030. CHAPTER 13 - DEPRAVITY - OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED - MORAL STATE AND LEGAL RELATION OF INFANTS.

CHAPTER 13 - DEPRAVITY - OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED - MORAL STATE AND LEGAL RELATION OF INFANTS.

IT has been objected that the doctrine of innate depravity is inconsistent with the principles of a righteous administration in the case of infants. The objection now presented has, perhaps, been more earnestly and repeatedly urged, and more confidently relied upon, by the advocates of the native innocence and purity of man, than any other. And as a proper understanding of the character and condition of infants is so vitally essential to a correct view of the entire doctrine of human depravity, we shall devote this chapter to the investigation of that interesting topic. The following are the principal theories which have been advocated upon this subject:

1. That infants are born perfectly innocent and holy.

2. That they are born without any moral character whatever, and alike indifferent to good and evil.

3. That they are born with a strong bias to evil, though not totally corrupt.

4. That they are born in a state of sinfulness and guilt, amounting to total depravity; and that, notwithstanding the atonement of Christ, some of them, dying in infancy, may perish everlastingly.

5. That they are born in a state of unholiness, but, through the atonement of Christ, in a state of justification or innocence, and that, if they die in infancy, they will be infallibly saved.

6. That they are born in a state of pollution and guilt, but that, through the atonement of Christ, all who die in infancy will infallibly be saved.

It will be readily perceived that while the difference between some of these theories is very slight, between others it is vastly important. In this place we remark, that what we conceive to be the true Scripture doctrine is contained in the last-mentioned theory. The first, viz., that “infants are born perfectly innocent and holy,” is the doctrine of Pelagians, Socinians, and Unitarians generally, and has already been sufficiently refuted. The second, viz., that they are born “without any moral character whatever, and alike indifferent to good and evil,” and the third, viz., that “they are born with a strong bias to evil, though not totally corrupt,” have both had their advocates among semi-Pelagians, Socinians, Unitarians, and some of the New School Presbyterians of the United States, and have already been sufficiently refuted. The fourth, viz., that “they are born in a state of sinfulness and guilt, amounting to total depravity, and that, notwithstanding the atonement of Christ, some of them, dying in infancy, may perish everlastingly,” has been advocated by none but predestinarians. The latter branch of this theory, which avows the possibility of infants perishing everlastingly, is the only portion of it inconsistent with what we conceive to be the Scripture doctrine; and it shall presently be considered. The fifth, viz., that “they are born in a state of unholiness, but, through the atonement of Christ, in a state of justification or innocence, and that, if they die in infancy, they will infallibly be saved,” has been advocated by some Arminian divines. That part of this theory, which avows the native innocence or justification of infants, is the only portion of it which we conceive to be erroneous, and it will be presently considered. The sixth, viz., that “they are born in a state of pollution and legal guilt, but that, through the atonement of Christ, all who die in infancy will infallibly be saved,” has been advocated by the loading divines of the Arminian school, and contains what we believe to be the Scripture doctrine; and so far as it differs from the fourth and fifth theories; we shall proceed to its investigation.

Observe here, that so far as this theory differs from the first, second, and third theories, it has already been considered in the investigation of the doctrine of innate total depravity; therefore its discrepancy with the fourth and fifth theories is all that is now before us. It differs from the fourth theory in that it avows the infallible salvation of all who die in infancy. It differs from the fifth theory in that it avows the native legal guilt of infants, in opposition to their native innocence or justification. We will attend to these two points in order.

I. We shall endeavor to show that all who die in infancy will infallibly be saved. The possibility of the eternal destruction of any who die in infancy is so directly at war with what we conceive to be the character of the divine attributes, and so shocking to the human feelings, that it is really astonishing that the sentiment should ever have received the least countenance. Few, indeed, even of those whose general system of theology required it, have had the hardihood openly to avow it; yet it has had some bold and confident defenders. In the “Westminster Confession of Faith,” the standard of the Presbyterians of the United States, we find the following declaration: “Elect infants, dying in infancy, are regenerated and saved by Christ through the Spirit, who worketh when, and where, and how he pleaseth.”

Here, although the possibility of infants perishing is not fully expressed, yet it appears to us to be clearly implied. To speak of “elect infants,” necessarily implies that there are reprobate infants; for if all infants were “elect,” the term elect in the passage would be superfluous and unmeaning. But the sentiments avowed in other parts of the same book clearly teach that there are reprobate infants. Election and reprobation, according to the whole Calvinistic scheme, are eternal and unconditional; consequently all who ever sustain the character of elect or reprobate must do so even in infancy. Again, as the salvation of “elect infants” is here specified, the idea is clearly implied that none others are saved. That such is the view taken by at least some of the leading authors of the Calvinistic school, we see from the following language of Dr. George Hill, in his Lectures, Book IV., Ch. 1.: “In what manner the mercy of God will dispose hereafter of those infants who die in consequence of Adam’s sin, without having done any evil, the Scriptures have not declared; and it does not become us to say more than is said in the excellent words of our Confession of Faith.” He then repeats the words from the Confession as above quoted.

Here observe, that although the author appears to shrink from a direct avowal of his sentiments, yet we can be at no loss to determine them from his own language. He was a Presbyterian, and here quotes with approbation the standard of his own Church, which we have seen implies the possibility - yea, the certainty - of some infants being not saved. Yet it must be confessed that the author, in the short quotation made from him, indirectly contradicts himself. He first affirms: “In what manner the mercy of God will dispose of those infants who die in consequence of Adam’s sin, without having done any evil, the Scriptures have not declared.” He then quotes, with commendation, the language of the Confession of Faith which, as we have seen, does expressly declare what disposition shall be made of one portion, and clearly implies what disposition shall be made of the other portion. Thus it is clear that the horrible doctrine of the eternal damnation of infants has had manifest favor with at least some of the most eminent predestinarians, although they have generally faltered, felt themselves trammeled, and fallen into inconsistency and self-contradiction, when they have spoken upon the subject. In the outset, we confess that the Scriptures nowhere declare, in express and direct terms, that all who die in infancy shall infallibly be saved. But this cannot be urged as a proof that the doctrine is not there plainly taught. The Scriptures nowhere declare, in express and direct terms, that there is a God; but who will venture to affirm that the existence of God is not therein plainly taught? Indirect and inferential testimony is frequently as powerful and convincing as a direct asseveration possibly can be. Indeed, there are some truths, both in science and religion so obviously implied and so deeply interwoven in the whole system with which they stand connected, that a direct affirmation of them would be a work of supererogation. Such is evidently the being of God above referred to. But so far from the Scripture evidence upon that subject being impaired by the absence of a direct affirmation, it derives additional strength and majesty from that very circumstance. The same observation will be correct in reference to the eternal salvation of all who die in infancy. This is so clearly implied in the very nature of the divine attributes and administration, and in the whole tenor of Scripture, that the inspired penmen have not stopped to affirm it in direct terms. But that the Scriptures do teach this doctrine in an indirect, though clear and forcible manner, we may readily see.

1. St. Peter declares that “God is no respecter of persons.” This may be taken as a brief illustration and comment upon the divine character and government, as we see them exhibited in the Scriptures. And were there no other text upon the subject, this is sufficient to prove the doctrine in question, our opponents themselves being judges. Now observe, it is admitted on all hands that some who die in infancy are saved; then it will follow that if a moral difference in the character of infants is not such as to justify so great a disparity in the divine procedure with them as to send the one to happiness and the other to perdition, all must inevitably be saved, or God is a “respecter of persons,” contrary to the text. That the moral character of infants is the same, is an undeniable fact. Therefore we must admit the salvation of all who die in infancy, or flatly deny the above scripture.

2. Take the doctrine and arguments of St. Paul, in the fifth chapter to the Romans where he contrasts the consequences of Adam’s sin with the benefits of the atonement of Christ, and you will find it impossible to understand his language unless you admit the truth of the doctrine for which we now contend. The apostle there shows that the benefits of redemption are coextensive with, yea, even surpass, the miseries of the Fall. How could this be, if some who are injured by the Fall are never benefited by Christ? And in what way can the infant, who dies and sinks to eternal destruction, be benefited by Christ? In the 18th verse of that chapter, we read: “Therefore, as by the offense of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so, by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life.” Here, if “all men,” in the first instance, includes the whole human family, so it must in the last instance. The terms are the same, and evidently used in the same sense. If this verse means any thing at all, it means that all who fell in Adam are provisionally restored in Christ. That all are actually and immediately justified, cannot be the meaning. Adults are not justified till they repent and believe; but the provision is made for the actual justification of all according to certain terms, unless they themselves reject it by a voluntary refusal to comply with the condition. Infants cannot reject the provision; therefore, if they die in infancy, their actual justification and salvation must infallibly be completed. But, I ask, how can the infant, upon the supposition that it dies and sinks to ruin, be properly said to have been benefited by the remedial scheme? How can it be said that the “free gift” came upon such, (eiv) “unto,” or in order to, justification of life? Surely we have in this passage indubitable, though indirect, proof of the eternal salvation of all who die in infancy.

Many other proofs of a kindred character might be adduced, but we deem them unnecessary. It will follow, from what has been above presented, that the doctrine of innate total depravity involves no difficulty in the divine administration in reference to infants, so far as their eternal destiny is concerned. Let the Fall be viewed in connection with the atonement. The merciful provision coexisted with the miseries of the curse; and as the hand of justice fell upon man to crush him, the hand of mercy was outstretched to redeem and save.

II. We now enter upon the investigation of that portion of the theory we have adopted which avows the native legal guilt of infants, in opposition to their native legal justification or innocence.

It has already been observed that some Arminian divines, who acknowledge the native moral pollution or unholiness of infants, contend, nevertheless, that through the atonement of Christ they are born in a state of justification or perfect innocence; and consequently that they are in no sense of the word guilty. The theory which we have presented not only contends that they are born unholy, but also that they are born legally guilty. Perhaps the difference of sentiment here may consist more in the definition of the term guilt than in the subject itself; but so intimate is the connection of this subject with the important doctrine of human depravity, and so powerful its bearing upon the great subject of the atonement, and the entire scheme of redemption, that great pains should be taken to be perfectly correct, even in the use of terms. A slight error here may almost imperceptibly lead to the pernicious principles of Pelagianism.

1. The simple question which we now discuss is this: Are infants, in any sense of the word, guilty? We adopt the affirmative. But first, we inquire for the definition of the terms guilt and justification, as these terms, in the subject before us, stand opposed to each other. According to Webster and other lexicographers, one definition of guilt is “exposure to forfeiture or other penalty;” and one definition of justification is, “remission of sin and absolution from guilt and punishment.” These definitions, we think, have not only been sanctioned by orthodox divines in general, but are in accordance with the Scripture representation of the subject. With the understanding of the terms here presented, if it can be shown that infants are exposed to any kind of “forfeiture, or any other penalty” of any kind whatever, it will appear that they are guilty. As justification, in theology, is properly taken for the opposite of guilt, it will follow that if infants are justified, in the full sense of the word, they cannot be guilty, in any sense of the word; but, on the other hand, if there is any sense of the word in which they are not justified, in the same sense, they must be guilty. Now, that they are not personally or actually guilty, or guilty in any sense of the word, so as to be personally accountable to God in judgment, or in danger of future and eternal punishment, we freely admit. Therefore the only question now in dispute is simply this: Are infants guilty, according to the Scriptures, in the view of the law and government of God, as a consequence of original sin visited upon them from Adam? This is the only and the plain point at issue. In the light of Scripture and reason, we proceed to examine the question. In Psalms 51:5, we read: “Behold, I was shapen in iniquity; and in sin did my mother conceive me.” On this verse, Dr. Clarke says: “I believe David to speak here of what is commonly called original sin.” The advocates for the native innocence of infants are reduced to the necessity of flatly contradicting this text, or, what is little better, the strange absurdity of asserting that both sin and iniquity may exist without guilt, and be reconciled with perfect innocence. Farther still, they must either reject Dr. Clarke’s comment, or admit that guilt is implied in original sin. In Isaiah 53:6, we read: “The Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all.” On this verse, Dr. Clarke says: “The Lord hath caused to meet in him the punishment due to the iniquities of all.”

Here, if we say that infants are not included, we are reduced to the absurdity of saying that all only means a part; but, what is far worse, we are driven into Pelagianism; for if the punishment due to the original sin attached to infants was not laid upon Christ, he never died for them, and, sure enough, they may safely be left without a Redeemer! But if it be said that infants are included in this passage, then are they legally guilty; for their “iniquity was laid upon Christ.” But if we still deny their guilt, we are reduced to the absurdity of saying that here is iniquity, and that, too, requiring punishment, and yet, how passing strange, this iniquity is free from guilt, and consistent with perfect innocence! The state of the case then, if we deny absolutely the guilt of infants, would be this: infants are involved in sin and iniquity so heinous that its punishment was laid upon Christ, and yet so inoffensive as not to imply guilt in any sense, but perfect innocence! It is clear that if Christ suffered for infants at all, it was either for their guilt or their innocence. There can be no medium: wherever there is no guilt, there is perfect innocence. Then, if we deny the guilt of infants, if Christ suffered for them at all, it was for their perfect innocence; and, if so, his sufferings in their case were useless, for a perfectly innocent being never could have suffered eternal torment, even if there had been no atonement. Yea, we may say more: a perfectly innocent being can never be punished at all, unless that punishment be accompanied by a counterbalancing reward. In Romans 3:19; Romans 3:23, we read: “That every mouth may be stopped, and all the world may become guilty before God;” and “All have sinned, and come short of the glory of God.” On these passages, Dr. Clarke uses these words: “Both Jews and Gentiles stand convicted before God, for all mankind have sinned against this law.” He afterward adds: “And consequently are equally helpless and guilty.” Here, unless we say that “all the world,” and “all mankind,” only mean a part, we are compelled to admit the guilt of infants; otherwise we contradict both the commentator and the apostle, for they both expressly use the word guilty.

It is, indeed, a matter of astonishment, that any one can read the fifth chapter of Romans, and not be convinced that all mankind, of every age, are held as sinful and guilty in consequence of the disobedience of Adam. On the 14th verse, Dr. Clarke uses these words: “In or through Adam, guilt came upon all men.” Here, again, we have our choice, to acknowledge the guilt of infants, or contradict both the text and commentator. In the 18th verse of this chapter, “all men” are said to be brought under “condemnation” for “the offense of one.” If infants are included in “all men,” then are they brought under condemnation for the sin of Adam; and if so, then are they held guilty for the sin of Adam. Our only escape from this conclusion is to say that “condemnation” does not imply guilt, but may consist with perfect innocence.

2. That the views we have expressed in relation to the hereditary guilt of infants are in accordance with the opinion of Mr. Wesley, and the leading and standard authors among his followers, we will now show by a few quotations.

First, from Wesley. “On Original Sin,” we make a few extracts - they were either original with him, or fully indorsed by him. “The death expressed in the original threatening, and implied in the sentence pronounced upon man, includes all evils which could befall his soul and body; death, temporal, spiritual, and eternal.” (Page 75.) “No just constitution can punish the innocent; therefore God does not look upon infants as innocent, but as involved in the guilt of Adam’s sin, Otherwise death, the punishment denounced against that sin, could not be inflicted upon them.” (Page 171.) “However, then, the sufferings wherein Adam’s sin has involved his whole posterity, may try and purify us, in order to future and everlasting happiness, this circumstance does not alter their nature; they are punishments still.” (Page 173.) “Where there is no sin either personal or imputed, there can be no suffering.” (Page 185.) “Death did not come upon them (infants) as a mere natural effect of their father Adam’s sin and death, but as a proper and legal punishment of sin; for it is said, his sin brought condemnation upon all men. Now, this is a legal term, and shows that death is not only a natural but a penal evil, and comes upon infants as guilty and condemned, not for their own actual sins, for they had none, but for the sin of Adam, their legal head, their appointed representative.” (Page 259.) “If, notwithstanding this, all mankind in all ages have died, infants themselves, who cannot actually sin, not excepted it is undeniable that guilt is imputed to all for the sin of Adam. Why else are they liable to that which is inflicted on none but for sin?” (Page 323.) The following we quote from Fletcher’s Appeal: “If we are naturally innocent, we have a natural power to remain so, and by a proper use of it we may avoid standing in need of the salvation procured by Christ for the lost.” (Page 123.) The following we extract from the second Part of Watson’s Institutes: “The fact of (infants) being born liable to death, a part of the penalty, is sufficient to show that they were born under the whole malediction.” (Ch.18.) “This free gift is bestowed upon all men (eiv) in order to justification of life.” (Ch. 18.). “As to infants, they are not indeed born justified and regenerate; so that to say that original sin is taken away as to infants, by Christ, is not the correct view of the case.” (Ch. 18.) “It may well be matter of surprise, that the natural innocence of human nature should ever have had its advocates.” (Ch. 18.) “The full penalty of Adam’s offense passed upon his posterity.” (Ch. 18.) “A full provision to meet this case is, indeed, as we have seen, made in the gospel; but that does not affect the state in which men are born. It is a cure for an actual existing disease, brought by us into the world; for, were not this the case, the evangelical institution would be one of prevention, not of remedy, under which light it is always represented.” (Ch. 18.) “Pain and death are the consequences only of sin, and absolutely innocent beings must be exempt from them.” (Ch. 18.) “The death and sufferings to which children are subject, is a proof that all men, from their birth, are ‘constituted,’ as the apostle has it, and treated, as ‘sinners.’” (Ch. 18.) “This benefit did not so come upon all men, as to relieve them immediately from the sentence of death. As this is the case with adults, so, for this reason, it did not come immediately upon children, whether they die in infancy or not.” (Ch. 18.) “The guilt of Adam’s sin is charged upon his whole posterity.” (Ch. 23.)

3. In the next place, we notice some of the difficulties connected with the doctrine of the perfect innocence of infants, which doctrine has, indeed, been the fountain of many of the most pernicious heresies in the successive ages of the Church.

1. It avows the principle that the stream is more perfect than the fountain whence it emanates. That we derive our nature, compound as it is, by descent, or natural generation, from Adam, all must admit. Adam, previously to this, had fallen; his nature was sinful and guilty; but if he imparted an innocent nature to his posterity, the stream must rise in perfection above its fountain. This not only involves an absurdity, but an express contradiction of the word of God; for we there read: “Adam begat a son in his own likeness and after his image;” consequently, if his nature was guilty, so must have been that of his descendants.

2. It destroys the connection between cause and effect, and thus saps the foundation of all philosophy and reason. That death is the effect of sin and guilt, the Scriptures plainly declare. Now, if all guilt is taken away from infants, the effect of guilt exists in their case without a cause; nor can it, on Bible principles, be accounted for.

3. It overturns a radical and essential principle in the divine government - which is, that the guilty, and not the innocent, are proper subjects of legal punishment. Now, if infants are perfectly innocent, it follows, as they are legally punished with death, that the just principles of government are destroyed.

4. It strikes at the foundation of the doctrine of redemption. For if infants are perfectly innocent, Christ came not to save them; he came “to save sinners.”

I know that the effort has been made to counterbalance all these arguments, by starting such objections as the following: -

(1) It is said that brutes suffer death; and we are asked, Are they guilty? We reply, Most assuredly they are, in the sense of imputation. On account of Adam’s sin, they suffer the forfeiture of their original state of happiness, and lie under the penalty of death; and this, according to the lexicographers and the tenor of Scripture, is guilt.

(2) It is objected that justified, and even sanctified, Christians suffer death; and we are asked, Are they, in any sense of the word, guilty? We reply Yes. They may be justified, and even sanctified, in the Spirit, but sin and guilt attach to the body as well as the soul. Soul and body were united in the transgression, and upon this compound nature the penalty fell. It is guilt that will slay the body in death, and confine it in the tomb. From this part of the sentence of condemnation the resurrection alone can free us. This is one sense in which Christ was “raised again for our justification.”

(3) It is objected that it is absurd to say that an individual not actually guilty, should be made so, in view of the law, for the act of another. To which we reply, that it is no more absurd than that he should be made a sinner for the act of another; and the Scripture affirms that “by the offense of one, many were made sinners.” This might appear absurd and unjust, were it disconnected with redemption, but such is an improper view; for had it not been for the provisions of redemption, none but the first unfortunate pair ever could have had a personal existence.

(4) It is objected that “although infants would be guilty, independent of redemption, yet Christ has removed their guilt, and they are all born innocent, by virtue of his atonement.” This objection has great weight with some, and, at first view, appears quite plausible; but upon close inspection it will vanish. What can this objection mean? “Infants would be guilty, independent of redemption.” Strange, indeed! Independent of redemption, they never could have existed; and who can comprehend a guilty nonentity? If they were only guilty as they existed seminally in Adam, then were they only redeemed as they existed seminally in Adam; for none but sinners needed redemption. According to this, it would follow that, after all, none were redeemed but the first pair; for none others were involved in the guilt. But if it still be urged that “the atonement has removed the guilt of infants,” we simply ask, Has the atonement removed that which never existed? If infants are not, and never have been, guilty, it is clear that their guilt never could have been removed. The apostle does not say, “By one man’s disobedience many” would have been made sinners, had it not been for the atonement; but he says, “Many were made sinners.” Now, if it be said that they were only made sinners seminally, as they existed in Adam, we reply, that in the same sense they all disobeyed in Adam. Hence, according to this theory, the apostle should have said, (to have spoken intelligibly,) either, By one man’s disobedience, one man was made a sinner, or, By the disobedience of many, many were made sinners. If it was only seminally that they were made sinners, seminally they actually disobeyed; and thus, according to this notion, the number that disobeyed was precisely equal to the number made sinners; and thus the apostle’s beautiful argument is reduced to nonsense. To maintain a darling theory, must we be required to make such havoc with Scripture?

Again, look at Romans 5:18 : “By the offense of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation.” Can any believe that the apostle was here teaching us that all men were only condemned seminally, as they existed in Adam? If the condemnation was only theirs seminally, the offense also was theirs seminally, and it is nonsense to say of the “offense” that it was “by one man,” but of the “condemnation,” that it was “upon all men;” for, according to this theory, “all men” offended in the same sense in which they were condemned. The atonement, as such, made no sinner immediately and absolutely righteous. The blood of Christ does not apply itself to the soul of man. It is the office of the Holy Spirit to “take of the things of Christ, and show them unto us.” By the atonement of Christ, the “free gift” comes upon “all men,” not to justify them immediately and unconditionally, but in order to justification of life - that is, the provision is made, the blood has been shed, and, according to God’s plan, the Spirit applies it to the justification, not of those who always have been righteous, but of the ungodly. The adult is justified by faith when he is born again. The infant is not required to believe; but if it die in infancy, the Spirit of God can create it anew and fully justify and prepare it for heaven.

Special attention should be given to the scope of the apostle’s argument in the fifth chapter to the Romans. It runs thus: Death passes upon all men; therefore all are guilty; and if all are thus seen to be guilty, he draws the conclusion that all alike need redemption, and that the “free gift has come” alike upon “all.” If his argument proves all men to be sinners at all, it proves them to be such at the time death passes upon them. Hence it is plain that the notion that infants are made perfectly innocent through Christ, before they were ever made guilty, or before they existed, or as soon as they began to exist, is both absurd and unscriptural.

Finally, we remark, if infants are only saved from becoming guilty sinners through Christ, then he is not their Redeemer from sin, but only a preventer. He does not deliver from disease, but only stands in the way to prevent its approach.

If infants are not by nature guilty, under the sentence of the divine law, then it will follow that justification may be by works; (which is contrary to the apostle’s doctrine;) for the evangelical obedience under the gospel is not such as is impossible to be complied with; and if it be possible to comply with the evangelical requirements of the gospel, then, as there is no previous charge or ground of condemnation, it is possible for an individual to be justified by his own works.

If it be attempted to evade this by saying that infants were guilty, but that Christ has removed that condemnation, so that they are born in a justified state; to this we reply, How can any thing be affirmed or denied of that which has no existence? What kind of a condemnation is that which is pronounced against a being which never had any existence? and what kind of a justification is that which implies the removal of condemnation from a being which does not and never did exist? Indeed, such a supposititious condemnation and justification are absurd. For, if the being condemned had no existence at the time, the condemnation could have had no existence; for no attribute, quality, or condition, can exist separate from the thing of which it is affirmed. And if the condemnation had no existence, the justification which removed it could have had no existence. Thus it appears that the notion that infants were condemned and justified both, before they had any existence, and that consequently they are born in a justified state is an absurd fiction. But if it still be insisted that Christ redeems infants from the sin and guilt which they would have inherited from Adam but for the atonement, then it follows that Christ is only an imaginary Saviour, effecting imaginary redemption for imaginary sinners; and thus the whole scheme is reduced to a farce, and the very atonement itself is uprooted, and shown to be imaginary! We choose rather to abide by the plain Scripture, and look upon this notion of the perfect innocence of infants, and deliverance from guilt that never existed, as obviously untenable.

Another theory, somewhat different from any we have named, has been advocated by a few reputable Arminian divines. It has been espoused by Dr. F. G. Hibbard in his recent treatise on “The Religion of Childhood.” So far as we can perceive, this theory takes the scriptural view of the doctrine of depravity in the abstract - admitting it to be both total and hereditary. This theory, in reference to the moral state of infants, is so nearly related to Pelagianism, that it is difficult to discern wherein they substantially differ.

It teaches that all infants, at the first moment of their existence, are freed from all sin, and guilt, and made partakers of regeneration.

Pelagius taught that the moral state of infants is the same with that of Adam before the Fall - that is, that infants inherit no corruption or guilt from Adam, but are born as sinless and holy as he was when first created. The theory to which we now refer, differs from Pelagianism, in that it admits that all infants inherit guilt and corruption from Adam; but avers that the atonement of Christ is so immediately applied to them that, at the first moment of their existence, all that sin and pollution are removed, so that they are holy and regenerate as soon as they begin to exist.

Thus, it seems to us, that while this theory differs greatly from Pelagianism, because it attributes the gracious state of infants to the atonement of Christ, yet it so harmonizes with the Pelagian theory concerning the moral state of infants, that, in that particular, there is scarce a shade of difference between them. This theory does not exactly teach, like Pelagianism, that infants are born pure and sinless; but that they are so constituted at the first moment of their existence - that is, though they derive from their connection with Adam condemnation and death, yet, by reason of the atonement, the entire malediction of the Fall is removed from them - as Dr. Hibbard expresses it, “coincident with the date of existence - at the moment they become human.” Hence it appears that on this point the theory in question differs from Pelagianism only by the measure of a moment - an instant of time! Of what avail for good or evil can be that native guilt and depravity which, the moment they come upon, or are about to come upon, the infant, are removed? How can native depravity, under such circumstances, tend to corrupt the heart or vitiate the life? And, on this point, how can the theory in question maintain longer than a single moment any vantage-ground over Pelagianism?

Again, this theory, to our mind, involves a palpable self-contradiction. It maintains that all infants are involved in condemnation for Adam’s sin, but that this condemnation is removed as soon as they begin to exist. Now, we ask, how can they be condemned before they exist? Or how can that be removed which never existed? If infants inherit a depraved and guilty nature, it cannot be before they have a nature, nor can they possess a nature before they have an existence. And if, at the first moment of their existence, they are perfectly innocent and regenerate through Christ, when were they condemned and unregenerate through Adam? Was it before they had an existence? If so, what conception are we to form of a condemned, unregenerate nonentity?

It has been argued by the advocates of the theory we here oppose, that “if the grace and gift of righteousness are only a title to life, and not a present personal inception of life, then also, by the conditions of the argument and the law of antithesis upon which it rests, the death spoken of (Romans 5:1-21.) must be only a liability of death - a death in prospect - not a personal present fact and experience.” To this we reply, that if the antithesis of the apostle requires that, because the death is real, personal, and experimental, so must be the life; then, upon the same mode of reasoning, if the life is real, personal, and experimental, so must be the death. But, according to the theory, where shall we find the real, personal, and experimental death from which infants are delivered by the atonement? The theory gives them the “life” in question as soon as they exist - the moment they become human. When did they have personal experience of the antithetic “death?” Was it before they had an existence? This hypothesis is absurd. Was it after they had existence, and before they had life? This is impossible, according to the theory, for it teaches that they possess the antithetic “life” the first moment of their existence. Could they personally experience this “life” and “death” (antithetically opposed to each other) at the same moment? This would be a contradiction. Hence, according to the very reasoning brought to sustain the theory, it is plainly overthrown. For if the “life,” the perfect innocence, the regeneration, possessed by the infant the first moment of its existence, is a real personal, experimental realization, so must be the “death” from which it is a deliverance. If the one is a personal experience, the other cannot be supposed to have only a conceptual existence.

Again, Dr. Hibbard says (page 121): “The justification covers all the condemned, and reverses the ‘judgment’ which stands against us at the first moment, when it would otherwise take effect.”

Here is a plain admission that, according to this theory, the atonement of Christ only delivers the infant world, not from actual, experimental, personal death, but from conceptual death - that is, it is a real, actual salvation from ideal, imaginary, or conceptual evil. The reversed judgment had not actually taken effect. It is reversed “at the first moment, when it would otherwise take effect.”

Once more: the theory under review, while it admits in words the doctrine of native depravity, does, in effect, set it aside. The advocates of the theory admit that, “had it not been for mediatorial interposition, no child of Adam would have been born, and the consequences of the first transgression would have terminated on the first guilty pair.” From this it follows that we are indebted to the atonement for our very being, and all our faculties of whatever kind. Hence it must be admitted that if perfect innocence and regeneration belong to our nature, as soon as we have a nature, (as the theory teaches,) they must belong to that nature as soon as do the faculties of sight and hearing, or any native faculty we possess. And if these faculties or qualities - sight, hearing, innocence, regeneration - all flow through the atonement, and come to us at the same time - as soon as we exist - why is not the one as natural as the others? If we are by nature possessed of sight and hearing, are we not by nature possessed of perfect innocence and regeneration? If all begin as soon as we possess a nature, and flow from the same source, how can any of them be acquired or superinduced? Are they not all equally natural? And if so, are we not as naturally innocent and regenerate beings as we are hearing, seeing, breathing, or living beings? Hence, how can we be naturally sinful and unholy? In other words, how can the doctrine of native human depravity be true? We do not charge the advocates of the theory here opposed with denying the doctrine of man’s native depravity. They intend no such thing. We only advance the opinion that their theory and the doctrine of the native depravity of human nature are logically irreconcilable.

Thus have we endeavored to show that the doctrine of innate total depravity, as connected with the character of infants, is consistent with the nature of the divine administration.