Appendix - CHAPTER 2 SECTION I OF THE PURE INTELLECT AND ITS OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 2 SECTION I OF THE PURE INTELLECT AND ITS OPERATIONS

Having hitherto considered the ideas of sensation as the only materials the mind of man has to work upon, I come to treat of the mind itself, or the pure intellect. I do not mean by this the imma terial part of us, nor yet the most refined and exquisite parts of the body, which are immediately subservient to its nobler operations but both of these operating together in essential union. Our present knowledge is gradually performed, by the concurrent motion of some bodily part within us; which is the cause of that weariness we feel, after long continued thinking. We should never be tired with this, if the pure spirit could reason independently of all material organs. But experience shows us, the case is otherwise: we find it a labour to the brain, and feel ourselves as much wearied with intense thought, as with hard bodily labour: having premised this of them in general, I proceed to consider the particular operations of the intellect, which presuppose sensation, and contain the whole process and utmost extent of human understanding. The first of these is a simple view or survey of the ideas of sensation, just as they lie in the memory This the logicians have rightly termed SIMPLE APPREHENSION; but they generally confound it with pure sensation, whereas, it is easy to observe essential differences between them. I. In simple apprehension the mind is often active, in sensation always passive. 2. Simple apprehension presupposes sensation, and is always subsequent to it. ‘3. By sensation the mind receives ideas; by simple apprehension she surveys those already received. The second operation of the intellect on the ideas of sensation is JUDGMENT. This may be divided into several species; the most considerable of which are these that follow.

1. The SEPARATING our ideas from each other, and ranging them under distinct heads.

2. The COMPARING them with each other, and observing their agreements or disagreements.

3. The ENLARGING OF DiMINISHING them. So we can enlarge the idea we have of a tree, to any size, even to reach the clouds; or diminish it in our thoughts, till we reduce it to what it was in its first principle or seed.

4. The DIVIDING or COMPOUNDING them. So we divide any simple idea into its several parts, or compound the ideas of several houses, to make up that of a city. All these species of judging are peculiar to men, and not enjoyed by brutes in any degree.

Another act of the intellect, generally reduced to judgment, is ABSTRACTiON. This, some suppose to be performed, by drawing the mind off from all ideas of sensation, from all compositions of them, and from all complex notions, in order to form ideas of incorporeal beings. But it may be doubted, whether this be practicable in our present state. The true abstraction seems to consist, not in forming ideas independent on sensation, but in substituting the only notions we have, which are natural, easy and familiar, to represent those supernatural things, of which, otherwise we can have no notion; in transferring our thoughts from the literal propriety of the words, by which we express them, to that analogical signification, whereby they are, as it were, spiritualized. This seems to be the only abstraction we are capable of, with regard to things spiritual. And this is so far from being independent on sensation, and the operations of intellect that we can no otherwise think or speak of such objects, than in these worldly and human symbols; and that if we abstract from these; we extract from all thought of heavenly beings, and can have neither names nor ideas for them.

What has been hitherto said of the operations of the intellect relate only to ideas of sensation. Therefore, it is proper to observe here that the same operations are likewise exercised upon all our alterations and compositions of them. When the memory is once furnished with those voluntary alterations and combinations of simple ideas, the mind has the same full power over them, as over the ground work of them, namely, that of simple apprehension, and of judgment in all its branches .And the same arbitrary sway it has over all the complex notions and conceptions, which are formed out of those simple or complex ideas considered together with the operations of the intellect upon them.

Before we close this head of judgment, it is worth while to take particular notice of that species of one of its branches, comparing which is distinct from all the rest, and is commonly called RELATION. This is that act of the mind, whereby it considers the dependence , of things on each other. I shall dwell on it no longer than is necessary to show the procedure of the understanding, in attaining knowledge,

First when we consider the relations of sensible objects to each other, as they are in their own nature, without any respect which they bear to our understanding, hence opens a spacious field of knowledge that of natural causes and effects, of the manner, wherein natural things act, upon, or. suffer from each other : in short, of their influence one another numberless ways: and this ‘is natural philosophy.

Secondly, from our ideas of sensation we infer the existence of those outward objects, that occasion them in us. And from the existence of these we infer a first cause of all things, eternal and necessarily existing. Hence again we have the knowledge of the relation he bears to us, as our Creator and our preserver. From these relations flow all the duties of piety; such as love,  reverence, praise, and prayer.

Again. When we consider the relation, we bear to our fellow creatures, of the same nature and degree in this world hence we come to be sensible of our obligations to justice and humanity.        And when we distinguish these by particular, nearer relations, such as parent or child, servant or master, hence we deduce all the duties necessary to the well-being of the whole kind, and of every individual.            

Lastly, when we consider the relation we bear to ourselves, the regard every man ought to have for his own happiness ; hence we may infer all those duties, that naturally, tend to promote the good either of our body or mind. And all comprehended under this second head, is properly natural religion. For the sanction of this, and to show the tendency of its precepts to our future happiness, the understanding proceeds thus. From the unequal distribution of rewards, to those who observe them, and of punishments to those who transgress them in this life, so evidently inconsistent with the goodness and justice of an All-perfect Being we infer the necessity of future rewards and punishments, and consequently the immortality of human souls