Appendix - CHAPTER 1 SECTION III THE PROPERTIES OF IDEAS OF SENSATIONS

CHAPTER 1 SECTION III THE PROPERTIES OF IDEAS OF SENSATIONS

Since then the IDEAS OF SENSATION are the foundation, and rough materials, of all, even our most abstracted knowledge, (out of which every man raises a superstructure, according to the different turn of those organs, that are more immediately subservient to the operations of the understanding, and the different ways in which he employs those operations:) it will be convenient to say something concerning’ the properties of these ideas. Their first property is, that they are ORIGINAL. ‘We receive them from our first coming into the world without any immediate concurrence of the understanding, antecedently to any of its operations. The soul, till these are received, is wholly unactive, and cannot so much as form one thought. These ideas are, in respect of our subsequent notions, like the first particles of matter in respect of the things compounded of them. They run through infinite changes, as the mind works upon them; yet in themselves remain unchangeable. And as our compound notions are made out of these, so are they all ultimately resolvable into them.

Ideas of sensation are by this property distinguished.

1. From such ideas, as are supposed to be innate, and antecedent to the impression of any outward object. That we have no such ideas, sufficiently appears even from hence, that we have no occasion for them. We have no occasion for innate ideas of sensible objects, because there is an obvious way of obtaining them by the senses. And as to our knowledge of spiritual things, as it cannot be accounted for by innate ideas, so it easily may be accounted for without them. The rise and whole extent of this knowledge is easily accounted for, from the ideas we have of sensible objects, the necessary consequence we draw from, their existence, to the. existence of things not sensible, and from that manner of conceiving these, which we naturally fall into, by the help and mediation of such things. as are within our present sphere.

2. From such ideas as are supposed to be acquired by, and seated in the understanding, to be the ground-work of our knowledge of spiritual things, as others are of our knowledge of things material. Now if there were any such ideas, we must acquire them one of these ways: either,

First, by the presence of the object itself, and its immediate impression on some faculty disposed to receive and retain the impression. But every one may be conscious, that immaterial objects were never so present to any faculty of his mind, as to imprint and leave upon it any just and real similitude and resemblance of themselves. Or,

Secondly, these ideas must proceed from the immediate power of God. That he can impregnate the mind with them, is certain. But bow is it proved, that he does If ever he does, it is by an extraordinary, supernatural act. Whereas, we are now speaking what our perceptions are, in the ordinary way of nature. Or,

Thirdly, the mind has a power of raising up to itself ideas of things. whereof, it can have no actual view, of objects which have no communication with any of our faculties. But if it cannot form one idea of any material object, without the actual presence of it, much less can it frame ideas of immaterial objects, without their immediate presence.

Perhaps the power of raising up to itself ideas, without the presence or impression of any object, is the privilege of the Divine mind, answerable to that of creation. But the power of our mind in the little world, is much the same with that of the whole man in the greater. It is as impossible for it to raise up to itself any new idea, independent of all sensation, as it is for a man to add one particle to the common mass of matter. A second property of an idea of sensation is, that it is simple ; by” which I mean, that it is an appearance, which cannot be resolved more than one of the same kind.

Simple ideas are generally confined within too narrow a compass For not only those of sounds, smells, tastes, colours, and qualities, are simple, but the ideas of all single bodies. All strikes the sense at once, is to be accounted a simple idea. For you cannot divide the idea you have of any one body, into’ the idea of more bodies than one; though it may be subdivided into the ideas of the several parts of that body. By this property, ideas of sensation are distinguished.

1. From the various alterations and combinations of them made by the mind. The mind cannot indeed destroy any of these ideas any more than it could create them. But it alters, enlarges or diminishes them; it separates and transposes them, and thus is furnished, with a new set of ideas from within, as well as with simple ones without.

2. From those notions, which the understanding forms out of simple, and complex ideas, considered together with the various operations of the understanding upon them. Such is the notion we form of most virtues and vices: each of which is apprehended by ideas of sensation, and the action of the mind upon them put together into one complex conception. A third property of ideas of sensation is, that they are direct and immediate. These original, simple ideas, necessarily presuppose the presence of the object, arid its actual impression on the’ sense: whence follows a direct and immediate representation of it, without the intervention of any thing else. Thus we could not have had the idea of’ a tree, if the eye had not actually seen it; nor of a trumpet’s sound, if some of the undulating air had not actually struck upon the ear. By this property, ideas of sensation are distinguished

I From the ideas we have of those objects of the same kind, which we never actually perceived Thus, the Idea of a man we have been, is put for a man we never saw having no way of conceiving a rn-in that was never Wesent, but by substituting for him the idea of one that was.

2. From all conceptions of things, which are purely metaphorical There are two sorts of metaphor, human and divine.

Divine metaphor is the substituting our ideas of. sensation, which are direct and immediate with ‘the words belonging to them, for the things of heaven of which we have no direct idea, or immediate conception as when God’s knowledge is expressed by His BEING In EVERY PLACE his power by a STRONG HAND

Divine and human metaphor agree ‘in this. That the words, figuratively transferred from one thing to another, do, not agree with the things to which they are transferred, in my part of their literal sense. So hands and eyes, when applied to God, are not spoke in any part of their literal signification : as neither is the word SMILING, when applied to the verdure of the field.

They differ in this, that in human metaphor, the things, for which the figurative words are substituted. may be as immediately and directly known, as the ideas placed in their stead. But in Divine metaphor, only the substituted ideas are direct and immediate. We have no direct or immediate conception of the things they are substituted for.

3. From all conception of things, which are purely analogical. Divine analogy is the substituting words. that express our ideas for heavenly things, whereof we have no ideas. Thus far it agrees with metaphor; but here lies the essential difference. Metaphorical words are spoke of heavenly things, in no part of their proper sense: analogical, in some part of it, though not the whole. So the word HAND is spoken of God metaphorically: for he has no kind of any sort whatever. The word POWER IS spoken of’ him annologically for he has some sort of power, though of quite a different sort from ours. The true nature of our present knowledge of divine things, is by the apostle very aptly described by our SEEING IN A GLASS DARKLY, or IN A MIRROR, IN AN OBSCURE REPRESENTATION. To shew the aptitude and significancy of which expressions. I shall observe two things:

1. That a glass exhibits to us nothing of the substance of the thing represented in it: the similitude therein having no more of the essence of the thing itself, than a mere shadow. Yet we cannot say, but there is a real likeness of the substance in the airy form. There is such a proportion between them, that the idea of a Lice we never saw, but in a glass, is a just one, and may well be substituted for the face itself, of which it gives some real knowledge.

Thus as to those conceptions, which stand in our minds to represent spiritual things, though the things they stand for are of quite another sort, and though these substitutes are no more in respect of them, than a fleeting appearance in the glass is to the man represented by it: yet there may be such a proportion between them, as to make our conceptions of natural things just representations of things supernatural. So that the knowledge we have of them is true, and our reasonings upon them substantial. is long as they are kept within the due compass of those’ representations. For then it is, that men run into absurdity, concerning spiritual things, when not content with this analogical knowledge, they argue from things natural to the intrinsic nature of the supernatural, and suppose, that what is affirmed of these representations only, is literally true of the things they represent. The second thing I would observe concerning this phrase is, That in all instances we use the same expressions, by which we express the things themselves, for their appearances in the glass. And indeed justly: for though there is nothing of the real nature of the objects, in those appearances, yet, Seeing there is such a proportion between them, the same words aptly serve for both. So we say, We see a man in the glass, or the sun or moon in the water, ;vhen we see only an appearance. which has nothing of the real nature of a man, or the sun or moon. And there is such a proportion between the object and its appearance, as would give us some idea of it, though we had never seen it, hut in a glass, or in the water. By what has been already said, analogy in general may be easily distinguished from metaphor: but because the distinction between this and divine analogy is of so great importance, I shall set the difference between these two in a clearer and opposite light.

Metaphor expresses an imaginary analogy, a real correspondence metaphor is no more than an allusion; analogy, a substitution of ideas and conceptions. The intention of’ metaphor, is only to express more emphatically something known more exactly before : the intention of analogy, to inform us of something, which we could not have known without it. Metaphor uses ideas of sensation to express things, whereto they have no real resemblance; analogy substitute our notions and complex conceptions of things, with which they’ have a real correspondence. To conclude: Words applied metaphorically, are not understood in any part of their proper sense analogical words are understood in a part, though not the whole of their literal meaning.