Did Not Succeed
IT takes two to make a slander—one to listen, the other to report. If mankind would act as a Russian general once did, the race of scandal-mongers would die of enforced idleness. A Russian once tried to tell Skobeleff of certain scandalous reports about him. "One of your officers," he began, "is spreading lies about you. May I give you his name?" "No, no; not a word," answered the general sharply. "My officers fought like heroes. I love them. One word of mine was sufficient for their going willingly to death." When the Russian, thus silenced, had left the room, Skobeleff called his servant, and asked—"Did you notice well that face?" "Yes, general." "If so, then remember that for that man I am never at home, never! Do not forget my order!"
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that their heritage of objections to Calvinism (and they are little else, for few Arminians have given the system personal examination and study) are simply moral problems, that subsist independently of all religions, for they belong to the constitution and course of nature; and it is as much the duty of the Scientist, the Philosopher (of whatever school), the Deist, and the Atheist to explain it, as it is ours. Even Agnosticism is no refuge; for to say we "do not know," explains nothing, removes nothing, helps nothing; it complicates the difficulty, and is itself a sad fact requiring explanation.
What if I cannot explain the objections urged against my system of truth? Who can remove all the difficulties that belong to his creed, or to his speciality? Can the oculist tell all about the eye, and all its relationships? Can the physiologist, physicist, psychologist, geologist, tell us about their respective sciences? These specialists know they cannot; for many facts seem to be quite inexplicable to them.
The Arminian system is open to most grave objections, which, in the opinion of some of the great thinkers of this and past ages, cannot be met, and so have not been met; and yet the Arminians cling to their system: even so, if we could not explain all the deep things of God involved in our system, that is no reason why we should forsake it, or why others should refuse to accept it.
We preach in Calvinism what we believe to be the true doctrine of the universe, the true doctrine of God, the true doctrine of man, the true doctrine of life, and the true doctrine of eternity.
That some men, looking exclusively on the mysteries of this system, and confounding the system with the mysteries that belong to all systems, reject Calvinism, does not weaken our faith in it; it only illustrates what we see in other departments of thought, viz., that few men seem capable of taking a comprehensive view of things: most men have narrow horizons, and these they often make still more contracted through prejudice and early training.
We do not profess to have formulated a system of Christian doctrine that cannot be objected to, but simply one that offers the most complete and correct explanation of the Word of God.
Let us now examine a few of the philosophical objections that are urged against Calvinism.
1. THEY SAY IT IS ARBITRARY, PARTIAL, AND UNJUST. Our answer to this startling statement is very simple:
1. *We reply that it is not unjust.* This objection against our view of divine truth is as old as the apostle Paul, and it was urged in much the same terms in his day. This fact ought to seriously impress all Arminians. In Romans ix. we see how God claims supreme sovereignty over man, and two illustrative cases are given; first, the cases of Esau and Jacob, and then that of Pharaoh. The claim itself is made in so many words: "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy," &c. The Arminians then, as now, objected, "Is there unrighteousness with God?" (verse 14); "Why doth he still find fault?" (verse 19).
In express terms we have the Arminian objection, and we have also the Calvinistic reply: God claims the right to do as he will with his own, and he demands, "Who art thou that repliest against God?" We find both objection and answer in the inspired Book.
The first question with all Bible students should be, "Is Calvinism scriptural?" and if it is in the Book—and surely this doctrine is in the Book—at least such is the first feeling and impression of all that read it, and it requires much explaining away and many mental struggles before our first impressions are rubbed out by Arminianism,—then our duty is to receive it. If it is scriptural, and we still think it to be unjust, then we must either confess that we know only in part, and await further and fuller light, or else we must revise our idea of divine justice. We must not try God by our poor, limited notions of justice or mercy. It is not so much what we think of justice, as what justice thinks of us; not so much what we think of God, as what God thinks of us. Of this we may be sure, that the revelation of the scriptural doctrine of election is much clearer than our poor sense of justice.
Let us clearly know that God is under no obligation to extend his grace to all men, or even to any man; he extended none to angels, but he has done so to us—is he therefore unjust? If not—and none contends that he is—no more is he unjust in extending his grace to some men, and not to all men. If it be a question of extending his grace to all or none, he claims and exercises the right to extend it just to whomsoever he pleases—to none, or to some; to this one, or to that.
Grace is not a debt owing to all, all therefore having a reasonable and just right to expect it; it is a free favour bestowed on some men, and not a just debt paid to all. As Paul says, "If it is of debt, it is no more of grace; and if it is of grace, it is no more debt"; it is the one or the other, it cannot be both; and Paul says, and we say, on his authority, and on the authority of all the other writers of the Book, that salvation is all of grace, and not in any sense of debt.
Justice holds that all men alike are destitute of God's favour, and hence salvation can be ours only through the sovereign grace of God. Our attitude towards God is not that of a loyal subject, but of a traitor and a rebel. Our relationship is not that of parent and child, but of judge and criminal. Our position is not the sinless one of Adam in Paradise; if it were, it would alter the complexion of the whole case; but we are sinful and sinning rebels, and the great moral Governor must treat us accordingly; and if he thinks proper to arrange for the salvation of whomsoever he pleases, surely justice cannot demand that, because some are saved, all must be. God and man alike claim to bestow their favours on whom they please. Justice is for all; grace is for few, none, or all, just as the gracious Sovereign pleases.
The finally impenitent, the vessels of wrath, are condemned for their own personal sins; they are not condemned because they are non-elect, they are punished only for the deeds done in the body.
2. We reply that it is not partial in any unworthy sense. I say, "unworthy" sense. Take the realm of nature, and do we not see partiality here? See how grand and symmetrical some trees are, how gnarled and stunted others are, and by no action of their own. See how some bear precious fruits, while others bring forth nothing but leaves, and never can bear anything else. We have weeds and tares as well as flowers and grain; vessels of worth, and vessels of worthlessness. So in the animated kingdom; and so throughout nature.
You see the same partiality in men, in the various ethnic types, their
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opportunities, privileges, difficulties. Everywhere man also claims to be partial with his favours; if he were bound to be otherwise, there could be no favours, no grace, no gifts; all things would be reduced to debt. We are partial in the bestowment of favours, and impartial in the observance of rights: God claims the same right.
This same objection obtains in Arminianism. It is surely partiality to give some the opportunities of hearing the gospel which are denied to others: to favour some, as we are favoured, with a flood of gospel light, while others are still in darkness, and ultimately to receive some into heaven, and reject all the rest.
While God or man has anything that he can call his own he will assert his sovereign right over it; he must be at liberty to bestow his favours on whom he will. God's exercise of this power has infallibly secured the salvation of a countless number, and therein we ought to rejoice, and do rejoice.
3. We reply that it is not arbitrary. Of old, men were daring enough to say that "the ways of the Lord are not equal"; but God indignantly repelled the charge, saying, "Your ways are not equal."
If by arbitrary we mean that God is the arbiter of his own favours, that he has as much freedom here as we ourselves both claim and exercise, then the doctrine is arbitrary: God has done what he in his own great wisdom knew to be best. If by arbitrary we mean that the act is without sufficient reason, that it is wilful, and not the outcome of wisdom or love, then the doctrine is not arbitrary.
The position was one of utter hopelessness for man; and God, out of his own good pleasure, according to his riches in grace, and out of his boundless love, resolved that all men should not perish, as the fallen angels did before them, that provision for their salvation should be made, and placed within their reach; and it is no more unjust of God to decree that a vast number shall be saved, than to save a vast number; the decree to save some is as just as the act of saving some. What God does to the saved in the final issue of things is just what God designed to do, and the "design" and the "doing" are equally just, generous, divine.
II. THEY SAY IT IS SIMPLY FATE.
1. We reply, fate supposes no free agent, whereas this doctrine does. The great religions of Buddha, Confucius and Mohammed are fatalistic: sovereignty has degenerated into force, purposeless procession, meaningless movement, heartless homogeneity. The vast majority of mankind are fatalists: not orientalists merely, but the western intellect has succumbed to it. Positivism, Materialism, Agnosticism, Secularism, are fatalistic.
There must be something to induce these men of such different casts of mind and different training to receive this fascinating yet fatal dogma. Fate is not the truth, it is a cruel caricature of it, and is as different from Calvinism as darkness is from light.
Fate is the concurrent and continued action of all material forces acting blindly and necessarily without purpose on the one hand, or the free co-operation of man on the other; the end is effected without choice or intention in any one; all is remorseless necessity.
Calvinism, on the other hand, teaches that all the forces of nature
are wielded by a loving, wise and powerful personal God, who co-operates in all things, and makes all things work together for good. A gracious purpose runs through all nature, all providence, all revelation, and notwithstanding the sin of man, this sublime, sovereign, saving purpose is being realized.
Calvinism teaches that man is free, and acts according to his own choice, wish, will, humour, as the case may be; that he freely acts along his line of operations, and God freely acts along his: while we do what we determine to do, God does what he determines to do, and thus while we fulfil our wills, he fulfils his.
God determines the act, but he also determines that that act shall be the free act of man. Calvinism teaches that we are free, and our consciousness sanctions the teaching.
2. We reply that fate supposes no wise purpose, whereas this doctrine does. Calvinism and fate teach antagonistic doctrines concerning the source, the action, the purpose, and the issue of all things. Fatalists have to personify nature, and speak as if she had purpose, contrivance and forethought; and this is but an undesigned confirmation of our contention, that there is design, purpose, plan everywhere, and that everywhere that purpose is the best, and is being realized in the best way by God in nature, in providence, and in redemption.
All forms of false philosophy have to use our terms, else their meaning could scarcely be conveyed at all, and all this is but paying court undesignedly to the truth for which we contend.
Ours is a sublime affirmation, it gives the grandest conception of God, the truest philosophy of the universe, and the noblest theology of man.
We hold every man's life to be a plan of God; a plan embracing body, soul, history, and, if men will co-operate along the gracious lines of the plan, holiness and heaven are theirs. If they prefer to walk along the punitive lines, if they prefer to pervert the plan and blur it, then misery and hell must be theirs.
Every world is a plan of God, the universe is a plan of God, and everywhere is purpose, and all the purposes are modes of expressing the one sublime purpose which he purposed in himself.
Calvinism asserts the personality and the purpose of the divine sovereign, and the personalities and purposes of the human subjects, and thus differs entirely from what is called fate.
III. THEY SAY THAT IT DESTROYS MAN'S FREE AGENCY.
1. We reply that it does not do so in theory. The objection is that while foreknowledge, admitted by the Arminian, implies the certainty of the future event, Calvinism implies a fixed purpose to cause the event to take place, thus leaving man no choice in the matter.
The objection arises from a misapprehension; for our theory involves the freedom of man; he has all the freedom that is possible to a rational being; that is, he can act as upon the whole he wishes to act: weighing the several motives, he acts according to the prevailing disposition of his heart; that disposition is evil, and so his acts are evil; not because he is not free, but because he is not good.
God determines what shall take place, but he determines that all that takes place shall also in the fullest sense be the act of men themselves.
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God places before us good and evil, and we are to make our choice. Being evil, we choose evil, and thus the world is flooded with iniquity.
Calvinism secures freedom to God and freedom to man; God's purpose is not tossed about by every whim of man, and man is not an automaton in the hands of God.
It is possible so to enforce the freedom of God to the destruction of human freedom as to become Antinomian; and it is possible so to push human freedom as to rob God of his sovereignty, and so become Arminian. The Calvinist comes between these two systems, and with equal emphasis asserts the freedom of God and the freedom of man.
2. We reply that it does not do so in fact. We know that we do what upon the whole we choose to do; every sane man does this. We often act against strong and searching motives, we often act against desire, and even against principle; but reduce our act to its last analysis, and we shall find that we act as upon the whole we thought it best to act. We did what we willed to do; so we know that we have freedom, and we equally know that God has a purpose that is being carried out in all its details. It is as clear that God has a purpose and is carrying it out as that we have a purpose and are carrying it out. Peter combines the two in Acts ii. 23: "Him, being delivered up by the determinate counsel of God, ye by the hand of lawless men did crucify and slay." It is said here that God determined that this act should take place—that was his purpose; "ye by lawless men did crucify"; you determined that that act should take place—that was your purpose: both purposes were realized, and all the agents, divine and human, had fullest freedom. So that in fact as well as in theory Calvinism does not destroy our freedom.
Let us take a case from a higher state of life. Paul says, "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God which worketh in you both to will and to work, for his good pleasure." God works, you work; God wills, you will; God's pleasure is fulfilled, your pleasure is fulfilled. Here the apostle preserves the right of God to act as he will towards and in his saints, and also preserves the right of saints to act as they will.
In other parts of Scripture we are taught that the supreme freedom is to do the will of God. The grandest freedom is to be in harmony with God. Angels are supremely free; demons are supremely fettered; the one do their own will, the other the will of God; and man is free in proportion as he co-operates with God in the realization of the divine purpose. We teach that man's freedom is part of the very purpose of God.
IV. THEY SAY THAT IT MAKES GOD THE AUTHOR OF SIN.
1. We reply that the origin of evil is a difficulty that presses all systems alike. If we were all Materialists this difficulty would still confront us, and nearly all the difficulties which infidelity delights in denouncing are difficulties that do not belong to religion at all, or to the Bible, or to Christianity: they are facts that demand an explanation, and it is to the interest of man, as man, to discover, or get in some way to know that explanation. Materialism after denying the existence of God, is still confronted with the problem of moral evil, and seeks its explanation in denying the manhood of man, for it reduces him to the level of a brute. With them all evil is but good in evolution, except when
it is a personal injury to themselves: then it is evil; and ought to be punished. Theoretically only is evil the birth-pangs of good. Dr. Tyndall is driven to say that men cannot help doing evil, and other men cannot help punishing them for it. So helpless is Materialism in the presence of this problem.
Arminianism is no better off. It admits—(1) That God clearly foresaw all things, clearly foresaw all the sins of man. (2) That though God clearly foresaw all this, yet he* placed men in the very position wherein he foresaw they would sin. (3) That though he foresaw all this he did not alter his course, but created men that certainly would sin. It is most unwise therefore on the part of our opponents of whatever school to urge this problem of the origin of evil on us as if it belonged to our system of truth: it is no more my duty, and it is no more to my interest, to explain this difficulty than it is the duty of Materialism and Arminianism. Let this be distinctly understood, and it will save much confusion.
2. We reply that it does not make God the author of sin.
(1) How do we describe God? We describe him as perfect in knowledge, and in moral nature—that he is infinitely holy, just and good, he is the author of all holiness in the universe, and is of purer eyes than to behold iniquity. We hold and teach that it is morally impossible for God to originate sin. We take our stand here on the evidence that God is infinitely pure.
(2) How do we describe sin? It is lawlessness. It is a state alien to all our true relations. It is violation of God's law. It is a perverted and perverse state of our whole being and proper line of conduct. God describes sin in most appalling words; he both denounces it and exposes it. He forbids it, and he punishes it. The fact of sin is a stupendous mystery; but there is no mystery with regard to the guilty parties. God lays the entire blame on man.
(3) How do we describe man? He is a free moral agent, a rational being who is influenced by the prevailing disposition of his will; one who originates his own acts, and who consciously does what on the whole he wills to do. Sin is therefore our own deliberate or thoughtless choice. The first sin was simply the perversion and the abuse of the powers which God gave to us for good purposes; we changed the centre of moral life from the will of God to the will of man: thus self and not God became and now is our moral centre.
(4) How do we describe God's purpose? God's purpose was such that though he clearly foresaw that man would sin a sin which could not be prevented by God without degrading man to an automaton or a beast, he made him a free agent; and if we are to be free we must be free indeed, and if free we may or may not sin. This is the highest order of a moral being in a state of probation, and thus God made us. God resolved that the sin should be our own free act, which it was, and thus guilt lies at our door. He resolved that this sin should occasion the fullest, grandest, sublimest display of his own glory, and that his grace should be at least commensurate with our guilt; "Where sin abounded, grace more abounded."
God neither decreed the sin, nor tempted man to sin. All our good thoughts, feelings, and acts are inspired by him and distinctly traced to
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him in the Book. All our sins are as distinctly traced to our own evil heart of unbelief.
God permitted man, in the exercise of his own free will, to sin, and he decreed, in his overwhelming grace, to make the very sin of man to praise him. The sin is ours and ours only; all the grace is the outcome of God's eternal decree.
