02 - God and Religion

SECTION II.

GOD AND RELIGION.

PROFESSOR STEWART’S chapter, in his "Handbook of Christian Evidences," on "God and Religion," is a fair sample of orthodox exposition and defence. It is intended to justify the belief in a God who is described as the "First Cause, a self-existent Being, the Creator and Regulator of the Universe;" and also to establish as a fact "the reality, power, and universality of religion." This, however, it should be remembered, has nothing to do with the question of Christian evidences, inasmuch as, if the main contentions of this chapter were proved to be correct, it would not necessarily prove the existence of the Christian Deity, or that Christianity is "a universal phenomenon of human experience and history." The fact seems to be overlooked that there are other gods believed in besides the one depicted in the Bible, and that there are several religions professed which have but little in common with Christianity. The duty of an expounder of Christian evidences appears to us to be to endeavor to show that the Theism of the Scriptures is reasonable, and that the religion based upon its teachings is true. Whatever is urged in reference to other religions may, or may not, be accurate; but it is of no value as Christian evidence.

Let us illustrate our meaning upon these points. The God believed in by Voltaire, Paine, Francis William Newman, and most of the adherents of what is termed "Advanced Theism," is certainly not the same Deity as is believed in by so-called Christians, and therefore, if the existence of the God of the advanced Theists were demonstrated, it would not follow that the reality of the Bible God was established. The ablest of our modern Theists will not attempt to defend the "Supreme Being" of either the Old or the New Testament. The same argument applies to religion. It is not enough for an expounder of Christian evidences to make the general statement that religion is a fact, and to urge that a belief in some form of it is universal. Even if this were true, that would not prove the evidential claims made on behalf of the Christian system, which must be judged by its own merits. It is admitted that other religions, Buddhism for instance, is as sublime in its teachings as Christianity, and that the followers of Buddha are more numerous than the disciples of Christ. Up to the present time Christianity is not known by two-thirds of the human race; and among the one-third, where a knowledge of it obtains, the majority of the people have no practical faith in its teachings. As a matter of fact, religion per se may be true, while the Christian form of it may be false. Orthodox believers seem to ignore this truth. We need not dwell here upon the original meaning of the term "religion," or upon the fact that with the Romans it did not signify merely theological worship, but it meant justice to the State and to the community. It is only necessary for our present purpose to remind the reader that Christian evidences have failed to show that the religion of the New Testament is unique, or that it is superior to other religious systems. The theory that Christianity has the advantage of the authority of revelation to support it has no force whatever, for, as Max Maller, in his "Science of Religion" (page 45), observes, "the claims to a revealed authority are urged far more strongly and elaborately by the believers in the Veda than by the apologetical theologians among the Jews and Christians."

Professor Stewart, like most Christian advocates, puts it that the study of the Christian evidences must be preceded by "a conviction of the existence of God and of the reality and power of religion." Now, we submit that persons who are already convinced need no evidence to convince then), and, therefore, to seek for evidence to prove what is regarded as having been proved is, to say the least, a work of supererogation. Much importance is attached by Christian exponents to the alleged universal need that is said to be felt for religion. But the truth of this allegation will depend entirely upon the definition that is given of religion. If by the term we mean love, truth, justice, and benevolence, the cultivation of man’s moral nature, and the exemplification in our daily actions of fidelity to our professions, and due consideration for the rights and comforts of others, then, doubtless, most civilized person are religious. But if by religion we mean the teachings of theology and its doctrines, then its universal need has not been proved. Neither has it been shown that such religious ideas are innate; they are acquired as the result of early training and of general education. (See F.J. Gould’s "Concise History of Religion," vol. 1., pages 10, 11, and 12.)

Professor Stewart endorses, as indeed most Christians do, among the definitions of religion, the following. "Religion consists fundamentally in the practical recognition of a constraining bond between the inward life of man and an unseen person." "The perception of the infinite under such manifestations as are able to influence the moral character of man." Now, to assert that religion, as it is here defined, is universal is the height of presumption. We know of no one who can recognize a "bond" between himself and "an unseen person," or who has the faculties to perceive "the infinite," who is able "to influence the moral character of man." The question is not if such a "bond" and "the infinite" exist, but can we know of them? If, as we allege, we cannot, then they form no part of practical religion, which is, when properly understood, the ruling principle of a man’s life. Now, we do know of many persons who acknowledge that they have no belief whatever in theological religion, and these facts are sufficient to destroy the contention of its universality. We repeat that there is a marked difference between the universal belief in some of the claimants that are found in all the different religions of the world, and the universality of one particular form of religion. The former may be true, while the latter we know to be false, which proves that Christian evidences are of no value upon this point. For facts to prove that the belief in any one theological religion is not universal, the reader is referred to Sir John Lubbock’s "Origin of Civilization," Tuttle’s "Career of Religious Ideas," and to vol. i. of F.J. Gould’s "Concise History of Religion." In these works ample evidence is furnished upon the authority of travellers and missionaries, whose names are there given, that tribes and races of men have been found where there was not the slightest belief in any form of religion. Sir John Lubbock,. on page 467 of his work above mentioned, says: "It has been asserted over and over again that there is no race of men so degraded as to be entirely without a religion -- without some idea of a Deity. So far from this being true, the very reverse is the case. Many, we might almost say all, of the most savage races are, according to the nearly universal testimony of travellers, in this condition." Burton states that some of the tribes in the Lake Districts of Central Africa "admit neither God, nor angel, nor devil" (page 468). "In the Pellew Islands Wilson found no religious building nor any sign of religion ... Some of the tribes (of Brazilian Indians), according to Bates and Wallace, were entirely without religion."

Professor Stewart frankly admits that "it is not by argument we obtain our conviction of the existence of God," but he adds: "Formal arguments in support of this conclusion are not useless." As this position is a very popular one among a certain section of Christians, and, moreover, as it is regarded as a part of the Christian evidences, it deserves a brief notice. In the first place, it appears to us that, if argument will not secure conviction, there is no utility in attempting to supply it; yet "four forms" of an argument are given by Professor Stewart to prove the existence of God. They areas follows: --

1. The First Cause. The belief in this is considered to be more reasonable than to believe either in an unending series of natural causes, or that things came "into existence without a cause." Here, it will be observed, creation is Assumed without a particle of evidence being given in its favor; while no notice is taken of the theory of the eternity of the universe. Now, if it is unreasonable to believe that anything could come into existence without a cause (which we think it is), what about the alleged First Cause, which is held to be ’uncaused’? Is it not more reasonable to believe in the eternity of that of which we know something than in the uncaused existence of that of which we know nothing?

2. It is stated that, as there are in the works of nature marks of intelligence and purpose, the author of nature must be intelligent. The weak and inconclusive feature in this argument lies in the inference that intelligence in nature must have had an intelligent author. This very point, upon which some evidence is required, is simply assumed without even any attempt being made to give reasons for the assumption. If the intelligence in nature needed a higher intelligence to produce it, is it not fair to suppose, upon the same principle, that this higher intelligence would require for its production a still higher intelligence? Further, if, in consequence of the existence of intelligence, it be more rational to believe that the universe was caused than to believe that it is self-existent, then must it not be equally rational to consider that this still higher intelligence was caused?

3. The allegation here is that our minds are so constituted that we are driven to the conclusion that God is a being that must be. This is but an assertion, and, until some evidence is given in its support, it proves nothing. The same may be said of space, which we cannot conceive of either beginning or ending.

4. We are here told that we have a feeling of responsibility to a personal and moral Being, and, therefore, we are led to infer his existence. To this we offer an unqualified denial; for no such feeling of responsibility is found among savages or untaught persons. To attempt to show that the presence of a moral sense in cultivated man is a proof of the existence of a supernatural power is really too illogical to require further comment than to say that it is a pure assumption, and cannot possibly afford any evidence of a logical conclusion. The case of Religion and God stands thus: The former, to be acceptable to the refined intelligence of the present age, should be free from all theological mysticism and doctrinal absurdity; and the latter can only be a question of subjective faith, not capable of argumentative demonstration. Christianity has not the required freedom, and, therefore, it is desirable that it should yield to a better faith -- one that is more in harmony with the genius and mental culture of the nineteenth century. As to the God of the Christians, with his Biblical record of folly, cruelty, and injustice, we allege that such a being is not suited as an subject of worship; while in the earthquakes, cyclones, and volcanic eruptions that are constantly destroying the lives of thousands of innocent men, women, and children we fail to see any proof of love and kindness on the part of what is termed the God of Nature. In our opinion, no moral argument can be based upon Theism in the presence of the fact that these calamities and disorders obtain in the world. So long as the lion and the tiger roam the forest pursuing their work of devastation and devouring their prey; so long as vice flourishes, and virtue pines in want and misery; so long as "fraud glitters in the palace, and honesty droops in the hovel," so long shall we be ready to exclaim with the Rev. George Gilfillan, who, in his "Grand Discovery of the Fatherhood," in noticing the horrors and the evils that exist around us, asks: "Is this the spot chosen by the Father for the education of his children, or is it a den of banishment or torture for his foes? Is it a nursery, or is it a hell? There is no discovery of the Father in man, in his science, philosophy, history, art, or in any of his relations." Well may Dr. Vaughan, in his work, "The Age and Christianity," write: "No attempt of any philosopher to harmonize our ideal notions as to the sort of world which it became a Being of infinite person to create, with the world existing around us, can ever be Pronounced successful. The facts of the moral and physical world seem to justify inferences of an opposite description from benevolent.’