James 3

James 3:1-99

Chap. 3 a. 1-12. The danger, as connected with the upholding of faith without works, of eagerness to teach: and, by occasion, the manifold and irrepressible sins of the tongue. Then follows, b. 13-18. an exhortation, to prove a man’ s wisdom by mildness, not by a contentious spirit.

1. The more the idea prevailed, that faith, without corresponding obedience, was all that is needful, the more men would eagerly press forward to teach: as indeed the Church has found in all ages when such an opinion has become prevalent: for then teachers and preachers of their own appointing have rapidly multiplied. Be not (‘ become not:’ let not that state of things prevail among you in which you become) many teachers (πολλοί belongs not to the predicate, as Schueckenb. al., so that πολλοὶγίνεσθαι should = multiplicari: nor does it mean “ nimii in docendo,” as Baumgarten: nor = πάντες , as Grotius: but is to be taken with διδάσκαλοι , and in its proper meaning. And διδάσκαλοι is not, as E.V., “ masters,” which conveys a wrong idea: but teachers, persons imparting knowledge in the congregation. This in the primitive times might be done by all in turn, as we know from 1 Corinthians 14:26-33: and St. James exhorts against the too eager and too general assumption of this privilege), my brethren, knowing that we (i. e. as many of us as are teachers) shall receive greater condemnation .

2. For (see above: this supplies the ellipsis) oftentimes (adverbial: see reff. and Winer, § 54. 1) we all offend (πταίω , cognate with πίπτω , πέπτωκα , πτῶσις , see Buttmann, Lexil. i. p. 295, to stumble, fall: cf. the proverb, μὴδὶςπρὸςτὸναὐτὸνλίθονπταίειν : hence figuratively, to err or offend morally. The present assertion is to be taken in the widest moral sense, as an axiom applying to our whole conduct. It is in the next clause limited to the subject in hand, viz. the tongue): if any man (see ch. 1:5, 23, 26) offendeth not (is void of offence: οὐ , because the negative belongs, not subjectively to the hypothesis, but objectively to the fact included within the hypothesis) in word (in speaking: and therefore the hypothesis is applicable to these many who set up for teachers, seeing that thus their chances of offence would be multiplied many fold), he (is) a perfect man (explained by what follows), able to bridle the whole body also (I cannot see the force of De Wette’ s objections against the general sense of the πολλὰπταίομενἅπαντες . The sense surely runs well thus: We all oftentimes offend: and of those frequent offences, sins of the tongue are so weighty a part and so constant a cause, that he who is free from them may be said to be perfect, inasmuch as he is able to rule every other minor cause of offence: ‘ the whole body’ standing for all those other members by which, as by the tongue, sin may be committed: which may be ὅπλαἀδικίαςτῇἁμαρτίᾳ or ὅπλαδικαιοσύνηςτῷθεῷ , Romans 6:13).

3-6. The importance and depravity of the tongue, so small a member, is illustrated by comparisons: 1. with the small instrument, the horse-bit, ver. 3:2. with the small instrument, the ship-rudder, ver. 4:3. with a small fire burning a great forest, vv. 5, 6.

3. This mention of χαλιναγωγῆσαι , and the situation of the tongue where the χαλινός also is placed, introduce this similitude: which circumstances will also account for τῶνἵππων standing first and emphatic, χαλινός and στόμα being ideas already given by the context. But (transitional) if of horses we put (so χαλινὸνἵππῳἐμβάλλειν , Æ lian V. H. ix. 16) bits (τούς , which are in common use: the bits, of which every one knows) into the mouths, in order to their obeying us (thus shewing, by the expression of this purpose, that we recognize the principle of turning the whole body by the tongue),— (now comes the apodosis after the εἰ : see below) we turn about also (in turning the bit one way or the other) their whole body .

4. The second comparison takes up, not the protasis with its εἰδέ , but only the apodosis foregoing. Behold, even (or also) the ships, though so great (the participle carries a slightly ratiocinative force, illative or exceptive according to the circumstances), and driven by fierce (see reff.: and cf. Æ lian de Animal, v. 13, σκληρὸνπνεῦμα : and Hist. Var. ix. 14, ἵναμὴἀνατρέπηταιὑπὸτῶνἀνέμων , εἴποτεσκληροὶκατέπνεον . See other citations in Wetst.) winds ( interprets this as having a meaning respecting ourselves: “ Naves magnæ in mari, mentes sunt hominum in hac vita, sive bonorum sive malorum. Venti validi, a quibus minantur (?), ipsi appetitus sunt mentium, quibus naturaliter coguntur aliquld agere” &c.

But it is not likely that the Apostle had any such meaning), are turned about by a very small rudder, whither-soever the desire of the steersman (him who actually handles the tiller) may wish. The same thought occurs in Aristot. Quæ st Mechan. 5, τὸπηδάλιον , μικρὸνὄν , καὶἐπ ʼ ἐσχάτῳτῷπλοίῳ , τοσαύτηνδύναμινἔχει , ὥστεὑπὸμικροῦοἴακος , καὶἑνὸςἀνθρώπουδυνάμεως , καὶταύτηςἠρεμαίας , μεγάλακινεῖσθαιμεγέθηπλοίων . Philo, In Flacc. 5, vol. ii. p. 521, joins the two ideas together, ἐμπειροτάτουςκυβερνήτας , οἳκαθάπερἀθλητὰςἵππουςἡνιοχοῦσιν , ἀπλανῆπαρέχονταςτὸνἐπ ʼ εὐθείαςδρόμον . Cf. also Lucret. iv. 899, and other examples in Wetst.

5. Application of the comparison. Thus also the tongue is a little member, and boasteth great things is interpreted by Œ c., μεγάλαἐργάζεται , and so Thl., Calv., De Wette, al., in the Homeric sense of εὔχεταιεἶναι . But Huther well observes that there is no need for thus forcing the word out of its ordinary meaning, for the deeds of the tongue follow. This μεγάλααὐχεῖ is the method which it uses to accomplish its deed; it vaunts great words which bring about great acts of mischief). Behold, how small (ἡλίκος is ‘ quantulus’ as well as ‘ quantus,’ e. g. in Lucian, Hermot. 5, παπαί , ὦἙρμότιμε , ἡλίκουςἡμᾶςἀποφαίνεις , οὐδὲκατὰτοὺςπυγμαίουςἐκείνους , ἀλλὰχαμαιπετεῖςπαντάπασινἐνχρῷτῆςγῆς .

De Wette however understands it here “ how great,” and thinks that not the smallness of the first spark, but the greatness of the fire in its ultimate extent, is intended. Against this, as Wiesinger and Huther observe, is ἀνάπτει , which can hardly mean ‘ consumes,’ but must be said of the first lighting up.

Seneca has the very similar words, “ quam lenibus initiis quanta incendia oriantur,” Contr. v. 5) a fire kindleth how great a forest (ὕλη is taken by some Commentators to mean “ materia, lignorum congeries,” as in ref. Sir. So Jerome on Isaiah 66:15, Isaiah 66:16, vol. iv. p. 813, “ Parvus ignis quam grandem succendit materiam:” Erasm., Grot., al. But the ordinary meaning gives a far livelier and more graphic sense here. Cf. also Hom. Il. β . 455, ἠΰτεπῦρἀΐδηλονἐπιφλέγειἄσπετονὕλην , and λ . 155, ὡςδ ʼ ὅτεπῦρἀΐδηλονἐνἀξύλῳἐμπέσῃὕλῃ .

The comparison is beautifully used in a good sense by Philo, De Migr. Abr. § 21, vol. i. p. 455, σπινθὴργὰρκαὶὁβραχύτατοςἐντυφόμενοςὅτανκαταπνευσθεὶςζωπυρηθῇ , μεγάληνἐξάπτειπυράν · καὶτὸβραχύτατονοὖνἀρετῆς , ὅτανἐλπίσιχρησταῖςὑποθαλπόμενονἀναλάμψῃ , καὶτὰτέωςμεμυκότακαὶτυφλὰἐξωμμάτωσε , καὶτὰἀφαυανθένταἀναβλαστεῖνἐποίησε , καὶὅσαὑπὸἀγονίαςἐστείρωτοεἰςεὐφορίανεὐτοκίαςπεριήγαγεν [Tischdf. in his 8th edn., omitting with 1 the καί in ver. 6, carries on the sentence to ἡγλῶσσα , construing ἡλίκονπῦρ as an accusative, and ἡλίκηνὕλην as in apposition with it]).

6. Likewise the tongue is a fire, that world of iniquity ; not, as many Commentators, an elliptical clause requiring ὕλη to complete it— “ igni respondet lingua, materiæ seu silvæ respondet mundus improbus,” Morus, in Huther. But, when taken as a designation of ἡγλῶσσα , the interpretations are various. 1. Œ c. mentions as an alternative the signification “ adornment” for κόσμος . After giving the ordinary interpretation, he says, ἢκόσμοςἐστίν , ἤτοικοσμοῦσατὴνἀνθρωπίνηνφύσινκ .τ .λ ., and before, κοσμεῖτὴνἀδικίανδιὰτῆςτῶνῥητόρωνεὐγλώττουδεινότητος . And so it is taken by Wetst., Elsner, Wahl, and others. But it is rightly objected by Huther, that κόσμος never signifies that which (actively) adorns, but that wherewith a thing or person is adorned, as in 1 Peter 3:3: so that it would be here that wherewith, not that whereby, iniquity is adorned. 2. Estius makes the words mean, a world of iniquity, “ quia (lingua) peccata omnigena parit.” 3.

Le Clerc, Hammond, Kuinoel, al. hold the words to be spurious, and a gloss: but most absurdly. We have the similar use of ὁκόσμος in ref. Prov., τοῦπιστοῦὅλοςὁκόσμοςτῶνχρημάτων , τοῦδὲἀπίστουοὐδὲὄβολος : and the Latins often use ‘ abyssus,’ ‘ mare,’ ‘ oceanus,’ in the same sense [a complete repertory of all wickedness, as the world is of all things]. The use of the art. in titular appositional clauses of this kind is natural as designating the thing pointed at— ‘ mundus ille iniquitatis’ ): the tongue (we must not, although we omit οὕτως , follow Lachmann, and Tischdf. [edn. 7], in destroying the stop at ἀδικίας and carrying the sense on to this clause: for thus we make a very lame sentence, with the subject, ἡγλῶσσα , twice repeated. The new sentence begins here) is (perhaps we cannot find in English a better word for καθίσταται , though it does not give the exact meaning, which is as in vulg., “ constituitur.” Any rendering of this in English would be too forcible; as if some divine arrangement were spoken of: “ collocata est” (Beza, Piscator, Schneckenburger, al.) is not exact. See reff.) among our members that one which defileth (ref.) the whole body and setteth on fire (the other clause, καὶἡγλῶσσαπῦρ , is now taken up.

By the construction, strictly considered, these two participles, φλογίζουσα and φλογιζομένη , are (as Wiesinger) subordinated to ἡσπιλοῦσα , there being no articles before them. But forasmuch as thus we should find a difficulty in the sense, in that the action indicated by the first of these participles can hardly take place within our members, it is better, with Huther, to regard the participles as new particulars, and the construction as not a strictly exact one.

Something of the same inaccuracy is found in ch. 4:11, but not in 4:14, as Huther also alleges) the orb of the creation (in interpreting the difficult words τὸντροχὸντῆςγενέσεως , one thing must especially be borne in mind: that like ὅλοντὸσῶμα , they designate some material thing which agreeably to the figure used may be set on fire. This would at once set aside all figurative explanations, such as “ rotam originis nostræ , quæ , simul atque nati sumus, cursum suum auspicatur,” Gebser, al.,— τὸνχρόνον , τὸντροχοείδηδηλονότι , τῆςζωῆς , lsidor.-pelus.,— founded on the parallel in Anacreon (iv. 7), τροχὸςἅρματοςγὰροἷαβίοτοςτρέχεικυλισθείς . So likewise Œ c., τροχός , ὁβίοςεἰςἑαυτὸνἀνελιττόμενος , illustrating it by the Psalmist speaking of ὁστέφανοςτοῦἐνιαυτοῦ : such again as that of Wolf, “ indesinens successio hominum aliorum post alios nascentium,” after the Syr., “ It turneth the course of our generations which run as a wheel,” In seeking then for some material interpretation, we come first to that of Wiesinger,— the whole body— the circumference of our corporeal being, the τροχὸςτῆςγενέσεως , as the πρόσωποντῆςγενέσεως in ch. 1:23: the circumference (of the body) which is congenital with us. But, as Huther has observed, it would be in the highest degree unnatural, when the Writer has just expressed ὅλοντὸσῶυα without a figure, that be should again express it in a figure, and that without the least indication of the identity of meaning. The same objection is fatal to Bengel’ s view, who also understands it of the body, but gets this meaning by an allegorical method, “ Rota sive sphæ ra superior est ipsa nature humana rationalis: gehenna vero est pars profundior, cor: lingua in medio ex inferioribus inflammatur et superiora inflammat.” More ingenious is the idea of Beza (ed. 1598), “ Jacobus mihi videtur alludere ad rapiditatem circumactæ rotæ , suo motu flammam concipientis:” and this is followed by Benson, who says, “ The present life of man is here compared to a wheel, which is put in motion at our birth, and runs swiftly till death puts a stop to it. By the rapidity of its (?) motion the tongue sets this wheel in a flame, which sometimes destroys the whole machine.” Cf.

Hor. Od. i. 1. 3, “ metaque fervidis evitata rotis:” but it seems to lie too far from the words for us to suppose that the Apostle can have thus intended to express it.

And besides, the propriety of the comparison is not satisfied: for in the case of a wheel, it is set on fire by its own rapid motion, not by any thing without it. It appears then to me that we are driven to the rendering given above, on which Beza says (ed. 1565), “ Mihi videtur minus dura explicatio, si τὸντροχόν accipiamus ἀντὶτοῦκύκλου , et τῆςγενέσεως pro τῆςκτίσεως , ut significetur linguam posse vel totum orbem conditum accendere.” In favour of this, we have, that τροχός is used for “ orbis” in Aristoph. Thesmoph. 17: for circular enclosures, Plato, Critias, p. 113 ff.; Soph. frag. 222 d; Schol. on Plato, Legg. iii. p. 451: see also Odyss. μ . 173; φ . 178, 183: and that γένεσις is used in the concrete sense of “ creation” by Plato, Tim. p. 29 d, e , and by other writers. And it is remarkable also (De W.), that just below, when St. James would speak of men as created after God’ s image, he uses not κτισθέντας but γεγονότας . Cf. also his use of τὸπρόσωποντῆςγενέσεως , before cited, in ch. 1:23, “ the face wherewith he was created.” This sense, the whole orb or cycle of creation, is not, as Wiesinger affirms, “ at least not favoured” by ver. 7, but on the contrary agrees exceedingly well with it.

After the mention of the τροχὸςτῆςγενέσεως , it is natural that the Apostle should take up with the γάρ the details of creation, and assert that they might all be tamed by man, but that the tongue is untameable. Again, such sense is most agreeable to the similitude just used, of a small spark kindling a vast forest.

This sense is found in Syr., æ th., Crusius, Cocceius, and De Wette [the expression in E.V., the course of nature, is sufficiently near the meaning, and expresses it in better English, perhaps, than any other]), and itself set on fire (notice the present, indicating that it is habitually, continually, so set on fire: see below) by hell (which is itself γέεννατοῦπυρός , ref. and al. These words are not to be explained away, as Theile, “ igne fœ dissimo ac funestissimo:” such is not St. James’ s teaching, cf. ch. 4:7, where the devil, as a tempter to evil, is personally contrasted with God: but are to be literally taken. It is the devil, for whom hell is prepared, that is the tempter and instigator of the habitual sins of the tongue. It is out of the question (see above) to regard φλογιζομένη as alluding to the original temptations of the fall: equally so, to suppose it to have a future reference, and to imply that the tongue shall be tormented in (ὑπο) hell: as some in Œ c., ἀλλὰκαὶαὐτήφησιφλογίζεταιὑπὸτῆςγεέννης , ὡςδῆλονἀπὸτοῦτὴνγλώσσηνἀποτηγανιζομενουπλουσίου : so also Grot., Benson, Semler, Storr, Rosenmü ller. I need hardly add, that the foolish conjectural emendation γέννης , “ a (ὑπο) nativitate,” insisted on with much confidence in a note to an anonymous version of St.

James and St. Peter (Hatchard, 1842), is quite out of the realm of, as the construing proposed on its adoption is beneath, legitimate criticism [though it can claim the support of spec ‘ a genitura’ ].

Wiesinger says, “ This passage reminds us, in its general sense, of the O. T. sayings, Proverbs 16:27: Psalms 120:2-4: Sir. 28:11 ff.” The last clause, καὶφλογ . ὑπὸτ . γ ., is strikingly paralleled by the Targum on Psalms 120:2, where the deceitful tongue is compared “ cum carbonibus juniperi, qui incensi sunt in gehenna inferne.” But none of these passages treats of the destruction which the tongue brings on its own body (cf. Wiesinger’ s interp. above)).

7, 8. The untameableness of the tongue. The thought in ver. 3, though not directly leading on to this, yet is a hint tending towards it.

7. For (a fresh fact is adduced, substantiating the strong terms used of the mischief of the tongue) every nature (natural generic disposition and character; and so below, when joined to ἀνθρώπινος : not, “ kind,” “ genus,” as E. V. and many Commentators) of beasts (quadrupeds, see below) and winged things, of creeping things and things in the sea (creation is divided into four classes: θηρία , πετεινά , ἑρπετά , and ἐνάλια . The first then is not to be taken in its wide sense, as Acts 28:4, Acts 28:5, but as distinguished from the other three, i. e. as = quadrupeds, beasts of the earth, proper. The classification in Peter’ s vision, ref. Acts, is different: τὰτετράποδατῆςγῆςκαὶτὰθηρίακ . τὰἑρπετὰκ . τὰπετεινὰτοῦοὐρανοῦ , θηρία there at least including the fishes) is (habitually, pres.) tamed and hath been tamed (has long ago been reduced into subjection: such taming has become (perf.) an enduring fact in the world’ s history, exemplified (pres.) every day) by the nature (not, “ ingenii sollertia,” as Schneckenb., al.; but φύσις as before, natural generic character) of man:

8. but (exception) the tongue no one of men can tame (the assertion is absolute, not to be weakened by εὐκόλωςκ . ἄνευπόνου , as the Schol. in Matthæ i. And it is plain that to read it, as Œ c., interrogatively (εἰτὰἀτίθασσαθηρίαὁἄνθρωποςτιθασσεύεικαὶχειροήθηποιεῖ , ἆρατὴνἑαυτοῦγλῶσσανοὐδαμάσει ;), is quite out of the question. Observe δαμάσαι , aor., ‘ even to tame once,’ not habitually, pres. Now we see fully the meaning of ver. 2): it is a restless mischief , (it is) (the supply of a copula is necessary on account of the change of gender, referring back again to γλῶσσα . Or, the two clauses may be rendered without any copulæ , as quasi-exclamations) full of death-bringing poison . I cannot forbear referring the reader to Erasmus’ s very elegant paraphrase of these two verses, 7, 8; and thanking Wiesinger for directing attention to it.

9, 10. Exemplification of ἀκατάστατονκακόν , by the inconsistent use of the tongue.

9. Therewith bless we (i. e. as applied to God, ‘ praise we:’ cf. Ps. 144:21 LXX. The first person is used of mankind in general, considered as one agent) the Lord and Father (an unusual connexion to designate God: cf. ch. 1:27, where we have the more usual one, found also here in the rec. Both terms are to be taken of the Father: the former, on the side of His Power: the latter, on that of His Love), and therewith curse we men (generic), which (not, who, which would personally designate certain men thus made; but which, generic. This distinction, which some modern philologists are striving to obliterate, is very important in the rendering of Scripture, and has been accurately observed by our English translators) have been created (and are still, as the perf. part. shews.

See below) after the likeness of God (which remains in us, marred indeed, but not, as is sometimes carelessly said, destroyed. This likeness we ought to revere, in ourselves and in others: and he who curses, despises it. Not man’ s original state, but man’ s present state is here under consideration: and on that consideration depends the force of the Apostle’ s argument).

10. Out of the same mouth cometh forth blessing and cursing (by this resuming and collocation of the two opposite acts, the inconsistency is further shewn). These things, my brethren, ought not so to take place.

11. Illustration from nature, that such conduct is unnatural. Doth a fountain (the fountain, generically, as ὁκόκκοςτοῦσίτου , John 12:24: ἐξῆλθενὁσπείρωντοῦσπεῖραι , Matthew 13:3: τὰκοινοῦντατονἄνθρωπον , ib. 15:19, 20 al. freq.) out of the same chink send forth the sweet and the bitter (water, of course: but there is no need to supply any thing: the contrast is in the contrary nature of the two)?

12. Shews further that natural organizations do not bring forth things opposite to or inconsistent with their usual fruits, but each one has one result, and that always. Can, my brethren, a figtree bring forth olives, or a vine figs? Nor (as if the former sentence had been a negative one) can salt (water) bring forth sweet water (i. e. if the mouth emit cursing, thereby making itself a brackish spring, it cannot to any purpose also emit the sweet stream of praise and good words: if it appear to do so, all must be hypocrisy and mere seeming).

13-18. Wisdom must be shewn by meekness and peaceableness, not by contentiousness. This paragraph is closely connected with the subject of the chapter as enounced in ver. 1. Where that ambition, and rivalry to be teachers, existed, there was sure to be contentiousness and every evil thing.

13. Who is (cf. the similar question in Psalms 33:12, τίςἐστινἄνθρωποςὁθέλωνζωὴνκ .τ .λ .; παῦσοντὴνγλῶσσάνσουἀπὸκακοῦκ .τ .λ .) wise and a man of knowledge among you? Let him shew (aor. because referring to each individual ἔργον when performed, rather than to his general habit) out of (ref.: to which passage and its reasoning the Apostle seems again to be referring. The σοφία and ἐπιστήμη would be dead without this exhibition, as faith without works) his good conduct (in life: see reff.) his works (the good conduct is the general manifestation: the works, the particular results of that general manifestation. The sum of both makes up the ἔργα in the former case, ch. 2.) in meekness of wisdom .

14-16. Consequences of the opposite course.

14. But if ye have (as is the fact: this is implied by the indic.: cf. Colossians 3:1, εἰοὖνσυνηγέρθητετῷχριστῷκ .τ .λ .) bitter emulation and rivalry (see on ἔριθος and ἐριθεία in note, Romans 2:8. Beware of confounding ἐριθεία with ἔρις , as is very generally done) in your heart (out of which come thoughts and words and acts, see Matthew 15:18, Matthew 15:19), do not (in giving yourselves out for wise, which (cf. ver. 15) you cannot really be) boast against (ref.) and lie against the truth (q. d. κατακαυχᾶσθεκ . καταψεύδεσθε , but the latter compound is resolved to bring out more forcibly the ψεῦδος in their conduct. Some, as De W. and Wiesinger, suppose κατακαυχ . κατά to belong together, and καὶψεύδεσθε to be an insertion of the Apostle further to define the κατακαυχᾶσθε . Others again have taken pains to excuse the imagined tautology in ψεύδεσθεκατὰτῆςἀληθείας , which however is no tautology at all. ἡἀλήθεια , from its following κατακαυχᾶσθε , is necessarily not subjective, ‘ truth’ merely, as a quality absent from the conduct of those thus acting, but objective, ‘ the truth,’ of which their whole lives would be thus a negation and an opposition;— which would be in their persons vaunted against and lied against).

15. Designation of such pretended wisdom. This wisdom is not one descending from above ), but earthly (as the sharpest contrast to ἄνωθενκατερχομένη : belonging to this earth, and its life of sin and strife), sensual , devilish (like, or partaking of the nature of, the devils. This word must not be figuratively taken, as by Hottinger (in Huther), “ impuro genio magis quam homine digna:” it betokens both the origin of this hypocritical wisdom (cf. φλογιζομένηὑπὸτῆςγεέννης above, ver. 6), and its character: it is from,— not God, the giver of all true wisdom, ch. 1:5, but— the devil,— and bears the character of its author).

16. Justification of the foregoing assertion. For where is emulation (in a bad sense) and rivalry (see above), there is confusion , and every evil (reff.) thing (or, deed).

17, 18. Character and praise of heavenly wisdom.

17. But (contrast) the wisdom from above is first of all pure (“ Ad duplex genus qualitas revocatur: altero interna vis uno vocabulo exprimitur, quippe una ipsa cæ terarumque effectrix, altero externæ rationes sex notationibus describuntur, quæ ad primarium scriptoris consilium invidiæ rixisque occurrendi omnes redeunt.” Theile. ἁγνή , καθαρὰκαὶἀρύπαρος , μηδενὸςτῶνσαρκικῶνἀντεχομένη , Œ c. It is hardly necessary to guard any scholar against the abuse of this text often found, when it is made to signify that the heavenly-wise must be pure, i. e. free from all contact with any thing that offends, before he can be peaceable: and thus it is used to further, instead of to discourage, an uncharitable spirit), then (= in the second place: its external qualities are now enumerated) peaceable, forbearing (μὴἀκριβοδίκαιοςἐπὶτὸχεῖρον , Aristot. Eth. Nic. x. 6. See note on Philippians 4:5), easily persuaded (“ suadibilis,” vulg.

The word occurs in the active sense of “ easily persuading,” in Æ schyl. Agam. 274, πότεραδ ʼ ὀνείρωνφάσματ ʼ εὐπειθῆσέβεις : and Choeph. 259, πέμπεινἔχοιςἂνσήματ ʼ εὐπειθῆβροτοῖς : but not, that I am aware, in this passive sense), full of compassion (the great triumph of the Christian practical life is won by ἔλεος : see ch. 2:13) and good fruits (contrast to πᾶνφαῦλονπρᾶγμα above), without doubting (as might be expected, from the various meanings of διακρίνεσθαι , this word has been variously interpreted. Luther, E. V., and most Commentators render it “ without partiality,” unparteiisch, thus giving to a passive adjective an active meaning: and in the same spirit, Œ c., μὴδιακρίνουσαπαρατηρήσειςβρωμάτωνκ . διαφόρωνβαπτισμάτων : Beza, “ absque disceptatione:” vulg., “ non judicans:” Calvin, “ Nimis anxiam et scrupulosam inquisitionem notat, qualem fere in hypocritis cernere licet, qui dum nimis exacte inquirunt in fratrum dicta et facta, nihil non in sinistram partem rapiunt:” Bengel, “ Non facit discrimen ubi non opus est, v. gr., inter potentes et tenues.” The passive sense is kept by Gebser, who understands “ undivided:” the heavenly-wise keeping banded together in love: Wetst., “ non duplex.” Two considerations contribute to substantiate the rendering given above, which is that of De Wette, Wiesinger, and Huther. 1. The word would seem, from its close junction with ἀνυπόκριτος , rather to betoken an inner quality than (as Gebser above) an outward circumstance: 2. when thus used of an inner quality, cf. ch. 1:6 and 2:4, our Apostle, in common with other N. T. writers, signifies by it ‘ to doubt.’ So that I would understand by it “ expers omnis cujuscunque ambiguitatis et simulationis,” as Huther), without feigning (“ These two characteristics are also added with especial reference to the state of things among the readers: on ἀδιάκριτος , cf. ch. 1:6-8; 2:4: on ἀνυπόκριτος , ch. 1:22, 26; 2:1.” Huther).

18. Before, in ver. 16, after the characterization came the statement of the result: and so now here. That result was designated as a present one, ἀκαταστασίακ . πᾶνφαῦλονπρᾶγμα : this is a future one, but beautifully anticipated by the pregnant expression καρπὸςσπείρεται : see below. But (δέ passes from the subjective character to the objective result) fruit (or, the fruit, καρπός being in the emphatic place and therefore losing its article) of righteousness (genitive of apposition: that fruit which is righteousness: see ref. Heb. and cf. Isaiah 32:17: righteousness in its wider sense: in themselves and in others; in practice and in reward; in time and in eternity) is sown (in saying καρπὸςσπείρεται the Apostle uses a prolepsis, as if a husbandman should this autumn be said to sow next year’ s bread) in peace by them who work (better than “ make,” which seems to confine the meaning to the reconciling persons at variance.

So also in ref. Matt. The dative participle is not a ‘ dativus commodi,’ but the dat. of the agent: the former view would leave out of the proposition that which is in fact its necessary and most important feature, viz. that the peace-workers themselves are the sowers of the fruit) peace.