1.4 THE MISUNDERSTANDING
THE MISUNDERSTANDING OF SHARP’S RULE WITH REFERENCE TO THE PLURAL Considered to be Legitimately Applied to the Plural by Some As we have already seen by surveying some commentaries on Ephesians 4:11, several commentators assumed that the article-noun- kai<- noun plural construction identified the second noun with the first just as the singular construction did.5 Wuest articulates this assumption most clearly: "The words ’pastors’ and ’teachers’ are in a construction called Granvill [sic] Sharp’s rule which indicates that they refer to one individual.”6 How has such an assumption arisen? On this we can only conjecture, but it is possibly due to (1) the lack of clarity by Sharp himself in stating his first rule and (2) a continued ambiguity in the grammars. As we saw earlier, Sharp does not clearly state that his rule is applicable only in the singular. Such a conclusion may be at best only inferred via an argument from silence (i.e., in stating that "the latter always relates to the same person. . . i.e. it denotes a farther description of the first-named person,”17 Sharp only refers to the singular). However, a perusal of his monograph reveals that he insisted on the singular in order for the rule to apply absolutely.8 The grammars have perpetuated this ambiguity. Some, of course, have dogmatically stated (and without sufficient evidence) that the rule Scholars who believed in the Deity of Christ have not wished to claim too much and to fly in the face of Winer, the great grammarian, for three generations. But Winer did not make out a sound case against Sharp’s principle as applied to 2 Peter i. 1 and Titus ii. 13. Sharp stands vindicated after all the dust has settled.
(A. T. Robertson, "The Greek Article and the Deity of Christ," The Expositor, 8th Series, vol. 21 [1921] 185, 187.) 5 See n. 1 for a survey of these commentaries.
6 K. Wuest, Wuest’s Word Studies from the Greek New Testament Ephesians and Colossians (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1953), 101.
7 G. Sharp, Remarks, 3.
8 On pp. 5-6 Sharp points out that . . . there is no exception or instance of the like mode of expression, that I know of, which necessarily requires a construction different from what is here laid down, EXCEPT the nouns be proper names, or in the plural number; in which cases there are many exceptions. . . .
64 GRACE THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL does not even apply in the singular.9 Others have sided with Sharp, but apparently have neglected his requirement that the construction be in the singular, or else their discussion is vague enough to be misleading.10 Robertson stands apart as having the most lengthy 9 E.g., W. H. Simcox (The Language of the New Testament [London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1890]) declares: ". . . in Tit. ii. 13, 2 Peter i. 1, we regard qeou? and swth?roj as indicating two Persons, though only the former word has the article" (p. 50). G. B.
Winer (A Treatise on the Grammar of New Testament Greek, trans. and rev. by W. F.
Moulton, 3rd ed., rev. [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1882]), as was mentioned in n. 4, allowed his theological bias to override the plain evidence from the syntax governed by Sharp’s Rule: In Tit. ii. 13. . . considerations derived from Paul’s system of doctrine lead me to believe that swth?roj is not a second predicate, co-ordinate with qeou? . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[In n. 2 at the bottom of the same page:] In the above remarks it was not my intention to deny that, in point of grammar, swth?roj h[mw?n may be regarded as a second predicate, jointly depending on the article tou?; but the dogmatic conviction derived from Paul’s writings that this apostle cannot have called Christ the great God induced me to show that there is no grammatical obstacle to our taking the clause kai> swt . . . Xristou? by itself, as referring to a second subject (p. 162).
J. H. Moulton (A Grammar of New Testament Greek, vol. 1: Prolegomena, 3rd ed.
[Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1908]) is strongly influenced by Winer’s comment on Titus 2:13, reading it as though borne from a sober grammatical judgment: "We cannot discuss here the problem of Titus 213, for we must as grammarians, leave the matter open: see WM 162, 156n [italics added]" (p. 84). But his own Trinitarian persuasion comes through as he cites evidence from the papyri that the phrase found in Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1 was used of one person, the emperor (ibid.). Finally, M. Zerwick (Biblical Greek Illustrated by Examples [Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1963]) states that the rule is only suggestive, "since the unity of article would be sufficiently accounted for by any conjunction, in the writer’s mind, of the notions expressed" (p. 60).
10 E.g., L. Radermacher (Neutestamentliche Grammatik, 2nd ed. [Tubingen: J. C.
B. Mohr, 1925]) makes an ambiguous statement: "Wenn mehrere Substantiva in der Auflahlung miteinander verbunden werden, gentigt oft der Artikel beim ersten Wort und zwar nicht allein bei gleichem Genus" (p. 115), citing ta? e]nta<lmata kai> didaskali<aj (Colossians 2:22) as evidence. He goes on to say that the same phenomenon occurs in hellenistic Greek, citing o[ h!lioj kai> selh<nh as an example (ibid.). His two examples are both impersonal, one being singular and the other plural. A case could be made for the first example expressing identity, but certainly not the second. W. D.
Chamberlain (An Exegetical Grammar of the Greek New Testament [New York:
Macmillan, 1941]) seems to have a clear understanding as to when the rule applies and when it does not, but he does not clearly articulate this to the reader (p. 55). F. Blass and A. Debrunner (A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and Other Early Christian literature, trans. and rev. by R. W. Funk [Chicago: University of Chicago, 1961]) seem to support the rule in Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1, but also apply it to proper, impersonal names (p. 145)! They make no comment about the plural. C. F. D. Moule (An Idiom-Book of New Testament Greek, 2nd ed. [Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1959]) has a sober treatment of the rule, seeing its application in the singular and questioning it in the plural (pp. 109-10). But he sides with Radermacher by allowing it
THE ARTICLE-NOUN-KAI’-NOUN PLURAL CONSTRUCTION 65 discussion of the article-noun- kai<-noun construction though he con- siders the impersonal construction to fit the rule and the plural construction to specify two distinct groups.11 Improper Semantic Approach by Others More recently, a few have recognized that the rule applies absolutely only to singular nouns.12 Their articulations as to when the with impersonal nouns. N. Turner (A Grammar of New Testament Greek, vol. 3:
Syntax, by N. Turner [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1963] and Grammatical Insights into the New Testament [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1965]) seems to vacillate in his. discussion, for he apparently allows the rule to stand with the singular nouns (Syntax, 181; Insights, 15-16), but also applies it to the plural at his discretion (Syntax, 181).
Thus he speaks of a "unified whole" with reference to Ephesians 2:20, Luke 22:4, and Acts 15:2, but then declares that this same construction may "indeed indicate that two distinct subjects are involved [italics mine]" (ibid.), citing the common phrase oi[ Farisai?oi kai> Saddoukai?oi as an illustration. It is doubtful that the construction indicates two antithetical ideas; it is rather better to say that it allows for this. J. H.
Greenlee (A Concise Exegetical Grammar of New Testament Greek, 3rd ed. [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1963]) is very unclear when he applies the rule to impersonal constructions (Ephesians 3:18) and plurals (John 7:45) (p. 50). C. Vaughan and V. E. Gideon (A Greek Grammar of the New Testament [Nashville: Broadman, 1979]) apply the rule to both impersonal and personal constructions, making no comment about the plurals (p. 83). They do note, however, that there are exceptions with the impersonal constructions (ibid., n. 8). Finally, J. A. Brooks and C. L. Winberry (Syntax of New Testament Greek [Washington: University Press of America, 1979]) apply the rule to personal, impersonal, and plural constructions explicitly (pp. 70-71). It is no wonder, therefore, that the exegetes have misread the semantic range of the plural construction since the grammarians have almost universally failed to restrict the application of the rule to the singular or have been so vague as to speak only of some kind of unity (whether a loose tie or apposition) with reference to the plural.
11 A. T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research, 4th ed. (Nashville: Broad man, 1934), 785-89.
12 E. A. Blum ("Studies in Problem Areas of the Greek Article" [Th.M. thesis, Dallas Theological Seminary, 1961]) declares with reference to Sharp’s first rule
(p. 29):
Since he is talking about nouns of personal description, Wuest was wrong in applying the rule to Acts 2:23 [t^? . . . boul^? kai> prognw<sei]. Since he limits his rule to the singular, it is wrong to apply the rule to the "pastors and teachers" of
Kuehne is in full agreement, observing that Sharp "specifically excluded plural personal nouns and proper names from the rule" (JT 13 [December, 1973] 17). A. M.
Malphurs ("The Relationship of Pastors and Teachers in Ephesians 4:11" [Th.M. thesis, Dallas Theological Seminary, 1978]) concurs: "Therefore, Sharp states that plural nouns as well as proper names are an exception to his rule because some examples in the Scriptures seem to agree with the rule while others contradict it"
(p. 23). R. D. Durham ("Granville Sharp’s Rule" [unpublished paper, Grace Theo- logical Seminary, 1972]) acknowledges the exceptions to the rule of the plural and proper names, but thinks that Sharp meant to include impersonal nouns as meeting the
66 GRACE THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL rule does and does not apply are, therefore, among the clearest presentations I have seen. However, when they examine the plural construction, their semantic approach is inadequate in that the only question they raise is: are the two groups identical or distinct?13 Such a question for the singular, personal construction is entirely adequate: either the first-named person is identical with the second-named person or he is distinct. But the very nature of a plural construction demands that several other questions be asked if we are to see with precision its semantic range (i.e., since the plural construction deals with groups, there may be other possibilities besides absolute distinc- tion and absolute identity). Thus, although the most recent treatments of the article-noun- kai<-noun plural construction are accurate in absolutely applying Sharp’s rule only to the singular, they are never- theless inadequate in only raising the same question they asked of the singular construction.14 requirements of his first rule (p. 7). Finally, G. W. Rider ("An Investigation of the Granville Sharp Phenomenon and Plurals" [Th.M. thesis, Grace Theological Seminary, 1980]) sides with Durham in treating plurals and proper names as exceptions, but impersonal nouns as fitting the rule (pp. 23-25). Thus all five of the most recent treatments on the article-noun- kai<-noun construction acknowledge that Sharp in- tended to exclude plurals and proper names from consideration. However, Durham and Rider believe that Sharp did not exclude impersonal constructions. Although this point is ancillary to the subject of this paper, I believe that Durham and Rider have misread Sharp, for Sharp explicitly states that he accepts the impersonal constructions as fitting the second, third, fifth, and sixth rules, but not the first or fourth (Remarks, 120; cf. also pp. 140-42 in which Sharp refutes a certain Mr. Blunt for bringing in impersonal constructions as exceptions to the rule). It may be added here that there has been quite a bit of confusion and misunderstanding by some over the application of the impersonal construction to Sharp’s first rule. For example, some see the rule applying in Ephesians 3:18 (to> pla<toj kai> mh?koj kai> u!yoj kai> ba<qoj) because the four terms of measurement all refer to God’s love. Although this is true, the four terms are not identical with each other. Such would have to be the case if Sharp’s rule were to apply here. Cf. also Revelation 1:9; Revelation 5:12 for very clear references where the impersonal construction does not fit the rule.
13 Blum, "Problem Areas," pp. 26-27 (Blum is not to be faulted, however, since the plural construction is entirely ancillary to the point of his thesis); Kuehne (JT 13 [December, 1973]) has a lengthy discussion on the plural construction, though he deals with it under only two semantic grids: identical vs. distinct groups (pp. 18-21);
Malphurs ("Pastors and Teachers") follows the same scheme as Kuehne (pp. 24-29), neglecting any semantic nuances besides distinction and identity; Durham ("Sharp’s Rule") attempts to make all plural constructions fit the rule, even though he recognizes that Sharp considered the plurals as a clear exception (pp. 31-34). It seems to me that Durham’s error is that he does not distinguish unity from identity (cf. the comments in n. 12 with reference to impersonal constructions); finally, Rider ("The Granville Sharp Phenomenon and Plurals") deals only with the question of distinction vs. identity, even though his thesis is specifically on the plural phenomenon (pp. 41-78, 79-96).
14 This is completely understandable because (1) when those who have studied Sharp’s rule finally turn to the plural construction, the question foremost in their minds most naturally is: does the plural construction fit the rule or not? Thus by their
THE ARTICLE-NOUN-KAI’-NOUN PLURAL CONSTRUCTION 67