John 1

John 1:1

The Apologists Bible Commentary

John 1

1In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.

C o m m e n t a r yWith the possible exception of Genesis 1:1, this verse is the most striking opening of any book of the Bible. Often missed in the various discussions about what John means by this elegant and deceptively simple sentence, is the fact that this verse is poetic. Many commentators have noted the poetic form of the first 18 verses of John’s Gospel - the so-called “Prologue.” Some see in the Prologue an early Christian hymn; others argue against that view. But few, if any, deny that John is writing beautiful, rhythmic prose. John captures our attention with both style and content. He wants to create questions in the minds of his readers - questions which his Gospel will answer in full measure.

If this verse is poetic in nature, and if the writer intends to arrest his audience - to grab their attention from the outset with a striking and consciously enigmatic statement - is it little wonder that so much has been written about the ultimate meaning of this verse, and the final clause in particular? The opening phrase, “In the beginning,” is an allusion to Genesis 1:1.

The same phrase in Greek appears in the Greek translation of the Old Testament, the Septuagint, which John and his audience would have been intimately familiar. But whereas Genesis opens with “In the beginning God,” John opens with “In the beginning was the Word.” In the place where “God” occurs in Genesis, John substitutes “was the Word” in his Gospel. This juxtaposition of God and the Word - the interplay between the Word with God and the Word as God - is one of the primary themes of the Prologue, and the Gospel as a whole. From the outset, John challenges his audience by introducing the Word - the Son of God - into places and activities where they would have expected God to be. The Word never replaces God, however, but rather is always there beside Him. The “beginning” is the beginning in Genesis - the first act of creation, when God made the heavens and the earth.

There is little evidence that Jews in the Second Temple period held a common belief in an undefined period prior to the creation in Genesis, during which God created things other than the heavens and the earth. John’s audience would have understood his meaning quite easily, though it would have surprised and intrigued them: In the beginning, before all creation, the Word already existed.

The Greek word translated “was” signifies continual existence (see Grammatical Analysis, below). There is no more hint here of the creation of the Word than there is of the creation of God. The Greek for “Word” is LOGOS. Much speculation has surrounded John’s source for this term. Many have suggested Philo as a likely source. However, recent scholarship has focused more on Jewish Wisdom tradition, which spoke of God’s Word in a metaphoric sense as having personal attributes.

The discovery of a native Jewish origin for LOGOS has caused most scholars to abandon the notion that John’s Gospel represents an early Gnostic text (championed by Bauer and others). If John’s audience was familiar with the use of LOGOS as a personified attribute of God, it must be asked whether they would consider John’s LOGOS to be a separate being, or still in some way a “part” of God - either literally or still an exaggerated personification.

It is impossible to tell with certainty, of course, but it seems likely that their prior understanding of the term would lead them to consider the LOGOS primarily a “part” of God, though in what sense, they could only wait for John to explain. This seems particularly likely, given that the Wisdom tradition was also poetic in nature. Thus, John audience would have understood that in the Beginning, God has with Him His creative Word - the Word by which He spoke the universe into existence. They would, at this point, perhaps have more readily thought of the Word as yet another poetic personification of an attribute of God; it is unlikely they would have assumed that the Word that was intimately with God was another god, a secondary created being, whose creation appears nowhere in this passage, and whose existence stretches back before the beginning of creation. “The Word was with God.” The personal distinction between God and the Word is clearly expressed. The words “Word” and “God” in the Greek are both preceded by the article, specifying a personal reference. This phrase presents significant difficulties to Modalists <>.

The word behind “with” denotes an intimate, personal relationship. It might almost be translated “toward,” an idea echoed in verse 18, where Son is said to be “in the bosom of the Father.” John’s audience would now be confronted with a clear statement that the LOGOS is more than a mere personification of a divine attribute: The LOGOS is a personal being, just as the Father is. “And the Word was God.” Here we have what are certainly the most widely discussed five words in the Bible.

Is John here declaring that the Word is God the Father? A secondary, lesser god? Or One who possesses Deity in the same measure as the Father, but is also distinct from the Father? The word “LOGOS” is, again, preceded by the article. But the word “God” is not. While Greek possesses the definite article (“the”), it does not have an indefinite article (“a, an”). In Greek, the absence of the article usually signifies indefiniteness; however the grammar here makes that unlikely (see Grammatical Analysis, below). Definiteness is also a possibility, and indeed, many commentators and some grammarians see “God” here as a definite noun.

There is a third option: Qualitative. Qualitative nouns occurs in sentences like John 1:1c throughout the NT. They do not signify definiteness (“the God”), nor indefiniteness (“a god”), but rather attribute all the qualities or attributes of the noun to the subject of the sentence. If “God” is qualitative, here, it means that all the attributes or qualities of God - the same God mentioned in the previous clause - belong to the Son. Consider the sentence: “Homo Erectus was Man.” Here “Man” is neither definite (“the Man”) nor indefinite (“a man”), but rather qualitative. If I made this statement to an evolutionist, I would be asserting that our ancient ancestor possessed all the qualities or attributes of humanity.

I am saying he is truly human. Similarly, John is saying that the LOGOS is truly God - not the same Person mentioned in the previous clause - but possessing the same attributes or qualities.

The majority of grammarians who have written on this subject view “God” in 1:1c as qualitative, though some older grammarians did not use this term. Some grammarians and most commentators regard “God” in 1:1c as definite, though their interpretations of this verse are much the same as those who see it as qualitative. Ultimately, grammar and context must determine John’s intention, and both, it will be argued below, point conclusively to this verse being accurately paraphrased as follows: “In the beginning of all creation, the Word was already in existence. The Word was intimately with God. And the Word was as to His essence, God.” “In the beginning” recalls the opening words of Genesis 1:1: “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.” The expression does not refer to a particular moment of time but assumes a timeless eternity. “Word” is the Greek logos, which has several meanings. Ordinarily it refers to a spoken word, with emphasis on the meaning conveyed, not just the sound.

Logos, therefore, is an expression of personality in communication. Scripture also tells us that it is creative in its power: “By the word [logos, LXX] of the Lord were the heavens made, their starry host by the breath of his mouth” (Psalms 33:6).

This verse clearly implies that the expression of God had creative power and called the universe into being. To the Hebrew “the word of God” was the self-assertion of the divine personality; to the Greek the formula denoted the rational mind that ruled the universe. John is asserting that the “Word” is the source of all that is visible and antedates the totality of the material world. The use of logos implies that John was endeavoring to bring out the full significance of the Incarnation to the Gentile world as well as to the Jewish people. He does not adopt the Greek concept in its entirety, but he uses this term to indicate that Jesus had universal rather than local significance and that he spoke with ultimate authority. He was preexistent, involved in the act of creation, and therefore superior to all created beings.

This presentation lifts Christ above the materialistic, pagan concept of deities just as the Incarnation brings the Hebrew concept of God into everyday life. The preposition “with” in the phrase “the Word was with God” indicates both equality and distinction of identity along with association.

The phrase can be rendered “face to face with.” It may, therefore, imply personality, coexistence with the Creator, and yet be an expression of his creative being. The position of the noun God in the Greek text marks it as a predicate, stressing description rather than individualization. The “Word” was deity, one with God, rather than “a god” or another being of the same class. This is the real meaning of the phrase. Unity of nature rather than similarity or likeness is implied. The external coexistence and unity of the Word with God is unmistakably asserted (EBC <>).

In the beginning-the beginning before all beginnings, prior to the beginning of Genesis 1:1. The phrase could be rendered “from all eternity.” The expression in Greek “characterizes Christ as preexistent, thus defining the nature of his person” (Dana and Mantey). was the Word-Greek, ho logos, signifying primarily “the Expression”-God expressed, God explained, God defined (see 1:18).

The Greek term logos in philosophical terminology also denoted the principle of the universe, even the creative energy that generated the universe (Morris). Thus, Christ as the Logos is the agent of and the personal expression of the Creator God. the Word was with God-The preposition translated “with” is pros. In Koine Greek pros (short for prosτpon pros prosτpon, “face to face”) was used to show intimacy in personal relationships (see Matt. 13:56; 26:18; Mark 6:3; 14:49; 1 Cor. 13:12; 6:10; 2 Cor. 5:8; Gal.1:18). Thus, for John to say “the Word was with God” was for him to mean “the Word was face to face with God” (see Williams’s translation) or “the Word was having intimate fellowship with God.” This speaks of the preincarnate Son’s relationship with the Father prior to creation-in fact, prior to everything (see 1:18; 17:5, 24). the Word was God-The Greek clause underlying this clause stipulates, according to a rule of grammar, that “the Word” is the subject and “God” is the predicate nominative. Another particularity of the Greek is that the article is often used for defining individual identity and often absent in ascribing quality or character. In the previous clause (“the Word was with God”), there is an article before “God” (ton theon), thus pointing to God the Father; in this clause, there is no article before “God.” The distinction, though a fine one, seems to be intended.

In the previous clause, John indicates that the Son was with God, the Father; in this clause, John indicates that the Son was himself God (or should we say, deity) but not the God (i.e., God the Father). Therefore, some translators have attempted to bring out these distinctions by rendering the last clause as follows: “and what God was the Word was” (NEB) or “and he was the same as God” (TEV).

Thus, we see that John presents the Word as being eternal, as being with God (the Father), and as being himself God (or, deity). This is the One who became flesh and dwelt among men on earth (JFB <>). G r a m m a t i c a l A n a l y s i sen arch hno logoV, kaio logoV hn proV ton qeon, kai qeoV hno logoV. EN ARCHΚΚN hO LOGOS, KAI hO LOGOS ΚN PROS TON THEON, KAI THEOS ΚN hO LOGOS. In [the] beginning was the Word, and the Word was with (the) God, and the Word was God. ARCHΚ · Beginning, origin in the abs[olute] sense (BAGD <>). · 1 John has the phrases "that which was from the beginning" (1:1) and "he who was from the beginning" (2:13-14) for the Logos who has become perceptible to the disciples but is eternally preexistent, since it is God himself who here gives himself to us. "In the beginning" in Jn. 1:1 says this specifically of the Logos; the Logos is before all time, so that no temporal statements can be made about him. Eternal preexistence is plainly implied (TDNT <>). ΚN ("was") is the indicative imperfect active form of the verb EIMI, signifying continuous or linear existence in past time. The contextual contrast is between ΚN and EGENETO ("to become"), the continuous preexistence of the LOGOS (v. 1) and the LOGOS becoming flesh at a specific point in time (v. 14). "In the beginning, the LOGOS already was." The preexistence of the Word is strongly brought out by the phrase en arch hno logoV (en arche en ho logos, “in the beginning was the word”).

Arch (arche) according to H. Bietenhard “is an important term in Gk. philosophy,” which means, among other things, “starting point, original beginning” (DNTT, 1:164).

By itself, this may not seem too significant, for few would debate that we are dealing with the “original beginning.” It is the presence of the verb hn (en, “was”) that brings out the importance of this phrase. Literally, it could and should be rendered “When the beginning began, the Word was already there.” This is the sense of en which is in the imperfect tense and implies continuing existence in the past. So before the beginning began, the Word was already in existence. This is tantamount to saying that the Word predates time or Creation (EBC <>). PROS · with the acc[usative] of a person, after verbs of remaining, dwelling, tarrying, etc. (which require one to be conceived of as always turned towards one)…after EIMI…Jn i.1 (Thayer <>). · be (in company) with someone…J 1:1f (BAGD <>). · a marker of association, often with the implication of interrelationships…’the Word was with God’ John 1:1 (Louw & Nida <>) Some commentators, such as JFB, above, see PROS in this verse as shorthand for the idiomatic expression PROSΤPON PROS PROSΤPON (literally “face to face”). This seems view is given weight by the context, in which the Son is said to be “in the bosom of the Father” (v. 18), and thus in the ideal position to declare the Father to the world.

TON THEON, literally “the God,” is in the accusative case, which makes this the direct object of the second clause (hO LOGOS is in the nominative, and is thus the subject). There is no difference in meaning between THEON here and THEOS in the next clause; they are the same word in different cases.

The article TON (accusative form of hO) indicates a personal distinction. As Karl Rahner and others have noted, the articular <> form of THEOS in the New Testament usually refers to the Father (Rahner <>, p. 146; Harris, Jesus <>, p. 47). Thus, saying “the Word was with (the) God” is the same as saying “the Word was with the Father.” THEOS EN HO LOGOS. The first task of the translator faced with this clause is to determine the subject. In most sentences or clauses (such as John 1:1b), the noun in the nominative case is the subject. The noun in the accusative case is the direct object.

However, in Greek, “copulative” verbs (generally a form of “to be” or “to become”) take the nominative case, not the accusative. Technically, a copulative verb does not ascribe an action, but predicates something about the subject.

The “object” of a copulative verb, therefore, is called the “Predicate Nominative <> (PN),” not the direct object. As we have seen, EN is a form of the verb “to be.” Therefore, both THEOS and LOGOS are in the nominative case - one is the subject and the other the PN. In such cases, if one noun has the article and the other does not, the noun with the article is the subject (see Dana and Mantey <>, p. 148; McGaughy <>, p. 50; etc.). Thus, hO LOGOS is the subject of the sentence; THEOS is the PN. “The Word was God,” not “God was the Word.” While the latter is not impossible from the standpoint of pure grammar, McGaughy’s <> study makes it highly unlikely. So, John is telling us something about the LOGOS - that He is THEOS. The $64,000 question, then, is what does John mean by this?

Since THEOS is anarthrous <>, does he mean that the Word was “a god” (indefinite)? Or does he mean that the Word is God (definite)?

Or does he mean that the Word has all the qualities and attributes of God (qualitative)? To answer this essential question, we will need to review how several prominent grammarians have viewed this issue. Pre-Colwell Before E.C. Colwell wrote his landmark study (see below), many scholars viewed THEOS in John 1:1c as qualitative: · “It is necessarily without the article (qeoV noto qeoV) inasmuch as it describes the nature of the WOrd and does not identify His Person. It would be pure Sebellianism <> to say 'the Word was o qeoV" (Westcott). · "o qeoV hno logoV (convertible terms) would have been pure Sabellianism.... The absence of the article here is on purpose and essential to the true idea" (Robertson, Grammar, pp. 767-768). · "QeoV hno logoV emphasizes Christ’s participation in the essence of the divine nature” (Dana and Mantey <>, p. 140). · “QeoV without the article signifies divine essence, or the generic idea of God in distinction from man and angel; as sarx, ver. 14, signifies the human essence or nature of the Logos” (Lange) · “QeoV sine artic. essentialieter, cum artic. personaliter” (Chemnitz). · “QeoV must then be taken as implying God, in substance and essence, not`o qeoV ,’the Father,’ in Person….as in sarx egeneto [John 1:14], sarx expresses that state into which the Divine Word entered by a definite act, so in qeoV hn, qeoV expresses that essence which was His - that He was very God.

So that this verse might be connected thus: the Logos was from eternity, - was with God (the Father), - and was Himself God” (Alford). It is important to note that these scholars did not use the term “qualitative” to describe their view of THEOS in John 1:1c.

Prior to Phillip B. Harner’s study of qualitative anarthrous predicate nouns (see below), “qualitative” nouns were viewed more or less as indefinite nouns. These scholars would probably have described THEOS as definite, but not as a convertible term with hO THEOS in John 1:1b. Indeed, Julius Mantey, in his famous letter to the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, cites Colwell’s study as ‘proving’ that THEOS in 1:1c is definite, though it is clear from what he wrote in his Manual Grammar several years before that by this he does not see definiteness as requiring convertibility. Convertible terms are 100% equivalent, such as “Jesus” and “Son of God” in this sentence: “Jesus is the Son of God.” We can reverse the terms without changing the meaning: “The Son of God is Jesus.” If THEOS in 1:1c is convertible with hO LOGOS, John would be teaching that the LOGOS Isaiah 100% equivalent to the hO THEOS of 1:1b, which would be conducive to some form of Modalism <>. These scholars all argue that the anarthrous PN preceding the copulative verb stresses the nature of THEOS.

As we will see, this is precisely the way later scholars described a “qualitative” noun - one that stresses the qualities, attributes, or nature of the noun. Colwell’s Rule In 1933, E.C.

Colwell published his now famous study <> of the use of the article with PNs occurring both before and after the verb. Colwell began by identifying a number of PNs which he believed were definite by virtue of the context. He then performed a statistical analysis of their occurrence - either before or after the verb - and with the article or without. He found that 87% of definite PNs before the verb occurred without the article. He “tentatively” offers a rule which, in part, stipulates: “Definite predicate nouns which precede the verb usually lack the article” (Colwell <>, p. 20). Colwell reasons: But it is in the realm of translation and interpretation that the data presented here have their most valuable application.

They show that a predicate nominative which precedes the verb cannot be translated as an indefinite or a “qualitative” noun solely because of the absence of the article; if the context suggests that the predicate is definite, it should be translated as a definite noun in spite of the absence of the article (IBID <>, p. 20). Thus, Colwell’s study indicates that THEOS in John 1:1c should not be translated as an indefinite noun solely on the basis of the absence of the article.

Colwell, like most grammarians prior to Harner (see below), considered “qualitative” nouns to be more or less equivalent to indefinite nouns. Recall, though, that Colwell studied only nouns which he had identified as definite based on the context - he did not study all nouns in the New Testament. Thus, some scholars have questioned Colwell’s further application of his rule: Loosely speaking, this study may be said to have increased the definiteness of a predicate noun before the verb without the article, and to have decreased the definiteness of a predicate noun after the verb without the article. The opening verse of John’s Gospel contains one of the many passages where this rule suggests the translation of a predicate as a definite noun. Kai qeoV hn`o logoV looks much more like “And the Word was God” than “And the Word was divine” when viewed with reference to this rule. The absence of the article does not make the predicate indefinite or qualitative when it precedes the verb; it is indefinite in this position only when the context demands it.

The context makes no such demand in the Gospel of John, for this statement cannot be regarded as strange in the prologue of the gospel which reaches its climax in the confession of Thomas (IBID <>, p. 21). Based on his data gathered from known definite nouns, Colwell extrapolated that more or less the same statistical balance would prove true with nouns that were exegetically questionable.

As we shall see below, subsequent studies have called this extrapolation into question, particularly those that emphasize qualitativeness as a semantic force independent of definiteness or indefiniteness. At the same time, the vast majority of commentators (e.g., Carson <>) and some grammarians (e.g., Metzger) have accepted Colwell’s conclusions regarding John 1:1, as has at least one major study (see Lane McGaughy, below). As with their earlier counterparts, these more recent scholars do not perceive definiteness as requiring convertibility, but rather emphasize that the nature of THEOS is ascribed to the Word: “The ‘Word does not Himself make up the entire Godhead; nevertheless the divinity that belongs to the rest of the Godhead belongs also to Him’” (Tasker, The Gospel According to St. John, p. 45, quoted in Carson <>, p. 117). They are thus not far semantically or exegetically from those who argue for a qualitative or qualitative-definite semantic force for THEOS in 1:1c. Maximilian Zerwick Zerwick’s introductory grammar <> first appeared in Latin in 1944.

A revised and expanded edition was published in 1960, and an English translation with further additions followed three years later. Zerwick admits that Colwell has presented “not a few persuasive examples” that definite nouns preceding the verb usually appear without the article, but he cautions: “[Colwell’s] theory has its appeal, but it is not easy to admit that the reason for this use of the article it to be found in a circumstance (order of words) which seems to belong to an altogether different category’ (Zerwick <>, p. 56), Zerwick echoes other grammarians in viewing nouns without the article as being primarily qualitative: The omission of the article shows that the speaker regards the person or thing not so much as this or that person or thing, but rather as such a person or thing, i.e. regards not the individual but rather nature or quality. (Zerwick <>, p. 55, emphasis in original).

Zerwick conflates qualitative and indefinite nouns into a single category and places THEOS in John 1:1c in that category: for in the nature of things, the predicate commonly refers not to an individual or individuals as such, but to the class to which the subject belongs, to the nature or quality predicated of the subject; e.g. Jo 1,1 kai qeoV hn`o logoV, which attributes to the Word the divine nature (IBID <>). In fact, this one mention of “class” is the only time Zerwick may be inferred to understand indefiniteness to be present in an anarthrous <> noun at all. His entire discussion of the non-use of the article centers on the qualitative aspects ascribed to the subject. Thus, for Zerwick, nouns are either definite or qualitative, and membership in a class is secondary to the attributes, characteristics, or qualities ascribed to the subject when the author omits the article. Blass, Debrunner, and Funk The Blass and Debrunner grammar, translated and revised by Robert Funk, generally endorses Colwell’s study, but notes: “[Colwell] deals only with sentences in which the verb appears and only with nouns which are unambiguously definite” (BDF <>, p. 143).

The latter point will be developed in greater detail by Dixon (see below) with regard to the application of Colwell’s Rule and John 1:1c. Blass and Debrunner have little to say about predicate nouns which lack the article, but in reference to Mark 7:15 remark: “the idea which runs through the whole discourse is that there really is something which produces this effect, and this given category is now referred to a particular subject” (IBID).

Thus, it may be inferred that Blass and Debrunner view anarthrous <> nouns in much the same was as Zerwick, primarily ascribing qualities or characteristics to the subject rather than membership in a class (the category itself is “referred” to the subject - the subject is not said to be placed in the category). Lane McGaughy McGaughy’s published dissertation <> on the use of the Greek verb EINAI (“to be”) has been widely recognized for its thoroughness. McGaughy examines Colwell’s statistics and finds several of the “exceptions” to his rule that Colwell noted are, in fact, not exceptions at all. Thus several scholars have recognized McGaughy as supporting Colwell’s conclusion that THEOS in John 1:1c is definite (e.g., Carson <>, p. 137) or has even given it greater weight . McGaughy says that John 1:1 “should be translated ‘And the Word was God’ rather than ‘And the Word was divine’” (McGaughy <>, p. 77). He cites Zerwick approvingly: “A noun preceding the verb and lacking the article should not be regarded as ‘qualitative’ on the mere grounds of the absence of the article” (IBID <>).

Interestingly, McGaughy has not, to my knowledge, addressed Harner’s article (which appeared one year after McGaughy’s study), which distinguishes between a qualitative meaning and the weaker adjectival “divine” which McGaughy argues against. Phillip B.

Harner The impact of Phillip B. Harner’s study <> of qualitative anarthrous predicate nouns on the interpretation of John 1:1 cannot be overemphasized. Harner noted that “Colwell was almost entirely concerned with the question whether anarthrous predicate nouns were definite or indefinite, and he did not discuss at any length the problem of their qualitative significance” (Harner <>, p. 76). Again, Colwell, like most older grammarians, saw qualitative nouns as more or less the same as indefinite nouns. Harner argues that qualitativeness should be considered a semantic force in its own right: This study will suggest that anarthrous predicate nouns preceding the verb may function primarily to express the nature or character of the subject, and this qualitative significance may be more important that the question whether the predicate noun itself should be regarded as definite or indefinite (IBID <>, p. 75). Harner says that qualitativeness may coexist with either a definite or indefinite semantic force.

Though not explicitly stated, a close reading also indicates that he believed qualitativeness may exist by itself. When considering Mark 12:35, Harner says, “the predicate noun could be interpreted as defininte, indefinite, or qualitative, depending on the particular meaning or emphasis which we understand the passage to have” (IBID <>, p. 79).

Harner found that 80% of anarthrous pre-verbal PNs in Mark and John are qualitative and 20% are definite. None are exclusively indefinite, which supports Colwell’s conclusion as well. Harner notes that some qualitative nouns, such as HAMARTΤLOS (“sinner”) in John 8:31, though best translated with the indefinite article due to English idiom, should actually be considered qualitative: Again the qualitative aspect of the predicate is most prominent; they [the Jews] think that Jesus has the nature or character of one who is “sinner.” There is no basis for regarding the predicate as definite, although in this instance we would probably use the indefinite article in English translation (IBID <>, p. 83). Harner stresses that when considering whether a pre-verbal predicate noun is definite, indefinite, or qualitative, it is important to consider how the writer might have expressed his intentions using another, and possibly less ambiguous, syntax as well as what he actually wrote. Thus, with John 1:1c, Harner notes the following possibilities: A. hO LOGOS ΚN hO THEOS B. THEOS ΚN hO LOGOS C. hO LOGOS THEOS ΚN D. hO LOGOS ΚN THEOS E. hO LOGOS ΚN THEIOS Clause A, with an arthrous <> predicate, would mean that logos and theos are equivalent and interchangeable.

There would be no ho theos which is not also ho logos. But this equation of the two would contradict the preceding clause of 1:1, in which John writes that`o logoV hn proV ton qeon.

This clause suggests relationship, and thus some form of “personal” differentiation, between the two (IBID <>, p. 84-85). So, Harner, in agreement with Robertson, Dana & Mantey, and most other scholars cited above, notes that if both THEOS and LOGOS were articular, the two terms would be convertible. Since John did not use this syntax, his intended meaning must be something else. Harner continues: Clause D, with the verb preceding an anarthrous predicate, would probably mean that the logos was “a god” or a divine being of some kind, belonging to the general category of theos but as a distinct being from ho theos. Clause E would be an attenuated form of D. It would mean that the logos was “divine,” without specifying further in what way or to what extent it was divine.

It could also imply that the logos, being only theios, was subordinate to theos (IBID <>). Thus, Harner notes that had John wished to express the idea that the LOGOS was “a god,” or a divine being distinct from hO THEOS, he had at least two unambiguous ways of doing so.

Since he did not, we may conclude that John in all likelihood chose the syntax he did because he wished to express something else with regard to the LOGOS. Clauses B and C, with an anarthrous predicate preceding the verb, are primarily qualitative in meaning. They indicate that the logos has the nature of theos. There is no basis for regarding the predicate theos as definite. This would make B and C equivalent to A, and like A they would then contradict the preceding clause of 1:1 (IBID <>). Note here that Harner equates a definite semantic force in a pre-verbal PN without the article to an articular noun.

He sees both forms as examples of a convertible proposition. This is the major point of contention between scholars who regard THEOS in 1:1c as definite as opposed to those who see it as qualitative.

Scholars on both sides interpret this clause in more or less the same way, as Harner himself notes: “In many cases their [commentators’] interpretations agree with the explanation that is given above” (IBID <>). Those who agree with Harner reject a definite force because they view it as semantically the same as a convertible proposition, which would present problems with regard to the previous clause (1:1b). Those who view THEOS as definite believe the absence of the article precludes the the possibility of convertibility. Yet both generally agree that the meaning of 1:1c is as Harner himself translates it: “The Word had the same nature as God” (IBID <>, p. 87). Harner continues: As John has just spoken in terms of relationship and differentiation between ho logos and ho theos, he would imply in B or C that they share the same nature as belonging to the reality theos. Clauses B and C are identical in meaning but differ slightly in emphasis.

C would mean that the logos (rather than something else) had the nature of theos. B means that the logos had the nature of theos (rather than something else).

In this clause, the form that John actually uses, the word theos is placed at the beginning for emphasis (IBID <>, p. 85). Thus, Harner says that not only is John attributing the nature of THEOS to the LOGOS, but emphasizes that nature by placing THEOS at the head of the clause. The emphasis of THEOS would seem unaccountable if John intended an indefinite nuance, but is perfectly understandable if THEOS is qualitative, signifying that the Son’s nature is that of God. Paul Dixon Dixon’s study <> is the first of several to challenge the popular application of Colwell’s rule. Dixon notes that Colwell’s data begins with definite PNs and demonstrates that these usually lack the article. However, those using the rule to “prove” that THEOS in John 1:1c is definite (including Colwell himself!) are not actually citing Colwell’s rule, but it’s converse: The rule does not say: an anarthrous <> predicate nominative which precedes the verb is definite.

This is the converse of Colwell’s rule and as such is not a valid inference….from the statement “Definite predicate nominatives preceding the verb are anarthrous,” it is not valid to infer “Anarthrous predicate nominatives preceding the verb are definite” (Dixon <>, pp. 11-12). Colwell himself affirmed that the converse of the rule was as valid as the rule itself, and said that anarthrous <> pre-verbal PNs would normally be definite (Wallace <>, p. 259).

Like Harner, Dixon considers qualitativeness a semantic force in addition to definiteness and indefiniteness. While Harner says that qualitativeness may exist either independently or along with definiteness or indefiniteness, Dixon argues that only one of these three semantic forces is the author’s intended meaning in any given instance: The whole notion that a noun can have two or more simultaneous nuances as used in a particular context is rather like saying a word can have two or more simultaneous meanings when used in a particular context. There is no question that a word can have two or more meanings, but when it is actually used by an author it almost always has a particular meaning, unless he is intentionally employing a double entendre (perhaps like KEFALΚN in 1 Corinthians 11:5). Likewise, we can assume an author has a particular nuance of a noun being used and is not intentionally being ambiguous so as to confuse the reader (Dixon, message posted on b-greek discussion list on the Internet, Friday, March 2, 2001). Dixon’s statistical methodology, unlike Colwells’, was to begin with anarthrous <> PNs (as opposed to only examining those PNs which were definite), and determine the semantic force of each. His statistical analysis substantiates Harner’s findings: “When the anarthrous <> predicate nominative precedes the verb it is qualitative in 50 of 53 occurrences, or 94% probability” (Dixon <>).

Dixon concludes: We may conclude three things about John 1:1. First, Colwell’s rule cannot be applied to the verse as an argument for definiteness.

Colwell’s rule says that definite predicate nominatives preceding the verb usually are anarthrous. The rule says nothing about definiteness. It does not say that anarthrous predicate nominatives preceding the verb usually are definite. This is the converse of the rule, and as such is not necessarily valid. Indeed, our thesis demonstrates just the opposite, that anarthrous predicate nominatives preceding the verb usually are qualitative, 94% of occurrences. Second, on the basis of the contrast with 1:14 (where the humanity of Christ is stressed), we conclude that THEOS in 1:1c stresses quality. Third, this thesis demonstrates that the statistical probability for THEOS being qualitative, rather than definite or indefinite, is quite high, 94% (IBID <>). Daniel B.

Wallace In his intermediate Greek grammar <>, Wallace accepts Harner’s definition of the qualitative semantic force, and provides a number of examples outside of John 1:1. Wallace, like Harner, advocates qualitativeness as a separate semantic category, either coexisting alongside definite or indefinite semantic forces or existing by itself. Citing Harner and Dixon, Wallace concludes that THEOS in John 1:1 is qualitative, and finds the indefinite semantic force the least likely for preverbal predicate nominatives. Though Wallace says that “the Word was divine” may be an acceptable translation, this is only acceptable if we define “divine” in such a way that it is only applied to true Deity. The import of the qualitative force goes well beyond what we commonly would refer to as “divine” in contemporary usage: The idea of qualitative qeoV here is that the Word had all the attributes and qualities that “the God” (of 1:1b) had. In other words, he shared the essence of the Father, though they differed in person.

The construction the evangelist chose to express this idea was the most concise way he could have stated that the Word was God and yet was distinct from the Father (Wallace <>, p. 269, emphasis in original). Don Hartley One of the possible objections to Wallace’s advocacy of qualitativeness as by far the most likely semantic force (apart from a concurrent definite or indefinite nuance) is that most of the examples he provides are “mass” nouns.

Mass nouns are those that cannot be semantically indefinitized or pluralized (that is, that cannot be used with the indefinite article, and for which there is no plural form). “Flesh,” is a mass term - we would not say “a flesh,” nor “fleshes.” A “count” noun, on the other hand, is a noun that can be used with the indefinite article and for which there is a plural form. “Dog” is a count noun - we can say “a dog,” or “dogs.” Simply put, a count noun is something that can be counted; a mass term is one that cannot. We can count dogs but not flesh. Some have argued that mass terms differ dramatically from count terms in the semantic force they can convey (it is sometimes argued that count terms must always be definite or indefinite and that there is no such thing as a “qualitative count noun”).<> Because it is generally conceded that mass terms can exude a qualitative force, it has been argued that the statistical analyses of Harner and Dixon are weighed unfairly towards qualitative nouns, particularly when applying those statistics to THEOS, which is a count noun. Don Hartley, a student of Dan Wallace’s and research assistant on Wallace’s grammar <>, wrote his Master’s of Theology thesis at Dallas Theological Seminary on the topic of Colwell’s Construction and mass / count nouns. He also published a paper <> derived from his thesis. Hartley’s methodology is to examine every example of Colwell’s Construction in the Greek New Testament.

Hartley purposely leaves controversial or questionable nouns out of this sample. He then eliminates all factors that would unfairly weigh the sample towards one semantic force, such as mass terms.

He carefully identifies all potential semantic forces - following Wallace, Hartley advocates qualitativeness as either a standalone semantic force, or as one that can coexist alongside definite or indefinite forces. He notes that all mass terms exude a purely qualitative force (John 1:14, for example, does not teach that the Logos became The Flesh or a flesh, but rather “flesh,” signifying that all the Logos possesses all the qualities or attributes of “flesh”). He therefore concludes that qualitativeness is a valid semantic category apart from definiteness or indefiniteness, and argues that this force may be applied equally to mass or count terms. Hartley’s results demonstrate that in John’s Gospel, a preverbal PN is usually qualitative (56%), as opposed to definite (11%), indefninte (17%), or qualitative-indefinite (17%). He concludes that from the standpoint of pure statistical analysis, THEOS in John 1:1c is most likely qualitative: “Thus, Jesus is God in every sense the Father is” (Hartley <>, p. 40). Conclusion While the scholars we have considered have some differences with regard to the applicability of Colwell’s Rule to John 1:1c and the particular semantic force of THEOS in this clause, they are unanimous in regarding the proper understanding of John’s meaning: The Word has all the qualities, attributes, or nature of God, the same God referenced in the previous clause.

The absence of the article, all agree, is purposeful; John intends to remove any possibility of a convertible proposition. The definite article signifies a personal distinction, thus the Person of God is in view in John 1:1b.

The absence of the article signifies that the nature or essence of God is in view in 1:1c. John is not teaching that the Logos is the same Person as the Father. Nor, do the scholars believe, is John teaching that the Logos is a second god. All agree that the indefinite semantic force is unlikely. It is my view that those who argue that the definite semantic force would signify a convertible proposition have the best case. The purely qualitative nuance is well-attested in the Greek New Testament, as has been demonstrated by Harner, Dixon, Wallace, and Hartley.

The latter has demonstrated its application to both mass and count terms, and thus its application to THEOS in John 1:1c. It is important to note that even those scholars who maintain that THEOS is definite nevertheless argue that the significance of John’s words are virtually identical with those who argue for a qualitative nuance.

Based on the evidence presented here, we may confidently take John’s meaning as: “In the beginning of all creation, the Word was already in existence. The Word was intimately with God. And the Word was as to His essence, God.” _______________________________ Notes 1. This line of argument is addressed in the Jehovah’s Witness/John 1:1c section of Other Views Considered (below). It has been thoroughly debated <> by Don Hartley and Jehovah’s Witness apologist, Greg Stafford. I had a brief interaction <> with Greg Stafford on this subject as well. O t h e r V i e w s C o n s i d e r e dJehovah’s Witnesses John 1:1a <> John 1:1b <> John 1:1c <> Bible Students John 1:1a <> F u r t h e r R e a d i n gArticles The New World Translation and John 1:1: What the Scholars Really Said <> Robert Hommel Jesus as “a god” Alongside God: JWs and John 1:1 <> Sam Shamoun Theos is a Count Noun: Is the Word “God” or “a god” in John 1:1c <> Robert Hommel Dialogs Don Hartley and Greg Stafford on Mass / Count Nouns and John 1:1 <> Robert and Jason BeDuhn on John 1:1 and the New World Translation <> Robert and Greg Stafford on John 1:1 and Mass-Count Nouns <> Robert and Kevin on Qualitative “Count” Nouns in the Greek New Testament <>

John 1:18

The Apologists Bible Commentary

John 1

18No one has ever seen God, but God the One and Only, who is at the Father’s side, has made him known (NIV).

C o m m e n t a r yJohn 1:18 presents some interesting challenges for the translator and exegete. The issues surround the phrase rendered in the NIV as “God the One and Only.” Other versions read as follows: NASB ESV KJ V ISV RSV NWT the only begotten God the Only God the only begotten Son the unique God the only Son the only-begotten god The theological stakes are high. Does this verse call Jesus the “only Son” or the “only God?” Is the Son an “only-begotten god” - a created secondary god alongside the “unbegotten” Father? Or is He the “only begotten Son” in a literal sense - begotten by a union of the Father and Mary? The exegetical issues may be categorized as those dealing with whether Jesus is called “Son or God” (a textual issue) and how this title is modified or amplified (an issue of translation). Only Son or Only God?

The initial problem is a textual one. Of the thousands of early Greek New Testament manuscripts, there are four principal textual variants of this phrase.

We first need to establish which variant we believe represents the original text, then move from there into possible translations of that text. The four variants (in transliterated Greek) are: 1. ho monogenκs (The Only One) 2. ho monogenκs huios (the only Son) 3. monogenκs theos (only God) 4. ho monogenκs theos (the only God) In the field of textual criticism, there are two fundamental criteria used to establish which text represents the original: External evidence and internal evidence. External evidence consists of examining the manuscripts containing the variants, collating them into “families” or so-called “text-types,” charting them to see which variant may be present in the earliest manuscripts, determining which variant has the greatest manuscript support in raw numbers, which is distributed across the largest number of text-types, etc. Next, the textual critic will see which variant best explains the others - that is, if we can demonstrate that an original monogenκs theos more easily was changed in the transmission process to ho monogenκs huios rather than the other way around, the former reading gains support as the possible original text. Only after the external evidence has been weighed - and only if it is found to not to be conclusive - will textual critics turn to internal evidence, such as immediate and larger context, authorial style and usage, etc. According to the majority of modern scholars (but by no means all), the external evidence favors monogenκs theos as the original text.

However, it must be noted that this reading exists primarily in the Alexandrian text-types. Textus Receptus - the manuscript tradition behind the KJV and many other Bibles - reads ho monogenκs huios.

This reading ranks second in terms of the number of manuscripts containing it, and has a wider distribution among text-types. Turning to internal evidence, ho monogenκs huios is consistent with John’s usage elsewhere and fits the immediate context (Son…Father) better than the other variants. Buchsel says monogenκs theos “can hardly be credited to J[oh]n, who is distinguished by monumental simplicity of expression” (TDNT, 4:740, note 14). Monogenκs theos is a so-called hapax legomenon - a rare one-time occurrence in the NT. Textual critics prefer readings that are not unique, unless compelled by external evidence otherwise. But, as Kurt Aland, has noted even strong internal evidence should never outweigh external evidence (Aland and Aland, The Text of the New Testament, p. 280).

Such is the case with John 1:18. A final consideration, which many scholars consider decisive, is that it is easier to explain a scribe - either by design or mistake - changing theos to huios, rather than the other way around.

The reading monogenκs theos is the more “difficult” reading, in that it does not occur elsewhere in the NT, and it directly attributes theos to Jesus. As William Barclay notes, “the more difficult reading is always the reading which is more likely to be the original” (Jesus As They Saw Him, p. 23). This is because a scribe would generally be inclined to “smooth out” difficult readings, rather than create them. Even if it were a simple scribal error, the sudden appearance of a “difficult reading” in the manuscript tradition would likely be corrected back to the normative text, whereas a sudden “smoothing” might remain in place and ultimately replace the original. On balance, monogenκs theos is represented in a great number of the earliest MSS, is prominent in the MSS that are considered to contain accurate texts, and is most probably what John actually wrote. Translating Monogenκs There are two significant difficulties the translator must resolve when rendering monogenκs in English: What does the word mean and does it function as an adjective or as a noun?

The first difficulty is complicated by a long tradition of translating monogenκs as “only-begotten.” This is the rendering found in most English Bibles prior to the 20th Century, most notably the King James. The rendering “only-begotten,” however, actually predates the Bible in English, going back to Jerome’s Latin Vulgate.

The Old Latin versions uniformly translated monogenκs as the Latin unicus (“only”). Jerome rendered monogenκs this way as well, when the word does not refer to Christ. However, in the six verses where it does, Jerome rendered it unigenitus (“only-begotten”). Jerome, probably following Gregory of Nazianzus (A.D. 329 - 390), sought to respond to the Arian claim that Christ was a created being by referring to the relationship of the Father to the Son as one of “generation” (the Father = gennetor [“begetter”]; the Son = gennema [“begotten”]). Following Origen, Gregory (and Jerome) understood the generation of the Son to be an eternal process, one which maintained the unity of the Son in Eternity with His Father, while preserving the Biblical distinction between the Two. This unfortunate (though perhaps well-intentioned) theological rendering of monogenκs influenced the King James translators, and they in turn, most English Bibles produced since then.

In the last century, however, scholars and translators have recognized that monogenκs is not related to the verb gennao (“begotten”), but to ginomai (“to be”). Thus, the Old Latin and Jerome (in the verses not referring to Jesus Christ) are correct to render monogenκs as unicus (“only”) - literally, “one of a kind” (see Grammatical Analysis <>, below, for further details).

And this practice has been followed by many modern versions, rendering it variously as “only,” “unique,” or “one and only.” Some scholars and translators, however, argue that monogenκs - when used of persons - carries the sense of an only offspring. Thus, translations such as the ESV, ISV and the RSV render monogenκs in John 1:14 and Hebrews 11:17 as “only Son,” even though it appears in these verses absolutely (that is, by itself, without an accompanying noun). The second difficulty is determining whether monogenκs functions as a noun or adjective in this verse. John uses monogenκs as a noun (or “substantive”) just four verses earlier. In John 1:14, monogenκs is a substantive, meaning: “only Son” or “only One.” But in three other verses (John 3:16, 18; 1 John 4:9), John uses monogenκs as an adjective modifying the noun “Son” (Greek: huios). It would seem, on the surface, that John 1:18 is most similar to the adjectival usage, with the word “God” taking the place of “Son” (Greek: monogenκs theos vs monogenκs huios).

In this case, monogenκs would modify “God” in John 1:18 the same way it does “Son” in John 3:18: “The only God” or “Only Son God.” But surface appearances do not always reveal the entire picture. In his three clear adjectival uses of monogenκs, John uses the article<>.

In the substantival use in John 1:14, he does not - nor does he does so in John 1:18. The lack of the article in John 1:18 suggests that monogenκs and theos may be understood as two substantives in apposition (“only Son, [who is] God”)<>. As Fennema puts it:: “Reading the terms individually, rather than as a unit, is consistent with the lack of an article to bind them together."<> McReynolds and Harris make the same point.<> Had John wished to use monogenκs unambiguously as an adjective, he could have written ho theos ho monogenκs. He could also have made the adjectival force far more likely by writing ho monogenκs theos. Instead, he wrote simply monogenκs theos, using monogenκs without the article as he does just four verses earlier, and with a writer of John’s evident skill, this certainly was intentional. Further, in John’s Gospel, there are 72 occurrences of nominative-masculine-singular adjectives (like monogenκs, in John 1:18), and only eight of them precede the noun.<> That’s an 8:1 ratio.

Let’s consider the eight. Three are terms which, to my knowledge, never occur substantivally in any context (“every,” 2:10; “large,” 6:5; “my,” 7:8).

That leaves five, one of which is monogenκs theos. The remaining four are all allos mathκtκs ("[the /an]other disciple,” 18:15; 20:3; 20:4; 20:8). All but one are articular. Conversely, John uses allos five times substantivally (4:37; 5:7, 32, 43; 15:24; 21:18). In all cases, allos is anarthrous. Considering John’s usage of nominative-masculine-singular adjectives that can be substantivized preceding a nominative-masculine-singular noun, we find: 1. John only fronts a noun with monogenκs once when he intends it to be adjectival, and it is articular in that case. 2. Excluding John 1:18, he uses the article 75% of the time when intending the adjectival meaning. 3.

Again, excluding John 1:18, in all cases when intending the substantival meaning, he uses the anarthrous construction. This is not to say that an attributive adjective must have the article.<> But these statistics suggests that John favors using the article with adjectives in the first attributive position, and therefore might intend a substantival meaning in the anarthrous monogenκs in John 1:18. When we look at John’s regular use of monogenκs elsewhere, and particularly in the immediate context (monogenκs is clearly used as a noun just four verses earlier), and consider the many clear examples of substantival use in Biblical and contemporary Greek texts,<> the evidence for a substantive reading is quite strong. Conclusion Monogenκs means “only” or “only child/son/offspring.” It can stand alone as it does in John 1:14 - “the only Son” - or it can be used adjectivally to modify a noun as it does in John 3:16 - “the only Son."<> In John 1:18, it can be viewed as a substantive (“The only one, “the Unique One”), a substantive absolute containing the idea of an only offspring (“the Only Son”), or adjectivally modifying theos (“the only God,” “the unique God”). Theos can also be taken both substantivally (“God”) or adjectivally (“divine”). Thus, the translator has a number of “legitimate” choices he or she can make that are true to the grammar.

How each ultimately chooses to render the passage depends an a host of factors. A number of prominent scholars prefer apposition to an adjectival rendering.<> Origen cites of John 1:18 in Contra Celsum 2.71: “kai monogenκs ge τn theos …,” which I would translate “the one and only [Son], being God…” McReynolds cites this as “a clear early witness as to how one should understand the reading monogenκs theos.“10 <> On the whole, I find the evidence presented by these scholars convincing.

I would render monogenκs theos as “the only Son, God.” However, an adjectival reading for monogenκs is also possible, yielding a translation similar to the ESV or ISV, “the one and only God.” G r a m m i t i c a l A n a l y s i s monogenhV qeoV � wn ton kolpon tou patroV ekeinoV exhghsato MONOGENΚS THEOS hO ΤN TON KOLPON TOU PATROS EKEINOS EXΚGΚSATO [The one and only God who is in the bosom of the father, [he] has explained [Him]. MONOGENΚS BAGD <>: “In the Johannine lit[erature] m[onogenκs] is used only of Jesus. The mngs. only, unique may be quite adequate for all its occurrences here…But some (e.g., WBauer, Hdb.) prefer to regard m[onogenκs] as somewhat heightened in mng. in J and 1J to only-begotten or begotten of the Only One.” (Bauer, it will be remembered, believed the Gospel of John was a gnostic text, and hence saw a theology behind John’s writing compatible with the creation of the Logos as a semi-divine intermediary between the Monas and the creation with which He could not directly interact). Louw & Nida <>: “Pertaining to what is unique in the sense of being the only one of the same kind or class - ‘unique, only.’” Moulton & Milligan <>: “Literally ‘one of a kind,’ ‘only,’ ‘unique’ (unicus), not ‘only-begotten….’” Grimm/Thayer <>: “Single of its kind, only, [A.V. only-begotten].” (Note that Thayer’s insertion merely cites the KJV translation, which owes considerable debt to the Vulgate of Jerome, who translated monogenκs “unigenitus”). NIDNTT <>: “The only begotten, or only….RSV and NEB render monogenκs as ‘only.’ This meaning is supported by R. E.

Brown, The Gospel According to John, Anchor Bible, I, 1966, 13 f., and D. Moody, “ God’s Only Son: The Translation of John 3:16 in the Revised Standard Version,” JBL 72, 1953, 213-19.

Lit. it means “ of a single kind,” and could even be used in this sense of the Phoenix (1 Clem. 25:2). It is only distantly related to gennao, beget. The idea of “ only begotten” goes back to Jerome who used unigenitus in the Vulg. to counter the Arian claim that Jesus was not begotten but made.” Newman <>: “Unique, only.” LSJ <>: “Only, single” (references John 1:14, the only NT verse cited). TDNT <> defines monogenκs as “only begotten,” but distinguishes between nouns ending in -genes and adverbs ending in -genκs. The former denote the source of the derivation, the latter the nature of the derivation. Thus, the author (Buchsel) concludes that monogenκs means “of sole descent.” But Pendrick argues strongly against this view: Buchsel’s claim that “in accordance with the strict meaning of genos, -genκs always denotes derivation” is contradicted both by the evidence of the aforementioned adjectives as well as by the fact that even in the earliest Greek literature genos occurs without the denotation of derivation.

On the other hand…monogenκs could be … interpreted rather as ‘only-born.’ (:Pendrick, “,” NTS, 41, pp. 587-588). Buchsel also calls “an only-begotten, one who is God:” “an exegetical invention [which] can hardly be credited of [John], who is distinguished by monumental simplicity of expression.” (TDNT 4 p. 740).

Buchsel makes this comment in a footnote, and doesn’t elaborate on his reasons for his conclusion. As far as I know, he has never in print provided a reason for this comment. Buchsel provides a list of his sources, but makes no reference to the Patristics. This is a rather striking omission, since the term is used over 100 times in Patristic writings. For Biblical and extra-Biblical uses of monogenκs as a substantive, see note <>, below. In any case, few modern scholars writing on monogenκs have agreed with Buchsel on this point. O t h e r V i e w s C o n s i d e r e d Jehovah’s Witnesses objection: The New World Translation (NWT) of Jehovah’s Witnesses renders John 1:18 as follows: No man has seen God at any time; the only-begotten god who is in the bosom [position] with the Father is the one that has explained him. (John 1:18 NWT). In defense of this translation, Jehovah’s Witness apologist Greg Stafford, citing Dahms, argues that monogenκs - at least in John’s usage, always means “only-begotten” (Stafford <>, pp. 356-357): We have examined all of the evidence which has come to our attention concerning the meaning of monogenκs in the Johannine writings and have found that the majority view of modern scholarship has very little support….‘Only-begotten’ is the most accurate translation after all (Dahms, “The Johannine Use of Monogenes Reconsidered,” NTS, 29, p. 231). Mr. Stafford acknowledges that Pendrick argues against Dahms on numerous points, and Mr. Stafford interacts with him and finds his counter-arguments unsatisfactory. I will address each of Mr.

Stafford’s objections to Pendrick in my Response, below. Regarding the meaning of monogenκs, Mr.

Stafford concludes: “In filial contexts where monogenκs is used of an offspring, the idea of generation seems always to be present, or at least implied, in the NT” (Stafford, pp. 357-358). Another Witness author, Rolf Furuli, is less dogmatic about the precise meaning of monogenκs, however he argues whether it means “unique,” “only-begotten,” or “uniquely derived,” It implies the generation/derivation of only one of its kind….the words of John 1:18, therefore, may imply that apart from the Father, others may be called “gods,” but of these only one is “the only-begotten/uniquely derived god.” (Furuli <>, p. 224). response: Mr. Stafford’s conclusion (that in the NT, when monogenκs is used of an offspring, “the idea of generation seems always to be present, or at least implied”) is overdrawn. Indeed, Mr. Stafford admits that in Luke, “either ‘only-begotten’ or ‘only’ is equally acceptable” (Stafford <>, p. 358, emphasis added). The implication Mr.

Stafford and Mr. Furuli find of generation may be explained by “the obvious and natural connection between ‘child’ and the notion of birth or derivation.“11 <> On other occasions, Mr.

Stafford argues that the meaning of a word in the NT should be informed by usage in the LXX.12 <> But in the case of monogenκs, Mr. Stafford does not consider the LXX at all, saying: “We are primarily concerned with usage…in the NT” (Stafford <> p. 358). Mr. Stafford’s reluctance may be due to the fact that, as Pendrick (citing Buchsel) notes: Monogenκs in the LXX means ‘only,’ ‘single’ … or ‘unique’ … or even ‘solitary’…reflecting the Hebrew yachid which it translates.“13 <> Pendrick argues that monogenκs in Hebrews 11:17 means “unique.” Mr. Stafford agrees that Pendrick’s argument is “possible,” but rejoins: “in human terms a child must have two parents, and Isaac was the only-begotten son of both Abraham and Sarah” (Stafford <>, p. 358). But, as Pendrick points out, “Isaac is there spoken of as Abraham’s son (the article ton has possessive force),“14 <> not Abraham and Sarah’s son.

The Genesis account refers to Isaac as Abraham’s “only” son (Hebrew: yachid in Genesis 22:2, 12, 16). While the LXX renders yachid as “beloved” (Greek: agapηtos), Aquila renders it as monogenκs in Genesis 22:2, as does Symmachus in Genesis 22:12.

As Richard Longenecker notes: “the fact that yachid can be translated by both monogenηs and agapηtos suggests something of the roughly synonymous notations associated with these two Greek words.“15 <>. Thus, there is really no basis for concluding that monogenκs in Hebrews means anything other than “only” or “only son.” Turning to John’s use of monogenκs, Pendrick argues that the adjective “emphasizes Jesus’ unique status as the only son of God.“16 <> Mr. Stafford responds: “But Jesus is not God’s only son! (Stafford <>, p. 359).” Stafford suggests that the translation “unique Son” calls into question how Jesus is unique, and concludes: “Only-begotten is the only [translation] that answers this question and at the same time remains true to the Biblical teaching that God does have other sons” (Ibid). Pendrick’s argument is substantially more nuanced than Mr. Stafford implies. Pendrick points to support for his view in the “leitmotif which runs through the whole of John’s Gospel,” namely: The uniqueness of Jesus - of his relation to the Father, of his mission and of the revelation which he offers….Monogenκs here emphasizes that as God’s only son, Jesus is the only source of revelation about the Father.17 <> While others may be called God’s sons in the Bible, there are many ways in which God’s Son is unique - and, as Pendrick correctly notes, one of the major themes in John’s Gospel is to explain the various ways in which Jesus is the Son of God (John 20:32).

Further, Pendrick anticipates the argument raised by Mr. Stafford as follows: Parallel to the Johannine use of monogenκs to emphasize Jesus’ uniqueness is the careful terminological distinction maintained between Jesus as God’s ‘son’ (huios) and believers as God’s children (tekna).18 <> Thus Pendrick demonstrates how the translation “only” or “unique” fits perfectly with one of John’s main purposes in writing his Gospel, and Mr.

Stafford’s response fails to provide a convincing reason to think otherwise. Pendrick also argues that there is no undisputed use of “begotten” (Greek: gennaτ) for Jesus in John’s Gospel or letters.19 <> Mr. Stafford responds that 1 John 5:18 is a counter-example: 1 John 5:18b (NIV) the one who was born of God keeps him safe, and the evil one cannot harm him (the “one born of God” is Jesus Christ). Pendrick considers this example to be “uncertain.” In the first place, there is a major textual variant in this verse, reflected in translations based on Textus Receptus: 1 John 5:18b (ASV) but he that was begotten of God keepeth himself, and the evil one toucheth him not (the “one born of God” is the believer). The issue turns on who “the one born of God” is: Jesus or believers. If it is Jesus, argues Mr.

Stafford, “1 John 5:18 is referring to Jesus Christ, and therefore shows that the idea of Jesus’ ‘birth’ from God was well known to John” (Stafford <>, p. 360). Pendrick refers his readers to commentator and author Raymond Brown for “evidence and arguments” regarding the various ways this verse has been understood by scholars, and therefore of the “uncertainty” of its referent.

Mr. Stafford does not engage Brown’s arguments at all, instead apparently thinking that if he can demonstrate that the variant “him” (Greek: auton) is more likely than “himself” (Greek: heauton), he has successfully rebutted Pendrick. Let’s consider Mr. Stafford’s arguments in order, supplying counterpoints from Brown and others, as necessary. First, Mr. Stafford acknowledges that the variant “himself” occurs in a number of manuscripts, but “him” (Greek: auton) is the preferred reading, citing Metzger <>.

Metzger and the UBS Translation Committee rated auton as a \ variant (“almost certain”), but the reading “himself” is very widely exampled. It exists in: Codex Sinaiticus, the corrector of Alexandrinus, the Byzantine tradition, the Peshitta, Sahidic, Armenian, and by Origen, Epiphanius, Didymus, Theophylact and the critical version of Merk, Vogels, and von Soden.20 <> It appears the UBS Committee did not give “him” an \ rating due to this wide range of witnesses reading “himself.” But the textual variant tells only part of the story.

Even if one regards auton as the “almost certain” variant, this does not preclude the understanding that believers are the ones “born of God.” Indeed, auton may be used as a reflexive21 <>, and - as Brown notes - this was the interpretation of many Greek church fathers.22 <> Thus, we must turn to internal evidence to determine just how likely it is that John here uses “begotten” of Jesus. This brings us to Mr. Stafford’s second argument; namely that that if “himself” is the preferred reading, “we have a case where the believer who is spiritually ‘born’ from God ‘protects himself’” (Stafford <>, p. 360). Mr. Stafford apparently believes that because elsewhere, (John 17:15 and 2 Thessalonians 3:3) it is God that protects sinners, this meaning is unlikely. However, it should be noted that the all translations of the Bible based on Textus Receptus (including the KJV, ASV, and RSV) read “himself,” and yet no commentators using these versions found this reading to be theologically difficult.

John Gill provides a typical example: keepeth himself; not that any man can keep himself by his own power and strength; otherwise what mean the petitions of the saints to God that he would keep them, and even of Christ himself to God for them on the same account? God only is the keeper of his people, and they are only kept in safety whom he keeps, and it is by his power they are kept; but the sense is, that a believer defends himself by taking to him the whole armour of God, and especially the shield of faith, against the corruptions of his own heart, the snares of the world, and particularly the temptations of Satan (Gill <>).

Further, modern scholars such as Raymond Brown who argue for “himself” as either the preferred textual variant or the preferred meaning have also had no trouble reconciling the sense of this verse with the Bible’s teaching. Indeed, Brown notes that John himself speaks of Christians as “overcoming” the Evil One in 1 John 2:13-14.23 <> It would seem, then, that Pendrick’s assertion that Jesus is never indisputably described by John as “begotten” is confirmed by the evidence. While it is possible that John uses “begotten” of Christ in this verse, it is not certain enough upon which to base a lexical decision. As Brown notes: I find it hard to believe that if the Johannine writers thought that Jesus had been begotten by God, they would never elsewhere have used that language in the many passages on the subject.24 <> In conclusion, Mr. Stafford’s objections to Pendrick have not proven at all convincing. On the whole, the meaning of monogenκs is very well established: It means “only” or “unique,” and may well carry the sense of an “only child” or “only offspring.” objection: Mr.

Stafford considers the translation “only-begotten god” to be “lethal” to the Trinity: The reference to the Word as the “only-begotten god” shows that he is not the same God as the Father, nor His equal. Justin evidently understood this, for he argued: “There is, and there is said to be another God…and Lord subject to the Maker of all things.” (Stafford <>, p. 361). response: If this reading is so fatal to the Trinity, it is odd that John 1:18 was never a disputed text during the Arian controversy, being used equally by both sides.

As Ezra Abbot explains: Though monogenhs qeos may sound strangely to us, it was not a strange or harsh expression to copyists of the third, fourth, and fifth centuries. On the contrary, it was, as we have seen, a favorite phrase with many writers of this period, being used with equal freedom by the Arians and their opponents.25 <> It will be noted that Dr. Abbot was a Unitarian scholar of considerable note. Indeed, Mr. Stafford refers favorably to Abbot’s work on several occasions (e.g., Romans 9:5 <>). If anyone should have noticed the deadliness of this reading to the Trinity, it would be Dr. Abbot.26 <> As for Mr. Stafford’s reference to Justin Martyr, it would be a mistake to read later Arian thought back into Justin’s words.

Justin’s term “second God” occurs in his dialog with Trypho, a Jew. Justin is trying to demonstrate to a devout monotheist that there is another Person in the Bible who is called the true “God.” He does so by citing various theophanies in the OT (Dialog with Trypho, 56), by citing passages in which two “Gods” appear in the OT (Ibid., 58, 60, 126), as well as evidence from the NT, such as Hebrews 1:8 in which the Father calls the Son “God” (Ibid., 56). It must be noted that in each of these references, the implicit meaning is that the Logos is truly God - distinct from the Father and subordinate to Him, yet essentially one with Him as well. This meaning becomes explicit when Justin discusses passages in which “Lord” (YHWH) is ascribed to “two Gods:” It must be admitted absolutely that some other one is called Lord by the Holy Spirit besides Him who is considered Maker of all things (Ibid., emphasis added).27 <> objection: Mr.Furuli argues against reading monogenκs theos as two substantives in apposition (e.g., “The only [child], who is God”): Any adjective can be sustantivized but there is no example of this in the NT when it immediately precedes a noun in the same gender, number, and case (Furuli <>, p. 223). In support of this argument, Mr. Furuli cites textual scholar Bart Ehrman.28 <> Dr.

Ehrman concludes: “To the best of my knowledge, no one has cited anything analogous outside this passage.” response: It will first be noted that while adjectives normally agree in gender, number, and case with the nouns they modify, this is also true of two substantives in apposition. More importantly, there are a number of examples in the NT of substantivized adjectives preceding nouns of the same gender, number, and case.

Here are just two examples: Mat. 13:28: Echthros Anthropos Echthros is tagged by Friberg as Adj-Nom-Masc-Sing; Anthropos is tagged Noun-Nom-Masc-Sing. These are exactly the same tags as monogenes theos in John 1:18. BAGD defines echthros as an adjective in this verse, but: “the position of e before a suggests that e is an adjective here, but a by itself could also serve to emphasize the uncertainly…then this example would belong to b” (b is the substantival definition). Vine defines echthros as an adjective but “used as a noun” in this verse. Thayer translates the phrase in this verse: “a man that is hostile, a certain enemy.” NWT: “an enemy, a man” Darby: “a man [that is] an enemy” YLT: “a man, an enemy.” Acts 2:5: Ioudaioi andpes (eulabeis) Ioudaioi is tagged by Friberg as Adj-Pronomial-Nom-Masc-Sing; andpes is tagged Noun-Nom-Masc-Sing NWT: “Jews, reverent men” Darby: “Jews, pious men” YLT: “Jews, devout men” If Ehrman were correct, Ioudaioi would have to modify andpes, hence “Jewish men.” While some translations render Ioudaioi as an adjective, the New World Translation, which Furuli is defending, takes it as a substantive in apposition to andpes. These examples can be multiplied.

Greek scholar Daniel Wallace has written an article doing exactly that, which you can find here <>. To my knowledge, Dr.

Ehrman has not responded. Thus, Dr. Ehrman’s assertion is not borne out by the evidence. There is no grammatical reason why monogenκs theos cannot be be understood as two substantives in apposition. As noted in the Commentary, above, Origen understood it this way, as have a number of modern Greek grammarians and commentators. Notes. 1.

John 3:18 has the article and adjective in what Greek grammarians call the first attributive position (article+adjective+ noun): tou monogenous huiou in John 3:18 John 3:16 and 1 John 4:9 have the article and adjective in the second attributive position (article+noun+article+ adjective): John 3:16: ton huion ton monogenκ 1 John 4:9: ton huion autou ton monogenκ 2. An appositional substantive further defines the head-noun, as in: “This is my friend, Roger.” We may use the gloss “who is” to help identify appositional nouns (e.g., “This is my friend, who is Roger”). 3.

D.A. Fennema, “John 1:18”, NTS 31, p. 128. 4. Paul R. McReynolds, “John 1:18 in Textual Variation and Translation,” in New Testament Textual Criticism: Its Significance for Exegesis: Essays in Honor of Bruce M. Metzger, Epp and Fee, eds, 1981, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981, p. 106; Harris <>, p. 91. 5. These statistics were derived from an analytical search of the Greek New Testament using Quickverse Greek Edition, which utilizes the Friberg morphological tagging system. 6. “Adjectives and particles may be attributive when no article is used” (Robertson <>, p. 656).

Robertson cites John 1:18 as an example, but says just two sentences before: “The attribute may be substantive in apposition with another substantive.” 7. In Biblical usage, monogenκs appears as an absolute ten times (LXX: Judges 11:34, Psalms 21:20; 24:16; 34:17, Tobit 3:15; 6:14; Wisdom 7:22; NT [excluding John 1:18]: Luke 9:38, John 1:14, Hebrews 11:17.

Lampe lists eleven examples of monogenκs used absolutely in his Patristic Greek Lexicon. In The Martyrdom of Polycarp, section 20:2, we find a substantival use (tou monogenous iesou christou) which the Lightfoot/Harmer/Holmes translation renders “the only begotten Son, Jesus Christ (Holmes, The Apostolic Fathers, p. 242-243). 8. It may be asked why, if monogenκs contains in itself the meaning “only child” or “only son,” it modifies huios in John 3:16, 18, and 1 John 4:9? The NT is replete with examples of ‘doubled’ word pairs. For example: Eiserchomai eis occurs over 80 times in the NT. Erchomai eis occurs 70 times.

Both mean ‘come into,’ but eiserchomai also means “come into” when used absolutely (c.f., Matthew 8:5). However, we do not translate eiserchomai eis as ‘come into-into.” The doubling may simply be to make the gender of the “only child” explicit, or to provide emphasis. 9.

E.g., Burton, du Plessis, de Kruijf, Finegan, Theobald, Fennema, Beasley-Murray, Carson, McReynolds, BAGD, Westcott, R.E. Brown, William Loader, Feuillet, Lagrange, Cullmann, Lindars, E.A. Abbott, Barnard, Rahner, J.A.T. Robinson, W.F. Howard, and the translators of the NIV and ESV. 10. McReynolds, p. 108. 11. Gerard Pendrick, “,” NTS, 41, p. 590. 12. E.g., Stafford <> proskyneo (pp. 206-207); prτtotokos (p. 217-218); archη (p. 239 n 119). 13.

Pendrick, p. 592. BDB <> defines yachid as: only, only one, solitary. The TWOT <> lists “only-begotten” as a possible gloss for yachid, not on the basis of any inherent meaning in the Hebrew, but because it is sometimes rendered in the LXX as monogenκs. But they add: “It must be pointed out, however, that even monogenκs may “be used more generally without reference to its etymological derivation in the sense of ‘unique’, ‘unparalleled,’ ‘incomparable,’ " (They are here quoting the TDNT <> entry for monogenκs). 14. Pendrick, p. 593, emphasis in original. For the article used as a possessive pronoun, see Robertson <>, p. 684; Wallace <>, pp. 215-216.

Pendrick here is responding to Dahms, who argues that monogenηs means “only-begotten” in Hebrews 11:17 on slightly different grounds than Mr. Stafford.

Pendrick argues convincingly that Dahms’ appeals to Targum Pseudo-Jonathan and Philo do not support his position. Ellingworth, in his Commentary on the Greek text of Hebrews, notes that the chiastic structure of this verse concentrates “attention on Abraham, and thus prepare for the development in vv. 18-19” (Ellingworth <>, p. 600). 15. Richard Longenecker, “The One and Only Son <>”. Longenecker concludes his study: “in Johannine usage monogenηs is an adjective connoting quality, which should be translated in a manner signaling primarily uniqueness.” 16. Pendrick, p. 595. 17. Ibid.

Pendrick cites Raymond Brown: “It is the unique relation of the Son to the Father, so unique that John can speak of ‘God the only Son,’ that makes his revelation the supreme revelation” (Brown, The Gospel of John, p. 36). He could, of course, have cited numerous other commentators who have drawn this same conclusion, e.g., Beasley-Murray, John, pp. 15-16; Westcott, The Gospel According to St.

John, p. 15; Carson, The Gospel According to John, p. 135. 18. Pendrick, p. 595 note 43. 19. “There is no certain reference to Jesus as ‘begotten’ in Johannine texts; rather, it is Christians or believers who are repeatedly characterized as ‘begotten by God’” (Pendrick, p. 596). 20. Raymond Brown, The Epistles of John, p. 621. 21. BDF <>, 283. 22. Brown, p. 621. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid, p. 622. 25. Ezra Abbot, “On the Reading ‘Only-Begotten God’ in John 1:18: With Particular Reference to the Statements of Dr.

Tragelles,” in Thayer, JH, ed., Authorship of the Fourth Gospel and Other Critical Essays, George H. Ellis Publishers: 1888. 26. Mr. Stafford’s point also seems to have eluded commentators on John’s Gospel (e.g., Ridderbos, Carson, Beasely-Murray, Westcott, Robertson) and the NASB translators. 27. For more information on the Christology of Justin and other early Church Fathers often quoted by the Watchtower and its apologists, see Were Early Christians Trinitarians? <> 28. Bart D. Ehrman, The Orthodox Corruption of Scripture, London: Oxford Press, 1996 p. 81 (Furuli cites page 80 of the 1993 edition). Greg Stafford makes the same argument (Stafford <>, p. 359) without citing Ehrman or Furuli. F u r t h e r R e a d i n gArticles The Text and Grammar of John 1:18 <> Dan Wallace The One and Only Son <> Richard Longenecker