a solemn invocation of a superior power, admitted to be acquainted with all the secrets of our hearts, with our inward thoughts as well as our outward actions, to witness the truth of what we assert, and to inflict his vengeance upon us if we assert what is not true, or promise what we do not mean to perform. Almost all nations, whether savage or civilized, whether enjoying the light of revelation or led only by the light of reason, knowing the importance of truth, and willing to obtain a barrier against falsehood, have had recourse to oaths, by which they have endeavoured to make men fearful of uttering lies, under the dread of an avenging Deity. Among Christians, an oath is a solemn appeal for the truth of our assertions, the sincerity of our promises, and the fidelity of our engagements, to the one only God, the Judge of the whole earth, who is every where present, and sees, and hears, and knows, whatever is said, or done, or thought in any part of the world. Such is that Being whom Christians, when they take an oath, invoke to bear testimony to the truth of their words, and the integrity of their hearts. Surely, then, if oaths be a matter of so much moment, it well behoves us not to treat them with levity, nor ever to take them without due consideration. Hence we ought, with the utmost vigilance, to abstain from mingling oaths in our ordinary discourse, and from associating the name of God with low or disgusting images, or using it on trivial occasions, as not only a profane levity in itself, but tending to destroy that reverence for the supreme Majesty which ought to prevail in society, and to dwell in our own hearts.
“The forms of oaths,” says Dr. Paley, “like other religious ceremonies, have in all ages been various; consisting, however, for the most part of some bodily action, and of a prescribed form of words.” Among the Jews, the juror held up his right hand toward heaven, Psa 144:8; Rev 10:5. The same form is retained in Scotland still. Among the Jews, also, an oath of fidelity was taken by the servant’s putting his hand under the thigh of his lord, Gen 24:2. Among the Greeks and Romans, the form varied with the subject and occasion of the oath; in private contracts, the parties took hold of each other’s hands, while they swore to the performance; or they touched the altar of the god by whose divinity they swore: upon more solemn occasions, it was the custom to slay a victim; and the beast being struck down with certain ceremonies and invocations, gave birth to the expression, ferire pactum; and to our English phrase, translated from this, of “striking a bargain.” The form of oaths in Christian countries is also very different: but in no country in the world worse contrived, either to convey the meaning or impress the obligation of an oath, than in our own. The juror with us, after repeating the promise or affirmation which the oath is intended to confirm, adds, “So help me God;” or, more frequently, the substance of the oath is repeated to the juror by the magistrate, who adds in the conclusion, “So help you God.” The energy of this sentence resides in the particle so: So, that is, hac lege, upon condition of my speaking the truth, or performing this promise, and not otherwise, may God help me! The juror, while he hears or repeats the words of the oath, holds his right hand upon a Bible, or other book containing the Gospels, and at the conclusion kisses the book. This obscure and elliptical form, together with the levity and frequency of them, has brought about a general inadvertency to the obligation of oaths, which, both in a religious and political view, is much to be lamented; and it merits public consideration, whether the requiring of oaths upon so many frivolous occasions, especially in the customs, and in the qualification for petty offices, has any other effect than to make such sanctions cheap in the minds of the people. A pound of tea cannot travel regularly from the ship to the consumer, without costing half a dozen oaths at least; and the same security for the due discharge of their office, namely, that of an oath, is required from a churchwarden and an archbishop; from a petty constable and the chief justice of England. Oaths, however, are lawful; and whatever be the form, the signification is the same. Historians have justly remarked, that when the reverence for an oath began to diminish among the Romans, and the loose epicurean system, which discarded the belief of providence, was introduced, the Roman honour and prosperity from that period began to decline. The Quakers refuse to swear upon any occasion, founding their scruples concerning the lawfulness of oaths upon our Saviour’s prohibition, “Swear not at all,” Mat 5:34. But it seems our Lord there referred to the vicious, wanton, and unauthorized swearing in common discourse, and not to judicial oaths; for he himself answered, when interrogated, upon oath, Mat 26:63-64; Mar 14:61. The Apostle Paul also makes use of expressions which contain the nature of oaths, Rom 1:9; 1Co 15:31; 2Co 1:18; Gal 1:20; Heb 6:13-17. The administration of oaths supposes that God will punish false swearing with more severity than a simple lie, or breach of promise; for which belief there are the following reasons:
1. Perjury is a sin of greater deliberation.
2. It violates a superior confidence.
3. God directed the Israelites to swear by his name, Deuteronomy
Heb 6:13; Heb 10:20; and was pleased to confirm his covenant with that people by an oath; neither of which, it is probable, he would have done, had he not intended to represent oaths as having some meaning and effect beyond the obligation of a bare promise.
Oath, an appeal to God in attestation of the truth of what you say, or in confirmation of what you promise or undertake. Cicero correctly terms an oath a religious affirmation; that is, an affirmation with a religious sanction. Hence it appears that there are two essential elements in an oath: first, the human, a declared intention of speaking the truth, or performing the action in a given case; secondly, the divine, an appeal to God, as a Being who knows all things and will punish guilt. According to usage, however, there is a third element in the idea which ’oath’ commonly conveys, namely, that the oath is taken only on solemn, or, more specifically, on juridical occasions.
The essence of an oath lies obviously in the appeal which is thereby made to God, or to divine knowledge and power. The customary form establishes this, ’So help me God.’ The Latin words (known to have been used as early as the sixth century), whence our English form is taken, may be thus rendered: so may God and these holy gospels help me; that is, ’as I say the truth.’ The present custom of kissing a book containing the Gospels has in England taken place of the latter clause in the Latin formula.
Oaths did not take their origin in any divine command. They were a part of that consuetudinary law which Moses found prevalent, and was bound to respect, since no small portion of the force of law lies in custom, and a legislator can neither abrogate nor institute a binding law of his own mere will. Accordingly, Moses made use of the sanction which an oath gave, but in that general manner, and apart from minute directions and express words of approval; which shows that he merely used, without intending to sanction, an instrument that he found in existence and could not safely dispense with. Examples are found in Exo 22:11, where an oath is ordered to be applied in the case of lost property; and here we first meet with what may strictly be called a judicial oath (Lev 6:3-5).
The forms of adjuration found in the Scriptures are numerous. Saul sware unto Jonathan, ’As the Lord liveth’ (1Sa 19:6). ’A heap and a pillar’ were for a witness between Laban and Jacob, with the ensuing for a sanction, ’The God of Abraham and the God of Nahor, the God of their father, judge betwixt us. And Jacob sware by the fear of his father Isaac’ (Gen 31:52, sq.). A common formula is, ’The Lord do so to me and more also’ (Rth 1:17; 1Sa 14:44), which approaches nearly to our modern form, ’So help me God,’ and is obviously elliptical. Reference appears to be had to the ancient custom of slaying some animal in confirmation of a treaty or agreement. The animal thus slain and offered in a burnt offering to God became an image or type, betokening the fate which would attend that one of the two contracting parties who failed in his engagement; subsequently the sacrifice was in ordinary cases omitted, and the form came in itself to have the force of a solemn asseveration.
An oath, making an appeal to the divine justice and power, is a recognition of the divinity of the being to whom the appeal is made. Hence to swear by an idol is to be convicted of idolatry. Such an act is accordingly given in Scripture as a proof of idolatry and a reason for condign punishment. ’How shall I pardon thee for this? Thy children have forsaken me, and sworn by them that are no gods’ (Jer 5:7; Jer 12:16; Amo 8:14; Zep 1:5).
Other beings besides God are sometimes added in the form of an oath: Elijah said to Elisha, ’As the Lord liveth, and as thy soul liveth’ (2Ki 2:2; 1Sa 20:3). The party addressed is frequently sworn by, especially if a prince: ’As thy soul liveth, my lord, I am the woman,’ etc. (1Sa 1:26; 1Sa 17:55; 1Sa 25:26; 2Sa 11:11). The Hebrews as well as the Egyptians swore also by the head or the life of an absent as well as a present prince: ’By the life of Pharaoh’ (Gen 42:15). Hanway says that the most sacred oath among the Persians is ’by the king’s head.’
The oath taker swore sometimes by his own head (Mat 5:36); or by some precious part of his body, as the eyes; sometimes, but only in the case of the later Jews, by the earth, the heaven, and the sun (Mat 5:34-35); as well as by angels; by the temple (Mat 23:16), and even by parts of the temple (Mat 23:16). They also swore by Jerusalem, as the holy city (Mat 5:35). The Rabbinical writers indulge in much prolixity on the subject of oaths, entering into nice distinctions, and showing themselves exquisite casuists.
We have already intimated that it was usual to put the hand under the thigh (Gen 24:2; Gen 47:29). The more usual employment of the hand was to raise it towards heaven; designed, probably, to excite attention, to point out the oath-taker, and to give solemnity to the act (Gen 14:22-23). In the strongly anthropomorphitic language of parts of the Scripture, even God is introduced saying, ’I lift up my hand to heaven, and say, I live forever’ (Deu 32:40). It can only be by the employment of a similar license that the Almighty is represented as in any way coming under the obligation of an oath (Exo 6:8; Eze 20:5). Instead of the head, the phylactery was sometimes touched by the Jews on taking an oath.
The levity of the Jewish nation in regard to oaths, though reproved by some of their doctors, was notorious; and their conduct in this respect was severely censured by Christ himself in language which seems to forbid the use of oaths altogether (Mat 5:34-37; Jas 5:12).
A solemn affirmation accompanied by an appeal to the Supreme Being. God has prohibited all false oaths, and all useless and customary swearing in ordinary discourse; but when the necessity or importance of a matter requires an oath, he allows men to swear by his name, Exo 22:11 Lev 5:1 . To swear by a false god was an act of idolatry, Jer 5:7 12:16.\par Among the Hebrews an oath was administered by the judge, who stood up, and adjured the party who was to be sworn. In this manner our Lord was adjured by Caiaphas, Mat 26:63 . Jesus had remained silent under long examination, when the high priest, rising up, knowing he had a sure mode of obtaining an answer said, "I adjure thee by the living God, that thou tell us whether thou be the Christ." To this oath, thus solemnly administered, Jesus replied that he was indeed the Messiah.\par An oath is a solemn appeal to God, as to an all-seeing witness that what we say is true, and an almighty avenger if what we say be false, Heb 6:16 . Its force depends upon our conviction of the infinite justice of God; that he will not hold those guiltless who take his name in vain; and that the loss of his favor immeasurable outweighs all that could be gained by false witness. It is an act of religious worship; on which account God requires it to be taken in his name, Deu 10:20, and points out the manner in which it ought to be administered, and the duty of the person who swears, Exo 22:11 Deu 6:18 Psa 15:4 24:4. Hence atheists, who profess to believe that there is no God, and persons who do not believe in a future state of reward and punishment, cannot consistently take an oath. In their mouths an oath can be only profane mockery.\par God himself is represented as confirming his promise by oath, and thus conforming to what is practiced among men, Heb 6:13,16 -17. The oaths forbidden in Mat 5:34-35 Jas 5:12, must refer to the unthinking, hasty, and vicious practices of the Jews; otherwise Paul would have acted against the command of Christ, 1Ch 1:9 Gal 1:20 2Co 1:23 . That person is obliged to take an oath whose duty requires him to declare the truth in the most solemn and judicial manner; though undoubtedly oaths are too often administered unnecessarily and irreverently, and taken with but slight consciousness of the responsibility thus assumed. As we are bound to manifest every possible degree of reverence towards God, the greatest care is to be taken that we swear neither rashly nor negligently in making promises. To neglect performance is perjury, unless the promise be contrary to the law of nature and of God; in which case no oath is binding. See CORBAN, and VOWS.\par A customary formula of taking an oath was "The Lord do so to me, and more also;" that is, the lord slay me, as the victim sacrificed on many such occasions was slain, and punish me even more than this, if I speak not the truth, Rth 1:17 1Sa 3:17 . Similar phrases are these: "As the Lord liveth," Jdg 8:19 "Before God I lie not," 1Ch 9:1 ; "I say the truth in Christ," 1Ti 2:7 ; "God is my record," Php 1.8. Several acts are alluded to as accompaniments of an oath; as putting the hand under the thigh, Gen 24:2 47:29; and raising the hand towards heaven, Gen 14:22,23 Deu 32:40 Jer 10:5 .\par
Oath. The principle on which an oath is held to be binding is incidentally laid down in Heb 6:16, namely, as an ultimate appeal to divine authority, to ratify an assertion. On the same principle, that oath has always been held most binding which appealed to the highest authority, as regards both individuals and communities. As a consequence of this principle, appeals to God’s name on the one hand, and to heathen deities, on the other, are treated in scripture as tests of allegiance. Exo 23:13; Exo 34:6; Deu 29:12; etc.
So also the sovereign’s name is sometimes used as a form of obligation. Gen 42:15; 2Sa 11:11; 2Sa 14:19. Other forms of oath, serious or frivolous, are mentioned, some of which are condemned by our Lord. Mat 6:33; Mat 23:16-22 and See Jas 5:12. (There is, however, a world-wide difference between a solemn appeal to God and profane swearing). The forms of adjuration mentioned in Scripture are --
Lifting up the hand. Witnesses laid their hands on the head of the accused. Gen 14:22; Lev 24:14; Lev 17:7; Isa 3:7.
Putting the hand under the thigh of the person to whom the Promise was made. Gen 24:2; Gen 47:29.
Oaths were sometimes taken before the altar, or, as some understand the passage, if the persons were not in Jerusalem, in a position looking toward the Temple. 1Ki 8:31; 2Ch 6:22.
Dividing a victim and passing between or distributing the pieces. Gen 15:10; Gen 15:17; Jer 34:18.
As the sanctity of oaths was carefully inculcated by the law, so the crime of perjury was strongly condemned; and to a false witness, the same punishment was assigned, which was due for the crime to which he testified. Exo 20:7; Lev 19:12.
Heb 6:16; "an oath for confirmation is the end of strife (contradiction)." Therefore, Christianity sanctions oaths, but they are to be used only to put an end to contradiction in disputes and for confirmation of solemn promises. God, in condescension to man’s mode of confirming covenants, confirmed His word by oath; by these "two immutable things in which it is impossible for God to lie, we have strong consolation who have fled for refuge to lay hold upon the hope set before us." And "because He could swear by no greater, He sware by Himself": also Heb 7:28. Jesus Himself accepted the high priest’s adjuration (Mat 26:63). Paul often calls God to witness the truth of his assertions (Act 26:29; Rom 1:9; Rom 9:1; 2Co 1:23; 2Co 11:31; Gal 1:20; Php 1:8). So the angel, Rev 10:6. The prohibition "swear not at all" (Mat 5:34; Jas 5:12) refers to trivial occasions, not to oaths on solemn occasions and before magistrates. In every day conversation your simple yea or nay suffices to establish your word.
The Jews held oaths not binding if God’s name did not directly occur (Lightfoot, Hor. Heb.). "Thou shalt perform unto the Lord thine oaths" meant in the Jews’ view, which Christ combats, if not sworn to the Lord the oath is not binding. Jesus says on the contrary, every oath by the creature, heaven, earth, etc., is by the Creator whether His name be mentioned or not, and is therefore binding. In the perfect Christian state all oaths would be needless, for distrust of another’s word and untruth would not exist. Meantime, they are needed on solemn occasions. But men do not escape the guilt of "taking God’s name in vain" by avoiding the name itself, as in the oaths, "faith!" "gracious!" "by heaven," etc. The connection in Jas 5:12 is, Swear not through impatience to which trials may tempt you (Jas 5:10-11); in contrast stands the proper use of the tongue, Jas 5:13.
To appeal to a pagan god by oath is to acknowledge his deity, and is therefore forbidden (Jos 23:7; Jer 5:7; Jer 12:16; Amo 8:14), as in swearing to appeal to God is recognizing Him (Deu 6:13; Isa 19:18; Isa 65:16). An oath even to a pagan king is so binding that Jehovah’s chief reason for dethroning Zedekiah and giving him over to die in Babylon was his violating his oath to Nebuchadnezzar (Eze 17:13-20; 2Ch 36:13). Jewish criminal procedure admitted the accused to clear himself or herself by oath (Num 5:19-22; 1Ki 8:31); our Lord, Mat 26:63. Oath gestures were "lifting up the hand" (Deu 32:40; Gen 14:22; Isa 3:7; Eze 20:5-6). Witnesses laid their hands on the head of the accused (Lev 24:14).
Putting the hand under the thigh of the superior to whom the oath was taken in sign of subjection and obedience (Aben Ezra): Gen 24:2; Gen 47:29; or else because the hip was the part from which the posterity issued (Gen 46:26) and the seat of vital power. In making (Hebrew "cutting") a covenant the victim was divided, and the contracting parties passed between the portions, in token that the two became joined in one.
The false witness was doomed to the punishment due to the crime which he attested (Deu 19:16-19). Blasphemy was punishable with death (Lev 24:11; Lev 24:16). The obligation in Lev 5:1 to testify when adjured (for "swearing" translated "adjuration,"
Oath. The forms of solemn affirmation mentioned in Scripture are: 1. Lifting up the hand. Witnesses laid their hands on the head of the accused. Gen 14:22; Lev 24:14; Deu 17:7; Isa 3:7, A. V., but the R. V. reads "he shall lift up his voice." 2. Putting the hand under the thigh of the person to whom the promise was made. Gen 24:2; Gen 47:29. 3. Oaths were sometimes taken before the altar, or by an appeal to Jehovah; "as the Lord liveth." 2Ki 2:2. Comp. 1Ki 8:31; 2Ch 6:22. 4. Dividing a victim and passing between or distributing the pieces. Gen 15:10; Gen 15:17; Jer 34:18. As the sanctity of oaths was carefully inculcated by the law, so the crime of perjury was strongly condemned; and to a false witness the same punishment was assigned which was due for the crime to which he testified. Exo 20:7; Lev 19:12. The New Testament has prohibitions against swearing. Mat 5:34-37; Jas 5:12. It cannot be supposed that it was intended by these to censure every kind of oath. For our Lord himself made solemn asseverations equivalent to an oath; and Paul repeatedly, in his inspired epistles, calls God to witness the truth of what he was saying. The intention was, as Alford well notes upon Mat 5:34-37, to show "that the proper state of Christians is to require no oaths; that, when evil is expelled from among them, every yea and nay will be as decisive as an oath, every promise as binding as a vow."
A solemn asseveration with an appeal to God that what is said is true. The apostle said that among men an oath for confirmation is the "end of all strife" or dispute; and God, willing to show "the immutability of his counsel, confirmed it by an oath; that by two immutable things [His word and His oath] in which it was impossible for God to lie, we might have a strong consolation." Heb 6:16-18. Jehovah swore that the Lord Jesus should be a priest for ever after the order of Melchizedek. Psa 110:4.
Lev 5:1 has been interpreted as signifying that when the voice of adjuration was heard, persons were compelled to confess what they knew as to any charge. Thus the Lord Jesus when adjured by the high priest answered him. The Lord was under an accusation, and was adjured to say if it was true. He acknowledged that He was "the Christ the Son of God." Mat 26:63-64.
The Lord exposed the folly of the tradition that some oaths were not binding. Mat 23:16-22.
In the common intercourse of life there should be no oaths, the simple ’yea’ and ’nay’ should be enough, "swear not at all," Mat 5:34-37; Jas 5:12; the context of these passages shows that they do not refer to judicial oaths: cf. also Heb 6:13; Heb 6:16; Heb 7:21; Rev 10:6.
By: Executive Committee of the Editorial Board., Julius Rappoport
Function of Oath.
The Hebrew terms for "oath," "alah" and "shebu'ah," are used interchangeably in the Old Testament (comp. Gen. xxiv. 8 and 41; see also Shebu. 36a). According to the ancient Jewish principle of jurisprudence the judicial oath was employed in civil cases only, never in criminal cases, and only in litigations concerning private property, never in those over sacerdotal property; and over movable but not over immovable property. Later rabbinical law, however, impose⋅ the oath even in the case of sacerdotal and immovable property (Shebu. 42b; Shulḥan 'Aruk, Ḥoshen Mishpaṭ, 95, 1). Moreover, the oath was administered only in case no evidence, or only insufficient evidence, was forthcoming on either side (Shebu. 45a, 48b). But if there was ample evidence, documentary or oral, i.e., that of witnesses (Weiss, "Dor," i. 202), in support of the statements of the litigants, or if claim and disclaimer were not positive, no oath could be imposed, according to Biblical law. The character of the oath was, then, in the nature of a rebuttal of the claim of the plaintiff and was imposed upon the defendant as a purgative measure; or God was called upon as a witness, there being no other. Adelung, indeed (in Saalschütz, "Archäologie," p. 277), derives the German "eid" (oath) from the Hebrew "'ed" (="witness"); see also Delitzsch (on Gen. xxi. 30), Trumbull ("Blood Covenant," p. 266), Tyler ("Oaths," p. 87), and Paley ("Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy," book iii., ch. 16, p. 1).
Taken Always by Defendant.
Though the oath was not considered as full legal evidence (Frankel, "Der Gerichtliche Beweis," p. 305), it was accepted in lieu of something better. However, the oath was not meant to be an ordeal, a means of frightening the contestant into telling the truth, except in the case of the oath of purgation administered to a woman suspected of adultery (Num. v. 21; Michaelis, "Das Mosaische Recht," section 301, p. 341). The perjurer, however, was not liable to the court, but to God Himself (see Perjury); furthermore, to such as were suspected of a disposition not to speak the truth the oath was not administered (Shebu. vii. 1). The Biblical oath was imposed only upon the defendant (Shebu. vii. 1; Ḥoshen Mishpaṭ, 89, 1; "Yad," Ṭo'en, i. 2). The reason for this is in the dictum, "Possession is nine-tenths of the law"; or, as the Talmud (B. Ḳ. 46a) states it, "Whosoever would oust a possessor must bring evidence to establish his claim; his positive assertion alone is not sufficient, for the possessor may take the oath in support of his equally positive denial of plaintiff's claim."
Biblical Oaths.
The codifiers classify the Biblical oaths under the following three divisions: (1) "Oaths of keepers or custodians": A leaves certain objects in the care of B; B admits having received them, but claims that they have been stolen or lost; he takes the oath in support of his assertion and is acquitted from responsibility (Shebu. viii. 1; B. M. 93a; B. Ḳ. 107b; "Yad," She'elah, iv. 1, vi. 3; Ḥoshen Mishpaṭ, 87, 7). (2) "Part admittance": A claims to have lent B 100 shekels; B admits the claim as regards only 50, and after taking the oath is acquitted; but if B repudiates the claim in its entirety he is acquitted without oath. (3) But if A has one witness in proof of his claim, B must take the oath in either case (Shebu. vi. 1; B. M. 3a; Ḥoshen Mishpaṭ, l.c.). The admissions of B in cases 1 and 2, and the statement of the one witness in case 3, are considered as half-evidence (Frankel, l.c.) in support of A, but not as sufficient to warrant a judgment in his favor. B, therefore, takes the oath, which is equal to half-evidence, and thereby invalidates the claim of A.
Mishnaic Oaths of Satisfaction.
Though Biblical legislation imposed the oath only upon the defendant, changed times and conditions rendered it necessary for the teachers of Mishnah to impose the oath at times even upon the plaintiff, in cases where the defendant is not competent to take the oath, or where the claim of plaintiff has evidently a greater probability of truth than the disclaimer of defendant. These oaths are known as "mishnaic" oaths; and while the Biblical oaths are of a purgative nature, the mishnaic oaths are "oaths of satisfaction" ("nishba'in we-noṭelin"—"they swear, and their claim is satisfied"; Shebu. vii. 1). The following cases fall within this category: (1) The defendant should take the Biblical oath, but he is suspected of a disposition to swear falsely; the court can not, therefore, administer the oath to him, and imposes the mishnaic oath upon the plaintiff instead. (2) It is imposed further in the case of a laborer claiming wages; (3) of a storekeeper claiming settlement for goods ordered; (4) of one who claims compensation for robbery; and (5) of one who claims compensation for battery, certain indications supporting the claim. In all these cases, the claims being based upon positive charges, while the disclaimer is not quite positive, the plaintiff takes the oath and secures judgment (Shebu. vii. 1; Ḥoshen Mishpaṭ, 89, 1; 90, 1; 91, 1; 92, 1). In some cases the mishnaic oath is imposed when the claim is not positive, as in the cases of partners, renters (paying part of the crop for rent), guardians (appointed by the court), and stewards. All these must take the mishnaic oathof purgation if accused of unscrupulous conduct, even though the claim is based only on a vague suspicion (Shebu. 45a, 48b; "Yad," Shutfin, ix. 1; Ḥoshen Mishpaṭ, 93, 1).
Rabbinical Oath.
Later Talmudical practise has imposed the oath in cases where according to Biblical and mishnaic law no oath was imposed, as, for instance, where a claim is repudiated in its entirety. The originator of this form of oath, known as the "imposed oath" (
; see Rashi to B. M. 5a), was the Babylonian Naḥman ben Jacob (235-324 C.E.; Shebu. 40b; B. M. 5a; Ḥoshen Mishpaṭ, 87, 7).
There is still another form of oath—the "oath of adherence" ("gilgul shebu'ah"; see Frankel, l.c.; Mendelssohn, however ["Jahrb. für Preussische Gesetzgebung," cxvi. 414], calls it "Neben-eid"). If one of the litigants is compelled to take the oath and his opponent seizes the opportunity to confront him with a second claim, upon which, had it been made separately, no oath would have been taken, the second claim is "adhered" to the first claim, and the defendant must take the oath in connection with both claims (Ḳid. 28a; Shebu. 48b). The only exception to this rule is made in favor of the laborer claiming his wages. To his oath no other claim can be attached: "it should rather be made as easy as possible for him" (Ḥoshen Mishpaṭ, 89, 6). In any other case there is no difference; whatever the oath, a second claim may always be "adhered" to it (Shebu. 48b; Ḥoshen Mishpaṭ, 94, 1). In other respects, however, there are far-reaching differences among the Biblical, the mishnaic, and the rabbinical oaths, both in practise and in principle.
Biblical, Mishnaic, and Rabbinical Oaths.
(1) If the Biblical oath is required and the defendant will not take it, judgment is rendered against him, and his property is levied upon; if the mishnaic oath is required and the defendant will not take it, judgment is rendered against him, but his property can not be attached, and only a thirty days' ban is issued against him; or, if this be of no avail, slight corporal punishment is inflicted upon him by the court; but if it is the rabbinical oath that he refuses to take, not even judgment can be rendered against him; instead he is acquitted (Shebu. 41a; Ḥoshen Mishpaṭ, 87, 9; B. B. 33a).
(2) If the Biblical oath is required but it can not be administered to the defendant on account of his immoral character or because it is suspected that he would swear falsely, the plaintiff takes the oath and secures judgment; if the mishnaic oath is required but the defendant is not admitted thereto for the reasons stated, he is acquitted without oath ("Yad," Ṭo'en, iii. 4; Ḥoshen Mishpaṭ, 87, 13). He must, however, according to later rabbinical practise, take the rabbinical oath (B. B. 33a; Ḥoshen Mishpaṭ, 92, 9), if the claim against him is based upon a positive statement; but if it is the rabbinical oath that is required and he is not permitted to take it for the reasons given, the defendant is acquitted without any oath (Ḥoshen Mishpaṭ, 92, 10).
(3) The Biblical or mishnaic oath, whether of satisfaction or of purgation, when required of the defendant can not be imposed instead upon the plaintiff if he is not willing to take it; but the rabbinical oath may be so imposed (Shebu. 41a; Ḥoshen Mishpaṭ, 87, 11).
(4) The Biblical oath is imposed only if claim and disclaimer are positive; the mishnaic or the rabbinical oath, even if they be vague and uncertain (Shebu. vii. 1).
(5) The Biblical oath is imposed only when the object in litigation is private and movable property, and not if it is sacerdotal or immovable property; the rabbinical oath is imposed even in cases involving sacerdotal or immovable property (Shebu. vii. 1; Ḥoshen Mishpaṭ, 95, 1).
(6) If the Biblical or the mishnaic oath is imposed, the juror must swear by the name of Yhwh and must hold a Bible or a sacred object in his hands, and the judge must admonish the juror and impress upon him the sacredness and the importance of the oath. The judge must also warn him against any mental reservation or ambiguity; but if he takes the rabbinical oath he may not mention the name of Yhwh: he says merely, "I swear—." He need not hold in his hands a sacred object, and it is not necessary for the judge to admonish or warn him (Shebu. 36a; Ḥoshen Mishpaṭ, 87, 13, 20, 21; see Frankel, "Die Eidesleistung," p. 31; Mendelssohn, in "Jahrb. für Preussische Gesetzgebung," cxvi. 414, in reference to gradation of oath).
No Oaths in Criminal Cases.
The Geonim have extended the oath even to cases where the Talmud does not impose it, as when minors are concerned, if the oath is in their favor (Ḥoshen Mishpaṭ, 89, 2); and sometimes they have put even witnesses under oath, though legally the latter are not called upon to swear (Ḥoshen Mishpaṭ, 28, 2; Frankel, l.c. p. 212). The Bible, however, mentions only the following cases in which a judicial oath was required: a keeper suspected of careless watching or of taking a piece of property entrusted to him for safe-keeping (Ex. xxii. 7-10), and a woman suspected by her husband of adultery (Num. v. 22); and enlarged and amplified as was the scope of the oath in post-Biblical times, it was still restricted to civil courts. In criminal cases no oath was employed, as, according to Jewish principles of jurisprudence, no one charged with a criminal act could be believed even upon oath. Assault and battery and embezzlement were considered only from their civil side, in regard to liability for damages. Nor was a witness, even in civil matters, put under oath, for "if we can not believe him without an oath we can not believe him at all" (Tos. Ḳid. 43b). The adjuration of a witness mentioned in Lev. v. 1 refers to a private adjuration for one to appear and testify as to what he knows about the case, but not to judicial adjuration (see commentaries of Keil and Delitzsch ad loc.; comp. Shebu. 35a).
No Oaths for Witnesses.
The court may adjure the witness if it sees fit, and such, indeed, was the practise in geonic times, but it is not obliged to do so (Frankel, l.c. p. 212), as the character of the witness is assumed to be one of probity and above suspicion or reproach (B. Ḳ. 72b; Sanh. 25a; Ḥoshen Mishpaṭ, 34, 1; Josephus, "Ant." iv. 8, § 15). In short, the oath was not the only means by whicha statement could be supported; on the contrary, it was employed only for want of better evidence. But if there were witnesses, their statements were accepted as full legal evidence, and they were not subjected to an oath; for to swear falsely is not more sinful than to utter an ordinary lie. It is one's duty to speak the truth whether without or with an oath.
Neither were there any oaths for rulers or for subjects or citizens as such. The "oath of fidelity" that Herod required from the people ("Ant." xv. 10, § 4) was adopted from Roman custom. Nor were there priestly oaths. Yoma i. 5 refers not to an oath taken upon entering office, but to the oath of service, introduced as a check upon Sadduceeism. There were no official oaths of any kind, for officials were supposed to do their duty without the oath. "The multiplication of oaths," says Michaelis (l.c. section 301, p. 342), "tends rather to the corruption of morals." Paley (l.c. p. 144) also deplores the fact that "a pound of tea can not travel regularly from the ship to the consumer without costing at the least a half-dozen of oaths." The Jewish law, then, knew only judicial-oaths.
Extrajudicial Oaths.
But while legally recognized oaths were limited to judicial proceedings, extrajudicial oaths were employed freely in private life. The nature of the oaths mentioned in Num. xxx. 2 places them in the category of vows; they were employed merely "as props to a weak will," and "were taken in order the better to uphold the Law" (Ḥag. 10a). These extrajudicial oaths were: oaths of agreement—e.g., between Abraham and Abimelech (Gen. xxi. 23), Isaac and Abimelech (ib. xxvi. 31), Jacob and Esau (ib. xxv. 33), Jacob and Laban (ib. xxxi. 53), Joshua and the Gibeonites (Josh. ix. 16), Zedekiah and Nebuchadnezzar (II Kings xxiv. 20; II Chron. xxxvi. 13); oaths of promise—e.g., between Abraham and Melchizedek (Gen. xiv. 22), Abraham and Eliezer (ib. xxiv. 3), Jacob and Joseph (ib. xlvii. 31), Joseph and his brothers (ib. 1. 25), Rahab and the spies (Josh. ii. 12), David and Jonathan (I Sam. xx. 3, 13), Saul and the woman of Endor (ib. xxviii. 10), David and Shimei (II Sam. xix. 23); oaths of adjuration—e.g., those of Deut. xxvii. 15, Josh. vi. 26, and I Sam. xiv. 24. Though strictly speaking these were not oaths in a judicial sense, they were, nevertheless, recognized as morally binding and as necessary to national security (II Sam. v. 3; Esth. x. 5; Josephus, "Ant." xv. 10, § 4), and even to international security (II Chron. xxxvi. 13; II Kings xxiv. 20; see Ned. 65a and Manasseh ben Israel in Mendelssohn's "Werke," iii. 248). Even if fraudulently obtained (Josh. ix. 16) or erroneously made (I Sam. xiv. 24; Judges xi. 35; Josephus, "Vita," § 53) the oath was considered inviolable. Even the silent determination of the heart was considered as the spoken word which must not be changed (Mak. 24a; B. M. 44a). The general principle was, "Let thy 'yea' be 'yea' and thy 'nay,' 'nay'" (B. M. 49a; comp. Matt. v. 37; James v. 12). The Law had already placed a careful restriction upon the practise of oath-taking in the case of a member of a family other than the head (Num. xxx.), and in post-exilic times people seem indeed to have been more careful in regard to taking oaths (Eccl. ix. 2); the prophet Zephaniah conceived the possibility of avoiding the oath altogether (iii. 13). The Essenes also avoided swearing, which they esteemed worse than perjury; "he that can not be believed without an oath is already condemned" (Josephus, "B. J." ii. 8, § 6). Philo says, "The bare word of a virtuous man should be like an oath, steadfast, inviolable, and true. Should necessity absolutely require an oath let a man swear by his father and mother . . . instead of by the name of the highest and first Essence." Even in judicial oaths, swearing by the name of Yhwh was abolished altogether during the age of the Geonim (Rashi to Shebu. 38b; Ḥoshen Mishpaṭ, 87, 19). See Covenant; Evidence; Perjury; Vows.
Bibliography:
Maimonides, Yad ha-Ḥazaḳah, chapters To'en and She'elah; Shulḥan 'Aruk, 28, 75, 87-96;
Frankel, Der Gerichtliche Beweis nach Mosaisch-Talmudischem Rechte;
idem, Die Eidesleistung der Juden;
J. E. Tyler, Oaths;
Blumenstein, Die Verschiedenen Eidesarten nach Mosaisch-Talmudischem Rechte, Frankfort-on-the-Main, 1883;
Hamburger, R. B. T.;
Michaelis, Das Mosaische Recht;
Keil, Archäologie;
Cheyne and Black, Encyc. Bibl.;
Hastings, Dict. Bible;
Schaff-Herzog, Encyc.
The calling upon God to witness the truth of a statement. As an appeal to the testimony of God, it is an act of religion. An oath may be:
assertory, whereby God is called to witness the truth of an assertion of fact, past or present
promissory, whereby God is called upon as a witness to a resolution, a vow, or an agreement made with another party, and as a "guaranty and pledge of future fulfillment
To have a valid oath there must be the intention, at least virtual, of invoking the testimony of God, and a word or sign by which such an intention is manifested. Such a word or sign is contained in the formulas, "God is my witness," "I swear by God," "May God destroy me if," etc. Other expressions such as "By my conscience" or "As God lives" are; at most doubtful. To make an oath lawful it is necessary that what one swears be true or at least beyond a prudent doubt or, in the case of a promissory oath, be sincerely intended and not unlawful. Moreover there must be a sufficient reason for taking an oath. Such sufficient reason is had when an oath is ordered by lawful authority or required for God’s honor or our own or our neighbor’s good.
1. Law Regarding Oaths:
The oath is the invoking of a curse upon one’s self if one has not spoken the truth (Mat 26:74), or if one fails to keep a promise (1Sa 19:6; 1Sa 20:17; 2Sa 15:21; 2Sa 19:23). It played a very important part, not only in lawsuits (Exo 22:11; Lev 6:3, Lev 6:5) and state affairs (Ant., XV, x, 4), but also in the dealings of everyday life (Gen 24:37; Gen 50:5; Jdg 21:5; 1Ki 18:10; Ezr 10:5). The Mosaic laws concerning oaths were not meant to limit the widespread custom of making oaths, so much as to impress upon the people the sacredness of an oath, forbidding on the one hand swearing falsely (Exo 20:7; Lev 19:12; Zec 8:17, etc.), and on the other swearing by false gods, which latter was considered to be a very dark sin (Jer 12:16; Amo 8:14). In the Law only two kinds of false swearing are mentioned: false swearing of a witness, and false asseveration upon oath regarding a thing found or received (Lev 5:1; Lev 6:2 ff; compare Pro 29:24). Both required a sin offering (Lev 5:1 ff). The Talmud gives additional rules, and lays down certain punishments for false swearing; in the case of a thing found it states what the false swearer must pay (
2. Forms of Swearing:
Swearing in the name of the Lord (Gen 14:22; Deu 6:13; Jdg 21:7; Rth 1:17, etc.) was a sign of loyalty to Him (Deu 10:20; Isa 48:11; Jer 12:16). We know from Scripture (see above) that swearing by false gods was frequent, and we learn also from the newly discovered Elephantine papyrus that the people not only swore by Jahu (= Yahweh) or by the Lord of Heaven, but also among a certain class of other gods, e.g. by Herem-Bethel, and by Isum. In ordinary intercourse it was customary to swear by the life of the person addressed (1Sa 1:26; 1Sa 20:3; 2Ki 2:2); by the life of the king (1Sa 17:55; 1Sa 25:26; 2Sa 11:11); by one’s own head (Mat 5:36); by the earth (Mat 5:35); by the heaven (Mat 5:34; Mat 23:22); by the angels (BJ, II, xvi, 4); by the temple (Mat 23:16), and by different parts of it (Mat 23:16); by Jerusalem (Mat 5:35; compare
3. The Formula:
Not much is told us as to the ceremonies observed in taking an oath. In patriarchal times he who took the oath put his hand under the thigh of him to whom the oath was taken (Gen 24:2; Gen 47:29). The most usual form was to hold up the hand to heaven (Gen 14:22; Exo 6:8; Deu 32:40; Eze 20:5). The wife suspected of unfaithfulness, when brought before the priest, had to answer “Amen, Amen” to his adjuration, and this was considered to be an oath on her part (Num 5:22). The usual formula of an oath was either: “God is witness betwixt me and thee” (Gen 31:50), or more commonly: “As Yahweh (or God) liveth” (Jdg 8:19; Rth 3:13; 2Sa 2:27; Jer 38:16); or “Yahweh be a true and faithful witness amongst us” (Jer 42:5). Usually the penalty invoked by the oath was only suggested: “Yahweh (or God) do so to me” (Rth 1:17; 2Sa 3:9, 2Sa 3:35; 1Ki 2:23; 2Ki 6:31); in some cases the punishment was expressly mentioned (Jer 29:22). Nowack suggests that in general the punishment was not expressly mentioned because of a superstitious fear that the person swearing, although speaking the truth, might draw upon himself some of the punishment by merely mentioning it.
Philo expresses the desire (ii. 194) that the practice of swearing should be discontinued, and the Essenes used no oaths (BJ, II, viii, 6; Ant., XV, x, 4).
4. Oaths Permissible:
That oaths are permissible to Christians is shown by the example of our Lord (Mat 26:63 f), and of Paul (2Co 1:23; Gal 1:20) and even of God Himself (Heb 6:13-18). Consequently when Christ said, “Swear not at all” (Mat 5:34), He was laying down the principle that the Christian must not have two standards of truth, but that his ordinary speech must be as sacredly true as his oath. In the kingdom of God, where that principle holds sway, oaths become unnecessary.
An oath may be defined as an assertion that a statement is true (Germ. assertorischer Eid) or shall be true (promissorischer Eid), or a promise of loyalty and fidelity, made binding by invocation of the Deity, or of some person or thing revered or dreaded. The motive for telling the truth may be regard for what is thus invoked (e.g. the honour of God) or the fear of avenging punishment. It is generally held that the latter thought is dominant and determinative, even when only implicit. In an adjuration one person states the terms of the oath and another accepts it, thus owning the solemn sanction invoked by the first party as the ground and guardian of the truth he vows to tell. The other use of the ambiguous words ‘oath,’ ‘swear,’ viz. for meaningless profanity of speech, does not immediately concern us, in spite of Mar_14:71 (English Version ) (see Encyclopaedia Biblica iii., article ‘Oath’). An oath in the primary sense guarantees truth-telling under necessity, and, like the ‘necessary’ lie (Notlüge), belongs at best to the higher, and too frequently to the lower, casuistry. A NT example of the latter, which Jesus vigorously denounced, occurs in Mat_23:16-22. On such casuistry, irreverence is a close attendant. To the present writer it appears that the customary views on this subject need considerable revision if they are to be harmonized with the Gospels, with justice to certain ‘sects’ (Quakers, Mennonites, etc.), with practical experience of the law-courts, and with the possibility that even of a thing which is ‘woven into the common law’ it may be necessary to say, in Milton’s words (Of Reformation touching Church Discipline, 1641, p. 78): ‘Let it weave out again.’
The chief NT passages concerned are Mat_5:33-37, where Jesus gives the command, ‘Swear not at all,’ and the parallels in Mat_23:16-22 and Jam_5:12. It is maintained by Zahn and others, with much probability, that St. James has here preserved the original words of Jesus in a purer form than St. Matthew (T. Zahn, ‘Matt.,’ in Kommentar zum NT, 1903 ff., p. 244). The chief grounds for this view are:-(1) that certain ancient writers quote the first part of Mat_5:33-37 as it now stands, but substitute Jam_5:12 for St. Matthew’s ending; (2) that some of these writers appear not to have known this Epistle, and therefore they and St. James will have derived these words from a common source, older and better than Mat_5:37; (3) that Jam_5:12 is free from an apparent inconsistency which attaches to Mat_5:37, for Jesus has been urging that His followers should keep to the simplest possible form of affirmation, and ‘yea, yea’ is not strictly that; the second ‘yea’ seems almost a vain repetition. On the other hand, Jam_5:12 may possibly be secondary; for instead of ‘Let your “yea” be (a reliable and unadorned) “yea” and your “nay,” “nay,” it may be rendered: ‘Let yours be the “yea, yea,” “nay, nay” (enjoined in Mt.).’ Further, while St. Matthew’s double ‘yea’ can scarcely be defended (but see H. H. Wendt, The Teaching of Jesus, Eng. translation , 1892, i. 269) as securing clearness-for what illumination does the repetition convey?-yet the emphasis added by the second word is by no means extreme, and Jesus may therefore have used it; it falls short of the ‘verily’ which He used so often. However this may be, the two passages yield the common and unmistakable general principle of a characteristic Christian simplicity and moderation of speech. This is further enforced by the words, ‘Swear not at all’ (ìὴ ὅëùò). Any exceptions to this strongly exclusive phrase must bear the burden of proof, and to apply it strictly in the meantime is the only natural course, and the precise reverse of ‘hair-splitting’ (T. Keim, Jesus of Nazara, Eng. translation , iii. [1877] 314). This strictness is made still more binding by the parallel in St. James: ‘nor by any other oath.’ The forbidden oaths specified in Mat_5:34-36 are illustrations only-selected, not exhaustive. The ground of the prohibition is the link with God which in the thoughts of our Lord’s hearers (ch. 5) and also in the teaching of the Pharisees (ch. 23) had been snapped; this He replaces with reiterated emphasis. These evasive or frivolous oaths are condemned expressly because, in principle, the name of God is involved in them. The main appeal in both chapters is, as J. Köstlin (in PRE [Note: RE Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche.] 3 v. 239 f.) has already maintained, an appeal to reverence, though this is indissociably combined with the demand for veracity. All false swearing amounts indirectly to profane swearing. For it must be irreverent either because God’s presence is invoked in order to make a lie more credible, or else because men adopt a formula (as in Matthew 5, 23) which seeks to exclude Him while the lie is told. The ‘evil’ which is the source of ‘whatsoever is more than’ a simple affirmation consists of casuistry and irreverence alike.
That Jesus is not attacking untruthfulness alone is further shown by this, that He offers His teaching as a conscious correction of that which had been given to the ancients, viz. that vows or oaths by God must be kept (cf. W. C. Allen, International Critical Commentary , ‘St. Matthew,’3 1912, p. 53). If Jesus meant that the oath by God should be left standing (so Keim, op. cit. p. 311 f.) in the interests of veracity, He only confirmed the OT. Moreover, if that were His only object, then instead of ‘Swear not at all’ (for one cannot evade the reference to God), He would have needed to say, ‘Never let any matter of importance be settled without an oath, and that directly by the name of God.’
Wendt (op. cit. p. 269 f.) and others hold that the oath is ‘of the evil’ because it implies that the truth need not be told on other occasions. But that seems to imply that the oath itself is not ‘of the evil,’ but a highly commendable act of exceptional virtue. It is true that oaths on special occasions encourage a double standard of truthfulness. This is, indeed, denied in a vigorous article by W. C. Magee (CR [Note: R Contemporary Review.] xlix. [1886] 1 ff.), in which it is maintained that oaths are only a forcible reminder of a duty which applies equally at other times; but the oath actually uttered by witnesses always concerns itself quite specially with the particular case under trial. Yet this limitation of the veracity due outside the oath cannot be the chief evil in the oath. That chief evil, so far as it is lying at all, must be lying which is committed in and under the oath; and this is not merely nor chiefly unveracity; by it a despite is done to God which seems to have been, in the judgment of Jesus, an additional and greater sin. Now the admissions of writers of all views show that a very large proportion of those who have strong motives for untruth will not be deterred by any oath that can be devised (cf. Magee, op. cit. p. 3). In any case, their testimony will be false, and thus a certain irreverence will be implied in it, but only remotely; the requirement of an oath will simply make it far more pointed and direct; for it is known beforehand that a large number, if they take an oath at all, will commit perjury; moreover, few of these perjuries will be investigated, and the number punished will be negligible. At the other end of the scale are those who would tell the truth under any circumstances-the earnest Christians whom the oath only forces into a certain lowering of tone, and the high-minded unbelievers who, when the case is over, will have been truthful in everything except in the oath by which their truthfulness is ‘ensured.’ And with both of these undesirable results the name of God will be concerned in a way which is at least indelicate.
The ideal of Jesus is clear. A man is to be so truthful that his possible untruthfulness need not be reckoned with, and therefore he will take no oath, nor be asked to take one. But if men will not always trust him, owing to the general lack of trustworthiness, is he or is he not to submit to this indignity (cf. Clem. Alex. Stromata, vii. 8, and Kant’s epithet ‘State blackmail’ or ‘civil extortion’ [bürgerliches Erpressungsmittel] in Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, 1793, p. 226; Eng. translation , 1838), in which he will feel that God is implicated? It may be said that this surrounding ‘evil’ of the world would make only the demanding of the oath to be wrong, not the taking of it. But any submission to or compromise with the ‘evil’ can be regarded as an unworthy surrender, and as itself evil. Another vital point is the shrinking attitude towards God which is taken in the oath by the explicit or implicit invocation of His powers of punishment. The question arises whether that is a Christian or a sub-Christian conception of Him; whether the Christian does not tell the truth, in the ordinary course, from far higher motives; and whether, by suddenly accepting an official injunction to ‘believe and shudder’ before Him whom he is usually permitted to love, he does not do an injustice to God and to himself. Magee admits that the oath has lost its power increasingly with the decline of superstitious dread (op. cit. p. 13 f.), and Köstlin admits that the non-swearing sects have been influenced largely by a reverence and delicacy which lie upon the unspoiled Christian spirit like bloom.
In face of all this, can the oath be re-instated by the actual practice of Jesus or of St. Paul? In the case of the latter, ‘the disciple is not above his master’ (see Barclay, quoted by A. Tholuck, Sermon on the Mount, Eng. translation , 1860, p. 261); and apart from that, the actual examples of asseveration in his Epistles are not very convincing (see H. Weinel, St. Paul, Eng. translation , 1906, p. 358, and C. H. Watkins, St. Paul’s Fight for Galatia, 1914, pp. 108, 159 f.). This is especially evident at 1Co_1:14-16, which, in view of the ‘I thank God,’ reveals a strange lack of clarity; and, where the witness is himself uncertain, strong expressions of affirmation and invocation can but add to the difficulties.
As to Jesus, it is curious that Mat_26:63-65 should be thought so conclusive. There are two important variations in the Synoptic accounts, thus:
Mat_26:63 ff.|Mar_14:61 f.|Luk_22:67 f.|
I adjure thee by the living God, that thou tell us whether thou be the Christ.|Art thou the Christ, the Son of the Blessed?|Art thou the Christ? Tell us.|
Thou hast said.|I am.|If I tell you, ye will not believe.|
For the adjuration, we have the authority of St. Matthew alone; and an adjuration would not in any case be an ordinary oath. If one who is ‘adjured’ does not, by one explicit word, say that he makes the adjuration his own, it remains the utterance of the other party only, and no one can prove that he answers, or answers truly, because of it (see Hasting's Dictionary of the Bible (5 vols) , article ‘Adjure’). The Jewish use of ‘Amen’ in acceptance of an adjuration is often appealed to as if it occurred here (see Tholuck, op. cit. p. 254), but Jesus said no such word. He makes reference only to the question asked Him, not to the adjuration in itself. And is that reply explicit? According to St. Mark, He answers, ‘I am (the Messiah)’; but probably St. Mark is secondary here, for Messianic utterances are usually the more confident the later they are. [Note: Mark’s confidence and emphasis show how far he is from the thought of an unwilling confession extorted solely by an adjuration. He mentions no adjuration, and on his showing the question might have been answered earlier if it had been asked.] Moreover, ‘I am’ can be understood as St. Mark’s interpretation of ‘Thou hast said,’ but not vice versa. J. Weiss has argued with much force that Jesus could not, to any purpose, answer either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (Schriften des NT2, i. [1906] 393 f., 516 f.; cf. W. C. Allen on Mat_26:63 [op. cit. p. 283 f.] and Swete on Mar_14:62 [St. Mark2, 1902]). In St. Luke this evasiveness, or indefiniteness, is patent, but in St. Matthew also the emphatic pronoun (‘Thou hast said’-not I; cf. Luk_22:70) suggests that a definite answer was refused. That the high priest treated the answer (or perhaps the following prophecy) as a plain self-condemnation proves nothing except that he wished to do so (cf. Swete on Mar_14:61 and article Conspiracy). The tone of Jesus’ reply is at any rate lofty, and not in the least submissive. Essentially the same reply is given by Jesus to Pilate (who has no interest in making it more definite than it is), and it is not regarded as closing the case (Mar_15:2, Mat_27:11, Luk_23:3).
On this evidence it cannot be held, with any confidence, that Jesus accepted the adjuration, and His example does not, therefore, justify oaths in law, as distinguished from private conversation. In Matthew 5 He is not dealing directly with law-courts, but we do not know that He would have exempted them from His prohibition, if questioned.
The expression åἰ äïèÞóåôáé óçìåῖïí (literally ‘if a sign shall be given’) in Mar_8:12, if an abbreviated oath-formula, goes far to decide the practice of Jesus. In opposition, however, to Piscator’s Strafmich-Gott-Bibel (Herborn, 1606), and to various commentaries, it must be questioned whether the invocation of God’s punishment, undoubtedly absent from His words, was present to His mind. Nothing could be more foreign to His usual attitude to the Father. Much more prominence has been assigned to His habitual expression ‘Verily’ (= ‘Amen’), which He used in an unprecedented way (G. Dalman, The Words of Jesus, Eng. translation , 1902, pp. 226-229). It lends some support to the double and thus emphatic ‘yea’ and ‘nay’ in Mat_5:37, though the view can scarcely be accepted (see, e.g., E. Klostermann, and cf. H. J. Holtzmann, in loc.) that this doubling constituted not only an emphasis but an oath, for then the whole context makes Mat_5:37 impossible, and Jam_5:12 must be substituted. Dalman speaks as if Jesus, feeling the need of asseveration, and embarrassed by the recollection that He had said ‘Swear not at all,’ fixed upon ‘Amen’ as an evasive but virtual oath (cf. Achelis on early ‘Christian’ oaths [Christentum, 1912, Excursus 62]). But it is only fair to suppose that Jesus regarded ‘verily’ as differing from the oath in principle; for by it a man neither cringes before God’s punishments, nor presumptuously offers to suffer them on certain conditions of his own.
Regarding Heb_6:13 f., Heb_7:20 f. and Rev_10:5 f., from which the conclusion is often drawn that Jesus cannot have forbidden all oaths, since oath-taking is here ascribed to God and His angels, and commended when practised by men, it may be said: (1) that not all the genuine teachings of Jesus were everywhere known, understood, and practised in the churches of the 1st cent.; (2) that the Divine example, especially in the handling of something dangerous, is not always enjoined upon man. The lex talionis is forbidden to men that it may be left entirely to God (Mat_5:44-45, Rom_12:19, 2Ti_4:14). There are also the objections that the ascription of oath-taking to God may be simply anthropomorphic-which is the very opposite of following a Divine example; and that His swearing ‘by Himself’ is irreconcilable with the ordinary definition of an oath (see above), for it avowedly does not include an appeal to a higher power (Heb_6:13), still less the invocation of a penalty.
Exegetically, the best conclusion is perhaps Augustine’s: that to swear falsely is perdition, to swear truly is perilous, and that the only safe course is to leave the oath alone. Practical experience tends in the same direction. Defender after defender admits that perjury is committed constantly, increasingly, and with impunity. This has the most deadening effect on morality and religion alike, and there is a very general desire to limit oaths to a few matters on which truthfulness is specially vital, or to abolish preparatory oaths altogether and accept sworn testimony only to evidence already given. The latter suggestion, however, would have positively bad effects unless witnesses were solemnly reminded beforehand that they would have to take an oath afterwards; otherwise, if they had once uttered falsehood, they would almost certainly not go back on it. On the Continent there is a strong movement within the legal profession to substitute declarations for oaths (cf. F. Paulsen, System der Ethik7, 8, 1906, ii. 208-209); in certain Swiss cantons, where the experiment has been tried, false evidence has not increased. In any case, the best deterrent would be more frequent prosecutions and severer sentences for untrue witness. It would probably be best to lay upon the magistrate the duty of impressing on witnesses the seriousness of their position, but to leave him free to do this when and how he thought best. A set form becomes almost inevitably a formality. Finally, it is necessary to realize that much of the argumentation on this whole subject is double-edged. If, for instance, as the advocates of the oath say, the word ‘verily’ is practically the equivalent of an oath, could they not be satisfied with this equivalent? They could then, perhaps, settle the controversy by accepting as adequate some such words as these: ‘Recognizing the solemn duty of truthfulness, I verily promise that the evidence which I shall give in this case shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.’
Literature.-Besides the works mentioned in the article , see articles ‘Oath’ in Hasting's Dictionary of the Bible (5 vols) (G. Ferries), ‘Oaths’ in Dict. of Christ and the Gospels (G. Wanchope Stewart), and ‘Eid (Ethisch)’ in RGG [Note: GG Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart.] (O. Scheel), with the recent literature there quoted. Reference may also be made to the Commentaries on Matthew, by B. Weiss10 (in Meyer’s Kommentar, 1910), T. Zahn3 (Kommentar zum NT, 1910), E. Klostermann and H. Gressmann (in Lietzmann’s Handbuch zum NT, 1909), H. J. Holtzmann3 (Handkommentar zum NT, 1901), W. C. Allen3 (International Critical Commentary , 1912), A. B. Bruce (Expositor’s Greek Testament , 1897), A. Plummer (1909); on Mark, by B. Weiss8 (in Meyer, 1892), G. Wohlenberg1, 2 (in Zahn, 1910), E. Klostermann and H. Gressmann (in Lietzmann, 1907), H. J. Holtzmann3 (Handkom., 1901), E. P. Gould (International Critical Commentary , 1896), A. B. Bruce (Expositor’s Greek Testament , 1897), H. B. Swete (1902); on Hebrews, by B. Weiss6 (in Meyer, 1897), E. Riggenbach (in Zahn, 1913), H. Windisch (in Lietzmann, 1913), M. Dods (Expositor’s Greek Testament , 1910); on James, by W. Beyschlag (in Meyer, 1897), W. O. E. Cesterley (Expositor’s Greek Testament , 1910), R. J. Knowling (1904), J. B. Mayor (31910). See also the text-books on Ethics by I. A. Dorner (Eng. translation , 1887), C. E. Luthardt (Eng. translation , 1889), H. Martensen (Eng. translation , 1881-85), G. C. A. v. Harless (Eng. translation 8, 1868), R. Rothe (21867-71), F. H. R. Frank (1884-87), K. Köstlin (1887), L. Lemme (1905). Nearly all the German work is marked by a strong emphasis on loyal citizenship; see especially Lemme and Frank.
C. H. Watkins.
According to Hebrew thought, when people took an oath they called down a curse upon themselves if they were not telling the truth (Mar 14:71) or if, after making a promise, they did not keep their word (2Sa 3:8-10). In swearing by the name of God, they were inviting God to take decisive action against them should they be false to their oath (1Sa 19:6; 2Ki 2:2; Jer 42:5; Eze 17:18-19; see CURSE).
There were various rituals that people followed in swearing oaths. Where two parties bound themselves to a contract by oath, they sometimes carried out a ritual where they passed between portions of slaughtered animals, calling down the fate of the animals on themselves should they break their oath (Jer 34:18; cf. Gen 15:9-20). A person might, in swearing an oath, raise one hand above the head or, if swearing to another, place one hand under the other person’s thigh (Gen 24:2-3; Deu 32:40).
People could swear oaths before local judges or at the sanctuary altar (Exo 22:10-11; 1Ki 8:31). A special ritual was available when a woman was suspected of adultery and she wanted to swear her innocence (Num 5:11-31).
When Israelites swore by the name of God, they were to be careful not to swear falsely (Lev 19:12). Under no conditions were they to swear by the name of a false god (Amo 8:14). If they swore a rash oath and later regretted it, they could ask forgiveness through presenting a guilt offering and making any compensation that may have been necessary (Lev 5:4-6; Lev 6:5; cf. 1Sa 14:24-29).
Even God sometimes bound himself by an oath; for example, in his covenant promises to Abraham (Gen 15:5-20; Gen 22:16-17; Luk 1:68-73; Heb 6:13-14), to David (Psa 89:34-36; Act 2:30), to the messianic king (Psa 110:4; Heb 7:15-22; Heb 7:28), and to his redeemed people (Heb 6:16-17). Although he had no need to take an oath (since his word is always sure), in his grace he confirmed his promise by an oath, so that believers might be doubly certain of their ultimate salvation (Heb 6:17-20).
Wrong practices developed among the Jews concerning the taking of oaths. Some considered that if, in swearing an oath, they did not actually use the name of God, they were not bound by that oath. They felt no guilt if they swore ‘by heaven’, ‘by earth’, ‘by Jerusalem’ or ‘by the head’ and then broke their promise, for such oaths did not use God’s name. Jesus told them that if they were truthful and honest in all their day-to-day behaviour, they would not feel the need to swear oaths at all. Everything a person says should be true and straightforward (Mat 5:33-37; Mat 23:16; Jas 5:12).
A strong declaration that one will tell
the truth or keep a promise, often using
the name of God or something else
known to be real or important.