War

or WARFARE, the attempt to decide a contest or difference between princes, states, or large bodies of people, by resorting to extensive acts of violence, or, as the phrase is, by an appeal to arms. The Hebrews were formerly a very warlike nation. The books that inform us of their wars display neither ignorance nor flattery; but are writings inspired by the Spirit of truth and wisdom. Their warriors were none of those fabulous heroes or professed conquerors, whose business it was to ravage cities and provinces, and to reduce foreign nations under their dominion, merely for the sake of governing, or purchasing a name for themselves. They were commonly wise and valiant generals, raised up by God “to fight the battles of the Lord,” and to exterminate his enemies. Such were Joshua, Caleb, Gideon, Jephthah, Samson, David, Josiah, and the Maccabees, whose names alone are their own sufficient encomiums. Their wars were not undertaken upon slight occasions, or performed with a handful of people. Under Joshua the affair was of no less importance than to make himself master of a vast country which God had given up to him; and to root out several powerful nations that God had devoted to an anathema; and to vindicate an offended Deity, and human nature which had been debased by a wicked and corrupt people, who had filled up the measure of their iniquities. Under the Judges, the matter was to assert their liberty, by shaking off the yoke of powerful tyrants, who kept them in subjection.

Under Saul and David the same motives prevailed to undertake war; and to these were added a farther motive, of making a conquest of such provinces as God had promised to his people. Far was it from their intention merely to reduce the power of the Philistines, the Ammonites, the Moabites, the Idumeans, the Arabians, the Syrians, and the several princes that were in possession of those countries. In the later times of the kingdoms of Israel and Judah, we observe their kings bearing the shock of the greatest powers of Asia, of the kings of Assyria and Chaldea, Shalmaneser, Sennacherib, Esarhaddon, and Nebuchadnezzar, who made the whole east tremble. Under the Maccabees a handful of men opposed the whole power of the kings of Syria, and against them maintained the religion of their fathers, and shook off the yoke of their oppressors, who had a design both against their religion and liberty. In still later times, with what courage, intrepidity, and constancy, did they sustain the war against the Romans, who were then masters of the world!

We may distinguish two kinds of wars among the Hebrews: some were of obligation, as being expressly commanded by the Lord; but others were free and voluntary. The first were such as God appointed them to undertake: for example, against the Amalekites and the Canaanites, which were nations devoted to an anathema. The others were undertaken by the captains of the people, to revenge some injuries offered to the nation, to punish some insults or offences, or to defend their allies. Such was that which the Hebrews made against the city of Gibeah, and against the tribe of Benjamin, which would support them in their fault; that which David made against the Ammonites, whose king had affronted his ambassadors; and that of Joshua against the kings of the Canaanites, to protect the Gibeonites. Whatever reasons authorize a nation or a prince to make war against another, obtained, likewise, among the Hebrews; for all the laws of Moses suppose that the Israelites might make war, and might defend themselves, against their enemies. When a war was resolved upon, all the people that were capable of bearing arms were collected together, or only part of them, according as the exigence of the existing case and the necessity and importance of the enterprise required. For it does not appear that, before the reign of King David, there were any regular troops or magazines in Israel. A general rendezvous was appointed, a review was made of the people by tribes and by families, and then they marched against the enemy. When Saul, at the beginning of his reign, was reformed of the cruel proposal that the Ammonites had made to the men of the city of Jabesh-Gilead, he cut in pieces the oxen belonging to his plough, and sent them through the country, saying, “Whosoever cometh not forth after Saul and Samuel, to the relief of Jabesh-Gilead, so shall it be done unto his oxen,” 1Sa 11:7. In ancient times, those that went to war generally carried their own provisions along with them, or they took them from the enemy. Hence these wars were generally of short continuance; because it was hardly possible to subsist a large body of troops for a long time with such provisions as every one carried along with him. When David, Jesse’s younger son, stayed behind to look after his father’s flocks while his elder brothers went to the wars along with Saul, Jesse sent David to carry provisions to his brothers, 1Sa 17:13. We suppose that this way of making war prevailed also under Joshua, the Judges, Saul, David at the beginning of his reign, the kings of Judah and Israel who were successors to Rehoboam and Jeroboam, and under the Maccabees, till the time of Simon Maccabaeus, prince and high priest of the Jews, who had mercenary troops, that is, soldiers who received pay, 1Ma 14:32. Every one also provided his own arms for the war. The kings of the Hebrews went to the wars in person, and, in earlier times, fought on foot, as well as the meanest of their soldiers; no horses being used in the armies of Israel before David. The officers of war among the Hebrews were the general of the army, and the princes of the tribes or of the families of Israel beside other princes or captains, some of a thousand, some of a hundred, some of fifty, and some of ten, men. They had also their scribes, who were a kind of commissaries that kept the muster roll of the troops; and these had others under them who acted by their direction.

Military fortifications were at first nothing more than a trench or ditch, dug round a few cottages on a hill or mountain, together with the mound, which was formed by the sand dug out of it; except, perhaps, there might have sometimes been an elevated scaffolding for the purpose of throwing stones with the greater effect against the enemy. In the age of Moses and Joshua, the walls which surrounded cities were elevated to no inconsiderable height, and were furnished with towers. The art of fortification was encouraged and patronized by the Hebrew kings, and Jerusalem was always well defended, especially Mount Zion. In later times, the temple itself was used as a castle. The principal parts of a fortification were,

1. The wall, which, in some instances, was triple and double, 2Ch 32:5. Walls were commonly made lofty and broad, so as to be neither readily passed over nor broken through, Jer 51:58. The main wall terminated at the top in a parapet for the accommodation of the soldiers, which opened at intervals in a sort of embrasures, so as to give them an opportunity of fighting with missile weapons.

2. Towers, which were erected at certain distances from each other on the top of walls, and ascended to a great height, terminated at the top in a flat roof, and were surrounded with a parapet, which exhibited openings similar to those in the parapet of the walls. Towers of this kind were erected, likewise, over the gates of cities. In these towers guards were kept constantly stationed; at least, this was the case in the time of the kings. It was their business to make known any thing that they discovered at a distance; and whenever they noticed an irruption from an enemy, they blew the trumpet, to arouse the citizens, 2Sa 13:34; 2Sa 18:26-27; 2Ki 9:17-19; Nah 2:1; 2Ch 17:2. Towers, likewise, which were somewhat larger in size, were erected in different parts of the country, particularly on places which were elevated; and these were guarded by a military force, Jdg 8:9; Jdg 8:17; Jdg 9:46; Jdg 9:49; Jdg 9:51; Isa 21:6; Hab 2:1; Hos 5:8; Jer 31:6. We find, even to this day, that the circular edifices of this sort, which are still erected in the solitudes of Arabia Felix, bear their ancient name of castles or towers.

3. The walls were erected in such a way as to curve inward; the extremities of them, consequently, projected outward, and formed a kind of bastions. The object of forming the walls so as to present such projections, was to enable the inhabitants of the besieged city to attack the assailants in flank. We learn from the history of Tacitus, that the walls of Jerusalem, at the time of its being attacked by the Romans, were built in this manner. These projections were introduced by King Uzziah, B.C. 810, and are subsequently mentioned in Zep 1:16.

4. The digging of a fosse put it in the power of the inhabitants of a city to increase the elevation of the walls, and of itself threw a serious difficulty in the way of an enemy’s approach, 2Sa 20:15; Isa 26:1; Neh 3:8; Psa 48:13. The fosse, if the situation of the place admitted it, was filled with water. This was the case at Babylon.

5. The gates were at first made of wood, and were small in size. They were constructed in the manner of valve doors, and were secured by means of wooden bars. Subsequently, they were made larger and stronger; and, in order to prevent their being burned, were covered with plates of brass or iron. The bars were covered in the same manner, in order to prevent their being cut asunder; but it was sometimes the case that they were made wholly of iron. The bars were secured by a sort of lock, Psa 107:16; Isa 45:2.

Previously to commencing war, the Heathen nations consulted oracles, soothsayers, necromancers, and also the lot, which was ascertained by shooting arrows of different colours, 1Sa 28:1-10; Isa 41:21-24; Eze 25:11. The Hebrews, to whom things of this kind were interdicted, were in the habit, in the early part of their history, of inquiring of God by means of Urim and Thummim, Jdg 1:1; Jdg 20:27-28; 1Sa 23:2; 1Sa 28:6; 1Sa 30:8. After the time of David, the kings who reigned in Palestine consulted, according to the different characters which they sustained, and the feelings which they exercised, sometimes true prophets, and sometimes false, in respect to the issue of war, 1Ki 22:6-13; 2Ki 19:2, &c. Sacrifices were also offered, in reference to which the soldiers were said to consecrate themselves to the war, Isa 13:3; Jer 6:4; Jer 51:27; Joe 3:9; Oba 1:1. There are instances of formal declarations of war, and sometimes of previous negotiations, 2Ki 14:8; 2Ch 25:27; Jdg 11:12-28; but ceremonies of this kind were not always observed, 2Sa 10:1-12. When the enemy made a sudden incursion, or when the war was unexpectedly commenced, the alarm was given to the people by messengers rapidly sent forth, by the sound of warlike trumpets, by standards floating on the loftiest places, by the clamour of many voices on the mountains, that echoed from summit to summit, Jdg 3:27; Jdg 6:34; Jdg 7:22; Jdg 19:29-30; 1Sa 11:7-8; Isa 5:26; Isa 13:2; Isa 18:3; Isa 30:17; Isa 49:2; Isa 62:10. Military expeditions commonly commenced in the spring, 2Sa 11:1, and were continued in the summer, but in the winter the soldiers went into quarters. The firm persuasion that God fights for the good against the wicked, discovers itself in the Old Testament, and accounts for the fact, that, not only in the Hebrew, but also in the Arabic, Syriac, and Chaldaic languages, words, which originally signify justice, innocence, or uprightness, signify likewise victory; and that words, whose usual meaning is injustice or wickedness, also mean defeat or overthrow. The same may be said in respect to words which signify help or aid, inasmuch as the nation which conquered received aid from God, and God was its helper, Psalm 7:9; 9:9; 20:6; 26:1; 35:24; 43:1; 44:5; 75:3; 76:13; 78:9; 82:8; 1Sa 14:45; 2Ki 5:1; Isa 59:17; Hab 3:8.

The attack of the orientals in battle has always been, and is to this day, characterized by vehemence, and impetuosity. In case the enemy sustain an unaltered front, they retreat, but it is not long before they return again with renewed ardour. It was the practice of the Roman armies to stand still in the order of battle, and to receive the shock of their opposers. To this practice there are allusions in the following passages: 1Co 16:13; Gal 5:1; Eph 6:14; Php 1:27; 1Th 3:8; 2Th 2:15. The Greeks, while they were yet three or four furlongs distant from the enemy, commenced the song of war; something resembling which occurs in 2Ch 20:21. They then raised a shout, which was also done among the Hebrews, 1Sa 17:52; Jos 6:6; Isa 5:29-30; Isa 17:12; Jer 4:19; Jer 25:30. The war shout in Jdg 7:20, was as follows, “The sword of the Lord and of Gideon.” In some instances it seems to have been a mere yell or inarticulate cry. The mere march of armies with their weapons, chariots, and trampling coursers, occasioned a great and confused noise, which is compared by the prophets to the roaring of the ocean, and the dashing of the mountain torrents, Isa 17:12-13; Isa 27:2. The descriptions of battles in the Bible are very brief; but although there is nothing especially said, in respect to the order in which the battle commenced and was conducted, there is hardly a doubt that the light- armed troops, as was the case in other nations, were the first in the engagement. The main body followed them, and, with their spears extended, made a rapid and impetuous movement upon the enemy. Hence swiftness of foot in a soldier is mentioned as a ground of great commendation, not only in Homer, but in the Bible, 2Sa 2:19-24; 1Ch 12:8; Psa 18:33. Those who obtained the victory were intoxicated with joy; the shout of triumph resounded from mountain to mountain, Isa 42:11; Isa 52:7-8; Jer 50:2; Eze 7:7; Nah 1:15. The whole of the people, not excepting the women, went out to meet the returning conquerors with singing and with dancing, Jdg 11:34-37; 1Sa 18:6-7. Triumphal songs were uttered for the living, and elegies for the dead, 2Sa 1:17-18; 2Ch 35:25; Jdg 5:1-31; Exo 15:1-21. Monuments in honour of the victory were erected, 2Sa 8:13; Psa 60:1; and the arms of the enemy were hung up as trophies in the tabernacle, 1Sa 31:10; 2Ki 11:10. The soldiers who conducted themselves meritoriously were honoured with presents, and had the opportunity of entering into honourable matrimonial connections, Joshua 14; 1Sa 17:25; 1Sa 28:17; 2Sa 18:11. See ARMIES, and See ARMS.

Under this head we may notice some of the usages of Hebrew warfare which have not been considered under other heads, referred to at the end of this article.

The army of Israel was chiefly composed of infantry, formed into a trained body of spearmen, and, in greater numbers, of slingers and archers, with horses and chariots in small proportion, excepting during the periods when the kingdom extended over the desert to the Red Sea. The irregulars were drawn from the families and tribes, particularly Ephraim and Benjamin, but the heavy armed derived their chief strength from Judah, and were, it appears, collected by a kind of conscription, by tribes, like the earlier Roman armies; not through the instrumentality of selected officers, but by genealogists of each tribe, under the superintendence of the princes. Of those returned on the rolls, a proportion greater or less was selected, according to the exigency of the time; and the whole male population might be called out on extraordinary occasions. When kings had rendered the system of government better organized, there was a sort of muster-master, who had returns of the effective force, or number of soldiers ready for service, but who was a kind of secretary of state. These officers, or the shoterim, struck out, or excused from service:— 1st, those who had built a house without having yet inhabited it; 2nd, those who had planted an olive or vineyard, and had not tasted the fruit—which gave leave of absence for five years; 3rd, those who were betrothed, or had been married less than one year; 4th, the fainthearted, which may mean the constitutionally delicate, rather than the cowardly.

The levies were drilled to march in ranks (1Ch 12:38), and in column by fives abreast (Exo 13:18); hence it may be inferred that they borrowed from the Egyptian system a decimal formation, two fifties in each division making a solid square, equal in rank and file: for twice ten in rank and five in file being told off by right hand and left hand files, a command to the left hand files to face about and march six or eight paces to the rear, then to front and take one step to the right would make the hundred a solid square, with only the additional distance between the right hand or unmoved files necessary to use the shield and spear without hindrance; while the depth being again reduced to five files, they could face to the right or left, and march firmly in column, passing every kind of ground without breaking or lengthening their order.

With centuries thus arranged in masses, both movable and solid, a front of battle could be formed in simple decimal progression to a thousand, ten thousand, and to an army at all times formidable by its depth, and by the facility it afforded for the light troops, chariots of war, and cavalry, to rally behind and to issue from thence to the front. Archers and slingers could ply their missiles from the rear, which would be more certain to reach an enemy in close conflict, than was to be found the case with the Greek phalanx, because from the great depth of that body missiles from behind were liable to fall among its own front ranks. These divisions were commanded, it seems, by ketsinim, officers in charge of one thousand, who, in the first ages, may have been the heads of houses, but in the time of the kings were appointed by the crown, and had a seat in the councils of war; but the commander of the host, such as Joab, Abner, Benaiah, etc. was either the judge, or under the judge or king, the supreme head of the army, and one of the highest officers in the state. He, as well as the king, had an armor-bearer, whose duty was not only to bear his shield, spear, or bow, and to carry orders, but, above all, to be at the chief’s side in the hour of battle (Jdg 9:54; 1Sa 14:6; 1Sa 31:4-5). Beside the royal guards, there was, as early at least as the time of David, a select troop of heroes, who appear to have had an institution very similar in principle to our modern orders of knighthood.

In military operations, such as marches in quest of, or in the presence of, an enemy, and in order of battle, the forces were formed into three divisions, each commanded by a chief captain or commander of a corps, or third part, as was also the case with other armies of the east; these constituted the center, and right and left wing, and during a march formed the van, center, and rear.

The war-cry of the Hebrews was not intonated by the ensign-bearers, as in the West, but by a Levite; for priests had likewise charge of the trumpets, and the sounding of signals; and one of them, called ’the anointed for war,’ who is said to have had the charge of animating the army to action by an oration, may have been appointed to utter the cry of battle (Deu 20:2). It was a mere shout (1Sa 17:20), or, as in later ages, Hallelujah! while the so-called mottoes of the central banners of the four great sides of the square, of Judah, Reuben, Ephraim, and Dan, were more likely the battle-songs which each of the fronts of the mighty army had sung on commencing the march or advancing to do battle (Num 10:34-36; Deu 6:4).

Before an engagement the Hebrew soldiers were spared fatigue as much as possible, and food was distributed to them; their arms were enjoined to be in the best order, and they formed a line, as before described, of solid squares of hundreds, each square being ten deep, and as many in breadth, with sufficient intervals between the files to allow of facility in the movements, the management of the arms, and the passage to the front or rear of slingers and archers. These lasts occupied posts according to circumstances, on the flanks, or in advance, but in the heat of battle were sheltered behind the squares of spearmen; the slingers were always stationed in the rear, until they were ordered forward to cover the front, impede an hostile approach, or commence an engagement. Meantime, the king, or his representative, appeared clad in holy ornaments, and proceeded to make the final dispositions for battle, in the middle of his chosen braves, and attended by priests, who, by their exhortations, animated the ranks within hearing, while the trumpets waited to sound the signal. It was now, with the enemy at hand, we may suppose, that the slingers would be ordered to pass forward between the intervals of the line, and, opening their order, would let fly their stone or leaden missiles, until, by the gradual approach of the opposing fronts, they would be hemmed in and recalled to the rear, or ordered to take an appropriate position. Then was the time when the trumpet-bearing priests received command to sound the charge, and when the shout of battle burst forth from the ranks. The signal being given, the heavy infantry would press forward under cover of their shields, the rear ranks might then, when so armed, cast their darts, and the archers, behind them all, shoot high, so as to pitch their arrows over the lines before them, into the dense masses of the enemy beyond. If the opposing forces broke through the line, we may imagine a body of charioteers reserve, rushing from their post, and charging in among the disjointed ranks of the enemy, before they could reconstruct their order; or wheeling round a flank, fall upon the rear; or being encountered by a similar maneuver, and perhaps repulsed, or rescued by Hebrew cavalry. The king, meanwhile, surrounded by his princes, posted close to the rear of his line of battle, and in the middle of showered missiles, would watch the enemy and strive to remedy every disorder. Thus it was that several of the sovereigns of Judah were slain (2Ch 18:33; 2Ch 35:23), and that such an enormous waste of human life took place; for two hostile lines of masses, at least ten in depth, advancing under the confidence of breastplate and shield, when once engaged hand to hand, had difficulties of no ordinary nature to retreat; because the hindermost ranks not being exposed personally to the first slaughter, would not, and the foremost could not, fall back; neither could the commanders disengage the line without a certainty of being routed. The fate of the day was therefore no longer within the control of the chief, and nothing but obstinate valor was left to decide the victory. Sometimes a part of the army was posted in ambush, but this maneuver was most commonly practiced against the garrisons of cities (Jos 8:12; Jdg 20:38). In the case of Abraham (Gen 14:15), when he led a small body of his own people, suddenly collected, and falling upon the guard of the captives, released them, and recovered the booty, it was a surprise, not an ambush; nor is it necessary to suppose that he fell in with the main army of the enemy. At a later period there is no doubt the Hebrews formed their armies, in imitation of the Romans, into more than one line of masses, and modeled their military institutions as near as possible upon the same system [ARMOR; ENCAMPMENTS; ENGINES OF WAR; FORTIFICATIONS; STANDARDS].

One of the evil fruits of the fall, and an appalling manifestation of the depravity of mankind, Gen 6:11-13 Isa 9:5 Jas 4:1-2, often rendered apparently inevitable by the assaults of enemies, or commanded by God for their punishment. See AMALEKITES and CANAAN.\par By this scourge, subsequently to the conquest of Canaan, God chastised both his own rebellious people and the corrupt and oppressive idolaters around them. In many cases, moreover, the issue was distinctly made between the true God and idols; as with the Philistines, 1Sa 17:43-47 ; the Syrians, 1Ki 20:23-30 ; the Assyrians, 2Ki 19:10-19,35 ; and the Ammonites, 2Ch 20:1-30 . Hence God often raised up champions for his people, gave them counsel in war by Urim and by prophets, and miraculously aided them in battle.\par Before the period of the kings, there seems to have been scarcely any regular army among the Jews; but all who were able to bear arms were liable to be summoned to the field, 1Sa 11:7 . The vast armies of the kings of Judah and Israel usually fought on foot, armed with spears, swords, and shields; having large bodies of archers and slingers, and comparatively few chariots and horsemen. See ARMS.\par The forces were arranged in suitable divisions, with officers of tens, hundreds, thousands, etc., Jdg 20:10 1Ch 13:1 2Ch 25:5 . The Jews were fully equal to the nations around them in bravery and the arts of war; but were restrained from wars of conquest, and when invaders had been repelled the people dispersed to their homes. A campaign usually commenced in spring, and was terminated before winter, 2Sa 11:1 1Ki 20:22 . As the Jewish host approached a hostile army, the priests cheered them by addresses, Deu 20:2 1Sa 7:9,13, and by inspiring songs, 2Ch 20:21 . The sacred trumpets gave the signal for battle, Num 10:9,10 2Ch 13:12-15 ; the archers and slingers advanced first, but at length made way for the charge of the heavy-armed spearmen, etc., who sought to terrify the enemy, ere they reached them, by their aspect and war-cries, Jdg 7:18-20 1Sa 17:52 Job 39:25 Isa 17:12,13 .\par The combatants were soon engaged hand to hand; the battle became a series of duels; and the victory was gained by the obstinate bravery, the skill, strength, and swiftness of individual warriors, 1Ch 12:8 Psa 18:32-37 . See Paul’s exhortations to Christian firmness, under the assaults of spiritual foes, 1Co 16:13 Zep 6:11-14 1Th 3:8 . The battles of the ancients were exceedingly sanguinary, 2Ch 28:6 ; few were spared except those reserved to grace the triumph or be sold as slaves. A victorious army of Jews on returning was welcomed by the whole population with every demonstration of joy, 1Sa 18:6,7 . The spoils were divided after reserving an oblation for the Lord, Num 31:50 Jdg 5:30 ; trophies were suspended in public places; eulogies were pronounced in honor of the most distinguished warriors, and lamentations over the dead.\par In besieging a walled city, numerous towers were usually erected around it for throwing missiles; catapults were prepared for hurling large darts and stones. Large towers were also constructed and mounds near to the city walls, and raised if possible to an equal or greater height, that by casting a movable bridge across access to the city might be gained. The battering-ram was also employed to effect a breach in the wall; and the crow, a long spar with iron claws at one end and ropes at the other, to pull down stones or men from the top of the wall. These and similar modes of assault the besieged resisted by throwing down darts, stones, heavy rocks, and sometimes boiling oil; but hanging sacks of chaff between the battering-ram and the wall; by strong and sudden sallies, capturing and burning the towers and enginery of the assailants, and quickly retreating into the city, 2Ch 26:14,15 . The modern inventions of gunpowder, rifles, bombs, and heavy artillery have changed all this. See BATTERING-RAM.\par As the influence of Christianity diffuses itself in the world, war is becoming less excusable and less practicable; and a great advance may be observed from the customs and spirit of ancient barbarism towards the promised universal supremacy of the Prince of peace, Psa 46:9 Isa 2:4 Mic 4:3 .\par "Wars of the Lord" was probably the name of an uninspired book, long since lost, containing details of the events alluded to in Num 21:14-15 .\par

War. The most important topic in connection with war is the formation of the army which is destined to carry it on. See Army. In 1Ki 9:22, at a period (Solomon’s reign) when the organization of the army was complete, we have apparently a list of the various gradations of rank in the service, as follows:

1. "Men of war" = privates;

2. "servants," the lowest rank of officers = lieutenants;

3. "princes" = captains;

4. "captains," perhaps = staff officers;

5. "rulers of the chariots and his horsemen" = cavalry officers.

Formal proclamations of war were not interchanged between the belligerents. Before entering the enemy’s district, spies were sent to ascertain the character of the country and the preparations of its inhabitants for resistance. Num 13:17; Jos 2:1; Jdg 7:10; 1Sa 26:4. The combat assumed the form of a number of hand-to-hand contests; hence, the high value attached to fleetness of foot and strength of arm. 2Sa 1:23; 2Sa 2:18; 1Ch 12:8. At the same time, various strategic devices were practiced, such as the ambuscade, Jos 8:2; Jos 8:12; Jdg 20:36, surprise, Jdg 7:16, or circumvention. 2Sa 5:23.

Another mode of settling the dispute was by the selection of champions, 1 Samuel 17; 2Sa 2:14, who were spurred on to exertion by the offer of high reward. 1Sa 17:25; 1Sa 18:25; 2Sa 18:11; 1Ch 11:6. The contest having been decided, the conquerors were recalled from the pursuit by the sound of a trumpet. 2Sa 2:28; 2Sa 18:16; 2Sa 20:22.

The siege of a town or fortress was conducted in the following manner: A line of circumvallation was drawn round the place, Eze 4:2; Mic 5:1, constructed out of the trees found in the neighborhood, Deu 20:20, together with earth and any other materials at hand. This line not only cut off the besieged from the surrounding country, but also served as a base of operations for the besiegers.

The next step was to throw out, from this line, one or more mounds or "banks" in the direction of the city, 2Sa 20:15; 2Ki 19:32; Isa 37:33, which were gradually increased in height until they were about half as high as the city wall. On this mound or bank, towers were erected, 2Ki 25:1; Jer 52:4; Eze 4:2; Eze 17:17; Eze 21:22; Eze 26:8, whence, the slingers and archers might attack with effect.

Catapults were prepared for hurling large darts and stones; and the crow, a long spar, with iron claws at one end and ropes at the other, to pull down stones or men from the top of the wall. Battering-rams, Eze 4:2; Eze 21:22, were brought up to the walls by means of the bank, and scaling-ladders might also be placed on it.

The treatment of the conquered was extremely severe in ancient times. The bodies of the soldiers killed in action were plundered, 1Sa 31:8 2Ma 8:27; the survivors were either killed in some savage manner, Jdg 9:45; 2Sa 12:31; 2Ch 25:12, mutilated, Jdg 9:45; 2Sa 12:31; 2Ch 25:12 mutilated, Jdg 1:6; 1Sa 11:2, or carried into captivity. Num 31:26.

Israel at its Exodus from Egypt went up "according to their armies," "harnessed," literally, "arranged in five divisions," van, center, two wings, and rearguard (Ewald): Exo 6:26; Exo 12:37; Exo 12:41; Exo 13:18. Pharaoh’s despotism had supplied them with native officers whom they obeyed (Exo 5:14-21). Moses had in youth all the training which a warlike nation like Egypt could give him, and which would enable him to organize Israel as an army not a mob. Jehovah as "a man of war" was at their head (Exo 15:1; Exo 15:3; Exo 13:20-22); under Him they won their first victory, that over Amalek (Exo 17:8-16). The 68th Psalm of David takes its starting point from Israel’s military watchword under Jehovah in marching against the enemy (Num 10:35-36). In Jos 5:13-6;Jos 5:5.

Jehovah manifests Himself in human form as "the Captain of the host of the Lord." Antitypically, the spiritual Israel under Jehovah battle against Satan with spiritual arms (2Co 10:4-5; Eph 6:10-17; 1Th 5:8; 1Th 6:12; 2Ti 2:3; 2Ti 4:7; Rev 6:2). By the word of His mouth shall He in person at the head of the armies of heaven slay antichrist and his hosts in the last days (Rev 17:14; Rev 19:11-21). The Mosaic code fostered a self defensive, not an aggressive, spirit in Israel. All Israelites (with some merciful exemptions, Deu 20:5-8) were liable to serve from 20 years and upward, thus forming a national yeomanry (Num 1:3; Num 1:26; 2Ch 25:5). The landowners and warriors being the same opposed a powerful barrier to assaults from without and disruption from within.

The divisions for civil purposes were the same as for military (Exo 18:21, compare Num 31:14); in both cases divided into thousands, hundreds, fifties, and tens, and the chiefs bearing the same designation (sariy). In Deu 20:9 Vulgate, Syriac, etc., translated "the captains at the head of the people shall array them." But if "captains" were subject to the verb and not, as KJV object, the article might be expected. In KJV the captains meant are subordinate leaders of smaller divisions. National landholders led by men already revered for civil authority and noble family descent, so long as they remained faithful to God, formed an army ensuring alike national security and a free constitution in a free country. Employed in husbandry, and attached to home, they had no temptation to war for conquest. The law forbidding cavalry, and enjoining upon all males attendance yearly at the three great feasts at Jerusalem, made war outside Palestine almost impossible.

Religion too treated them as polluted temporarily by any bloodshed however justifiable (Num 19:13-16; Num 31:19; 1Ki 5:3; 1Ch 28:3). A standing army was introduced under Saul (1Sa 13:2; 1Sa 14:47-52; 1Sa 18:5). (See ARMY.) Personal prowess of individual soldiers determined the issue, as they fought hand to hand (2Sa 1:28; 2Sa 2:18; 1Ch 12:8; Amo 2:14-16), and sometimes in single combat (1 Samuel 17; 2Sa 2:14-17). The trumpet by varied notes sounded for battle or for retreat (2Sa 2:28; 2Sa 18:16; 2Sa 20:22; 1Co 14:8).

The priests blew the silver trumpets (Num 10:9; Num 31:6). In sieges, a line of circumvallation was drawn round the city, and mounds were thrown out from this, on which towers were erected from whence slingers and archers could assail the defenders (Eze 4:2; 2Sa 20:15; 2Ki 19:32; 2Ki 25:1). The Mosaic law mitigated the severities of ancient warfare. Only males in arms were slain; women and children were spared, except the Canaanites who were doomed by God (Deu 20:13-14; Deu 21:10-14).

Israel’s mercy was noted among neighbouring nations (1Ki 20:31; 2Ki 6:20-23; Isa 16:5; contrast Jdg 16:21; 1Sa 11:2; 2Ki 25:7). Abimelech and Menahem acted with the cruelty of usurpers (Jdg 9:45; 2Ki 15:16). Amaziahacted with exceptional cruelty (2Ch 25:12). Gideon’s severity to the oppressor Midian (Judges 7-8), also Israel’s treatment of the same after suffering by Midian’s licentious and idolatrous wiles, and David’s treatment of Moab and Ammon (probably for some extraordinary treachery toward his father and mother), are not incompatible with Israel’s general mercy comparatively speaking.

polemos (G4171) War, Fight

mache (G3163) Battle, Strife

Polemos and mache often are used together, as are polemein (G4170) and machesthai (G3164). The difference between polemos and mache is the same as that between the English words warand battle:ho polemos Peloponnesiakos is "the Peloponnesian War"; he en Marathoni mache is "the battle of Marathon." In dissuading the Athenians from yielding to the demands of the Spartans, Pericles admitted that with their allies, the Spartans were a match for all the other Greeks together in a single battle. But Pericles denied that the Spartans and their allies would retain the same superiority in a war against those who had made different preparations:

For in one battle [mache] the Peloponnesians and their allies were able to withstand all the Greeks, but they were unable to wage a war [polemein] against a similar hostile preparation.

Although polemos and polemein remain true to their primary meanings and do not acquire secondary ones, this is not the case with mache and machesthai.Mache and machesthai often designate contentions that fall far short of armed conflict. There are machai of every kind: erotikai (of love), nomikai, logomachiai, and skiamachiai (shadow-boxing). Eustathius expressed these differences well:

The terms wars [polemoi] and battles [machai] either refer to the same action in a parallel way, or there is a difference in the termsif, for example, one is disputing with words, as logomachia [a battle about words] indicates. The poet himself later speaks of battling [machessameno] over words (1.304). At all events, mache is a clash between men; polemos involves pitched battles and opportune times for fighting.

Tittmann stated:

They agree in that they denote an encounter, a strife, a fight; but polemos and polemein properly refer to a fight that takes place with the hands, while mache and machesthai refer to any strifealso of minds even if it does not result in beatings and killings. In the former the fight is thought of; in the latter it is sufficient to think of a strife which usually is not followed by a fight.

Plato distinguished stasis (insurrection or sedition) from polemos. According to Plato, the former refers to civil strife, the latter to foreign strife. "For in the case of enmity at home it is called stasis, but in a case involving foreigners it is called polemos."

War. The ancient battles were truly murderous. Scarcely ever was any quarter given, except where the vanquished were retained as slaves. 2 Chron. IS:17. Enemies were then, as now, surprised and overcome by unexpected divisions of the forces, by ambushes, and by false retreats. Gen 14:15; Jos 8:12; Jdg 20:36-39; 2Ki 7:12. In lack of artillery, unwieldy machines for casting heavy stones and other destructive missiles were invented. Uzziah "made in Jerusalem engines invented by cunning men, to be on the towers and upon the bulwarks, to shoot arrows and great stones withal." 2Ch 26:15. There was no part of the ancient military preparations more terrible than chariots. Exo 14:7; Deu 20:1; Jos 17:16; Jdg 4:3. They were in common use wherever there was any cavalry. 2Sa 10:18; 1Ch 18:4; 2Ch 12:3; 2Ch 14:9. Walls and towers were used in fortifications, and the latter were guarded by soldiers, and are called "garrisons." 2Sa 8:6; Eze 26:11. Various passages lead to the opinion that divisions of the army were common, as in modern times. Gen 14:15; Jdg 7:16; 1Sa 11:11. The most frequent division of the host was into tens, hundreds, and thousands, and each of these had its commander or captain. Jdg 20:10; 1Sa 8:12; 2Ki 11:4. Among the Hebrews these divisions had some reference to the several families, and were under the heads of families as their officers. 2Ch 25:6; 2Ch 26:12. The captains of hundreds and of thousands were of high rank, or, so to speak, staff officers, who were admitted to share in the councils of war. 1Ch 13:1. The whole army had its commander-in-chief or captain, who was over the host, and its scribe or keeper of the muster-roll. 1Ki 4:4; 1Ch 18:15-16; 1Ch 27:32-34; 2Ch 17:14; 2Ch 26:11. In Isa 33:18 the words translated "he that counted the towers" probably indicate what we should call a chief engineer. Under David the army of 288,000 men was divided into twelve corps, each of which was consequently 24,000 strong and had its own general. 1Ch 27:1-34. Under Jehoshaphat this was altered, and there were five unequal corps, under as many commanders. 2Ch 17:14-19. The cohort had 500 or 600 men, and the legion embraced ten cohorts. The light troops were provided with arms which they used at some distance from the enemy, such as bows and arrows. They are designated in 2Ch 14:8; while the heavy-armed were those who bore shield and spear. 1Ch 12:24. The light troops of the army of Asa were taken principally from the tribe of Benjamin because of their extraordinary accuracy of aim. Jdg 20:16. See Arms, Armor. The troops were excited to ardor and bravery by addresses from their priests, who were commanded to appeal to them. Deu 20:2. In later times kings themselves were accustomed to harangue their armies. 2Ch 13:4. Finally, perhaps, after the sacrifices had been offered, the summons was given by the holy trumpets. Num 10:9-10; 2Ch 13:12-14. It was the practice of the Greeks, when they were within half a mile of the enemy, to sing their war song. A similar custom probably prevailed among the Jews. 2Ch 20:21. Next followed the shout, or war cry, which the Romans accompanied with the noise of shields and spears struck violently together. This war cry was common in the East, as it is to this day among the Turks. It was the "alarm" or "shout" so often mentioned in Scripture. 1Sa 17:52; 2Ch 13:15; Job 39:25; Jer 4:19.

WAR (πόλεμος).—As the Gospels record the story of Christ, whose mission was to bring ‘peace on earth and goodwill to men,’ the references to war are not numerous. But St. Luke has three references well worthy of attention.—1. In Luk 3:14 ‘the soldiers’ (στρατευόμενοι, (Revised Version margin) ‘soldiers on service’) consult John the Baptist. It is not possible to say who the soldiers were, or in what expedition they were engaged, but they were not Roman soldiers, or any part of the force of Herod Antipas against his father-in-law Aretas, since the quarrel between Herod Antipas and Aretas had not developed then.—2. In Luk 14:31 (where He is enforcing the general lesson that we should not undertake what we have neither the strength nor the will to achieve, or enter upon His service unless we are prepared, if necessary, to sacrifice life itself) our Lord draws attention to the action of a king in calling a council of war. Possibly there is here a historical allusion to the war between Herod Antipas and Aretas (Josephus Ant. xviii. v. 3).—3. In Luk 19:43 our Lord shows His familiarity with the history of warfare when He prophesies that the enemy will cast up a bank (χάραξ) or a trench round Jerusalem. This prophecy was literally fulfilled forty years afterwards, when Titus surrounded Jerusalem with a palisaded mound and wall of masonry (agger and vallum).

Jesus seems to have recognized war as rising from the nature of man and the constitution of society; but as His teaching lays hold upon nations, the methods of war become less barbarous, and we have good cause to anticipate a time, and to work for it, when ‘nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more.’ While, therefore, Jesus Christ did not condemn war in the abstract, the whole spirit of Christianity is against it (see Hasting’s Dictionary of the Bible , art. ‘War’).

Coll. A. Macdonald.

By: Executive Committee of the Editorial Board., M. Seligsohn

Details. —Biblical Data:

The earliest war recorded in the Old Testament is that of the Elamitic king Chedorlaomer and his allies against the five kings of Sodom and its adjacent cities (Gen. xiv. 1et seq.). The result of the conflict was the destruction of the vanquished army in the field and the captivity of all the non-combatants, whose possessions became spoils of war. In the battle the troops were arranged in order (Gen. xiv. 8, R. V.), and the King of Sodom and his four allies displayed a certain degree of strategy by fighting in a valley, although their plan proved unsuccessful. Some modern scholars infer from the obscure passage II Sam. xi. 1 that wars were regularly begun in the spring. In many instances negotiations were carried on through messengers or ambassadors to avert bloodshed (Judges xi. 12-28; I Sam. xi. 1-10; I Kings xx. 2-11); and the Hebrews were expressly forbidden to make an attack without first demanding the surrender of the enemy (Deut. xx. 10 et seq.). The only instance in which war was declared without previous negotiations was that of the war between Amaziah, King of Judah, and Jehoash, King of Israel (II Kings xiv. 8).

In addition to the various modes of Divination employed by all the nations before setting out for war (comp. Ezek. xxi. 26 et seq.), the Israelites consulted Yhwh, who was not only their divinity, but also the war-god par excellence (comp. Ex. xv. 3, and the frequent phrase ), deciding whether they should begin the war and whether they would be successful (Judges i. 1; xx. 18, 23). In these passages the manner of consultation is not indicated, but from other sections and from the Septuagint it may be inferred that the priest put on the ephod and stood before the Ark to consult the Urim and Thummim (Judges xx. 27-28; I Sam. xiv. 18, xxviii. 6, xxx. 7). Occasionally the divinities were consulted through dreams or prophets, or even through familiar spirits evoked by a witch (Judges vii. 13; I Sam. xxviii. 6 et seq.; I Kings xxii. 15). Troops were generally summoned by the blowing of a trumpet or the warhorn, which was likewise the signal that warned the people of an enemy’s approach (Judges iii. 27; II Sam. xx. 1; comp. Ezek. xxxiii. 2-11), although sometimes banners were placed on the tops of high mountains or messengers were sent through the different tribes of Israel (Judges vii. 24; I Sam. xi. 7; Isa. xiii. 2). Occasionally extraordinary means were used to arouse a popular feeling of indignation which would ultimately impel the nation to make war, as in the case of the Levite who cut the body of his concubine into twelve parts and sent them to the other tribes of Israel, thus kindling between them and the Benjamites the war which resulted in the destruction of the latter tribe (Judges xix. 29 et seq.; comp. also I Sam. xi. 7).

The War-Priest.

The army of the Israelites was always accompanied to the field by a priest, Phinehas having this post in the battle with the Midianites (Num. xxxi. 6). It was the duty of the priest to care for the spiritual welfare of the soldiers and, before the attack, to encourage them and to inspire martial enthusiasm in them (Deut. xx. 2-4). Sometimes, however, the high priest himself went upon the field, where he attended the Ark, which was carried into action quite as idols and images were borne into battle by the Philistines (I Sam. iv. 3-4; II Sam. v. 21, xi. 11). Like other Semites, the Israelites began a war with burnt offerings and fasting (Judges vi. 20, 26; xx. 26; I Sam. vii. 9, xiii. 10), this explaining the frequency of the phrase "to sanctify war," and the epithet "sanctified" as applied to warriors (Micah iii. 5; Isa. xiii. 3; Jer. vi. 4, xxii. 7). A single instance is recorded, though in obscure terms, of a human sacrifice as a burnt offering in a time of extreme danger (II Kings iii. 27). According to a passage of D, furthermore, the officers of the Hebrew troops were required to proclaim before a battle that whosoever had betrothed a wife and had not taken her, or had built a house and had not dedicated it, or had planted a vineyard and had not eaten of it, or was fearful and faint-hearted, should return home (Deut. xx. 5-9). This regulation was actually carried out under the Maccabees (I Macc. iii. 56), which shows that the document is of a post-exilic date.

Raids.

From the geographical condition of Palestine, the raid was the favorite mode of warfare both among the Hebrews and among the other Semites (Gen. xlix. 19; I Sam. xiii. 17, xxvii. 8; II Sam. iii. 22; II Kings xiii. 20), although in the course of time regular battles were fought, and in certain cases tactics of modern warfare were employed. The first instance recorded was in the battle of Gibeah between the tribes of Israel and the Benjamites (Judges xx. 30 et seq.). After laying an ambush behind the city, the Israelites pretended to flee from the Benjamites, thus enticing the latter from their fortified positions. Suddenly the Israelites wheeled, and the Benjamites found themselves outflanked on all sides. It is also probable that in the battle of Gilboa between the Philistines and the army of Saul, the Philistines resorted to strategy by striking northward at the plain of Esdraelon instead of attacking the Israelites by the shorter route from the southwest. By this device, which proved completely successful, the Philistines lured Saul’s army from the valleys, where a stout defense could be offered, to the open plain, where the Israelites might be overwhelmed by sheer force of numbers (I Sam. xxviii. 1-xxxi. 7). A strong army was sometimes divided so that the enemy might be attacked from different directions (Gen. xiv. 15; II Sam. xviii. 2), and ambuscades were often used with success (Josh. xiii. 10-28; Judges xx. 30-44; II Kings vi. 8-9). Night marches were particularly in favor with the Hebrews; thus Joshua marched at night, Gideon assailed the Midianites about midnight, and Saul attacked the Ammonites before dawn (Josh. x. 9; Judges vii. 19; I Sam. xi. 11). It may be noted that night marches were made by other Semites as well, for Nebo was captured from the Israelites by Mesha, King of Moab, after such a march (Moabite Inscription, line 15). An instance is likewise recorded in which the Philistines chose a champion who challenged one of the opposing army to a duel to decide the fate of both forces (I Sam. xvii. 4 et seq.). Such proceedings were afterward much in vogue among the Arabs in their pre-Islamic tribal conflicts.

Fortresses.

Fortresses played an important part in war, especially in defense. In early times the Israelites were unable to reduce the fortified cities of the inhabitants of the land, and consequently had no meansof defense except to hide themselves in caves or mountains (Judges vi. 2; I Sam. xiii. 6; comp. Isa. ii. 21); but in the regal period they became so proficient in the art of warfare that they not only reduced the fortresses of the enemy, beginning with Jerusalem (II Sam. v. 7 et seq.), but also built many fortified cities. The chief method of reducing one of these towns seems to have been to throw up around the walls a bank, from which the archers might shoot their arrows into the place; while an instance is recorded from an earlier period in which the gates of a city were set on fire (Judges ix. 48 et seq.). According to a marginal note on I Kings xx. 12, R. V., the Syrians used engines in their effort to reduce Samaria, while similar machines were frequently employed in addition to the battering-ram for breaching walls in the time of Ezekiel (Ezek. iv. 2, xxvi. 8-9). The strength of the walls and the efficiency of the beleaguering army naturally conditioned the length of a siege. Thus Jericho, which fell in consequence of a miracle, was taken after a continuous onslaught of seven days (Josh. vi. 3 et seq.), but the Syrian sieges in Samaria were doubtless lengthy since they entailed terrible famines, and Jerusalem was captured by the Babylonians only after a siege of two years, despite the systematic operations of Nebuchadnezzar (II Kings xxv. 1-4). In their sieges the Hebrews were forbidden to fell fruit-trees for use in building bulwarks against the fortified city (Deut. xx. 19-20).

Treatment of Captives.

The accounts of wars in the patriarchal period show that the conquered peoples were reduced to captivity and their property was taken as spoils of war. In the case of the Shechemites, all the males were massacred by the sons of Jacob, while the women and children and all their possessions were carried off as booty (Gen. xxxiv. 25-29). Later, according to a document belonging to D (Deut. xx. 10-17), the Hebrews were commanded to make a wide distinction between the inhabitants of the land whom they were to replace and the Gentiles outside the land. Mildness was to be shown the latter in case they surrendered without fighting and submitted to pay tribute. If they were subdued by force of arms, however, every man was to be slain, while the women, children, cattle, and all else should belong to the victors. Far different was to be the treatment of the inhabitants of the land, who were to be slaughtered without exception, not even the cattle being left alive. If this passage is of early date, it is evident that the command with regard to the inhabitants of the land was only partially executed, since, excepting the thirty-one kings enumerated in Josh. xii. 9-24, the greater part remained unconquered, and the Israelites were obliged to live with the very Gentiles whom they had been bidden to exterminate (comp. Josh. xviii. 2-3; Judges i. 21-35). Even when the Israelites proved victorious, they often granted the inhabitants their lives, and subjected them only to tribute (Judges i. 28, 30, 33, 35). At a later period, however, gross cruelty was practised both by the Hebrews and by the other nations. After having defeated the Moabites, David cast them down to the ground and measured them with a line, putting to death two lines and keeping one alive (II Sam. viii. 2), while he put the Ammonites under saws, harrows, and axes of iron and made them pass through the brick-kiln (ib. xii. 31). Menahem, King of Israel, the Syrians, and the Ammonites are charged with the massacre of pregnant women (II Kings viii. 12, xv. 16; Amos i. 13); and Amaziah is described as causing ten thousand Edomite captives to be hurled from a cliff (II Chron. xxv. 12), while in some instances children were dashed against rocks (Ps. cxxxvii. 9).

Conditions of Peace.

There are instances of treaties of peace in which conditions were imposed by the victors on their defeated foes. The first treaty recorded is that which Nahash, King of Ammon, proposed to the people of Jabesh-gilead, and which was marked by the savagery of the Ammonite king, the terms being that the right eye of every inhabitant of the city should be put out (I Sam. xi. 2). A treaty which might almost have been made in modern times, on the other hand, was drawn up between Ben-hadad and Ahab; by it the cities previously captured from Israel were to be restored, while Ahab had the right of making streets in Damascus, the same conditions having been previously imposed on the father of Ahab by Ben-hadad’s father (I Kings xx. 34). Sennacherib, in the treaty with Hezekiah by which he withdrew his army from Judah, exacted a heavy indemnity from the Jewish king (II Kings xviii. 14). The victors generally returned home in triumphal processions and celebrated their victories with songs and festivals (Judges v. 1 et seq., xi. 34, xvi. 23; comp. Prism Inscription, col. 1, line 53, in Schrader, "K. B.," ii. 141 et seq.).

Attitude of the Prophets.

The wars in the earlier period were religious in character and thus had the sanction of the Prophets. Deborah herself urged Barak to make war on Sisera and accompanied him into the field (Judges iv. 6 et seq.), while Elisha exhorted Joash, King of Israel, to prosecute the war with Syria and advised the allied kings to avail themselves of stratagem against the Moabitish army (II Kings iv. 16 et seq., xiii. 14-19), and an anonymous prophet encouraged Ahab to battle with Ben-hadad (I Kings xx. 13-14). Naturally the Prophets were opposed to war among the tribes of Israel, and when Rehoboam wished to resort to arms to recover his lost sovereignty over the ten tribes, he was prevented by the prophet Shemaiah (ib. xii. 21-24). In later times the Prophets considered war from a political point of view, and Jeremiah, seeing that hostilities against the Babylonians would be to the detriment of the Israelites, always advised the latter to submit to the stronger people and live in peace with them (Jer. xxvii.12 et passim). War in general was represented by the Later Prophets only in its horrible aspect, and many of them, particularly Isaiah, longed for the time when there would be no more war, and when weapons should be transformed into agricultural implements (Isa. ii. 4; Micah iv. 3; and elsewhere). See Army; Fortress.

—In Rabbinical Literature:

The Rabbis laid special stress on the distinction between obligatorywar ("milḥemet miẓwah," or "milḥemet ḥobah") and voluntary war ("milḥemet ha-reshut"). The former category comprised the campaigns against the seven nations who inhabited the land, the battles against Amalek, and the repulse of an enemy attacking an Israelitish city; while the latter class denoted any war waged for the extension of Jewish territory. Obligatory war had the priority, nor was it necessary for the king to ask the permission of the Sanhedrin to levy troops, since he could compel the people to take the field. Voluntary war, on the other hand, could be declared only by the Great Sanhedrin of seventy-one members. Although certain persons were permitted by Deut. xx. 5 et seq. to leave the field before a battle began, this was allowed, according to rabbinical opinion, only in case of a voluntary war. No such leave of withdrawal was granted in an obligatory war, but, on the contrary, even a bridegroom and bride were obliged to leave their nuptial chamber and join the army (Soṭah 44b; Sanh. 2a, 20b; Maimonides, "Yad," Melakim, v. 1-2). The Rabbis differed greatly regarding the terms of peace to be offered the inhabitants of a beleaguered city (Deut. xx. 10 et seq.). According to Sifre, Deut. 199, which was followed by Rashi (on Deut. l.c.), peace might be proposed only in a voluntary war, while in an obligatory war no terms should be allowed. It would appear, however, from Lev. R. xvii. 6 and Deut. R. v. 13 that peace might be offered even in an obligatory war, and this was established as a law by Maimonides (l.c. vi. 1; comp. Naḥmanides on Deut. l.c.). According to both Maimonides and Naḥmanides, the command of extermination which was imposed regarding the seven nations (Deut. xx. 16-17) was applied only in case the beleaguered people refused to surrender. The submission in consideration of which the conquered were granted their lives had to be complete, since they were required to accept the seven commandments of the Noachidæ, and were obliged to pay tribute and to recognize their condition of servitude (Maimonides, l.c.).

In direct opposition to the obvious interpretation of Deut. xx. 5-9, the Rabbis declared that all the proclamations contained in that passage were made by the priest anointed as the chaplain of the army ("meshuaḥ milḥamah"), and the verses were interpreted as meaning that the priest made the proclamations and the officers repeated them to the troops, who could not hear the priest (Soṭah 43a; Maimonides, l.c. vii. 1, 4; comp. Sifre, Deut. 193). A Jewish army was forbidden to begin the siege of a Gentile city less than three days before the Sabbath, but it might continue its operations on that day even in a voluntary war. The army was permitted to encamp in any place, and the slain soldiers were to be buried in the place where they had fallen, since the combat had made it their own.

The Jewish soldiers enjoyed four privileges: they might take wood anywhere without incurring the charge of robbery; they were permitted to eat fruit even though it was not certain that it had been properly tithed ("demai"); and they were exempt from washing their hands and from "’erube ḥaẓerot" (Shab. 19a; ’Er. 17a; Tosef., ’Er. iv. [iii.] 7; see also ’Erub). In besieging a Gentile city, the troops were commanded to invest it on three sides and to leave one side free so that any one who wished might escape from the town (Maimonides, l.c. vi. 7). During the seven years consumed by Joshua’s conquest of Palestine the Israelitish soldiers were allowed to eat any food which they found in the houses of the Gentiles, even though such provisions were forbidden under all other circumstances (Ḥul. 17a; Maimonides, l.c. viii. 1).

WAR.—1. In the days before the monarchy the wars of the Hebrew tribes must have resembled those of early Greece, when ‘the two armies started out, marched till they met, had a fight and went home.’ Rarely, as in the case of the campaign against Sisera (Jdg 4:1-24), was it necessary to summon a larger army from several tribes. From the days of Saul and David, with their long struggle against the Philistines, war became the affair of the whole nation, leading, also, to the establishment of a standing army, or at least of the nucleus of one (see Army). In the reign of Solomon we hear of a complete organization of the kingdom, which undoubtedly served a more serious purpose than the providing of ‘victuals for the king and his household’ (1Ki 4:7).

Early spring, after the winter rains had ceased, was ‘the time when kings go out to battle’ (2Sa 11:1). The war-horn (EV [Note: English Version.] ‘trumpet’), sounded from village to village on their hilltops, was in all periods the call to arms (Jdg 6:34, 1Sa 13:3, 2Sa 20:1). How far the exemptions from military service specified in Deu 20:5-8 were in force under the kings is unknown; the first express attestation is 1Ma 3:55.

2. War, from the Hebrew point of view, was essentially a religious duty, begun and carried through under the highest sanctions of religion. Israel’s wars of old were ‘the wars of J″ [Note: Jahweh.] ’ (Num 21:14), and was not Jahweh Tsĕbâ’ôth, especially ‘the God of Israel’s battle-array’ (1Sa 17:45).? His presence with the host was secured by ‘the ark of J″ [Note: Jahweh.] ’ accompanying the army in the field (2Sa 11:11, cf. 1Sa 4:3 ff.). As an indispensable preliminary, therefore, of every campaign, the soldiers ‘sanctified’ themselves (Jos 3:5) by ablutions and other observances preparatory to offering the usual sacrifices (1Sa 7:9; 1Sa 13:9). The men thus became God’s ‘consecrated ones’ (Isa 13:2 RV [Note: Revised Version.] ), and to open a campaign is in Heb. phrase ‘to consecrate war’ (Joe 3:9, Jer 6:4 etc.). Isa 21:5 ‘anoint the shield’ (cf. 2Sa 1:21) is commonly taken to allude to a practice of smearing shields with oil, that hostile weapons might more readily glance off (see, for another explanation, Marti or Duhm, Jesaia, ad loc.).

To ascertain the propitious moment for the start, and indeed throughout the campaign, it was usual to ‘enquire of the Lord’ by means of the sacred lot (Jdg 1:1, 1Sa 23:2 and oft.), and in an age of more advanced religious thought, by the mouth of a prophet (1Ki 22:6 ff.). Still later a campaign was opened with prayer and fasting (1Ma 3:47 ff.).

As regards the commissariat, it was probably usual, as in Greece, to start with three days’ provisions, the soldiers, for the rest, helping themselves from friends (cf. however, the voluntary gifts, 2Sa 17:27 ff.) and foes. The arrangement by which ‘ten men out of every hundred’ were told off ‘to fetch victual for the people’ (Jdg 20:10), is first met with in a late document.

3. As the army advanced, scouts were sent out to ascertain the enemy’s position and strength (Jdg 1:24 [AV [Note: Authorized Version.] ‘spies,’ RV [Note: Revised Version.] ‘watchers’], 1Sa 26:4, 1Ma 5:38). Where the element of secrecy enters, we may call them spies (so Jos 2:1 RV [Note: Revised Version.] , 2Sa 15:10, 1Ma 12:28; cf. Gideon’s exploit, Jdg 7:11 ff.).

Little is known of the camps of the Heb. armies. The men were sheltered in tents and booths (2Sa 11:11; this reference, however, is to a lengthy siege). The general commanding probably had a more elaborate pavilion’ (1Ki 20:12; 1Ki 20:16, see Tent). The obscure term rendered by RV [Note: Revised Version.] ‘place of the wagons’ (1Sa 17:20; 1Sa 26:5; 1Sa 26:7) is derived from a root which justifies us in supposing that the Hebrew camps were round, rather than square. Of the 20 Assyrian camps represented on the bronze plates of the gates of Balawat, 4 are circular, 14 almost square, and 2 have their long sides straight and their short sides curved outwards. Two gates are represented at opposite ends, between which a broad road divides the camp into two almost equal parts (Billerbeck u. Delitzsch, Die Palasttore Salmanassars, II. [1908], 104). The Hebrews divided the night into three watches (Jdg 7:19, 1Sa 11:11).

4. The tactics of the Hebrew generals were as simple as their strategy. Usually the ‘battle was set in array’ by the opposing forces being drawn up in line facing each other. At a given signal, each side raised its battle-cry (Jdg 7:21, Amo 1:14, Jer 4:19) as it rushed to the fray; for the wild slogan of former days, the Ironsides of the Jewish Cromwell, Judas the Maccabee, substituted prayer (1Ma 5:33) and the singing of Psalms (2Ma 12:37). It was a common practice for a general to divide his forces into three divisions (Jdg 7:16, 1Sa 11:11, 2Sa 18:2, 1Ma 5:33). A favourite piece of tactics was to pretend flight, and by leaving a body of men in ambush, to fall upon the unwary pursuers in front and rear (Jos 8:15, Jdg 20:36). As examples of more elaborate tactics may be cited Joab’s handling of his troops before Rabbath-ammon (2Sa 10:9-11), and Benhadad’s massing of his chariots at the battle of Ramoth-gilead (1Ki 22:31); the campaigns of Judas Maccabæus would repay a special study from this point of view. The recall was sounded on the war-horn (2Sa 2:23; 2Sa 18:16; 2Sa 20:22).

5. The tender mercies of the victors in those days were cruel, although the treatment which the Hebrews meted out to their enemies was, with few exceptions (e.g. 2Ki 15:16), not to be compared to what Benzinger only too aptly describes as ‘the Assyrian devilries.’ It is one of the greatest blots on our RV [Note: Revised Version.] that 2Sa 12:31 should still read as it does, instead of as in the margin (see Cent. Bible, in loc). The Hebrew wars, as has been said, were the wars of J″ [Note: Jahweh.] , and to J″ [Note: Jahweh.] of right belonged the population of a conquered city (see Ban). Even the humane Deuteronomic Code spares only the women and children (Deu 20:13 f.). The captives were mostly sold as slaves. A heavy war indemnity or a yearly tribute was imposed on the conquered people (2Ki 3:4).

The booty fell to the victorious soldiery, the leaders receiving a special share (Jdg 8:24 ff., 1Sa 30:26 ff.). The men ‘that tarried by the stuff’—in other words, who were left behind as a camp-guard—shared equally with their comrades ‘who went down to the battle’ (1Sa 30:24 f., a law first introduced by David, but afterwards characteristically assigned to Moses, Num 31:27). The returning warriors were welcomed home by the women with dance and song (Exo 15:20 ff., Jdg 11:34, 1Sa 18:6 etc.). The piety of the Maccabæan age found a more fitting expression in a service of thanksgiving (1Ma 4:24). See also Army, Armour Arms, Fortification and Siegecraft.

A. R. S. Kennedy.

War, in its juridical sense, is a contention carried on by force of arms between sovereign states, or communities having in this regard the right of states. The term is often used for civil strife, sedition, rebellion properly so called, or even for the undertaking of a State to put down by force organized bodies of outlaws, and in fact there is no other proper word for the struggle as such; but as these are not juridically in the same class with contentions of force between sovereign states, the jurist may not so use the term.However, a people in revolution, in the rare instance of an effort to re-establish civil government which has practically vanished from the community except in name, or to vitalize constitutional rights reserved specifically or residuarily to the people, is conceded to be in like juridical case with a State, as far as protecting its fundamental rights by force of arms. Grote insisted that war was a more or less continuous condition of conflict between those contending by force; and so indeed it is; but even Grote, when seeking to determine the grounds of right and wrong in such a condition, necessarily moved the question back to the right to acts of force in either contending party, and so justified the more accepted juridical definition of a contest at arms between contending states. The judicial condition of the contending parties to the war is spoken of as a state of belligerency, while the term war more properly applies to the series of hostile acts of force exercised in the contention. To present here the position of Catholic philosophy in this regard, it will be convenient to discuss in sequence: I. The Existence of the Right of War; II. Its Juridical Source; III. Its Possessor; IV. Its Title and Purpose; V. Its Subject-matter; VI. Its Term. From these we may gather the idea of a just war. I. THE EXISTENCE OF THE RIGHT OF WARThe right of war is the right of a sovereign state to wage a contention at arms against another, and is in its analysis an instance of the general moral power of coercion, i.e. to make use of physical force to conserve its rights inviolable. Every perfect right, i.e. every right involving in others an obligation in justice a deference thereto, to be efficacious, and consequently a real and not an illusory power, carries with it at the last appeal the subsidiary right of coercion. A perfect right, then, implies the right of physical force to defend itself against infringement, to recover the subject-matter of right unjustly withheld or to exact its equivalent, and to inflict damage in the exercise of this coercion wherever, as is almost universally the case, coercion cannot be exercised effectively without such damage. The limitations of this coercive right are: that its exercise be necessary; and that damage be not inflicted beyond measure -- first of necessity and secondly of proportion with the subject-matter of right at issue. Furthermore, the exercise of coercion is restricted in civil communities to the public authority, for the reason that such restriction is a necessity of the common weal. In like manner the use of force beyond the region of defence and reparation, namely for the imposition of punishment to restore the balance of retributive justice by compensation for the mere violation of law and justice, as well as to assure the future security of the same, is reserved to public authority, for the reason that the State is the natural guardian of law and order, and to permit the individual, even in a matter of personal offence, to be witness, judge, and executioner all at once -- human nature being what it is -- would be a source of injustice rather than of equitable readjustment.Now the State has corporate rights of its own which are perfect; it has also the duty to defend its citizens’ rights; it consequently has the right of coercion in safeguarding its own and its citizens’ rights in case of menace or violation from abroad as well as from at home, not only against foreign individuals, but also against foreign states. Otherwise the duty above indicated would be impossible of fulfillment; the corporate rights of the State would be nugatory, while the individual rights of citizens would be at the mercy of the outside world. The pressure of such coercion, it is true, may be applied in certain circumstances without both parties going to the extreme of complete national conflict; but when the latter arises, as it commonly will, we have war pure and simple, even as the first application of force is initial warfare. Catholic philosophy, therefore, concedes to the State the full natural right of war, whether defensive, as in case of another’s attack in force upon it; offensive (more properly, coercive), where it finds it necessary to take the initiative in the application of force; or punitive, in the infliction of punishment for evil done against itself or, in some determined cases, against others. International law views the punitive right of war with suspicion; but, thought it is open to wide abuse, its original existence under the natural law cannot well be disputed. II. THE SOURCE OF THE RIGHT OF WARThe source of the right of war is the natural law which confers upon states, as upon individuals, the moral powers or rights which are the necessary means to the essential purpose set by the natural law for the individual and the State to accomplish. Just as it is the natural law which, with a view to the natural purposes of mankind’s creation, has granted its substantial rights to the state, so it is the same law which concedes the subsidiary right of physical coercion in their maintenance, without which none of its rights would be efficacious. The full truth, however, takes into consideration the limitations and extensions of the war-right set by international law in virtue of contract (either implicit in accepted custom or explicit in formal compact) among the nations which are party to international legal obligation. But it must be noted that civilized nations, in their effort to ameliorate the cruel conditions of warfare, have sometimes consented to allow, as the less of two imminent evils, that which is forbidden by the natural law. This is not strictly a right, though it is often so denominated, but an international toleration of a natural wrong. In the common territorial or commercial ambitions of great powers there may be an agreement of mutual toleration of what is pure and simple moral wrong by virtue of the natural law, and that without the excuse of it being a less evil than another to be avoided; in this case the unrighteousness is still more evident, for the toleration itself is wrong. The original determination of the right of war comes from the law of nature only; consent of mankind may manifest the existence of a phase of this law; it does not constitute it.The agreement of nations may surrender in common a part of the full right and so qualify it; or it may tolerate a limited abuse of it; but such agreement does not confer a particle of the original right itself, nor can it take aught of it away, except by the consent of the nations so deprived. The usage of the better part of the world in such a matter may be argued to bind all nations, but the argument does not conclude convincingly. The decisions of American courts lean toward the proposition of universal obligation: English jurists are not so clearly or generally in its favour. Of course, for that part of the international law bearing on war, which may be justly said to be the natural law as binding nations in their dealings with one another, the existence of which is manifested by the common consent of mankind, there can be no controversy: here the international law is but a name for a part of the natural law. Suarez, it is true, is inclined to seek the right of war as a means not precisely of defence, but of reparation of right and of punishment of violation, from the international law, on the ground that it is not necessary in the nature of things that the power of such rehabilitation and punishment should rest with the aggrieved state (though it should be somewhere on earth), but that mankind has agreed to the individual state method rather than by formation of an international tribunal with adequate police powers. However, the argument given above shows with fair clearness that the power belongs to the aggrieved state, and that though it might have entrusted, or may yet entrust, its exercise to an international arbiter, it is not bound so to do, nor has it done so in the past save in some exceptional cases. III. THE POSSESSOR OF THE RIGHT OF WARThe right of war lies solely with the sovereign authority of the State. As it flows from the efficacious character of other rights in peril, the coercive right must belong to the possessor, or to the natural guardian, of those rights. The rights in question may be directly corporate rights of the State, or which, of course, the State is itself the possessor, and of which there is no natural guardian but the sovereign authority of the State; or directly the rights of subordinate parts of the State or even of its individual citizens, and of these the sovereign authority is the natural guardian against foreign aggression. The sovereign authority is the guardian, because there is no higher power on earth to which appeal may be made; and, moreover, in the case of the individual citizen, the protection of his rights against foreign aggression will ordinarily become indirectly a matter of the good of the Commonwealth. It is clear that the right of war cannot become a prerogative of any subordinate power in the state, or of a section, a city, or an individual, for the several reasons: that none such can have the right to imperil the good of all the state (as happens in war) except the juridical guardian of the common good of all: that subordinate parts of the state, as well as the individual citizen, having the supreme authority of the state to which to make appeal, are not in the case of necessity required for the exercise of coercion; finally, that any such right in hands other than those of the sovereign power would upset the pace and order of the whole state. How sovereign authority in matter of war reverts back to the people as a whole in certain circumstances belongs for explanation to the question of revolution. With the supreme power lies also the judicial authority to determine when war is necessary, and what is the necessary and proportionate measure of damage it may therein inflict: there is no other natural tribunal to which recourse may be had, and without this judicial faculty the right of war would be vain. IV. THE TITLE AND PURPOSE OF WARThe primary title of a state to go to war is: first, the fact that the state’s right (either directly or indirectly through those of its citizens) are menaced by foreign aggression not otherwise to be prevented than by war; secondly, the fact of actual violation of right not otherwise reparable; thirdly, the need of punishing the threatening or infringing power for the security of the future. From the nature of the proved right these three facts are necessarily just titles, and the state, whose rights are in jeopardy, is itself the judge thereof. Secondary titles may come to a state, first, from the request of another state in peril (or of a people who happen themselves to be in possession of the right); secondly, from the fact of the oppression of the innocent, whose unjust suffering is proportionate to the gravity of war and whom it is impossible to rescue in any other way; in this latter case the innocent have the right to resist, charity calls for assistance, and the intervening state may justly assume the communication of the right of the innocent to exercise extreme coercion in their behalf. Whether a state may find title to interfere for punishment after the destruction of the innocent who were in no wise its own subjects, is not so clear, unless such punishment be a reasonable necessity for the future security of its own citizens and their rights. It has been argued that the extension of a state’s punitive right outside of the field of its own subjects would seem to be a necessity of natural conditions; for the right must be somewhere, if we are to have law and order on the earth, and there is no place to put it except in the hands of the state that is willing to undertake the punishment. Still, the matter is not as clear as the right to interfere in defence of the innocent.The common good of the nation is a restricting condition upon the exercise of its right to go to war; but it is not itself a sufficient title for such exercise. Thus the mere expansion of trade, the acquisition of new territory, however beneficial or necessary for a developing state, gives no natural title to wage war upon another state to force that trade upon her, or to extort a measure of her surplus territory, as the common good of one state has no greater right than the common good or another, and each is the judge and guardian of its own. Much less may a just title be found in the mere need of exercising a standing martial force, of reconciling a people to the tax for its maintenance, or to escape revolutionary trouble at home. Here, also, it is to be noted that nations cannot draw a parallel from Old-Testament titles. The Israelites lived under a theocracy; God, as Supreme Lord of all the earth, in specific instances, by the exercise of His supreme dominion, transferred the ownership of alien lands to the Israelites; by His command they waged war to obtain possession of it, and their title to war was the ownership (thus given them) of the land for which they fought. The privation thus wrought upon its prior owners and actual possessors had, moreover, the character of punishment visited upon them by God’s order for offenses committed against Him. No state can find such title existing for itself under the natural law.Furthermore, a clear title is limited to the condition that war is necessary as a last appeal. Hence, if there is reasonable ground to think that the offending state will withdraw its menace, repair the injury done, and pay a penalty sufficient to satisfy retributive justice and give a fair guarantee of the future security of juridical order between the two states concerned -- all in consequence of proper representation, judicious diplomacy, patient urgency, a mere threat of war, or any other just means this side of actual war -- then war itself cannot as yet be said to be a necessity, and so, in such premises, lacks full title. A fair opportunity of adjustment must be given, or a reasonable assurance had that the offence will not be rectified except under stress of war, before the title is just. Whether the aggrieved state should consent to arbitrate differences of judgment before resorting to war, is within its own competency to decide, as the natural law has established no judge but the aggrieved state itself, and international law does not constrain it to transfer its judicial right to any other tribunal, except in so far forth as it has by prior agreement bound itself so to do. None the less, when the grievance is not clear, and the public authority has sound reason to think that it can arrange for a tribunal where justice will be done, it would seem that the necessity of war in that individual case is not final, and even though international law may leave the state free to refuse all arbitration, the natural law would seem to commend if not to command it. Towards this solution of international differences, in spite of the difficulty of securing an unbiased tribunal, we have in the last fifty years made some progress.Again, the question of proportion between the damages to be inflicted by war and the value of the national right menaced or violated must enter into consideration for the determination of the full justice of a title. Here we must take into account the consequences of such right being left unvindicated. Nations are prone to go to war for almost any violation of right, and its reparation absolutely refused. This tendency argues the common conviction that such violation will go from bad to worse, and that, if sovereign right is not recognized in a small thing, it will be far less so in a great. The conviction is not without rational ground; and yet the pride of power and the sensitiveness of national vanity can readily lead, in the excitement of the moment, to a mistaken judgment of a gravity of offence proportionate to all the ills of war. Neither is force a successful means of securing honour, unless it be to assure the due recognition of the rights of the sovereign power behind that honour; while in the calm forum of deliberate reason the loss of one human life outweighs the mere offended vanity of a king or a people. The true proportion between the damage to be inflicted and the right violated is to be measured by whether the loss of right in itself or in its ordinary natural consequences would be morally as great a detriment to the common good of the state aggrieved as the damages which war conducted against the aggressor would entail upon the common good of the same, throwing into the balance against the latter the additional amount of damage due him as the punishment of retributive justice. Finally, a state going to war must weigh its own probable losses in blood and treasure, and its prospect of victory, before it may rightly enter upon a war: for the interest of the common good at home inhibit the exercise of force abroad, unless reasonably calculated not to be an ultimate graver loss to one’s own community. This is not properly a limitation of title, but a prudential limitation upon the exercise of a right in the face of full title. The proper purpose of war is indicated by the title, and war conducted for a purpose beyond that contained in a just title is a moral wrong. V. THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE RIGHT OF WARThis will cover what may be done by the warring power in exercise of its right. It embraces the infliction of all manner of damage to property and life of the other state and its contending subjects, up to the measure requisite to enforce submission, implying the acceptance of a final readjustment and proportionate penalty; it includes in general all acts that are necessary means to such damage, but is checked by the proviso that neither the damage inflicted nor the means taken involve actions that are intrinsically immoral. In the prosecution of the war the killing or injuring of non-combatants (women, children, the aged and feeble, or even those capable of bearing arms but as a matter of fact not in any way participating in the war) is consequently barred, except where their simultaneous destruction is an unavoidable accident attending the attack upon the contending force. The wanton destruction of the property of such non-combatants, where it does not or will not minister maintenance or help to the state or its army, is likewise devoid of the requisite condition of necessity. In fact the wanton destruction of the property of the state or of combatants -- i.e. where such destruction cannot make for their submission, reparation, or proportionate punishment -- is beyond the pale of the just subject-matter of war. The burning of the Capitol and White House at Washington in 1814, and the devastation of Georgia, South Carolina, and the Valley of the Shenandoah during the America Civil War have not escaped criticism in this category. That "war is hell", in the sense that it inevitably carries with it a maximum of human miseries, is true; in the sense that it justifies anything that makes for the suffering and punishment of a people at war, it cannot be ethically maintained. The defence, that it hastens the close of war through sympathy with the increased suffering even of non-combatants, will not stand. The killing of the wounded or prisoners, who thereby have ceased to be combatants, and have rendered submission, is not only no necessity, but beyond the limits of right because of submission, while common charity requires that they be properly cared for.A doubt might arise about the obligation to spare wounded and prisoners, the guardianship or care of whom would prevent immediate further prosecution of the war at perhaps its most auspicious moment, or their dismissal but replenish the forces of the enemy. The care of the wounded might be waived, as its obligation is not of justice but of charity, which yields to a superior claim of one’s own benefit: but the killing of prisoners presents a different problem. All practical doubt in the matter has been removed among civilized nations by the agreements of international law. The canons of the natural law of necessity and proportion this side the limit of intrinsic moral wrong are so hard of application by the contending forces that the history of wars is full of excesses; hence international law has steadily moved towards hard and fast lines that will lessen the waste of human life and the miseries of warfare. Thus the use of ammunition causing excessive destruction of human life or excessive suffering, incurable wounds, or human defacement beyond the requirements for putting the combatants out of the conflict and so winning a battle are excluded by international agreement based upon the obvious limitation of the natural law. Poisoning, as imperilling the innocent beyond measure, and assassination, as associated with treachery and the personal assumption of the right of life and death (to say nothing of its want of a fair opportunity of defence and the cowardice commonly implied therein), have met with common condemnation, thus closing the loophole of obscurity in the natural law. The natural law is clear enough, however, in condemning as intrinsically immoral lying and the direct deception of another, as well as bad faith and treachery. The phrase, "All is fair in love and war", cannot be taken seriously; it is a loose by-word taken from the reckless practices of men, and runs counter to right reason, natural law, and justice. No end justifies an immoral means, and lying, perjury, bad faith, treachery, as well as the direct slaughter of the innocent, wanton destruction, and the lawless pillage and outrage of cruder times, are, as far as the worst of them go, a thing of the past among civilized nations. That states are not always nice in conscience about lying, deceit, and bad faith in war as in diplomacy is occasionally a fact today; and the defence of lying and deceit in the stratagems of war, where good faith or common convention is not violated, is a sequence of the erroneous doctrine of Grote that lying is not intrinsically immoral, but only wrong in as far as those with whom we deal have a right to demand the truth of us; but as such teaching is almost unanimously repudiated in Catholic philosophy, the practice has today in Catholic thought no ethical advocate. The hanging of spies, though commonly said to be merely a measure of menace against a peculiar peril of war, would seem to have behind it a remote suggestion of punishment of a form of deceit which is intrinsically wrong.In the terms of readjustment after victory, the victorious state, if its cause was just, may exact full reparation of the original injustice suffered, full compensation for all its own losses by reason of the war, proportionate penalty to secure the future not only against the conquered state, but, through fear of such penalty, even against other possibly hostile states. In the execution of such judgment the killing of surviving contestants or their enslavement, though, absolutely speaking, these might fall within the measure of just punishment, would today seem to be an extreme penalty, and the practice of civilization has abolished it.Here we are confronted with the appalling destruction of the vanquished in the Old-Testament wars, where frequently all the adult males were slain after defeat and surrender, and sometimes even the women and children, unto utter extermination. But we cannot argue natural right from these instances, for, where justly done, this wholesale slaughter was the direct command of God, the Sovereign Arbiter of life and death, as well as the Just Judge of all reward and punishment. God by revelation made the Israelites but executioners of His supernatural sentence: the penalty was within God’s right to assign, and within the Israelites’ communicated right to enforce. The appropriation of a part of the territory of the vanquished may quite readily be a necessity of payment for reparation of injury and loss, and even the entire subjection of the conquered state, as a part of, or tributary to, its conqueror, may possibly fall within the proportionate requirements for full reparation or for future security, and, if so, such subjection is within the competency of the last adjudication. The history of nations, however, would indicate that this exaction was enforced far oftener than it was justified by proportionate necessity. VI. THE TERM OF THE RIGHT OF WARThe term of the right of war is the nation against which war can justly be waged. It must be juridically in the wrong, i.e. it must have violated a perfect right of another state, or at least be involved in an attempt at such violation. Such a perfect right is one based upon strict justice between states, and so grounding an obligation in justice in the state against which war is to be waged. Here there is call for a distinction between the obligation of an ethical and a juridical duty. A juridical duty supposes a right in another which is violated by the state’s neglect to fulfil that duty; not so a merely ethical duty, for this is one proceeding from some other foundation than justice, and so implies no right in another which is violated by the non-fulfillment of the duty. The foundation of the right of war is a right violated or threatened, not a mere ethical duty neglected. No State, any more than an individual, may use violence to enforce its neighbour’s performance of the latter. Hence a foreign state may have a duty to develop its resources not for its own immediate or particular need alone, but out of universal comity to help the prosperity of other states, for one community is bound to another by charity as are individuals; but there is in another state no right to that development founded in justice. To assume that one state has the right to make war upon another to force it to develop its own resources is to assume that each state holds its possessions in trust for the human race at large, with a strict right to share in its usufruct inhering in each other state in particular -- an assumption that yet awaits proof. So, too, the need of one state of more territory for its overplus of population gives it no right to seize the superabundant and undeveloped territory of another. In the case of extreme necessity, parallel to that of a starving man, where there is not other remedy except forced sale or seizure of the territory in question, there would be something upon which to base an argument, and the case may be conceived, but seems far from arising. Similarly, a government’s neglect of a juridical duty towards its own people of itself gives no natural right to a foreign state to interfere, save only in the emergency, extreme and rare enough, where the people would have the right of force against its government and by asking aid from abroad would communicate in part the exercise of this coercive right to the succouring power. Lastly, in the case of a state’s wholesale persecution of the innocent with death or unjust enslavement, a foreign power taking up their cause may fairly be said reasonably to assume the call of these and to make use of their right of resistance.In conclusion, a war, to be just, must be waged by a sovereign power for the security of a perfect right of its own (or of another justly invoking its protection) against foreign violation in a case where there is no other means available to secure or repair the right; and must be conducted with a moderation which, in the continuance and settlement of the struggle, commits no act intrinsically immoral, nor exceeds in damage done, or in payment and in penalty exacted, the measure of necessity and of proportion to the value of the right involved, the cost of the war, and the guarantee of future security.-----------------------------------ST. THOMAS, Summa Theologica (Rome, 1894), II-II, 40 and 108; SUAREZ, De caritate (Paris, 1861), XIII; BELLARMINE, De laicis (Naples, 1862), III, 4 and 6; MOLINA, De justitia et jure (Cologne, 1752), XCIX; GROTE, De jure belli et pacis (s.d., 1719); COSTA-ROSSETTI, Philosophia moralis (Innsbruck, 1886); CASTELFIN, Philosophia moralis (Brussels, 1899); LAWRENCE, Principles of International Law (Boston, 1909).CHARLES MACKSEY Transcribed by Thomas M. Barrett Dedicated to the cause of World Peace The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume XVCopyright © 1912 by Robert Appleton CompanyOnline Edition Copyright © 2003 by K. KnightNihil Obstat, October 1, 1912. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., CensorImprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York

Conflicts between nations occur for a variety of reasons, but always they are evidence of sin in the world. Some nations go to war because they are aggressive, others because they have to defend themselves against aggression. But in neither case do nations have unlimited right to do as they like. This applies even when nations are God’s instrument to carry out his judgment on the wicked (Isa 10:5-14; Hab 2:12-13; Hab 2:16-17).

Instructions for Israel

According to God’s plan for Israel, the conquest of Canaan was not merely for political or material gain, but had a moral and religious purpose. God had given the Canaanites time to repent but they had consistently refused. Finally, their sin reached the extent where God could postpone judgment no longer (Gen 15:16; Deu 9:5). The destruction of the Canaanites along with their idols, and at times their animals and possessions, was also of significance in God’s purposes for Israel. It helped to protect Israel from the corrupt religion, moral filth and physical disease that characterized life throughout Canaan (Deu 7:1-2; Deu 7:16; Deu 7:25-26; Deu 20:16-18).

This policy of total destruction applied only to Israel’s conquest of Canaan. The Israelites were not to destroy non-Canaanite cities unless the people refused Israel’s terms of peace. They attacked only when all else failed. Even then they were to attack only the soldiers, not the women and children (Deu 20:10-15; cf. Jdg 11:12-28), and they were not to destroy the natural environment (Deu 20:19-20). They were to treat prisoners of war well, and if they took any of the captive women as wives, they had to treat them with consideration and respect (Deu 21:10-14; cf. 2Ki 6:21-22).

Not all Israelite men were required to fight for their country. Those excused from military service included any who had recently committed themselves to some undertaking that could be ruined if they suddenly abandoned it (Deu 20:1-7). If any went out to battle but then became afraid, they were to be sent home (Deu 20:8; cf. Jdg 7:3).

Israel’s leaders usually consulted priests or prophets before going to war, to ensure they were acting with God’s approval (1Sa 30:7-8; 2Ki 3:11). They could be confident of victory if God was on their side (Jos 23:10; 2Ch 20:15; Psa 68:1). They could celebrate their triumphs with victory songs (Exo 15:1-3; Jdg 5:1-5; Psa 18:1-6), but they were not to delight in war, and neither were their enemies (Psa 68:30). God gained no pleasure from bloodshed, even when it resulted in victory (1Ch 22:8; Psa 11:5). He preferred to work for peace (Isa 9:6-7; Mic 4:3-4; Zec 9:9-10).

The Old Testament record

In the early days of their settlement in Canaan, the Israelites enjoyed a fairly peaceful existence and saw no need for a regular army. Later, when hostile neighbours began to invade Israel’s territory, a local leader would arise to assemble a fighting force and drive out the enemy (Jdg 3:1-3; Jdg 5:14-15; Jdg 6:33-35; Jdg 7:24; Jdg 10:18; see JUDGES, BOOK OF).

With the appointment of Saul as Israel’s first king, a regular army was established (1Sa 11:6-8; 1Sa 13:2; 1Sa 17:2). At that time most of Israel’s fighting was done by foot soldiers who used swords, spears, and bows and arrows (1Sa 31:1-4; 2Sa 2:23; see ARMOUR; WEAPONS). Armies set up their bases in well protected camps (1Sa 17:20; 1Sa 25:13), and usually went to war in spring or summer, when weather conditions were favourable (2Sa 11:1; 2Ki 13:20).

David improved Israel’s army till it was the strongest among the nations of the region (2 Samuel 8). As he seized the chariot forces of conquered enemies, Israel’s army began to use chariots. The next king, Solomon, enlarged Israel’s chariot force considerably (2Sa 8:4; 2Sa 15:1; 1Ki 4:26; 1Ki 9:22; 1Ki 10:26; cf. 1Ki 22:35; see CHARIOT). A later king, Uzziah, further modernized the army by providing it with better armour and weapons, including special equipment for use against besieging armies (2Ch 26:14-15).

Siege was a common part of warfare, and was often considered essential if an aggressor failed to take a city in a surprise attack or head-on assault. The more powerful armies had huge pieces of siege equipment, some of which were designed to shoot over the city walls, others to break down the walls. The attackers usually heaped earth against the walls to enable them to get closer to the top, where the walls were thinner and easier to break through (2Ki 6:24; 2Ki 25:1; Eze 4:2). Meanwhile, people inside the city slowly starved to death or died of disease (2Ki 25:2-3; Jer 32:24; Lam 2:10-12; Lam 2:19-21; Lam 4:4-9). The victorious siege often ended with senseless butchery, rape, plunder and destruction (2Ki 25:4-17; Psa 74:4-8; Psa 79:1-3; Lam 5:11-12; Nah 2:5-9; Nah 3:1-3).

Christians and war

As long as there is sin in the world there will be war (Mat 24:6; Jas 4:1), and governments will be forced to protect their people from aggression. The Old Testament record seems to support the view that this use of force by a government is within the authority given it by God. That authority allows it to punish wrongdoers and preserve the well-being of its citizens (Rom 13:4; 1Ti 2:1-2; 1Pe 2:13-14; see GOVERNMENT).

Christians, however, should never try to expand or defend the kingdom of God through war (Mat 26:52-54; Joh 18:36). God alone has the right to impose his kingdom by force, and he will exercise that right when Jesus Christ returns and finally destroys all enemies (Revelation 16; Rev 17:14; Rev 19:11-21; see KINGDOM OF GOD).

In the meantime, Christians live in a world where they are members of God’s kingdom and at the same time members of earthly nations (see NATION). God’s kingdom is of a different kind from the ‘kingdoms’ of the world, and Christians must not apply the legal procedures of civil government to their personal behaviour. Civil law requires legal retaliation for wrongdoing, and therefore imposes a punishment to suit the offence. Christian morality requires believers to forgive those who do them wrong (Mat 5:38-42; cf. Rom 12:17-21 with Rom 13:1-6).

War is one of those cases where Christians at times see tension between these two responsibilities. In the New Testament, as in the Old, believers seem to have had no objection to engaging in military service themselves or accepting the protection that those in military service provided for them (Luk 3:14; Luk 7:2-9; Act 10:1-4; Act 23:17-35; Heb 11:33-34). But in the century immediately following the apostolic era, most Christians were strongly pacifist. They believed all war to be wrong and they refused to participate in military service.

Throughout the history of the church, sincere Christians have held a variety of views ranging from total pacifism to total commitment to military service. Some Christians, while not believing all involvement in war to be wrong, believe it to be wrong for Christians to take part in war. Others, still condemning war, consider that when the state of affairs becomes so bad that the ideal is no longer possible, they may be forced to accept the lesser of two wrongs (cf. Mat 19:8). While refusing to initiate aggression themselves, they consider that to resist an evil attacker is not as bad as allowing the evil to triumph unhindered. They do not enjoy such action, but at the same time they do not believe they should leave the protection of the defenceless entirely to non-Christians (cf. Isa 1:17).

Even if Christians believe it is right for them to take part in war, they must not accept the decisions of their government without question. Governments can make decisions that are so unjust or immoral that Christians may feel they must disobey them if they are to remain obedient to God. God alone can demand absolute obedience (cf. Dan 3:17-18; Act 4:19; Act 5:29). Whatever the circumstances, Christians must, like their God, work to achieve justice and peace (cf. Isa 2:4; Isa 9:2-7; Isa 11:1-9; Mat 5:6; Mat 5:9; see JUSTICE; PEACE).