G1932 ἐπιείκεια (epieíkeia)

ἔπιείκεια [WH -xia, see I, ε7, -as, 7, (ἐπιεικής, 4- V-), mildness, gentleness, fairness, [‘sweet reasonableness’ (Matthew Arnold)]: Acts xxiv. 4; joined with πραότης [4- v-], 2 Co. x.1; Plut. Pericl. 39; with φιλανθρωπία, Polyb. 1, 14, 4; Philo, vit. Moys. i. § 36; with χρηστότης, Hdian. 5, 1,12 [6 ed. Bekk.]. Cf. Plato, defin. p. 412 b.; Aristot. eth. Nic.5, 10. (Bar. ii. 27; Sap. ii. 19 ; xii. 18; 2 Mace. ii. 22; 3 Macc. iii. 15.)

ἐπιείκεια epieikeia 2x

also spelled ἐπιεικία, reasonableness, equity; in NT gentleness, mildness, 2 Cor. 10:1; clemency, Acts 24:4*

ἐπιεικία (Rec. -είκεια), -ας, ἡ

(< ἐπιεικής), [in LXX: Wi 2:19 12:18 Ba 2:27, Da LXX 3:(42), 4:24, TH (3:42), II Mac 2:22 10:4, III Mac 3:15 7:6 * ;]

fairness, moderation, gentleness ("sweet reasonableness," Matthew Arnold): Ac 24:4; c. πραΰτης, II Co 10:1.†

SYN.: πραΰτης (v. Tr., Syn., § xliii)

Ταπεινοφροσύνη and ἐπιείκεια, though joined together by Clement of Rome (Cor. 56), are in their meanings too far apart to be fit subjects of synonymous discrimination ; but πραότης, which stands between, holds on to both. The attempt has just been made to seize its points of contact with ταπεινοφροσύνη. Without going over this ground anew, we may consider the relations to ἐπιείκεια in which it stands. The mere existence of such a word as ἐπιείκεια is itself a signal evidence of the high development of ethics among the Greeks.' It expresses exactly that moderation which 1 No Latin word exactly and adequately renders it ; ‘clementia’ sets forth one side of it, ‘ equitas’ another, and perhaps ‘ modestia ’ (by which 154 SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. ὃ xu. recognizes the impossibility cleaving to all formal law, of anticipating and providing for all cases that will emerge, and present themselves to it for decision; which, with this, recognizes the danger that ever waits upon the assertion of legal rights, lest they should be pushed into moral wrongs, lest the ‘summum jus’ should in practice prove the ‘summa injuria’; which, therefore, urges not its own rights to the uttermost, but, going back in part or in the whole from these, rectifies and redresses the injustices of justice.’ It is thus more truly just than strict justice would have been; being δίκαιον, καὶ βέλτιόν Tivos δικαίου, as Aristotle expresses it (Hthic. Nic. v. 10. 6); ‘es ist nimlich nicht das gesetzlich gerechte, sondern das dasselbe berichtigende’ (Brandis) ; being indeed, again to use Aristotle’s words, ἐπανόρθωμα νόμου, ἣ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου :3 and he sets the ἀκριβοδίκαιος, the man who stands up for the last tittle of his legal rights, over against the ἐπιεικής. In the Definitions which go under Plato’s name (412 Ὁ) it is δικαίων καὶ συμφερόντων ἐλάτTwos: it is joined by Lucian (Vit. Auct. 10) to αἰδὼς and μετριότης, and in a fragment of Sophocles is opposed to ἡ ἁπλῶς δίκη. Correctio ejus, Grotius defines it, in quo lex propter universalitatem deficit. Εὐὐγνωμοσύνη in its meaning approaches very closely to ἐπιείκεια, but has not as the Vulgate translates it, 2 Cor. x. 1) a third; but the word is wanting which should set forth all these excellencies reconciled in a single and a higher one. 1 In the words of Persius (iv. 11), ‘rectum discernit ubi inter Curva subit, vel cum fallit pede regula varo.’ 2 Daniel, a considerable poet, but a far more illustrious thinker, in a poem addressed to Lord Chancellor Egerton very nobly expands these words, or the thought in these words; indeed, the whole poem is written in honour of ἐπιείκεια or ‘ equity,’ as being ‘the soul of law, The life of justice, and the spirit of right.’ So too in Spenser’s Fairy Queen the legend of Artegal is devoted to the glorifying of the Christian grace of ἐπιείκεια. § xt. SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 155 completely been taken up into the scientific language of ethics. This aspect of ἐπιείκεια, namely that it is a going back from the letter of right for the better preserving of the spirit, must never be lost sight of. Seneca (De Clem. ii. 7) well brings it out: ‘Nihil ex his facit, tanquam justo minus fecerit, sed tanquam id quod constituit, justissimum sit;’ and Aquinas: ‘ Diminutiva est penarum, secundum rationem rectam; quando scilicet oportet, et in quibus oportet.? Gédschel, who has written so much and so profoundly on the relations between theology and jurisprudence, has much on this matter which is excellent (Zur Philos. und Theol. des Rechts und der Rechtgeschichte, 1835, pp. 428-438). The archetype and pattern of this grace is found in God. All his goings back from the strictness of his rights as against men; all his allowance of their imperfect righteousness, and giving of a value to that which, rigorously estimated, would have none; all his refusals to exact extreme penalties (Wisd. xii. 18 ; Song of Three Children, 18 ; 2 Mace. x. 4; Ps. Ixxxv. 5: ὅτι ov, Κύριε, χρηστὸς καὶ ἐπιεικὴς καὶ πολυέλεος : cf. Clement of Rome, Cor. 29: ἐπιεικὴς καὶ εὔσπλαγχνος Ἰ]ατήρ : Plutarch, Coriol. 24; Peric. 39; Ces. 57); all his keeping in mind whereof we are made, and measuring his dealings with us thereby ; all of these we may contemplate as ἐπιείκεια upon his part; even as they demand in return the same, one toward another, upon ours. Peter, when himself restored, must strengthen his brethren (Luke xxii. 32). The greatly forgiven servant in the parable (Matt. xviii. 23), having known the ἐπιείκεια of his lord and king, is justly expected to shew the same to his fellow servant. The word is often joined with φιλανθρωπία (Polybius, v. 10. 1; Philo, De Vit. Mos. i. 36; 2 Mace. ix. 27); with ἡμερότης (Philo, De Car. 18; Plutarch, De Vit. Pud. 2); with μακροθυμία {Clement of Rome, Cor. 13); with ἀνεξικακία (Wisd. 11. 19); often too with πραότης : thus, besides the passage 156 SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. ὃ xu. in the N. T. (2 Cor. x. 1), by Plutarch (Peric. 39; Cas. 57; ef. Pyrrh. 23; De Prof. Virt. 9). It will be called ἀνανδρία by as many as seek to degrade a virtue through the calling it the name of the vice which is indeed only its caricature (Aristides, De Concord. i. p. 529). The distinction between πραότης and ἐπιείκεια Estius (on 2 Cor. x. 1) sets forth in part, although incompletely : ‘Mansuetudo [πραότη5] magis ad animum, ἐπιείκεια vero magis ad exteriorem conversationem pertinet;’ compare Bengel: “πραότης virtus magis absoluta, ἐπιείκεια magis refertur ad alios.? Aquinas too has a fine and subtle discussion on the relations of likeness and difference between the graces which these words severally denote (Swnm. Theol. 2° 3°, qu. 157): ‘Utrum Clementia et Mansuetudo sint penitus idem.? Among other marks of difference he especially presses these two: the first that in ‘ clementia’ (ΞΞ ἐπιείκεια) there is always the condescension of a superior to an inferior, while in ‘mansuetudo’ (spadrns) nothing of the kind is necessarily implied: ‘Clementia est lenitas superioris adversus inferiorem: mansuetudo non solum est superioris ad inferiorem, sed cujuslibet ad quemlibet ;” and the second, that which has been already urged, that the one grace is more passive, the other more active, or at least that the seat of the πραότης is in the inner spirit, while the ἐπιείκεια must needs embody itself in outward acts: ‘ Differunt ab invicem in quantum clementia est moderativa exterioris punitionis, mansuetudo proprie diminuit passionem ire.’ It is instructive to note how little of one mind our various Translators from Wiclif downward have been as to the words which should best reproduce ἐπιείκεια and. ἐπιεικής for the English reader. The occasions on which ἐπιείκεια occur are two, or reckoning τὸ ἐπιεικές as an equivalent substantive, are three (Acts xxiv. 4; 2 Cor. x. 1; Phil. iv. 5). It has been rendered in all these ways: ‘meekness,’ ‘ courtesy,’ ‘ clemency,’ ‘ softness,’ ‘ modesty,’ 8 xuv. SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 157 f gentleness,’ ‘patience,’ ‘patient mind,’ ‘moderation.’ ᾿Επιεικής, not counting the one occasion already named, occurs four times (1 Tim. iii. 3; Tit. ili. 2; Jam. 111. 17; 1 Pet. ii. 18), and appears in the several Versions of our Hexapla as ‘ temperate,’ ‘soft,’ ‘gentle,’ ‘ modest,’ ‘patient,’ ‘ mild,’ ‘courteous.’ ‘Gentle’ and ‘ gentleness,’ on the whole, commend themselves as the best; but the fact remains, which also in a great measure excuses so much vacillation here, namely, that we have no words in English which are full equivalents of the Greek. The sense of equity and fairness which is in them so strong is more or less wanting in all which we offer in exchange. ὃ xliv. - κλέπτης, ληστής.

ἐπιείκεια. An interesting ex. of this word occurs in the Abinnaeus correspondence, when an official writes urging him in his character of πραιπόσιτος to keep a look-out for any natron that might be smuggled into Arsinoe, and to arrest those engaged in the attempt—P Lond 23179 (c. a.p. 346) (= II. p- 285, Chrest. I. p. 379) τὰ αὐτὰ δηλώ, ἵνα μετὰ πάσης ἐπιεικείας τὴν φρουρὰν τῶν ταμειακῶν νίτρων ποιήσῃ Kal πάντας ὅσους καταλαμβάνεις ἐπισχῇς μετὰ καὶ τῶν κτηνῶν Cf. from the inscrr. OG/S 504° (time of Hadrian) where a certain Οὔλπιος Εὐρυκλῆς is praised ds... ἐν τῶι κοινῶι ἐπὶ παιδείαι τε καὶ τῆι ἄλληι ἀρετῆι Kal ἐπιεικείαι διάδηλον ἑαυτὸν πεποιηκέναι), 20. 507° (time of Hadrian) αὐτῶι τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιεικείᾳ τε καὶ αἰδοῖ πάσηι κεχρημένωι, and Sy// 932° (iii/a.p. ad init.) ἐντείλ]ας μὴ ὕβρει μηδὲ Bla, δικαιοσύνῃ δὲ καὶ ἐπεικείᾳ [κρατ]εῖν τοὺς ἐνοικovvtas. In P Oxy I. 6γ5 (A.D. 338) ἅπερ ἀντέγραψεν πρὸς τὴν σὴν ἐπιείκιάν τε καὶ καθαρότητα, ‘which in reply he wrote to your clemency and impartiality” (Edd.), the abstract honorific periphrasis: cf. CPR I. 19!?4 (A.D. 350). The word is used by Proclus in his description (Zfzstologr. Gr. p. 8 €) of an ironical epistle—Alay ἄγαμαι τὴν σὴν ἐπιείκειαν, ὅτι οὕτω ταχέως μεταβάλλῃ am’ εὐνομίας cis τὸ ἐναντίον (cited by Dibelius HZNZ ad Phil 45).

ἐπιείκεια (epieikeia) — gentleness. ἐπιείκεια, ἡ, reasonableness, [Refs 5th c.BC+].

2. equity, opposed to strict law, [Refs 5th c.BC+]

3. of persons, reasonableness, fairness, [NT+5th c.BC+]; also, goodness, virtuousness, [Refs 5th c.BC+]

II. personified, [Refs 1st c.AD+]