10-CHAPTER 10. PLINYS REPORT AND TRAJAN S RESCRIPT

CHAPTER 10. PLINYS REPORT AND TRAJAN S RESCRIPT [Note: Pliny, "Epist. ad Trajan," 96, 97.] 1. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS.

WORD of preliminary is needed on the question of the genuineness of the documents. The question fortunately has been already raised, discussed, and, we may almost say, buried. The correspondence of Pliny with Trajan depends on a single manuscript, of unknown age, found in Paris about 1500, apparently taken to Italy in the next few years, used by several persons before I 508, and never since seen or known. In spite of this suspicious history, the correspondence is indubitably genuine. It contains such a picture of provincial administration that, until Mommsen had written and the publication of the Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum had been well advanced, no one was able adequately to understand its importance; [Note: The whole correspondence can be studied best in Mr. Hardy’s useful edition, the notes in which bring out the characteristics of provincial administration very well. A few occasional errors are not such as to interfere with the enjoyment and profit of the reader.] and each advance in our knowledge of the imperial organization only enables us more clearly to appreciate the importance of this unique revelation of Roman provincial government. The two letters (nos. 96 and 97) which especially concern us now are also genuine. The one is indubitably written in Pliny’s style. The other shows the direct, incisive manner of the great practical administrator, Trajan, who speaks his meaning without a single unnecessary clause; but we have not the same criteria about the style as we have in the case of Pliny, and we must take into account that such rescripts were perhaps composed in the imperial chancellery from the Emperor s notes or verbal directions. Personally, I must confess that the whole series of Trajan’s rescripts to Pliny make on me the impression of having been composed (and doubtless dictated) by one single person; but it is not easy to estimate, and it is certainly not safe to minimize, the degree to which uniformity of style could be impressed on an official bureau under the permanent direction of one powerful genius. The spirit of these documents, so different from that of any later age, is alone a sufficient defence. A forger is confined within the limits of his own knowledge and of the tone and spirit of his time; but these documents become more pregnant with meaning the longer they are studied; and the difficulties which they undoubtedly present are caused partly by the imperfection of our own knowledge, and partly by determined prepossession in favour of some imperfect historical view. In order to appreciate properly two such documents we must put ourselves in the position of the two parties, and we must clearly conceive their character and their training the one with the precise, formal, but scrupulously just character of a lawyer of high standing and long practice in the Roman courts, the other the greatest and most clear sighted administrator that ever wielded the power bequeathed by Augustus. We may be sure that a question on a point of legal procedure addressed by Pliny to Trajan puts before him clearly the legal aspect of the situation ; but he explains nothing which he can assume to be present in the Emperor s mind. We have, then, not merely to translate the documents, which is comparatively easy, but to understand them, which is very difficult. We have to read much between the lines, to conceive very precisely the meaning of certain phrases, and above all to remember that these are business papers, and the writers men of affairs not philosophers discussing subtleties, nor historians drawing a picture of events for the benefit of future readers, This is by no means a short or easy task ; and I trust therefore to your patience if I enter with even painful minuteness into the discussion of the whole situation, and to your indulgence if, after all, I should fail to grasp thoroughly, or explain clearly, the situation.

2. THE RELIGIOUS QUESTION IN BITIIYNIA-PONTUS. In A.D. 112, [Note: Mommsen leaves a choice between the two years 112, 113.

] as we learn incidentally from Pliny’s letter, the new religion had spread so widely in Bithynia, not merely in the cities, but also in the villages and the country districts generally, that the temples were almost deserted, and the sacrificial ritual was interrupted. Information against the Christians was lodged with Pliny; but we are left to guess from what quarter it came, and what precise form it took. He docs not expressly tell us whether the accusations were simply couched in the form that the accused were Christians, or whether it was also alleged that they had caused injury and undeserved loss to respectable persons, or had been guilty of grave crimes.

Whatever was the precise character of the charges Pliny entertained them.

It is probable that Pliny, with his strict, precise ideas of the law, and with the careful, zealous attention to duty which belonged to his character, proceeded, immediately on his arrival in the province, to carry out the principles of Roman provincial administration with an energy and thoroughness that formed a strong contrast to the conduct of the preceding governors. The latter had permitted a laxity of administration, which had led to serious disorders and disorganization throughout the province. Pliny had been sent on a special mission to restore order; and he showed his activity, we may be sure, from the day he entered on office. The character of his mission to restore order in a province disorganized by lax administration lends additional emphasis and meaning to the fact that he rigidly enforced the procedure against the Christians. It also throws a clear light on his explanation to the Emperor that the Christians deserved death for their obstinate and insubordinate spirit, quite apart from any question as to the penalty of their Christianity. They offered a gross instance of the disorder and insubordination which had been allowed to pervade the province, and which Pliny was commissioned to stamp out. Such was his first duty, and it is easy to understand how the Christians must have appeared to him to need energetic and severe treatment as soon as his attention was called to them.

Now Pliny pointedly mentions that an improvement in one branch of trade, viz. in the sale of fodder for the victims that were kept in stock at the temples to be ready for sacrifice by worshippers took place in consequence of his energetic measures against the Christians. This curious reference to a rather humble trade suggests that originally complaints had been made to Pliny by the tradesmen whose business was endangered, and that in this way his attention was first drawn to the Christians. He saw that persons engaged in a lawful occupation were interfered with in their trade, and deprived of their proper gains, through the disturbance caused in society and ordinary ways of life by the action of the Christians and the new fangled ideas and ways which they introduced. Such interference with the settled course of society was certain to rouse the action of the Roman Government wherever it was vigorously administered, and it was, as a rule, in some such way that the Christian religion in its earlier stages attracted the notice and the repressive action of the State. [Note: E.g., Paul’s troubles at Philippi and at Ephesus were caused in this way. See p. 131.] An example of the attitude which a Roman governor would be likely to assume towards any such interference with the normal course of trade may be quoted from the neighbouring province of Asia. When disturbances were caused at Magnesia on the Mseandcr by the bakers, who had struck for higher prices, a Roman official (of course the proconsul) prohibited them from forming a union, and ordered them to continue their industry. Such revolutionary conduct was destructive of peace and order, and was always vigorously repressed by the Roman Government. No question was asked whether the bakers had any justification for their demand for higher prices. Their action in depriving the city of the necessary supply of bread must necessarily cause disorder, and was therefore dangerous. The proconsul, accordingly, ordered them to submit in all respects to the officials charged with the superintendence of the general interests of the city. [Note: ἀπαγορύω μμτε συνέρκεσθαι τούς ἀρτοκ[ό]κους κατ εταιρίαν, μητε προεστηκότας θρασύύμθαι, πειθαρχειν δέπ[άν]τωσ τοισ υπερ του κοινη συμΦέροντος επιταττομένοις, καὶτην αναγκαίαν του αρτου εργασίαν ανενδεη παρέχειν τμ πόλει.-Bull. Correspondance Hellénique, 1883, p. 506. It is unfortunate that this extremely interesting and important document is imperfect, so that the date and the precise circumstances are uncertain.] 3. FIRST AND SECOND STAGE OF THE TRIALS. In the investigations which followed in Bithynia or Pontus, [Note: On the precise part of the province Bithynia-Pontus, where the trials were held, see p. 224.] the earlier cases appear to have been of a uniform type. The first that were accused they were no doubt the boldest and most prominent adherents of the faith [Note: They correspond to those qui fatebantur in Tacitus, Annals, xv. 44; see p. 238.] appear to have all, without exception, persisted in avowing their religion. Pliny’s procedure was to put three times to them the question whether they were Christians, at the same time threatening them with punishment. When they persisted in declaring themselves Christians, Pliny condemned to death those who were provincials, while those who were Roman citizens he ordered to be transported to Rome to await the Emperor’s decision.

More complexity in the cases appeared, when in consequence of the proceedings [Ipso tractatu : i.e., new cases resulted from information obtained in the first trials; but Mr. Hardy’s explanation-that the informers were encouraged to fresh accusations-is perhaps correct; or both results may be summed up in one brief phrase. As I am disposed new charges were brought; to understand it, ipso tractatu corresponds to indicio eorum in Tacitus, Annals, xv. 44: information obtained in the course of the first trials is meant; but Tacitus lays more stress on the fact that this information was gained through the examination of the accused persons, Pliny on the fact that it was elicited in connection with their cases. As other cases of later date show, Pliny would begin in each case by identifying the accused, asking his name, station, city, occupation, etc. See, e.g., Acta Carpi, and M. Le Blant, Supplém. aux Actes des Martyrs, § 59, in Mémoires de l’Institut, tome xxx., part II., 1883.] and the variety in the cases was still further increased when an anonymous document reached Pliny denouncing a large number of persons. In the course of the further trials that were thus brought about, some of the defendants at once denied that they were Christians, others at first acknowledged, but yielded (as we may understand from the context) to the threats of the governor, and recanted, saying that they had formerly been Christians, but had ceased to be so, some even twenty-five years ago. All these offered incense before the statue of the Emperor, and cursed Christ. Pliny now found himself in a difficulty. He had no doubt as to the procedure when the culprits persisted in claiming the name of Christian, but when they repented he began to hesitate. Apparently he detained the penitents until he consulted the Emperor, while those who denied that they were or ever had been Christians were dismissed. This exposition differs to a slight degree from the view held by Neumann, [Note: "Es lief ein anon. Klagschrift ein: . . . Jetzt begnügt sich Plinius aber nicht mehr mit der Frage, ob die Angeklagten Christen sind, sondern jetzt fragt er sie auch, oh sie es überhaupt einmal waren. Auch genügt ihm jetzt nicht mehr die einfache Verleugnung, sondern er fordert dass sich dieselbe in der Anrufung, u.s.w. bewähre" ( Neurnann, p. 20).] who says that a change in the form of procedure occurred after the anonymous document of accusation (libellus accusatorius) was received, and that Pliny, who had previously accepted the denial at once, now in the second series of trials went further, first, asking whether they ever had been Christians, and secondly, requiring them to confirm their denial by distinct acts of conformity to the established religion. But this further procedure need not and cannot be taken as an innovation introduced in the second series of trials. In the first series, where the best known cases appeared, there were only respondents of one class, viz., the confessors (confitentes or fatentes) ; in the second series several classes appeared (plures species inciderunt). Pliny did not modify his procedure: he acted throughout on a certain view as to the proper law and procedure, and when he began to feel some misgivings whether his knowledge was equal to the complexity and importance of the cases, he stayed the investigations till he could lay his difficulties before the Emperor.

Pliny does not expressly state that there were in the later series of trials and cases of persistent and resolute confession; but there can be no doubt that there were. It was unnecessary for him to mention them expressly, for his object was merely to indicate the various types: the confessors are mentioned once for all in the original series of cases, and Pliny’s way of treating them is described. [Note: Neumann’s view is different. He considers that Pliny reserved all cases of confession in the further series of trials: "Das Urteiliibcr die Christen die fest geblieben hat er offenbar noch nicht gefallt," p. 20.] When the simple process of listening to reiterated confession and pronouncing sentence was no longer sufficient, Pliny began to inquire into the course of action, the principles, and the character of the Christians. The question here arises, why did he make this inquiry? Was it from enlightened curiosity and scientific desire to investigate the facts, or was it as an essential necessary part of the legal proceedings? Pliny’s position and legal training leave no doubt that he conceived the inquiry to be necessary in order to enable him to decide on their case. If they persistently confess the Name Pliny does not think it essential to inquire further into their behaviour before condemning them; but if they recant and abjure the Name, and prove their penitence by acts of conformity with the religion recognized by the State, then he finds it necessary to investigate into their previous action and life before he comes to any determination as to what verdict he should pronounce. What is his view in acting thus? It is obviously as follows. Mere penitence for past crime is not in law a sufficient atonement, and does not deserve full pardon. A robber who confesses and promises to live a better life is treated less harshly than a persistent criminal, but he is not pardoned forthwith; his past life and conduct are examined into, to see what penalty is appropriate for him. Similarly Pliny proceeded to investigate into the past life and conduct of the Christians with a view to determine what degree of punishment was appropriate. Having abjured Christianity, they could no longer be condemned for the Name, as persistent confessors were. But if they had in their past life been guilty of child-murder, and cannibalism, and other abominable crimes, they were still amenable to the law, and must stand further trial. The analogy with the proceedings at Lugdunum in A.D. 177 is remarkable. There also the penitents were not pardoned fully, but an investigation was made into their past conduct as Christians, and the evidence of slaves was taken. These slaves were Pagans, belonging to Christian masters. Their evidence was to the effect that the Christians had been guilty of abominable crimes." [Note: θυέστειαδέîπνι and Οἰδιπóδειοιμίξεις, Eusebius, Hist. Eccles., V. 1.] Thereupon, those who had abjured their religion were imprisoned as murderers and guilty criminals, and suffered even more than the confessors, who were punished simply as Christians. [Note: Afterwards the governor wrote to ask the Emperor’s instructions about those culprits that were Romans, and in explaining the situation mentioned (apparently incidentally, and not with a view to ask for guidance) what he had done with the penitents; and the Emperor in his rescript ordered that all penitents should be pardoned.] 4. PLINY’S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE CHRISTIANS.

Pliny apparently fully believed at first that the charges currently brought against the Christians were well founded, and that the general proscription, in accordance with which he condemned them instantly after confession, was founded on their detestable rites. lie proceeded to inquire into the cases individually ; and he learned first of all from those who recanted, and afterwards from two deaconesses (who, being slaves, were examined under torture), that the rites of the Christian religion were simple and harmless, that their discipline forbade all crimes, that the worshippers bound themselves by a sacramentum to do no wrong, and that the charges commonly brought against them of practicing child-murder, cannibalism, and other hideous offences at their private meetings were groundless. [Note: Neumann acutely remarks that from their answers we can gather that the questions put to them were about the very charges which are explicitly mentioned in the proceedings at Lugdunum. See above, note. The same charges are referred to by Tacitus, Annals, xv. 44, as flagitia.]

Pliny clearly was much impressed with the harmlessness and simplicity which he discovered in the principles of the new religion. But this general impression did not affect his attitude towards it. He still considers that it is a crime, and that those whom he had condemned were deserving of death for obstinacy, if not for Christianity. He felicitates himself on the good results that had been already produced by his action, and he expects that by a continuation of judicious and rigid enforcement of the law, the sect may be easily suppressed and order restored. He found it to be nothing more than a superstitio prava innnodica. It was a superstition (in other words, a non- Roman worship of non-Roman gods), in the first place a degrading system (prava), and secondly, destructive of that reasonable and obedient course of life which becomes both the philosophic mind and the loyal citizen (immodica). They had indeed been in the habit of holding social meetings, and feasting in common; but this illegal practice they had abandoned as soon as the governor had issued an edict in accordance with the Emperor’s instructions, forbidding the formation or existence of sodalities. None of the fundamental laws applied to their case; they avoided breaking these laws. The only question that remains about the system is whether in itself, apart from its effect on the life and conduct of its votaries (which is found by Pliny to be morally good), it requires to be prohibited on political or religious considerations ; and these two were to the Roman essentially connected, for the State interfered in religious matters only in so far as they had a political aspect and a bearing on patriotism and loyalty ; while in other respects the gods were left to defend themselves (deorum iniurice dis euro).

5. THE CASE WAS ADMINISTRATIVE, NOT LEGAL.

Meanwhile Pliny resolved to postpone further proceedings until he learned what was the Emperor’s view as to the proper action to take; and he mentioned in his report that his strongest motive for postponing proceedings lay in the consideration of the large number of persons affected. This leads to the question under what special law, or in virtue of what power, Pliny understood the proceedings to be conducted. He was too strict a lawyer to take the view that the law should be leniently administered because it was disobeyed by a large number of persons ; on the contrary, the Roman practice was guided by the maxim that, when offenders increase in numbers, an example must be made by enforcing the law more strictly and energetically. Accordingly, Pliny cannot have conceived the matter as one coming under some definite law ; he understood it to be a matter of practical administration, and he knew, as every Roman governor knew, by nature and by training, that government must often be a compromise. He might, by too rigidly carrying out the general principle that mere profession of Christianity was dangerous to law and order and deserving of death, increase rather than quiet the disorder, through the number of prosecutions. It was a case in which much was left to his own judgment, in which tact and governing capacity had full opportunity; in short, one where he acted with the full authority vested in a governor and administrator, not as the mere instrument and judge enforcing the penalty of a fixed and definite law.

Pliny must have been under the impression that his action was in accordance with the general powers and instructions of all governors of provinces, to maintain peace and order, and to seek out and punish all persons whose action disturbed, or was likely to disturb, public order. [Note: Digest, 48, 13, 4, 2: "Mandatis (i.e., the general instructions given to each governor of a province) autem cavetur de sacrilegiis ut præsides sacrilegos latrones plagiarios conquirant, et ut, prout quisque deliquerit, in eum animadvertant." Digest, 1, 18, 13, pref.: "Ulpianus libro VII. de officio proconsulis. Congruit bono et gravi præsidi curare, ut pacata atque quieta provincia sit quam regit. Quod non difficile obtinebit, si sollicite agat ut malis hominibus provincia careat, eosque conquirat: nam et sacrilegos latrones plagiarios fures conquirere debet, et prout quisque deliquerit in eum animadvertere.’] Such also is the interpretation of Neumann, who has understood the facts better than any of his predecessors. This view is confirmed by the character of the correspondence of Pliny with Trajan. He refers to the Emperor, not questions of law, but questions of administration and policy; he asks for relaxation of law or custom in individual cases, and, in general, seeks for guidance in cases which are left to his own judgment and tact. Especially where he thinks an exception might be made to a general principle, he consults the Emperor in matters which appear almost ludicrously slight; but critics have been too severe on Pliny, for in these cases he is really only criticizing the rules laid down for him, and suggesting that they may judiciously be relaxed. Such examples show how strictly Pliny conceived himself to be bound by the general principles of Imperial policy, and how afraid he was to swerve from them in small matters ; and he may no doubt be taken as a good example of the Roman official. The imperial policy ruled absolutely in the provinces, and the emperors, though not present, were consulted before even slight modifications of the general rules were made. The representatives who governed provinces were not viceroys but merely deputies. This fact is very important in our present subject: the policy throughout the empire towards the Christians was moulded by the wishes and views of the reigning Emperor.

Mommsen has pointed out the power in the Roman constitution which allowed the most prompt and effectual action against the Christians and which seems to have been always employed in the proceedings taken against them. [Note: See his paper in Historische Zeitschrtft, xxviii., p. 398, on which the ensuing paragraph is founded.] The higher magistrates were entrusted with a very large power of immediate action on their own responsibility for checking any disorder or abuse, and for correcting and chastising any person who was acting in a way prejudicial, or likely to be prejudicial, to the State. They could, where they thought it advisable, in such cases inflict personal indignity, such as tearing the clothes and beating; they could order a culprit to be for the moment imprisoned, and they could fine him, or even put him to death, but they were not empowered to inflict lasting punishments (such as exile or imprisonment for a definite term), except in so far as the momentary act of punishment caused permanent results. Especially in the case of religion this magisterial action was widely and almost exclusively employed. The Roman religion was the expression of Roman patriotism, the bond of Roman unity, and the pledge of Roman prosperity. Magisterial action, prompt and vigorous, was a better and shorter way of preventing the Roman citizen from neglecting this part of his duties to the State, and of punishing the tempter who made him neglect them, than any appeal to formal law and a formal trial. Hence, although such legal procedure was possible, it was hardly used, was never developed, and has no practical bearing on our present subject. It was by magisterial action alone that Isis-worship was expelled beyond the walls of Rome, that worship of the Celtic deities was forbidden to Roman citizens by Augustus, that Romans who professed the Jewish religion were expelled from the city.

Pliny therefore was not acting in virtue of his imperium, which gave him power of life and death over all persons within his province, except Roman citizens; nor is there any reason to think that he was the first governor called upon to act in such cases. The supposition is therefore excluded that any formal law had been enacted to forbid Christianity. We may safely infer also that no express edict of any Emperor had been issued to suppress Christianity. The inference is confirmed by the way in which Pliny put the case to the Emperor. He was in the habit of quoting or referring to any edict or rescript of any emperor which bore upon any question referred to Trajan; and if the usage of previous proconsuls in Bithynia had given prescriptive force to a point of administration, [Note: See Epist. 108.] he mentioned the fact. But here he refers to no previous edict or law. An instructive parallel is to be found in Epist. 110. There a point is raised for Trajan s consideration, a point of practical administration, where compromise is advisable or at least allowable. Pliny puts the case as turning on a point in his instructions (mandata) forbidding all donations from cities to individual citizens. The question is whether this principle is retrospective, whether prescriptive right of long standing has any validity, and whether the public prosecutor of Amisos is justified in demanding that a donation given twenty years ago should be refunded. In the case of the Christians, not merely does Pliny not state any law or edict against which they had offended, but he points out that they had taken care to avoid offending against the edict which he had, according to the regular practice, issued on assuming command of the province. In the edict he had, in accordance with the Emperor’s instructions (mandata), insisted on strict observance of a law which had been suffered by preceding governors to fall into abeyance viz., the law forbidding sodalities. Thereupon the Christians had altered their practice so as to conform to the law.

6. PLINY’S QUESTIONS AND TRAJAN’S REPLY.

Pliny puts three special questions to the Emperor, which I have postponed in order to bring them into immediate connection with the rescript sent in reply by Trajan.

Trajan does not formally reply to the questions in this form and order; but in his brief review of the situation and the principles of action an answer to each is implicitly contained. After the long discussion which has just been given we can readily understand his view.

This rescript does not initiate procedure against the Christians. It is absurd to suppose that Trajan for the first time laid down the principle, “The Christians are criminals deserving death; but you may shut your eyes to them until an accuser insists on your opening them." Trajan’s language is that of one who feels unable to contravene or to abrogate an existing principle of the imperial government, but who desires this principle to be applied with mildness and not insisted on. Neumann has rightly perceived that this is the true meaning of Trajan’s rescript, and in this respect has made a great advance on previous critics. It is one of the most astounding facts in modern historical investigation that so many modern, and especially German, critics of high standing and authority, [Note: Even those who have not fully adopted this erroneous view have often been affected to some degree by it. On the history of the view see Lightfoot s note, Ignat. and Polyc., i., p. 7. M. Doulcet, in his Essai snr les Rapports dc rEglise Chrctienne avcc I Etat Romain, 1883, p. 52, reckoned Wieseler the only scholar who declined to accept this view ; but Lightfoot mentions others. It would be un fair to refrain from alluding to the many English scholars, Lightfoot, Salmon, Hort, etc., who, in writings or in lectures, have interpreted Pliny and Trajan more correctly. But in general their treatment of the question has suffered to some slight degree from their treating it as a matter of formal and positive law, instead of as a question of practical administration.] have reiterated that Trajan was the first to make the Name a crime, and that any Christian document which refers to the Name as a ground for death must be later than his rescript. [Note: The inference has been drawn especially about First Peter; see above, p. 187.] 7. THE CHRISTIANS WERE NOT PUNISHED AS A SODALITAS.

Trajan, like Pliny in his early trials, condemns the Christians simply on their confession without further question, trial, or proof. They are outlaws; they are treated like brigands caught in the act. It is necessary to insist on this point, because many high authorities differ from the view here stated. Practically the question comes to this: were the Christians condemned for violating the general law (recently confirmed by Pliny’s edict in accordance with the imperial mandate which regulated and confined within very narrow limits the right of forming associations (collegia, sodalitates or were they condemned simply for the Name? A want of clearness and a wavering between these two essentially different forms of trial are apparent in much that has been written on the subject. The same writers who in one page recognize that the Name is punished, on the next page speak of the edict against sodalities as the ground on which the Christians were punished. [Note: In the original form of these lectures I criticized Mr. Hardy’s excursus on the subject; but he has informed me that he has, since the book appeared, modified his opinion there expressed.] In answer to this question, the following considerations suggest themselves:

1. If the Christians had been punished by Pliny as an illegal association (sodalitas) he must have put some questions on the point to them. Even the most arbitrary of governors could not condemn a criminal to death for violating a law without some show of trial, some statement of the law, and some show of testimony, good or bad, that the criminal had broken the law; much less can we suppose that a strict lawyer like Pliny would act in so illegal a way. Even a confession of guilt was regarded by the Roman law in some cases [Note: Viz., injudicio; but in cognitions (pp. 21 6, 398), acknowledgment of the charge sufficed to ensure condemnation.] as insufficient to entail condemnation.

2. Pliny could not have asked Trajan what their crime was, and how he should treat them, if he had conceived them to be a sodalitas. It had already been made abundantly clear to him by repeated rescripts that Trajan would not permit the smallest infraction or exception to the law. [Note: Trajan would not permit the formation of a body of one hundred and fifty firemen in a great city like Nicomedeia (Epist. 33, 34); he also forbade poor people to join together for a common meal at common expense (Epist. 102, 103). All such unions were dangerous, as liable to cause common action and to assume a political character.]

3. Pliny expressly mentions that the Christians had of their own accord given up a weekly meeting and a common meal, which would have constituted them a sodalitas.

4. Trajan would not in his rescript have ordered Pliny to abstain from seeking out the Christians, if he had under stood them to be a sodalitas. He regarded the prohibition of sodalitas as a fundamental point in strong government.

8. PROCEDURE. The question may suggest itself, if Pliny was acting on a principle of administration carried out by previous governors, whether of Bithynia or elsewhere, are we not obliged in accordance with what has just been stated, to conclude that he would have quoted the action of previous governors as justifying him? The answer is clear. He does refer to it, and explains why he is uncertain as to its character: he had never taken part in investigations (cognitions) of the case of Christians. Many points are involved in this short statement. [Note: The import of the phrase is, as a rule, disguised by the rendering 11 I have never been present at “such cases. The meaning in this report is: “I never occupied such an official position as to be called on to decide or advise in the case of Christians, and therefore I am ignorant of the precise nature of the proceedings."] In the first place, Pliny and Trajan were obviously well aware that such investigations were of ordinary occurrence. [Note: As to the number of such cases, the words do not justify any inference. 1 cannot agree with Mr. Hardy, who says that Pliny’s statement proves conclusively that the trials of Christians had been neither frequent nor important; otherwise Pliny would not have been ignorant of their procedure. The following paragraphs will prove that the inference is unjustifiable.]

Secondly, these cases were cognitions not formal trials according to law, judicial. Pliny’s experience as a lawyer had lain in the judicia before the centum viral courts, with a few political cases before the Senate. Cognitiones might indeed fall within the jurisdiction of the Senate and consuls; but it seems pretty certain that trials of Christians were left to the Emperor or his delegates. [Note: Hence almost all cases of Christians that we know of came before governors of provinces, prefects of the city, or the Emperors in person (see Mommsen, Historische Zeitschrift, xxviii., p. 414).] The Emperor often delegated such cognitiones, even in Rome, to the prefect of the city, and necessarily in the provinces to the governors. Pliny could not be fully cognizant of the law in such cases. He had not hitherto governed a province, nor had he been prefect of the city. The cognitiones held by the Emperor were conducted in private [Note: This was generally, and probably always, the case. See Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, ii., p. 926, ed. ii. Mr. Furneaux is certainly wrong (Tacitus, Annals, vol. ii. p. 577) when he speaks of such standing qucæstiones de Christianis as we have in Pliny’s letter. The process against the Christians was invariably, so far as evidence goes, Imperial cognition, exercised personally by the Emperor or delegated to the præfectus urbi or to the provincial governors. Judicium before a quæstio was never employed.] , and only the result was known publicly. Pliny could not have been acquainted with the procedure in such cognitiones, except as a member of the consilium, which the emperors often employed for consultation. But though he had never actually taken part in such cases, he naturally, as a Roman lawyer and official, had a general idea of their character and procedure. In conducting these investigations Pliny followed a definite procedure. He put the question three times to each person, giving full opportunity of repentance. What was his reason for following this course? A possible interpretation of his action is that he was, from motives of pure humanity, anxious to avoid inflicting the penalty of death. There is no doubt that this kind of action would be quite in accordance with his private character. But we must remember that Pliny in this case is the Roman magistrate and judge, and that he is a man in whom long experience as a lawyer and judge had rendered dominant and habitual the strict law-abiding spirit of the Roman. On the judicial bench Pliny was no longer the kind and generous, though rather weak and affected, man whom we sec in his carefully studied letters ; he is the Roman officer, trained in the law-courts in the straitest Roman formalism and pragmatical spirit of minute legality. He had not the loftier character which could discern the spirit behind the letter of the law. To him it was second nature to act according to the prescribed forms, and in this case we must assume that he did so. He indeed says that he had never before taken part in such trials; but, as we have already seen, this does not imply entire ignorance of the forms of procedure. It merely means that he did not feel himself complete master in this branch of law. He could trust his law to the extent of executing 100 or 200 persons, [Note: On the numbers see p. 220.] but when it came to a case of thousands he was not so confident.

Moreover, Pliny is here reporting his procedure to the Emperor, and there can be no doubt that he conceives himself to be playing the strict official. Nothing could be more foreign to the Roman ideal than to allow that conduct on the tribunal should be influenced by individual emotions of compassion or humanity. Severity, degenerating even into cruelty, is characteristic of the best and most upright class of Roman governors: lenity, as a general rule, was the result only of weakness, of partiality, or of carelessness. Pliny certainly was most careful and conscientious; and equally certainly he did not consider that his procedure would seem to the Emperor to imply weakness. We observe also that the same procedure obtained in numerous other trials of later date, which we cannot think were modeled after Pliny’s example. The only possible hypothesis seems to be that Pliny was acting according to a standing procedure which had grown up through use and wont. A succession of governors and emperors, applying the general view that Christianity was subversive of law and order, and acting with the same general intention of maintaining law and order, had, with the usual legal constructiveness characteristic of the Romans, brought about a general procedure which had all the force of legal precedent.

One objection which might perhaps suggest itself hardly deserves notice. If the procedure had already become habitual, how should Pliny require consulting the Emperor about it? If any answer is needed after the above discussion of his position, we might quote the fact that in A.D. 177 the governor of Gallia Lugdunensis consulted Marcus Aurclius, and received a rescript correcting his action in a fundamental point. Even Septimius Severus was probably consulted by his delegates; for his action towards the Christians took the form of one or more rescripts. The governors wished to act as the Emperor would act if he were present; and hence in this matter, where details were left greatly to their individual judgment, they frequently asked advice.

9. ADDITIONAL DETAILS.

Some details must be noticed before we leave the subject. The regular morning meetings which Pliny speaks about, and which, as we know, must have been weekly meetings, were not abandoned, and Pliny obviously accepts them as strictly legal. Amid the strict regulations about societies, the Roman Government expressly allowed to all people the right of meeting for purely religious purposes. [Note: Unless, of course, the religion was a forbidden one; but the Empire had quite given up in practice, though not in theory, the old objection to non-Roman religions as illicit.] The morning meeting of the Christians was religious; but the evening meeting was social, including a common meal, and therefore constituted the Christian community a sodalitas. The Christians abandoned the illegal meeting, but continued the legal one. [Note: Neumann indeed considers that the Christians suspended even the morning meeting for religious purposes. This seems not to be required by the Latin words, while it is inconsistent with the principles of the Christians to suppose that they discontinued their Sunday worship.] This fact is one of the utmost consequences. It shows that the Christian communities were quite alive to the necessity of acting according to the law, and of using the forms of the law to screen themselves as far as was consistent with their principles.

Pliny’s language permits no inference as to the number of executions, and we are left entirely to individual estimate of probability. How many examples would be sufficient to produce the effect described by Pliny in restoring the disused worship of the ancestral gods, and reintroducing the disused temple ritual?

Probably the history of the Church may show that I have not exaggerated in speaking of 100 or 200. If some sort of remote analogy may be found in the number of witches burned in Scotland at no very remote period, I may seem to have understated the probabilities. A certain lapse of time is also required to produce the effect described.

It is also quite impossible to attain certainty as to Pliny’s treatment of the confessors, whether he employed torture, or condemned them to be exposed in the amphitheatre, or took the more merciful course of ordering them to instant execution. [Note: The latter is the ordinary, but not the necessary, sense of duci iussi. The phrase is perhaps used more generally, "I ordered them to be taken whither the law directed." The torture applied to the deaconesses was not punishment, but the preliminary required by the Roman law before the evidence of slaves could be accepted.] Probably he would follow the usual course, which was to utilize condemned criminals for the public games.

Trajan’s letter to Pliny applied only to the single province. A copy, of course, was permanently preserved in the governor’s office; but in the ordinary course of events the document would not have any wider publicity or influence. Accident, however, gave this rescript an unusual importance both in ancient and in modern times. It was published (of course by the Emperor’s permission) after a few years in the collected correspondence of Pliny and Trajan. It thus reached a wider public; and officials, who were always eager to act according to the imperial wishes, would take it as representing Trajan’s settled policy. Tertullian was able to quote this letter; whereas he merely refers by inference to the supposed reports of Pilate to Tiberius, and of Aurclius to the Senate, assuming that, if sought in the imperial archives, they may be found. The importance of Trajan’s rescript is twofold, being due, partly to its internal character, partly to the chance which preserved it to our time. An entirely fictitious importance has been attached to it, as if it was the first imperial rescript about the Christians and defined for the first time the Imperial attitude towards them. [Note: We need not doubt that anxious reports from many governors had reached Rome long ere this, coming especially from Asia Minor; and that the matter had engaged the serious attention of the Emperors.] Its real importance is very different. It marks the end of the old system of uncompromising hostility. A question suggests itself which is of interest in estimating Pliny’s character, but which does not directly bear on our purpose. Was his intention in consulting the Emperor merely to learn his views, or had he any wish and hope that the policy towards the Christians should be reconsidered? Personally, I can feel no doubt that the latter alternative is correct. It would of course be unbecoming and unprofessional to hint that the imperial policy should be reconsidered; but Pliny goes as far as he could go without directly suggesting it and he has conceded to the prevailing anti-Christian prejudice enough to avoid the appearance of hinting. The only respectful course for him was to profess ignorance, and ask for instructions; and thus we have the astonishing change in his attitude, that, beginning with unhesitating condemnation, he ends by addressing to the Emperor the charmingly simple question, “Am I to punish them for the Name, or for crimes co existing with the Name?" He apologizes more for consulting the Emperor on this case, involving the lives of many thousands, than he does for any of the other questions, many rather insignificant, which he addresses to him. The apology seems unsuitably elaborate; and we cannot really appreciate the letter, till we understand that the writer is desirous to have the policy changed, and yet shrinks from seeming in any way to suggest a change.

Considering the confidence which Trajan reposed in Pliny and the friendship he entertained for him, we shall not err in believing that this letter exercised some influence on him. Trajan’s reply inaugurated a policy milder in practice towards the Christians; and it is a pleasant thought that a writer, whose life gives us a finer conception than any other of the character of the Roman gentleman under the Empire, should be, in the last months of his life, so closely identified with the change of policy and with the first step in the rapprochement between the Empire and the Church.

10. RECAPITULATION. In view of the importance and the complication of the subject, it will be convenient to sum up our results here:

11. TOPOGRAPHY. The province which Pliny governed, officially entitled Bithynia et Pontus, was of very wide extent, reaching from the river Rhyndacos on the west to beyond Amisos on the cast. The question suggests itself whether his experiences, with regard to the Christians, extended over the whole province, or was confined to part of it. Mommsen has shown that Pliny visited the eastern part of his province in the summer and autumn of 112, and that letters 96 and 97 were written during this visit, perhaps from Amisos. [Note: See Mommsen s paper on Pliny’s life in Hermes, iii., p. 59. The letters which immediately precede and follow 96 and 97 were written from Amisos.] It is therefore clear that the events which led to Pliny’s letter took place there, and that the description of the great power acquired by the new religion in the province applies to Eastern Pontus at least. But it would not be right to restrict his description to this part of the province. The general impression made by the letter is, that it describes a condition of things which was true of the province as a whole, and was not confined to a small district. Pliny speaks of the cities (civitates) in general as being much affected by Christianity. In the letter Pliny alludes to two distinct stages in his proceedings against the Christians. In the first stage he acted without hesitation, and had no thought of appealing to the Emperor for advice. But facts that came to his knowledge in the second stage led him to hesitate, and to stop further proceedings until he heard from the Emperor. We may, then, feel fairly confident that the second stage of the proceedings belonged to Eastern Pontus, and that the two deaconesses whose evidence produced such an effect on Pliny belonged to the church of Amisos, or of the immediate neighbourhood. This fact suggests some reflections on the geographical distribution of Christianity in the north of Asia Minor.

We have seen, on page 10, that Amisos was the point on the north coast to which the new religion might naturally be expected to spread earliest. We now find that Amisos is the place where, in A.D. 112 or 113, renegades were found in considerable number; and that some of these claimed to have abandoned that religion even twenty- five years previously. Christianity, therefore, was already of some standing in Amisos in A.D. 87 or 88.

We have seen that in the earlier stage of the proceedings all the accused persons were confessors: renegades appeared only in the later stage in Eastern Pontus. This implies, probably, that in the western parts Christianity was more recent, and that greater boldness was required to be a Christian; whereas about Amisos the religion had spread more widely, and was more powerful, so that there might even be advantages in belonging to such a strong and closely united sect. We are therefore again brought, by a new line of argument, to the conclusion that Amisos was the first city on the Black Sea to which Christianity spread. As to the date when this took place, it was, on the one hand, some time before 87-88 ; and, on the other hand, it would naturally be later than the spread of Christianity along the main Eastern highway to Ephesus and other Asian cities, about 55-57. We may fairly place the entrance of the new religion into Amisos about 65-75 A.D.