πάθος, -ους, τό, (παθεῖν, πάσχω), fr. Aeschyl. and Hat. down ; i.q. πάθημα (q. v.; [the latter differs fr. πάθος (if at all) only in being the more individualizing and conerete term; cf. Schmidt, Syn. ch. 24 § 117); 1. whatever befalls one, whether it be sad or joyous; spec. a calamity, mishap, evil, affliction. 2. a feeling which the mind suffers, an affection of the mind, emotion, passion; passionate desire; used by the Greeks in either a good or a bad sense (cf. Aristot. eth. Nic. 2, 4 [ef. Cope, Introd. to Aristotle’s Rhet. p. 133 sqq.; and his note on rhet. 2, 22,107). In the N. T. in a bad sense, depraved passion: Col. iii. 5; πάθη ἀτιμίας, vile passions, Ro. i. 26 (see ἀτιμία) ; ἐν πάθει ἐπιθυμίας, [in the passion of lust], gen. of apposit. [W. § 59, 8 a.], 1 Th. iv. δ." [Syn. πάθος, ἐπιθυμία: π. presents the passive, ἐπ. the active side of a vice; ἐπ. is more comprehensive in meaning than π΄; ἐπ. is (evil) desire, π᾿ ungovernable desire. Cf. Trench ὃ lxxxvii.; Bp. Lghtft. on Col. iii. 5.]

πάθος pathos 3x

suffering; an affection, passion, especially sexual, Rom. 1:26

πάθος, -ους, τό

(< πάσχω), [in LXX: Jb 30:31 (אֵבֶל), Pr 25:20, and very freq. in IV Mac (1:1 ff., al.)*;] like πάθημα;

that which befalls one, that which one suffers.

a passive emotion or affection (esp. of violent emotion), a passion, passionate desire; in NT always in bad sense: Col 3:5; π. ἀτιμίας, Ro 1:26; π. ἐπιθυμίας, I Th 4:5.†

SYN.: π. = πάθημα, exc. that πάθημα is the more concrete and particular. In NT usage, π. represents the passive, ungoverned aspect of evil desire, as opp. to ἐπιθυμία, which is the active and also the more comprehensive term (v. Tr., Syn., lxxxvii); cf. also ὄρεξις.

Πάθος occurs three times in the N. T.; once coordinated with ἐπιθυμία (Col. 111. 5; for παθήματα and ἐπιθυμίαι in like manner joined together see Gal. v. 24) ; once subordinated to it (πάθος ἐπιθυμίας, 1 Thess. iv. 5); while on the other occasion of its use (Rom. i. 26), the πάθη ἀτιμίας (“ vile affections,” A. V.) are lusts that dishonour those who indulge in them. The word belongs to the terminology of the Greek Schools. Thus Cicero (Tusc. Quest. iv. 5): ‘Que Greci πάθη vocant, nobis perturbationes appellari magis placet quam morbos ;’ on this preference see iii. 10; and presently after he adopts Zeno’s definition, ‘aversa a recté ratione, contra naturam, animi commotio ;’ and elsewhere (Offic. ii. 5), ‘motus animi turbatus.’ The exact definition of Zeno, as given by Diogenes Laértius, is as follows (vii. 1. 68): ἔστι δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος ἡ ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις, ἢ ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα. Clement of Alexandria has this in his mind when, distinguishing between ὁρμή and πάθος, he writes (Strom. li. 18): ὁρμὴ μὲν οὖν φορὰ διανοίας ἐπί τι ἢ ἀπό του πάθος δέ, πλεονάζουσα ὁρμὴ, ἡ §Lxxxvul SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT 303 ὑπερτείνουσα τὰ κατὰ τὸν λόγον μέτρα - ἢ ὁρμὴ ἐκφερομένη, καὶ ἀπειθὴς λόγῳ (see Zeller, Philos. d. Griechen, iii. 1. 208). So far as the N. T. is concerned, πάθος nowhere obtains that wide sense which it thus obtained in the Schools; a sense so much wider than that ascribed to ἐπιθυμία, that this last was only regarded as one of the several πάθη of our nature, being coordinated with ὀργή, φόβος, and the rest (Aristotle, Hth. Nic. ii. 5,2; Diogenes Laértius, vii. 1. 67). ᾿Επιθυμία, on the contrary, in Scripture is the larger word, including the whole world of active lusts and desires, all to which the σάρξ, as the seat of desire and of the natural appetites, impels; while the πάθος is rather the ‘morosa delectatio,’ not so much the soul’s disease in its more active operations, as the diseased condition out of which these spring, the ‘morbus libidinis,’ as Bengel has put it well, rather than the ‘libido,’ the ‘lustfulness’ (‘ Leidenschaft’) as distinguished from the ‘Lust.’ Theophylact: πάθος ἡ λύσσα τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ὥσπερ πυρετός, ἢ τραῦμα, ἢ ἀλλὴ νόσος. Godet (on Rom. i. 26): ‘Le terme πάθη, passions, a quelque chose de plus ignoble encore que celui de ἐπιθυμίαι, convoitises, au ver. 24; car il renferme une notion plus prononcée de passivité morale, de honteux esclavage.’ ᾿Ἐπιθυμία, being τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις, as Aristotle (Rhet. i. 11); ἄλογος ὄρεξις, as the Stoics, ‘immoderata appetitio opinati magni boni, rationi non obtemperans,’ as Cicero (Tusc. Quest. 111. 11) defined it, is rendered for the most part in our Translation ‘lust’ (Mark iv. 19, and often); but sometimes ‘concupiscence’ (Rom. vii. 8; Col. iii. 5), and sometimes ‘desire’ (Luke xxii. 15; Phil. i. 23). It appears now and then, though rarely, in the N. T. in a good sense (Luke xxii. 15; Phil. i. 28; 1 Thess. ii. 17; ef. Prov. x. 24: Ps. cii, 5) ; much oftener in a bad; not as ‘concupiscentia’ merely, but as ‘ prava concupiscentia,’ which Origen (i Joan. tom. x.) affirms to be the only sense which in the Greek Schools it knew (but see Aristotle, Rhet. i. 11); thus ἐπιθυμία κακή (Col. lil. 5); ἐπιθυμίαι σαρκικαί (1 Pet. 11. 11); νεωτερικαί (2 Tim. 11, 22); ἀνοήτοι καὶ βλαβεραί (1 Tim. vi. 9); κοσμικαί (Tit. ii. 304 SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT § LXXxVviI 12); φθορᾶς (2 Pet. 1. 4); μιασμοῦ (2 Pet. 11. 10); ἀνθρώπων (1 Pet. iv. 2); τοῦ σώματος (Rom. vi. 12) ; τοῦ διαβόλου (John Vili. 44): τῆς ἀπάτης (Ερ65. iv. 22) ; THS σαρκός (1 John ii. 16) ; τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν (ibid.) ; and without a qualifying epithet (Rom. vii. 7; 1 Pet. iv. 3; Jude 16; cf. Gen. xlix. 6; Ps. cv. 14). It is then, as Vitringa, in a dissertation De Concupiscentid Vitioséd et Damnabili (Obss. Sac. p. 598 sqq.}, defines it, ‘ vitiosa illa voluntatis affectio, qua fertur ad appetendum que illicite usurpantur; aut que licite usurpantur, appetit ἀτάκτως ᾽ ; this same evil sense being ascribed to it in such definitions as that of Clement of Alexandria (Strom. ii. 20): ἔφεσις καὶ ὄρεξις ἄλογος τοῦ κεχαρισμένου αὐτῇ. Compare iv. 18: ὄρεξιν οὖν ἐπιθυμίας διακρίνουσιν οἱ περὶ ταῦτα δεινοί" καὶ τὴν μέν, ἐπὶ ἡδοναῖς καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ τάττουσιν, ἄλογον οὖσαν" τὴν δὲ ὄρεξιν, ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀναγκαίων, λογικὴν ὑπάρχουσαν κίνησιν. In these δεινοί he of course mainly points to Aristotle (thus see Rhet. i. 10). Our English word ‘lust,’ once harmless enough (thus see Deut. vii. 7, Coverdale’s Version, and my Select Glossary, s.v.), has had very much the same history. The relation in which ἐπιθυμία stands to πάθος it has been already sought to trace. ὋὉρμή, occurring twice in the N. T. (Acts xiv. 5; Jam. iii. 4), and ὄρεξις, occurring once (Rom. i. 27), are elsewhere often found together; thus in Plutarch (De Amor. Prol. 1; De Rect. Rat. Aud. 18; where see Wyttenbach’s note) ; and by Eusebius (Prep. Evang. xiv. 765 d). ὋὉρμή, rendered by Cicero on one occasion ‘appetitio’ (Off. ii. 5), ‘appetitus animi’ on another (fm. v. 7), is thus defined by the Stoics (Plutarch, De Repugn. Stoic. 11): ἡ ὁρμὴ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγος ἐστὶ προστακτικὸς αὐτῷ Tov ποιεῖν. They explain it further as this ‘motus animi,’ φορὰ ψυχῆς ἐπί τι (See Geller, Philos. d. Griechen, ili. 1. 206), which, if toward a thing, is ὄρεξις, if from it ἔκκλισις. When our Translators render ὁρμή ‘ assault’ (Acts xiv. 5), they ascribe to it more than it there implies. Manifestly there was no ‘assault’ actually made on the house where Paul and Barnabas abode; for in such a case it would have been very superfluous for St. Luke to tell us that §Lxxxvil SYMVONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT 305 they “were ware’ of it ; but only a purpose and intention of assault or onset, ‘Trieb,’ ‘Drang,’ as Meyer gives it. And in the same way at Jam. iii. 4, the ὁρμή of the pilot is not the ‘impetus brachiorum,’ but the ‘ studium et conatus voluntatis.’ Compare for this use of ὁρμή, Sophocles, Philoct. 237; Plutarch, De Rect. Rat. Aud. 1; Prov. iii. 25 ; and the many passages in which ὅρμή is joined with προαίρεσις (Josephus, Antt. xix. 6. 8). But while the ὁρμή is thus oftentimes the hostile motion and spring toward an object, with a purpose of propelling and repelling it still further from itself, as for example the ὁρμή of the spear, of the assaulting host, the ὄρεξις (from ὀρέγεσθαι) is always the reaching out after and toward an object, with a purpose of drawing that after which it reaches to itself, and making it itsown. Very commonly the word is used to express the appetite for food (Plutarch, De Frat. Am. 2; Synvp. vi. 2.1); so too ‘orexis’ in the Latin of the silver age (Juvenal, Sat. vi. 427; xi. 127); in the Platonic Definitions (414 6) philosophy is described as τῆς τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ ἐπιστήμης ὄρεξις. After what vile enjoyments the heathen, as judged by St. Paul, are regarded as reaching out, and seeking to make these their own, is sufficiently manifest from the context of the one passage in the N.T. where ὄρεξις occurs (Rom. i. 27; ef. Plutarch, Quest. Nat. 21). δ Ixxxvill. ἱερός, ὅσιος, ἅγιος, ἁγνός. Ἵερός, probably the same word as the German ‘hehr’ (see Curtius, Grundziige, vol. v. p. 869), never in the N. T., and very seldom elsewhere, implies any moral excellence. It is singular how seldom the word is found there, indeed only twice (1 Cor. ix. 18 ; 2 Tim. 111. 15); and only once in the Septuagint (Josh. vi. 8: ἱεραὶ σάλπιγγες) ; four times in 2 Maccabees, but not else in the Apocrypha; being in none of these instances employed of persons, who only are moral agents, but always of things. To persons the word elsewhere also is of rarest application, though examples are not x ! 306 SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT § LXxxvill wanting. Thus ἱερὸς ἄνθρωπος is in Aristophanes (Rane, 652) a man initiated in the mysteries ; kings for Pindar (Pyth. v. 97 [Diss., 181 Heyn.]) are ἱεροί, as having their dignity from the gods; for Plutarch the Indian gymnosophists are ἄνδρες ἱεροὶ καὶ αὐτόνομοι (De Alex. Fort. i. 10); and again (De Gen. Socr. 20), ἱεροὶ καὶ δαιμόνιοι ἄνθρωποι: and compare De Def. Orac. 2. ‘lepds (τῷ θεῷ ἀνατεθειμένος, Suidas) answers very closely to the Latin ‘sacer’ (‘ quidquid destinatum est diis sacrum vocatur ’), to our ‘sacred.’ It is that which may not be violated, the word therefore being constantly linked with ἀβέβηλος (Plutarch, Quest. Rom. 27), with ἄβατος (Ibzd.), with ἄσυλος (De Gen. Socr. 24); this its inviolable character springing from its relations, nearer or remoter, to God; and θεῖος and ἱερός being often joined together (Plato, Tim. 45 a). At the same time the relation is contemplated merely as an external one; thus Pillon (Syn. Grecs): “ ἅγιος exprime Vidée de sainteté naturelle et intérieure ou morale; tandis ᾿ qu’ ἱερός, comme le latin sacer, n’exprime que l’idée de sainteté extérieure ou d’inviolabilité consacrée par les lois ou la coutume.’ See, however, Sophocles, Gidip. Col. 287, which appears an exception to the absolute universality of this rule. Tittmann : ‘In voce ἱερός proprie nihil aliud cogitatur, quam quod res quedam aut persona Deo sacra sit, nulla ingenii morumque ratione habita; imprimis quod sacris inservit.’ Thus the t ἱερεύς is a sacred person, as serving at God’s altar ; but it is not in the least implied that he is a holy one as well ; he may be a Hophni, a Caiaphas, an Alexander Borgia (Grinfield, Schol. in N. T., p. 397). The true antithesis to ἱερός is βέβηλος (Plutarch, Quest. Ron. 27), and, though not so perfectly antithetic, μιαρός (2 Mace. v. 16). Ὅσιος is oftener grouped with δίκαιος for purposes of discrimination, than with the words here associated with it; and undoubtedly the two constantly keep company together ; thus in Plato often (Theat. 176 ὃ; Rep. x. 615 b; Legg. ii. 663 δ); in Josephus (Anitt. viii. 9. 1), and in the N. T. (Tit. i. 8); and so also the derivatives from these; ὁσίως and δικαίως (1 Thess. ii. 10); ὁσιότης and δικαιοσύνη (Plato, §Lxxxvil SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT 307 Prot. 329 c; Luke i. 75; Ephes. iv. 24; Wisd. ix. 3; Clement of Rome, Cor. 48). The distinction too has been often urged that the ὅσιος is one careful of his duties toward God, the δίκαιος toward men ; and in classical Greek no doubt we meet with many passages in which such a distinction is either openly asserted or implicitly involved: as in an often quoted passage from Plato (Gorg. 507 δ) : καὶ μὴν περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὰ προσήκοντα πράττων, δίκαι᾽ ἂν πράττοι, περὶ δὲ θεοὺς ὅσια." Of Socrates, Marcus Antoninus says (vii. 66), that he was δίκαιος τὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, ὅσιος τὰ πρὸς θεούς : οἵ, Plutarch, Demet. 24; Charito, i. 10. 4; and a large collection of passages in Rost and Palm’s Lezicon, s.v. There is nothing, however, which warrants the transfer of this distinction to the N. T., nothing which would restrict δίκαιος to him who should fulfil accurately the precepts of the second table (thus see Luke i. 6; Rom. i. 17; 1 John ii. 1); or ὅσιος to him who should fulfil the demands of the first (thus see Acts li. 27; Heb. vii. 26). It is beforehand unlikely that such distinction should there find place. In fact the Scripture, which recognizes all righteousness as one, as growing out of a single root, and obedient to a single law, gives no room for such an antithesis as this. He who loves his brother, and fulfils his duties towards him, loves him in God and for God. The second great commandment is not coordinated with the first greatest, but subordinated to, and in fact included in, it (Mark xii. 30, 31). If ἱερός is ‘sacer,’ ὅσιος is ‘sanctus’ (=‘ sancitus’), ‘quod sanctione antiquid et precepto firmatum’ (cf. Augustine, De Frid. et Symb. 19), as opposed to ‘ pollutus.’ Some of the ancient grammarians derive it from decba, the Homeric synonym for σέβεσθαι, rightly as regards sense, but wrongly ' Not altogether so in the Huthyphro, where Plato regards τὸ δίκαιον, or δικαιοσύνη, as the sum total of all virtue, of which ὁσιότης or piety is a part. In this Dialogue, which is throughout a discussion on the ὅσιον, Plato makes Euthyphro to say (12 6): τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ μέρος τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι εὐσεβές τε καὶ ὅσιον, τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν" τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι τοῦ δικαίου μέρος. Socrates admits and allows this; indeed, has himself forced him to it. > 308 SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT §LXxxvill as regards etymology; the derivation indeed of the word remains very doubtful (see Pott, Htym. Forschung. vol. 1. p. 126). In classical Greek it is far more frequently used of things than of persons ; ὁσία, with βουλή or δίκη understood, expressing the everlasting ordinances of right, which no law or custom of men has constituted, for they are anterior to all law and custom ; and rest on the divine constitution of the moral universe and man’s relation to this, on that eternal law which, in the noble words of Chrysippus, is πάντων βασιλεὺς θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων : οὗ. Euripides, Hecuba, 799-801. Thus Homer (Odyss. xvi. 428): οὐδ᾽ Soin κακὰ ῥάπτειν ἀλλήλοισιν. The ὅσιος, the German ‘ fromm,’ is one who reverences these everlasting sanctities, and owns their obligation ; the word being joined with εὐσεβής (2 Mace. xii. 45), with edopxos (Plato, Rep. ii. 868 d), with θεῖος (Plutarch, De Def. Orac. 40) ; more than once set over against ἐπίορκος (Xenophon, Anab. ii. 6. 25). Those things are ἀνοσία, which violate these everlasting ordinances; for instance, a Greek regarded the Egyptian custom of marriage between a brother and sister, still more the Persian between a mother and son, as ‘ incestum ’ (incastum), μηδαμῶς ὅσια as Plato (Legg. viii. 888 δὴ) calls them, mixtures which no human laws could ever render other than abominable. Such, too, would be the omission of the rites of sepulture by those from whom they were due, when it was possible to pay them ; if Antigone, for instance, in obedience to the edict of Creon, had suffered the body of her brother to remain unburied (Sophocles, Antig. 74). What the ὅσιον is, and what are its obligations, has never been more nobly declared than in the words which the poet puts into her mouth : οὐδὲ σθένειν τοσοῦτον φόμην τὰ σὰ κηρύγμαθ᾽, ὥστ᾽ ἄγραπτα κἀσφαλῇ θεῶν νόμιμα δύνασθαι θνητὸν ὄνθ᾽ ὑπερδραμεῖν (453-5). Compare an instructive passage in Thucydides, ii. 52, where ἱερά and ὅσια occur together, Plato in like manner (Legg. ix. 878 b) joining them with one another. This character of the §Lxxxvil SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT 39 ὅσιον as anterior and superior to all human enactments, puts the same antithesis between ὅσια and νόμιμα as exists between the Latin ‘fas’ and ‘jus.’ When we follow ὅσιος to its uses in sacred Greek, we find it, as was inevitable, gaining in depth and intensity of meaning ; but otherwise true to the sense which it already had in the classical language. We have a striking testimony for the distinction which, in the minds of the Septuagint translators at least, existed between it and ἅγιος, in the very noticeable fact, that while ὅσιος is used some thirty times as the rendering cf tpn (Deut. xxxili. 8; 2 Sam. xxii. 26; Ps. iv. 4), and ἅγιος nearly a hundred times as that of wip (Exod. xix. 6; Num. vi. 5; Ps. xv. 3), in no single instance is ὅσιος used for this, or ἅγιος for that; and the same law holds good, I believe, universally in the conjugates of these ; and, which is perhaps more remarkable still, of the other Greek words which are rarely and exceptionally employed to render these two, none which is used for the one is ever used for the other; thus καθαρός, used for the second of these Hebrew words (Num. v. 17), is never employed for the first ; while, on the other hand, ἐλεήμων (Jer. 111. 12), πολυέλεος (Exod. xxxiv. 6), εὐλαβής (Mic. vii. 2), used for the former, are in no single instance employed for the latter. "Ayvos = WIP (on the etymology of which word see the article in Herzog’s Leal-Hncyclopddie, Heiligkeit Gottes) and ἅγνός have been often considered different forms of one and the same word. At all events, they have in common that root “AI, reappearing as the Latin ‘sac’ in ‘sacer,’ ‘sancio, and many other words. It will thus be only natural that they should have much in common, even while they separate off, and occupy provinces of meaning which are clearly distinguishable one from the other. ἽὝΑγιος is a word of rarest use in Attic Greek, though Porson is certainly in error when he says (on Kuripides, Med. 750; and compare Pott, Htymol. Forsch. vol. iii. p. 577) that it is never used by the tragic poets; for see Aischylus, Suppl. 851. Its fundamental idea is separation, and, so to speak, consecration 310 SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT § LXxxvul and devotion to the service of Deity; thus ἱερὸν μάλα ἅγιον, a very holy temple (Xenophon, Hell. iii. 2. 19) ; it ever lying in the word, as in the Latin ‘sacer,’ that this consecration may be as ἀνάθημα or ἀνάθεμα (see back, page 15). Note in this point of view its connéxion with ἁγής, dyos: which last it may be well to observe is recognized now not as another form of ἄγος, and as being indeed no more than the Ionic form of the same word, but fundamentally distinct (Curtius, Grundztige, p. 155 sqq.). But the thought lies very near, ἢ that what is set apart from the world and to God, should separate itself from the world’s defilements, and should share in God’s purity; and in this way ἅγιος speedily acquires a moral significance. The children of Israel must be an ἔθνος ἅγιον, not merely in the sense of being God’s inheritance, a λαὺς περιούσιος, but as separating themselves from the abominations of the heathen nations round (Lev. xix. 2; xi. 44); while God Himself, as the absolutely separate from evil, as repelling from Himself every possibility of sin or defilement, and as warring against these in every one of his creatures,! obtains this title of ἅγιος by highest right of all (Lev. x. 3; 1 Sam. ii. 2; Rev. iii. 7; iv. 8). It is somewhat different with ἅγνός. ‘“Ayveta (1 Tim. iv. 12; v. 2) in the Definitions which go by Plato’s name too vaguely and too superficially explained (414 a) εὐλάβεια τῶν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἁμαρτημάτων * τῆς θεοῦ τιμῆς κατὰ φύσιν θεραπεία : too vaguely also by Clement of Alexandria as τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἀποχή, or again as φρονεῖν ὅσια (Strom. v. 1);° 15. better defined as ἐπίτασις σωφροσύνης by Suidas (it is twice joined 1 When Quenstedt defines the holiness of God as ‘summa omnis labis expers in Deo puritas,’ this, true as far as it goes, is not exhaustive. One side of this holiness, namely, its intolerance of unholiness and active war against it, is not brought out. 2 In the vestibule of the temple of sculapius at Epidaurus were inscribed these lines, which rank among the noblest utterances of the ancient world. They are quoted by Theophrastus in a surviving fragment of his work, Περὶ EioeBeias : ἁγνὸν χρὴ ναιοῖο θυώδεος ἐντὸς ἰόντα ἔμμεναι - ἁγνείη δ᾽ ἔστι φρονεῖν ὅσια. §Lxxxvul SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT 311 with σωφροσύνη in the Apostolic Fathers: Clement of Rome, Cor. 64; Ignatius, Hphes. 20), as ἐλευθερία παντὸς μολυσμοῦ σαρκὸς καὶ πνεύματος by Phavorinus. ᾿Αγνός (joined with ἀμίαντος, Clement of Rome, Cor. 29) is the pure ;. sometimes only the externally or ceremonially pure, as in this line of Euripides, ἁγνὸς γάρ εἰμι χεῖρας, ἀλλ᾽ ov τὰς φρένας (Orestes, 1604; cf. Hippolytus, 316, 817, and ἁγνίζειν as = ‘ expiare,’ Sophocles, Ajax, 640). This last word never rises higher in the Septuagint than to signify a ceremonial purification (Josh. iii. 5; 2 Chron. xxix. 5; cf. 2 Mace. i. 33); neither does it rise higher in four out of the seven occasions on which it occurs in the N. T. (John xi. 55; Acts xxi. 24, 26; xxiv. 16, which is also true of ἁγνισμός, Acts xxi. 26). ‘Ayvos however signifies often the pure in the highest sense. It is an epithet frequently applied to heathen gods and goddesses, to Ceres, to Proserpine, to Jove (Sophocles, Philoct. 1273); to the Muses (Aristophanes, Rane, 875; Pindar, Olymp. vii. 60 ‘[Diss., 109 Heyn.], and Dissen’s note); to the Sea-nymphs (Kuripides (Iphig. ὧν Aul. 982); above all in Homer to Artemis, the virgin goddess, and in Holy Seripture to God Himself (1 John iii. 8). For this nobler use of ἁγνός in the Septuagint, where, however, it is excessively rare as compared to ἅγιος, see Ps. xi. 7; Prov. xx. 9. As there are no impurities like those fleshly, which defile the body and the spirit alike (1 Cor. vi. 18, 19), so ἅγνός is an epithet predominantly employed to express freedom from these (Plutarch, Prec. Con). 44; Quest. Rom. 20; Tit. 11. 5; ef. Herzog, Real-Encyclop. s. v. Keuschheit); while sometimes in a still more restricted sense it expresses, not chastity merely, but virginity ; as in the oath taken by the priestesses of Bacchus (Demosthenes, Adv. Ne@ram, 1871) : εἰμὶ καθαρὰ καὶ ἁγνὴ ἀπ’ ἀνδρὸς συνουσίας : with which compare ἀκήρατος γάμων τε ἁγνός (Plato, Legg. viii. 840 6; and Euripides, Hippolytus, 1016); ἁγνεία too sometimes owns a similar limitation (Ignatius, ad Polyc. 5). If what has been said is correct, Joseph, when tempted’ to sin by his Egyptian mistress (Gen. xxxix. 7-12), approved 312 SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT ὃ LXxxix himself ὅσιος, in reverencing those everlasting sanctities of the marriage bond, which God had founded, and which man could not violate without sinning against Him: ‘“ How can 1 do this great wickedness and sin against God ?”’ he approved himself ἅγιος in that he separated himself from any unholy fellowship with his temptress ; he approved himself ἁγνός in that he kept his body pure and undefiled.

πάθος, which in the NT has always a bad connotation ‘‘ passion,” “lust’’ (see Trench, Sy. ὃ Ixxxvii), may be illustrated from Pretsigke 3451° (i/B.c.) ἀπὸ πάθους iBlov, Sy// 373 (=* S10)? (A.D. 55) σπουδαίῳ πάθει τοὺς ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἐπ᾽ ἐμοῦ ποιησαμένων λόγους, and 24. 890 (=* 1239)?°(ii/aA.D.), where ὅσα κακὰ κ[αὶ πά͵]θη ἀνθρώποι[ς] y(()verat are invoked as a curse on the man who disturbs a tomb. BGU ITI. 5884 (i/a.p.) shows the noun, unfortunately in a broken context: in zd. I. 31628 (A.D. 359) κρυπτὸν πάθος, the reference is to bodily sickness. See also Epict ii. 2. 3. MGr πάθος, “‘suffering,” ‘‘ passion” ; pl. πάθη, πάθια. Part VI.

πάθος (pathos) — passion. πάθος [ᾰ], εος, τό, (πάσχω) that which happens to a person or thing, τὰ ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις τῆς ὄψεως π. [Refs 5th c.BC+]; τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ βίῳ [τῆς ψυχῆς] π. [Refs]; incident, accident, τὰ ἀνθρωπήϊα π. [Refs 5th c.BC+]; τὸ συντυχὸν π. [Refs 5th c.BC+]; οὗ τόδ᾽ ἦν π. where this incident took place, [Refs]; ἔξωθεν π. [Refs 5th c.BC+]; unfortunate accident, [Refs 5th c.BC+]

2. what one has experienced, good or bad, experience, τὸν πάθει μάθος θέντα κυρίως ἔχειν [Refs 4th c.BC+]; τά γ᾽ ἐμὰ π. my experiences, [Refs 5th c.BC+]; opposed to ἔργα, [Refs 5th c.BC+]; opposed to πρᾶξις, [Refs 5th c.BC+]

2. b in bad sense, misfortune, calamity, [Refs 5th c.BC+]; τὰ τῆς Νιόβης π. [Refs 5th c.BC+]; ἀνήκεστον π. ἔρδειν to do an act which is an irreparable mischief to one, [Refs 5th c.BC+]; μετὰ τῆς θυγατρὸς τὸ π., i.e. her death, [Refs]; π. μέγα πεπονθέναι, of a great defeat, [Refs]

2. c ={πάθημα}[Refs 4th c.BC+]

II. of the soul, emotion, passion (λέγω δὲ πάθη.. ὅλως οἷς ἕπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη [Refs 5th c.BC+]; ἐρωτικὸν π. [Refs 5th c.BC+]; π. ποιεῖν to excite passion, [Refs 4th c.BC+]; ἐκτὸς τοῦ π. εἶναι to be exempt from passion, [Refs 3rd c.BC+]; περὶ παθῶν, title of work by Zeno the Stoic, [Refs 4th c.BC+], sensation (including pleasure and pain), ἀκουστικὸν π. [Refs]

III. state, condition, τὸ τῆς παντοδαπῆς ἀγνοίας π. [Refs 5th c.BC+]; opposed to ἐνέργεια, [Refs 2nd c.AD+]; opposed to ποίημα, [Refs 5th c.BC+]

III.2. incidents of things, changes or happenings occurring in them, τὰ οὐράνια π. [Refs 5th c.BC+]; τὰ περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν π. [Refs 4th c.BC+]

III.3. properties, qualities of things, opposed to οὐσία, [Refs 5th c.BC+]; π. λέγεται.. ποιότης καθ᾽ ἣν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ἐνδέχεται, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρόν, καὶ βαρύτης καὶ κουφότης, κτλ. [Refs 4th c.BC+]; ἀριθμοῖς καὶ γραμμαῖς καὶ τοῖς τούτων π. [Refs 4th c.BC+]; τῶν φυτῶν τὰ μέρη καὶ τὰ π. [Refs 4th c.BC+]

IV. Grammars, modification in form of words (especially dialectal), πάθη τῆς λέξεως [Refs 4th c.BC+]

IV.2. in Syntax, modified construction, of omission or redundancy, [Refs]

IV.2. b passivity, [Refs 2nd c.BC+]

IV.2. c in writing, signs other than accents and breathings (ἀπόστροφος, ὑφέν, ὑποδιαστολή), [Refs 2nd c.BC+]

V. Rhet., emotional style or treatment, τὸ σφοδρὸν καὶ ἐνθουσιαστικὸν π. [Refs 4th c.BC+]