Part 2, Chapter 2

PART II - DOCTRINE OF ELECTION CHAPTER II.
OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF ELECTION STATED, AND THE ERRORS AND INCONSISTENCIES OF ARMINIANISM EXPOSED. A number of general objections are urged against the doctrine of Election, which it will be satisfactory to consider before we proceed to the direct proof of its truth.

One of the most plausible objections is, that the doctrine is inconsistent with the JUSTICE of God. Now that God is infinitely just, we admit and assert; and if the doctrine of Election is indeed inconsistent with Divine justice, it must be rejected as false and injurious. Justice consists in a strict regard for all the rights or just claims of others. Injustice, in the Divine administration would necessarily consist, therefore, either in withholding from his creatures those blessings to which they have a just claim; or in inflicting upon them sufferings which they do not deserve. Does the doctrine of Election represent God as doing either of these things? If it does, the objection urged against it is valid; if it does not, the objection has no force. In what, then, consists the alleged injustice implied in the doctrine under consideration? It of course does not consist in the saving of the elect. Their salvation is indeed wholly of grace; but in the plan of salvation, the exercise of grace, it is admitted, is perfectly consistent with Divine. justice,-its claims having been fully satisfied by Jesus Christ for his people. The injustice implied in the doctrine must, therefore, if it exist at all, be exercised toward the non-elect. Let us, then, carefully examine wherein, if this doctrine be true, they are treated unjustly. Are blessings withheld from them to which they have just claim? Or are sufferings inflicted which they do not merit? That we may satisfactorily answer these questions, let us get a distinct view of the real condition of the human race. On the following points, the more evangelical class of Arminians agree with us: 1. That God created man in his moral image, in true holiness. 2. That our first parents yielded to the temptation of the devil, and fell from their original holiness. 3. That in his trial Adam was the federal head of his posterity, and that his first sin was imputed to them; and, consequently, they are regarded and treated as if they had done what he did. Of the consequences of the imputation of Adam’s sin to his posterity, Rev. Richard Watson says:-"The first consequence, then, of this imputation is the death of the body, to which all the descendants of Adam are made liable, and that on account of the sin of Adam." The second consequence, he says, is "death spiritual, that moral state which arises from the withdrawment of that intercourse of God with the human soul, in consequence of its becoming polluted, and of that influence upon it which is the only source and spring of the right and vigorous direction and employment of its powers in which its rectitude consists; a deprivation from which a, depravation consequently and necessarily follows." The third consequence, according to the same author," is eternal death, separation from God, and endless banishment from his glory in a future state."[Theol. Inst., pt. 2, ch. 18] Now, admitting the views of Mr. Watson concerning the imputation of Adam’s sin, and the consequences flowing therefrom, to be correct, what is the real condition of the human family, aside from the plan of salvation? All are mortal, exposed to temporal death; all are spiritually dead, totally depraved; and all are "children of wrath," exposed to eternal misery. The doctrine of Election teaches, that God, of his infinite mercy, purposed, from eternity, to renew, sanctify, justify and save, through Jesus Christ, a portion of the fallen race of Adam; and this doctrine, we are assured, is inconsistent with the justice of God. That is, if God should thus choose a portion of the human race, and pass by the remainder, leaving them in their fallen and condemned condition, he would thus do injustice to these last. Of course, as before remarked, he would, if the objection be well founded, either withhold from them what they have a just claim to, or inflict upon them sufferings they do not deserve.

Now, let us suppose, that God had passed by the whole human race, leaving them in their fallen, depraved and condemned condition, as he passed by the fallen angels, would he have been chargeable with injustice toward them? If not, he would simply have left them to a just doom, and to a just punishment. But if he might justly pass by all, how is he chargeable with injustice toward those whom he does thus pass by? Does the injustice consist in saving some? Will it be pretended, that his bestowing on some a gracious salvation, deprives others of what they had a just claim to? Those who are saved, receive blessings to which they have no claim,-are saved by grace, not by merit. Does the bestowing upon some men blessings to which they had no claim, give others a just claim to those blessings? If so, it would follow that but one sinner could be saved by grace; for so soon as saving grace was bestowed on one, all others would have a just claim to the same blessings, and would consequently receive them as debt, not as grace. But the idea is too absurd. If it be admitted that God might justly have passed by all men and left them to perish, it follows inevitably that in saving some he does no injustice to others whom he does not save. In other words, if God might justly leave all to perish, he is not in justice bound to save any; and if he is not bound to save any, he does no injustice to those whom he does not save.

If we can understand Mr. Watson, he contends that the imputation of Adam’s sin to his posterity, and their consequent exposedness to eternal misery, are just. He says: "The justice of this [i. e., their exposedness to eternal misery] is objected to, a point which will be immediately considered; but it is now sufficient to say, that if the making the descendants of Adam liable to eternal death, because of his offence, be unjust, the infliction of temporal death is so also; -the duration of the punishment making no difference in the simple question of justice. If punishment, whether of loss or of pain, be unjust, its measure and duration may be a greater or a less injustice; but it is unjust in every degree. If, then, we only confine the hurt we have received from Adam to bodily death,-if this legal result of his transgression only be imputed to us, and we are so constituted sinners as to become liable to it, we are in precisely the same difficulty as to the equity of the proceedings, as when the legal result is extended further. The only way out of this dilemma is that adopted by Dr. Taylor, to consider death not as a punishment, but as a blessing, which involves the absurdity of making Deity threaten a benefit as a penalty for an offence, which sufficiently refutes the notion."[Theol. Inst., pt. 2, ch. 18] This language is sufficiently plain. Mr. Watson proves conclusively, that the imputation of Adam’s sin to his posterity, together with all the consequences even to eternal misery; is strictly just. Most assuredly, then, it cannot be unjust in God to inflict upon any of his creatures just punishment. To assert that it is, would be a palpable contradiction. But it may be said, that it would have been unjust in God to have passed by all the human race, and left them to perish in their sin; that since Adam’s posterity had no agency in his sin by which they were brought into a ruined condition, God was bound to provide for them a way of escape. On this point the language of Mr. Watson appears contradictory. Speaking of natural death as coming upon Adam’s posterity because of his sin, he says, "here was justice, the end of which is to support law, as that supports government." Of their spiritual death, flowing from the same cause, he says, "here was justice, a display of the evil of sin, and of the penalty it ever immediately induces." In regard to the resurrection by Jesus Christ, regeneration by the Holy Spirit, and the offer of eternal life, he says, "here is mercy." Now if such language means anything, it means that the justice of God would consign the whole human race to death,-temporal, spiritual and eternal; and that it is mercy which affords them the offer of salvation. And yet he says immediately afterwards: "In all this, it is impossible to impeach the equity of the Divine procedure, since no man suffers any loss or injury ultimately by the sin of Adam, but by his own willful obstinacy,-the ‘abounding grace’ by Christ Jesus, having placed before all men, upon their believing, not merely compensation for the loss and injury sustained by Adam, but infinitely higher blessings, both in kind and degree, than were forfeited in him." He here defends the justice of God in the imputation of Adam’s sin, on the ground that by the plan of salvation through Jesus Christ he offers the human race the opportunity of escaping from the consequences of that imputation, evidently implying, that but for the offer of salvation, which he yet ascribes to mercy, that imputation would be unjust. This ground is much more strongly taken, when he urges against the doctrine of Election the objection that it is unjust. He says: "In whatever light the subject be viewed, no fault, in any right construction, can be chargeable upon the persons so punished, or as we may rather say, destroyed; since punishment supposes a judicial proceeding, which this act shuts out. For either the reprobates are destroyed for a pure reason of sovereignty, without any reference to their sinfulness, and thus all criminality is left out of the consideration; or they are destroyed for the sin of Adam, to which they were not consenting; or for personal faults resulting from a corruption of nature which they brought into the world with them, and which God wills not to correct, and they have no power to correct themselves. Every received notion of justice is thus violated." The position is here distinctly taken, that it would be unjust in God to pass by all or any of the human family, leaving them to perish in their sin, without both offering them a Saviour, and giving them such assistance that they can correct that corruption of nature with which they came into the world. Consequences of most serious import follow this position.

1. In the first place, it clearly charges God with injustice. Observe, Mr. Watson not only admits, but asserts that God did impute the sin of Adam to his posterity, and that the legitimate consequences of that imputation were natural death, spiritual death, and exposedness to eternal death; and yet he contends most earnestly, that it would be unjust that they should be left to suffer these consequences. Most certainly, then, the imputation itself; which exposes them to undeserved sufferings, is unjust. Nor is the difficulty at all removed by the fact, that God offers them the opportunity of salvation through Jesus Christ. An unjust act cannot be made just by another act intended to compensate for the injustice done. If I, without provocation, push a man into a pit, and he be badly bruised, it is no justification of the act that I let down a ladder for him, and call in a physician to cure his wounds. If the imputation of the sin of Adam to his posterity, with all the consequences legitimately flowing from it, be not in itself just, the provisions of the gospel, of which many never hear, cannot make it so. These provisions can be considered in no other light, than as being some amends made for an injury previously done. In a word, the human race are in their present lost condition, either by the operation of just principles or of unjust principles. If the former be admitted, then evidently there can be no injustice in their being left where justice placed them. If the latter be alleged, then God is charged with injustice. So far, then, from our doctrine being chargeable with making God unjust, the objection lies strongly against Arminianism!

2. The objection we are considering destroys all grace in the gospel system, and makes the salvation of men a mere matter of debt. As a matter of fact, the human race, it is admitted, are fallen, mortal, depraved, and exposed to eternal misery. If left in this condition, they must perish. But Mr. Watson and his Arminian brethren say, it would be most unjust that they should be left to perish. Justice, then, requires that an adequate provision be made for their escape. The gospel is such a provision. Is it not, then, clear that the mission of the Son of God into our world, his crucifixion, and the whole plan of salvation, is a mere matter of justice toward men,-a provision which God, who imputed to them Adam’s sin, and thus brought them into their lost condition, was bound in justice to make? Observe, if Christ bad not come into the world and died, all men must have perished. But says Mr. Watson, they would be destroyed "for a pure reason of sovereignty, without any reference to their sinfulness, and thus all criminality is left out of the consideration; or they are destroyed for the sin of Adam, to which they were not consenting; or for personal faults resulting from a corruption of nature which they brought into the world with them, and which God wills not to correct, and they have no power to correct themselves. Every received notion of justice is thus violated." Evidently, according to this reasoning, God was bound to send his Son to die for man, to offer them salvation, and give them sufficient aid to enable them to accept. And if, when the offer is made, any accept it, God is bound in justice to save them; for surely it would be unjust that any one perish who accepts the offer of life which God was bound to make. And, then, it is not only true that all dying in infancy are saved, (which we believe,) but both they and believing adults are saved, not by grace, but by justice. It would have been unjust that either class should perish.

Indeed, if the principles advanced by Mr. Watson are true, we see no necessity for an atonement. If justice requires that men should have the offer of salvation, why should Christ suffer to make it consistent for God to do a just thing? Then indeed the law, which is just, would offer salvation without an atonement. Where, then, is the grace in the plan of salvation? There can be none.

How different this view from that presented in the Scriptures:-"God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him, might not perish, but have everlasting life." Men were in a perishing condition, and the offer of salvation through Christ is here declared to be the result of boundless love, not of Divine justice toward men. Accordingly Paul says: -“Ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that though he was rich, yet for your sakes he became poor, that ye through his poverty might be rich."[2 Corinthians 8:9] The whole provision and the entire salvation of man is declared to be the manifestation of the boundless grace of God, not in any degree the result of Divine justice to injured man. "For by grace are ye saved through faith: and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God." "The WAGES of sin is death; but the GIFT of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord."

We are constrained to charge upon Arminianism, that it destroys all brace in the plan of redemption. Is there grace in the salvation of infants? No; for it is alleged that it would be most unjust that they should perish because of their connection with Adam, and of their consequent depravity. Justice, therefore, saves them. Is there grace in the salvation of adults? No; for they derive their natural death and their depravity, from which flow all their sins, from Adam; and God is bound to offer them deliverance, and, of course, to save them, if they accept the offer.

3. There is another most serious error in the doctrine of Mr. Watson. He evidently considers depravity of heart as so far destroying or impairing the free agency and accountability of man, that unless divine influence be exerted upon them to remove its effects, they cannot be justly required to repent and turn from their sins, and to trust in Jesus Christ, He says:-"If all men everywhere would condemn it, as most contrary to justice and right, that a sovereign should condemn to death one or more of his subjects for not obeying laws which it is absolutely impossible for them under any circumstances which they can possibly avail themselves of to obey, and much more the greater part of his subjects, and to require them, on pain of aggravated punishment, to do something in order to the pardon and remission of their offences, which he knows they cannot do, say to stop the tide or to remove a mountain, it implies a charge as awfully and obviously unjust against God, to suppose him to act precisely in the same manner as to those whom he has passed by and rejected, without any avoidable fault of their own." In the same connection he speaks of "personal faults resulting from a corruption of nature which they brought into the world with them, and which God wills not to correct, and they have no power to correct themselves," and represents the non-elect as "left under a necessity of sinning in every condition." Now if this representation be correct, the effect of depravity upon the minds of men is so completely to paralyze their powers, that they are under a necessity of sinning, and can no more love and obey God than they can stop the tide or remove a mountain. Look at the consequences which necessarily flow from such a principle.

1. Men left without divine influence to relieve them from the effects of depravity are not accountable beings, and are under no obligation to obey the law of God. If they can no more obey the law of God than they can stop the tide, and are under a necessity of sinning, they can be under no obligation to obey. And if they are under no obligation to obey, they are not chargeable with sin in disobeying; and if not chargeable with sin in disobeying, they do not and cannot sin. The conclusion, therefore, to which we are forced, according to Mr. Watson’s doctrine, is that men, left in their natural state, are so depraved that they cannot sin! for certain it is, that they who cannot obey, cannot disobey.

2. According to this doctrine, the very first effect of Divine grace on the hearts of men, is to enable them to sin! Left entirely to themselves, as we have seen, they could not sin; but it is admitted that all do sin when they reach the period of moral agency, which they could not do if left without divine influence. Does it not follow, that all the actual transgressions of men, so far as they possess any criminality, are traceable to that divine influence which, according to our Arminian brethren, is given to every man? And does not this look like making God the author of sin?

3. According to the doctrine we are considering, the more depraved men become the less sin they commit! Total depravity, we are assured, makes it necessary for men to sin. Now let the sinner reject that divine aid which is proffered him, extinguish by his persevering wickedness that spark of grace which it is said God has put into his heart, and ever after he is under a necessity of doing as he does,-can no more obey God than he can stop the tide. He may be criminal, to some extent, in extinguishing that spark, just as a man would be in deliberately putting out his eyes; but as the latter would be under no obligation to see after his eyes were put out, so the former would he under no obligation to obey God after he had extinguished the spark of grace in his heart. Forever afterwards he would be incapable of either obeying or disobeying God. He could sin no more!

4. If the effect of depravity be to destroy free agency and accountability, then the more depraved a man becomes, even though he have not entirely expelled from his heart all divine influence, the less capable he is of sinning. So that the most depraved men in the world really commit less sin than those who are far better!

5. According to this doctrine, the devils and all lost spirits are wholly incapable of sinning; for most assuredly they are totally depraved, and have in their hearts not a spark of Divine grace. They devise wicked plans, and execute them; and they blaspheme the name of God; but since they are under a necessity of doing these things, and can be under no obligation to do otherwise, they are chargeable with nothing criminal. They are so deeply depraved, that they cannot sin! To such absurdities does the doctrine lead, upon which is founded the charge of injustice against the doctrine of Election. The plain truth is, that there is no tendency in depravity to destroy or impair man’s free agency and just accountability. Satan has free agency as perfect now, as before he fell from heaven. The only difference is that he loved to do right then, and he loves to do wrong now. But in choosing to gratify his evil affections by doing wrong now, he is as free as he was in choosing to gratify his pure affections by doing right then; and, therefore, he is under the same obligation to obey God now as then. The evidence of our free agency is our own consciousness, and the worst man is as distinctly conscious of acting freely, and of being justly accountable, as the best. It is not true, therefore, that the sinner, left to himself, is under the necessity of sinning; nor is it true, that to require him to obey God, or to believe in Christ, would be as unreasonable and as unjust as to require him to stop the tide or to remove a mountain. The charge of injustice against the doctrine of Election, is made out by connecting Arminian philosophy with Calvinistic theology. We protest against the unnatural union, and against all inferences drawn from it. We hold, that the human mind is from its very nature free, and must always continue free; and consequently the obligation of all men capable of understanding the requirements of the Divine law to obey it, is perfect, whether they are totally depraved or not. That there is a sense in which the sinner cannot serve God, is true; but his inability is not of a kind which interferes with his free agency and accountability. Like Joseph’s brethren, who "hated him and could not speak peaceably to him," the sinner is the more criminal for his inability. To sum up the whole matter, the human race are in their lost and ruined condition by the operation of just principles, or they are not. If they are, God might justly leave them in that condition; and if, for reasons satisfactory to Infinite Wisdom, he should pass by some of them, there would be no injustice done them. He would withhold nothing from them to which they have any just claim, and he would inflict on them no punishment they do not deserve. For it is absurd to say, that men are justly exposed to eternal misery; and yet it would be unjust that they should suffer it. It is the same as saying, it is unjust to inflict a just penalty. But if it be alleged, that men are fallen and exposed to ruin by the operation of principles that are not just, then, in the first place, it follows that the principles of God’s moral government, under which he placed Adam and his posterity; are unjust; and, in the second place, that there is no grace in his remedial system,-it being nothing more than God’s plan of offering to men what in justice he could not withhold.

We feel constrained here distinctly to charge, not upon Arminians themselves, but upon their system, that it impugns the principles of God’s moral government, by admitting the fact of the imputation of Adam’s sin to his posterity, and yet declaring the legitimate consequences of that imputation unjust. We charge that system with making the whole plan of salvation a matter not of grace but of debt, by holding God under obligation to provide men the means of escape from their fallen condition.

Whatever difficulties men may find in seeing the consistency of the imputation of Adam’s sin to his posterity with the principles of justice, so long as we admit the fact, (and the Scriptures do plainly teach it,) we must believe it perfectly consistent. It is certain that God never adopted an unjust principle, -a principle which, legitimately acted upon, would do injustice to any of his creatures. If, therefore, he did adopt the principle of federal representation, as Arminians admit, that principle is just, whether with our present limited knowledge we can see it to be so or not. There is, however, really no more difficulty in reconciling with justice the imputation of Adam’s sin to his posterity, than in reconciling the sufferings of infants and universal depravity, or the fact that children do, in multitudes of instances, suffer terribly in consequence of the wickedness of their parents. Indeed it would not be difficult to prove that the doctrines of the Scriptures on this point, is attended with fewer difficulties than any theory by which men have attempted to explain the existing state of things.

If, then, the doctrine of imputation is just, and if men are free agents irrespective of any divine influence upon their hearts, the doctrine of Election is not inconsistent with the justice of God. The non-elect are deprived of nothing to which they have just claim, and are subjected to no unmerited punishment. They loved sin, and God left them to pursue the course they chose. Indeed multitudes of them are chargeable with freely and deliberately rejecting the offers of salvation. The opposers of this doctrine, then, must assail it on some other ground. A second objection to the doctrine of Election is, that it represents God as A RESPECTER OF PERSONS. Now, we cheerfully admit that the objection, if well founded, is fatal to the doctrine; for it is certain, as the Scriptures repeatedly declare, that God is not a respecter of persons. Before we can determine what force there is in the objection, we must ascertain the precise meaning of the phrase respecter of persons. This we can do by comparing the passages of Scripture in which it occurs. Moses charged the Jewish judges: "Ye shall not respect persons in judgment; but ye shall hear the small as well as the great; ye shall not be afraid of the face of man," etc. Again:-“Thou shalt not wrest judgment; thou shalt not respect persons, neither take a gift; for a gift doth blind the eyes of the wise, and pervert the words of the righteous." In these passages, it is evident that the phrase has reference exclusively to the conduct of a judge trying a cause brought legally before him. If in his decisions he were influenced not by the law and the testimony, but by personal prejudice in favor of one of the parties, or by the fear of man, or by a bribe, he would be a respecter of persons. In the same sense it is applied to God: "For the Lord your God is God of gods, and Lord of lords, a great God, a mighty, and a terrible, which regardeth not persons, nor taketh reward: he doth execute the judgment of the fatherless and widow, and loveth the stranger, in giving him food and raiment." Paul explains the phrase, when he says, God "will render to every man according to his deeds, etc.; for there is no respect of persons with God." When Peter saw that God had accepted Cornelius, a pious Gentile, he said: "Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons: but in every nation he that feareth him and worketh righteousness, is accepted with him." If God had rejected Cornelius, who was a truly pious man, simply because he was a Gentile, whilst he would receive a Jew of the same character, he would have been a respecter of persons. But inasmuch as he accepts all righteous men, of whatever nation, he is not so. A respecter of persons, then, is one who, acting as a judge, decides not according to law and testimony, but is governed by sinister motives; who does not treat those who come before him according to their character; who withholds from some that to which they have just claim, in order to give to others what is not their due; or who is governed in his treatment of men by prejudice, not by a proper estimate of their real character. Precisely this interpretation of the phrase respecter of persons, is given by Dr. Adam Clarke.*

[* In his Commentary on Acts x. 34, he thus explains it: "He does not esteem a Jew, because he is a Jew; nor does he detest a Gentile, because he is a Gentile. It was a long and deeply rooted opinion among the Jews; that God never would extend his favor to the Gentiles; and that the descendants of Jacob only should enjoy his peculiar favor and benediction. Of this opinion was St. Peter, previously to the heavenly vision mentioned in this chapter. He was now convinced that God was no respecter of persons; that all must stand before his judgment-seat, to be judged according to the deeds done in the body; so no one nation of people, or individual, could expect to find a more favorable decision than another, who was precisely in the same moral state: for the phrase respect of persons, is used in reference to unjust decisions in a court of justice, when through favor, or interest, or bribe, a culprit is acquitted, and a righteous or innocent person condemned. And as there is no iniquity (decisions contrary to equity) with God, so he could not shut out the pious prayers, sincere fasting, and benevolent alms giving of Cornelius; because the very spring whence they proceeded was his own grace and mercy. Therefore he could not receive even a Jew into his favor, (in preference to such a person) who had either abused his grace or made a less godly use of it than this Gentile had done."]

Now the doctrine of Election teaches that all the human race are fallen, depraved, and exposed to the wrath of God, none of them having any claims upon God; and that upon some of them he, for his own glory, bestows gifts and blessings which he does not bestow upon others. Is this doctrine liable to the objection, that it makes God a respecter of persons? The objection is based upon the principle, that God is bound to give to every individual of the human family precisely the same or equal gifts; and, consequently, if in any one instance he fails to do this, he is a respecter of persons. Or if it be admitted that he may bestow upon some, gifts which he grants not to others no more undeserving, those who press this objection must tell us precisely how far he may proceed in making a difference before he becomes chargeable with respecting persons. One individual, for example, is born blind, and another is blessed with vision. God in his providence bestows upon the latter an inestimable blessing, which he withholds from the former; and this difference, existing before either could do good or evil, is not founded on difference of character. Is God, then, a respecter of persons? The Arminian will agree with us that he is not. But why not? Mr. Watson urges against Election the objection under consideration on the ground that it makes the acceptance or rejection of men stand on some ground of aversion or dislike, which cannot be resolved into any moral rule and has no respect to the merits of the, case itself.[Theol. Inst., pt. 2, ch. 26] No; it represents God as bestowing upon some persons gifts which he bestows not on others who possess the same depravity of heart. And in the case we are considering, God certainly does withhold from one of his creatures a blessing of incalculable value, which he bestows upon another; and, as before remarked, this difference is made before either of them has done good or evil. Into what moral rule can we resolve this difference? What respect has it to the merits of the case itself? Yet all are compelled to admit that God does make just such differences, and even greater, in his treatment of his creatures in ten thousand instances; and still he is not, a respecter of persons. Why such differences are made, it is impossible for us to know; but certain it is, that God has the best reasons for making them. But it may be said, that however it may be consistent in God to make a difference in the treatment of his creatures, as regards mere temporal blessings, such as vision, health, wealth, liberty, and the like, he cannot, without being a respecter of persons, make a similar difference in the bestowment of spiritual blessings connected with the salvation of the soul. We answer: 1. That it does not appear how the principle is changed, when the difference relates to spiritual gifts. If God may withhold from an individual the blessing of vision, why not any other blessing? The withholding of a greater blessing might be a greater injustice, if there were injustice in the case, or a more glaring manifestation of respect of persons; but the principle is the same. 2. But Mr. Watson, even when urging the objection against election, that it makes God a respecter of persons, concedes the principle which overthrows the objection. He says:-"This phrase, we grant, is not to be interpreted as though the bounties of the Almighty were dispensed in equal measures to his creatures. In the administration of favor, there is place for the exercise of that prerogative which, in a just sense, is called the sovereignty of God; but justice knows but one rule,"[Theol. Inst., pt. 2, ch. 26] etc. And are not all the blessings of salvation through Christ mere favors to men? Do not even Arminians hold that they are all of grace? If so, there is confessedly room for the exercise of sovereignty. If men have just claim to any of these blessings, they are not gracious. If they are gracious, and men consequently have no claim to them, it is clear beyond dispute that no injustice is done by withholding them. So that what Mr. Watson says about the one rule of justice, does not apply to the case in hand. But Mr. Watson admits that God may and does make a difference in the treatment of his creatures concerning even spiritual blessings. Amongst the benefits derived to man from the Atonement, he mentions the revelation of the will of God, and the declaration of his purposes of grace as to man’s actual redemption. "These purposes, " he remarks, "have been declared to man with great inequality we grant, a mystery which we are not able to explain, "[Theol. Inst., pt. 2, ch. 23] etc. Again he says:-"The second kind of Election which we find in Scripture is the election of nations or bodies of people to eminent religious privileges, and in order to accomplish, by their superior illumination, the merciful purposes of God, in benefitting other nations or bodies of people. Thus the descendants of Abraham, the Jews, were chosen to receive special revelations of truth, and to be ’the people of God,’ to be his visible Church, and publicly to observe and uphold his worship." Again:-"For Christians were the subjects, also, of this second kind of Election,- the election of bodies of men to be the visible people and Church of God in the world, and to be endowed with peculiar privileges."[Theol. Inst., pt. 2, ch. 26] Now let us see how the objection lies. It is admitted, that God may make great differences in the bestowment of temporal blessings upon different nations and individuals, without being a respecter of persons. It is also admitted, that he may and does choose some to peculiar religious privileges, of which others are left destitute, -privileges the design and tendency of which are to secure their conversion and salvation,-without being a respecter of persons. But it is asserted, that if he should go one step further, and exert upon some a sanctifying influence which he does not exert upon others, he would thereby make himself a respecter of persons! How, we ask, have our Arminian friends ascertained the precise amount of difference God may make in the bestowment of his grace, without becoming a respecter of persons? Their position is plainly contradictory. They admit the principle embraced in the doctrine of Election, viz: that God makes a difference in the bestowment of his blessings upon men; and then directly deny it, holding that to do so, would make him a respecter of persons!

Now the plain truth is, that grace, from its very nature, must be free; and, therefore, God may bestow or withhold it as in his infinite wisdom lie chooses. And so long as he withholds from no one of his creatures anything to which he has a just claim, and inflicts upon no one more punishment than his sin deserves, and so long as he rejects no righteous man; no one has the right to find fault, or charge him with respecting persons. The doctrine of Election does not represent him as doing either of these things, and consequently the objection we are considering is of no force whatever. A third objection to the doctrine of Election is, that it is inconsistent with the sincerity of God in offering salvation by Christ to all who hear the gospel. But if, as we believe, every man is a free moral agent, perfectly free to accept or reject the offer of salvation, where is the insincerity in making the offer to all? It is objected again, that according to the Calvinistic view, Christ made no atonement for the non-elect; and our Arminian friends have urged against the doctrine all those passages of Scripture which represent Christ as having died for all men. But the word for, like all other prepositions, has a number of meanings. What, then, do they mean by affirming that Christ died for all men? Do they mean that he made an atonement which, in consequence of his infinite dignity, is sufficient for all men? If so, we have no controversy with them; for we hold that the Atonement is of infinite value, and that no one is lost because its virtue is exhausted. Do they mean that in making an atonement Christ designed to offer salvation indiscriminately to all men? If so, we agree with them. Our views of the gospel require us to preach it "to every creature." Do they mean that Christ really purposed to save all men by his death? They cannot mean this; for, in the first place, multitudes were forever lost before he died, and it will scarcely be pretended that he designed to save them. In the second place, he certainly knew who would believe and be saved; for he knew all things; and it would be absurd to say that he designed to save those he knew he never would save. What, then, we again ask, do Arminians mean by the declaration that Christ died for all men? Do they mean that he really intended to save no one individual, but to offer salvation alike to all, and to give all equal opportunities to accept it? They cannot mean this; for, in the first place, it is an undeniable fact that Christ has not made the offer of salvation to all. Multitudes have lived and died without ever so much as hearing his name. If it be said, the heathen are responsible only for the light they have, we cheerfully admit it; but they are deeply depraved and under condemnation, and the question is not whether they will be chargeable with the additional sin of rejecting the gospel, but whether they have light and divine influence enough to save them without the gospel. If it be said that the heathen are all saved without means, then are they in a better condition than if they had the gospel, and it would be cruel to send it to them. In the second place, it is certain that God has not given to all equal opportunities of being saved. For of those who have heard the gospel, some have far better opportunities of being instructed in its glorious truths, and are placed under much stronger influences of a religious character than others. We are well satisfied, that if Arminians, by asserting that Christ died for all men, mean anything more than that he designed to offer salvation indiscriminately to all who hear the gospel, they will find it difficult to tell what they do mean. The atonement, we believe, is sufficient to save all, if they would believe; all are free moral agents, and may accept or refuse the offer of life. The gospel may, therefore, be sincerely offered to all, whilst they may be left to their own choice.

It is true, God does not subdue their pride,, their enmity, their unbelief, and their love of sin; but will it be pretended that God cannot sincerely offer salvation to a free moral agent, unless, in addition to the invitation, he by a special influence dispose him to accept of it? God invites them to come to Christ. They are unwilling to come, and he lets them alone, leaves them to their own inclinations. This is all. If it be said, God knows that without the special influences of his Spirit sinners will not come; we answer, that according to the admission of Mr. Watson, he knows who will accept and who will reject the offer of salvation; and yet this knowledge is admitted to be perfectly consistent with sincerity in inviting those who, he knows, will not come. A fourth objection to the doctrine of Election is, that it involves in it the damnation of infants. The following language of the Westminster Confession is appealed to in proof of the objection: "Elect infants, dying in infancy, are regenerated and saved by Christ through the Spirit, who worketh when, and where, and how he pleaseth." On this point we remark: It is certain that Presbyterians have never understood this language as teaching the doctrine of infant damnation. Persons have often asserted that they had heard the doctrine preached, but on particular inquiry it has been found that their statements were either maliciously false, or mere inferences of their own from what the preacher said. But no respectable Presbyterian writer can be found, either in ancient or modern times, who has taught that any dying in infancy are lost. Calvinistic writers, it is true, hold that the sin of Adam was imputed to his posterity, he being their federal head, and that they consequently are involved with him in a common condemnation; and the more evangelical Arminians, as we have seen, hold the same doctrine. Calvinists, therefore, believe that infants as well adults are expose to eternal death, and are saved only by grace through Christ Jesus. But no respectable Presbyterian writer, we repeat, can be found who teaches that any dying in infancy are actually lost. The doctrine of Infant damnation was charged upon the Presbyterian Church by ALEXANDER CAMPBELL, in a public debate with the author of these pages. In reply we said:-“I am truly gratified that the gentleman has brought forward the charge against us, of holding the doctrine of the damnation of infants; because it is believed by many who are unacquainted with our views. He says, our Confession of Faith teaches this doctrine. This is not correct. It is true that it speaks of elect infants,-’Elect infants dying in infancy, are regenerated and saved by Christ through the Spirit.’ Are all infants, dying in infancy, elect? All Presbyterians who express an opinion on the subject, so believe. The expression, ’elect infants,’ the gentleman seems to think, implies non-elect infants; but I call upon him to produce one respectable Presbyterian author who has expressed the opinion that infants dying in infancy are lost. Mr. Campbell boasts of his familiarity with the doctrines of our Church. He, then, is the very man to make good this oft-repeated charge. I call for the proof. So far as I know the sentiments of Presbyterians on this subject, they believe that all that die in infancy are of the elect,-are chosen of God to eternal life, and are sanctified by the Holy Spirit and saved according to his eternal purpose. Infants do not die by accident. He whose providence extends to the falling of a sparrow, takes care of every human being; and we believe that his purpose is to save those whom he calls from time before they are capable of knowing the truth. But the gentleman has made the charge that the Presbyterian Church holds the doctrine of the damnation of infants, and now I demand the proof." In answer to this demand, repeatedly made, Mr. Campbell quoted one or two passages from the writings of Calvin, and one from Turretine, in which those great and good men opposed the doctrine of the Pelagians and Socinians, who hold that Adam’s sin did not affect his posterity, and that men are not born in original sin; and in which they affirmed that all Adam’s posterity are exposed to eternal death, and might justly have been left to perish. But neither of them taught that any infant is in fact lost. They simply taught, that the salvation of all, infants as well as adults, is of grace, not of justice.

We state these facts to show that the fairest opportunity was given to a man well qualified to prove the charge true, that Presbyterians hold the doctrine of Infant damnation; that although both our challenge and our explanation of Presbyterian faith have been extensively circulated, the former has not even yet been met, whilst the latter has been universally approved by Presbyterians. If, then, Presbyterians are capable of understanding the language of their own Creed, it does not, directly or impliedly, teach the doctrine of Infant damnation. And until it can be shown that God could not predestinate to eternal life all those he is pleased to call from earth in infancy, the objection we are considering is of no weight whatever.

We have now carefully examined the most plausible objections urged against the doctrine of Election, and we think they have been proved to be unfounded. We now proceed to the direct inquiry, whether this doctrine is taught in the sacred Scriptures.