Romans 2

CHAPTER II

The Self-Convicted Moralists, Chapter 2

Romans 2:1

1 Men are chained, even by God’s judgment upon them, to the mass of wickedness just described so graphically. It is understood that the Christians are set free by grace as will be told in due time. But here is the moralist—his ilk is numerous—who will fully agree with all that Paul says about this general wickedness, who will even sit in judgment on another man (v. 1) or, being a Jew, will lay down the law to other men (v. 17 and 21, etc.) under the delusion that this moralism and its serious practice, instanced in the long line of reformers or Weltverbesserer, exempts them from an indictment such as this one made by Paul. The apostle turns the tables on them: by their very moralism they seal their own conviction.

Some commentators note this progression of Paul’s thought but not its bearing on the great subject of God’s saving righteousness through faith alone, the connection with which is so plain. Other’s think that Paul scored the Gentiles in 1:18–32 and now in 2:1–3:20 scores the Jews in the same fashion. But he deals with the moralists in this chapter.

Another idea is advanced, that of objectors. Paul becomes dramatic, addresses the readers individually with “thou” in v. 1 and in v. 17, and this is thought to imply that these two individuals deny what he has said regarding all men generally. But these men are moralists, and one is also a Jew, and they agree fully with the apostle in his grand indictment, yea, for this very reason continue in their moralism. Paul’s object is far greater than merely to convict also them of unrighteousness. He robs them, absolutely must rob them, of their moralism and their moralizing because they regard this as the way of escape from God’s wrath (1:18). They have reformed, they see all this horrible wickedness of men, they turn against it, do it seriously, the Jewish moralist even with God’s own perfect law, and they deem this the way of escape for themselves as well as for others.

But the only way of escape is the righteousness of God by faith, which alone wipes out all man’s unrighteousness. Paul had to demolish this deluding moralism.

He is not spending all this energy just to tighten his vast net lest the Jews as Jews or these moralists, pagan and Jewish, slip through. These moralists themselves admit that in 1:18–32 he has caught all of them. Why catch these few a second time? Paul is doing nothing of the kind. His paradoxical treatment of them must not lead us off the road which his epistle builds. He confounds their moralism by their moralism, not to prove all men sinners, but to dumbfound all moralists who think that they and all men are able to escape from their sins—sins which all of them admit—by reforming, by moralism. He confronts them with this their supposedly sure way of escape in order to produce in them the self-conviction that this moralism is not only not a way of escape but even the worst part of their condemnation and doom.

This fellow who sets himself up as a judge over another man, why does he do it? This richly equipped Jew, who excels all of the other moralists in his grand equipment, why does he so earnestly, even so fanatically lay down the law to other men, for that matter also to careless Jews? Ask and answer these questions and you will see Paul’s object. The moralist wants the other man to reform, the Jewish moralist wants men to reform by adopting his Mosaic law. But this is not the way out. The space Paul devotes to this subject is not wasted because this is the way out which men generally, Jews included, constantly try.

Modernism makes moralism its great gospel. Paul confounds this fictitious way. He does not wait until he has shown God’s true and only way. His vision is not so narrow as to think only of Jews as such moralists who are seeking to escape where the doors are doubly barred. He has more penetration.

Wherefore without excuse art thou, O man, everyone judging! For by this that thou judgest the other thou art condemning thine own self, for the same things thou art committing that judgest, and we know that the judgment of God is, in accord with truth, against those committing such things. But art thou counting on this, O man judging those committing such things and (yet) doing them (thyself), that for thy part thou wilt escape the judgment of God? Or the riches of his beneficence and the patience and the longsuffering, art thou despising them, unaware that this benefit from God is trying to lead thee to repentance? Well, in accord with thy hardness and unrepentant heart thou art (only) treasuring up for thyself wrath in a day of wrath and revelation of God’s righteous judgment, etc.

It is apparent that 1:18–32 constitutes one section and chapter two another. This means that διό connects with the entire previous section and not with 1:32 alone. In the same manner, διό in 1:24 connects with 1:18–23. The fact that the broader connection is correct is evidenced by the first word, “without excuse,” which reaches back to this same term used in 1:20.

The sense, too, does not admit a connection only with 1:32. The fact that men have God in their consciousness, know that they are worthy of death and yet do the death-worthy things and applaud others who do them, this fact does not establish the truth that the man who judges, condemns, and seeks to stop them is “without excuse.” This adjective places this judge back into 1:20, into that whole paragraph. He is one of this whole mass of ἄνθρωποι (1:18) who hold up the truth in unrighteousness. As such Paul has once before, in 1:20, branded him together with all the rest as being “without excuse.” Paul is now not again doing this. With διό he is affixing a new and a second and a more terrible brand to this man. By presuming to act as a judge of men with whom he is in the same condemnation he becomes worse even than those whom he judges. “Therefore” = because it is already condemned with all other men as being “without excuse,” this business of one of these judging any of these receives a second, a severer verdict “without excuse.”

By means of “O man!” Paul individualizes, but by means of “everyone judging” he retains this entire class. The Greek uses “O” with vocatives sparingly, hence it is strong when it is used. Both the first and the second persons are employed in order to make the discourse more pointed, more dramatic, B.-D. 281. Paul has call for this here. Out of the original mass verdict “excuseless” a new and a more deadly verdict “excuseless” leaps at this man who judges, a greater guilt is his. All are locked in the prison under a blanket condemnation, but this judge is thrust into the inner prison where only the worst are confined.

Let us note the paradox which brings on Paul’s dramatic language. Has not the climax of sin been reached in 1:32, when men realize God’s righteous ordinance that death is the only reward and yet fly in the face of it, do, and even move others to do what is thus death-worthy? No, Paul says, this climax is climaxed in the man who does—the very opposite! They, fully realizing what is involved, go on and persuade others to go on; this man, also realizing what is involved, assumes a judicial sternness and decrees that everybody must stop, must stop forthwith. How, then, can he be worse than those? Why, he is a thousand times better!

Certainly, all should stop and be stopped. And yet this judge is the worst of all, doubly “without excuse,” not only worst in his person, but also in his influence on others. He represents the very delusion that must be destroyed if the gospel is to stand.

Paul’s line of thought is derailed when this judge is conceived as an objector. He is the very opposite. He subscribes to all that Paul says in 1:18–32, also to the part which God plays. This is the very law which he applies in his judging and his effort to get men to stop. We must get this point clearly in mind. The astounding thing is that this judge’s agreement with Paul is the ultimate of disagreement.

How can this be? Paul’s exposure of the godlessness and unrighteousness of men, down even to their going counter to their own convictions—here include all the prophets, Christ, and all the apostles!—aims to drive men to the gospel, to God’s righteousness by faith in Christ; this judge’s excoriation of men’s wickedness, even when he uses Paul’s words (1:18–32) or other Biblical words, does the direct opposite: drives men to fatuous moralism, the false refuge where sits this judge himself, sure in the thought that he is safe, sure that all whom he can persuade to sit with him will be equally safe. Those others know in their hearts that by doing what they do and applauding what they applaud they are not fit to live; when, then, God’s law and the gospel reach them, it is not a difficult matter to bring them to repentance (note the reference to repentance in v. 4, 5). This judge, because of his very judging, thinks he is quite fit to live, thinks others, too, would be fit if only they heeded him, and only the dynamite Paul here puts under him in order to explode his refuge of moralism may make him accessible to God’s law and the gospel.

Many a pulpit of today has in it a duplicate of Paul’s ἄνθρωποςὁκρίνων. These judges use the pulpit for their pronouncements. Hear how they blast the wickedness of men all about them. They seek to create a sensation. The papers print and applaud. The man who preaches law and gospel like Paul and those who repent and believe get a long column of silence in the papers. Do you wonder that the apostle becomes dramatic when he confounds the protagonist of this moralism?

He does it with one blow, the double γάρ, which is re-enforced by the δέ with the κρῖματοῦΘεοῦ. “For in this that thou judgest the other thou condemnest thyself, for the same things thou art committing that judgest.” Κρίνεις and κατακρίνεις are distinct in force. Like the two ὁκρίνων the former is neutral and does not imply whether the verdict is favorable or adverse, while the compound verb contains the adverse verdict. It is for this reason that ἐνᾧ is here not used for ἐντούτῳἐνᾧ, “the very thing in which,” etc., but equals ἐντούτῳὅτι, “in or by this very fact that thou judgest,” etc. It is not correct to think that this judge only condemns, or that Paul speaks only of his condemning. He also acquits, even commends, namely all those who bow to him and obey him. Nor is he a mere denouncer; his denunciations are issued for the purpose of getting men to reform, in order that he may commend and praise them.

In 1:32 the wicked applaud the wicked; this judge applauds those who reform. He is a mighty moralist who is acclaimed as “a power for good in the world” and proud of this.

Yet he has not even the shadow of an excuse. “Without excuse” does not repeat the “without excuse” used in 1:20 as being the real reason for this judge’s guilt while the two γάρ state the evidential reason. It is διό that reaches back, and this new “without excuse” rests on the two “for” clauses. What Paul says is that the moment this judge opens his mouth, whether to acquit or to condemn, by the mere fact of judging he condemns himself. Let him but open his mouth for or against the other man, out comes “guilty” against himself, The man never knew that, only those who have gone to school with Paul and with his Master now know it. This knowledge comes as a shock. Paul wants it to come that way.

He strikes in this way more than once in this epistle. Men look up to this judge; Paul shows him and them that the fellow is not only condemned by God but is even self-condemned (Luke 19:22).

The self-condemnation lies in this that this judge commits the very things which he judges. Ὁκρίνων, placed emphatically at the end, is not ὁκατακρίνων, thou “that art condemning.” This judge is self-condemned not merely when he condemns another but also when he acquits another. The very things of which he acquits the other, just as the very things for which he condemns the other recoil like a boomerang against himself, no matter what he may be pleased to adjudge about the other fellow. Of course, not for one moment has he realized this (v. 3 shows what he thought), but the awful fact is now revealed. There is not a moralist in all the world who dares lift himself above other men in order to judge even one of them without condemning first of all and worst of all himself. “Worst of all” because the others are at least ashamed to do so.

Τὰαὐτά, “the same things” as to quality and not as to detail, no specific sins being mentioned; and πράσσω is used as it is in 1:32. The best commentary on “the same things” is that given by Jesus in Matt. 5:20, etc. Many censorious moralists keep clear of the grosser forms of sin, but what about that in view of Matt. 15:19; 7:1–5? In regard to the matter of judging note what Jesus says of himself in John 8:15, 16; 3:17, and Paul of himself and of the Christians in 1 Cor. 5:12–6:3. When true Christians voice God’s judgment on the basis of this Word they first bow to it themselves in true repentance.

Romans 2:2

2 With δέ Paul clinches the self-condemnation of the moralist-judge; a few texts have γάρ. The lone inflectional and thus unemphatic “we” in “we know,” appearing as it does between dramatic “thous,” does not refer to the Romans and to Paul to the exclusion of this judge and those like him. “We know” means that it is a matter of common knowledge; in 1:32 Paul has the stronger “having realized” and predicates it regarding the bad sinners there mentioned. This judge did not know that he was all along condemning himself by his judging. Paul upsets him by telling him that and by proving it.

But this judge, too, knows “that the judgment of God is in accord with truth against those committing such things.” Οἷδα states only that the object is perceived by the subject, γινώσκω states that the subject places himself in relation to the object. C.-K. 388. That is the case here. Men perceive the fact of God’s opposition to the sins in question. The fact that they always put themselves in relation to this truth is not implied. This judge evidently did not do so as far as his own person and his life were concerned.

Paul is now doing that very thing for him. This zealous moralist used what he knew of the κρῖμα of God in censoring and reforming others and presumed that his very doing this made it unnecessary to investigate his own personal relation to that κρῖμα. This word, formed like δικαίωμα, is not the act or the procedure of judging (κρίσις is often used in this sense) but the outcome, the judicial decision, here the one that stands for all cases. The fact that this is an adverse verdict lies, not in the word, but in the phrase “against those,” etc.

By the use of κρῖμα God is made the judge, and before this Judge, Paul hales this moralist-judge who has been failing to do this. God’s eternal verdict is “against those that commit such things” not only as open sinners but also as this judge does. The emphasis is on this final phrase. That is the simple, actual truth (reality) of the matter. The phrase “according to truth” modifies the entire clause. It is often the predicate: “the judgment of God is in accord with truth,” truth being its norm.

The norm, however, is righteousness. As in the case of other phrases with ἀλήθεια which are inserted into a sentence as this one is (C.-K. 122), the adverbial idea is enough. While some regard this phrase as being the real point, others stress the final participle, that in God’s verdict the doing decides everything. This doing, by the way, includes even the motives of the heart.

Romans 2:3

3 Paul sees through the critical moralist. He pierces him with two deadly questions (v. 3, 4) and then crushes him with his inward guilt (v. 5). The exposure is complete. The dramatic “thou” continues.

Most translators and commentators prefer to regard the next two verses as two questions. Against this view a few urge the absence of interrogative particles; but in scores of cases such particles are not necessary. The questions are said to trail off into an assertion in v. 5; but this assertion follows the questions like a blow. These questions continue the dramatic personal address. The statement that their answers are not indicated, and that this judge would not reply, “Yes,” overlooks the fact that Paul himself gives the fullest answer in v. 5, where he states what awaits him who does what v. 3, 4 ask about. We regard these verses as questions.

“But art thou counting on this, O man,” etc.? charges the man with doing so. Paul tears away the curtain behind which this moralist has been hiding. Once more he gets to hear his guilt: “judging those committing such things and (yet) doing them (thyself).” The very idea that a man like this should expect to escape God’s judgment, regarding which we all know that it stands like a rock against those who commit such things, to say nothing about their judging others! It is about time that this man be shown in what a desperate situation he is although he feels himself secure. The fact that by his judging he is drawing others into the same delusive security is implied only by the judging with which he is charged.

Here we see why Paul devotes so much attention to this type of sinners. Because of their moralism they count on escaping God’s judgment. By calling on people to reform, by denouncing those who will not, by lauding those who will, they as “a great power for good in the world” take it for granted that they will escape, will not be caught in God’s judgment. In fact, only because of this conviction regarding themselves could they continue their moralistic judging. Paul’s question, which is really stronger than an assertion, melts away this conviction. Escape? Nay, they will be doubly caught!

Romans 2:4

4 But this moralist’s folly runs also in another direction which is allied with his counting himself secure. A second question exposes this folly. It is introduced by the conjunction “or” which we noted in connection with 1:21. “And” would merely combine the questions, “or” draws attention to each separately. The moralist does both: counts himself secure and misconceives God’s beneficence toward himself, and Paul bids him to look at each folly separately. God has been mighty good to him despite his excessive moralistic guilt. But instead of appreciating that, looking up to the true divine purpose of it, in his moralistic pride he looks down on it (κατά in the verb), “despises” it by disregarding its real purpose, yea, by counting it as God’s approval of moralism and of his activity in judging other sinners.

What a frightful thing to do! Paul’s exposure intends to shock.

He puts the great objects forward: “the riches of his beneficence and the patience and the longsuffering,” thus making them most emphatic. The verb governs the genitive, and there are three of these genitives. We cannot combine “the riches” with the patience and the longsuffering because no one speaks of the riches of these two. “The riches of the beneficence” of God is indeed great, consisting, as it does, of all the manifestations of his kindness, the shower of good gifts which God bestows on his creatures. Acts 14:17 names some of them. Secondly, “the patience,” ἀνοχή from ἀνέχεσθαι, “to hold up.” God holds up the judgment which is due to crash down upon men in their guilt. While he attests his wrath in various manifestations of preliminary judgments, the final destruction is held up, i.e., is delayed.

The figure is that of a load that God bears, which men heap up more and more, making it heavier and heavier. The wonder of it all is that God holds any of it up even for a day; yet he holds up all its weight and does not let it crash down on the sinner’s head. So “the longsuffering” is added. The mind waits long before it proceeds to action. Constantly provoked to abolish the flagrant sinners, God waits still longer. Trench makes the excellent distinction: μακροθυμία is exercised in regard to persons, ὑπομονή in regard to things (afflictions, etc.), hence the latter is never used with reference to God.

The addition of “the patience and the longsuffering” is significant here where this judge, by his judging which is contrary to God, constantly provokes the judgment of God. Matt. 7:1, 2. Usurping the judgment seat, this judge even arranges God’s judgment to suit himself (v. 3) and ought promptly to get the full taste of that judgment. We should note the perfect grasp with which Paul holds fast all that he has said from v. 1 onward and hurls it anew against this moralist-judge.

Καταφρονεῖςἀγνοῶν are purposely juxtaposed, for Paul is speaking of this special “thinking down on” all this benefit on the part of God, this perverse depreciation of it which consists in being unaware of its supreme purpose regarding sinners, even the worst of them, namely “that this benefit from God is trying to lead thee to repentance.” The neuter τὸχρηστόν, “the benefit,” while it matches ἡχρηστότης, “the beneficence,” includes the three points just named; and the genitive is subjective, God bestows the benefit. The present tense is conative: “is trying to lead,” R. 880.

One of the great concepts of the Scriptures is μετάνοια “repentance,” originally a change of mind that comes afterward, i.e., too late, but in the Scriptures employed to denote the spiritual change away from sin in true contrition and toward God and Christ for pardon and justification in faith. Paul is speaking of repentance in this full sense and not in the modified sense employed by Jesus in Matt. 11:21. Whatever this judge thinks of God’s abounding benefit which is continuously showered upon all these sinners whom he judges, including especially also himself, the thought that it has anything to do with repentance, especially also his own, never occurs to him. Dreaming that the judgment of God will not strike him, why should he think of anything like repentance and the fact that this divine benefit is crying out to him to repent?

We ought not to think that God’s general beneficence toward men is here made a means of grace that is able to produce saving repentance. To escape this un-Biblical idea it will not do to reduce the concept “repentance” to that of mere amendment as found in Matt. 12:41. We escape these misconceptions when we drop the idea that all that Paul has to say to this moralist is what is contained in these few verses with their direct personal address. This is not a tiny letter which is mailed only to him. It is a small piece of the entire letter. Any moralist who finds himself especially addressed in it is to read on and thus to learn how God’s benefit to him is intended to lead to true repentance by way of the law and the gospel; for these are the actual means that effect it.

“Unaware” contains severe blame. This man ought to be aware, doubly so since he is judging other men to whom God is still giving so much kindness, treating them with so much patience and longsuffering. This judge denounces them, wants them to reform. Moreover, he is in delusion with regard to himself since he has reformed. His own follies blind his eyes to the blessed purpose that shines out so plainly from God’s beneficence, patience, etc. Can any reasonable man fail to see that all this blessing from God cannot be an end in itself, that it must have, absolutely must have an ulterior end, be a means to something greater, final, eternal?

The beast may fill its belly from day to day and then come to an end—not so man. If this were the extent of God’s purpose, everything would be vacuous. Add this patience and longsuffering of God while we know his judgment and at times are made to see his righteous wrath. Why such delays; have they no purpose beyond themselves? Then they would also be vacuous. Can even this moralist-judge be blind to the fact that even he does not deserve this constant beneficence of God, that something is wrong even with him, that God must have some greater purpose to which his beneficence is but a means?

Is it too much to say that ἀγνοῶν means, “will not see”?

Here we have a clear statement of the purpose of God’s beneficent providence in a world of sinners, including its moralists. All of it is aimed at repentance so that, when God comes with his law and his gospel, men may bow in contrition and faith, even the moralists. Acts 17:30. The Christian Weltanschauung is neither philosophical nor moral; it is soteriological. Any other world view leaves us suspended in the air.

Romans 2:5

5 With δέ Paul now strikes home. The moralist—damnation awaits him on judgment day! Thus is this judge judged. Paul here and now pronounces God’s own verdict upon this judge who is so busy with his moralism and passing verdicts upon others that he has forgotten to pass the proper judgment on himself. Thus is his mouth stopped, 3:19. This divine verdict is now uttered upon this man so that, by crushing him utterly, he may be actually brought to repentance, may, indeed, escape the judgment of God now and at that day.

For Paul is preaching the law to this man. This entire section is law, law in preparation for the gospel that follows in 3:21, etc. This should not be overlooked. Some think that Paul is simply sending this man to his doom, is now done with him. This is not prophecy, it is law, and the apostles use the law aright, namely to awaken the terrores conscientiae. The fact that Paul names “the hardness and unrepentant heart” of this moralist as the measure (κατά) of the wrath he is storing up ought not to mislead us to think that Paul has given this man up; he is right now busy trying to break up this condition, for that reason he is delivering these sledgehammer blows.

Σκληρότης, from σκληρός, dried, stiff, is the hardness or stiffness that will not bend. The figure is not that of a rock that is hard but that of a dried-out, dead branch. One article connects the two terms and makes them one concept. The Greek had no abstract term to match “stiffness,” so Paul used the adjective “unrepentant” and combined it with “heart.” The hardness consists in impenitence, and this refers to what Paul has just said regarding God’s purpose to attain repentance. It was defeated in the case of this man, and, therefore, wrath is his lot. Paul might have written, “In accord with thy hard and impenitent heart,” but the use of the noun “hardness” makes the expression stronger. “Heart” fixes the seat of the trouble in the center of the personality, for in the heart the ego dwells.

There is a subtle irony in the paradoxical statement “thou art (only) treasuring up for thyself wrath.” “Wrath” is used pregnantly for the punishment which God’s just wrath must inflict. Would any man want to “treasure up for himself” such wrath? The verb implies that this judge is accumulating more and more divine wrath against himself as one accumulates a great treasure, that he is hoarding it so that none of this wrath will fail to descend upon his head. The amount of this treasure of wrath he makes as large as possible. Since the amount corresponds with “the hardness and impenitent heart,” he is as hard and as impenitent as he can be. The irony is crushing. For the whole idea of accumulating more and more treasure is suggested by the moralistic zealousness of this man who thinks that the more he judges others and tries to reform them, the more he is accumulating a great moral treasure of merit with God for which God will let him escape any judgment of wrath (v. 3). “Well,” says Paul, “treasure, indeed, thou art accumulating, piling it up more and more—treasure of wrath!”

With this reality Paul demolishes this man’s delusion, stuns the deluded man in order to break up his hard and impenitent heart and to melt it in repentance. A master in preaching the gospel, Paul is equally a master in applying the law. The two always go together. Exempla docent. Here is a master exemplum, which shows us how to deal with all these moralists as well as with those who follow them. All reform that leaves the heart hard and obstructs true repentance only heaps up the wrath instead of making escape sure. The warning that lies in this even for us Christians should also be clear.

“In wrath’s day” is definite, the genitive making it so. This is not some day in the course of time when wrath descends in judgment but the final day of wrath. We must connect what Paul here says about this day with what he has just said about the beneficence, patience, and longsuffering of God in v. 4. God, indeed, holds up his wrath even when its preliminary judgments show that it is being held up, for even they, in great part, still aim at repentance. “Wrath’s day” makes the final settlement, pays out to the last penny the whole treasure of wrath which this man (and all other impenitent men) has been accumulating for himself. God’s bank will never default. On God’s wrath see 1:18.

An important second genitive characterizes this day. In order to imitate the further omission of the Greek articles, which emphasizes the quality expressed in each noun, we may translate: “God’s righteous judgment’s revelation day,” that day which is marked by the complete revelation of the δικαιοκρισία of God. We have no English compound similar to this, and the Greek compound is rare although it is found in the papyri; the simple adjective and the noun are found in John 7:24 and in 2 Thess. 1:5. The sense, however, is not “that God does justice to the righteous by his judgment on the godless” (C.-K. 333) but that every judgment of God, judging act as well as verdict, whether of acquittal or of condemnation, is wholly, absolutely righteous, never deviating in the least from the absolute norm of right. “Wrath” refers only to condemnation; this second term includes also acquittal and is unfolded as to both sides in what follows. That day will bring the revelation that all God’s judging and all his judgments are righteous, a revelation for the whole universe of men and angels. Even the damned will have it and will know that their damnation is righteous.

The implication is that even now we see many preliminary judgments of God intermingled with restraints, with patience, longsuffering, beneficence, which are often very puzzling even to enlightened Christians. In v. 4 we see how wrongly men, especially the moralists, view all this. The last day and its final judgment will clear up everything, answer every question, dissipate every doubt. The dikaiokrisia of God will be revealed, and no creature will find even the least flaw in its perfection. This is strange in a way and yet true. Every judge, by virtue of being a judge, is himself judged by any and every verdict.

Any unjust verdict of his condemns, first of all, himself as being guilty for pronouncing it; any just verdict acquits him in the same way. The fact that God should apply this to himself, that he should be concerned about his judgments and the verdict he renders on himself by means of them, may seem strange and yet is not, for he is righteousness itself. The fact that on the last day not a soul will even question a single judgment of his will be due to the revelation God makes (objectively) and to the moral nature of those to whom he makes it when they at last stand face to face with him (subjectively).

Romans 2:6

6 Paul describes the final judgment at length (v. 6–16). It underlies all that he has said to the moralist-judge (v. 1–5), likewise all that he intends to say to this moralist in case he is a Jew (v. 17–29). That explains the extended consideration devoted to the judgment. Paul is preaching the law to these moralists, and the law always climaxes in the final judgment. In v. 2, 3 reference was made to the κρῖμα, the judgment of God, and in v. 5 Paul referred to the δικαιοκρισία of God, his righteous judgment. Both become fully clear when the great judgment on the last day is understood.

When Paul emphasizes so strongly that every human being must at last face this judgment, we must not lose the specific implication which includes the moralist just addressed as well as the one about to be addressed in v. 17, etc. They are the ones who call forth this description of the judgment which, just because it is universal, is also so individual.

It is interesting to ask why Paul introduces also the Jews in this description. Some seem to share the view that this entire chapter deals with the Jews. We have seen that it deals with the moralists, the general type of these in v. 1–5, the special Jewish type in v. 17, etc. This clears up the reference to both Jew and Greek in the intervening description of the judgment. Paul could not postpone this description until he reached the end of the chapter, until he had dealt also with the Jewish moralist; he places it between them and, by specifically naming the Jew in v. 9, 10, makes his description of the judgment apply with great directness to the moralist already described in v. 1–5 and with no less directness to the one about to be described. That explains even more, namely why he twice writes, “both Jew and Greek” (“Gentile” in the A.

V. is unsatisfactory) and exactly as he had done in 1:16, with πρῶτον, “first of all,” referring to both. If the barbarians had moralists, they were unknown. Only the educated Greek world had them in a way that was comparable to the Jews. These are the data for this important paragraph which reveal how integral it is to this chapter. The whole of it is closely knit. Not a single statement trails off on a tangent.

It is well also to recognize the fact that this description presents the judgment as it will actually occur, exactly as Jesus describes it in Matt. 25:31–46, to say nothing about other passages. To think that v. 5–12 are hypothetical and were written only as an argument: 1) if there were no gospel; 2) if the fulfillment of the law (the natural law on the part of Gentiles, the revealed on the part of Jews) were possible: then God would judge as is here stated—is to misunderstand this section. No sinner, especially no moralist, can be reached by hypothetical dangers. This is not an empty roll of thunder but the actual lightning stroke that kills all moralism root and branch; no man can endure it and live.

Paul is using the final judgment as law. And the fact that he has in mind the actual final judgment and is using it aright as law appears from his statement that this judgment acquits as well as condemns and adds even whom it acquits. The law must ever be preached in conjunction with the gospel. One way of escape is open. Paul points to it here, he will tell of it at great length presently; what he here says is preliminary. To regard it as the last word is to turn the law into just what moralists make it, as offering salvation by reform, the very thing Paul shows to be impossible.

The notable thing about this description is the fact that the universality of the judgment is not merely implied or tersely expressed—Matt. 25:32 has “all nations”—but fully developed as regards the Gentiles (ἔθνη v. 14), whose lack of the Jewish written law will not count against them, but the transgression of the moral law written in their very hearts and consciences will. Paul’s treatment of this angle, made necessary because in v. 1–5 the Gentile moralist is included, is of special value.

Who will duly give to each man according to his works: to some according to endurance in good work glory and honor and incorruption, as seeking life eternal; to some, as from self-seeking as well as disobeying the truth, as moreover obeying the unrighteousness, wrath and indignation, tribulation and anguish on every soul of man working out the base, first of all of Jew as well as of Greek; but glory and honor and peace for everyone working the good, first of all to Jew as well as to Greek.

Connectives link everything as far as v. 17 together and by means of the relative ὅς attach the whole of it to v. 5. But this is one of those demonstrative relatives for which we might use the subject of a new sentence: “He is the One who will give,” etc.

Paul is not quoting; his wording is that found in the LXX of Ps. 62:13 and Prov. 24:12, and ἀπό in the verb brings out the thought that God will duly give, i.e., give to every man what is due him, what he has the full right to claim as coming to him. In this very fact lies the righteousness of God’s judgment, his δικαιοκρισία (v. 5). Nor will any man be passed by, allowed to slip through, for in this way injustice would be done.

The entire Scriptures, notably also Jesus, declare that at the last day the verdict will be “in accord with the works” of each man, will harmonize with them. Paul is merely repeating this fact. If any pagan moralist is still in doubt about it he is now told the fact. For Paul is not confining himself to natural theology in regard to what he says of the final judgment but is referring to revealed theology. But in this connection “the works” are not separate, perhaps disjointed acts of men but the sum of each man’s life which characterizes him and shows to which of the two great classes he belongs. In v. 9, 10 the plural becomes two singulars, τὸκακόν and τὸἀγαθόν, “the base” which God must reject, “the good” which he gladly accepts.

The reason that God’s verdicts at the last day are in accord with the works and not merely in accord with the presence or the absence of faith is due to the fact that this judgment is “a revelation” (v. 5) of the perfect justice of God to the universe of angels and of men. The works are open to view, hence are the public evidence in this public judgment which shows the presence or the absence of faith. In the secret judgment of each man during life and at the moment of death faith and unbelief decide; in order to show the rightness of this secret judgment in public, before the universe, works serve as the evidence which all can see. As faith has its native works so also has unbelief.

Romans 2:7

7 The two datives used in v. 7 and 8 expand the dative ἑκάστῳ, the two classes are described and their final verdicts announced. No man needs to wait, he can now read his final verdict, for he needs only to investigate as to which of the two classes here designated he belongs. The difficulty in understanding the construction arises from the supposed necessity of making τοῖςμέν the article with the following participle, and τοῖςδέ the article with the other participles. But these are not articles that substantivize participles, the participles are merely predicative, and μέν and δέ show plainly that the two τοῖς are the correlative demonstratives: “some—some.”

The κατά phrase occurring in v. 7 corresponds with that used in v. 6, and both must, therefore, be translated in the same way: “to everyone according to his works: to some according to endurance in well-doing,” etc. This means that “glory and honor and incorruption” are objects of ἀποδώσει, “shall duly give,” and not of ζητοῦσι, “seeking.” We have “glory and honor and peace” in v. 10 which restates v. 7 with the same construction. That, too, is decisive, for Paul certainly would not once make identical terms like “glory and honor” in the identical connection the object sought and again the object given, nor once “life eternal” the object given and in the next breath “glory and honor” this object after just saying that these were sought.

The beautiful chiasm that results should be noted: “glory, honor, incorruption”—“as seeking”—“as disobeying and obeying”—“wrath, indignation, anguish.” The verdicts are outside, the predicative descriptions inside. It is said that Paul changes the construction, and that this change is characteristic. “Glory,” etc., in v. 7 are accusatives after “shall duly give” in v. 6, but at the end of v. 7 “wrath,” etc., are suddenly nominatives with “shall be” understood. But one might ask why Paul made this change. God does not give wrath nor any of these terrible four. The dative “some” used in v. 8 with these nominatives is the common Greek idiom: something to someone (a copula is not even necessary.) These second “some” simply have wrath, indignation, etc. The distinction between these and the others is finely drawn and true.

In v. 9 Paul purposely dropped the idea of giving, for infliction is the idea to be expressed. To the righteous is given, the wicked are deprived—“even that he hath shall be taken away from him,” Luke 19:26.

After the construction is thus made clear in the simplicity, the beauty, and the precision in which Paul wrote it, the sense is clear. To some God shall give glory and honor and incorruption. These sacred three are mentioned here and again in v. 10; to the rest (v. 8), the worldly, the secular four, “wrath,” etc., are left (not given). “Glory” consists in the heavenly attributes that are on the last day bestowed on the godly as a personal possession of both body and soul, this glory shining forth in heavenly radiance. “Honor” is the correlative, the high esteem on the part of men and on the part of angels who view this gift of glory and its radiance. “Incorruption” is the complement to the other two of this trio, for this glory shall never fade, this honor never cease. All earthly glory fades, sic transit gloria mundi is even proverbial; all earthly honor is effaced, for even if it lasts for years on earth. it does not count with God. But when this corruptible shall put on incorruption (1 Cor. 15:54), the saints of God shall reach that permanence which no man is able to attain in this transient world.

God shall duly give to each one “according to his works” (v. 6) and thus to the godly “according to endurance in good work.” First the plural “works,” spreading them out in detail, then “work,” singular, for all of them constitute a unit; and we have already seen how Paul thus significantly employs singular and plural terms. “Good” work is one that is good in God’s judgment. Moralists have a different conception of this goodness of the work which really stamps the man as what he is. The genitive “endurance of good work” is objective (B.-D. 163), the endurance directed toward good work. Mark the absence of the articles, which stresses the quality of the nouns.

The best comment on “endurance” is Jesus’ word in Matt. 24:13, it is the endurance that holds out to the end, that finishes the course (2 Tim. 4:7, 8), that does not draw back (Heb. 10:39). The word means “to remain under.” It is never used with reference to God (see remarks on “longsuffering” in v. 4), always refers only to things and not to persons, and here brings out the thought of the load that a good work is. In a wicked world we are constantly tempted to throw off the burden, to remain under it no longer, to run free in the false freedom of those who do evil as they please. Only those who hold out shall be saved. It is faith, faith alone that holds out; Paul kept the faith. The continuance in faith is evidenced by the endurance in the good work.

All are sinners, yet not one of the sins of these endurers is brought to light in the final judgment. They could not be, for see what God long ago did with them, Ps. 103:12; Isa. 43:25; Micah 7:19. Their endurance by faith in good work characterizes these sinners and not the faults that still clung to them during life and that were also removed by God’s ἄφεσις or remission. God’s righteous judgment (δικαιοκρισία, v. 5) must accord with this endurance in good work, i.e., his final public verdict must acquit and accept those who have this endurance, the fruit of God’s own grace. Κατά shows that the verdict corresponds. The fact that it includes also a correspondence in degrees of glory is true but is scarcely to be stressed in a description as general as this one is. “As seeking life eternal,” predicative to the dative “some,” shows what animated them; they were like all those who are described in that famous chapter, Hebrews 11, who by faith looked ahead, sought the city to come, and thus held out in good work despite every affliction involved.

Σωὴαἰώνιος is one of those towering terms that runs through the New Testament. See how John uses it in 3:15, 16 and says that it is already our possession by faith. Paul uses it here with reference to the consummation at the time of the judgment, which is described in 1 John 3:2: “We shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is.” Σωὴ is the spiritual, divine life principle itself. Some call it communion with God, but it is more than a relation, it is born of God, exists in us constantly in communion with God. In its consummation it is eternal, can never be lost, and is utter blessedness; its opposite is the second death. What are all the ills we endure in this short earthly sojourn when we hold out in faith compared with life eternal in heaven with God!

Here Paul presents the whole plan of salvation in a nutshell from the angle of the last judgment. God will, indeed, judge differently from these moralist-judges who acquit themselves (v. 3), scorn repentance (v. 4), and with hard and unrepentant hearts blindly accumulate nothing but wrath for the last great day. Let them look at God’s judgment and learn to repent and thus by faith to endure in good work.

Romans 2:8

8 As τοῖςμέν is not the article with some substantivized term, so τοῖςδέ cannot be. The prevalence of the view that ἐξἐριθείας is the substantive with the latter, so that we must translate as our versions do: “those that are,” etc., is one of the phenomena of learned exegesis. We are pointed to ὁἐκπίστεως, οἱἐκπεριτομῆς, οἱἐκνόμου, and told that this is a Greek idiom, but here τοῖςμέν precedes, which is the still more common idiom “some—some.” Some interpreters supply οὖσιν and complicate the matter by regarding τοῖς as the article which substantivizes three participles: “unto them that are contentious (factious) and do not obey the truth but obey unrighteousness,” which is the rendering found in our versions. Καί—δέ correspond and connect only two participles: “as well—as moreover.”

The sense of ἐριθεία, which word is not found in Hellenistic literature and in earlier Greek except in Aristotle, is sometimes misunderstood, for it is connected with ἔρις “strife,” Hader (L.), or left in doubt by B.-P. 481. Our versions use the adjectives “contentious” (A. V.), “factious” (R. V.). The noun is derived from ἐριθεύειν, to work for wages as a mercenary and hence = Lohnsucht, the mercenary spirit that wants quick returns. Although this derivation is known, some introduce the idea of contention, haggling about pay.

As in v. 7 the participle is predicative, so are the two occurring in v. 8: “to some as from self-seeking as well as disobeying the truth as moreover obeying the unrighteousness.” They “both” (καί) do the one, “moreover also” (δέ) the other. Instead of employing a second καί which would mean “both—and” Paul had to write δέ, because, while disobeying and obeying are homogeneous and thus could be connected by “both—and,” “truth” and “unrighteousness” are heterogeneous, which δέ indicates, for it indeed adds but adds something that is different.

Paul has already described this class of men by saying that they “suppress the truth in unrighteousness,” 1:18. We see that he here restates, but so as to explain and to amplify, a procedure that is regularly followed by him. Suppressing the truth in unrighteousness means disobeying it and obeying the unrighteousness, doing both because of a low, self-seeking spirit, for in no other spirit could this be done. “The truth” (see 1:18) is broad, for these men disobey even the truth revealed in nature, they will not let it control their lives (see 1:21) but remain hard and unrepentant (2:5). The real things about God and about themselves produce no response in their souls. Since Paul is speaking of judgment day, “the truth” includes also the full reality that is supernaturally revealed in the Word. It, too, is spurned. But they obey the unrighteousness.

In 1:25 “the lie” is opposed to “the truth,” the unreality (posing as reality) to the reality. Here the negative lies on a plane that is different from the positive, for “the unrighteousness” is the quality of all that God condemns and must condemn while “the truth” is the sum of the actual facts as they exist. Both are pictured as masters whom one obeys, and there is no third: one obeys either the one or the other of these masters. But note the disparity (marked by δέ): the truth is the true, the divine master. God is in the truth, yea, is the truth, and truth is eternal, prevails, and those joined to it by obedience have the blessedness it contains; but the unrighteousness is the spurious master made by wicked men for themselves and is, therefore, condemned and doomed to condemnation from the very start. What a master!

One to be trampled under foot. To be obeyed? Never!

How this master secures obedience and draws men away from the obedience to the truth is explained by the phrase indicating source: “from self-seeking,” that mean desire for immediate, selfish gain. To obey the truth means endurance, something that is difficult at times, means good work, something that is distasteful to our evil nature, means a reward of grace at death, at the judgment. The unrighteousness of men’s own heart proffers immediate satisfaction by means of all that men desire to indulge in irrespective of any hampering by a norm of divine right. That is the bait for which men fall. And the more they obey their own unrighteousness as their master, the more this master grows and holds them in an iron grip as slaves.

So brief and so simple the words, a mere line, yet so perfect the analysis of all the ungodliness and wickedness of men. Any trace of Stoic moralism in them? Not even a little.

For these men “wrath” (see 1:18) and “indignation,” wrath’s hot outburst, both of these from God, and as a result two equally closely allied experiences for man: “tribulation” in the sense of pressure and thus “anguish” or narrowing in of both body and soul. They will not know whither to turn, and in vain will they cry to the mountains, “Fall on us!” and to the hills, “Cover us!” Luke 23:30.

This is the reality, which is announced in advance, in order to bend the stiff and unrepentant hearts if anything will still bend them. In v. 5 “wrath” appears alone, here it appears unfolded in four terms, which form two pairs.

Romans 2:9

9 With our versions we place only a comma between the two pairs (no “and” connects them) and read right on. Some place a period between them and thus have an asyndeton which calls for two ἔσται. When a comma is inserted, the singular “on every soul of man” merely individualizes the preceding plural “to some.” The just judgment (v. 5) is just also in this respect that it includes everyone on both sides. When they are thus closely connected, v. 9 and 10 reverse v. 7 and 8 so that the four form a chiasm: godly—wicked, wicked—godly. Twice the emphasis rests on “everyone,” each time with the addition “first of all both Jew and Greek,” which lends a peculiar force to the individualization. The parallel is made pointed by the two opposites τὸκακόν and τὸἀγαθόν, “the base,” “the good,” which resembles the singular τοῦἔργουἀγαθοῦ of v. 7.

Only the participles differ, and the difference (the perfective κατά in the first but not in the second) is important. The wicked man fully works out, fully accomplishes the base; the godly man works the good, that is all. He never works it out fully, in completeness, imperfection is ever left, sin is not wholly cast out, hence human merit has no place in the judgment. Even in such incidental expressions Paul’s doctrine is perfect. Inspiration is evident in the very words. “Soul of man” is not repeated in v. 10, need not be, for ψυχή is here used only in the sense of person: “every human person.”

The rule that, when the Greek repeats it is content with the simplex, cannot be applied here; for if the simplex were here to be equal to the compound participles, a wrong sense would result; for who is able fully to be working out the good? Even our best works are imperfect.

Romans 2:10

10 Paul states the terrible punishment of the wicked only once, all of it in succession at the junction of the chiasm, but the gift of grace he states twice, even with the repetition of two terms, “glory and honor,” as though he loved to dwell on this gift of blessedness. But now for “incorruption” he substitutes the great term “peace,” the Hebrew shalom, meaning Unversehrtheit, here the final state and its enjoyment (see 1:7). This final peace matches incorruptibility; he who attains either has the other.

To each of the two classes Paul adds the significant apposition we have already noted in connection with 1:16; “first of all of Jew as well as of Greek.” In the first instance he has the genitive, in the next the dative. Most emphatically Paul says that God’s judgment includes every man. Jew and Greek represent only two classes of men. What about a representative of the rest? If it be said that here “Greek” means “Gentile,” and that thus the representation is complete, why such additions to what is already said perfectly in the two “every”?

All that we have remarked in connection with our discussion of 1:16 applies here with even more force. The view that the Jews will be judged before the Gentiles is incorrect, and this would be a strange point to inject here. The view that a difference will be made between godly Jews and Gentiles and again between ungodly Jews and Gentiles, is specifically denied in v. 11, etc. Here again πρῶτον modifies “Jew as well as Greek”: to these two “first of all” applies what Paul says regarding the judgment; and if first of all to them, then also to the rest.

This description of the judgment was precipitated by the moralist (v. 1–5). Where do we find this moralist? He is either a Jew or a Greek but not a barbarian. Moralizing, such as Paul crushes, occurs only there where the necessary culture is found. While “Greek,” placed beside “Jew” as here, referred to a man of Greek culture, today, in a world in which no such single culture dominates, a different term would be needed. In 1:14 Paul himself supplies such a term: “wise” placed beside “Greeks,” and these contrasted with “ignorant,” “barbarians.” In a letter dealing with moralists Paul’s double “first of all Jew as well as Greek” is exceedingly pertinent in the case of persons who lived in the capital of the world. There, if anywhere in that day, the moralists would be heard.

Romans 2:11

11 For there is no respect of persons with God; for as many as sinned without law shall also perish without law; and as many as sinned in connection with law shall be judged by means of law; for not the hearers of law are righteous with God, but the doers of law shall be declared righteous.

It is the “righteous judgment” (v. 5) that Paul is setting forth by showing how at the last day it will judge the works, judge absolutely every man, a truth that both Jew and Greek might well note; for in this δικαιοκρισία (v. 5) there is no such thing as προσωποληψία with God, “taking a man’s face” and not a man’s works. Acts 10:34. This term is Hebraistic to indicate partiality or favoritism on the part of a judge. Paul’s point is missed by those who apply the statement to Jews over against Gentiles; it is also missed by others who apply it to Jews over against cultured Greeks, i.e., when God sees a Jew before his judgment seat he lets him slip through, but when a Gentile or when a Greek comes, God condemns him. This is impossible, for twice and thus with pointed emphasis Paul has combined “Jew and Greek,” these two are equally to note what he says about the judgment. These two together, these two in the very first place, are to know that, when they come before the righteously judging Judge, God will not accept their faces instead of their works. The implication, of course, is that, if he does not accept their faces he will also accept the face of no other man who stands lower than Jew and Greek.

Romans 2:12

12 The reason that Jew and Greek might think that they should be favored in the judgment of God is due to the fact that they operated with “law.” When they present their faces to the great Judge, when he sees that they are lawmen, will he not let them pass? Never. Anything resembling “law” will be of entirely minor importance. The great question will concern itself with the works as we have already been shown. Whether these have been done without anything resembling law or, as in their case, in connection with something called law, will be entirely immaterial: “for as many as did sin without law shall also perish without law, and as many as did sin in connection with law shall be judged by means of law.” The aorists “did sin” are constative, they sum up the whole course of works as evidencing who and what these men are. Both groups are alike nothing but sinners, merely sinners, those with law certainly being no better than those without law.

The point must be noted that the only difference here touched upon is the non-use and the use of law, either of which leaves men sinners and nothing but sinners; for nothing in the nature of law can possibly clear any man of sin. What folly, then, for any man, Jew as well as Greek, to hope that, because as a moralist he operated with law, God will let him pass—as though God were a judge who accepts a man’s face!

The only difference will be that those without law will merely perish without law, while those with law will be judged by means of law—two routes that lead to the same goal. Justice will be prominent in both instances; for the Judge will not apply law to those who ended as nothing but sinners without using anything like real law—that would be unfair. Nor will he need law in the case of these—they merely perish as the sinners that they are. The only fair thing in the case of others who made law their boast will be that the Judge use this means (διά) when he pronounces judgment on them; and the fact that this judgment will be one of condemnation is plain: “they did sin” exactly as those “did sin” of whom Paul just said, “they will perish.”

Here Paul robs every moralist of his essential tool. The fellow who judges another as described in v. 1, etc., must have some sort of law for his judging, and if he be also a Jew, as v. 17, etc., describes, he will lay down the Mosaic law to men. Without law there could be no moralists, Greek or Jewish. Paul turns this business of law to vapor in their hands and thus also in the hands of all who heed and follow them: in the final judgment law is no advantage as compared with no law, and no law no disadvantage as compared with law. Neither could be unless God were unjust. Here “law” is used in its widest sense as something that is required by moralism, no matter in what form this moralism appears.

Romans 2:13

13 The fact that what has just been said about the divine impartial judgment as regards sinning without or with law is undoubtedly correct is evidenced (γάρ) by the further truth “that not the hearers of law are righteous with God, but the doers of law shall be justified,” i.e., pronounced righteous by God. Not the hearers of law righteous (no verb), but the doers of law shall be declared righteous. The opposition is direct and sharp: οὐδίκαιοι—δικαιωθήσονται. Both the hearers of law and the doers of law have law, which means that this statement omits mention of those who live and act without law. It explains why Paul just said that “as many as did sin in connection with law shall be judged by means of law.” Those who operate with law never get beyond being mere hearers of law and never get to be doers of law. They never get beyond the status of sinners, sinners just like those who pay no attention to anything like moral law.

Law is able to produce only hearers of law, it never did and never will produce a single doer of law. Even the moralist-judge who operates so strongly with law is exposed as being self-condemned by the very law with which he operates (v. 1).

We need not worry about either point, that moralism never produces anything but hearers of law, and again that God justifies the doers of law. Neither part of Paul’s statement is hypothetical: if only hearers of law, then not righteous in God’s final judgment; but if doers of law, then declared righteous. Paul does not in this place care to discuss the fact that earnest moralists do many works that are in conformity with such law as they use; he will treat that truth in connection with those who have no law at all, for even they do things that conform to law. Yet all such doing of law is as nothing, for it never gets a man out of his status as a sinner and. into the status of a “righteous” man, δίκαιος in God’s sight, it leaves him just where the man devoid of law is. So in reality a hearer of law is all that this operator with law is or can be.

But there are actual doers of law, yes, doers of law whom God will declare righteous at the last day, “both Jew and Greek,” who did that which is good, and glory, honor, and peace will be their eternal lot (v. 10). Paul calls them doers of law because in the public judgment at the last day God will pronounce his verdict “according to the works” (v. 6). Need we yet add that these doers of law are not “moral men” as the world imagines them, “the nobler pagans” included? These, plus their Jewish counterpart, Paul is smiting in this very chapter. All of these he lists as at best being hearers of law and never for a moment as being “righteous.” The “doers of law” are those who by faith and a new heart actually do what God bids and by their doing demonstrate their faith so that in the public judgment at the last day God can point to their works as the evidence on which his righteousness acquits and must acquit them. And remember, “first of all Jew as well as Greek,” which includes also any others on the same basis and never on any other basis.

Romans 2:14

14 Those who operate with law, who never become doers of law that will be justified, are in no better position than those who sin and perish without law. But this necessitates the explanation that actually very few can be said to be devoid of law.

For whenever Gentiles who do not have law, by nature perform things of the law, these, though not having law, are unto themselves law, such as demonstrate the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience joining in witness, and in alternation with each other the reasonings making accusation or also making defense, in connection with a day when God will judge the secrets of men according to my gospel through Jesus Christ.

We do not agree with the exegesis which makes Paul’s ἔθνη equal to τὰἔθνη on the plea that what Paul here predicates belongs to all Gentiles. We also do not accept the deduction of R. 796 and others that “in general when νόμος is anarthrous in Paul it refers to the Mosaic law.” Here and often it does not, and when it does in some places, it refers to that law only as law in general. These linguistic views are due to the traditional interpretation that in 1:18–32 Paul deals with the Gentiles and in chapter 2, with the Jews and thus in these verses puts the Gentiles on the same level with the Jews by saying that both alike have the law, the Gentiles the law written in their hearts, the Jews the law written in their Tora. However true the substance of this is, it is not what Paul says here.

We have seen at every pertinent point that all men are included in 1:18–32, and that chapter 2 deals with the moralist, not again in order to include him, but to expose his false way of escaping from the divine judgment on the universal sinfulness of man (v. 3). The story of the last judgment is told for the special benefit of the moralist; it is he especially who is to see who will and who will not escape in that judgment so that he may see that he is among the latter (v. 5) Whether he be Jew or Greek, as a moralist he operates with law as the means of escape. Paul exposes the folly of this: law, anything like law in any form or type of moralism, is no more a means of escape in God’s judgment than having no law and thus having no moralism (v. 11–13) Now both Jewish and Greek moralists fondly imagine that they are the favored ones who alone have law and are able to use it as a means of escape. They are mistaken in this view. A large number of pagans, ἔθνη, “are unto themselves law,” show it by the actual application of it both in their lives (actions) and in their consciousness. These high moralists, both Jew and Greek, are thus thrown down from their pedestal.

They have no more than the pagan world generally has. What is their shallow moralism compared with this pagan self-condemnation which is due to the inner law of the heart itself? This is Paul’s thought.

The Greek had his philosophy of life, his ethics, his hopes for the hereafter. The more he deserved the name “Greek,” i.e., the more he had of the Greek culture, the more fully developed were these his ideas and convictions. In this respect he was comparable to the Jew so that thrice Paul writes “first of all Jew as well as Greek” (v. 9, 10, and 1:16). It is in contrast with these that Paul speaks of such as sin and as perish ἀνόμως, “without any law at all” (v. 12). Jew and Greek, when they are compared with them, despite all their law end in no better a way in God’s judgment (v. 12). When now, in explaining further (γάρ), Paul writes about “Gentiles who do not have law,” it is jumping at conclusions to say that these are the same as those who sin and perish “without law” (v. 12).

They are by no means the same, for Paul says that “these are to themselves law,” “these” is even emphatic. He adds that the law which he has in mind is written in their hearts; he adds further that it operates there, and he states how it does so. In other words, Jewish and Greek moralists with their respective law are not at all in a superior class; nor do all other men live and perish ἀνόμως, devoid of law. This is the very conception which Paul upsets by his present explanation. Here is a mighty class that has law operating even in its very heart. So little are those moralists superior to all others that hosts of these others are really superior to them; for moralists operate with an outward law, but these with one that is actually inward.

These are, of course, ἔθνη, pagans, Jews cannot be included, for they are under the Mosaic code. The Greeks are also excluded. Paul has combined “both Jew and Greek.” Twice in this connection and once before. Because the Greek is a pagan he is not necessarily included; he is a pagan who has an ethical code and for this reason belongs in the same class with the Jew and not with those who have law only in their nature. Also those who sin and perish “without any law” (v. 12) are excluded. They are also pagans but heed not even such law as should be in their hearts.

This interpretation will not be accepted by those who think that all Gentiles are here referred to. But Paul had looked around in this wicked world a bit. It still contains men who have no conscience at all, who in no way respond even to an inner law. Paul cites both classes against the moralistic Jew and Greek. In v. 12 he brings these two kinds of moralists down to the level of those who, like brute beasts, respond to no law whatever; here in v. 14, etc., he raises those who respond to the inner law of their natural being above those two types of moralists. Yes, ἔθνη without the article is correct.

It is true, pagans, many and many of them, “not having law,” anything like law bestowed from without, anything like the Jewish code from God, or like the Greek ethics taught in the Greek schools, nevertheless “by nature perform things of the law.” They do not, of course, always do so, for ὅταν means “whenever” and refers only to such instances as occur. And we must regard “things of the law” as referring to things belonging to the law which they do not have as a code of “law.” It is well to note that in τὰτοῦνόμου the article with the genitive is the article of previous reference and refers to νόμον just mentioned. Because of the idea that all Gentiles are in contrast with all Jews, “things of the law” is taken to mean, “things of the Mosaic law.” This restriction is doubtful as the contrast is doubtful. Moses and the Greeks agree in many ethical precepts, but whether they are in agreement or not, the pagans here described perform things that are enjoined by these precepts. They do it “by nature.” Neither a Jew nor a Greek taught them. They may never have come in contact with either.

Paul has in mind their own inborn moral nature. While in 1:18–29 he unfolds the vast immorality of the whole world of men, we here see that he is not blind to whatever of moral response is still left even in many pagans. It is not necessary to elaborate on the word φύσις and its various uses. Jew and Greek also have this “nature” as do also those who respond to no law and perish in that way by having utterly violated their very nature. Paul is speaking of such pagans as have only their moral nature, to which also they respond in certain instances.

“These” are the ones, Paul says, the very ones who, although, as stated, not having anything like law laid on them from without, Jewish code or Greek ethics, “to themselves are law.” Instead of just having they are. Despite not having they are. Yea, are makes up for not having.

Romans 2:15

15 How can this be? Οἵτινες has a causal implication: because they are “such as.” Since those deeds of theirs comply with such law as others have although they are done without such law by nature alone, “they demonstrate” to anyone who intelligently observes them and their deeds “the work of the law written in their hearts,” that is, how and why they are law to themselves. “Written,” says Paul, for the Jewish law was written, and the Greeks wrote whole books on ethics. Here we have a deeper writing, one in men’s own hearts. We may add that without this deeper writing even the Jewish and the Greek writings on parchment would not hold men’s hearts. The passive idea in “written” points to God as the writer; and “by nature” refers to “hearts,” the center of human beings. Here we have no moral evolution, no herd ethics, no social convention as to what society may decide as right or wrong, which changes as society changes; here we have what is left of the general image of God in the heart of man after the fall. It is the moral sense which is sadly distorted in many ways, is never otherwise than imperfect, is completely submerged in some (v. 12a). But what remains is highly significant.

Paul is most exact. He does not say that “law” is written in their hearts (which would be true) but “the work of the law”; for what of law is written in them and to what degree they are law to themselves has already been stated when it was said that they at times perform “things of the law.” These “things of the law” = “the work of the law,” i.e., of such law as the moralists, Jewish and Greek, have in their ethical codes. First the plural, “things of the law,” spreading them out to view individually, then the singular, “the work of the law,” the sum as the unit.

Some regard this as a reference only to the Jewish law. And they state that, since the Jewish law was given by direct revelation, it is much more perfect than what is still written in pagan hearts, a statement which is true. But Paul has combined Jew and Greek, which combination changes the viewpoint. He is not comparing extent and clearness of law but depth. Those moralists themselves practice what they condemn (v. 1), they are nothing but shallow “hearers of law” (v. 13), these pagans “do” at least to some extent, these pagans demonstrate that at least something is in their hearts. Paul puts the moralists beneath them; for their having, of which they are so proud (v. 3) over against those not having, is too much in their heads and not, as in the case of these others, a writing in the hearts.

This is Paul’s point, and for this reason he says even more regarding it by means of two genitive absolutes: “their conscience joining in witness, and in alternation with each other the reasonings making accusation or also making defense.” These are not modal participles that state how the demonstration is made, namely “in that their conscience testifies,” etc. This interpretation disregards the force of the verb “demonstrate” which always means to show by visible display, but the acts of the conscience and of the thoughts are invisible, and they could not for that reason be the way in which the demonstration is made.

The σύν in the participle is also overlooked, for it indicates an act of testifying that is second to a preceding testimony, one that is joined to the preceding. The two cannot be combined; and this applies also to the reasonings. On the other hand, to reduce these genitive absolutes to accompanying circumstances is a misunderstanding in the opposite direction; they are more than that. Both of them expound most graphically what has just been said about “the hearts”; for there is the seat of conscience, there the reasonings argue back and forth. If no work of the law were written in the hearts of these pagans, no conscience would exist to testify, no moral debating in self-condemnation or self-commendation would be possible. But both occur, and this fact is added testimony to what is so deeply written and engraved in the hearts.

First the visible proof: “things of the law.” Whenever those who have no law do them, it is a plain demonstration that they are law to themselves, that the work of the law is written in their hearts. Combined with this is not another ἔνδειξις or “demonstration” as it is often called, for these acts of conscience are invisible and not a demonstration but a testifying. The genitive absolute makes this testifying secondary to the visible proof. This genitive absolute is incomplete, for it does not yet state what the testimony is or how it is made; the second genitive absolute takes care of that.

We do not regard συνείδησις, which etymologically means Mitwissen, but always with oneself (C.-K. 396), as equivalent to “consciousness”; it is “conscience,” and we consider the debate as to whether a faculty or a function is intended as pointless. The very word implies a duality. I myself know, and conscience, too, knows. This is especially apparent when conscience blames me, when I should like to hush it up but find myself unable to do so and may even be driven to desperation by my conscience. It is often called the voice of God in us, but this is rather inaccurate; for conscience is not the fact that God knows and speaks in us but rather that I myself know and speak in judgment on myself. I am both judge and defendant and generally a culprit.

Still more must be said. Conscience holds me to a norm of right and condemns me when I violate that norm. Conscience is not itself that norm, it operates with that as a judge upon me and upon moral actions of mine. It always has its norm of right, but this norm itself is more or less imperfect, sadly so when it is removed from the Word which alone furnishes the true norm that fully enlightens conscience. In the case of pagans this norm is “the work of the law written in their hearts,” whatever the amount of it may be. Paul is speaking of what writing is left in them and not of what is erased or blurred but only of what is still plainly recognizable on the basis of its actually producing “things of the law.” God’s connection with this norm with which conscience operates appears in v. 16.

On this subject consult Franz Delitzsch, Biblische Psychologie, 2nd ed., 133, etc., but on p. 138, footnote, he is mistaken when he says that it is the sense of the apostle that at the final judgment Jesus may receive pagans in grace.

Some think that Paul is speaking only of the so-called conscientia consequens which passes judgment on deeds after they have been done, because he speaks of accusing and defending. But let us also look at what Paul says about these pagans doing “things of the law” (v. 14); for their conscientia antecedens prompted them to do just these things. Conscience is here to be understood in its full sense. This includes its complete activity which implies judging not only acts before and after but also the secret motives back of them, yea the entire character. This entire activity is nothing but testimony to what is still written in these pagan hearts. The σύν in the participle is not a mere strengthening; for conscience joins its testimony to the demonstration of the deeds and not to God’s testimony, for neither he nor any testimony of his has been mentioned.

The mere statement, “their conscience joining in witness,” is too brief to convey the full thought; hence Paul adds an expansion with explicative καί: “and in alternation with each other the reasonings making accusation or also making defense.” In this way conscience acts by adding its witness in regard to what is written in the hearts of these pagans. The Greek conceives the heart as the seat of the “reasonings.” These are not “judgments.” These reasonings act in a reciprocal way, “between themselves” (or each other), A. V. margin, which comes quite close to the sense; “the mean while” in the text of the A. V. is inaccurate. The reasonings operate back and forth between themselves. They do it whenever conscience acts; in fact, this is its activity. The subject of these reasonings is anything in which the moral quality of right or wrong may inhere in the estimation of the conscience concerned; finished acts or omissions, possible and contemplated acts or omissions, all these together with their inner motives and purposes, plus even the person’s own character as a whole.

It is generally something the conscience considers wrong on which these reasonings concentrate in debate between themselves; they “make accusation.” This is placed first because it happens so often. “Or also” adds that sometimes and not so often the reasonings judge something the conscience considers right and then “offer defense” in their debate between themselves. A simple “and” would imply that these right cases are about as numerous as the wrong ones, which could not be the fact in the case of pagans.

What Paul says is that the very fact that these two operations of the reasonings of conscience occur in pagan hearts is additional witness that corroborates the demonstration which is given by their doing by nature “things of the law” and proving that they “are law to themselves,” that “the work of the law is written in their hearts.” What he says is both simple and clear; for Christian consciences still operate in the same way although they have the full light of the Word regarding what is truly right and wrong and have been made much more responsive as well as effective in controlling their actions.

Some commentators confuse “accusing” and “defending” as though Paul says that in every case considered by the pagan conscience both take place: some reasonings attacking, others rallying to the defense. And what about the outcome? Is it left suspended in the air? Paul separates the two with a distinct disjunctive “or”; some actions meet with accusations, others (fewer) elicit a defense because those are wrong and these right in the judgment of the conscience. The phrase “between themselves” does not rule out this separation.

Again, this phrase is taken to mean that the reasonings accuse and sometimes defend each other or one another. This is sometimes thought to imply that “the conscience sits in judgment on itself.” But Paul did not write the accusative ἀλλήλους; he wrote a phrase with the preposition “between,” which has a different meaning.

Others state that this difference among the reasonings themselves is destructive of “the reliability of conscience” and then regard “between themselves” or “in alternation with each other” as meaning “between themselves” as persons, some pagans accusing, others defending an action or a person or each other. They then construe the singular participle, a feminine in form, not only with the singular feminine “conscience,” but also with the plural masculine “reasonings”; their conscience furnishes one added witness, and in the intercourse of these pagans with each other (so the phrase) their reasonings in debates and discussions furnish another witness, namely “when they accuse or in some instances defend.” This view is highly improbable. Paul wrote two genitive absolutes and placed the participles chiastically in order the more to assure the fact that there are two, the first being used with a feminine singular noun, the second with a masculine plural noun. As to saving “the reliability of conscience” in the proposed fashion, the motive is noble enough, but is this reliability lost when the reasonings in one man’s heart do the fighting and not lost but saved when a large number of pagans do the fighting by hurling these same reasonings at each other?

Some state that the fact that both αὐτῶν and μεταξὺἀλλήλων are placed forward denotes a correlation between the two, one that demands that the second, like the first, must denote persons. But even if αὐτῶν had been placed after its noun and thus in the truly emphatic position and thus also as close as possible to the phrase, a correlation would be strange because the pronoun and then the phrase must each be confined to its own genitive absolute.

Most of these commentators think that Paul intended to stress three points: 1) the demonstration of actual doing (v. 14); 2) one witness, the testifying conscience; 3) another witness, the disputing reasonings of pagans. But these two witnesses are one. Those who regard them as two have yet to show that the reasonings are not the voice of the conscience which blames one kind of action and motive and praises another. Even when pagans are regarded as disputing with each other, the reasoning with which they carry on the dispute could be only the voices of their consciences.

This view is based on the thought that a dispute pro and con must take place regarding every action, motive, etc. But Paul makes a distinct separation with “or also.” Then, too, his phrase “between themselves” does not denote an opposing alternation of the reasonings, some being for, some against, but a supporting alternation. Take a bad deed as an example. One reasoning accuses it from one angle, another from a second angle, and so on until no angle is left. In these its reasonings, especially about a wrong, conscience is inexorable. Once it gets to work it refuses to cease operation.

The Latins said: Conscientia mille testes, “conscience is a thousand witnesses.” And all of these insist on testifying. Try to hush them and they will turn against you for even trying such a thing. In this way, to quote Shakespeare’s statement, “conscience does make cowards of us all.” All defenses which we may try to think up our own reasonings in conscience will accuse as false pleas. In this way the reasonings in mutual support “between themselves” make their accusation. They literally band together and batter down their victim. But occasionally, when an action is considered right by the conscience, these reasonings rally to the defense.

Even when a man is blamed by other men, the reasonings, one after another, stand by him. Yea, if uncertainty should suggest itself, with its unimpeachable reasonings conscience batters down that uncertainty, at least tries to do so.

Paul is here presenting only the two main activities of conscience and these two only as they operate in pagans; he is not discussing the probable conscience, the doubtful conscience, and other ramifications. He never loses himself and his readers in indecisive details. The two grand facts are enough: regarding a wrong, the reasonings band together in accusation; regarding a right, they stand shoulder to shoulder in defense.

Romans 2:16

16 They do both, Paul says, “in connection with a day when God will judge the secrets of men according to my gospel through Jesus Christ.” The main point to be noted is that ἐν has its first and original meaning: “in union or connection with.” The activity of conscience even in pagans, whether it is accusing or defending by applying the moral law written in the heart, is never something pertaining only to the present moment when it takes place in the heart but an activity that is always in inner and vital connection with a “day” to come “when (some texts have the relative in the dative, some the phrase ‘in which’) God will judge the secrets of men.” The whole activity of conscience connects with the conviction regarding such a day and man’s accountability on that day when nothing can be hid, when God will probe even “the hidden things of men.” Cancel this day, and the keystone is broken out of the arch of all moral reasonings, all moral responsibility, all moral impetus to do “things of the law.” What worries even the pagan when he condemns himself in the court of conscience is the higher court of God with its judgment on a day to come. What comforts even a pagan when he acquits himself in the court of conscience is again this higher court and the conviction that on a day to come God, too, will acquit.

Ἐν modifies both of the participles that precede; the connection is direct and close. Verb and subject are reversed, which gives an emphasis to both: judge will God, yes, God. It is immaterial whether we prefer the reading κρινεῖ, “will judge,” or κρίνει, “judges,” for the present tense would refer to the future just as does the future tense. “The secret things” of men are named, not in contradiction to “the works” mentioned in v. 6, but because of the connection with conscience which probes even the secret motives and purposes. When the divine judge passes his verdict on the outward works he sees not merely their outward appearance as we do, he sees in that appearance all that lies beneath them down to the most secret bottom. “Of men” expresses the same universality as does the genitive in 1:18. The power of conscience lies also in this that no man shall be exempt from God’s final judgment. Paul is speaking of certain pagans (ἔθνη, v. 14), what their conscience attests, attests in connection with a day when “men,” i.e., all men, shall stand exposed before God with their secrets.

Paul speaks of this “day” as we know it by means of revelation although he is describing the consciences of pagans. But he does the same throughout from 1:18 onward God, God’s wrath, debasing God, (1:23), realizing God (1:32), to mention only these from 1:18–32, then, when considering the moralist in chapter 2: “the judgment of God” (v. 2, 3), “day of wrath and revelation,” etc. (v. 5) This does not mean that all men, all moralists, and even the pagans referred to in v. 14 understand and know all this in regard to God, the “day,” and the judgment.

At the very beginning (1:18) Paul said that men suppress the truth in unrighteousness, then (1:23) that they changed God into idol images. Yet despite all that darkening there, nevertheless, remains the realization of the righteous ordinance of God that they who do wickedness are not fit to live (1:32), and on the basis of this Paul exposes the moralist in 2:1, etc. So he now concludes this exposure of the moralist by pointing him to pagans who are morally wholly untutored and yet have a conscience that is so active morally the apostle does not propose to lose himself in a discussion of what such pagans know or no longer know about “a day” of final accountability. They know enough to stir the conscience into activity as their own conscience testifies.

Nor is this an abstract discussion regarding these pagans; it is also not addressed to them. Nor is it addressed to the Romans. No, it is addressed to the moralist whom Paul is confounding: “O man!” v. 1 and 3. Against him Paul hurls the whole judgment of God, τὸκρῖματοῦΘεοῦ (v. 2, 3), the whole “day” as it will actually be. And what he hurls at this dangerous moralist the Romans are to read in order to note that moralist’s annihilation.

For this reason Paul adds the phrases: “in accord with my gospel through Jesus Christ,” which modify the whole clause, “when God will judge the secret things of men.” This is not saying that the gospel or “my gospel” will be the norm (κατά) of the final judgment; the norm is God’s own righteousness. It is misleading to bring in grace and the view that at least some of these pagans will be saved. What Paul says is that all he states regarding judgment day—and he began by naming the “day” in v. 5, and then launched into its description in v. 6–13—all of it, as it is now again summarized, accords with his gospel which was preached by him as an apostle. All of it is law and not gospel but law that accords with the gospel. Paul would not be smiting the moralist with law and the judgment to come if he had no gospel. What would be the sense of that?

No more sense than to talk of conscience if there were no “day” of final reckoning. Paul says to the moralist only that he has the gospel; that whole precious gospel he will unfold in this letter as soon as he is through with the moralists. He has the one in Jewish garb yet to consider (v. 17, etc.).

Since the enclitic μου is without emphasis, this little “my” does not indicate a difference between the form of gospel as preached by Paul and the form as preached by the other apostles. Who is crushing this moralist with the law and the judgment day? Paul, of course. Well, then, who is going to offer this moralist the gospel? Paul. All this preaching of law is leading up to the saving gospel, accords with it. Now it is plain why Paul says “my gospel” in this connection.

Nor does Paul say that it is according to his gospel or according to that of anybody else that God will judge “through Jesus Christ” (see 1:1 on the name). “According to my gospel” is to be construed with what precedes and not with “through Jesus Christ” which follows. Both phrases modify the clause. As God’s judging is in accord with the gospel which Paul intends to offer the moralist, so it will be a judging “through Jesus Christ.” Paul could have omitted the last phrase, but the fact that it names Jesus Christ as the one through whom God will judge connects him who is the substance of the gospel with the final judgment. Law and gospel meet in Jesus Christ. This brings the entire paragraph to a unit point and is a beautiful example of the mastery of thought with which Paul so often weaves together many threads, lets none slip, and brings them to a final perfect unity. In how many secular writers is such mastery found?

The A. V. would have us connect v. 16 with v. 12 and make v. 13–15 a parenthesis; others shorten the parenthesis. These constructions are due to a misunderstanding of ἐν by making it Zeitbestimmung: “in or on” judgment day. Those who do not adopt the parenthesis have the problem of putting together with an ἐν the present actions of accusing or defending and the future action of God’s judging at the last day. Here are a few examples: 1) All connection is denied. Paul derailed his thought, or v. 16 is interpolated. But this is not an adequate solution. 2) Κρινεῖ, the future, is changed to κρίνει, the present, in order to make “day” any day when God judges, but in v. 5, 6 “day” is the final day. 3) The gap is bridged by an insertion: the present accusing or defending, we are told, “will become manifest” on the last day; or the participles accusing or defending are regarded as timeless, as continuing on and on until the last day is reached. 4) The whole of v. 15 with its present tense of the verb as well as its three present participles is transferred to the last day, all the actions taking place only then.

Romans 2:17

17 In v. 1–16 Paul lets the moralist convict himself. He includes every one of these moralists, πᾶς in v. 1 and “both Jew and Greek” in v. 9, 10, and makes no distinction between them. But the Jewish type of moralist deserves a little further consideration because he convicts himself in a double way. By judging other men all moralists convict themselves (v. 1); in addition to that, by also laying down his Jewish law for other men, the Jewish moralist convicts himself of not being a real Jew. His self-conviction is actually doubled. Instead of standing higher than the Greek moralist he really stands far lower. This exposure of the moralists, in particular also those of the Jewish type, does not intend to brand them merely as sinners but utterly to destroy all moralism as being the greatest foe of the gospel; for it pretends to be the one way of escape from the judgment of God on all the godlessness and wickedness of men (v. 3), instead of which it only plunges the chief moralists themselves into added guilt and thus greater damnation and carries all their adherents with them.

But thou, if thou addest to thyself the name Jew and restest on law and gloriest in God and knowest the Will and testest out the essentials as being instructed from the Law and as also confident of thyself to be guide of men blind, light for those in darkness, educator of men ignorant, teacher of babes, having the genuine form of the knowledge and of the truth in the Law; (if thou) as the one accordingly teaching another dost not teach thyself, the one preaching not to steal dost steal, the one saying not to commit adultery dost commit adultery, the one abhorring idols robbest temples—thou, the very one who gloriest in law, dishonorest God through the transgression of the Law, for the name of God is blasphemed because of you among the Gentiles even as it has been written.

The force of both the emphatic σύ and of the first clause is often overlooked. This strong “thou” reaches back to πᾶςὁκρίνων, “everyone judging,” in v. 1, and now singles out the one who adds to himself the name “Jew.” In v. 1–16 Paul has considered all the moralists, “every one” of them, “Jew as well as Gentile” (v. 9, 10), but the one who “adds to himself the name Jew” is under double guilt, and this added guilt must now be made plain. The verb is a true middle and not a passive because all the verbs that follow refer to actions of this moralist himself.

The compound means that “in addition” he takes the name “Jew” for himself. By this designation he raises himself above all other moralists. The idea is not that he is called “Jew” by others (A. V.), bears this name in general (R. V.), but that he takes it himself, proudly calls himself “Jew,” wants everybody to know this. By saying that this moralist himself takes this name Paul already wants it understood that he is not giving the fellow this name “Jew”; and we shall soon see that he denies that this moralist is a Jew in the true sense of the word (v. 28).

We know that “Jew” was regarded as a name of honor by the Jews. Even when they became Christian they clung to the added title “Jew” and frequently had it engraved on their tombs. So also Paul pointedly calls himself a Jew, a Hebrew, an Israelite, Acts 21:39; 22:3; 2 Cor. 11:22; Rom. 11:1; Phil. 3:5, and he is such in the true sense of the word.

The older view that in 1:18–32 Paul shows the sinfulness of the Gentiles and in 2:1–3:20 that of the Jews, and that in 2:17 he singles out one of these Jews as a sample of all must be revised. The later view that Paul starts to show the sinfulness of the Jews, not in 2:1, but here in 2:17, is still in need of a revision. To what has already been said in regard to this point we add that the very first clause of 2:17 answers both of these views. We here meet, not a representative of Jews in general, but a representative of the Jewish moralists. This type is exceedingly familiar from the Gospels. See what Jesus did to them in Matt. 23:13, etc.

The Greek moralist and his moralism were bad enough for the gospel, the Jewish moralist was the worst of all. When, however, Paul exposes the moralist’s self-conviction he does it in order to destroy the effect of his moralism upon all Christians and at the same time, if possible, to save the moralists themselves from their moralism by means of the gospel.

First, by means of coordinate clauses (καί, four of them) and then with two participles joined by τε Paul shows the equipment of this Jewish moralizer; secondly, by means of οὖν (v. 21) and four clauses we are shown how this Jewish moralizer operates in the most self-condemnatory way; finally, in the apodosis of the whole conditional elaboration Paul pronounces the verdict of condemnation upon this Jewish moralist and seals it with Scripture itself. It is all done in one grand sentence, done with terrific effect.

The protasis, εἰ with indicatives, a condition of reality, extends from v. 17 to v. 22. But it is imperative to note that a condition of reality states only what is assumed as a reality and not that what is thus assumed is, indeed, reality. R. 1006 bottom; B.-D. 371, 1. All conditions present only assumptions, each condition in its own way. Paul assumes that this moralist delights in calling himself “Jew.” Paul lets him do so and uses the assumption that he is “Jew” as he claims. But not for one moment does that mean that the man is actually a genuine Jew.

Whether he is or is not is another matter; we shall see that he is not (v. 28). In the grammatical condition of reality Paul uses the assumed reality of this moralist’s being “Jew” for the very purpose of proving that the actual reality is the opposite.

This is also true with regard to the other clauses which this “if” introduces: resting on law, glorying in God, knowing the Will, testing out the essentials. “Let us assume,” Paul says to this Jewish moralist, “that thou doest all these grand things!” Whether the man really does them remains to be seen. For Paul’s purpose the assumption is enough, for it will quickly reveal what the reality regarding him is.

Each statement contains the next. Open the first box and you see the second; open the second, and there is the third; and so on to the last. To be a real Jew means really to rest on law; to rest on law means really to glory in God, thus really to know the Will, thus really to test out the essentials. In the case of this moralist these actions are prefaced by the assumptive “if”; but they are one and all most excellent, blessed, and lead to heaven. If this man were what he claims to be, and if he did all these things, he would be saved and all who heard and heeded him, for then he would not in any sense be a moralist.

Anarthrous “law” is not “the Law” (R. 796) in the sense of the Tora as referring to the whole Old Testament or to the Pentateuch or in the sense of the Mosaic commands. It is law in general. To rest on law is to repose on it in full security, and fictitious security is here not in the mind of the writer. Legal work-righteousness is not Paul’s thought; vide Bengel: Requiescis in eo quod tibi angustiam intentat. In the present connection “law” is not in opposition to gospel.

A genuine Jew is most assuredly a man of law because he is attached to God and to God’s Will and to the essentials. Paul himself is such a man of law. Here “law” is the expression of God’s righteousness, and one rests on it by faith. Through it comes the restful circumcision of heart and spirit and the praise of God (v. 29). Alas, Paul can only assume: “if thou restest on law.” He cannot say that this man actually rests so; for while he glories in law (the same anarthrous “law”) he transgresses even the (Mosaic) law to the dishonor of God (v. 23).

To glory in God means to find one’s highest treasure in God and to manifest this. Paul does that in full reality; in regard to the Jewish moralist he can say it only by assumption (“if”). To assert that a false glorying is referred to denies the very assumption Paul makes, the assumption which is his invincible weapon against this moralist. Through the assumed good reality the apostle exposes the actual bad reality; for because of him and those like him the name of God is blasphemed among the Gentiles (v. 24).

Romans 2:18

18 To know the Will is genuine knowing of the real Will. It is assumed in the case of this moralist, assumed for the purpose already indicated. “The Will” is used in a pregnant, fixed sense and denotes what God wills, all of it, law as well as gospel will. This is not mere head knowledge or only the legal Will.

To test out essentials is the final assumption in this basic list. Coins were so tested, and only those that were genuine and of full weight were accepted (see 1:28). Διαφέροντα is usually given one of three meanings that are neutral, good, or bad: 1) “the things that differ,” i.e., are either good or bad (R. V. margin); 2) “the things that excel,” that differ favorably from the bad; 3) “the things that differ” from the Will, i.e., the bad. The third originated because of a dissatisfaction with the other two. But this word is the opposite of ἀδιάφορα, our “adiaphora,” “the things that do not matter,” and thus τὰδιαφέροντα means, “the things on which matters depend,” i.e., “the essentials” (L., also B.-P. 297) cf., Phil. 1:10. Again those who think that Paul is proving all Jews sinners insert derogation here.

This Jew tests out only moral distinctions according to his Mosaic code as to what is good, what is wicked in men’s deeds. But this view is, no doubt, indefensible.

These “essentials” are those of God’s Will, of his Will in the supreme sense, the essentials for man’s salvation; and their testing out includes their acceptance. The assumptions made by Paul regarding this moralist reach their climax: “if (finally) thou testest out (and thus acceptest) the essentials,” the things on which everything in religion, everything about salvation, depends. Alas, it can be only an assumption! This moralist is so blind as a tester that he fails to see the gospel essentials and never applies the essentials of the law to himself (v. 21, 22).

Law—God—the Will—the essentials are like the bellows of a camera, fold is drawn out of fold, each is held to the next. Law in general, in the religious sense of right and righteousness, connects with the true God, which connects with the Will revealed in his Word, which connects with the true essentials for man’s salvation. To rest on law is to glorify God, and that is to know the Will, and that is to test out and to accept the essentials. This is the picture of a genuine Jew who is saved by the Old Testament revelation, whose praise is from God (v. 29). Make false Judaism out of it, and Paul’s argument is derailed. But this beautiful picture is only an assumption in regard to the Jewish moralist, an assumption by means of which Paul reveals the reality regarding this Jewish moralist, the monstrous picture which is his real photograph.

If Christians are to flee his holy moralism as a deadly thing that is worse than the godlessness and unrighteousness of men in general (1:18–32), worse even than the moralism of the Greek (2:1–16), and if this Jewish moralist himself is to be saved by casting off his moralism as the deadly thing it is, then what this assumption reveals as to the reality in the case of this moralist must be clearly seen. Paul makes the beautiful assumption to make his readers see that dreadful reality hidden in this moralism.

By means of two participles the assumption is extended, the first showing the source from which this Jewish moralist is supposed to be drawing (he thinks he is really using this source); the second showing, and that at length, what he is supposed to be as a result of using this source; in fact, he is persuaded that he is all this. “As being instructed out of the Law” with its present participle means receiving constant instruction. Here we have the articulated ὁνόμος, and in order to distinguish it the better from νόμος in general (v. 17, 23) we capitalize: “the Law,” the Tora, the Old Testament as a whole. The Jewish moralist certainly used the whole Old Testament; sections taken from all parts of it were read regularly in the synagogue, and he would be a constant attendant, a diligent student.

Yet even this point in Paul’s assumption is narrowed by the commentators. Τὰδιαφέροντα, however translated, are said to be “of course those in the moral sense,” pertaining to morals alone; and so the instruction of this Jew is thought to be one regarding morals alone, those taught by the Mosaic code. This narrowing is then continued by the next participle with all its object predicates. Paul’s assumption, however, is in accord with what this moralist himself claims, that he is instructed from the entire Old Testament with reference to all it contains regarding the whole truth concerning God, his entire Will, all the essentials regarding salvation. But it is again only Paul’s assumption, and v. 20 shows the full range of what this Jewish moralist is assumed to have as the result of the Bible instruction assumed to have been absorbed by him. What he actually got from his actual instruction is again an entirely different matter. Paul will expose it to this moralist’s confounding and to warn all his readers.

Romans 2:19

19 With τε the connection between the assumed instruction and the assumed confidence of this moralist is made close, and it is close. Read together in one breath “as constantly instructed out of the Law and as also confident in regard to thyself,” etc., the adverbial accusative “thyself” is to be construed with the participle and not with the infinitive. The perfect tense implies that, having become persuaded and confident, this man now continues so.

Paul is considering the Jewish moralist, and the business of every moralist is the reformation of others. See how the moralist judges “the other man” in v. 1. Therefore the assumptions follow that line, regarding what this Jewish moralist is confident that he is for other men: “to be guide of men blind,” etc. “Blind” are those who have no eyes to see, he is “guide” for such; “those in darkness” are those who are prevented from seeing by darkness, he is “light” for them. The two form a pair and there is a chiasm in the terms: from “guide” to “light” is a great step upward, from “blind” to just being “in darkness” a step downward.

Romans 2:20

20 The second pair: “educator of men ignorant, teacher of babes,” is chiastic in the other direction, for such an educator is more than such a teacher, and men who have grown up in ignorance are in a worse state than the infant beginners. The first pair is also literal and thus helps to interpret the second pair which is figurative. In the Scripture many figures are thus followed by something literal in order to aid in their correct interpretation. Mighty man this moralist. Four predicates are required to picture him in Paul’s assumption; he feels capable of serving anybody and everybody with his moralism.

And why not? “Having the genuine form of the knowledge and of the truth of the Law,” ἔχοντα reaches back through the four predicate accusatives to σεαυτόν: confident “regarding thyself—as having,” etc. The whole thing is assumptive; what this man really has is by no means what is made the assumption. The μόρφωσις is “the genuine form” and not only “the outline or semblance” (Abbott-Smith). In the two places where this word appears in the New Testament it is passive in the sense of what the act of forming produces, “the form.” The genitives are objective and belong together. “In the Law” (here again the whole Old Testament) the assumption is that this moralist possesses the genuine form of the real knowledge which any man may attain and of the real truth which that knowledge may include. Paul does not intend to say that this man has only a mere outward form or semblance of the knowledge and of the truth, nor that this man is proud, arrogant in what he thinks he has.

Paul’s assumptions are not restricted to moral works, to the Mosaic legal code, but include the whole substance of knowledge and of truth of the entire Old Testament. This moralist is persuaded that he has all of it and can, therefore, be everything to these other men. In this respect he resembles Paul himself who had the same persuasion and confidence, yet with this difference that Paul’s confidence extended also to the New Testament fulfillment. The fact that the moralist’s confidence is wholly false, Paul’s wholly true, needs no proof. Paul proves it right here; but he does it by the most effective means, not by directly denying what this moralist’s confidence assumes (against which this man would only protest vehemently), but by assuming as real all that this man is confident he has (against which he cannot protest), by this very assumption striking his confidence a deadly blow.

Romans 2:21

21 The recognition that Paul does not begin the apodosis here but continues the protasis until he reaches v. 23, is becoming general; this also implies that Paul did not write questions. Correct our versions on both points. Very decisive is the fact that οὖν is to be construed with the subjects of the clauses of v. 21, 22, and that it cannot be inserted into their predicates. We should construe: if thou “as the one accordingly teaching another—as the one preaching,” etc. We cannot construe: “accordingly thou dost not teach thyself—thou dost thyself steal,” etc.

Nor is οὖν the proper word for introducing protases. The assumption that one is a Jew and has all the prerogatives here named, down to teaching another, preaching not to steal, etc., by no means proves that such a man does not teach himself, himself steals, etc. To assert or even to assume it on no better grounds is not to convict but to slander him. For this reason our versions regard these statements as questions and try to save Paul from slander by letting the Jew convict himself. But where is the Jew who is ready to do that after you assume all the high things here named by Paul? Οὖν is resumptive; the four ὁ, substantivizing present participles, are in apposition with the emphatic σύ in v. 17 and, like it, are to be construed with εἰ: if thou “as teaching therefore (οὖν: as just stated) another, dost not teach thyself”; if thou (as just stated) “as the one preaching not to steal dost thyself steal,” etc.

We have four subjects that have a good content, and οὖν draws the good assumed in them out of all the good already assumed regarding this moralist (v. 17–20); then in the same breath and after the same “if” (v. 17) four awful predicates: “if—thou dost not teach thyself, dost steal, dost commit adultery, dost rob temples.” See the mastery in bringing in this assumption of evil after so much assumption of good; see the effect! Every assumption of reality makes us wonder whether the reality assumed exists in actuality. The more these assumptions are accumulated, the more we wonder. But it is impossible that all of this good should even for one moment exist beside this evil. Yea, the higher the assumptions of good are heaped up, the swifter and the more resounding will be their collapse when the assumptions of evil arrive. For this reason Paul makes the catalog of the assumptions of good so long.

More than this. These are assumptions in a condition of reality and not assertions. Hence these four evil points are not direct charges as little as the long list of good points was actual praise. This moralist is not charged and thus cannot arise and shout “no, no” in denial. These assumptions of evil, like the assumptions of good, are direct blows at his conscience. If the assumptions of evil were made alone, he might ward them off, but being, as they are, accompanied by this array of assumptions of good, all of which are so delightful to him, the evil ones confound him.

What can his conscience say? In the case of the man himself this inner self-conviction is Paul’s aim, and in the case of his Christian readers the purpose is that they shall see this man’s self-conviction, see that moralism, so far from saving even its highest exponents, convicts them, yea, unless they repent and drop their moralism, destroys them.

The simplicity and, we may say, the boldness of Paul in selecting the evils for his final assumptions should not escape us. After the general assumption; “if thou as the one teaching another dost not teach thyself,” he cites three samples from the most common morality, stealing, adultery, temple robbing, three that even the casuist in morals must condemn. For that very reason they are so destructive for this moralism, so convincing in every way. It is morally axiomatic that a teacher must first teach himself, especially in religion. That was the self-condemnation of the scribes and the Pharisees, the Jewish moralists, that they sat as teachers in Moses’ seat and yet “they say and do not,” Matt. 23:1–3. But this is the constant flaw of moralism: it always tells others and not itself.

Let no one deceive himself on that point. Moralism cannot change the heart of even the moralist himself. Despite all its teaching of others it leaves the own heart untaught and does no better for others. Paul is so bold in this first and basic assumption of evil because he is so sure. Jesus was also entirely certain.

Boldly he offers the first assumption: “if thou as the one preaching not to steal dost steal.” Do not exclaim that this surely cannot be possible. Forget not the despicable stealing which Jesus himself openly charged against these very Jewish moralists, devouring widows’ houses, Matt. 23:14. Moralism is powerless to free even the moralist’s own heart from covetousness and greed and thus of in any number of ways appropriating what does not belong to him; and yet he will continue his moral preachment. Paul knows that this Jewish moralist’s lips will remain sealed and will offer no denial of the assumption. By openly directing attention to this divine commandment men will start to examine the moralist on this point—and lo, what they will find! Only a foolish moralist would deny this and thereby only precipitate a keener examination and a fuller exposure.

Romans 2:22

22 This is true also with regard to the Sixth Commandment. No moralism has ever been invented that could free the heart from lasciviousness. Read Matt. 15:19. With a heart like that due to moralism, how could the conduct be free from corresponding stain? While John 8:1–11 is not a product of John’s pen, the account itself is yet true, and v. 7–9 are most pertinent here. Let this moralist deny and violate his own conscience if he will; he will precipitate his own more complete exposure through his own friends and neighbors.

This is a Jewish moralist and as such will profess to abhor idols. Stealing and adultery belong to the common stock of moralists, idols to the select Jewish stock. In regard to this point Paul’s assumption is not: “thou worshipest idols.” It is keener: despite all his abhorring of idols this moralist appropriates what belongs to idols, what bears their damnable stain. He robs temples, which is the acknowledged meaning of ἱεροσυλεῖν. In Acts 19:37 the town chancellor asserts that Paul and his companions were not ἱερόσυλοι, “temple robbers,” referring to the temple of Diana in Ephesus. Everything that had to do with idols was βδέλυγμα to the Jew, which is the noun “abhorrence” for the participle βδελυσσόμενος, “abhorring,” here used by Paul. The Jews had special prohibitions in regard to this matter which go back to Deut. 7:25, etc., and forward to the Talmud.

The point to be considered is not the stealing, which is already fully covered. It is the violation of the first principle of Judaism itself, its abhorrence of all idols. To snatch some jewel, gold, or silver, or other valuable from an idol temple, to buy it from another, to work it up into something else, to sell it, yea, even to touch it and in any way to possess it, really destroyed a Jew’s Judaism. For this reason Paul selects this crime and places it last; it cancels the very first favorable assumption, “if thou denominatest thyself Jew.” What a Jew! Paul’s last assumption ties into his very first; the protasis is perfectly designed.

Now as to the reality note that this letter is directed to Rome, the city of idol worship and idol temples, not to Jerusalem where none existed. This shows the pertinency of this final assumption which, of course, makes particeps criminis any connection with things robbed as indicated.

The view that the robbery refers to the Temple of God in Jerusalem and consists in withholding tithes and offerings (Malachi 3:8–10) on the part of stingy Jews contradicts the facts as known regarding the scribes and the Pharisees; they scrupulously paid tithes of all they possessed (Luke 18:11), even of mint, dill, and cummin (Matt. 23:23). This is enough. Besides, this view blunts the point regarding idols. We must then allegorize: idols = the idolatry of covetousness. Or still more strange: “You profess great reverence for God in eschewing idolatry and yet in other forms you are guilty of the greatest irreverence” (Hodge)—which is scarcely Paul’s thought.

Romans 2:23

23 Now at last we have the apodosis: “thou, the very one who gloriest in law, dishonorest God through the transgression of the Law, for,” etc. We have the demonstrative relative ὅς. In order to bring out its force we translate: thou, “the very one who” (it depends on “thou” in v. 17). It is this demonstrative force of the relative which shows that we now have the apodosis. The relative often has this force so that at times it adds what is practically a new sentence. It resembles the use of a participle for expressing the main thought in the Greek. Those who begin the apodosis with v. 21 regard this ὅς as a relative. It is then scarcely different from the four ὁ with the participles that precede.

Paul’s apodosis is a verdict. His conclusio draws the inescapable inference from the long list of conditions laid down. But that involves the cancellation of the conditional clauses that assumed a good by the four that predicate evil. To his verdict Paul might append: quod erat demonstrandum. There is no longer a question as to whether this Jewish moralist will accept this verdict or rebel against it; for in the latter case he will be pointed to the clauses on which the verdict rests. He is at once condemned and silenced like any criminal who, after all of the evidence is in, is properly sentenced.

This verdict summarizes the evidence contained in the double and contradictory protases. The favorable ones are gathered up in: “the very one who gloriest in law”; the contradictory in: “the very one—through the transgression of the Law.” These two are even juxtaposed so as to bring out their contradictory force. The difference between glorying in “law” and transgressing “the Law” should not be overlooked. We have defined it above: “law” in v. 17, “the Law” in v. 18, 20. This Jewish moralist rests on law and glories in it as his security—“law” as the expression of righteousness, the supreme divine norm for all men; and yet he is here convicted of flagrantly transgressing the plainest, commonest parts of the ordinary moral law laid down in “the Law,” the Old Testament itself given especially to Jews.

What, then, is the verdict? “Thou art dishonoring God!” This formulation is due to v. 17: “thou gloriest in God”—a fine way to glory in him by dishonoring him! More important still, this formulation condemns the moralist as a moralist, for moralists make it their business to lay down the law to others, see v. 19, 20 in regard to what this Jewish moralist wanted to be for others, and the subjects in v. 21, 22 in regard to what he does for others. What is he really doing for all these others whom he blesses with his moralism? Dishonoring God!

Romans 2:24

24 “For the name of God is blasphemed because of you among the Gentiles,” etc. This is a part of the verdict, for the point is not what this man as a sinful Jew perpetrates to his own hurt, but what, as a Jewish moralist, he perpetrates to the hurt of those whom he would correct. These Gentiles are not so blind, in darkness, ignorant, and such babes (v. 19, 20) that they cannot see a few things, namely the very contradiction brought out in Paul’s protasis: all these holy claims of the moralist who would teach and guide them by his moralism and then himself vitiates them by the immoral acts he, this moralist himself, commits. The effect is that these Gentiles blaspheme “the name of God,” not “God” as such but his “Name,” which is placed forward for the sake of emphasis.

This is the first time we find ὄνομα used with reference to God (so also with reference to Christ); it always means his revelation by which he draws nigh to us, makes himself known, and by which we may, indeed, know him so as to trust him and to be saved by him. His name is the door to him and at the same time the power that draws us through this door. To blaspheme the Name, then, is to revile and to mock and shamefully to treat the very means that are intended to save. Paul is not speaking of the harm which is done God but of the mortal hurt which these Gentiles receive through the moralism of these moralists. Of course, the moralist’s greater damnation is assured as far as he is personally concerned, Matt. 23:14.

Here Paul uses the plural. He does not say, “because of thee,” but “because of you,” thereby showing that the one Jewish moralist thus far addressed is one of a class. Paul appends: “as it has been written,” the perfect tense, “and thus stands so to this day.” Since this phrase is placed after the words referred to, it indicates that no formal quotation is intended but only a free adoption of a line found in Isa. 52:5, a fuller elaboration of which is found in Ezek. 36:20–23, which presents God’s great concern for his Name. In its rendering of Isa. 52:5 the LXX inserted διʼ ὑμᾶς, thus translating interpretatively, for it was because of the Jews in the Babylonian captivity that their heathen captors blasphemed the Name. Paul retains this phrase, not as quoting it in its original sense, but as adopting it for the sense now expressed. The view that, because the LXX referred to all the Jews in the captivity, Paul must in this section of his letter likewise have all Jews in mind, is incorrect, for he is only adopting an Old Testament expression. The legitimacy of using another’s words for our own purpose should not be questioned; all good writers do that and often without indicating that the words are borrowed from another.

Romans 2:25

25 Paul’s “thou” continues in v. 25–27. The same Jewish moralist is addressed, but now as the self-convicted man that he is, a transgressor of the Tora, a dishonorer of God, a bringer of blasphemy on the name of God among the Gentiles. Beside him, a Jew and such a transgressor of the Law, Paul now places one of these Gentiles, a non-Jew but a fulfiller of the Law, and with a simple question that this Jewish moralist may answer for himself the apostle lets him complete his self-conviction, the fact that he is condemned in spite of the grand advantages of the Jew, namely the written Word and circumcision (v. 27). And the sum of this self-convicting procedure in the case of this moralist is that his entire moralism, and even its boast of circumcision and trust in that, are ruined for him, and that he himself is forced to do the ruining, so that all of Paul’s Roman readers may see it so thoroughly and completely done; for none of it, absolutely none of it can give us the circumcision of the heart and the spirit and thus the praise of God. This Jewish moralist mistakes himself for a real Jew who is able to make others real Jews; what a real Jew is he now learns for the first time: any man, even a Gentile, whose heart and spirit are circumcised, which calls for something that is vastly better than self-convicting Jewish moralism.

The point of this paragraph is missed when Paul’s personal “thou” is regarded as a blanket address to all Jews as Jews, and when some of the Roman Christians are introduced, namely those of Jewish extraction who are still infected with old Jewish notions and thus refuse to assent to Paul’s doctrine of universal human sinfulness. As far as the latter are concerned, the polemics against them are inserted into this paragraph by the commentators, the words of Paul contain no trace of such polemics.

As far as Jews in general are concerned, what is overlooked is the fact that their religious leaders, the ones who were most admired and followed by the great body of the nation, were these moralists, the scribes and the Pharisees, the rabbis. These moralistic leaders Paul is driving into abject self-conviction. After these leaders have been self-annihilated, the whole body of Jews is deprived of the Jewish moralism in which it had been led to trust. What would they have after their moralistic leaders were overthrown? Nothing! Nothing at all.

They were in no better condition than the great body of the Gentiles whose moralistic leaders Paul had likewise overthrown. Paul’s artillery destroys the leaders. That brings about complete victory, permanent victory. No rebellion ever will arise. The evil of moralism is destroyed at its very source. What is there after nothing is left of moralism for leader or for follower?

That is the very purpose: nothing left, nothing—except the gospel!

A very common view is: 1:18–32 proves Gentiles sinners; 2:1–3:20 proves Jews sinners; 3:21 presents the gospel which both need. A much better view is: 1:18–32 proves all men sinners (with no distinction whatever); 2:1–29 that all moralists, also the Jewish moralist, are self-convicted, and that there is no help for sin from moralism: thus the gospel alone saves.

For circumcision profits if thou practice law; but if thou be a transgressor of law, thy circumcision is become foreskin. If, then, the foreskin keep the righteous ordinances of the law, shall not his foreskin be reckoned as circumcision? and shall not the foreskin due to nature, by fulfilling the Law, judge thee, the transgressor of law despite written record and circumcision?

Here γάρ is plainly not illative, for it does not introduce a reason but is only explanatory as it is in a large number of instances. The point explained is circumcision; for this is a Jewish moralist, and in his moralistic system of law, which he propounds as the salvation of the world, the law of circumcision holds first place. Paul, of course, treats it only as a side issue, a fort that automatically falls when the main citadel capitulates. That citadel and all its bastions are described in v. 17–20 and were forced to capitulate in v. 21–24. The artillery that caused the capitulation consisted of a few commandments of the Jewish Law itself, the bombs of which exploded with deadly effect in the very heart of this moralistic citadel. The Jewish moralist surrendered as a Jewish transgressor of the moral Law of Judaism.

Note that “the transgression of the Law” in v. 23 reappears in “transgression of law,” v. 25, and in “the transgressor,” v. 27. Paul turns the same artillery on this outwork of Jewish moralism, circumcision; a few shots, and it joins the general capitulation.

To explain further (γάρ) Paul says to this moralist, “Let it be understood that circumcision profits, i.e., is worth a great deal.” There is no issue whatever in regard to that. But it profits and is valuable only on one condition: “if thou practice law.” That, too, needs no proof. “But if thou be a transgressor, thy circumcision has become foreskin,” has become that from the moment when thy transgression of law set in. To speak of circumcision “becoming” foreskin is a strong way of stating that it is no better, avails no more than never having been circumcised, to be like the Gentile who has kept his foreskin. Μέν and δέ contrast the statements, and both of them are so self-evident as to be almost axiomatic. Ah, if only circumcision made a transgressor of law over into a practicer of law! But does it? We must note the two ἐάν conditions of expectancy.

Circumcision profits, yes it does, the expectation being that thou, O moralist, practicest accordingly; but if this expectation fails and its opposite occurs, what does circumcision amount to? To foreskin, to not a bit more!

The two clauses introduced by ἐάν sway neither in the one direction nor in the other; they keep an even balance, do that purposely. A circumcised Jew may or may not be a doer of law; may or may not be a transgressor of law. It all depends. It is not the circumcision that decides, and that is the vital point. Judaism had many men who were like this Jewish moralist, who were circumcised properly enough and yet were rank transgressors of law (see the story of the Gospels and of Acts); again, Judaism had men who were true children of God (Joseph, Zacharias, Simeon, the shepherds of Bethlehem, the Baptist, to mention only these). They had circumcised hearts and spirits; they believed the Old Testament gospel; they were justified and righteous; their lives were according; and when Christ and the New Testament gospel came, they believed them with the same faith.

We know how circumcision profited them: it was the seal of the old covenant of grace and promise, of the covenant in which they actually lived, all the blessings of which they actually possessed. This seal sealed the covenant and the blessings to them; they could not have had them without this seal. Yes, circumcision profits mightily when this condition accompanies it. But it is a different story when the condition is the opposite. Circumcision cries out against the transgressor of law who is circumcised. His life shows that he is as far from the covenant as is the pagan who has foreskin, and yet he would bear the seal and would boast of being circumcised.

Paul does not say that the moralist whom he is addressing is such a transgressor of law. He has just said that very thing in v. 21–24, and that is valid for the following; this moralist even had to convict himself. All that Paul does now is to show that this self-conviction destroys also all benefit of this moralist’s circumcision, yea, destroys the circumcision itself as though it had never been performed.

We ought to note that Paul writes “law,” without the article, exactly as he did in v. 17, 25, and not “the Law,” as in v. 18, 20, 23. This difference is important. When Paul speaks of the circumcised man, the Jew, he uses only “law” and not, as we might expect, “the (Mosaic) Law,” does it even a third time in v. 27; while, when he speaks of the foreskin, the Gentile, he twice uses “the Law” and not, as we should expect, “law.” Is this accidental, unintentional? With the great covenant seal of salvation for

Judaism went “law” as such, the obedience of faith and of life to God’s will as such, and not merely the Mosaic code; the annulment of that seal and of all that it sealed was the disobedience to “law” in this deep and true sense. The circumcised heart and spirit of the Gentile, however, willingly bound itself also to “the Law” and used what Moses gave in the old covenant for his heart and his life.

Another point regarding “law” and “the Law.” The self-conviction of all moralists comes about by means of their evil deeds. It begins in v. 1: “the same things thou art committing”; it continues in v. 6: “to each one according to his works,” and then “law, law” in v. 13, etc. Then follows the Jewish moralist in particular who rests and glories in “law” (v. 17, 23), has “the Law” but dishonors God by deeds that are “transgression of the Law” (v. 18, 20, 23). With this compare what is said about the deeds of the godly whom God acquits in the final judgment (v. 7, etc.); working the good (v. 10), justified as “doers of law” (v. 13). So also in v. 27: “foreskin fulfilling the Law.”

This use of “law,” “the Law,” and deeds evil and good is so far from work-righteousness that it destroys everything of the kind by causing the self-conviction of all moralism. “Law,” including that of Moses, both his code and the whole Old Testament, accepted in obedience or defied in disobedience, produces in each the evidence of the deeds which show beyond question how a man stands with God. What is here said about circumcision and about foreskin and their connection with law and the Law should not be placed at the time of the final judgment, and λογισθήσεται and κρινεῖ in v. 27 postponed to this future date. Because v. 5, etc., deals with the final judgment, also v. 27 is supposed to place us there. Back of this lies the view that this chapter is directed at all Jews, puts all of them on the same level with Gentiles.

Romans 2:26

26 Beside the two ἐάν clauses dealing with circumcision, i.e., Jews, one practicing law, the other transgressing law, Paul places a third ἐάν clause, but this one has οὖν, for it is a legitimate deduction from the two preceding ἐάν statements. If the decisive thing is practicing and not transgressing law, and if the decisive thing even for the Jew is not merely circumcision, then (οὖν) what about it “if the foreskin keep the righteous ordinances of the Law”? The condition is again one of expectancy. In actual life there were many such cases among the proselytes of the gate, who were uncircumcised but, like Cornelius in Caesarea, most devout, and not merely in “law” as such but even in “the Law,” giving alms, observing the fixed hours for prayer (Acts 10:2), being esteemed by the Jews themselves as just men, of good report among them all (Acts 10:22). “Then,” οὖν (in accord with what has just been said about law in the case of the good and in the case of the bad Jew), what shall, what must be said about such an uncircumcised Gentile?

Paul is most exact when he says that this Gentile (“the foreskin” names him according to this abstract, most distinctive term) “keeps or guards,” not “the Law” (every part of its ceremonialism, circumcision, kosher eating, for instance), but “the righteous ordinances of the Law,” the δικαιώματα (the singular is explained in 1:32) laid down by God, the things that God has judicially fixed as right and righteous in his own revealed Law and juridically approved in advance. The ceremonial features of “the Law” were temporary, but its “righteous ordinances” were permanent. Circumcision, kosher eating, etc., would cease according to God’s own will but not fear, love, and trust in God, true use of his name, prayer, worship in faith, and the true godly life.

What about such a Gentile? “Shall not his foreskin be reckoned as circumcision?” The εἰς is used for the predicate nominative (R. 481). It certainly shall. This Jewish moralist himself would not dare to deny that fact. The very word “righteous ordinances” already contains God’s own verdict on such a Gentile, the verdict already laid down in “the Law,” in the whole Old Testament. And the passive, “shall it not be reckoned?” includes God as the one who does this reckoning, God who certainly would not contradict his own righteous ordinances. The abstract term “the foreskin” refers concretely to this Gentile man, hence we have the possessive “his” foreskin.

To reckon his foreskin as circumcision means to accept it as though it were circumcision, i.e., to make no difference between the two. If even in the case of the Jew the decisive thing is doing law and not transgressing law; if even in his case circumcision is not the decisive thing, shall the absence of circumcision in this Gentile be decisive, shall not his keeping the righteous ordinances count in his case, too, as it would in the case of a real Jew? The truth of the point is beyond question.

Does this wipe out circumcision? We have already answered this question. Circumcision was God’s seal for the covenant people and not the covenant itself. And now a new covenant had superseded the old. The old seal, once so separative, was so no longer in the new covenant which was to be open to all nations. But the righteous ordinances stood unchanged, they stand so today.

On them everything depends. For the first time we here have λογίζομαι used in its judicial sense, “to reckon something as a substitute, as an equivalent”; we shall notice this verb repeatedly. The striking thing in the force of this verb is the fact that not only what one has not is in his case regarded as the thing he has, but even what he has (foreskin) is regarded as its direct opposite (circumcision); and, of course, the man in question is treated accordingly. C.-K. 681. More must be said. To reckon thus is so far removed from being arbitrary, unfair, unjust, as to be the direct opposite.

In his righteousness God cannot reckon otherwise in all these cases. He could not do so in the present case. This Jewish moralist himself dares not call this reckoning of foreskin as circumcision wrong.

“Shall it not be reckoned?” is a future tense. This future is sometimes dated at the time of the final judgment. But why the postponement? There is no reason. Those Gentiles with whom Paul confounded the Jewish moralist have been dead a long time; the last day and its true reckoning will only repeat in public, before all the world, what God reckoned to these Gentiles when they lived according to his righteous ordinances here on earth and died as they lived. Some call this a “logical” future, but no grammar lists such a type of future. This is the regular future that is used in the apodosis of a condition of expectancy; after ἐάν with the subjunctive there follows a future indicative. Consult any grammar.

Romans 2:27

27 The admission to which Paul brings this Jewish moralist by means of the question introduced by οὐχί and its inevitable affirmative answer is now driven home by a simple extension of the question. In v. 26 Paul compels this man to drop his wonderful circumcision with which, in his legalistic moralism, he wanted to bless the whole world so that it would not need the gospel. But this is a bombshell which he is forced to drop, it does not merely leave him with empty hands, it explodes the moment he lets it go and tears him to pieces. It is not healthy to oppose Paul with a piece of moralism, certainly not with a piece that is as dangerous as circumcision.

This Gentile is safe in God’s hands, for God reckons his foreskin as circumcision; but this moralistic Jew who has to let go of his boast of circumcision—“shall not the foreskin due to nature, by fulfilling the Law, judge thee, the transgressor of law despite written record and circumcision?” The circumcision which this moralist is forced to drop as far as this Gentile is concerned turns into a judgment on this moralist; this foreskin, on which he concentrated his judgment and saw salvation only in its removal by circumcision, turns into judgment on this circumcised Jewish moralist himself as not being saved at all by this or by any other part of his moralism. The delusion regarding the saving power of moralism of the Jewish type is destroyed at its very source, in the person of its great protagonists and teachers. Destroyed thus, it has no value for all followers and pupils of these supposed masters, for their Jewish pupils, and for any Gentiles or even Christians who might think of listening to them in order to get something from them.

“Shall not the foreskin judge thee?” Although the verb used in this statement is neutral and may mean either acquit or condemn, here the judging can result only in the latter. And the tense is the future just as in v. 26: judge right now and for this very reason and only for this reason also at the last day. This is a judging like that mentioned in Matt. 12:41, 42. This Gentile does not seat himself on the judgment throne, he does not serve even as accuser or as accusing witness; his mere presence as the man that he is judges this Jewish moralist as the man that he is, of course, in the presence of God where judgment cannot be perverted.

This judging rests on two pairs of undeniable facts, and each pair consists of opposites. This Gentile has foreskin but has it only ἐκφύσεως, “due to nature,” and thus not as involving a base attitude of heart toward God who himself brought him into the world with foreskin. But this Jewish moralist has “written record and circumcision” (no articles, which stresses the quality of the nouns. Both are far more than mere nature, for this “writing” is the whole Old Testament, and “circumcision” is the seal of the great old covenant established by this writing. This is the first pair of opposites.

It is linked with the second pair. This is a Gentile “fulfilling the Law”; but this moralistic Jew is “a transgressor of law,” self-convicted as such in v. 21–24. This Gentile fulfills what the great Tora teaches, the saving δικαιώματα of the Tora, fear, love, and trust in God, etc., as stated above; but this moralistic Jew is a transgressor of even “law” as such, being guilty of deeds such as stealing, etc., v. 21. And now the intertwining. One would expect this Gentile to be “a transgressor of law,” and certainly not this great Jewish moralist; but the reverse is true. One would expect this Jew who has “written record and circumcision” (the great covenant seal) to be fulfilling the Law, and scarcely the Gentile who has foreskin due to nature; but again the reverse is true.

Is this a double anomaly? Not at all. Paul only compares these opposites and does not yet add to what they are due; but we already know: this Gentile found the gospel, this Jewish moralist rejected the gospel and observed circumcision only as a legal thing and not as the gospel covenant seal of the written record of God’s Old Testament.

Moreover, do not overlook the preceding ἐάν. These are cases that may be expected, they are treated as such, and the conclusion holds in their case alone. One cannot say that all Jews are referred to and yet not go on and say that all Gentiles are referred to. Some Jews and some Gentiles were children of God, most of both groups were not. Paul is considering a Gentile who was a child of God and a Jew who was not. He selects an ordinary Gentile who was but not an ordinary Jew who was not.

To think the latter is misleading. He selects the finest sample of a Jewish moralist, the strongest exponent of false Judaism, the worst of all gospel foes, the great leader who conducts all, Jews as well as Gentiles, into heaven (as he supposes) through the door of his moralism. This is the Jew whom Paul lets a common Gentile child of God convict and condemn in order that this Jew himself and all men may flee from this door as being one of the entrances to hell.

Διά = “in spite of.” Its idea of “through, between” refers to the action which passes through what may be favorable or may be hostile to it. Here it is the latter. Written record and circumcision ought to prevent this Jew from being a transgressor; he is one “in spite of” both. See Stellhorn, Romans; German translators feel this and add trotz in parenthesis.

Γράμμα, too, is not “letter” nor only the two stone tables. Was that all that this Jew had in writing? Was this the only writing to deter him from being a transgressor of law? Was this writing all that made real Jews what they were and some Gentiles children of God? To ask is to answer. The great Gramma despite which the moralist was what he was, is the entire Old Testament.

C.-K. 267 makes γράμμα the equivalent of the secular Vorschrift (generally in the plural), “written order or enactment,” which is here combined with “circumcision” and makes this Jew subject to that legal order. Διά is then regarded as having the force of “through”: “thee as transgressor of law through written enactment and circumcision” (subject to that enactment); and “through” is explained by saying that through the written enactment the sin is charged against the transgressor. But “through written enactment” cannot be construed with παραβάτης, one who steps to the side, deviates, for he does this on his own accord, “through” nothing but his own wickedness. And what single written order could Paul have in mind when he mentioned several in v. 21, 22?

Romans 2:28

28 The self-answering question addressed to the Jewish moralist seals his self-conviction. Yes, this foreskin adjudges him as “transgressor of law.” “For” usually is regarded as supplying the reason; but the reason that he must be judged so is stated at length in v. 21–24 and need not be restated. This “for” is explanatory. It explains what this moralist and all of us are to see in this judgment of the moralistic Jew by the godly Gentile. For not the visible one is a Jew, and not the visible one in flesh, circumcision; but the invisible Jew and circumcision of heart in spirit, not written record: he whose praise is not derived from men but derived from God. This translation shows how we regard the Greek, namely chiastically: the predicates in v. 28 fill out the subjects, and the subjects in v. 29 imply the necessary predicates, the whole being a beautiful example of great terseness coupled with balance.

When we look at this Jewish moralist we see (and he, too, is to see) what a real Jew and real circumcision are, and what this moralist and many who are misled by him have mistakenly and to their own great hurt imagined them to be. “The visible one” is not a Jew at all—he may be far worse than a Gentile. Ὁ and ἡ substantivize the phrases. “The visible one,” in flesh, is not circumcision at all—he may be far worse than foreskin. The phrases mean “in public,” the opposite being “in secret” (v. 29). For this reason circumcision is explained by the addition of “in flesh,” minus the article, as “in spirit” is added as an explanation for the opposite (v. 29). Translate the phrases by means of adjectives: “the visible one, physical,” visible as being physical.

Romans 2:29

29 Over against these two negatives stand the two positives: “on the contrary (ἀλλά after a negation), the invisible Jew,” he is a real Jew; “and heart circumcision in spirit,” it is the real thing. “Outwardly” and “inwardly” in our versions are also good translations of the Greek phrases; it is impossible to render them as phrases in English. Deut. 10:16: “Circumcise therefore the foreskin of your heart, and be no more stiff-necked.” Deut. 30:6: “And the Lord thy God will circumcise thine heart, and the heart of thy seed, to love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, that thou mayest live.” The claim that this genuine Judaism and this circumcision were not possible until Christ came makes impossible salvation for all Jews who lived before Christ, makes a farce of the entire old covenant, consigns every Old Testament saint to that fiction, the sheol of the realm of the dead, to lie there in the dark until Christ should release him. Thank God, even in the darkest decline of Judaism God always had his true saints, Jews at heart, circumcised in spirit.

Because Paul says “of heart,” it has been supposed that it is impossible to add “in spirit” as referring to this Jew’s own spirit but only as referring to the Holy Spirit, of whom we are then told, what no one would deny, that he alone bestows circumcision of the heart. Who could guess that in this connection the opposite of “in flesh” is not “in spirit” but “in (the) Spirit”? The doubling of the terms “of heart in spirit” emphasizes the inward spirituality, and in the last clause of a series we usually have more fulness. Physical circumcision calls for its exact and true opposite which is not merely circumcision of the heart but spiritual circumcision.

Since the subject of v. 25–29 is circumcision, the description of the genuine circumcision is elaborate in this last clause. Although it is positive after the preceding negative statement: “circumcision of heart in spirit,” a negative is, nevertheless, added: “not (in) written record.” Γράμμα must be identical in meaning with γράμμα in v. 27, “written record,” the Old Testament. In v. 27 “written record and circumcision” appear together in one phrase. Circumcision of the heart is connected with a man’s “spirit” and not merely with “a written record” such as the Jew had in his Old Testament. Why does Paul add this statement about “written record”? Because he has just said that this moralistic Jew, “in spite of written record and circumcision” (in mere outward compliance with it), is no Jew at all; so he now says that the true circumcision is “not in written record,” in mere outward compliance with such a record.

The Greek word cannot be translated “letter” and defined as the Mosaic law or even as only the law requiring circumcision. This is generally regarded as being self-evident. But even the legalistic, moralistic Jew believed that circumcision was embedded in the entire Old Testament and was not merely demanded in the specific command regarding it. Who does not know that this kind of a Jew imagined that all the Old Testament blessings were his just because he had circumcision in the flesh? This is the fiction Paul destroys. And this is setting aside the Old Testament as little as it is a setting aside of that part of it which demanded circumcision for the Israelite; for has not Paul said that circumcision profits—yea, but only when one acts accordingly (v. 25), i.e., shows by his life that his heart is circumcised.

What he thus begins to discuss in v. 25 he now completes in v. 29. The whole discussion is a compact unit.

Here we have another demonstrative relative. We might begin a separate sentence: “He, he is the one whose praise is not derived from (this is the force of ἐκ) men but derived from God.” God always sees through to the heart, no question about that; it is folly to think that he sees only what is visible to men, outwardly in the flesh. Men may praise just the latter because they cannot see farther; God never does so. God’s praise, his divine approval, is recorded everywhere in the Scriptures. The true Jew has it there even now, it was spoken to him directly and personally by God’s own lips. The view that God’s praise is bestowed only at the time of the last judgment is another current misunderstanding.

Why such a delay? We may here add that what was true with regard to the Jew and circumcision is still true with regard to the professed Christian and the rite of baptism—not the mere outward application counts with God, whatever men may think, but the inward acceptance and appropriation mediated by the outward means. Yes, baptism, too, profits when our lives show that this baptism has gone to our heart and spirit and is not mere compliance with a written record.

All moralists stand self-convicted, including the Jewish moralist with his circumcision in mere flesh. The moralism they offer men benefits them nothing but only makes them, too, self-convicted. Instead of raising out of guilt, it plunges more deeply into guilt. Paul destroys it so thoroughly because it is the false gospel that hinders the success of the true gospel. This true gospel alone is the power of God unto salvation for all men and in the very first place for both Jew and Greek (1:16).

B.-D. Friedrich Blass’ Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch, vierte, voellig neu-gearbeitete Aufiage besorgt von Albert Debrunner.

C.-K. Biblisch-theologisches Woerterbuch der Neutestamentlichen Graezitaet von D. Dr. Hermann Cremer, zehnte, etc., Auflage, herausgegeben von D. Dr. Julius Koegel.

R. A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research, by A. T. Robertson, fourth edition.

L. Handbuch zum Neuen Testament Dritter Band. Die Briefe des Apostels Paulus. 1. An die Roemer. D. Hans Lietzmann. 2. Auflage.

B.-P. Griechisch-Deutsches Woerterbuch zu den Schriften des Neuen Testaments, etc., von D. Walter Bauer, zweite, etc., Auflage zu Erwin Preuschens Vollstaendigem Griechisch-Deutschen Handwoerterbuch, etc.