CHAPTER II: THE SINLESSNESS OF CHRIST PROVED FROM THE EFFECTS PRODUCED BY HIS

THE SINLESSNESS OF CHRIST PROVED FROM THE EFFECTS PRODUCED BY HIS MANIFESTATION.

EVERY personality bearing the impress of clearly defined moral and religious qualities, will produce effects proportioned to the degree of force it possesses. The greater and the purer this force, the deeper, the more enduring, and the more wide-spread will be the effects resulting therefrom. If, however, a personality perfectly religious and moral should have existed,--if there ever had been One who was sinlessly holy,--the effects produced would have been of a kind entirely unique. And, on the other hand, if we actually meet with such effects, we have every reason to infer the existence of a proportionate force as their cause. The question, then, is: Do there exist in the special religious and moral constitution of the Christian, as essentially distinguished from the præ-Christian and the extra-Christian world, actual phenomena, which can only be satisfactorily explained on the assumption that the Author of Christianity was a Being of sinless holiness, and which, if this assumption is rejected, remain entirely inexplicable? We answer this question in the affirmative; and shall endeavour, in what follows, to maintain our assertion.

In so doing, while we distinguish between the religious and moral element, we would not, in an argument which must naturally have respect to the very essence of the Christian character, be understood to do so in the sense of regarding either as constituting separate and isolated spheres within the domain of Christian life. On the contrary, it is in the perfect union of these two elements that we recognise not only a leading feature, but a leading excellence of Christianity. Nor do we only recognise, but shall very decidedly bring forward this property with reference to the sinlessness of its Founder. Nevertheless, the religious and moral elements admit of being distinguished the one from the other, just as man in his inward relation to God, may be distinguished from man in his external operations; and each presents a different aspect to our contemplation. We shall therefore, in the first place, consider them separately; and shall commence our observations by viewing the Christian life from its moral side, as that which is most perceptible and prominent. __________________________________________________________________

Sec. 1.--The New Life of Christianity in its Moral and Religious Aspects.

The moral effects of Christianity are undeniable. It has in all ages produced, in those who have been deservedly called believers, a rich supply of virtues, and, indeed, of virtues which were not previously in existence, or at least not in so pure a form. This applies chiefly to humility, and to compassionate, ministering love. Nor has it exercised a less salutary moral influence upon the social relations of life. In marriage, and in the family, in civil and political life, in the relation of ranks, tribes, and nations to each other,--nay, in the whole condition of the human race,--it was Christianity which first laid the foundation of a state of society truly worthy of man. And these changes it has accomplished, not from without, not by any kind of constraint, but essentially from within, and by mere moral force. But chiefly have they been brought about by the fact, that, through the influence of Christianity, the godlike, free personality of man, and the equality of all men before God have been really recognised as they had never been before. All this irresistibly points to the abundance and depth of the moral forces inherent in Christianity. For the origin of these forces, however, we must necessarily go back to its Author and this alone is, at all events, strong testimony to the singularly prominent position He occupies in the domain of morals. But when our special subject is the doctrine of His sinlessness, all that has hitherto been touched upon may be considered as essentially comprised in one leading point, namely this, that the sum-total of these moral results makes it obvious that Christianity produced something new in the moral world, something which is utterly inexplicable, unless it be assumed that the Author of this creation was sinless and pure.

The idea of a new moral creation is one as peculiar to Christianity as it is indispensable to its completeness. This the Apostle Paul expresses in the most forcible manner when he says, If any man be in Christ, he is a new creature: old things are passed away; behold, all things are become new.' [114] The whole aim of Christianity is, that the old man of sin and selfishness may be destroyed, and a new man of righteousness and holiness, of self-denying love, may be born, first in the individual, then in ever increasing circles--in the nations, and in the whole human race. This new birth is not a mere doctrine to be stated, but an actual occurrence to be brought about in the heart, and visibly manifested in the life. The apostle affirms the reality of this occurrence in his case, from his own experience; but to all others who had eyes to see, it was undeniably confirmed by the fact that Saul of Tarsus had become Paul the Apostle, who was not only walking on an entirely different path of life, but was also impelled by an entirely new principle. [115] Paul is, however, in this respect only a type of Christians in general. The same occurrence, though it may be less distinctly marked, is repeated in the case of all who may be called Christians, in heart as well as in name. And the more decided Christians they are, the more will they be penetrated by the consciousness that Christianity has begotten in them a new life, and the more clearly will this be manifested in their whole life and conversation.

If, however, we are to define in general terms that new moral principle which distinguishes the Christian from the præ-Christian world, we should say that it is a principle of moral perfection surpassing both nature and the law, and whose ultimate aim is an actual freedom from all sin. Before the entrance of Christianity into the world, we find, on the one hand, in heathenism a surrender of the individual life to nature, without any decided consciousness of sin; on the other hand, in Judaism an overwhelming consciousness of sin, produced by the revelation of the Divine holiness, and by the strictness of the law, but unaccompanied by the vital power and confidence necessary to overcome it. If it be true that in the heathen world the life of nature was, in the case of certain nations, ennobled into something supremely beautiful, and even that certain great prophetic spirits were able to rise, to a certain degree, above its limits,--if it be true that in the domain of Judaism there was, beside the consciousness of sin, a consciousness of grace; yet, on the whole, the heathen and their gods were under the dominion of nature, which mind may glorify, but cannot overcome; while the Jews were in presence of the holy God, under the curse of sin, which the law could indeed give the knowledge of, and place under outward restraints, but was utterly unable to eradicate and subdue. When Christianity appeared, it broke the power of nature, and redeemed it from the curse of the law. For it is self-evident that a life determined only by natural motives is not to be thought of within the sphere of Christianity. By means of Christianity, moreover, the life will also rise above the essentially legal grade. The place of the law will be occupied by a morality made free from within,--a morality for which the law is no longer written on tables of stone, but on fleshy tables of the heart; and which, having its origin in Divine grace, and being conscious of this origin, cherishes also the assurance that, at some stage of its development, it will become free from sin.

Where, then, are we to seek the originating cause of this new creation, which we find in the moral life of the Christian world? Not, as every well-informed person will allow, in the moral precepts of Christianity. For it is not in the nature of mere precepts to vitalize: life can only be generated by life, and neither moral law nor moral ideas can produce entirely new characters. To form these, there is needed a character of a typical kind. But, true as this is in general, it especially holds good in Christianity. Here the moral precepts, great as is their excellence, by no means occupy the first place,--they do but spring from a primary source, whence all creative and vitalizing power is derived. This primary source is the Person of Christ, to which, in this case also, we are ultimately referred. The same apostle who, both by word and deed, bore such decided testimony to the new creation, says also, when stating the ultimate cause of that new life which was in him, I live yet not I, but Christ liveth in me.' [116] In the important passage, also, [117] from which our argument started, he connects the fact of any one being a new creature, not with his walking according to Christ's doctrine, but with his being in Christ,' i.e. personally united to Him. [118] And in so doing, he does but express the experience of every true Christian in every age. For all Christians will agree that it is not from ideas, doctrines, or precepts that they derive, and have derived, the regenerating power but from the personal life, or living personality of Christ, who has been formed, or at least has begun to be formed, in them.

If, then, the primary source of this new life--in which sin is conquered as to its principle, and the pledge of its final and complete subjugation bestowed--is inward fellowship with a real personality, what must have been the nature of this personality, that it should have produced such an effect? Evidently it could not have been itself subject to sin, for then it would have differed from others only in degree, and would thus have still partaken of the old nature. It would not have realized in itself a nature entirely new, nor would it have been capable of laying the foundation of a new moral creation, whose ultimate aim should be perfect freedom from sin. On the contrary, it must have been a personality actually withdrawn from all connection with the old nature,--one in which the power of sin was entirely broken,--one which, being itself in the highest sense a new beginning, was thus capable of exercising that deep, far-reaching, creative influence, which nothing but that which was possessed of original perfection could command.

To the objection, that the effect produced by the sinlessness of Christ, if this sinlessness is to be believed, would really have been to produce in those who came under the influence of His life a like and immediate freedom from sin, but that neither in the apostles, nor in the Christian world in general, were such results manifested our reply is as follows:--In the first place, we do actually find in the apostles, and in all true Christians, a something which is here of the greatest importance we find in them the principle of sin broken, and the assurance of its final and complete overthrow implanted. And this furnishes us with a pledge that a decisive victory has already been achieved over sin. If, however, in spite of its conquest in principle, it is still found operating in their lives, yet with this circumstance is always connected the certainty, that the reason thereof is to be found, not in any inadequacy of the purifying and sanctifying influence exercised upon them by Christ, but in the fact that sin is too deeply rooted in nature to be overcome at once, to be eradicated by any other than an arduous and gradual process. On the other hand, they have a conviction that they can only be more and more, and at last entirely, cleansed from sin, by a complete surrender to the renovating influence of Christ and such a conviction can be based on nothing but an assurance of the fulness, purity, and infinite efficacy of that holy, sinless life which is found in the Person of Jesus Christ.

It is evident, then, that if we assume the Author of Christianity to have been Himself subject to sin, it is impossible to comprehend how Christian morality, in its purest and most complete form, could have originated from such a being, and how its special nature could be expressed by the words, Old things are passed away all things are become new.' If, on the contrary, we acknowledge that its Founder was without sin, it is but natural that a really new moral creation should take place, within its sphere, through the fact that Christ is formed in the individual believer, and in believers collectively.

In Christianity, however, the moral element entirely depends upon the religious. Whenever we meet with a peculiar feature in the province of morals, we shall have to assume a corresponding one in that of religion and if in Christianity the moral life has been radically renewed, the religious consciousness must also have previously experienced a similar change.

What, then, is it which in this respect characterizes Christians, and makes a marked difference between them and all other religious communities? It is the fact that they regard themselves as reconciled to God and redeemed; that they cherish the assurance that, in the case of all who truly repent and believe, the guilt of sin is abolished, and a filial relationship to the holy God introduced. It was by means of this consciousness that the Christian Church was called into existence. Possessing this, whatever else she may be deficient in, she does not cease to be Christian; without it, she might still be a religious community of some undefined kind, but could no longer be entitled a Christian one. Least of all could she lay any claim to a new life, in the Christian sense of the term; for this cannot exist apart from a confidence that the guilt of sin is done away with, and a way of access opened to God as a merciful Father.

If, then, we find such a confidence existing in the Christian Church, and perceive, moreover, that by this confidence she either stands or falls, it is but reasonable to inquire whence it originated. The præ-Christian religions also had an abundant supply of means and ordinances for reconciling sinful man to God; and among these, sacrifices played by far the most important part. But if we ask after the result, we find that all they could effect was to allay, for a time, the feeling of guilt, while guilt itself was never radically abolished, nor the certainty that it was once for all taken away, begotten. Hence the need of repeated sacrifices was felt; and men were ever moving in the same circle of fresh sacrifices, and ever-recurring consciousness of sin, without attaining the satisfaction of an enduring peace with God. The reason of this was, that in this case sacrifice was nothing more than mere sacrifice, and more or less external to man, and that the assurance of pardon was unaccompanied by the destruction of the power of sin, and the implantation of a new life in its place. There was thus an attempted atonement for sin, but no real redemption from its power. A full and final atonement is only possible when it is personally effected, when a person intervenes, who not only by a voluntary self-surrender offers himself as a sacrifice, but also possesses the power of begetting in those who are inwardly united to him a new life,--a life really victorious over sin, by means of that perfect confidence of its pardon which is called forth by an actual revelation and communication of Divine grace. Here the atoning efficacy and the redeeming power coincide. And this coincidence being found only in Christianity, it may readily be perceived what kind of person could alone give to the Christian world the assurance that it was perfectly reconciled and really redeemed by him. Such an assurance could not be grounded upon a sinful man,--it could rest only upon one sinlessly holy; and it is only when we recognise the Author of Christianity to have been such a Being, that we can conceive how the religion which He founded could be pre-eminently the religion of atonement and redemption.

If, then, there is any reality in the consciousness of atonement and redemption possessed by Christians, this reality presupposes the existence of the condition under which alone it could have originated. And that this consciousness is a reality, is founded upon the fact of the experience of each individual believer. The doctrine of the sinless perfection of Jesus is therefore as secure as the experienced fact of His atoning and redeeming agency: they who would deny the former must also deny the latter, and will be either utterly incapable of explaining the phenomenon of Christian piety, in its most characteristic peculiarity, or be constrained to seek for an explanation by which it will be as good as explained away. __________________________________________________________________

[114] 2 Cor. v. 17.

[115] An excellent antithetical description of Saul the Jew and Paul the Christian is given by Hug in the Introduction, vol. ii. § 27. A short but brilliant one will be found also in Lange's article Paul,' in Herzog's Real Encycl. vol. xi. p. 24.

[116] Gal. ii. 20.
[117] 2 Cor. v. 17.

[118] The formula, ei tis en Christo, must by no means be deprived of its vital significance, by viewing it as an abstract reference to Christian doctrine or Christian truth; but, as the words themselves and their connection require, as a concrete reference to the Person of Christ. __________________________________________________________________

Sec. 2.--Morality and Religion united in Holiness.

Another circumstance must now be taken into consideration. Not only have morality and religion, individually considered, appeared under new aspects in Christianity, but a blending of the two, such as had never before existed, has been by it introduced into human life. This union of the religious and moral elements, which we call Holiness, is the highest quality attainable by man, and furnishes another point whence the sinlessness of Jesus may be inferred.

Undoubtedly a reciprocity of action between religion and morals may be found even beyond the province of Christianity. All vigorous piety manifests itself by moral results, and all deep morality is in some way or other based upon piety. If we conceive of either as existing independently, as entirely severed from the other, we should have, on the one side, a piety either of a sickly and internal character, confining itself to contemplation and emotion, or consisting solely of merely outward observances; on the other, a morality which, keeping closely within the bounds of legality, would exhibit a virtue, strict perhaps, and immoveable, but austere, and lacking all genuine warmth and heartiness. We are not, however, speaking of a greater or less degree of reciprocal action, but of a perfect fusion,--of such a oneness of religion and morality, that the one can never be found without the other;--no feeling of piety without moral worth and moral results, and no moral action which does not spring from piety. For holiness, as a human quality, exists only where a being, who has either continued free from sin, or, having sinned, has again become free from every stain of guilt, and victorious over every temptation, is ever, both in will and deed, following after good; and this not only from motives of duty, not merely for the sake of good itself, but for the sake of God; impelled, therefore, by that love which, like the Divine love itself, finds its objects even in the undeserving and the lost, and is ready to make any sacrifice for their deliverance.

Where, then, do we find even the notion of such a holiness as this?

We cannot seek for it in the heathen world. Even here the distinction between the profane and the sacred, between the impure and the consecrated, was understood, and its nobler spirits, at least, conceived that the pure alone could be worthy of fellowship with Divinity. But the Divine itself was not in its view perfectly holy. Heathenism is essentially the religion of nature, and consists either in the deification of nature, or the introduction of the Divine into natural life. This naturally and necessarily excluded from the sphere of the Divine the stricter notion of holiness; and where this was already wanting in the province of religion, it would be vain to seek for its impression in that of morals. In fact, though we do find in the ancient world the ideas of justice, of virtue, and of the good and beautiful, we by no means meet with that of holiness.

The revelation of the Old Testament is based on an entirely different foundation. Here the holiness of God, the free Creator and Governor of the world, forms the central-point, and the precept, Be ye holy, for I am holy,' [119] is, as it were, the root-word of the ancient covenant, the whole aim of which is to sanctify all to Jehovah, and to hallow all through Him. But, powerfully as this key-note pervades the whole of the Old Testament dispensation, the revelation of the Divine holiness itself is not as yet absolutely perfect. Far greater prominence is given to the unapproachable majesty and glory of God, than to His mercy and condescension: the full impress of His holy love is yet wanting; and hence that which is enjoined with respect to human sanctification and holiness still bears rather a preceptive, legal, and ceremonial character, than one truly spiritual, mental, and moral. It is only where the prototype of holy love is seen in God, and where man has become an image of that love, both in the relation he occupies towards God, and in his desires and external conduct, that holiness, in the full meaning of the term, is possible.

And this we find in Christianity. Here first, and here only, do we meet with that perfect idea of holy love in which piety and morality are indivisibly united. Christianity, moreover, does not regard this idea as a standard exalted above ordinary practice, but cherishes the most assured confidence of its realization, even in the sphere of human life. Not till the appearance of Christianity did a community exist whose fundamental characteristic and aim were not any one particular virtue or religious exercise, but sanctification; and that a sanctification extending from the inmost heart to every circumstance of life,--an existence wholly in God and from God, as religious in its motives as it is moral in its activity. Whence, then, arose so deep-reaching, so wondrous a change? Was it effected merely in the way of reasoning and instructing? Such an issue would be contrary to all analogy. It could only have been brought about with the results which actually accompanied it in the way of life; in other words, by the appearance of a person who should make a profound impression that he possessed such holiness in unmistakeable perfection, and should thus set up an entirely new standard of excellence within this sphere of life. It was precisely in this manner also that the type of truly classic excellence was introduced into the province of art. This was not effected by devising beforehand some theory of beauty, but by its actual exhibition in the creations of some more than usually gifted artist.

We have now, however, reached a point which will give rise to a special discussion. For it might be said: Granting that what has been hitherto advanced is correct, is it certain that the reality of a sinless life is needful to account for it? Might not the mere idea, the mere belief in such a life, produce the like effects? To this subject, then, we shall now devote a few words. __________________________________________________________________

[119] Lev. xi. 45, xix. 2. __________________________________________________________________

Sec. 3.--These Effects caused not by an Idea, but by an Actual Person.

The objection just hinted at is founded upon a spiritualism which everywhere flees from reality to dwell apart in a world of ideas, and seeks to resolve all life into mere intellectual conceptions. In fact, however, mere ideas have not the power of creating new life reality can only arise from reality and unless we are willing to regard the whole moral and religious life of the Christian world as a collection of mere ideas, instead of acknowledging it to be a reality, confirmed as such by our own experience, we must admit a corresponding reality as its starting-point, since there can be nothing in the effect whose germ was not previously in the cause.

But here the question specially arises: Whence came, then, the representation, or, if the term be preferred, the idea of sinless perfection? In all other cases, being and life are primitive, representation and conception derived. Yet here a notion is supposed to precede, which would not only have no foundation in an originating life, but to which there would nowhere exist a corresponding reality. And how is it to be accounted for that this thought should have appeared, with so marked a character and so powerful an energy, just at this point of the world's history, while we find nothing similar or equal to it at any other period, nor at the same period in any other instance?

We have already alluded to the fact that the notion of sinlessness had by no means attained so definite a form that nothing else remained to be done but to apply it to Jesus Christ, but that, on the contrary, the idea itself was first developed with and by the appearance of Jesus Himself. We have now arrived at the place where it will be needful to investigate this more closely. It is a fact of no slight significance. For if, on the one hand, we find that, previous to the appearance of Christ, and beyond the circle of Christian influences, the notion of sinlessness was either utterly indefinite, or, where it did occur, was inseparably connected with the certainty that its realization was impossible; while, on the other hand, we see that within the province of Christianity not only is the notion itself fully defined, but also accompanied by a firm faith in its actual realization in the life of a certain individual,--the conclusion forced upon us is, that between the former and latter state of things there must lie something by which this mighty change has been effected. Thus, again, the only natural explanation is offered by the supposition that the idea of sinlessness was realized in the Person of Jesus Christ.

But it is not enough to have made this general statement. It must be historically proved; and for this purpose it will be needful to enter somewhat into particulars.

The reason why the idea of pure holiness was impossible to the whole heathen world, lay, as has been already hinted, not only in the fact that polytheism was deficient in a spirit of thoroughly decided morality, but also in the positively immoral elements by which it was disfigured. For where the Divine models themselves were not regarded as pure, there could be no place for the notion of a virtue, spotless and in all respects perfect, within the province of human life. Nevertheless, even the heathen world possessed, in the form of philosophy and poetry, an extensive range of thought, which rose far above the limits of the popular religion; and in these departments we undoubtedly meet with very exalted views of morality. The tragic poets, especially Sophocles, present us with pictures of a virtue as sublime as it is pious and attractive; and those philosophers whose systems are borne up by a spirit of morality, naturally approach somewhat to the idea of a perfection of moral life in holiness,--because it is scarcely possible to go at all deep into the philosophy of moral subjects, without at least verging upon this idea. None of the sages of antiquity is more noteworthy in this respect than Plato. In the second book of his Republic he draws a sketch of a righteous man, in which he represents perfect integrity as necessarily conjoined with suffering. This must remind every thoughtful reader of the noblest instance of suffering virtue that we know of, and be regarded as one of the most remarkable anticipations of Christianity to be found among the deep utterances of that prophetic spirit. [120] In opposition to the unrighteous man, who, however, disguises himself in the garb of integrity, in order the better to carry out his ill designs, Plato places the simple and truly upright man,--the man who desires not to appear, but to be good, and who, in order that righteousness, and the love of righteousness, may appear in full purity, does not even appear as a righteous man, but is made to suffer as an evil-doer. This righteous man is thus described: [121] Without having done any unrighteousness, he still wears the appearance of being unrighteous, in order that he may be thoroughly proved to be righteous, inasmuch as he is not shaken in his integrity by the slander and other ills that thence arise, but remains stedfast' and constant even to death, having all his life been regarded as unrighteous, though in truth righteous.' Then with regard to his end he receives the following prediction That he will be bound, scourged, tortured, and blinded, and that after he has endured all possible evils, he will at last be hanged.' Now it is very certain that we have here presented to us the picture of a high and noble virtue and, what is especially worthy of note, it is virtue unobtrusive and suffering, virtue in the form of a servant. But, seen from the Christian point of view, two things are wanting. In the first place, the idea of virtue given here is entirely restricted to uprightness no reference is made to that inward religiousness by which virtue rises into holiness. Secondly,--and this is the main point,--all this is only a creation of the mind, while, on the other hand, we have no certainty that a righteousness, thus perfect in every respect, was ever actually realized in human life.

It is remarkable that one who lived at a period when he could survey the whole development of the ancient world, should expressly declare, as Cicero does, that he at least had never found a perfectly wise man:' on the contrary, he says the philosophers are all at variance as to what kind of a man such a one would be, if ever he might be expected to exist.' [122] Cicero had a sufficient knowledge both of ethics and history to qualify him for pasting such a sentence, and we may well regard his opinion as expressing the consciousness of the educated portion of the ancient world. In fact there did not exist in the sphere of heathenism an individual with whom the idea of moral faultlessness could be associated. If in any case we could conceive this possible, it would be in that of Socrates. But though we possess truly glorious descriptions of this great man by two revering disciples, yet neither have they, nor has any one else, asserted that he was absolutely free from moral failings, and in all respects perfect. [123] On the contrary, we find that, strictly speaking, the prevalent conviction of the heathen world was, that moral perfection and faultlessness were impossible to man. This is most expressly asserted in the words of one who, equally with Cicero, may be regarded as fitted to he the spokesman of heathen antiquity, and whose high moral culture is acknowledged: we mean Epictetus. In his writings decided prominence is given to the notion of moral faultlessness; but to the question, Is it possible to be faultless? he unhesitatingly answers, No, it is impossible; the only thing possible is to be ever striving to be faultless.' [124]

Such is the state of affairs with regard to the question which now occupies us, in the intellectual high places of the heathen world.
[125] With more probability might we assume the presence of the idea of sinless holiness in the monotheistic religions than in paganism. For here, in virtue of the unity and spiritual nature of God, there naturally exists a clearer impression of the idea of holiness. The Old Testament contains even the hope--at least in prophetic allusion that the Messiah was to be a perfectly holy servant of Jehovah. [126] Yet neither of the monotheistic law-religions,--neither the Mosaic preparatory to Christianity, nor the Mohammedan, which, in spite of its partial imitation of the Christian religion, was but an apostasy therefrom,--offers anything like a full representation of the idea of sinless holiness: much less is there implied in either of them a belief in the realization of that idea in any human being. If this thought is to be found in these. religions, it would be to their founders that we must chiefly look for it; but neither Moses nor Mohammed--between whom, as is obvious, we make a comparison under this point of view alone--lays claim to freedom from sin: they never even rose to this conception; nor did the adherents of their faith ever honour them as sinless beings. [127] With regard to Mohammed, the Koran makes no secret of the fact that he was guilty of failings, and he himself makes an admonition go forth from God commanding him to pray for the forgiveness of his sins: many reputed prayers of his have, moreover, been preserved in the traditions of his followers, in which he complies with this injunction. [128] But besides this, in the case both of the founder of Islam and the lawgiver of the Old dispensation, not only their lives, but even the character of their religious institutions, and their entire ministries, would have belied the predicate of sinlessness. Both of them, though in very different ways, were founders of states and leaders of armies, and, by these very circumstances, too much addicted to the use of external means to be able to maintain that purity of thought and action of which he alone is capable who, confining himself entirely to those interests which lie within the province of religion, uses none but spiritual weapons against every, even the most unjust, attack. Moreover, the doctrine and institutions of both are based only on law, and perfect holiness belongs to a higher sphere than that of law. It can exist only when the legal stage has been surmounted, and the obedience of faith and love has superseded obedience to law,--when there is no longer any need of an external law, because the law is written in the heart. [129]

This is, then, historically the state of the case: In the ages before Christ, no definite notion of sinless perfection, and where a shadow of the idea is found, an accompanying certainty of the impossibility of realizing it: since the appearance of Christ, not only the idea itself in full distinctness, but also the assured certainty of its achievement. On the one side there is a Plato, who describes the righteous man as great and glorious indeed, but still as only an ideal picture without reality; a Cicero, who calls in question the possibility of the realization of perfect wisdom; an Epictetus, who has a clearer idea of what sinlessness means, but is at the same time convinced of the impossibility of its ever being carried out in actual life. On the same side stand the founder of the Old Testament dispensation, who himself lays no claim to the possession of spotless righteousness, nor is regarded by his followers as perfectly sinless; the greatest prophet of the ante-Christian age, who had indeed an anticipation that the idea of holy purity would be realized, but. not till a future time, when it should be seen in the servant of God; and, lastly, the founder of Islam, who himself confessed his moral defalcations, and who lives in the traditions of his followers as one who owned his faults and prayed for their forgiveness. On the other side there are the plain, simple-minded apostles, themselves reckoned neither among the poets nor the philosophers, in whom we find not only the idea of sinless holiness most clearly defined, but in whom also faith in its actual realization in the person of Jesus became a power, strong enough to conquer the world and death; and by whom was given a description of the pure and holy life of Jesus, which called forth the same faith in others also, and which must, to this very day, be regarded as an inimitable picture of religious and moral perfection.

What conclusion shall we then draw from this state of things? Shall we conclude that the apostles--like the God of Plato, who, contemplating ideas, proceeded to fashion the world--by only viewing the idea of perfection and holiness, sketched from their own internal resources the portrait of Jesus, and filled up the details of His life from their own poetic fancy? But then we must first show that that which they are supposed to have thus contemplated, had for them a real existence; and we have just seen that the opposite was the case. We must first make it appear credible that sober-minded men would have had such faith in a production of their own imagination (which they took for something real), as to sacrifice for its sake all that men usually hold dear: and in this there is a manifest contradiction. No! it would be far simpler, and far more consistent with history, to conclude that if an idea arose in all its clearness in the minds of the apostles, which the great thinkers and poets of antiquity were either utterly ignorant of, or saw but dimly, this can be accounted for only by the manifestation of a real life; and if an all-conquering belief in the reality of a sinless life was produced in their minds, while hitherto such a life had been esteemed impossible, the cause could only lie in the overpowering impression produced by that life itself, as seen unfolding before their eyes.

We shall, however, draw this conclusion with greater confidence, in proportion as this view is found to be in other respects consistent with the nature of the case. For if the idea of sinless perfection does indeed belong, of its very nature, to the human mind, and form the foundation of its whole moral development yet, according to the laws of moral life, there can be no clear, full, and living consciousness of it, and consequently no belief in its realization, so long as sin is the ruling power in humanity. Hence, when the idea has become lucid and lifegiving, and when along with it there is the firm conviction of its realization, we are entitled to draw the conclusion that this has taken place as the result of an actual conquest of sin, and a real manifestation of a holy and perfect life. We say then: it is not possible to think otherwise than that He who called forth in His contemporaries, and through them in the Christian world, a belief strong, stedfast, and capable of transforming their whole life, in an altogether pure and holy virtue, was Himself in very deed a perfectly pure and holy Being.

We have, then--as a retrospect of what has been advanced will show--a series of facts which mutually confirm each other. The moral greatness of Christ is confirmed, in a general point of view, by that judicial and dividing effect which His appearance everywhere produced, as well as by the relation in which men of the most opposite dispositions stood towards Him:--His enemies, with their deadly hatred; the seemingly impartial, who could not, however, withdraw themselves from the influence of His spiritual power the traitor, who, in his despair, passed sentence upon himself and the friends, whose love and reverence endured even unto death. But more definite confirmation of the sinless perfection of the Lord Jesus is offered by the testimony of the apostolic circle,--a testimony contained partly in direct assertions, and partly in that life-portrait of Christ which forms their commentary and confirmation. Beyond and above all this, however, is the sublime self-testimony from the lips of Jesus Himself, which leaves us in no doubt of what was His own consciousness with respect to His moral character, and the, relation to God and to the human race resulting therefrom. This, too, does not stand alone, but is supported and corroborated by the world-wide effects produced by Him in the sphere of religion and morality,--effects so entirely unique that no adequate explanation of them can be found, unless we allow that the self-testimony of Christ, and its echo in the evidence furnished by the apostles, is indeed corroborated by facts.

Surely all these circumstances, taken together, furnish ample security for the sinless perfection of Christ. Nevertheless, when the question is to convert the assent of the understanding into the lively conviction of the individual, there is yet another kind of testimony to adduce. And this is the individual experience which each man may and ought to make by a direct application to the original sources,--to those Gospels, whose simple, powerful, and lively portraiture can be replaced by nothing else. If this is done in a candid and unprejudiced spirit, the image of the Lord Jesus will be vividly presented to his mind and this image will not only fill his whole soul with admiration, as some production of poetry or rhetoric might do, but will act as a moral power upon his heart, and thus take possession of his whole inner man. He will feel that he has here found that which elevates him above all that is low, earthly, and common, which directly purifies him, and penetrates him with the feeling of the Divine nearness. He will be constrained to say that, if he desires to be really in harmony with such a manifestation, he must become a radically new man and, on further consideration, he will be persuaded that there is no other moral phenomenon on earth which produces like effects, and therefore none which thus points to a higher order of things, and to an origin beyond ordinary human experience, even an origin which is Divine. [130]

In this sense we must say that it is the motel portraiture of the Lord Jesus which, in virtue of the vital power inherent in it itself, offers the best and strongest evidence of its truth and uniqueness. As the poet, [131] in reply to the question, Whence the sun's celestial fires are derived? answers, That which enlightens the world enlightens itself: its light bears witness that its origin is light,--so may the same be said of the portraiture of Him who is the light of the moral world--the Sun of righteousness.' He who beholds the light of the sun and feels the warmth of its rays, will have no doubts of its existence, nor of the power of its agency. So, too, he who has once felt in his own heart the peculiar power exercised by the Gospel delineation of the Lord Jesus, will entertain no kind of doubt as to its reality and origin. __________________________________________________________________

[120] Plato's Works, edited by Schleiermacher, third edition, vol. i.; Notes, p. 535.

[121] Plato, de Republica, L. ii. P. iii. vol. i. pp. 65 and 66 of Bekker's edition; in Schleiermacher's edition, as above, pp. 128 and
129. Compare on the passage, Baur in his Apollonius von Tyana u. Christus, S. 163-166.

[122] In the well-known passage of the Second Book of the Tusculan Disputations, where he speaks of triumphing over pain, and says that the pars inferior, the molle, demissum, humile in man, should be governed by the domina omnium et regina ratio. Here he says, ii. 22: In quo erit perfecta sapientia--quem adhuc nos quidem vidimus nominem: sed philosophorum sententiis, qualis futuris sit, si modo aliquando fuerit exponitur--is igitur, sive ea ratio quæ erit in eo perfecta et absoluta, sic illi parti imperabit inferiori, ut justus parens probis filiis. Here, indeed, only one aspect of morality, the victory over pain, is spoken of; but if even in this one respect, which was the very point in which antiquity, and especially heroic Rome, excelled, Cicero doubted whether a perfectly wise man had ever appeared, how much more would he have done so if the realization of a virtue absolutely pure iu every respect had been in question!

[123] The only passage which could be brought forward in support of an opposite assertion is in Xenophon's Memorabilia, lib. i. cap. i. § 11: Oudei`s de` po'pote Sokra'tous oude`n asebe`s oude` ano'sion ou'te pra'ttontos eiden, ou'te le'gontos e'kousen. It is evident, however, from the whole tenor of this defence, and especially from the immediately preceding context, that it is more legality, and especially the legality of his public dealings and discourses, which is here intended, than morality in its higher signification. But granting that the words are to be understood as applied to morality in the widest sense, even then the main point is wanting, viz. the testimony of Socrates himself. This, however, is indispensable, since he alone was capable of a thorough survey of himself. We shall, however, do no injustice to Socrates by assuming that he would not have applied to himself that great saying of the Redeemer, Which of you convinceth me of sin?' In the very fact that the demons of Socrates chiefly warned him against things which he was not to do, while Christ positively acted in all things from a pure consciousness of God within, from that Divine Spirit by which He was impelled, lies a most important distinction between the philosopher and the Saviour. It is not to be denied that the picture of a perfectly wise man, not merely as an idea, but as a reality, is presented to us even within the sphere of heathenism by Philostratus, in his Life of Apollonius of Tyana; but in this case there is a reference to Christianity, and the whole life is but an imitation of that of Christ, translated into Platonism and Pythagoreanism. This is convincingly proved by Baur, in his work, Apollonius of Tyana and Christ, or the Relation of Pythagoreanism to Christianity, Tübingen 1632, in which (p. 162) the result of his researches, as far as our present subject is concerned, is thus expressed: In the place of Him whom Christianity sets before us as the actually manifested Redeemer of the world, we have here a sage acting only by precept and example he is, moreover--and this must be the main point--no living form, but an image wanting independent reality and actual existence,--a faint and shadowy reflection of a living original, but for whom it is evident that even the creative idea which called it forth would be absent.'

[124] The words of Epictetus, iv. 12, 19th ed. Schweigh., are: Ti' oun; dunato`n anama'rteton einai e'de; Ame'chanon; all' ekeino dunato`n pro`s to` me` amarta'nein teta'stha dienekos. In an epigram in Demosthenes, de Corona, p. 322, the quality of doing all that is right is attributed to the gods alone.

[125] Since the notion, and the word which defines it, assume each the other, it may not be amiss to offer a few remarks upon the expressions anamartesia and anamartetos. These undoubtedly occur at a very early period in the language of classical antiquity, but at first they are for the most part applied only to external relations; and even when in later times used with reference to moral actions, they lack that full significance which Christian thought attributes to them. In Herodotus anamartetos is applied, v. 39, to a woman who had not sinned against her husband, and, i. 55, to a city which had incurred no debts. In Xenophon and Plato anamartetos is sometimes one who cannot err, sometimes one who has not actually erred; but in both instances it is used in no higher sense than as referring to the external affairs of life. In the first of these two meanings, Plato says, de Repub. lib. 1, Po'teron de` anama'rtetoi' eisin oi a'rchontes, e` oioi' te kai` amarta'nein; in the other, Xenophon, Horo ga`r ton anthro'pon oude'na anama'rteton diatelounta. Longinus, de Sublim. xxxi. 8, uses the word in the same sense as katharos and asphales, to denote the pure and the classical in style, and distinguishes in this respect between that which is merely free from faults, and that which is the work of genius (de Sublim. xxxiii. 2). It is in Diogenes Laertius (vii. 122) and Epictetus that it occurs with the most decided moral meaning. In the latter are found a whole series of passages in which the word occurs:--e.g. i. 4, 11: En ormais kai` aphormais anama'rtetos; iv. 8, 6: e tou philoso'phou pro'lepsis kai` epangeli'a, anama'rteton einai; and especially the above-mentioned remarkable passage, iv. 12, 19. Hamartesia also occurs, though less frequently, with the same various meanings. Compare Stephan. Thesaur. Ling. Gr. vol. ii. p. 1920, ed. Lond.

[126] Isa. liii. 9.

[127] The prerogative of sinlessness has never been laid claim to on behalf of Moses. The inadmissibility of such a notion would at once have been shown by a reference to Ex. ii. 12 and 14. Much less can sinlessness be predicated of Mohammed. On this point the reader is referred to the Contributions to a Theology of the Koran, by OEttinger (Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie, Jahrgang 1831, No. iii. pp. 62, 63), where we find the following observations: Nowhere in the Koran do we find the idea of sinlessness applied to a human being. Reference might indeed here be made to the passage (12, 53) where Joseph says, "I will not acquit myself of guilt, for every soul inclineth to evil, save him on whom God has compassion." But it is evident that this expression means no more than that every man will sin unless God's mercy hold him up, which by no means implies that any one may be wholly free from sin. The Koran, in general, regards sin more as an outward than an inward occurrence, while even the prophetic vocation does not necessarily involve a perfect freedom from external and manifest transgression; though Mohammed, when his conscience accuses him, or even when men reproach him for his sins, earnestly endeavours to weaken the force of such reproaches by supposed Divine revelations.' Still more decidedly is this point argued by Gerock (Christologie des Koran, Hamb. 1839, pp. 100, 101). It is there shown that in the Koran Jesus is indeed held up to imitation as a moral ensample, but necessarily without the predicate of sinlessness, since even Mohammed, who is greater than He, confesses to the commission of mistakes and precipitate actions. In one passage God says to Mohammed (Sur. 48, B. 1 and 2): We have granted thee a decisive victory, in order that Allah may forgive thee thy sins both past and future.' Again (Sur. 40, B. 57), Mohammed is reminded: Pray for the forgiveness of thy sins.' (So also p. 80, v. 1 seq.; p. 4, v. 104).

[128] Gerock, in the work already quoted, p. 101, note.

[129] 1 Tim. i. 9.

[130] Comp. Dorner, Jes. sündl. Vollk. p. 43, and Schaff On the Moral Character of Christ, p. 53.

[131] Schiller, in the Bride of Messina. __________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________

PART THIRD.

OBJECTIONS. __________________________________________________________________

AS we have before remarked, a mathematical or logically incontrovertible certainty is, with respect to our subject, impossible. Hence no proofs can be adduced which will absolutely exclude all doubts. Nor are doubts by any means lacking; for while many modern theologians have merely taken up a sceptical position with regard to sinlessness, there are others who have stated reasons which are sufficiently plausible to make a discussion of them needful. Such a discussion we are the more inclined to enter upon in the following pages, because the questions hence arising have not as yet been treated in the full and connected manner which the subject demands. [132]

The objections which have been raised may, in a general way, be classed as follows:--One class rests on a denial of the actual sinlessness of Jesus; the other on a denial of the possibility of sinlessness at all in the sphere of human life. In the former case the sinlessness of Jesus is impugned, partly on the ground of its being inconsistent with that law of development which is applied to Him in reference both to His character and His work; partly as at variance with the idea of temptation and partly on the ground of distinct utterances and facts recorded of Him.. In the second case, the objections to the sinlessness of Jesus are drawn, on the one hand, from experience on the other, from the very nature of the idea of sinlessness and the mode of its realization. These last objections are therefore partly empirical, and partly speculative, in their nature.

Adopting this classification, we shall proceed from that which is special to that which is general,--from that which is less important to that which is more so. That doubt is of less moment, and does not directly assail the character of Jesus, which hints that if He passed through a development at all, He must have begun in imperfection, and have risen gradually to perfection. We shall find it harder to reconcile with our idea of sinlessness, the notion that Jesus could have felt inwardly drawn towards evil when exposed to temptation while the strongest objection of all would be a really immoral utterance or deed. But, even supposing all that might be urged under these heads were answered, this would be of no avail, if it could be proved that sinless perfection is altogether impossible in the region of human existence, if experience or the nature of the moral idea witnessed unanswerably against its realization in a human being.

These are the difficulties which meet us here. In endeavouring to surmount them in the order above given, we shall of course labour to keep duly separate that which is essentially distinct but since objections of both kinds glide to a certain degree into each other, many difficulties must needs be touched upon in the first part, the more complete solution of which must be reserved to the second. __________________________________________________________________

[132] For a more cursory view of these questions, see Lutz. Biblische Dogmata, pp. 294-299; and Schumann, Christus, vol. i. pp. 289-296. __________________________________________________________________