the- race is brought distinctly into view and disclosed in the actual sinfulness of his life. This is not necessary to the utmost certainty of universal sinning. The universality is a warranted generalization from the uniformity in observed individuals. This is the method of science. In no department of nature is it thought necessary to observe and test every specimen or individual in order to the generalization and certainty of the science. After proper observation, the classification is never disturbed by the discovery of new instances so dissimilar as to refuse a scientific incorporation. The method is thoroughly valid in application to man. Now in all the disclosures of history, in all the moral and religious consciousness which has received a frank and open expression, a sinless man has not appeared. Of course we except the Son of man. However, he is not strictly an exception, because his unique character will not allow his human classification simply as a man; and he is as really distinct in his sinlessness as in his unique personality. There is no human exception. It is not assumed that all are equally sinful, nor that each is given to the commission of all sins. Nor is it denied that there have been many good men. The grace of redemption and the work of the Holy Spirit, operative in all ages and among all peoples, have not been without result. Many a soul, taking hold upon this divine help, has been lifted up into a thoroughly good life. Perhaps for the want of the fuller light of heavenly truth this has often been done without full consciousness of the doing. But take the testimony of such men, the truest and best of the race, and not one of them will say that his life has been without sin. No man could claim an entirely sinless life without profound offense to the common moral judgment, and that judgment would pronounce such profession itself a sin. The universality of actual sin is so certain that we need not the details of universal history to confirm it. The Scriptures are in full accord with the testimony of history. The explicit utterances of a few texts may suffice. “For there is no man that sinneth not” (1 Kings 8:46). This must mean, at least, that at some time sin is a fact in every life. “They are all gone aside, they are all together become filthy: there is none that doeth good, no, not one” (Psalms 14:3). Instances of salvation from sin are entirely consistent with these words, but they cannot mean less than the universality of sin. David prays to God: “And enter not into judgment with thy servant: for in thy sight shall no man living be justified” (Psalms 143:2). This is the very doctrine of Paul, that no man can be justified by the deeds of the law, because all have sinned. “For we have before proved both Jews and Gentiles, that they are all under sin.” “For all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God” (Romans 3:9; Romans 3:23). As previously shown, this universality of actual sin underlies the Pauline doctrine of justification. As all have sinned, all are under condemnation; for it is the function of the law to condemn the guilty, not to justify or forgive. This is the necessity for the atonement, and for justification by faith in Christ. Paul thus combines the universality of sin with his great doctrines of atonement and justification. In its certainty it stands with these doctrines. “If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness. If we say that we have not sinned, we make him a liar, and his word is not in us” (1 John 1:8-10). Again, one may be righteous before God, right with the law, and free from the guilt of sin, but only through a gracious forgiveness of sin. This is a necessity with all, because all have sinned. On this fact the testimony of Scripture is above question.

2. The Proof of an Evil Tendency in Man.—Natural tendency is manifest in a uniformity of results. “We obtain a notion of such a thing as tendency no other way than by observation; and we can observe nothing but events; and it is the commonness or constancy of events that gives us a notion of tendency in all cases. Thus we judge of tendencies in the natural world. Thus we judge of the ‘tendencies or propensities of nature in minerals, vegetables, animals, rational and irrational creatures.”^[476] This is the proper method of reaching the notion of a tendency of nature, and the principle so reached is most certain. There must be a tendency of nature under uniformities of action. This is a valid and necessary principle of science. It underlies physics, and chemistry, and natural history. Without it these sciences would be impossible; and their practical utilities would be impossible.

^[476]Edwards: Works, vol. ii, p. 318. The same principle is thoroughly valid for the habits of human life. As in the case of all other things open to scientific treatment, so the tendencies of human nature must be determined according to uniformities of human action. Here, then, is a uniformity in sinful action. All have sinned. With all the differences of temperament, social condition, education, moral training, and religious creed, there is this uniformity of action. Whether we view man as a species, or in the multitude of human personalities, this universality of sin is the proof of an evil tendency of his nature. “For it alters not the case in the least, as to the evidence of tendency, whether the subject of the constant event be an individual, or a nature and kind. Thus, if there be a succession of trees of the same sort, proceeding one from another, from the beginning of the world, growing in all conditions, soils, and climates, and otherwise in (as it were) an infinite variety of circumstances, all bearing ill fruit, it as much proves the nature and tendency of the hind as if it were only one individual tree, that had remained from the beginning of the world, had often been transplanted into different soils, etc., and had continued to bear only bad fruit. So, if there be a particular family, which, from generation to generation, and through every remove to innumerable different countries and places of abode, all died of a consumption, or all ran distracted, or all murdered themselves, it would be as much an evidence of the tendency of something in the nature or constitution of that race as it would be of the tendency of something in the nature or state of an individual, if one person had lived all the time, and some remarkable event had often appeared to him, which he had been the agent or subject of from year to year, and from age to age, continually and without fail.”^[477] On such valid principles the universality of actual sin is conclusive of an evil tendency in human nature. This evil tendency is the characteristic fact and the proof of native depravity.

^[477]Edwards: Works, vol. ii, p. 319.

3. Only Rational Account of Universal Sin.—In order to invalidate the argument for native depravity from the universality of actual sin, it has been attempted on other grounds to account for that universality, but without success. It will suffice to consider the chief attempts of the kind.

One attempt is, to account for the universality of sin on the ground of evil example and education. In any proper use for such a purpose, the distinction between bad example and bad education is not very thorough, indeed is but slight. However, we have no polemical interest in disputing any distinction which the case will allow. Bad example and bad education are both mighty forces in human life. Many minds are thus perverted, many hearts corrupted, many souls led into sin. But before they can even be assumed to account for the universality of sin there must be conceded them a universal presence and evil influence; for otherwise they could not account for the universal result. But bad example and bad education, every-where present and operative for evil, are simply forms of the universal sin, and therefore must themselves be accounted for. As a part of the universal sin, they must be valueless for any account of that universality. To attempt it is simply the fallacy of making a thing account for itself: worse than that; it is the egregious fallacy of making the part of a thing account for the whole.

There is another decisive view of this question. “While the great power of bad example and education is conceded, it should not be overlooked that such power, like all practical forces, is conditioned by certain responsive susceptibilities or inclinations in man. Without the responsive sensibilities the mightiest practical forces would be utterly powerless. There must be plasticity of substance as well as molding force, else there can be no casting of any form. For the molding power of any form of example or education there must be a plasticity of our nature which will readily yield to its influence. If bad example and education have such power over human life that they may be claimed to account for the universality of sin, there must be susceptibilities and tendencies of human nature which readily respond to their influence. Such susceptibilities and tendencies are possible only with an evil bias or inclination. Such evil bias or inclination is the characteristic fact and the proof of native depravity. Thus the great power of bad example and bad education, through which it is attempted to invalidate a leading proof of native depravity, becomes itself a proof of that depravity.

Again, it is maintained that free-will, without any evil tendency of human nature, sufficiently accounts for the universality of actual sin. If this position is valid, the argument for native depravity from that universality is answered. The main support of this position is brought from the case of Adam in the primitive sin. Without any evil bias, and against the tendencies of his nature to the good, Adam sinned purely through the freedom of volition. Therefore all may sin, and do sin, in the exercise of a like freedom. This is the argument. Dr. Taylor puts it thus: “Adam’s nature, it is allowed, was very far from being sinful; yet he sinned. And, therefore, the common doctrine of original sin is no more necessary to account for the sin that has been or is in the world than it is to account for Adam’s sin. . . . Thus their argument from the wickedness of mankind, to prove a sinful and corrupt nature, must inevitably and irrecoverably fall to the ground.^{[478] [478]} Cited by Edwards: Works, vol. ii, p. 361. From the instance of Adam one might in this manner prove the abstract possibility of universal sin from mere freedom of volition, but could not thus rationally account for its actuality. A single free action may easily be induced without any natural tendency or disposition. We often recognize individual acts of men as quite apart from their known character and habit of life. To account for such acts we do not require any permanent tendency or disposition. But to account for a habit of life, whether good or evil, we do require an inner tendency or disposition in accord with it. The case is infinitely stronger when we go from one man to all men, and especially when we go from a single action of one man to a uniformity of action in all men. We can account for a single act without any natural tendency or disposition thereto, but cannot account for the habit of even a single life without such tendency or disposition. How much less can we account for the universality of actual sin without a tendency to evil in human nature. The fallacy of Taylor’s argument thus appears. A single act of sin gives no account of universal sin, and is utterly powerless against the proof of an evil tendency derived from that universality. Native depravity is the only rational account of universal sin, and its reality is thus proved.^{[479] [479]} Edwards: Works, vol. ii, pp. 361-365.

4. Concerning Natural Virtues.—It is claimed that there are many natural virtues; and on this ground an objection is brought against the doctrine of native depravity. We do not think the objection valid, and therefore have no interest in disputing the fact of such virtues. However, they must not be exaggerated or counted for more than they are. There are natural virtues—virtues which we may call natural in distinction from such as spring from spiritual regeneration, though we do not concede their purely natural ground. They appear in personal character, in domestic life, in social life, in civil life, in the many forms of business. All along the centuries, men and women, without any profession of a regenerate life, yet of unquestionable purity, uprightness, and integrity of character, have appeared: some with natures gentle and lovable, and lives full of sympathy and kindness; others, strong and heroic, but true in all things. A doctrine of native depravity which cannot admit the consistency of such virtues with itself must be an exaggeration, and any inference which that inconsistency warrants goes to the disproof, not of the true doctrine, but of a form of it which exaggeration has made erroneous. There is no doctrine of native depravity in the Scriptures which renders the truth of such virtues inconsistent with itself. Native depravity does not make human nature demonian. It is not irredeemably bad. Life begins with evil tendencies, but also with activities of the moral and religious nature which act as a check upon these tendencies. Monsters of wickedness are a growth. Instances of utter badness from early life are comparatively few, and are properly regarded as abnormal. The Scriptures every-where recognize the moral and religious susceptibilities of men, except as they may be stifled by a vicious habit of life. In the absence of a true spiritual life with so many, natural virtues are necessary to the domestic, social, and civil forms of human life which actually exist, and which we must think to be in the order of the divine providence. Their providential purpose implies a capacity in human nature for the necessary natural virtues. The Scriptures contain no doctrine of native depravity inconsistent with these facts.

We have not conceded to such natural virtues a purely natural ground. We called them natural because actual in human life without spiritual regeneration. The fallen race is also a redeemed race, and a measure of grace is given to every man, and remains with him as a helpful influence, unless forfeited by a vicious habit of life. Human nature is not just what it would be if left to the unrestricted consequence of the Adamic fall. It is not so left. The helping grace of redemption does not await our spiritual regeneration, but a measure is given to every man, that we might be capable of the forms of life providentially intended for us; most of all, that we might be lifted up to a capacity for the moral and religious probation in which we are all placed. We thus have the true source of what we call natural virtues, and a source entirely consistent with the doctrine of native depravity. Further, the many providential agencies for the moral and religious improvement of mankind have ever co-operated with the helping grace of redemption. The virtues necessary to the providential forms of human life are thus nurtured and strengthened. Finally, these natural virtues are mostly of an instinctive character, spontaneous to our nature, and survive all changes and conditions, except that of an utter personal debasement.

They may exist and fulfill their necessary offices in the providential forms of human life, not only in the absence of a true spiritual state, but with the presence of an evil state. Their functions are fulfilled without any vitalizing moral principle, without any sense of duty to God. They have in themselves no strictly moral or religious quality, and can be carried up into a true moral and religious sphere only by the incoming of a true spiritual life, which subordinates all the powers and activities of the soul to itself and consecrates all to God and duty. These natural virtues therefore may be called virtues only in the most nominal sense. In themselves they are not virtues. And as they may exist, not only in the absence of a true spiritual life, but with aversion to such a life, with propensity to evil, and with actual evil, they give no proof against the doctrine of native depravity.