011. I. The Ontological Argument.

I. The Ontological Argument.

1. Logical Ground of the Argument.—This argument is grounded in some primary conception of God, or in some a priori truths, which are assumed to embody the proof of his existence. These primary conceptions vary in different constructions of the argument; but the variations need not here be stated, as they must appear in the progress of the discussion. We have no occasion to notice the slighter shades of variation. It will suffice that we present the argument in a few leading forms of its construction.

2. Different Constructions of the Argument.—The original of this argument is conceded to Anselm. His own construction of it is substantially in this form: We have the idea of the most perfect Being, a Being than whom a greater or more perfect cannot be conceived. T his idea includes, and must include, actual existence, because actual existence is of the necessary content of the idea of the most perfect. An ideal being, however perfect in conception, cannot answer to the idea of the most perfect. Hence we must admit the actual existence, for only with this content can we have the idea of the most perfect Being. This most perfect Being is God. Therefore God must exist.^[105]

^[105] Anselm:Proslogion, translated, with Gaunilon’s criticism and Anselm’s reply, in Bibliotheca Sacra, July and October, 1851. Of course this argument could not pass unquestioned. Gannilon, a monk of Marmoutier, was promptly forward with a logical criticism.^[106] Many have followed him. One point of criticism is obvious. We readily form the idea of purely imaginary beings. Hence actual existence cannot be deduced from any such idea. Anselm replied, and his reply has often been repeated, that the objection is valid with respect to imperfect or finite beings, because in their case actual existence is not of the necessary content of the idea, but that it is groundless as against the idea of the most perfect Being, because in this case actual existence is of the necessary content of the idea. This idea is not an intuitive conception. Proper analysis discloses the process of its construction. There is put into it whatever is regarded as necessary to constitute it the conception of the most perfect Being. For this reason the actual existence of the Being conceived must be put into the content of the idea. It is easy to add necessary existence to the actual existence of such a Being. But the possession of an idea merely through such a process of logical construction cannot conclude the truth of the divine existence.^{[107] [106]} Liber pro Insipienti.

^[107]Ueberweg:History of Philosophy, vol. i, pp. 378, 383-386. The argument as constructed by Des Cartes is thus summarily stated I “I find in me the notion of God, which I cannot have formed by my own power, since it involves a higher degree of reality than belongs to me. It must have for its Author God himself, who stamped it upon my mind, just as the architect impresses his stamp on his work. God’s existence follows also from the very idea of God, since the essence of God involves existence—eternal and necessary existence.”^[108] The last sentence, so far as it constitutes a distinct argument, drops into the Anselmic form, and hence requires no separate consideration. To the argument, as put in the former part of the citation, it is objected—just as against the Anselmic—that we have ideas of purely imaginary beings, and hence that objective reality is no implication or consequence of our mental conception. The objection is admitted so far as it relates to ideas of finite existences, and for the reason that the mind itself can originate such ideas; but it is declared groundless respecting the idea of God, for the origin of which he only is sufficient cause.

^[108]Ibid., vol. ii, pp. 41, 43.

It can hardly escape notice that this argument is inductive rather than ontological, and really the same in its principles and method as the cosmological argument. Nor is it conclusive. The assumption that the idea of God cannot originate in the human mind is neither self-evident nor provable. The conclusion of God’s existence as its only sufficient cause can have no more certainty than that primary assumption.^{[109] [109]} Saisset:Modern Pantheism, vol. i, pp. 27-64.

Dr. Samuel Clarke attempted a demonstration of the existence of God mostly on a priori principles, and so far constructed an ontological argument.^[110] A brief statement of his leading principles will suffice: 1. Something has existed from eternity. As something now is, something always was; for, otherwise, present things must have been produced from nothing, which is absolutely impossible. 2. There has existed from eternity some one unchangeable and independent Being; for, otherwise, there must have been an eternal succession of changeable and dependent beings, which is contradictory and absurd. 3. The unchangeable and independent eternal Being must be self-existent, or exist necessarily. This necessity must be absolute, as originally in the nature of the thing itself, and not simply from the demand of thought. From these principles further deductions are made respecting the perfections of the one eternal Being. The further attempt to prove the necessary existence of an eternal and infinite Being from the nature of space and time does not add to the strength of the argument. It may readily be granted that infinite space and infinite duration are necessities of thought and realities in fact; but they are not such realities as require a ground in essential or infinite being. They are neither attributes nor modes of such being, and would in themselves be the very same were there no essential being, or no mind to conceive them.

^[110]Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, in the Boyle Lectures, vol. ii.

Kant’s construction of this argument is not unlike that of Clarke. Necessary existence is the only ground of possible existence; there fore some being must necessarily exist. The necessary Being is single; is simple; is immutable and eternal; is the supreme reality; is a Spirit; is God.^[111] These several points are briefly but vigorously maintained.

^[111]Grounds of Proof for the Existence of God: Richardson’s translation.

We have presented only a few of the many forms in which this argument has been constructed. The chief aim has been to give a little insight, into its principles and method. Its prominence in theistic discussion is such that it could not with propriety be omitted. Estimates of its value as a proof of theism greatly differ. With some, now the very few, it is the strongest proof, while with others it is logically valueless. Among recent authors, Dr. Shedd occupies in its treatment two thirds of the pages given to the proofs of theism, while Bishop Foster dismisses it with little more notice than to remark that he never caught the argument.^{[112] [112]} For full historic information respecting this argument: Flint:Theism, lect. ix, with notes.