14-CHAPTER 14. THE POLICY OF HADRIAN, PIUS, AND MARCUS.
CHAPTER 14. THE POLICY OF HADRIAN, PIUS, AND MARCUS.
1. HADRIAN, AUGUST 11TH, 117, TO JULY 1OTH, 138, A.D. THE most important evidence about Hadrian’s attitude towards the Christians is his rescript addressed to Minucius Fundanus, who was proconsul of Asia about A.D. 124, a few years after Tacitus had filled the same office, and about twelve years after Trajan’s rescript to Pliny had been issued. A word is needed on the question whether this important document is genuine. The external evidence is, as Lightfoot says, " exceptionally strong: " it was quoted in full by Justin Martyr in his first Apology, addressed about A.D. 140 to Antoninus Pius, and was mentioned by Melito in his Apology addressed to Marcus Aurelius about thirty years later. Such evidence, of course, cannot be disbelieved, if the genuineness of the documents is admitted. But some modern critics, such as Keim, Aube, Lipsius, Overbeck, who have adopted a false view of the relations between the Church and the Empire, find that the rescript is very inconvenient for them. It is too clear and explicit to be misinterpreted in the way that they have misinterpreted Pliny’s report and Trajan’s rescript and it is irreconcilable with their view. Accordingly they declare that it must be a forgery. Justin refers to it only in the last chapter of his Apology, and this can easily be cut off. Hence for no reason except to save a hasty theory from being still-born, the last chapter of the Apology is pronounced spurious. It would be difficult to surpass the childishness of the argument against the genuineness of the conclusion of Justin’s Apology, but Keim surpasses it in his discussion of Melito s reference to the rescript. This reference cannot be eliminated from Melito’s Apology, nor can the Apology be pronounced spurious. The only resource, therefore, is to consider that the rescript had been forged before Melito wrote, and was accepted by him as genuine. Now after Keim has cut away from Justin the chapter where the rescript is quoted, he finds, of course, that Justin does not refer to the rescript. Accordingly he argues that, as Justin knows nothing about Imperial letters, whereas Melito quotes the letter to Fundanus, the letter must have been forged in the interval. [Note: "Als Entstehungszed wird man die Jahre von der justin’ schen Apologie, welcher keine Kaiserbriefe kenntund ein Hauptmotiv zur Entstehung derselben bot, bis zum Beginn des aurel’ schen Verfolgungssturmes (Frühjahr, 177 ) ansehen dür fen, etwa 160 - 176, am ehesten doch alas Jahr, 176."-- Keim, Aus dem Urchrist, p. 183.] It is really adding insult to injury, first to deprive Justin of his chapter appealing to the rescript, and then to quote him as a proof that the rescript had not yet come into existence. Justin does not quote Trajan’s letter to Pliny, therefore it also must, by parity of reasoning, be spurious; and we can date its origin as accurately as the origin of Hadrian’s letter. Athenagoras, about 177, did not know of Trajan’s letter, whereas Tertullian quotes it in his Apology about 197; therefore it had been forged in the interval. How easy it is on this principle to prove and date the forgery of every ancient document! The result of the polemic against the rescript is to bring out more clearly its inconsistency with the views advocated by Keim, Aube, etc., as to the relations of the Church to the Empire, and to relieve us from the necessity of discuss ing them. With regard to the perfect conformity of the rescript with the general history of the time, a very strong opinion has been pronounced by Mommsen, who says [Note: Histor. Zft., xxviii., p. 420.] that " the groundless suspicions cast on the genuineness of this document are the best proof how little capable recent writers are of understanding the attitude in which the Roman Government stood to the Christians." Lightfoot’s remark of older date [Note: Ignatius, i., p. 462 (478, ed. ii.).] is in full agreement with the opinion of the great historian: “not only is this rescript no stumbling-block when confronted with the history of the times. Some such action on the part of the Emperor is required to explain this history. . . . Short of actually rescinding the policy which made the profession of Christianity a crime, there must have been a vast amount of legal discouragement." This rescript is on the same lines as that of Trajan, but goes beyond it in several points.
Its intention is defined as being to prevent innocent persons from being harassed and false accusers from being allowed free scope.
The provincials may indeed prosecute their suit against Christians before the tribunal of the governors, but they must bring forward evidence, and not confine themselves to petitions and shouting, "Away with the Christians!"
Proof is required that the Christians have offended against the law.
If the prosecutor fails to make good his case, he must be punished as a false accuser.
There is in this rescript a studied vagueness in regard to the crimes of which proof is required. It is not expressly admitted, as it was by Trajan, that the Name is a crime; on the other hand, that established principle is not rescinded. As to the offence against the law which must be proved against the Christians, it is quite open to any governor to consider that the Name is an offence; but it would also be quite possible for him to infer from the rescript that some more definite crime must be proved. With this uncertainty facing him, the accuser might well dread failure and the consequent penalty. Everything would depend on the personal character of the judge; and we can quite under stand how one governor might readily find the case proved when the accused acknowledged the Name, whereas another might point out to the accused how they could answer the questions in such a way as to escape all penalty without violating their religion. [Note: This is said to have been done by Cincius Severus. (See Tertullian, ad Scap., iv.) He was, perhaps, proconsul of Africa between 180 and 190. (See Tissot, Fastes de Prov. Afr.) An example may be given of the methods which Cincius Severus might suggest to the Christians. The oath per genium Cœsaris was forbidden to Christians, and was not used by them; but the oath per salutem Cœsaris was lawful for them, and was a proper and widely recognised form among the pagans. A governor who was friendly towards the Christians might accept a solemn oath per salutem imperatoris or imperatorum as a sufficient guarantee of loyalty, and might enter in his records ( Plin., ad Traj., 96, 4; Digest., 48, 17, 1, 2) that the accused person had complied with the test of loyalty, and shown due respect to the cultus of the emperors, while an unfriendly governor might demand a more satisfactory proof of loyalty. Tertullian approves of the oath per salutem, Apol., § 32, sed et juramus sicut non per genios Cœsarum, ita per salutem eorum. (The Apologeticum was written in 197 A.D., when two Cæsars were reigning.) Dio Cassius, xliv., 50, says,οι τήν τ∈ ὑγί∈ιαν τήν τύχην ὤμνυσν. Numerous inscriptions show how common was the formula ὑU+03COέρ σωτηριαςτου+̑ Αυ + ̓τοκράτορος] The Emperor himself, the Olympian god who roamed over the Empire, looking into every religion, initiated into various mysteries, was quite alive to the fact that the State religion was a sham, and, looked at as a religion, a failure; but he knew also that it was the keystone of the Imperial policy, and he could not or would not face the task of altering it. He leaves the religious question quite open, and lets the rival sects fight it out for him to watch. In this ordinance about a religion he never alludes to the idea of religion. No other person could have written such a rescript; and without any evidence we might have identified it as Hadrian’s. That a Christian should have forged such a document without introducing some reference to religion is most improbable; and had the idea not been maintained by such distinguished scholars as Keim, Lipsius, Overbeck, etc., we might have been tempted to use stronger language.
Such action as that of Hadrian’s been, of course, quite illogical, and could not continue as a permanent policy. The rescript was sarcasm, and none knew this better than Hadrian himself. But sarcasm is not government, and the Empire had to be governed. The rescript left to Hadrian’s successors a difficult problem in their relations with the Christians. It did not settle any principle; and one of the most important clauses in it was susceptible of very various interpretations. The most certain points in it were that Trajan’s prohibition of seeking out the Christians was confirmed, and that the prosecutor who failed to make out his case was to be punished for false accusation (calumniti). But still the settled principle remained in operation, that any Christian might be ordered to execution at any time by any governor of a province. The most important effect of such acts as those of Trajan and Hadrian was to require some definite person, willing to take on himself the invidious character of accuser (which had hitherto been almost equivalent to murderer) of some definite person.
There are many indications that various circumstances might originate a short and temporary enforcement of the general law and practice. But apart from this, in the period on which we are now engaged, the Christians must have been, to a considerable extent, protected against accusers by their own strength and union. The professional accuser (delator), though necessitated and encouraged by the Roman laws, [Note: There was no public accuser, and many laws were inoperative unless private initiative set them in motion.] was always highly unpopular. [Note: Compare Horace, Sat., 4, 66.] Even in our own country a private prosecutor has always to face a certain prepossession against him, which can be overcome only by a complete proof of the justice of his plea But in the Mediterranean lands there is a much stronger feeling, for law and police are tacitly regarded as enemies to the individual citizen to an extent that we can hardly understand, at least after we have ceased to be boys at school; and the same feeling existed in ancient times. Occasionally revenge produced a delator, but usually an accuser was actuated by hopes of gain. In free Rome of the Republic, political advancement was sometimes the inducement; but generally the actual rewards in money or position, promised in several individual laws to successful prosecutors, elicited delatores. In the case of prosecutions on the charge of Christianity, no such rewards were to be obtained; the delator would not win permanent approval even from those who hated the Christians, and who might encourage him at the moment. An isolated accuser would have much to lose, and could, in general, have little chance of gaining anything. Finally, the hatred of a united and energetic body like the Christians would, in itself, be a serious penalty, and, in places where Christianity was very strong, might be a sufficient deterrent to any single prosecutor. The hatred which was popularly entertained for the Christians during the century following 64 A.D. was too intense not to contain a considerable element of fear. In modern history, the Judenhass and Judenhetze are strongest where the Jews are thought dangerous. An example of the strong feeling entertained by the Christians against any who had been instrumental in procuring the condemnation of Christians, is found in the action taken in A.D. 320 against those who, in the great persecution by Diocletian and Maximian, had played the part of informers or accusers, or had delivered up to destruction copies of the sacred books (traditores).
How then were accusers found in the face of such deterrent motives? In the first place, from disturbance of trade. This is a subject on whom we have very little information; but that trade was highly developed and very influential in the Asiatic societies is obvious. We have already referred to the strike of the bakers in Magnesia (p. 200), which produced such serious consequences as to require the intervention of the proconsul. The circumstances which led to the outbreak of persecutions in the second century are almost wholly unknown to us, and no case in point later than the hypothetical one of 112 (which has been already alluded to) is known; yet it is highly probable that combined action of a whole trade was occasionally instrumental in prompting the action of the Government against the Christians. In the second place, motives of a personal nature, such as revenge, might occasionally induce individuals to face the odium and appear as delatores. An example of this occurs in the case of Ptolemaeus, who was prosecuted before the prefect of the city, Lollius Urbicus, about 152. [Note: See Borghesi, Œuvres, ix., 295; Justin, ii. Apolog., 2. Lightfoot, Ignat. i. p. 509, gives the date 155-160, after Borghesi, viii. 545; but in the later vol. (1884) Borghesi inclines to an earlier date.] But the great danger lay in popular excitement produced by some sudden cause, some general calamity, or signs, prodigies, and prophecies, which either made the multitude by a unanimous impulse act as accuser, or raised individuals beyond the influence of motives which, in saner moments would weigh with them. As Tertullian puts it: "If the Tiber rises, if the Nile does not rise, if the heavens give no rain, if there is an earthquake, famine, or pestilence, straightway the cry is, The Christians to the lions!" [Note: Apolog., 40.]
Hence we see how strong Hadrian’s rescript was, for it expressly forbade the shouts of a crowd to be received as an accusation, and required some definite individual to appear and to take the risk of punishment if he failed to prove his case. That proceedings against the Christians were not quite discontinued under Hadrian must be taken as certain. The general principle of proscription had not been abrogated, and the evidence as to this and the following reigns is clear. Lightfoot is on this point not so accurate and logical as he generally is, [Note: Ignat. and Pol., i., p. 507.] except in his concluding phrase, that our knowledge is too scanty to permit the inference that no prosecutions of Christians took place under Hadrian. But when he disposes of all the Acta which assign martyrdoms to this reign, on the ground that “the reign of Hadrian was a convenient receptacle for these real or supposed martyrdoms which were without a date," it is impossible to follow him. The reign of Domitian, who in all later time was one of the typical persecutors, was equally convenient, and was comparatively empty; so also was the reign of Trajan. There occur under Hadrian more martyrdoms about which detailed Acta are preserved, than under Domitian or Trajan; but the reason is that Hadrian was later, and nearer the time when Christian historians flourished. More actual names of individuals were remembered under his reign; but even in their case, hardly anything of perfectly authentic character is preserved. The Acta are fabulous, or nearly so; but that does not warrant the rejection of the tradition as unhistorical, or the assertion that martyrs attested by the older martyrologies are purely fictitious (pp. 40572, 434^). Nor can we accept Lightfoot s explanation that here “misinterpretation of Eusebius words" by Jerome originated the belief in a persecution under Hadrian. Eusebius statement is that Quadratus composed his Apology because: certain wicked men were endeavoring to molest our people "; and Lightfoot holds that “the implication is that they were thwarted in their endeavors." This seems too strong an inference. Quadratus, a private citizen in Athens, could become aware of such endeavors only through their resulting in action. Hadrian did not hold a public discussion as to his policy, but the Christians, finding that he was disposed to relax in some degree the severity of the standing policy, and hoping that he would listen to argument, began to defend their cause in formal Apologies. That Eusebius knew few facts regarding Hadrian’s action is certain; but his comparative ignorance was due to the dearth of authorities. The Apology of Aristides is itself the best proof that a defence and a protest against the accepted policy were thought necessary by the Christians. [Note: The view of Professor Rendel Harris is that Aristides addressed, not Hadrian, but the succeeding Emperor Hadrianus Antoninus, in the beginning of his reign.] But after all deductions are made, the fact remains that the lot of the Christians in this reign must have been comparatively a happy one after their experiences before A.D. 112.
Rescripts such as that addressed by Hadrian to Fundanus were secret and confidential documents. We learn the exact terms of some, in whole or in part, in ways not contemplated by the writers, and quite apart from their nature. Trajan’s was published of course with the Emperor’s permission in the collected correspondence that passed between him and Pliny; and many fragments of others are quoted in the law books, and thus preserved to us. Hadrian’s was quoted by Justin Martyr about twenty years or less after it was written. How had it become known to the Christians? This is a point of some interest, but an answer cannot be given with certainty. Possibly Hadrian himself may have intentionally allowed it to be brought to their knowledge. But, so far as I can judge, it is more probable that its terms became known to them through their influence in the province of Asia and in the bureau (officium) of the proconsul. That supposition is quite in accordance with the general impression we receive, that the new religion was very widespread and influential in this and the neighbouring provinces before the middle of the second century. We find an example which has some bearing on this point in the case of Florinus, who was listening to Polycarp’s lectures in Smyrna along with Irenaeus, while he was attending the Imperial court and enjoying high favour there. The exact date and the precise circumstances are as yet a matter of conjecture. In the great uncertainty about Irenaeus birth and early life the facts may belong to any time between 135 and 150. But it is quite probable that an inscription may any day be found giving a clue to the circumstances and time when an imperial visit, otherwise unknown to us, was made to Asia during this period. [Note: This is a fair example how much may reasonably be expected from the progress of investigation and discovery.]
It is of course possible that the Christians bought a copy of the rescript Many instances are recorded in which they purchased from the clerks (commentarienses) copies of the official shorthand report of the proceedings at trials of martyrs, and these official Acta form the groundwork of many of the tales of martyrs, and are even reproduced verbatim in some of the best and most authentic accounts. [Note: Le Blant, Actes des Martyrs, pp. 65 and 70.] The rescript would certainly be preserved in the proconsular archives of the province of Asia. [Note: Archivum firoconsulis is the phrase used by St. Augustin in reference to Africa (contra Crescunium, iii., 80(70), Le Blant, pp. 63-4.] 2. ANTONINUS PIUS, JULY IOTH, 138, TO MARCH 771-1, A.D. 161. The more liberal procedure of Trajan and Hadrian was, on the whole, maintained in this reign. The general tone of the rescript to Fundanus seems to have characterized the letters addressed by Antoninus Pius to several cities of Greece and Thrace, forbidding disorderly procedure against the Christians. [Note: The reasoning of Neumann (p. 28), Overbeck ( Studien zur Geschichte, etc., p. 146 ff.), and others, about these letters is vitiated by their wrong interpretation of the phrase μηδὲν ν∈ωτ∈ρίζ∈ιν . This does not indicate"innovations," as they understand it, but riotous and tumultuous action. In the Latin original novœ res was, no doubt, the phrase. Lightfoot rightly translates the phrase, Ignat., i., 459. The letters are mentioned by Melito, in a lost Apology addressed to Marcus Aurelius, and quoted by Eusebius, H. E., iv., 26.] These letters confirmed the section in Hadrian’s rescript, ordering that mere tumultuous shouting should not be taken as a formal accusation of the Christians. They required that the proper procedure before the governors of the provinces should be observed, and forbade any riotous action on the part of the populace. In this very restriction, however, it is implied that the regular formal procedure was still maintained, and was, in the opinion of the Emperor, fully adequate to the requirements of the case. As to the facts which occasioned these letters, we may assume with some confidence that tumultuous action, similar to that which took place at Smyrna in A. D. 155 against Polycarp, had occurred in various other cities about the same time; and the Emperor wrote to the Athenians, Larissaians, Thessalonians, and the Greek cities in general, [Note: Among these Smyrna is included. The phrase is not "cities of the province Achaia," but "all Hellenes," which includes those of the Aegean coast. Compare the coin on which the people of Tralles claim to be the "First of the Greeks," see above, p. 157 n.] reminding them of the actual state of public law, and warning them against stretching municipal action too far, and encroaching on the powers of the Imperial Government (see p. 393). [Note: This point of view is involved in vewrfpi^eiv and novcs res. The precise time when the letters to the cities were written is not recorded. Melito implies that it was after the assumption of Marcus Aurelius as Caesar in A.D. 147; and the reasoning in the text shows that it was probably soon after the action of the Smyrnaeans in A.D. 155.] The action of the citizens of Smyrna was in direct disobedience to the rescript of Hadrian; but the rescript was in advance of public feeling, and was therefore liable to be disregarded. It seems also clear that the pro consul was a weak official. This is shown by his attitude towards the mob. His inclination and sense of duty urged him to give Polycarp a further hearing and a formal trial, if he could “prevail upon the people; " but their shouts impelled him to order, or rather to permit, immediate execution. [Note: See 10 of the letter of the Smyrnaeans.] We may suppose that the passions and fears of the mob were strongly excited by some recent great calamity, for many events of that kind are mentioned in the reign of Pius. [Note: Script. Hist. Aug., iii., Vit. Anton., 9.] In Smyrna a serious earthquake had occurred not long before, A.D. 151 or 152 apparently. [Note: Lightfoot, Ignat. i., p. 461, following Waddington, Pastes, 141; but the latter gets his date from the forged letter of Antoninus to the Koinon of Asia, which he assigns to A.D. 152, whereas Mommsen and Lightfoot, p. 483, put it in 158. Probably the date for the earthquake is pretty accurate.] This series of outbreaks of popular feeling in the Greek cities points to some widely spread cause; and the circumstances of the following reign show that the cause was a general revival of paganism in a more philosophic and reasoned form. A larger body of detailed information is extant about the sufferings of individual martyrs under Antoninus Pius than under Hadrian. Lightfoot has clearly shown this, [Note: Ignat. and Pol., i., p. 509.] but we need not infer that the Christians really suffered more. We are now coming nearer the period when regular contemporary registration of Christian history began; and moreover, the extraordinary personal importance of Polycarp secured the preservation of the facts of his death. The language of Justin and of Minucius Felix is conclusive as to the existence of persecution in this reign. In his first Apology Justin appeals direct to the Emperor against the principle now enforced that the mere Name is a capital offence. He argues against it on the ground of justice and legality, and quotes the rescript to Fundanus as a proof that Hadrian was opposed to it. He did not find it serves his purpose to quote Trajan’s rescript, which expressly affirmed the principle; and his silence about the rescript is no argument that he did not know it. The later rescript of Hadrian might fairly be considered as over ruling the earlicr. [Note: I need not quote all the passages in Justin, which are numerous. (See Lightfoot, Ignat. and Pol., i., p. 534.) The date of Minucius not later than A.D. 160 appears to Lightfoot established by the passages quoted by Schwenke. I have not the right to express any opinion on the date of Minucius; but, if the words are pressed in that way, they point to a period before A.D. 147.] But he does not refer to the actual seeking out of Christians as practiced by the Government officials, and we shall sec that in this respect the authorities for the succeeding reign differ greatly from him. A procedure conforming to the rescripts of Hadrian and Antoninus was employed in the case of Ptolemaeus and Lucius. Neither of them was sought out by the prefect, Lollius Urbicus, but private accusers came forward against the former, and the latter offered himself voluntarily. [Note: Lollius was, according to Borghesi, praefectus urbi about 152. See note, p. 327.] The exception in the case of Polycarp has been shown to be an infraction of the established rule. A good example of the action which a Roman official might take at the time is furnished by the case of Pudens, who, as Neumann has shown, was probably proconsul of Cyrene and Crete a few years before 166.[Tertullian,ad Scap., iv. The usual view is that Pudens was proconsul of Africa when the incident occurred; but Neumann’s reasoning establishes the strong probability of his case. If the usual view were correct, Pudens’ proconsulate would have to be dated under Commodus; for his action is contrary to the character of procedure under Marcus, but similar in style to that of Cincius Severus, which has been quoted previously (p. 323).] He expressly declared that he was forbidden by the instructions (mandatum) of the Emperor to investigate the case of a Christian, unless a formal accuser appeared; and, after tearing up the document of accusation which was sent along with the prisoner, he dismissed him on the ground that no individual prosecutor had come forward.
3. MARCUS AURELIUS, MARCH 7TH, 161, TO MARCH 17TH, 180. The larger policy of Trajan and Hadrian was not understood by Marcus Aurelius. His ideal was to be the true Roman; and a decided reaction towards the older narrow Roman policy is apparent during his reign. He could not of course “stem the torrent of descending time "; ideas enlarged, policy widened, and the conception of Rome developed insensibly and inevitably. But philosophic leanings now no longer inclined toward Christianity and against the Imperial rule, as in the Flavian period. The Cynics indeed were still in opposition to the narrower policy, and championed the cosmopolitan spirit, which was steadily marching towards its final triumph. But popular dilettante Greek philosophy was no longer on the side of the opposition. It was now seated on the throne; and for the time the Imperial policy coquetted with other favourites, and lost sight of the goal towards which history was moving.
Christian thought was diametrically opposed to the Greek ideals of social life; [Note: I do not refer here to questions of morality. The introduction of the purest morality into Greek ideals would have left them still essentially opposed to the Christian principles of society.] and for a time, while the retrogressive tendency in the Imperial policy lasted, a union took place of the Roman power and the Greek philosophic influence, in opposition to the Christian re organization of society. They allied themselves with the current religions, and tried to make explicit in the ceremonial paganism the higher ideas, which certainly were latent beneath the gross and detestable exterior of its mystic rites. Paganism, which the Imperial policy had throughout the first century, from Augustus to Domitian, tried in vain to galvanize into life, began even under Hadrian to feel, under the stimulus of opposition to Christianity, the pulse of returning life. The mysteries set before the initiated a doctrine which might compete with Christian doctrine, and might prove that the higher truths of life and morality had been stolen from them by the Christians. Already in 134 A.D., Hadrian was greatly interested in watching the contest between the doctrines of Christianity and the mysticism of the religion of Serapis, which he considered to be of much the same character and rank. [Note: See the letter to Servianus, quoted in Script. Hist. Aug., xxix., ( Vita Saturnini} 8; Lightfoot, Ignat. and Pol., i., p. 480.]
It seems clear that during this reign the active pursuit of the Christians became a marked feature. Celsus in his True Word speaks of them as being sought out for execution. [Note: See Origen, c. Celsum, viii., 69. The date of Celsus work has been the subject of much discussion, but it may be probably placed in this reign, when conjoint Emperors were in power, either in 161-169, or 177-180. The variation between the singular and the plural in referring to the sovereign authority is characteristic of many docu ments of the period. (See p. 249.)] The evidence of the Christian writers is to the same effect. Melito, about 170-171, refers to new edicts, according to which the Christians are pursued. [Note: Quoted by Eusebius, H. E., iv., 26: καινὰδόγματα, προστάγματα.] Such persecution he declares to be unprecedented.
It would also appear, if Melito can be trusted, that rewards were promised to informers from the property of the accused; for the informers are said to be greedy for property of others, and to spoil the innocent by day and by night.
Athenagoras, about 177-180, also refers to the harassing, plundering, and persecution of the Christians, and the fines imposed on them (which are probably the rewards given to informers). He speaks also in strong terms about the Name being sufficient proof of guilt, and entailing death. [Libellus pro Christianis, 1. etc.]
Theophilus of Antioch, about 1 80, also mentions that the Christians were pursued and sought out in his time. [Note: The word διώκουσι, which he uses, reminds us that the officials charged with this duty and commanded by the Eirenarch were styled διωμἰ + ̑ται. See O. Hirschfeld, die Sicher heitspolizei im röm. Kaiserreich, p. 28 ( Berl. Sitzungsber., 1891, p. 872).] The Acts of Martyrs give similar evidence. The governor of Gallia Lugdunensis sought out the Christians in 177; and already at the beginning of the reign, Justin Martyr and four companions were brought before Junius Rusticus, Prefect of the City in 163. In the beginning of the Acta Justini) it is said that the arrest was made in accordance with decrees enforcing worship of idols on the part of the Christians. It is clearly implied that the accused were sought out by officers in consequence of these decrees, and were not formally accused by any individual. Having acknowledged their religion, they are ordered to sacrifice, and the order is repeated with threats of severe punishment. The seeking out of Christians, then, is a marked feature in all documents relating to the time of Marcus Aurelius; whereas there is not a trace of evidence that it was practiced under Antoninus Pius, and it had been forbidden by Trajan and Hadrian. Keim has correctly observed that it begins under Marcus Aurelius; [Note: "Under M. Aurel kam die Verfolgung des ’Atheismus’ recht im Schwung und unter ihm erst kam es zur Aufsuchung der Christen".--Aus dem Urchrist., p.99. Justin, in his first Apology, written under Pius, is emphatic about the Name being a capital crime; but he makes no reference to the seeking out of Christians or to rewards for accusers.] but we hold that this was the re-introduction of the Flavian practice, the only logical course when Christianity was a crime.
These facts prove clearly that new methods were introduced by Marcus Aurelius, at least in the sense that proceedings against the Christians were enforced more actively, though the penalties remained the same. The question arises how this was brought about. Was it by a general edict? Was it by a clause inserted in the general instructions to governors? Or did the governors merely act on the knowledge that the Emperor was inclined to act logically in respect of the Christians, and, as they were criminals deserving death, to seek them out actively?
Some expressions occurring in the documents of the period would, if taken strictly, imply that an edict on the subject was issued. But probably they are simply rather loose phrases, which must not be taken too strictly. Melito, who speaks of “new decrees” in one place, uses in another the term “instructions.” [καινὰδόγματα, nova decreta, in the former case,προστάγματα,mandata, in the latter. In Acta Justini, i., also the word isπροσσάγματα.] The latter term is probably the right one; the action towards the Christians was guided by the Imperial instructions to provincial governors (mandata). These instructions, as has been shown, were susceptible of varying interpretation, according to the feeling of the governor and the tone of the reigning Emperor. During this reign the general revival of religious feeling would naturally lead to a stricter and logical interpretation of the instructions; especially as it would rapidly become known that the Emperor was not opposed to this course. The question remains, whether there was any actual change made in the instructions by Marcus? Neumann considers p. 33 n., that there had previously been actually a clause in the instructions, forbidding the seeking out of Christians, and that this prohibition was abrogated by Marcus. He quotes the action of Pudens, as above described; but it is very doubtful whether the proof is sufficient. Such a clause may perhaps have been inserted in the instructions issued by Hadrian and Pius to their lieutenants in the provinces; but the variability of procedure would rather suggest that the inconsistencies which we have described continued to exist throughout this whole century, and that none of the Emperors did anything beyond replying by rescript to questions which their lieutenants addressed to them. The lieutenants had the general instructions to seek out and punish sacrilegious persons, etc., and Christians were sacrilegious. The lieutenants might then either carry out the instructions logically, or observe the rescripts of Trajan and Hadrian forbidding the hunting out of Christians. Under Marcus the logical course was the rule.
We conclude, then, that no actual change was made by Marcus Aurelius in the wording of the clauses that regulated the attitude of the provincial governors towards the Christians. He did not professedly alter the policy of his immediate predecessors, and yet the spirit of that policy was, for a time, changed.
Far more cases of persecution are known in this than in the preceding reign; but no stress can be laid on this fact. Contemporary record of historical facts had now begun among the Christians, and the interest in preserving Christian documents and the Acta of martyrs dates from about the sixth decade of this century. The principle of proscription still continued; and persecution had never ceased even under the most tolerant Emperors.
Neumann’s view (p. 32) is very different He traces the intensification of persecution in this reign to a rescript, dated, according to his view, in A.D. 176, forbidding the introduction of new religious rites which tended to unsettle the minds of the people. This view we cannot accept, (1) It does not explain the facts, for the seeking out of Christians seems to have been practiced before 176 (Acta Justini, 163, Melito, perhaps 170). (2) The rescript was merely a reply to some question addressed to the Emperor, and does not appear to have been the basis of procedure against Christians, for it was approved by Christian Emperors, and retained in the Digest. (3) In 177 the Christians at Lugdunum do not appear to have been punished for proselytizing; nor did they suffer the milder penalties of this rescript.[Neumann quotes the expression of the populace at Lugdunum,ξένην τινάκαινήν εἰσάγουσι θρησκείαν, Euseb., H. E., v., 1, 63; but this phrase was not used in the trial, nor did the thought affect the proceedings. Neumann follows Keim in his dating, see p. 321 n.] The procedure is the same as of old, but carried out with more activity.
Coincident with the change of policy there was a revival of the old charge of flagitia against the Christians. It is quoted from Pronto, the tutor of Marcus, and it is mentioned in connection with the persecution at Lugdunum in 177. The evidence of slaves was used in support of it; and the statements made even by Christian writers, not very much later, about actual scandals, suggest that the revival was only an exaggeration of real evils.
4. THE APOLOGISTS. With Hadrian’s rescript begins the age of Apologies i.e., formal defenses of the faith. Christianity had now a hearing granted to it. Before 112, when the religion was absolutely condemned, an Apology would have been absurd. Now that the Imperial policy was hesitating about its attitude, and a trial was allowed, defence and argument might have some effect; and a long series of formal pleadings in defence were addressed to the Government, beginning, perhaps, about 129, when Aristides presented his Apology to Hadrian during his visit to Athens. [The Apology is noticed in Euseb., H. E., iv., 3, and dated in Chron., A.D. 125; but Hadrian’s second visit is the only one that can be thought of. Professor Rendel Harris brings down the date to 140. Eusebius seems to treat Hadrian’s rescript as the effect of the Apology; but this is, no doubt, pure conjecture, and we rather consider the Apology as elicited by the rescript.]
Defence and argument imply a recognition of the authority to which it is addressed. The spirit of which we discerned some slight indications in Ignatius letters (sec p. 315), had developed greatly before the first Apology was presented. In the age which produced I John and Apocalypse, and which nourished the spirit of Ignatius, an Apology would have been treason to religion. The irreconcilable opposition to the actual system, and the aspiration after an absolutely new era and a new society, had now been given up. The Church responded to the tone of Hadrian’s action: mutual allowance and an approximation between the two great enemies began. The Apologists always express or imply with regard to the character of Trajan’s action the same view that we have taken. It is indeed true that the Apologists were special pleaders, and that their testimony in certain respects must be discounted to a certain degree. But they were advocates of at least fair ability and good sense; misrepresentation of the Imperial action was subject to immediate contradiction, and could only injure their cause. They would naturally darken the colours of the picture which they drew of contemporary paganism; they saw only the bad side of it, and no student of ancient life can accept their account as complete. But, if the view that Trajan was the institutor of formal persecution were correct, it is hard to see how sane men could think to effect any good by misstating plain facts of recent history to the Emperors. The Apologists of the second century stand on a much higher intellectual level, if our interpretation of the evidence is correct. The objection may be urged against the credit of the Apologists that Tertullian speaks of Marcus Aurelius in terms much more favourable than facts seem to warrant. [Analog., 5.] But, as we have seen, Marcus did not formally make any change in the policy of his predecessors, though he favored a more severe interpretation of the clauses on which that policy was based; and he ranks, in a general view, with Trajan, Hadrian, and Pius, as contrasted with the uncompromising spirit of the Flavian Emperors; and this is all that Tertullian asserts. [Tertullian expressly notes that Marcus did not alter the general principle of condemning Christians. This is exactly what we have to remark about all these Emperors.]
Moreover, it is obvious that Tertullian firmly believed in the existence of a letter from Aurelius to the Senate, ascribing to Christian soldiers the merit of a great deliverance from imminent danger during his German wars. It is impossible, and, unless new documents are discovered (of which hope need not be abandoned), it must always remain impossible, to discover the truth of that famous legend. So much is certain: (1) such a deliverance did occur, and was universally attributed to the special interposition of Heaven; (2) there were many Christian soldiers in the army; [Note: In accordance with the method of recruiting the Roman army, as deduced by Mommsen, Hermes, 1884, pp. 8 ff, and stated very precisely for Africa by Cagnat, l’Armée Romaine d’Afrique, pp. 353 ff., Legio XII. Fulminata, whose permanent station (stativa) was at Melitene, would be originally recruited from the Eastern provinces; but after Hadrian ( Mommsen, p. 21) the recruiting for it would be almost wholly restricted to the adjacent provinces of Asia Minor. Christianity was specially strong in these provinces; "and," as Mommsen remarks ( Histor. Zft., xxviii. p. 419, n. 2), "the camp and the court were always centres of Christianising influence."] (3) The Christians at the time attributed the deliverance to the prayers of these soldiers, [Apollinaris is strictly contemporary; Tertullian wrote within about twenty-three years of the event.] (4) Pagan historians narrated the almost miraculous event, but explained it differently. It is not safe to assert absolutely, what is the simplest explanation that Tertullian merely assumes that there existed a letter of Marcus to the Senate, declaring that the deliverance had followed the prayers of the Christians, and denouncing penalties against their accusers. This explanation is apparently simple; but it leaves unsolved the greatest difficulty of the case- viz., how could Tertullian entertain the belief which he expresses so positively in a document addressed to the Senate, if it were contrary to all facts and all non-Christian evidence and belief? It is clear that Tertullian was not conscious that any opinion different from his own existed, or that any member of the Senate would be likely to challenge his statement. There seems to be more in the story than we can as yet fathom. The Apologists do not ask for a change of law; they ask for a regulation of practice to accord with the law of the State. They demand for Christians a fair trial on some definite charge, attested by witnesses, with permission to make and prove their defence. They ask to be brought under the ordinary law; and they inveigh against the exercise of arbitrary authority against them on no definite charge. This, the most elementary right of citizens, had been absolutely denied them by the Flavian policy, which treated them as brigands. Trajan had left the Flavian principle unaltered, but had exempted them from active pursuit. The Apologists justly argue against the illogical nature of a policy which treats them like brigands when any one formally accuses them, but does not take the trouble to look for them: if they are brigands, it is the duty of the State to hunt them down. Even Hadrian had shrunk from the decisive step of clearly stating that Christianity was not in itself a crime; and this is the step which the Apologists urge upon the Emperors whom they address. In support of this claim the Apologists advance various arguments: (1) that their religion has a high moral tone, and is absolutely inconsistent with the gross crimes which were currently charged against them; (2) that it is of a higher moral character than Paganism, and is therefore an educative influence in the State; (3) that Christians are loyal citizens, and, though they are compelled by their religion to abstain from some of the conventional signs of loyalty, yet in all essential points they discharge its duties fully; (4) that a name is not in itself a crime, and that even a brigand is not punished for the name he bears, but only after the truth has been proved in regard to his actions. An essential point in the Christian doctrine was the unity and brotherhood of all men; and the same idea was being gradually wrought into the Imperial system. Trajan and Hadrian, two Spaniards, free from the narrower Roman tradition, were, not unnaturally, the leaders in the policy of mercy towards the party that carried out most logically the idea which they themselves did much to work out in practice. Tatiana expresses this idea more clearly than any other of the Apologists, and contrasts it with the theories of Greek philosophy, which always clung to the old separation of states, and the belief that moderate size was of the essence of a state. In 28 he professes the cosmopolitan doctrine, and rejects the narrower systems which separate state from state. The true philosophy maintains that there should be one common polity for all, and one universal system of law and custom. The Christian doctrine, 29, puts an end to the servitude that is in the world, and rescues mankind from a multiplicity of rulers. Its aim, 32, is universal education, not education confined to the rich, as among the Greeks and Romans; its principle is free education to the poor, and it makes no distinction of sex, but admits all to its universal system of education. He defends, 33, the Christian custom of women studying philosophy. [Tatian did not address any Emperor; but he employs similar arguments with the other Apologists, sometimes expressing them more sharply. Tertullian’s Apologeticum would need a chapter to itself.]
