01.06. Of False And True Accommodation

Section Fifth. Of False And True Accommodation; Or, The Influence That Should Be Allowed To Prevailing Modes Of Thought In Fashioning The Views And Utterances Of The Sacred Writers. THE previous discussions have had respect mainly to the language of the New Testament, and the principles or rules necessary to be followed, in order to our arriving at the precise and proper import of its words. There are, however, elements of various kinds, not properly of a linguistic nature, which must yet, according to the influence allowed them, exercise an important bearing on the sense actually obtained from the words and phrases of Scripture elements, which will affect the interpretation of some parts of Scripture—more than others, or tend to modify the meaning put on certain of its passages. The points referred to less properly concern the explanation of particular terms, than the nature of the ideas contained in them. They respect the question, what is there precisely of truth to be received, or of practical instruction to be obeyed, in the portions which have been analyzed and explained? It is quite possible, that one may know with perfect correctness every word in a passage, and yet, from some false conceptions or misleading bias, may have a very imperfect apprehension of its real purport, or, perhaps, give a wrong turn to the thoughts it expresses. It is necessary, therefore, on the basis of the principles already unfolded, to proceed to this higher line of hermeneutical inquiry, and endeavour, if possible, to set up some proper landmarks upon it.

I. Now, the first point that here calls for investigation is, the general one, in what relations the sentiments of the sacred writers stand to the spirit of their age—to its prevailing modes of thought and popular beliefs. Were they in any material respect modified by these? Or did they pursue an altogether independent course—never bending in aught under the prevailing current, if this at all deviated from the exact and natural line of things? Or, if they did to some extent accommodate themselves to this, how far might we expect the accommodation to go? At a comparatively early period a certain doctrine of accommodation was introduced with reference to representations in Scripture which Origen, and others of the Fathers, were wont to regard as spoken or done κατʼ οἰκονομίαν, by way of dispensation, or through συγκατάβασις, a condescension, or an accommodation to the position and infirmities of the persons addressed. Advantage, it was believed, was taken of these, in order the more readily to gain the confidence or reach the understanding of those who were in an unfit state for receiving the naked truth. It is difficult to say precisely, how far the Fathers, who introduced this principle, meant to carry it, in respect to the teaching of Christ and the apostles; for they are neither very explicit nor altogether consistent in their statements upon the subject. For the most part they appear simply to have understood by it an adaptation in the form of Divine communications to the modes of human thought and speech, while the matter not the less remained true and divine; as in conduct the Apostle Paul became as a Jew to the Jews (1 Corinthians 9:20,) or externally conformed himself to their manners and customs, without in the least detracting thereby from the claims and principles of the Gospel. In this way, Scripture was explained as accommodating itself to men’s infirmities or habits, when it speaks of God as possessing human parts and passions, or uses parables, proverbs, and familiar images, to set forth to our view things spiritual and divine. But occasionally they seem to indicate an application of the principle beyond this limit, and to include the matter of what was taught or done, as well as the form: as when Origen (in his Priricipia, L. iv.) speaks of mystic dispensations employed by God, which, in their literal sense or obvious meaning, were opposed to enlightened faith and reason—or when Jerome, in his Epistle to Augustine, teaches that Paul, as well as Peter, feigned himself to be a Jew, and yet reproved Peter at Antioch by what he calls honesta dispensatio, which the one administered, and the other submitted to feignedly, that they might show the prudence of apostles. It requires no arguments to prove, that honest dispensations of this sort but ill accord with that godly simplicity, which we are wont to ascribe to the apostles, and would, if generally believed in, somewhat shake their credit as inspired writers. Fortunately, however, the Fathers erred comparatively little in this direction; and it was rather from inadvertence, or from perplexity in dealing with particular passages, than from any general laxity of principle, that they have been occasionally betrayed into rash and unguarded statements upon the subject.

It was reserved for modern times to apply the principle of accommodation to the teachings of Scripture in the full and proper sense, and to represent Christ Himself and the apostles as pandering to the mistaken views and narrow prejudices of their time. Wetstein was among the first to lay down a formal principle of this sort, although Grotius in some of his comments had before virtually acted on it. But Wetstein, in a little work on the criticism and interpretation of the New Testament (A.D. 1724,) gave it out as a canon of interpretation, in respect to those passages, which seem to be at variance with truth, or with each other, that the sacred writers should be viewed “as not always expressing their own opinion, nor representing matters as to their real state, but occasionally also expressing themselves according to the sentiments of others, or the sometimes ambiguous, sometimes erroneous, opinions of the multitude.” And he indicates, that this mode of explanation should be especially adopted in regard to what is often said in the New Testament of sacrifices, of Satan, of angels and demons. Shortly after, Semler (both in a new edition of Wetstein’s treatise, and in works of his own, took up the principle of interpretation thus announced, and with characteristic ardour and industry applied it to the explanation of the New Testament writings. His fundamental position was, that the exposition of the New Testament should be pre-eminently historical; that is, that one should have respect to the spiritual conditions of the time the prevailing thoughts and opinions, as well as external circumstances, of those among whom Christ and His apostles lived; and these he represented to be such, that the truth could not always be spoken as it should have been, and required a use to be made of Old Testament Scripture in reference to Gospel events, such as cannot be justified on principles of grammar or grounds of abstract reason. Our Lord and His apostles, therefore, spoke at times ex vulgari opinione, not precisely according to the truth of things; yet so as that, by instituting a comparison of the different parts of their writings, and making the more general and comprehensive rule the more special and peculiar, we may arrive at the ultimate and permanent ideas of the Gospel. The door was thus fairly opened for exegetical license,—and from Semler’s day to this, there have never been wanting men fully disposed to avail themselves of the liberty which it invited them to take. Loose as Semler’s views were, and great as was the havoc which he carried into the received views of Scripture, he lived to see (with grief, it is said) others far outstripping him in the same line of accommodations. By degrees every thing was reduced to a subjective standard; and if in any thing an interpreter found statements recorded, or doc trines taught, which did not accord with his notions of the truth of things, the explanation was at hand, that such things had found a place in Scripture merely on a principle of accommodation; the people at the time were capable of appreciating nothing higher, or the writers themselves as yet understood no better. And so, in the hands of many on the Continent, and of some also in this country, of some here still, the proper teaching of the Gospel came to be reduced to the scanty form of a Sadducean creed. The doctrines of the Trinity, of the Divine Sonship of Messiah, of the atonement, of the personality of the Spirit, of a corporeal resurrection and a final judgment, have all been swept away by the abettors of the principle under consideration; and even the idea of Christianity’s being in any peculiar sense a revelation from Heaven, has been sometimes represented as merely a mode of speech suited to the time of its appearance.

Such has been the practical result of the accommodation theory, or the historical principle of interpretation (as it has been sometimes called)—a result which carries along with it the virtual doom of the principle itself. For, obviously enough, to deal in such an arbitrary and magisterial manner with sacred Scripture, is not to interpret, but to sit in judgment upon it, as we might do upon any human composition, and receive or reject what it contains, according to our preconceived notions. The proper revelation—the real standard of truth and error, is in that case within; we stand upon essentially infidel ground; and seeing that Scripture as much contradicts, as coincides with our views of things, it were better to discard it as an authority altogether—treat it merely as a help.

Most commonly, however, the accommodation principle is confined within a comparatively narrow range, and applied to what are called innocuous errors. So Seiler, for example, in his Hermeneutics, who says, that in such a matter we must be careful to distinguish between innocuous and nocuous errors. Among the innocuous he includes chiefly errors of an historical and chronological kind—such as he conceives occur in the speech of Stephen, Acts — and exegetical errors, or false interpretations of several passages of the Old Testament, which were erroneously supposed to contain what the words did not really indicate. So, too, Rosenmuller, in his Historia Interpretationis, I. p. 27, who thinks, that as the Jews had a fondness for something out of the direct and simple style of writing, loved to exhibit their sentiments in an allegorical dress, and to seek for them strained and fanciful supports in Scripture, so the apostles acted wisely in adapting themselves in these respects to the genius and habits of their countrymen. Whence with him, and many others in this country and America (including such names as Moses Stuart, Home, Adam Clarke, Albert Barnes,) the formula, “that it might be fulfilled,” or “then was fulfilled what was spoken,” is held to have been used often as a kind of Rabbinical flourish, an embellishing of the narrative or discourse with quotations, which, though they had properly another sense, yet were so expressed as to admit of being happily applied to the circumstances and events of Gospel history. But would this really have been a wise, or even a justifiable procedure, on the part of our Lord and the apostles? Would such a fanciful application of Scripture have been an innocuous error? Is it so light a thing for inspired men to misquote the writings of each other? It is precisely to their use of Old Testament Scripture—to the elucidations they give of its meaning, and the specific applications they make of its several parts, that we are indebted for our more certain know ledge of its design, and especially for our insight into the connexion that subsists between the Old and the New in God’s dispensations. To bring looseness and ambiguity into such a region were in reality to destroy all certainty of interpretation, and open the door on every hand for fanciful conceits or groundless conjecture. Surely the same majestic authority which said of the Old Testament writings, “And the Scripture cannot be broken,” virtually said, at the same time, It must not be arbitrarily dealt with; it is too sacred a thing to be coupled with mock fulfilments, or brought into connexion with events, to which it bore no proper reference. And the rather may we thus conclude, when we think of the slender nature of the reasons for which, it is supposed, an accommodation should have been made. To give fancied ornateness to a discourse, or show a sort of Rabbinical adroitness in the mere handling of texts—and thereby to win for the moment a readier attention to what they said or wrote—were these sufficient motives for our Lord and His disciples travestying the great laws of sound exegesis, and bringing confusion into the sense of ancient Scripture? No—we may rest assured, they knew their calling better; and as in other things they were not afraid to meet the strongest prejudices of their countrymen, and lay the axe to the most rooted corruptions, it were folly to think, that in this, and for such trivial considerations, they should have entered into compromises about the truth. Least of all could they be guilty of such improper trifling with the oracles of God, who brought it as one of their heaviest charges against the men of that generation, that they erred in not knowing the Scriptures, or in making them void with their own traditions.

We hold it, therefore, to be contrary to any right views of the mission of Christ and His apostles, to suppose, that they in such a sense accommodated themselves to the modes of thought and contemplation around them, as to admit error into their instructions—whether in respect to the interpretation of Scripture, or in respect to forms of opinion and articles of belief. “This,” as Heringa has justly said in his notes to Seiler, “were consistent neither with wisdom, nor with honesty; it had not been suited to the case of extraordinary ambassadors of God, furnished with such full powers, and assisted by such Divine interposition as they were. There is a vast difference between leaving errors untouched which would in time expire either of themselves, or by deeper views of the very doctrine preached, and the confirmation of the same errors, by admitting them into their own instructions.” It is, plainly, one thing to desist from unfolding a doctrine, because men are for the time capable of apprehending or bearing it, and another and very different thing to countenance them in the mistakes and delusions, in which that incapacity has its ground. The one course, in either respect, was compatible with inspired wisdom, the other was not; and when ever explanations are given, which would involve our Lord and His apostles in the formal admission or inculcation of what is in itself erroneous, out of deference to existing circum stances, we must hold it to be a false accommodation: since, if knowingly done by them, it must have been in the sphere of religious instruction, doing evil that good might come; but if without conscience of the evil, on their part, then it must have bespoken their participation in the errors of the time, and their consequent unfitness for being the infallible guides and instructors of the world.

II. In rejecting, however, this false accommodation, because it trenches on the matter of the teaching contained in the New Testament, we say nothing against such an accommodation as has respect to the form merely of the doctrines or lessons taught, which might be perfectly admissible, and, in a sense, even necessary. In this direction there was abundant room, in New as well as Old Testament times, for a true accommodation, of which the inspired writers wisely availed themselves, and which must be duly taken into account by those who would fairly interpret their writings. The limits within which such accommodation might be practised, cannot always, perhaps, be very precisely defined; but, in the general, it may be stated to consist in the falling in with prevalent modes of thought or forms of conception, so as, not to lend countenance to error, but to serve for the better apprehension of the truth. An accommodation of this sort might be employed under two kinds one more general, the other more specific; the former grounded in characteristics of thought common to mankind at large, the latter in such as were peculiar to the age and country in which the sacred penmen lived.

(1.) To the first or more general class of accommodations are to be referred the representations given of Divine and spiritual things—which lie beyond the region of sense, and are not directly cognisable by any faculties we possess. Such things can only be made known to us by an accommodation from the visible to the invisible, from the known to the unknown; and though, in such cases, the form is necessarily imperfect, and conveys an inadequate idea of the reality, it still is the fittest representation of the idea, the nearest to the truth of things, which it is possible for us in present circum stances to attain to. What is said, for example, of God’s anger towards sinners—or of His being revealed (through Christ) in flaming fire for the execution of judgment upon the wicked—or of the possibility of moving Heaven by prayer to depart from some purpose already formed, as if there could be passion or mutability with God—everything of this sort manifestly proceeds upon that necessity, which is inherent in our natures, of thinking and speaking of God in a human manner. It is impossible, otherwise, to gain definite ideas of His perfections and government; and the only way of guarding against the abuse of such representations, is by the employment of counter-representations, which declare God to be in Himself essentially spiritual, unchangeable, and incapable of being carried away by the feelings and impulses of finite beings. We must, nevertheless, think of Him, and conduct ourselves towards Him, as if the human form of conceptions respecting Him conveyed the exact truth;—He will act toward impenitent sinners precisely as if He were moved to anger by their sins—His appearance for judgment against them will be as if He were encompassed with devouring fire—He will give effect to earnest and believing prayer, as if He could be changed by the entreaties of His people.

Essentially similar, and belonging to the same class, are the representations given of Satan and his agents. Being in themselves simply spirits, without bodily parts, the language used concerning them could not have been intelligible, unless it had taken its hue and colour from human forms and earthly relationships. So that when Satan is spoken of as falling from heaven, as being chained or set loose, as overcoming the saints or being bruised under their feet—or when the demons gene rally are spoken of as going into men, as driven out of them, as wandering in dry and desert places, and such like, it is open for consideration, how far in such things there is an accommodation in the form of the truth exhibited to what is cognizable by the senses. To a certain extent there must be an accommodation—as several of the things mentioned are, if literally understood, incompatible with the nature of incorporeal creatures, and some, if closely pressed in the literal sense, would be found inconsistent with others. Due allowance, therefore, must be made in our interpretations for the sensuous and external form of such statements—not to the extent, certainly, of explaining away the existence of those evil spirits (which were to tamper with the very substance of the representations;)—but yet so as to render what is contained in them a description of the relative, rather than of the absolute state of things—of what Satan and his agents are or do in reference to human interests, and as contemplated through a human medium. Viewed thus, the whole, probably, that can be understood, for example, by Satan being cast down from heaven, is losing the place of godlike power and influence he had reached—and by the demons wandering in dry and desert places, their being bereft for a season of that malignant satisfaction, which they find in inflicting evil upon the unhappy subjects of their sway—being left, like persons in a desert, without refreshment and without a home. It is need less, at present, to pursue the subject into further details, as from what has been said the principle of interpretation may be distinctly understood.

It may be added, however, that the same kind of accommodation, which appears in the language used of essentially Divine and spiritual things, is also required in many descriptions of the still undeveloped future. For, although that future may lie within the region of sensible and earthly things, yet, if the world’s affairs are then to assume an aspect essentially different from what has hitherto belonged to them, they can only be distinctly imaged to our view under the form of the present or the past. Partial, of course, and imperfect such prophetical representations of the higher things to come must always be, but they are the only ones adapted to our existing condition; and the nearest approach to the truth, the best practical conception we can form, of what is hereafter to be realized, is by the help of representations so drawn from the theatre of actual and known relations. But this opens too wide a field of thought for investigation in a general course of hermeneutical instruction; it is enough to have indicated the fundamental principle, on which the structure of prophecy is framed, and on which its interpretation should proceed. (For the particular investigation, see “Prophecy viewed in respect to its Distinctive Nature,” etc.)

(2.) But there is another and more specific class of accommodations, which cannot thus be said to have their explanation in the necessary limitations of the human mind, in its relation to the objects and beings of a higher sphere, but which arose out of the modes of thought and expression peculiar to the age and country in which the sacred writers lived. Every age and country has certain peculiarities of this description; and as the inspired penmen were not prevented by the Spirit, but rather led thereby, to think and write in a manner agreeable to the usage of the times, such peculiarities must be taken into account, if we would fully understand the passages where they occur, or even sometimes avoid serious misconceptions of their meaning. The peculiarities referred to are often no further remarkable, than that they are connected with what seems a singular turn of expression—some peculiarity in the mode of conception embodying itself in a corresponding peculiarity in the form of representation. For example, both Hebrews and Greeks were in the habit of conceiving certain states of mind or body, indicated by some verb or adjective, as limited or particularized by a related noun in a way not natural to us—they simply placed the limiting noun in the accusative, without any thing to mark the nature of the connexion, while we invariably attach it to the verb or adjective by a preposition. The expressions in Greek, ποδὰς ὠκύς, κάμνειν τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς τὰς φρένας ὑγιαίνειν, θαυμαστὸς τὸ μέγεθος, and such like, are familiar to every one acquainted with the Greek language; and precisely similar are many phrases in Hebrew such as—רַגְל֭יו-חָלָה אֶת, he was diseased the feet of him; יְשׁוּפְך רֹאשׁ, he will crush thee the head; הִכּהִכּהוּ נֶפֶשׁ, he smites him the soul or life; קוֹלִי אֶקֻרָא, my voice I will cry. In all such cases, we find it necessary to use some preposition before the noun—with, in respect to, upon, or such like—in order to bring out the idea we wish to express. This arises from our conceiving the state expressed by the verb or adjective as something by itself, as having no necessary connexion with any particular object; and so, when there is such an object to be specified, we must connect the two by terms that will fitly indicate the connexion. The Hebrews and Greeks seem to have viewed matters more concretely; they conceived of the state indicated as inseparably connected with some individual person or thing, and thought it enough to name in the loosest way the particular part or property affected. They were satisfied with the accusative, as it is called, of nearer definition—or that which expresses the relation of the particular to the general.

It arose partly, perhaps, from the same tendency in ancient times to a more concrete mode of contemplation than prevails now, that the Hebrews, and to some extent also the Greeks, express relations in a more inward manner than we do—they look to the sphere or element in which a thing is, or is done; while we, viewing the matter more ab extra, speak of the way or instrument by which it comes to be so. Thus they said, to drink in a cup, while we say, to drink from it, or out of it, to walk in the counsel of any one; “in murder in my bones,” Psalms 42:10, as if my bones were actually undergoing murder; Ecclesiastes 7:14, in the day of joy be thou in joy (joyful)—הֳיִה בְטוֹב—live in it as thy proper element. Quite similar in the New Testament are such passages as Apoc. Revelation 13:10, “If any one ἐν μαχαίρᾳ ̓̓ποκτενεῖ,” literally, kills in sword—identifies himself, in a manner, with the sword, so as to make its proper action, killing, his own—“he must be killed ἐν μαχαίρᾳ:”—Romans 2:12, “As many as have sinned ἐν νόμῳ, shall be judged ἐν νόμῳ” the ἐν denoting the status of the person spoken of, in respect to law—in it, as possessing the knowledge of its requirements and its penalties:—1 Corinthians 4:21, “What will ye? Shall I come to you ἐν ῥάβδῳ ἥ ἐν ἀγάπῃ”—in a rod, as if a rod led and impelled me, or love:— And to mention no more, 2 Peter 1:5-7, we have a whole series of graces coupled with ἐν, Englished in the authorized version by to, “add to your faith virtue,” and so on; but more properly the ἐν points to the spiritual state of the person addressed, as standing in the several graces mentioned; and the exhortation given them is, that in the spirit and power of these they should go on and have themselves established in others of a like kind. For us, however, it is more natural to regard faith and the other graces as principles or dispositions to be possessed and exercised; and in such a manner, that the cultivation of one should lead on to the possession and exercise of others.

These may seem somewhat minute distinctions; and it is only in a limited sense, that we can regard the expressions noticed as accommodations: they are such, only in so far as they show a falling in, on the part of the inspired writers, with a somewhat peculiar mode of conception, belonging to their age and country—and one, with which we must acquaint ourselves, if we would catch the precise shades of thought they meant to express. But we have only to follow out the same line of reflection a little further, to find it supplying us with some very natural and important explanations. The same tendency to the concrete, as contradistinguished from the isolating and analytic spirit of modern times, discovers itself occasionally in statements and forms of expression, which, if considered from a modern point of view, must appear loose and incorrect. For example, in the genealogy of Matthew 1, Joram is said to have begotten Ozias, or Uzziah, although in reality there were three intervening generations between the two. And in the Dissertation on the Genealogies of Matthew and Luke, there will both be found many other instances noticed of the same description in Old Testament Scripture, and the mistakes also pointed out, into which many have been led by overlooking the practice adverted to. Mr. Layard, in his work on Nineveh and Babylon, p. 613, when noticing an inscription, which seems to designate a certain king as the son of another, though he was only a successor, not the offspring of that other, remarks, that “the term, son of, appears to have been used throughout the East in those days, as it still is, to denote connexion generally, either by descent, or by succession.” It is well, that an existing practice in the East can thus be appealed to in confirmation of a usage, that seems so manifestly sanctioned in the genealogies;—but it is strange, that any students of Scripture should have been so regardless of the terms employed in other and similar portions of its records, as to have required any extraneous or modern proof of the usage.

It was only to advance a step farther in the same line, and view another class of related objects in a like concrete manner, if successive exemplifications of one great principle, or substantial repetitions of one line of procedure, instead of being precisely discriminated, were treated as in a manner one. The prominence given in the mind to the common principle or homogeneous action, appearing in the several cases, had the effect of practically obliterating the individual differences which separated one part of the transactions from another, and made the differences seem not worth noticing. In this way, Abraham and his posterity are often identified, in regard to the principle of faith, on account of which he was justified,—it is alike Abraham’s faith, whether appearing in him person ally, or in them;—and so in regard to the blessing connected with it—Abraham’s blessing comes upon them, and the in heritance of Canaan is indifferently spoken of as given to him or to them. Many similar examples occur in those Scriptures, which afford scope for the play of lively feeling or a warm imagination—those, therefore, more particularly, in which the facts and personages of history are worked up into the delineations of prophecy, or are considered as exponents of great and vital principles. It is thus we would explain a statement in the speech of Stephen before the Jewish council, which has often been treated as a demonstrable historical error, but which has only to be viewed as an accommodation to the mode of contemplation now referred to, in order to its being satisfactorily explained. The statement is that in which Stephen says, “So Jacob went down into Egypt, and died, he, and our fathers, and were carried over into Sychem, and laid in the sepulchre that Abraham bought for a sum of money of the sons of Emmor, the father of Sychem.” (Acts 7:15-16.) Now, there can be no doubt, that viewing the matter critically and historically, there are inaccuracies in this statement; for we know from the records of Old Testament history, that Jacob’s body was not laid in a sepulchre at Sychem, but in the cave of Machpelah at Hebron;—we know also that the field, which was bought of the sons of Emmor, or the children of Hamor (as they are called in Genesis 33:19,) the father of Sychem, was bought, not by Abraham, but by Jacob. It would appear, therefore, that to a critical eye there are no less than two distinct blunders here—and blunders so palpable, that a mere school-boy, who had read Old Testament Scripture, might without difficulty detect them. But this very circumstance, that the incongruities are so palpable and easy of detection, must surely render it very improbable, that they could have been fallen into by a man of Stephen’s penetration and discernment—to say nothing of his supernatural endowments by the Spirit. There must be some other explanation of the matter, than that which would resolve it into mere ignorance or forgetfulness of the facts of the case—the rather so, as it occurs in a speech remarkable for the insight it displays into the connexion and bearing of Old Testament history. And that explanation is to be found in the principle of accommodation, considered merely as determining the form and manner of the representation. Stephen here, as in his speech generally, is not acting the part of a simple narrator of facts; he has in view throughout important principles, substantially the very same principles, which were then struggling for victory in the cause with which he was identified; and it is only as connected with these, and serving to throw light on them, that he notices and groups together the occurrences of the past. In this part of his statement, where he is speaking of the godly fathers of the nation, he is silently contrasting their faith in God with the unbelief and hardness of subsequent generations, his own in particular; and the special proof of it, to which he points, is the purchase of ground from the Canaanites, at a time when it seemed little likely to the eye of sense that the land should ever be theirs, and destining their bodies to be deposited in the ground so purchased, as a pledge of the ultimate realization of their hopes. As the faith in this respect was one, and the way in which it showed itself the same, Stephen (after the manner of his countrymen) throws all together;—he does not distinguish between what was done by Abraham, and what was done by Jacob, as if they were separate and in dependent acts; he looks at the matter concretely, and as Abraham originated the procedure of buying ground for a sepulchre, and Jacob merely trod in his footsteps, so the whole is identified with Abraham,—the ground at Sychem is also contemplated as his purchase, in which, according to Jewish tradition, the patriarchal heads of the nation were brought from Egypt and buried; and the distinction is in a manner lost sight of between the transactions connected with Mamre, and those with Sychem,—because one character and one bearing belonged to them in the light contemplated by Stephen. (It is much in the same way, and on substantially the same principle, that two prophecies the utterance of quite different men are sometimes thrown together, and treated as one. See the remarks on Matthew 27:9-10.)

It appears, therefore, that there is a perfectly legitimate application of the principle of accommodation; and one that it may be of considerable importance rightly to understand and employ, for the proper elucidation and defence of New Testament Scripture. It is carefully to be borne in mind, however, that the accommodation has respect merely to the form and manner in which the statements are made, not to the substance of the truth therein communicated;—its whole object is to render the truth more distinctly comprehensible, or to give it greater force and prominence to the mind. And as it proceeds upon forms of thought and conception prevalent, it may be, only in the times and places where the inspired writers lived, or, at least, more markedly prevalent there than elsewhere, it must always be our first concern, to get ourselves well acquainted with the peculiarities themselves, and the state of mind out of which they originated. For thus alone can we come to perceive in what respects there was an accommodation, and know how to give due allowance to it, without, at the same time, impairing the substance of the truth that might be couched under it.