CHAPTER II: ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF SINLESSNESS IN GENERAL.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF SINLESSNESS IN GENERAL. __________________________________________________________________

WHEN the arguments against the actual sinlessness of Jesus, taken from matters of fact, are found to be inadequate, the possibility of sinlessness in the domain of human life may still be called in question. For if, indeed, such perfection were intrinsically impossible to human nature, it could not have been realized in the Lord Jesus, in so far as He shared that nature. Such an impossibility has been asserted, and reasons have been urged in support of it, which are partly drawn from experience, and partly from the nature of the moral idea, and the mode of its realization. The examination of the reasons of both kinds thus brought forward, is now, therefore, incumbent on us. __________________________________________________________________

Sec. 1.--Arguments drawn from Experience.

In many cases, undoubtedly, the fruit of experience in connection with the moral relations of life, is distrust of the purity of human virtue, and unbelief in the existence of true goodness and greatness amongst men. The more earnestly we examine the phenomena of human life around us, and the workings of our own hearts, the harder is it to attain the conviction, that there ever did live one who was wholly pure and perfect. Whithersoever our eyes are turned, we find concealed, under a thousand captivating forms, vanity and ambition, the pursuit of possessions, power, and enjoyment; malevolence and envy; and, above all, that evil of evils, selfishness, which in the subtlest way creeps into volitions and acts of a nobler character. Seldom does it fall to our lot to rejoice at the sight of a really pure deed never have we the happiness to discover a man whose life is an unblemished picture of moral perfection. The eye of our spirit becomes, in consequence, so accustomed to the constant spectacle of imperfection, to this chiaroscuro of human life, that we are in danger of ultimately losing the power of recognising a character of perfect moral purity, when presented before us. And it is an undeniable fact, that the knowledge of human nature on which many plume themselves, ends in the miserable and comfortless result of absolute moral scepticism.

But that acquaintance with man which leads to such a conclusion really begins with the principle of mistrust and there must have been beforehand an inclination to discover defects, and either not to pay attention to the good, or to attribute it to bad motives. Besides, such a knowledge is proved to be spurious, by the fact of its giving a result that tends to destroy our best powers, faith and love, and that blights at the root all self-sacrificing effort for the welfare of mankind. Moral scepticism, consistently carried out, possesses no firm ground on which to base a moral judgment, and does in fact ultimately undermine all those higher relations which rest upon such a judgment.
[213] In opposition to such a system, the mind of man, when unaffected by sophistries, will ever cleave to the belief that it is possible--at least from the tendency of a whole life--to recognise moral differences between man and man, not indeed infallibly, but still with sufficient certainty to satisfy an earnest and modest mind. Such a mind, pursuing its inquiries in a spirit of love, will never renounce its faith in human virtue. And there will be less danger of this, because such a faith does not entirely rest upon mere experience: it is based also upon something far higher,--upon the perception of the purposes of God in and for mankind. Hence faith in humanity, as well as faith in God, with which it is connected, is independent of experience, nay, often maintains its power in opposition to experience. Man is destined to good by God, and the law of his being is not selfishness and sin, but holiness and love. What, then, could justify us in believing that, universally and necessarily, only exceptions to this law are possible, and that never and nowhere can there be a fulfilment of it? If we have a strong and living faith in the destiny of humanity, we shall always be ready and willing to acknowledge that some one can become, and to recognise that One actually has become, what man should properly be,--an image of his holy Creator. If we have sufficient evidence to warrant our believing that there has been such a realization, no experiences of a contrary kind, however numerous, should prevent our reception of this one fact. Nor must we allow it to stand in our way, that this has not lain within the range of our own direct experience. A resolution in moral matters to admit only that which falls under our own observation, would make our circle of vision an exceedingly contracted one. Not only would our faith in the absolutely pure virtue of the Redeemer be overthrown, but even our faith in the moral excellence of all beyond the limits of our own sphere of life. The moral nature of man devolves upon him the duty of believing in general in higher virtue, even when it does not occur within the sphere of his own individual experience; and we cannot, therefore, rightly refuse faith in a perfect and pure virtue, when there is satisfactory evidence of the fact of its historical realization.

It may, however, be further asked: Is it not a universal, indubitable truth, that the very nature of man renders it impossible for him ever to be perfectly good? Does not experience show us that, to be human at all, involves both sinfulness and actual sin? The question thus started is of a very comprehensive nature; and we shall do well to examine, one by one, the different elements of which it is composed. [214]

And, first, it has been urged that, if we ascribe to Jesus the possibility of sinning, we must also conceive of Him as subject to sinfulness for sinfulness consists precisely in the possibility of sin, and not in the sum of actually committed sins. Sinfulness implies necessarily a minimum of sin, and therefore excludes absolute sinlessness.' [215] On the assumption that Jesus was a true, a real man, it cannot of course be denied that it was possible for Him to sin. This possibility is directly involved in human nature, in so far as this is to be morally developed. And if we assume that the possibility of sin means exactly the same as sinfulness, then it must be at once conceded that a germ of sin is implanted along with a moral nature. But the term sinfulness manifestly expresses far more than the mere possibility of sinning. Along with the latter, it is possible to form a conception of the free-will being in a state of perfect indifference to evil or good, and of a development from a condition of simple innocence to one of conscious virtue, without the intervention of sin. The former, on the contrary, presupposes a positive inclination to evil, from which there then arises actual sin. Hence, in acknowledging the possibility of sin in Jesus, we do not at all concede the existence of sinfulness, or even of the least trace of actual evil.

It is a further question, whether, besides that possibility of sin which we necessarily attribute to a personal being as such, there was not in Jesus that bias towards evil which we term original sin? The answers given to this question vary, of course, according to the varieties of theological opinion. We merely evade, not solve, the difficulty, when we reply by affirming that there is no such thing as original sin,--when we assert that man enters life innocent, in the full possession of his moral powers, and that there is nothing in himself to prevent his development being perfectly pure, especially when circumstances are favourable. We cannot indorse this answer, because, as we have plainly declared in the first section, we recognise in human nature a prevailing inclination to sin. Neither are we able to agree to the view, that the result of this inclination is only that we labour under a difficulty of good,' [216] but possess also a freedom capable in each separate instance of deciding in favour of that which is right, and hence rendering a perfectly sinless development conceivable. For as soon as the moral power is regarded as one which has to contend with inward difficulties, a perfectly pure beginning is no longer possible, and an internal discord is assumed irreconcilable with that sinless development which we attribute to the Lord Jesus.

On the assumption of universal sinfulness among men, there remains, therefore, no other way of accounting for the perfect purity of the life of Jesus, than by supposing that a creative Divine influence was at work in the origin of His personality. [217] Because God so willed and effected it, a new link was introduced by a direct creation into the chain of sinful life and the individual thus created was endowed with pure, fresh, and unblemished moral powers, in order that a perfectly holy, godly life might be first realized in Him, and then through Him in humanity. The objection, that the case is in this way transferred to the region of the miraculous, need not mislead us. The new commencement of moral and religious life in Christ is undoubtedly a miracle, and inexplicable save .on the assumption of direct Divine causality. The new thing, however, which is thus called into existence is not contrary to nature, but the re-establishment of nature in its original purity. [218] Besides, the origin of Christianity, and of all true religion in general, can only be explained on the condition that God should enter into real fellowship with humanity, and exert a creative influence on its development. This, again, is inconceivable, except on the supposition that the influence should manifest itself in a special manner in individual persons, and in every portion of the being of these persons. They who think they can explain the commencement, progress, and perfection of the religious life, and especially the origin of Christianity, apart from Divine agency, utterly misconceive its real nature.

It has been objected, and with greater apparent force, that in this way we destroy the significance of the life of Jesus as an example to men. If Jesus was in His origin free from sinful taint through special Divine influence, and if He was endowed with new moral power by special Divine gift, He cannot be, it is said, in respect of His moral perfection, a true, binding example to those who are not similarly favoured. To this we reply: The doctrine that Christ is an example for our imitation, must first of all be rightly understood. It evidently does not refer to all that Jesus was and did. He had a work to perform of an utterly unique kind, which, in its turn, required and assumed a unique personality. In this work, none of course can imitate Him in such wise as to do a like work--as to be a like person. He can only be regarded as our example with reference to religion and morality in general, to His perfectly holy disposition and conduct;--and even in these respects, not in the sense that we are to be as He was, but in the sense that we ought to become like Him, to attain to a conformity to Him, to be transformed into His glorious image. [219] This is a goal nu ot to be reached at once, but one set before us throughout the whole course of our earthly existence, and even beyond its limits. Now Jesus could not be a perfect and universal example of this kind unless He were absolutely pure and holy; and this, again, would be impossible if any impediment to a perfectly normal development were found in the basis of His personality. On the other hand, it is asserted that none but one absolutely like ourselves in all things, the original inclination to sin not excepted, could really be an example to us. But if this be the case, we shall find ourselves obliged either to give up the idea of a really perfect example, or to demand that it should be given by one naturally incapable of so doing. Hence the choice left us is--either we have no perfect example, or we must admit that this was furnished by a personality who was even in his moral constitution extraordinary. We need the less scruple to accept the latter alternative, since in other spheres, also, parallel instances occur.
[220] In those of poetry and art, that which is truly typical and classical is ever the production of minds of extraordinary endowment; yet it never strikes any one that these, if they are to be examples to others, must necessarily have worked their ways through all the hindrances and difficulties to which the rest of the world is subject.

Again, it is argued, that 'so far as the virtue of Jesus was really human, there must have been a sensuous element in it, for no human virtue is quite free from such an admixture; but imperfection is involved in such a subjection to the law of our sensuous nature, and thus an end is put to any absolute moral perfection.' [221] There is undoubtedly an element of truth in this observation also. We cannot deny the presence, in the virtue of Jesus, of that sensuous admixture which gives the freshness of life to our own willing and acting. Body and spirit in Him were connected in the same manner as in other men. But there is nothing to justify the assertion that there is something intrinsically sinful in this sensuous element of our volitions and acts. Provided that the highest principle of our constitution, the spirit (pneuma), is the ultimate and decisive source of our volitions and acts, they are good, although either at their origin, or during their progress, the freshness and vigour of our purposes may be owing to an inevitable admixture of the sensuous element. The sensuous part of man's being is only evil when it sets itself in opposition to the higher, the pneumatic part. By branding it as essentially sinful, we necessarily bring an accusation against the Author of our nature. [222] But it is impossible to show that the sensuous impulses in Jesus were in any single case, to an unwarrantable degree, the moving spring of a determination of His will; or that, when called into natural play, they ever came into conflict with His higher nature. The general character of His words and acts is not passionate excitement, but the most deliberate calmness and self-possession. [223]

Last of all, the objection has been raised from this side, that the feeling of humility in Jesus must have arisen from a consciousness of the imperfection and limitation of some minimum of sinfulness. Such a feeling is the means by which man frees himself from the guilt which cleaves to him: consequently Jesus was in this respect also our pattern, that He humbled Himself as a finite being before His heavenly Father.' [224] If we are to uphold the unity of the inward life and being of Jesus, we cannot admit this assertion; for the same Jesus who declared Himself free from all sin, who was certain throughout His whole life that He was glorifying the Father, could not have humbled Himself from any consciousness of imperfection; but only from that feeling of piety, which evidenced itself in perfect submission to God, and in loving condescension to man. And, in fact, humility does not arise from a consciousness of sin. To regard it in this light, would make it synonymous with the feeling of guilt. Humility really arises from that inward relation of an individual towards himself and others, which removes all over-estimation, all vainglory, even in the midst of the most evident superiority,--which does away with all efforts to exalt self and to dazzle others. It prompts, in its judgment and treatment of others, to a spirit of gentleness, appreciation, and kindly sympathy, so far as the interests of truth permit. In this sense only was Jesus humble; but in this He was a perfect model of humility. He laid claim to nothing for Himself, but received all that was given Him of the Father. He pleased not Himself, and would have none but God called good in the very highest sense. He never placed His own dignity in a conspicuous light, but sought, on the contrary, to conceal it. He made Himself as he that serveth, even to His disciples. He condescended to all, and was ever ready to cast the beams of His light and His love, not only on the meanest and weakest, but even upon the most sinful. Such humility by no means presupposes the presence of indwelling sin, and the necessity of freeing Himself from it, on the part even of Jesus, but is, on the contrary, quite consistent with perfect moral purity. __________________________________________________________________

[213] Comp. Reinhard's Moral Theol. iii. cap. 1, § 329.

[214] The difficulties which may be raised in this connection are most fully expressed by De Wette in his Christliche Sittenlehre, Pt. i. pp. 182-193, where the entire section on Christus der Heilige should be compared. De Wette speaks more positively in regard to the sinlessness of Jesus in his work entitled Das Wesen des christlichen Glaubens, § 53, p. 272 ff.

[215] De Wette, Sittenlehre, Pt. p. 188.

[216] Augustine calls it difficultas boni in his earlier writings.

[217] 'All individual life rests on an original and specifically determined form of being, which points back to the Creator' (Hale, Leben Jesu, § 32, p. 58). For a further carrying out of this proposition in relation to the sinlessness of Jesus, see the Streitschriften, No. iii. pp. 105-109.

[218] Christ as the second Adam. Gess, Lehre von der Person Chr. pp. 338, etc., defines the religious and moral disposition of Jesus as a natural nobility of soul, ever powerfully attracting Him towards God and towards good, yet by no means exempting Him either from temptation and conflict, or from the necessity of ever fresh resolutions and self-denial.

[219] 2 Cor. iii. 18.

[220] Parallel, not identical. The differences are well stated by Gess, Lehre von der Person Christi, pp. 339, etc.

[221] De Wette, Sittenlehre, Th. i. p. 188.

[222] Compare Müller's Lehre von der Sünde, i. 405 ff.; and with special reference to the perfect holiness of Jesus, pp. 439-442.

[223] This is beautifully unfolded in Sack's Apologetik, second ed. p. 207 ff.

[224] De Wette, Sittenlehre, Th. i. p. 192. __________________________________________________________________

Sec. 2.--Arguments drawn from the Nature of the Moral Idea.

In the last place, a word must be said on the position taken with regard to the subject under consideration by modern speculative criticism. [225] This decidedly opposes the sinlessness of Jesus, and does so chiefly on philosophic grounds, i.e. upon such arguments as are derived from the nature of the moral idea and its development in humanity: we are therefore under the necessity of meeting these objections also.

Modern speculation does indeed leave to Jesus a certain residuum of greatness, in virtue of which He was capable of being the occasion' of the rise of a new faith. Yet this greatness is of an indefinite kind, and in no case constitutes a specific distinction between Him and all other men. As a proof of this equality, two maxims are brought forward which are evidently regarded as fundamental axioms. One of these axioms is, that the first in a series of developments cannot at the same time be the greatest;' the other, that it is not the manner of the idea to realize itself in a single individual, but only in the sum-total of individuals,--in the genus.' If the first axiom held universally and necessarily true, we should be driven to conclude that the moral greatness of Jesus did not surpass the succeeding links of the chain of development realized in the Christian world and the relative eminence of Jesus, His character as our pattern, would thus be destroyed. But if the former axiom were shown to be inadmissible, and there remained only the second, this latter would, if applied to Jesus, at the least exclude the possibility of believing in His absolute moral greatness, and consequently do away with His typical relation to men.

In both these propositions, individually considered, there is a certain amount of truth; but in the application made of them to the founder of Christianity, we find but another exemplification of the erroneous tendency of modern speculation to merge the particular in the general, the concrete in the abstract; and this tendency we cannot but decidedly oppose. It is perfectly correct to say that in certain spheres of life the first in a series of developments is not at the same time the most perfect,--the commencement is not also the fulfilment. But it is no less true that in other spheres the first of a series must be also the highest, as certainly as that there would be no development at all were it otherwise. For our present purpose, we shall distinguish between the spheres of science, of art, and of the moral and religious life. In the first department, all is dependent on the range of knowledge; in the second, on the inventive intuition of genius, and the distinctive capacity to give shape and form to that which is imagined; in the third, on the entire inner life, in so far as it takes up a special position to things human and Divine. Knowledge is by nature progressive, because, on the one hand, it is dependent on experience, whose circle is widened only gradually, and by the co-operation of many; and, on the other hand, because it is based on processes of thought, which become ever deeper in their course. Consequently, if this progress goes on unimpeded, the later inquirer ordinarily surpasses the earlier. Here the axiom mentioned previously, holds good as a general rule. It is not possible that one man should comprehend in himself all that can be known. Least of all can this be expected of him who is the pioneer in any special branch of science or knowledge. Every inquirer and knower is complemented by other inquirers and knowers. It ie. true that at certain epochs giant minds arise, which either unite the elements they find at hand in higher combinations, or sagaciously anticipate the future; but even they cannot pass beyond certain definite limits, and it cannot fail that some of those who follow after may gain a higher eminence. It is quite different even in the sphere of art. There only those individuals accomplish anything great who are endowed with special creative powers, and with remarkable talents of execution; there, the most important works owe their origin not to a co-operation of many, but to the intuitions and technical skill of individual genius. In this department, supposing that the masters who arise, possessed of higher genius, do form schools, they ordinarily surpass their scholars and successors, and thus, whilst first in the order of time, are also relatively the most eminent. It is even conceivable, that a master endowed with the very highest powers should produce works in his department, which remain pre-eminent and unequalled in all subsequent times. The case is different, again, in the matter of religion. Religion has indeed an element of knowledge in common with science, and one of intuition and representation in common with art; but in its inmost nature, it is a peculiar state of being affecting the whole life of man,--it is that reference of the life of the individual to God which governs every thought and action. Here the personality, as such, is all in all. Everything depends on the manner in which it stands inwardly related to God. To speak of the gradual introduction of an essentially new form, of a principle of religion, by the combined exertions of many, is almost preposterous; for the life, the consciousness, is not the joint product, the joint result of the efforts of a community, but must originally reside in One, from whom it then passes on to others. He through whom a new religious life and consciousness are produced in others, is the founder of a religion; and he will naturally be the most perfect, as well as the first, in the series of development of which he is the originating cause. Only once can a peculiar religious consciousness be said to dawn for the first time; only once can there be a really original religious life; and of necessity the life and consciousness will be present with the greatest freshness, purity, and energy in the spirit of him in whom they take their rise. He who should surpass the founder of the system to which he belongs, in the intensity and energy of his religious life and consciousness, would himself become the founder of a new religion, and be the first in a new series of developments.

A speculative system which treats religion as a mode and branch of knowledge, and considers it, in contrast with philosophy, but an imperfect, elementary, childish knowledge, may find it very natural to conceive of piety as gradually progressing from a lower to a higher state (like all things else), and may consequently be unable to consider the founder of a religion as even relatively the greatest, for he is in its view only the occasion of its existence. But it is quite incredible that such should be the actual state of the case, because religion is not mere knowledge, and therefore its development is governed by totally different laws from those which hold good in the case of science. In one aspect, undoubtedly, religion may be classed as knowledge; that is, so far as it is a doctrinal system. On this side, religion may undergo a development through the co-operation of many. This is the domain of theological science, and in it the later may far surpass the earlier. But surely the more recent theological science is generally acknowledged to have gained at least one step,--to have established the principle, that religion is not properly knowledge, that Christianity is not originally a system of doctrine, and that the nature and functions of theology are quite distinct from those of religion. In religion there is ever an element which is primitive, underived, direct, which does not gradually arise, but is present perfectly, undividedly, and originally; and this is the case simply on account of its being life, consciousness, a peculiar state of the whole soul. No thought of individuals supplementing each other, especially when the institution of a religion is concerned, can possibly be entertained. If a new religion is to arise, that which constitutes its vitality must at first exist in a single individual. And if this has once been the case, there is neither room nor need for others to contribute aught else to this its essential foundation. Sound sense, on the contrary, will not fail to recognise in the originator of the new religious life the greatest in his own peculiar sphere; and in fact there is no historical religion which does not in this sense place its founder at the, head of its community. Moreover, a glance at actual history necessarily raises the question: If Christ is not to be considered the most perfect in that whole series of development, of which He was the first, who in the whole Christian world, during its successive ages, is to be regarded as having actually surpassed Him? A most expressive and intelligible silence is its only answer.

Still Jesus might, as the founder of Christianity, have been the greatest within the Christian community, without being therefore absolutely perfect. We may admit that He is an example, without absolutely regarding Him as our prototype. Against the latter criticism urges, that it is not the manner of the idea to realize itself in one individual, and grudgingly to deny itself to the rest; it realizes itself in the totality of individuals, in the race. Consequently, where an individual is represented to be the absolute embodiment of the idea, there is a transference to it of that which properly holds good only of the genus, for the individual is but a symbol of the totality.' In this objection also there is an element of truth. The idea does undoubtedly realize itself in humanity as a whole. Otherwise what significance could we attach to the existence and development of mankind? But in order to get at the whole truth, the other side must be taken into consideration, namely, that the idea realizes itself in humanity only in and through individuals. So far from the former excluding the latter, it is not even conceivable without it. All development in humanity has its ground in personalities: the higher the sphere thereof, the more certainly is this true. All great men derive their chief significance and importance from the fact that their life is not something isolated, but that whilst itself having its foundation in the foregoing development of humanity, it passes over into and becomes part of the succeeding development. The more fully this can be affirmed of any person, the greater he is; and if there existed a spirit possessing the capacity to diffuse and expand its inner life till it should become the life of entire humanity, we should be under the necessity of esteeming it absolutely great.

In connection, however, with the question as to the realization of the moral idea, everything will depend on the way in which we define the idea of humanity. The idea of humanity does not relate to any special sphere, such as that of science, or art, or political wisdom; nor can be said to have attained its realization in the perfection of any endowment which belongs exclusively to one of these spheres. The idea of humanity comprises in itself that which all men, as men, are bound to accomplish,--that for the performance of which, each, apart from his special talents, is endowed with the requisite capacities,--that which may be described as the universal task,--the task which all men, as such, are bound to accomplish, whatever other powers or gifts may have fallen to their share. Now this absolutely universal thing is religion and morality. These belong to all men alike,--make man in the full sense man, in relation first to himself, then to human society, and specially in the highest relation of all,--that, namely, to his holy Creator, Lawgiver, and Judge. If we recognise the highest aim of all humanity, and of every individual, to be the attainment of perfection in piety and morality, or, in other words, the state of perfect union with God, and the holiness which has its ground therein, we shall be driven to concede at once, either that this ideal perfect condition is never realized at all, or, that such realization takes place, first in the individual personality, and then, through it, in a greater or less number of individuals, but not in the race as such.

The fundamental thought ever firmly embraced by modern criticism is, that the idea is by no means a something lying beyond actuality,--a mere ought,'--but that it necessarily enters into real existence. This is, moreover, equally the result of our conviction, that the idea of man, which we recognise as Divine, but which we can only regard in God as creative, would, if it remained unrealized, be but empty and unreal. For if the idea. of man originated with God, and if man must therefore have been conceived of as perfect, as fulfilling, and not in conflict with, his destiny,--if, moreover, we are necessitated to ascribe reality to the thoughts of God,--we must assume that the Divine idea of man will in some way, and at some time, arrive at realization. But where is the realization to be met with? Modern speculation points us to the race, to the totality of human individuals forming a complement to each other. But from this standpoint, though original sin is denied, it is confessed that, taken together, we are sinful and imperfect beings. [226] Whence, then, is the realization of the idea to come? A series of imperfect beings, even if it is continued indefinitely, can never produce one that is perfect; the totality of all sinful men will not originate one who is sinless. Religious and moral perfection is a thing complete in itself, and can never be attained by the supply on the part of one imperfect being of that which was lacking in others. It must either be perfectly and completely present, or not at all. If the individuals are not moral and religious, the race cannot be said to be so. [227] In this method we should be driven to look upon the idea as a thing which ought to be,--as a goal ever revolved about, but never attained; and a notion of this kind cannot be called, even by modern criticism, an idea at all, but a mere fiction.

In maintaining that the idea bestows itself in its fulness on one individual,--a thing which we find, at all events, to be approximatively the fact in all departments, and specially in art,--we are far from implying that it is for this reason niggardly towards all other individuals: we mean, in truth, just the reverse. That special bestowment on one, is the commencement of the historical process by means of which alone it is possible for all the rest to become participators. It is eminently requisite that the idea should be realized in an individual, when a perfect manifestation of God is to be made, when a perfect atonement and deliverance are to be effected, and, by means of both, a perfect religion is to be established. If the establishment of any definite historical religion presupposes one who is the greatest as regards that stage of the religious life, one who is therefore a pattern, how much more must the establishment of the perfect religion presuppose one who is not only relatively the highest, but altogether perfect in the sphere of religion, and who is consequently our prototype! It is a sheer contradiction to call Christianity the absolute religion, and yet to declare its founder morally or religiously imperfect. The fundamental requirement of all religion is the union of God and man. This is allowed by modern speculation: but it makes the effecting thereof an infinitely light and easy matter by its pantheism, by its regarding God and man as directly one. But, apart from the objection, that union can only be spoken of as taking place between two objects essentially distinct from one another, the most important point of all is entirely lost sight of, viz. sin, which, wherever it exists, necessarily causes a separation between God and man. If the reality and significance of sin are admitted, union with God can only be conceived of as reunion, brought about by the breaking down and taking away of sin,--in other words, by atonement and redemption. But it is evident, again, that atonement and redemption, if they are to be accomplished by an individual, require the appearance at the head of the human race of one perfectly free from sin, well-pleasing to God, and in full communion with Him. Hence in this respect, also, we are reduced to a choice between two alternatives,--either religion is reduced to an unaccomplished ought,' or the religious idea was perfectly realized in its founder. But so far is the idea from being niggardly to others through its realization in one person, that, on the contrary, it is therein alone that efficient means exist for rendering the attainment of perfection possible to others, and for giving it the greatest possible extension. __________________________________________________________________

[225] The literature of this subject is well known. I therefore merely mention, on the one side, Strauss's Schlussabhandlung zum Leben Jesus and the christological portion of his Glaubenslehre, especially pp. 153-240, vol. ii.: on the other side, the essays of Alb. Schweizer on the Dignität des Religionstifters, in the Studien und Kritiken, 1834; and on Strauss's Leben Jesu, also in the Studien und Kritiken, No. III. 1837; my own treatises in the work Historisch oder Mythisch, Hamb. 1838; Fischer's Prüfung der Straussischen Glaubenslehre, Tüb. 1842, Heft ii. p. 10 ff.; and De Wette's Das Wesen des christlichen Glaubens, §§ 6 and 46.

[226] Strauss, Glaubenslehre, B. ii. p. 184.

[227] Julius Müller remarks very justly, in his Christian Doctrine of Sin, i. 265, that the moral idea demands complete realization--a realization that embraces all its fundamental aspects--in the life of the individual: it endures no division of the task; it does not allow one person to limit himself to the exercise of one virtue, and to leave to others to supplement him by the cultivation of the other virtues. It is one of the most flagitious attacks on the majesty of the moral idea, to refer its claims to a reciprocal compensation of men, which shall make up for the shortcomings of one by the virtues of the rest.' Schaff (On the Moral Character of Christ, p. 52) observes, that the realization of the idea in an individual is no more contradictory than its realization in the race,--that, on the other hand, what is true in the idea must necessarily be realized in individual life, and that all history points to such realization.' __________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________

PART FOURTH,

INFERENCES FROM THE FOREGOING FACTS AND ARGUMENTS. __________________________________________________________________

IF it is clearly established, in opposition to all the objections which have been raised, that Jesus Christ led on earth a life of sinless perfection, such a fact, being a realization of that which is best and highest in the sphere of human life, must be admitted to be in itself of incomparable importance. At the same time, however, this fact--as has been already hinted in the Introduction--is so constituted, that we cannot, as in the case of other extraordinary phenomena, stop at its simple admission. On the contrary, we shall find ourselves compelled to look both backwards and forwards from this point, and thus to reflect on its hidden reasons and connection. It will then quickly appear that we have here to do with a phenomenon of the most far reaching and widely influencing significance. [228] For sinlessness is manifestly a condition which cannot possibly occur as something isolated and disconnected: it presupposes the whole nature and character of the person of whom it is predicated, to be peculiar. Furthermore, it will not suffice, nor indeed shall we be able, to look upon the person whom we regard as thus peculiarly constituted as existing merely for himself: we shall be compelled to attach to him a significance for the whole human race. One so exalted above all who are sinners as to be absolutely perfect, must necessarily exist for all, and must, in all that he is and does, stand in a peculiar and important relation to the inner life of all. Thus the sinlessness of Christ is a central point from which light is shed on all sides, first upon the Person of Jesus Himself, to enable us more fully to know and understand Him; and then upon His position with regard to the human race, that we may be more capable of appreciating it.

We started from the point, that perfect religion and the work of salvation could only be conceived of as personally effected, and that by a person who should be himself in perfect union with God, and therefore absolutely perfect. Hence we inferred that if a person proved to be thus absolutely perfect should really appear in the midst of the sinful human race, there would be every reason to believe that, in and through him, the perfect religion would have been manifested in a personal form, and the foundation laid for the salvation of mankind in all ages. We have now to apply this to Christ and His work. And in doing so, we shall naturally direct attention, first, to the Person of Christ, independently considered, and then to the position He occupies towards mankind. With regard to the first point, we shall have to show what are those inevitable inferences from the sinless holiness of Christ, which exhibit Him in all respects as One in whom the relation of man to God and of God to man, and therefore the religious life in all its purity, fulness, and power, was realized. With regard to the second, it will be our task to make it evident that conclusions which prove that it was Jesus Christ exclusively who obtained salvation for the whole race of man, cannot possibly be avoided. It is self-evident that, in the treatment of our subject, we shall not go into minute details concerning the Person and work of Christ. Our purpose will be answered by bringing forward those more general and fundamental features which are, on the one hand, more closely connected with our own starting-point, and which, on the other, may best subserve the end we have mainly in view, viz. to prove that Christianity is the divinely appointed and perfect way of salvation. __________________________________________________________________

[228] Dorner treats on the importance of the sinlessness of Christ in Christian apologetics, in his already so frequently quoted work, § 4, pp. 49-58. He well shows that, in proving the Divine authority of Christianity in these days, more stress is to be laid upon the miracle of love, manifested in the moral character of Christ, than in those miracles of power which have hitherto been more appealed to for this purpose, because the special and most essential nature of God is to be found rather in His holy love than in His omnipotence. But, true as all is which he advances from this point of view, it is to be regretted that the author should in this section have stopped at general allusions, instead of going into details. __________________________________________________________________