036: On Drunkenness (Part 3)
ON DRUNKENNESS - Part 3
XXXVII. (151) After this the soul goes on to deny that it drinks wine or strong drink, boasting in its being continually sober throughout the whole of its life. For to have the reasoning powers really free, and unfettered, and pure, and intoxicated by no passion, was really a very important and admirable thing. (152) And from this it results that the mind which is filled with unmixed sobriety is of itself a complete and entire libation, and is offered as such to and consecrated to God. For what is the meaning of the expression, "I will pour out my soul before the Lord," but "I will consecrate it entirely to him?" Having broken all the chains by which it was formerly bound, which all the empty anxieties of mortal life fastened around it, and having led it forth and emancipated it from them, he has stretched, and extended, and diffused it to such a degree that it reaches even the extreme boundaries of the universe, and is borne onwards to the beautiful and glorious sight of the uncreate God. (153) Therefore this company is one of sober persons who have made instruction their guide; but the former one is a company of drunkards, whose leader is ignorance.
XXXVIII. (154) But since intoxication does not only display folly, which is the child of ignorance, but also utter insensibility; and since, again, wine is the cause of that insensibility which affects the body, while the cause of the insensibility of the soul is the ignorance of those things with which it is proper and natural to be acquainted; we must now say a few words about ignorance, reminding the reader of only the most important particulars relating to it. (155) To which, then, of the passions which affect the body shall we compare that passion in the soul which is called ignorance? To the deprivation of the organs of the external senses? Therefore all those, who have been injured in their eyes or ears, are no longer able to see or hear at all, but have no acquaintance with day or light, which are the only objects for the sake of which, if we are to tell the plain truth, life is really desirable, but dwell in lasting darkness and everlasting night, being made insensible to everything whether of small or great importance; men whom ordinary conversation naturally is accustomed to call infirm. (156) For even if all the other faculties of the rest of the body, should attain to the very extreme limit of strength and vigour, still, if they are tripped up, as it were, and deprived of their foundation by the deprivation of the eyes and ears, they will meet with a great fall, so as never again to be able to rise; for the things which support man and keep him erect are in name, indeed, the feet, but in reality the powers of hearing and seeing; and the man who possesses them in their complete integrity is awake and stands upright, but he who is deprived of them falls and will be utterly destroyed. (157) And ignorance does produce completely similar effects on the soul, depriving it of its faculties of seeing and of hearing, and allowing neither light nor reason to enter into it, lest the one should instruct it and the other should exhibit the truth to it. But shedding upon it dense darkness and abundant folly, it renders the most beautiful soul a deaf, and dumb, and lifeless stone.
XXXIX. (158) For knowledge, which is the opposite of ignorance, may be called, in a manner, the eyes and ears of the soul; for it applies the mind to what is said, and fixes its eyes upon things as they exist, and cannot endure to form a false judgment of anything which it either sees or hears. But it examines and carefully surveys every object which is worthy of being seen or heard, and even if it be necessary to sail or to travel over sea and land, it will traverse them to its furthest boundaries that it may see anything more important, or hear anything more modern; (159) for the love of knowledge admits of no hesitation or delay, it is an enemy to sleep and a friend to waking. Therefore, continually rousing up, and awakening, and sharpening the intellect, it compels it to roam about in every direction, where instruction is to be obtained, inspiring it with an avidity for hearing, and infusing into it an insatiable thirst for learning. (160) Therefore knowledge causes hearing and seeing, by means of which faculties success and rectitude of conduct are arrived at; for he who sees and hears, knowing what is expedient, chooses that, and rejecting the contrary is benefited by his knowledge. But ignorance causes to the soul a mutilation more grievous than the mutilation of the body, and is the cause of many errors, since it is unable to derive any assistance from without, either by foreseeing anything, or by any acuteness of hearing. Therefore, owing to its exceeding desolateness of condition, it is left utterly undefended and unprotected, and is exposed to the plots of all kinds of men and to dangers from all kinds of events. (161) Let us, then, never drink unmixed wine in such quantities as to cause insensibility to our outward senses, nor let us alienate ourselves to such a degree from knowledge as to diffuse ignorance, that vast and dense darkness, over our souls.
XL. (162) But there are two kinds of ignorance, one simple, being complete insensibility; and the other of a twofold nature, when a man is not only enveloped in ignorance, but also thinks that he knows what he never has known, being elated with an ungrounded opinion of his knowledge. (163) The former evil is the lighter one, for it is the cause of lighter offences, and of what we may perhaps call involuntary errors; but the second is of more importance, for it is the parent of great evils, and not only of unintentional but also of deliberate offences. (164) These are the offences of which Lot, the father of daughters, appears to me to be especially guilty, not being able to nourish a masculine and perfect plant in his soul; for he had two daughters by his wife, who was afterwards turned to stone, whom, using an appropriate appellation, one may call habit, a nature at variance with truth, and always, whenever any one tries to lead it on, lagging behind and looking round upon its ancient and customary ways, and remaining in the midst of them like a lifeless pillar. (165) Of these daughters of his the elder may be called Counsel, and the younger may be named Assent, for assent follows upon taking counsel; but no one after he has assented still takes counsel. Accordingly the mind, when it has taken its seat in its council chamber, begins to put its daughters in motion; and with the elder one, namely, Counsel, it begins to consider and investigate everything; and with the younger one, Assent, it begins easily to assent to the circumstances that arise, and to embrace what is hostile as though it were friendly, if they only present ever so slight an attraction of pleasure from this source. (166) But sober reasoning does not admit these things, but only that reasoning does so which is overcome with wine, and, as it were, drunk.
XLI. On which account it is said, "They made their father drink Wine," (36) [Gen 19:33] That is to say, they brought complete insensibility on the mind, so that it fancied itself competent by its own abilities to judge what was expedient, and to assent to all sorts of apparent facts, as if they really had solid truth in them; human nature being by no means and under no circumstances competent either to ascertain the truth by consideration, or to choose real truth and advantage, or to reject what is false and the cause of injury; (167) for the great darkness which is spread over all existing bodies and things does not permit one to see the real nature of each thing, but even if any one, under the influence of immoderate curiosity or of real love of learning, wishes to emerge from ignorance and to obtain a closer view, he, like people wholly deprived of sight, stumbling over what is before his feet, will fall, and so get behind hand before he can lay hold of anything; or else, snatching at something with his hands, he will make uncertain guesses, having only conjecture in the place of truth. (168) For even if education, holding a torch to the mind, conducts it on his way, kindling its own peculiar light, it would still, with reference to the perception of existing things, do harm rather than good; for a slight light is naturally liable to be extinguished by dense darkness, and when the light is extinguished all power of seeing is useless. (169) Accordingly we must, on these accounts, remind the man who gives himself airs by reason of his power of deliberating, or of wisely choosing one kind of objects and avoiding others, that if the same unalterable perceptions of the same things always occurred to us, it might perhaps be requisite to admire the two faculties of judging which are implanted in us by nature, namely, the outward senses and the intellect, as unerring and incorruptible, and never to doubt or hesitate about anything, but trusting in every first appearance to choose one kind of thing and to reject the contrary kind. (170) But since we are found to be influenced in different manners by the same things at different times, we should have nothing positive to assert about anything, inasmuch as what appears has no settled or stationary existence, but is subject to various, and multiform, and ever-recurring changes.
XLII. For it follows of necessity, since the imagination is unstable, that the judgment formed by it must be unstable likewise; (171) and there are many reasons for this. In the first place, the differences which exist in animals are not in one particular only, but are unspeakable in point of number, extending through every part, having reference both to their creation and to the way in which they are furnished with their different faculties, and to their way of being supported and their habits, and to the manner in which they choose and avoid different things, and to the energies and motions of the outward senses, and to the peculiar properties of the endless passions affecting both the soul and body. (172) For without mentioning those animals which have the faculty of judgment, consider also some of those which are the objects of judgment, such as the chameleon and the polypus; for they say that the former of these animals changes his complexion so as to resemble the soils over which he is accustomed to creep, and that the other is like the rocks of the sea-shore to which it clings, nature herself, perhaps, being their saviour, and endowing them with a quality to protect them from being caught, namely, with that of changing to all kinds of complexions, as a defence against evil. (173) Again, have you never perceived the neck of the dove changing colour so as to assume a countless variety of hues in the rays of the sun? is it not by turns red, and purple and fiery coloured, and cinereous, and again pale, and ruddy, and every other variety of colour, the very names of which it is not easy to enumerate? (174) They say indeed that among the Scythians, among that tribe which is called the Geloni, most marvellous things happen, rarely indeed, but nevertheless it does happen; namely that there is a beast seen which is called the tarandus, not much less than an ox in size, and exceedingly like a stag in the character of his face. The story goes that this animal continually changes his coat according to the place in which he is, or the trees which he is near, and that in short he always resembles whatever he is near, so that through the similarity of his colour he escapes the notice of those who fall in with him, and that it is owing to this, rather than to any vigour of body, that he is hard to catch. (175) Now these facts and others which resemble them are visible proofs of our inability to comprehend everything.
XLIII. In the next place, not only are there all these variations with respect to animals, but there are also innumerable changes and varieties in men, and great differences between one man and another. (176) For not only do they form different opinions respecting the same things at different times, but different men also judge in different manners, some looking on things as pleasures, which others on the contrary regard as annoyances. For the things with which some persons are sometimes vexed, others delight in, and on the contrary the things, which some persons are eager to acquire and look upon as pleasant and suitable, those very same things others reject and drive to a distance as unsuitable and ill-omened. (177) At all events I have before now often seen in the theatre, when I have been there, some persons influenced by a melody of those who were exhibiting on the stage, whether dramatists or musicians, as to be excited and to join in the music, uttering encomiums without intending it; and I have seen others at the same time so unmoved that you would think there was not the least difference between them and the inanimate seats on which they were sitting; and others again so disgusted that they have even gone away and quitted the spectacle, stopping their ears with their hands, lest some atom of a sound being left behind and still sounding in them should inflict annoyance on their morose and unpleasable souls. (178) And yet why do I say this? Every single individual among us (which is the most surprising thing of all) is subject to infinite changes and variations both in body and soul, and sometimes chooses and sometimes rejects things which are subject to no changes themselves, but which by their intrinsic nature do always remain in the same condition. (179) For the same fancies do not strike the same men when they are well and when they are ill, nor when they are awake and when they are asleep, nor when they are young and when they are old. And a man who is standing still often conceives different ideas from those which he entertains when he is in motion; and also when he is courageous, or when he is alarmed; again when he is grieved, or when he is delighted, and when he is in love, he feels differently from what he does when he is full of hatred. (180) And why need I be prolix and deep dwelling on these points? For in short every motion of both body and soul, whether in accordance with nature or in opposition to nature, is the cause of a great variation and change respecting the appearances which present themselves to us; from which all sorts of inconsistent and opposite dreams arise to occupy our minds.
XLIV. (181) And that is not the least influential cause of the instability of one’s perceptions which arises from the position of the objects, from their distance, and from the places by which they are each of them surrounded. (182) Do we not see that the fishes in the sea, when they stretch out their fins and swim about, do always appear larger than their real natural size? And oars too, even though they are very straight, look as if they were broken when they are under water; and things at a great distance display false appearances to our eyes, and in this way do frequently deceive the mind. (183) For at times inanimate objects have been imagined to be alive, and on the contrary living animals have been considered to be lifeless; sometimes again stationary things appear to be in motion, and things in motion appear to be standing still: even things which are approaching towards us do sometimes appear to be retreating from us, and things which are going away do on the other hand appear to be approaching. At times very short things seem to be exceedingly long, and things which have many angles appear to be circular. There is also an infinite number of other things of which a false impression is given though they are open to the sight, which however no man in his senses would subscribe to as certain.
XLV. (184) What again are we to say of the quantities occurring in things compounded? For it is through the admixture of a greater or a lesser quantity that great injury or good is often done, as in many other instances, so most especially in the case of medicines compounded by medical science. (185) For quantity in such compounds is measured by fixed limits and rules, and it is not safe either to stop short before one has reached them, nor to advance beyond them. For if too little be applied, it relaxes, and if too much, it strains the natural powers; and each extremity is mischievous, the one from its impotence being capable of producing any effect at all, and the other by reason of its exceeding strength being necessarily hurtful. Again it is very plain with reference to smoothness, and roughness, and thickness, and close compression, or on the other hand leanness and slackness, how very much influence all these differences have in respect of doing good or harm. (186) Nor indeed is any one ignorant that scarcely anything whatever of existing things, if you consider it in itself and by itself, is accurately understood; but by comparing it with its opposite, then we arrive at a knowledge of its true nature. As for instance, we comprehend what is meant by little by placing it in juxta-position with what is great; we understand what dry is by comparing it with wet, cold by comparing it with heat, light by comparing it with heavy, black by contrasting it with white, weak by contrasting it with strong, and few by comparing it with many. In the same way also, in whatever is referred to virtue or to vice, (187) what is advantageous is recognised by a comparison with what is injurious, what is beautiful by a comparison with what is unseemly, what is just and generally good, by placing it in juxta-position with what is unjust and bad. And, indeed, if any one considers everything that there is in the world, he will be able to arrive at a proper estimate of its character, by taking it in the same manner; for each separate thing is by itself incomprehensible, but by a comparison with another thing, is easy to understand it. (188) Now, that which is unable to bear witness to itself, but which stands in need of the advocacy of something else, is not to be trusted or thought steady. So that in this way those men are convicted who say that they have no difficulty in assenting to or denying propositions about anything. (189) And why need we wonder? For any one who advances far into matters, and who contemplates them in an unmixed state will know this, that nothing is ever presented to our view according to its real plain nature, but that everything has the most various possible mixtures and combinations.
XLVI. (190) Some one will say, We at once comprehend colours. How so? Do we not do so by means of the external things, air and light, and also by the moisture which exists in our eyes themselves? And in what way are sweet and bitter comprehended? Is it apart from the moisture in our mouths? And as to all the flavours which are in accordance with, or at variance with nature, are not they in the same case? What, again, are we to say of the smells arising from perfumes which are burnt? Do they exhibit plain unmixed simple natures, or rather qualities compounded of themselves and of the air, and sometimes also of the fire which consumes their bodies, and also of the faculty existing in our own nostrils? (191) From all this we collect the inference that we have neither any proper comprehension of colours, not only of the combination which consists of the objects submitted to our view and of light; nor of smells, but only of the mixture which consists of that which flows from substances and the all-receiving air; nor of tastes, but only of the union which arises from the tasteable object presented to us, and the moist substance in our mouths.
XLVII. (192) Since, then, this is the state of affairs with respect to these matters, it is worth while to appreciate correctly the simplicity, or rashness, or impudence of those who pretend to be able with ease to form an opinion, so as to assent to or deny what is stated with respect to anything whatever. For if the simple faculties are wanting, but the mingled powers and those which are formed by contributions from many sources are within sight, and if it is impossible for those which are invisible to be seen, and if we are unable to comprehend separately the character of all the component parts which are united to make up each faculty, then what remains except that we must think it necessary to suspend our judgment? (193) And then, too, do not those facts which are diffused over nearly the whole world, and which have caused both to Greeks and barbarians such erroneous judgments, exhort us not to be too ready in giving our credence to what is not seen? And what are these facts? Surely they are the instructions which we have received from our childhood, and our national customs and ancient laws, of which it is admitted that there is not a single one which is of equal force among all people; but it is notorious that they vary according to the different countries, and nations, and cities, aye, and even still more, in every village and private house, and even with respect to men, and women, and infant children, in almost every point. (194) At all events, what are accounted disgraceful actions among us, are by others looked upon as honourable; what we think becoming, others call unseemly; what we pronounce just, others renounce as iniquitous; others think our holy actions impious, our lawful deeds lawless: and further, what we think praiseworthy, they find fault with; what we think worthy of all honour, is, in the eyes of others, deserving of punishment; and, in fact, they think most things to be of a contrary character to what we think. (195) And why need I be prolix and dwell further on this subject, when I am called off by other more important points? If then, any one, leaving out of the question all other more remarkable subjects of speculation, were to choose to devote his time to an investigation of the subject here proposed, namely, to examine the education, and customs, and laws of every different nation, and country, and place, and city; of all subjects and rulers; of all men, whether renowned or inglorious, whether free or slaves, whether ignorant or endowed with knowledge, he would spend not one day or two, nor a month, nor even a year, but his whole life, even though he were to reach a great age, in the investigation; and he would nevertheless still leave a vast number of subjects unexamined, uninvestigated, and unmentioned, without perceiving it. (196) Therefore, since there are some persons and things removed from other persons and things, not by a short distance only, but since they are utterly different, it then follows of necessity that the perceptions which occur to men of different things must also differ, and that their opinions must be at variance with one another.
XLVIII. (197) And since this is the case, who is so foolish and ridiculous as to affirm positively that such and such a thing is just, or wise, or honourable, or expedient? For whatever this man defines as such, some one else, who from his childhood, has learnt a contrary lesson, will be sure to deny. (198) But I am not surprised if a confused and mixed multitude, being the inglorious slave of customs and laws, however introduced and established, accustomed from its very cradle to obey them as if they were masters and tyrants, having their souls beaten and buffeted, as it were, and utterly unable to conceive any lofty or magnanimous thoughts, believes at once every tradition which is represented to it, and leaving its mind without any proper training, assents to and denies propositions without examination and without deliberation. But even if the multitude of those who are called philosophers, pretending that they are really seeking for certainty and accuracy in things, being divided into ranks and companies, come to discordant, and often even to diametrically opposite decisions, and that too, not about some one accidental matter, but about almost everything, whether great or small, with respect to which any discussion can arise. (199) For when some persons affirm that the world is infinite, while others pronounce it to be confined within limits; or while some look upon the world as uncreated, and others assert that it is created; or when some persons look upon it as destitute of any ruler and superintendent, attributing to it a motion, deprived of reason, and proceeding on some independent internal impulse, while others think that there is a care of and providence, which looks over the whole and its parts of marvellous power and wisdom, God ruling and governing the whole, in a manner free from all stumbling, and full of protection. How is it possible for any one to affirm that the comprehension of such objects as are brought before them, is the same in all men? (200) And again, the imaginations which are occupied with the consideration of what is good, are not they compelled to suspend their judgment rather than to agree? While some think that it is only what is good that is beautiful, and treasure that up in the soul, and others divide it into numbers of minute particles, and extend it as far as the body and external circumstances. (201) These men affirm that such pieces of prosperity as are granted by fortune, are the body-guards of the body, namely strength and good health, and that the integrity and sound condition of the organs of the external senses, and all things of that kind, are the guards of that princess, the soul; for since the nature of good is divided according to three divisions, the third and outermost is the champion and defender of the second and yielding one, and the second in its turn is a great bulwark and protection to the first; (202) and about these very things, and about the different ways of life, and about the ends to which all actions ought to be referred, and about ten thousand other things which logical, and moral, and natural philosophy comprehends, there have been an unspeakable number of discussions, as to which, up to the present time, there is no agreement whatever among all these philosophers who have examined into such subject.
XLIX. (203) Is it not then strictly in accordance with nature that while its two daughters, Counsel and Assent, were agreed together, and sleeping together, the mind is introduced as embarrassed by an ignorance of all knowledge? for we read in the scripture, "They knew not when they lay down, or when they rose Up." (37) [Gen 19:35] (204) For it was not likely that in his state he could clearly and distinctly comprehend either sleep or waking, or a stationary position or motion; but when he appears to have come to an opinion in the best manner, then above all other times is he found to be most foolish, since his affairs then come to an end, by no means resembling that which was expected; (205) and whenever he has decided on assenting to some things as true, then he incurs a reproach and condemnation for his facility in adopting opinions, those things which he previously believed as most certain now appearing untrustworthy and uncertain; so that, as matters are in the habit of turning out contrary to what was expected, the safest course appears to be to suspend one’s judgment.
L. (206) Having now discussed these matters sufficiently, let us turn to what follows the points already examined. We said, then, that under the name of drunkenness was signified that covetousness and greediness, which has often greatly injured many persons, and the votaries of which one may see, even though they may be amply filled in all the channels of their bodies, still unsatisfied and empty as to their desires. (207) These men, if, being distended by the abundance of the things which they have devoured, they nevertheless get breath again for a short time, like wrestlers who are tired, soon descend again to the same contest. (208) Moreover, the king of the Egyptian country, that is of the body, appearing to the minister of drunkenness, his cupbearer, to be angry with him; again at no great distance of time is represented in the sacred scriptures as reconciled to him remembering that passion which breaks down the appetites in the day of his perishable creation, not in the imperishable light of the uncreated luminary; for it is said that it was Pharaoh’s birthday, (38) [Gen 40:20 hew:20 hew:20] when he sent for the chief butler out of his prison, that he might appear at his banquet; (209) for it is a peculiar characteristic of the man who is devoted to the passions, to think created and perishable things beautiful, because he is enveloped in night and dense darkness, as to the knowledge of imperishable things. On which account he embraces drunkenness as the beginning of all pleasures, and its minister the cupbearer.
LI. (210) Now there are three companions of and servants of the intemperate and incontinent soul, the chief baker, the chief cook, and the chief butler, whom the admirable Moses mentions in these words, "And Pharaoh was angry with the two eunuchs, with the chief butler, and with the chief baker, and he put them in prison with the chief cook;" and the chief cook is eunuch; for he says in another place, "And Joseph was brought down to Egypt, and a eunuch became his master, Pharaoh’s chief Cook," (39) [Gen 39:1] (211) and again, they sold Joseph to Pharaoh’s eunuch, the chief cook; (40) [Gen 37:36] and why is it that the aforesaid offices are absolutely committed to one who is neither man nor woman? Is it because men are by nature calculated to sow seed, and woman to receive it, and that the meeting of the two together is the cause of the generation, and also of the duration of all animals? But it belongs to an unproductive and barren soil, or one may rather say to one which has been made a eunuch, to delight in costly meats and drinks, and in superfluous extravagant preparations of delicacies, since it is unable to reality either to scatter the masculine seeds of virtue, or to receive and nourish them after they have been shed upon it; but, like a rough and stony field, only to destroy those things which ought to have lived for ever. (212) And it is laid down as a doctrine of the most general applicability and usefulness, that every author of pleasure is unproductive of wisdom, being neither male nor female, because it is incompetent either to give or to receive the seeds which have a tendency to incorruptibility, but is able only to study the most disgraceful habits of life, to destroy what ought to be indestructible, and to extinguish the torches of wisdom, which ought to be enduring and inextinguishable. (213) None of such persons does Moses permit to come into the assembly of God; for he says that, "A man who is bruised or castrated shall not enter into the assembly of the Lord." (41) [Deu 23:1]
LII. For what advantage is there, from the hearing of the sacred scriptures, to a man who is destitute of wisdom, whose faith has been eradicated, and who is unable to preserve that deposit of doctrines most advantageous to all human life? (214) Now, there are three persons who contribute to the conviviality of the human race, --the chief baker, the cup-bearer, and the maker of delicacies: very naturally, since we desire the use and enjoyment of three things--meat, confections, and drink. But some men only desire that indispensable food which we use of necessity for the sake of our health, and in order to avoid living in an illiberal manner. Others again desire immoderate and exceedingly extravagant luxuries, which, breaking through the appetites, and weighing down, and overwhelming the channels of the body by their number, usually become the parents of all sorts of terrible diseases. (215) Those, therefore, who are inexperienced in pleasure and the indulgence of the appetites and diseases, like the common people in cities, living a life free alike from hatred and from annoyances, as frugal people, have no need of all kinds of various ministers of refined skill, being contented with ordinary cooks, and cup-bearers, and confectioners. (216) But they who think that the most important and royal object of life is to live pleasantly, and who refer everything, whether of great or small importance, to this object, desire to avail themselves of the services of chief cooks and chief cupbearers, and chief confectioners, that is to say, of men possessed of the highest degree of skill in the arts which they profess. (217) For those who are skilful in the making of confections and luxuries invent the most various possible kinds of cheese-cakes, and honey cakes, and of innumerable other sweetmeats, varying from one another, not merely in the difference of their material, but also in the manner in which they are made, and in their shape, in such a way as not only to please the taste, but also to beguile the eye. (218) And again, the contrivances displayed in the examination of different kinds of wine to produce some, the effect of which shall speedily go off, and which shall not produce headache, but, on the contrary, shall be devoid of any tendency to heat the blood, and shall be very fragrant, admitting either a copious or a scanty admixture with water, according as the object is to have a strong and powerful draught, or a gentle and imperceptible one. And all the other devices and inventions of cup-bearers all come to the same end of art. (219) And to cook up and prepare fish, and birds, and similar viands, in every variety of manner, and to make all other kinds of sweetmeats and delicacies, we have plausible confectioners of exceeding skill; and there are thousands of other luxuries which they are clever at contriving, besides those which they have heard of or seen made by others, having devised them themselves out of their continued care and attention to be the object of making life luxurious, and effeminate, and not worth living.
LIII. (220) But all these men have been now spoken of as eunuchs, being utterly barren of wisdom. But the mind, with which the king of the belly makes a treaty and agreement, was the cupbearer; for by its own nature, the human race is very fond of wine, and this is the sole thing of which it is immeasurably insatiable, since there is no one who is impossible to be satisfied with sleep, and eating, and carnal enjoyments, and things like these; but nearly every one is insatiably fond of wine, and especially those who are occupied with serious business; (221) for after they have drunk they are still thirsty, and they begin drinking at first out of small cups, then, as they proceed, they tell their servants to bring them wine in larger goblets, and when they are pretty full and getting riotous, being no longer able to restrain themselves, they take bowls and goblets of all the largest sizes that they can get, and drink the wine unmixed in huge draughts, until they are either overcome by deep sleep, being no longer able to govern themselves, or till what they have poured into themselves is vomited out again through repletion. (222) But even then, nevertheless, the insatiable desire which exists within them continues to rage as though it were still under the influence of hunger. "For their wine is of the vine of Sodom," as Moses says, "and their tenderils are from Gomorrah; their grapes are grapes of gall, and their branches are bitter branches. The rage of dragons is their wine, and the incurable fury of Serpents." (42) [Deu 32:32] The interpretation of the name Sodom is "barrenness and blindness." But Moses here compares those who are the slaves of greediness for wine and general gluttony, and of other most disgraceful pleasures to a vine, and to the different products of the vine; (223) and the enigmatical meaning which he conceals under this allegory is this:--There is no plant of true joy naturally implanted in the soul of the bad man; inasmuch as it has no healthy roots, but only such as are burnt and reduced to ashes, since, instead of water, Heaven has poured upon it the fire of lightning which cannot be quenched, God having adjudged that as fitting punishment for the impious. But there is implanted in it the plant of excessive desire, barren of all good things, and destitute of anything deserving of regard or contemplation, which he here compares to a vine. Not meaning that one which is the parent of eatable fruit, but that one which produces bitterness, and wickedness, and ungodly cunning; and which is most fertile in anger, and fury, and the most savage dispositions; biting the soul like an asp or a viper, inflicting envenomed wounds, utterly incurable. (224) For which wounds, however, we pray that a relief may be found by propitiating the all-merciful God, in order that he may destroy this wild vine, and may condemn the eunuchs and all persons who are barren of virtue to everlasting punishment; and that, instead of them he may implant in our souls the valuable trees of right instruction, and may bestow upon us noble and masculine reason as its fruit, such as is able to bear within it good actions by way of seed, and is able to increase the virtues, and is calculated to maintain and preserve for ever the entire connection and system of happiness.