On the Resurrection of the Dead
A reasoned defense of the resurrection of the body, argued from God’s power, his justice and the purpose for which people were made. It is attributed to Athenagoras, though some scholars doubt he wrote it.
GreekOtto edition, 1857
English, ANFAnte-Nicene Fathers, vol. 2 (1885)
Modern EnglishSermonIndex
Chapter 1
Παντὶ δόγματι καὶ λόγῳ τῆς ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἀληθείας ἐχομένῳ παραφύεταί τι ψεῦδος· παραφύεται δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ὑποκειμένης τινὸς ἀρχῆς κατὰ φύσιν ὁρμώμενον ἢ τῆς κατ᾿ αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἕκαστον αἰτίας, ἀλλ᾿ ὑπὸ τῶν τὴν ἔκθεσμον σπορὰν ἐπὶ διαφθορᾷ τῆς ἀληθείας τετιμηκότων σπουδαζόμενον. Τοῦτο δ᾿ ἔστιν εὑρεῖν πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τῶν πάλαι ταῖς περὶ τούτων φροντίσιν ἐσχολακότων καὶ τῆς ἐκείνων πρός τε τοὺς ἑαυτῶν πρεσβυτέρους καὶ τοὺς ὁμοχρόνους γενομένης διαφορᾶς, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς τῶν ἐν μέσῳ στρεφομένων ταραχῆς. Οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀληθῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι κατέλιπον ἀσυκοφάντητον, οὐ τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐ τὴν γνῶσιν, οὐ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, οὐ τὰ τούτοις ἐφεξῆς καθ᾿ εἱρμὸν ἑπόμενα καὶ τὸν τῆς εὐσεβείας ἡμῖν ὑπογράφοντα λόγον.
Defence of the Truth Should Precede Discussions Regarding It.By the side of every opinion and doctrine which agrees with the truth of things, there springs up some falsehood; and it does so, not because it takes its rise naturally from some fundamental principle, or from some cause peculiar to the matter in hand, but because it is invented on purpose by men who set a value on the spurious seed, for its tendency to corrupt the truth. This is apparent, in the first place, from those who in former times addicted themselves to such inquiries, and their want of agreement with their predecessors and contemporaries, and then, not least, from the very confusion which marks the discussions that are now going on. For such men have left no truth free from their calumnious attacks-not the being of God, not His knowledge, not His operations, not those books which follow by a regular and strict sequence from these, and delineate for us the doctrines of piety.
Every doctrine and argument that holds to the truth about reality has some falsehood growing up beside it. This falsehood does not arise naturally from any underlying principle, nor from the cause that belongs to each thing as it is. It is promoted by people who have valued a lawless sowing of seed in order to corrupt the truth. We can see this first from those who long ago devoted themselves to these questions, and from how they disagreed with their elders and their contemporaries. We see it no less in the confusion of the debates going on today. For such people have left no truth free from slander. They have attacked the being of God, his knowledge and his working. They have also attacked the things that follow from these in order and set out for us the teaching of true piety.
Translator’s note. The Greek says “lawless sowing” (ἔκθεσμον σπορὰν), not merely “seed,” and the closing phrase has no word for “books”; it says only “the things that follow in sequence.”
Ἀλλ᾿ οἱ μὲν πάντη καὶ καθάπαξ ἀπογινώσκουσι τὴν περὶ τούτων ἀλήθειαν, οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν αὐτοῖς διαστρέφουσιν, οἱ δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐμφανῶν ἀπορεῖν ἐπιτηδεύουσιν. Ὅθεν οἶμαι δεῖν τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα πονουμένοις λόγων διττῶν, τῶν μὲν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀληθείας, τῶν δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας· καὶ τῶν μὲν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀληθείας πρὸς τοὺς ἀπιστοῦντας ἢ τοὺς ἀμφιβάλλοντας, τῶν δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας πρὸς τοὺς εὐγνωμονοῦντας καὶ μετ᾿ εὐνοίας δεχομένους τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Ὧν ἕνεκεν χρὴ τοὺς περὶ τούτων ἐξετάζειν ἐθέλοντας τὴν ἑκάστοτε προκειμένην χρείαν σκοπεῖν καὶ ταύτῃ τοὺς λόγους μετρεῖν, τήν τε περὶ τούτων τάξιν μεθαρμόζειν πρὸς τὸ δέον, καὶ μὴ τῷ δοκεῖν τὴν αὐτὴν πάντοτε φυλάττειν ἀρχὴν ἀμελεῖν τοῦ προσήκοντος καὶ τῆς ἐπιβαλλούσης ἑκάστῳ χώρας.
On the contrary, some of them utterly, and once for all, give up in despair the truth concerning these things, and some distort it to suit their own views, and some of set purpose doubt even of things which are palpably evident. Hence I think that those who bestow attention on such subjects should adopt two lines of argument, one in defence of the truth, another concerning the truth: that in defence of the truth, for disbelievers and doubters; that concerning the truth, for such as are candid and receive the truth with readiness. Accordingly it behoves those who wish to investigate these matters, to keep in view that which the necessity of the case in each instance requires, and to regulate their discussion by this; to accommodate the order of their treatment of these subjects to what is suitable to the occasion, and not for the sake of appearing always to preserve the same method, to disregard fitness and the place which properly belongs to each topic.
Some of them reject the truth about these matters completely and once for all. Others twist it to suit their own opinion. Others make a practice of professing doubt even about things that are plain. So I think those who labor at these subjects need two kinds of argument: one on behalf of the truth, and one about the truth. The argument on behalf of the truth is for those who disbelieve or doubt. The argument about the truth is for those who are fair-minded and receive the truth with goodwill. Therefore, those who want to examine these questions must consider what the need is at the time and measure their arguments by it. They must adjust the order of treatment to what is required. They must not neglect what is fitting, and the proper place of each point, merely to seem to keep always the same starting point.
Ὡς μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν καὶ τὴν φυσικὴν ἀκολουθίαν, πάντοτε πρωτοστατοῦσιν οἱ περὶ αὐτῆς λόγοι τῶν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς, ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὸ χρειωδέστερον, ἀνεστραμμένως οἱ ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς τῶν περὶ αὐτῆς. Οὔτε γὰρ γεωργὸς δύναιτ᾿ ἂν προσηκόντως καταβάλλειν τῇ γῇ τὰ σπέρματα, μὴ προεξελὼν τὰ τῆς ἀγρίας ὕλης καὶ τοῖς καταβαλλομένοις ἡμέροις σπέρμασι λυμαινόμενα, οὔτε ἰατρὸς ἐνεῖναί τι τῶν ὑγιεινῶν φαρμάκων τῷ δεομένῳ θεραπείας σώματι, μὴ τὴν ἐνοῦσαν κακίαν προκαθήρας ἢ τὴν ἐπιῤῥέουσαν ἐπισχών· οὔτε μὴν ὁ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐθέλων διδάσκειν, περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας λέγων, πεῖσαι δύναιτ᾿ ἄν τινα ψευδοδοξίας τινὸς ὑποικουρούσης τῇ τῶν ἀκουόντων διανοίᾳ καὶ τοῖς λόγοις ἀντιστατούσης. Διὸ πρὸς τὸ χρειωδέστερον ἀφορῶντες καὶ ἡμεῖς προτάσσομεν ἔσθ᾿ ὅτε τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀληθείας λόγους τῶν περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας· κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ποιῆσαι καὶ νῦν ἐπὶ τῶν τῆς ἀναστάσεως λόγων οὐκ ἀχρεῖον φαίνεται σκοποῦσι τὸ δέον.
For, so far as proof and the natural order are concerned, dissertations concerning the truth always take precedence of those in defence of it; but, for the purpose of greater utility, the order must be reversed, and arguments in defence of it precede those concerning it. For the farmer could not properly cast the seed into the ground, unless he first extirpated the wild wood, and whatever would be hurtful to the good seed; nor the physician introduce any wholesome medicines into the body that needed his care, if he did not previously remove the disease within, or stay that which was approaching. Neither surely can he who wishes to teach the truth persuade any one by speaking about it, so long as there is a false opinion lurking in the mind of his hearers, and barring the entrance of his arguments. And, therefore, from regard to greater utility, I myself sometimes place arguments in defence of the truth before those concerning the truth; and on the present occasion it appears to me, looking at the requirements of the case, not without advantage to follow the same method in treating of the resurrection.
As for proof and the natural order of things, the arguments about the truth always come before those on behalf of it. But as for usefulness, the order is reversed, and the arguments on behalf of the truth come before those about it. A farmer cannot properly sow seed in the ground unless he first removes the wild growth that harms the cultivated seed being sown. A physician cannot put healing medicines into a body that needs treatment unless he first cleans out the sickness already there, or checks what is flowing in. In the same way, a person who wants to teach the truth by speaking about it cannot persuade anyone while some false opinion lurks in the hearers’ minds and stands against his words. So, looking to what is more useful, we sometimes put the arguments on behalf of the truth ahead of those about the truth. For those who consider what is needed, it seems not unhelpful to do the same now in the discussion of the resurrection.
Καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις εὑρίσκομεν τοὺς μὲν ἀπιστοῦντας πάντη, τινὰς δὲ ἀμφιβάλλοντας, καὶ τῶν γε τὰς πρώτας ὑποθέσεις δεξαμένων τινὰς ἐπ᾿ ἴσης τοῖς ἀμφιβάλλουσιν ἀποροῦντας· τὸ δὲ πάντων παραλογώτατον ὅτι ταῦτα πάσχουσιν, οὐδ᾿ ἡντιναοῦν ἔχοντες ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀπιστίας ἀφορμήν, οὐδ᾿ αἰτίαν εὑρίσκοντες εἰπεῖν εὔλογον, δι᾿ ἣν ἀπιστοῦσιν ἢ διαποροῦσιν.
For in regard to this subject also we find some utterly disbelieving, and some others doubting, and even among those who have accepted the first principles some who are as much at a loss what to believe as those who doubt; the most unaccountable thing of all being, that they are in this state of mind without having any ground whatsoever in the matters themselves for their disbelief, or finding it possible to assign any reasonable cause why they disbelieve or experience any perplexity.
For here too we find some who disbelieve completely and some who doubt. Even among those who have accepted the first premises, some are as perplexed as the doubters. The most senseless thing of all is that they feel this way without having any starting point for their unbelief in the facts themselves. They cannot even find a reasonable cause to give for why they disbelieve or are perplexed.
Chapter 2
Σκοπῶμεν δὲ οὕτως. Εἰ πᾶσα ἀπιστία μὴ προχείρως καὶ κατά τινα δόξαν ἄκριτον ἐγγινομένη τισίν, ἀλλὰ μετά τινος αἰτίας ἰσχυρᾶς καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀσφαλείας· τότε γὰρ τὸν εἰκότα σώζει λόγον, ὅταν αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα περὶ οὗ ἀπιστοῦσιν ἄπιστον εἶναι δοκῇ· τὸ γάρ τοι τοῖς οὐκ οὖσιν ἀπίστοις ἀπιστεῖν ἀνθρώπων ἔργον οὐχ ὑγιαινούσῃ κρίσει περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν χρωμένων. Οὐκοῦν χρὴ καὶ τοὺς περὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἀπιστοῦντας ἢ διαποροῦντας μὴ πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν αὐτοῖς ἀκρίτως καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἀκολάστοις κεχαρισμένον τὴν περὶ ταύτης ἐκφέρειν γνώμην, ἀλλ᾿ ἢ μηδεμιᾶς αἰτίας ἐξάπτειν τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένεσιν (ὃ δὴ καὶ λίαν ἐστὶν εὐεξέλεγκτον), ἢ τῷ θεῷ τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἀνατιθέντας αἰτίαν εἰς τὴν τοῦδε τοῦ δόγματος ἀποβλέπειν ὑπόθεσιν, καὶ διὰ ταύτης δεικνύναι τὴν ἀνάστασιν οὐδαμόθεν ἔχουσαν τὸ πιστόν.
A Resurrection is Not Impossible.Let us, then, consider the subject in the way I have indicated. If all disbelief does not arise from levity and inconsideration, but if it springs up in some minds on strong grounds and accompanied by the certainty which belongs to truth [well and good]; for it then maintains the appearance of being just, when the thing itself to which their disbelief relates appears to them unworthy of belief; but to disbelieve things which are not deserving of disbelief, is the act of men who do not employ a sound judgment about the truth. It behoves, therefore, those who disbelieve or doubt concerning the resurrection, to form their opinion on the subject, not from any view they have hastily adopted, and from what is acceptable to profligate men, but either to assign the origin of men to no cause (a notion which is very easily refuted), or, ascribing the cause of all things to God, to keep steadily in view the principle involved in this article of belief, and from this to demonstrate that the resurrection is utterly unworthy of credit.
Let us consider it this way. Suppose all unbelief arose in people not offhand, from some unexamined opinion, but with a strong reason and with the soundness that belongs to truth. For unbelief is reasonable only when the very thing people disbelieve really does seem unbelievable. But to disbelieve what is not unbelievable is the act of people who do not use sound judgment about the truth. So those who disbelieve or doubt the resurrection must not give their opinion on it carelessly, according to what merely seems right to them and pleases the undisciplined. They must do one of two things. Either they must attach the origin of human beings to no cause at all, which is very easy to refute. Or they must assign the cause of all that exists to God, look to the foundation on which this teaching rests, and from that foundation show that the resurrection has no credibility at all.
Translator’s note. The Greek sentence beginning “If all unbelief...” is never completed (an anacoluthon), and the translation leaves it unfinished, as the Greek has it.
Τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσουσιν, ἐὰν δεῖξαι δυνηθῶσιν ἢ ἀδύνατον ὂν τῷ θεῷ ἢ ἀβούλητον τὰ νεκρωθέντα τῶν σωμάτων ἢ καὶ πάντη διαλυθέντα πάλιν ἑνῶσαι καὶ συναγαγεῖν πρὸς τὴν τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπων σύστασιν. Ἐὰν δὲ τοῦτο μὴ δύνωνται, παυσάσθωσαν τῆς ἀθέου ταύτης ἀπιστίας καὶ τοῦ βλασφημεῖν ἃ μὴ θέμις· ὅτι γὰρ οὔτε τὸ ἀδύνατον λέγοντες ἀληθεύουσιν οὔτε τὸ ἀβούλητον, ἐκ τῶν ῥηθησομένων γενήσεται φανερόν. Τὸ ἀδύνατόν τινι γινώσκεται κατ᾿ ἀλήθειαν τοιοῦτον ἢ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ γινώσκειν τὸ γενησόμενον, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ δύναμιν ἀρκοῦσαν μὴ ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι καλῶς τὸ ἐγνωσμένον. Ὅ τε γὰρ ἀγνοῶν τι τῶν γενέσθαι δεόντων οὐκ ἂν οὔτ᾿ ἐγειρῆσαι οὔτε ποιῆσαι τὸ παράπαν δυνηθείη ὅπερ ἀγνοεῖ· ὅ τε γινώσκων καλῶς τὸ ποιηθησόμενον, καὶ πόθεν γένοιτ᾿ ἂν καὶ πῶς, δύναμιν δὲ ἢ μηδ᾿ ὅλως ἔχων πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι τὸ γινωσκόμενον ἢ μὴ ἀρκοῦσαν ἔχων, οὐκ ἂν ἐγχειρήσειε τὴν ἀρχήν, εἰ σωφρονοίη καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν ἐπισκέψαιτο δύναμιν, ἐγχειρήσας δὲ ἀπερισκέπτως οὐκ ἂν ἐπιτελέσειε τὸ δόξαν.
This they will succeed in, if they are able to show that it is either impossible for God, or contrary to His will, to unite and gather together again bodies that are dead, or even entirely dissolved into their elements, so as to constitute the same persons. If they cannot do this, let them cease from this godless disbelief, and from this blasphemy against sacred things: for, that they do not speak the truth when they say that it is impossible, or not in accordance with the divine will, will clearly appear from what I am about to say. A thing is in strictness of language considered impossible to a person, when it is of such a kind that he either does not know what is to be done, or has not sufficient power for the proper doing of the thing known, For he who is ignorant of anything that requires to be done, is utterly unable either to attempt or to do what he is ignorant of; and he, too, who knows ever so well what has to be done, and by what means, and how, but either has no power at all to do the thing known, or not power sufficient, will not even make the attempt, if he be wise and consider his powers; and if he did attempt it without due consideration, he would not accomplish his purpose.
They will do this if they can show that it is either impossible for God, or against his will, to reunite and bring together bodies that have died, or even been completely broken up, so that they form the same human beings again. If they cannot show this, let them stop this godless unbelief and this forbidden blasphemy. What I am about to say will make it clear that they are wrong both when they call it impossible and when they call it against God’s will. A thing is truly known to be impossible for someone in one of two cases: either he does not know what is to come about, or he does not have power enough to carry out well what he knows. A person who does not know something that needs to be done could never attempt it or do it at all, since he does not know it. And a person who knows well what is to be made, and from what and how it could be made, but has either no power at all to do what he knows, or not enough, would not even attempt it, if he is sensible and takes stock of his own power. If he attempted it without thinking, he would not finish what he had decided on.
Ἀλλ᾿ οὔτε ἀγνοεῖν τὸν θεὸν δυνατὸν τῶν ἀναστησομένων σωμάτων τὴν φύσιν κατά τε μέρος ὅλον καὶ μόριον, οὔτε μὴν ὅποι χωρεῖ τῶν λυομένων ἕκαστον, καὶ ποῖον τῶν στοιχείων μέρος δέδεκται τὸ λυθὲν καὶ χωρῆσαν πρὸς τὸ συγγενές, κἂν πάνυ παρ᾿ ἀνθρώποις ἀδιάκριτον εἶναι δοκῇ τὸ τῷ παντὶ πάλιν προσφυῶς ἡνωμένον. Ὧι γὰρ οὐκ ἠγνόητο πρὸ τῆς οἰκείας ἑκάστου συστάσεως οὔτε τῶν γενησομένων στοιχείων ἡ φύσις ἐξ ὧν τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων σώματα, οὔτε τὰ μέρη τούτων ἐξ ὧν ἤμελλεν λήψεσθαι τὸ δόξαν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου σώματος σύστασιν, εὔδηλον ὡς οὐδὲ μετὰ τὸ διαλυθῆναι τὸ πᾶν ἀγνοηθήσεται ποῦ κεχώρηκεν ἕκαστον ὧν εἴληφε πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστου συμπλήρωσιν. Ὅσον μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὴν νῦν κρατοῦσαν παρ᾿ ἡμῖν τῶν πραγμάτων τάξιν καὶ τὴν ἐφ᾿ ἑτέρων κρίσιν, μεῖζον τὸ τὰ μὴ γενόμενα προγινώσκειν· ὅσον δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀξίαν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τὴν τούτου σοφίαν, ἀμφότερα κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ ῥᾴδιον ἐπ᾿ ἴσης τῷ τὰ μὴ γενόμενα προγινώσκειν τὸ καὶ διαλυθέντα γινώσκειν.
But it is not possible for God to be ignorant, either of the nature of the bodies that are to be raised, as regards both the members entire and the particles of which they consist, or whither each of the dissolved particles passes, and what part of the elements has received that which is dissolved and has passed into that with which it has affinity, although to men it may appear quite impossible that what has again combined according to its nature with the universe should be separable from it again. For He from whom, antecedently to the peculiar formation of each, was not concealed either the nature of the elements of which the bodies of men were to consist, or the parts of these from which He was about to take what seemed to Him suitable for the formation of the human body, will manifestly, after the dissolution of the whole, not be ignorant whither each of the particles has passed which He took for the construction of each. For, viewed relatively to the order of things now obtaining among us, and the judgment we form concerning other matters, it is a greater thing to know beforehand that which has not yet come to pass; but, viewed relatively to the majesty and wisdom of God, both are according to nature, and it is equally easy to know beforehand things that have not yet come into existence, and to know things which have been dissolved.
But God cannot be ignorant of the nature of the bodies that are to be raised, either of each whole member or of each particle. Nor can he be ignorant where each dissolved part goes, or which of the elements has received what was broken down and has passed into what is akin to it. This holds even though, to men, what has been naturally joined back into the whole may seem entirely indistinguishable from it. Before each body was formed, God was not ignorant of the nature of the elements from which human bodies would be made. Nor was he ignorant of the parts of those elements from which he was going to take what he chose for forming the human body. So it is plain that after the whole has been dissolved, he will not be ignorant where each part has gone that he took to complete each body. By the present order of things among us, and by the way we judge in other matters, it is the greater thing to know in advance what has not yet come into being. But in light of God’s dignity and wisdom, both are natural to him. It is just as easy for him to know things that have been dissolved as to know in advance things that have not yet come to be.
Chapter 3
Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, ὡς ἔστιν ἀρκοῦσα πρὸς τὴν τῶν σωμάτων ἀνάστασιν, δείκνυσιν ἡ τούτων αὐτῶν γένεσις. Εἰ γὰρ μὴ ὄντα κατὰ τὴν πρώτην σύστασιν ἐποίησε τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων σώματα καὶ τὰς τούτων ἀρχάς, καὶ διαλυθέντα, καθ᾿ ὃν ἂν τύχῃ τρόπον, ἀναστήσει μετὰ τῆς ἴσης εὐμαρείας· ἐπ᾿ ἴσης γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦτο δυνατόν. Καὶ τῷ λόγῳ βλάβος οὐδέν, κἂν ἐξ ὕλης ὑποθῶνταί τινες τὰς πρώτας ἀρχάς, κἂν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ὡς πρώτων τὰ σώματα τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, κἂν ἐκ σπερμάτων. Ἧς γάρ ἐστι δυνάμεως καὶ τὴν παρ᾿ αὐτοῖς νενομισμένην ἄμορφον οὖσαν μορφῶσαι, καὶ τὴν ἀνείδεον καὶ ἀδιακόσμητον πολλοῖς καὶ διαφόροις εἴδεσι κοσμῆσαι, καὶ τὰ μέρη τῶν στοιχείων εἰς ἓν συναγαγεῖν, καὶ τὸ σπέρμα ἓν ὂν καὶ ἁπλοῦν εἰς πολλὰ διελεῖν, καὶ τὸ ἀδιάρθρωτον διαρθρῶσαι, καὶ τῷ μὴ ζῶντι δοῦναι ζωήν, τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστι καὶ τὸ διαλελυμένον ἑνῶσαι, καὶ τὸ κείμενον ἀναστῆσαι, καὶ τὸ τεθνηκὸς ζωοποιῆσαι πάλιν, καὶ τὸ φθαρτὸν μεταβαλεῖν εἰς ἀρθαρσίαν.
He Who Could Create, Can Also Raise Up the Dead.Moreover also, that His power is sufficient for the raising of dead bodies, is shown by the creation of these same bodies. For if, when they did not exist, He made at their first formation the bodies of men, and their original elements, He will, when they are dissolved, in whatever manner that may take place, raise them again with equal ease: for this, too, is equally possible to Him. And it is no damage to the argument, if some suppose the first beginnings to be from matter, or the bodies of men at least to be derived from the elements as the first materials, or from seed. For that power which could give shape to what is regarded by them as shapeless matter, and adorn it, when destitute of form and order, with many and diverse forms, and gather into one the several portions of the elements, and divide the seed which was one and simple into many, and organize that which was unorganized, and give life to that which had no life,-that same power can reunite what is dissolved, and raise up what is prostrate, and restore the dead to life again, and put the corruptible into a state of incorruption.
Moreover, the very creation of human bodies shows that God’s power is sufficient to raise them. If at their first formation God made the bodies of men and their first elements when they did not exist, then he will raise them again with the same ease after they are dissolved, however that may happen. For this is equally possible for him. It also does no harm to the argument if some suppose that the first beginnings come from matter, or that human bodies come from the elements as their first constituents, or from seeds. Consider the power that can give shape to what they regard as shapeless matter, and adorn with many different forms what had no form or order. This power can gather the parts of the elements into one, divide the seed, which is one and simple, into many parts, give structure to what had none, and give life to what did not live. That same power can reunite what has been dissolved, raise up what lies fallen, make the dead alive again, and change the corruptible into incorruption.
Translator’s note. “Change the corruptible into incorruption” echoes Paul’s language in 1 Corinthians 15:42, 53.
Τοῦ αὐτοῦ δ᾿ ἂν εἴη καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς δυνάμεως καὶ σοφίας καὶ τὸ διατεθρυμμένον πλήθει ζώων παντοδαπῶν, ὁπόσα τοῖς τοιούτοις σώμασιν ἐπιτρέχειν εἴωθε καὶ τὸν ἐκ τούτων ἀγείρειν κόρον, διακρῖναι μὲν ἐκεῖθεν, ἑνῶσαι δὲ πάλιν τοῖς οἰκείοις μέρεσι καὶ μορίοις, κἂν εἰς ἓν ἐξ ἐκείνων χωρήσῃ ζῶον, κἂν εἰς πολλά, κἂν ἐντεῦθεν εἰς ἕτερα, κἂν ἐκείνοις αὐτοῖς συνδιαλυθὲν ἐπὶ τὰς πρώτας ἀρχὰς ἐνεχθῇ κατὰ τὴν φυσικὴν εἰς ταύτας ἀνάλυσιν· ὃ δὴ καὶ μάλιστα ταράττειν ἔδοξέ τινας καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ θαυμαζομένων, ἰσχυρὰς οὐκ οἶδ᾿ ὅπως ἡγησαμένων τὰς παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν φερομένας διαπορήσεις.
And to the same Being it will belong, and to the same power and skill, to separate that which has been broken up and distributed among a multitude of animals of all kinds which are wont to have recourse to such bodies, and glut their appetite upon them,-to separate this, I say, and unite it again with the proper members and parts of members, whether it has passed into some one of those animals, or into many, or thence into others, or, after being dissolved along with these, has been carried back again to the original elements, resolved into these according to a natural law-a matter this which seems to have exceedingly confounded some, even of those admired for wisdom, who, I cannot tell why, think those doubts worthy of serious attention which are brought forward by the many.
It belongs to the same power and wisdom to deal with a body that has been torn to pieces by a multitude of animals of every kind, such as usually attack such bodies and feed their hunger on them. God can separate it from them and join it again to its own parts and members. It makes no difference whether it has passed into one animal or into many, or from these into others, or whether, dissolved along with those animals, it has been carried back to the first elements by the natural breaking down into them. This is the very point that has seemed to trouble some people most, even some who are admired for their wisdom. For some reason I cannot understand, they thought that the objections commonly raised by the crowd were strong.
Chapter 4
Οὗτοι δέ γέ φασιν πολλὰ μὲν σώματα τῶν ἐν ναυαγίοις καὶ ποταμοῖς δυσθανάτων ἰχθύσι γενέσθαι τροφήν, πολλὰ δὲ τῶν ἐν πολέμοις θνησκόντων ἢ κατ᾿ ἄλλην τινὰ τραχυτέραν αἰτίαν καὶ πραγμάτων περίστασιν ταφῆς ἀμοιρούντων τοῖς προστυγχάνουσι ζώοις προκεῖσθαι βοράν. Τῶν οὖν οὕτως ἀναλισκομένων σωμάτων, καὶ τῶν ταῦτα συμπληρούντων μερῶν καὶ μορίων εἰς πολὺ πλῆθος ζώων διαθρυπτομένων καὶ διὰ τῆς τροφῆς τοῖς τῶν τρεφομένων σώμασιν ἑνουμένων, πρῶτον μὲν τὴν διάκρισιν τούτων φασὶν ἀδύνατον, πρὸς δὲ ταύτῃ τὸ δεύτερον ἀπορώτερον. Τῶν γὰρ τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐκβοσκηθέντων ζώων, ὁπόσα πρὸς τροφὴν ἀνθρώποις ἐπιτήδεια, διὰ τῆς τούτων γαστρὸς ἰόντων καὶ τοῖς τῶν μετειληφότων σώμασιν ἑνουμένων, ἀνάγκην εἶναι πᾶσαν, τὰ μέρη τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὁπόσα τροφὴ γέγονε τοῖς μετειληφόσι ζώοις, πρὸς ἕτερα τῶν ἀνθρώπων μεταχωρεῖν σώματα, τῶν μεταξὺ τούτοις τραφέντων ζώων τὴν ἐξ ὧν ἐτράφησαν τροφὴν διαπορθμευόντων εἰς ἐκείνους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ὧν ἐγένετο τροφή.
Objection from the Fact that Some Human Bodies Have Become Part of Others.These persons, to wit, say that many bodies of those who have come to an unhappy death in shipwrecks and rivers have become food for fishes, and many of those who perish in war, or who from some other sad cause or state of things are deprived of burial, lie exposed to become the food of any animals which may chance to light upon them. Since, then, bodies are thus consumed, and the members and parts composing them are broken up and distributed among a great multitude of animals, and by means of nutrition become incorporated with the bodies of those that are nourished by them,-in the first place, they say, their separation from these is impossible; and besides this, in the second place, they adduce another circumstance more difficult still. When animals of the kind suitable for human food, which have fed on the bodies of men, pass through their stomach, and become incorporated with the bodies of those who have partaken of them, it is an absolute necessity, they say, that the parts of the bodies of men which have served as nourishment to the animals which have partaken of them should pass into other bodies of men, since the animals which meanwhile have been nourished by them convey the nutriment derived from those by whom they were nourished into those men of whom they become the nutriment.
These people say that many bodies of those who died miserably in shipwrecks and rivers became food for fish. Many others died in wars, or from some other harsh cause or turn of events, and were left without burial; these lie exposed as food for whatever animals come upon them. So bodies are consumed in this way, and the members and parts that make them up are broken into pieces and spread among a great multitude of animals. Through nourishment these parts are united with the bodies of the creatures that feed on them. In the first place, they say, it is impossible to separate these parts again. And on top of this they raise a second point, which they think still harder. Some of the animals that have fed on human bodies are of the kind that people use for food. When these pass through the stomach of those who eat them, they become united with the bodies of the eaters. They say it is then entirely unavoidable that the parts of the first men, which became food for those animals, should pass into the bodies of other men. For the animals in between carry the nourishment they received from the first men over into the men for whom they themselves become food.
Εἶτα τούτοις ἐπιτραγῳδοῦσι τὰς ἐν λιμοῖς καὶ μανίαις τολμηθείσας τεκνοφαγίας καὶ τοὺς κατ᾿ ἐπιβουλὴν ἐχθρῶν ὑπὸ τῶν γεννησαμένων ἐδηδεσμένους παῖδας, καὶ τὴν Μηδικὴν τράπεζαν ἐκείνην καὶ τὰ τραγικὰ δεῖπνα Θυέστου καὶ τοιαύτας δή τινας ἐπισυνείρουσι παρ᾿ Ἕλλησι καὶ βαρβάροις καινουργηθείσας συμφοράς· ἔκ τε τούτων κατασκευάζουσιν, ὡς νομίζουσιν, ἀδύνατον τὴν ἀνάστασιν, ὡς οὐ δυναμένων τῶν αὐτῶν μερῶν ἑτέροις τε καὶ ἑτέροις συναναστῆναι σώμασιν, ἀλλ᾿ ἤτοι τὰ τῶν προτέρων συστῆναι μὴ δύνασθαι, μετεληλυθότων τῶν ταῦτα συμπληρούντων μερῶν πρὸς ἑτέρους, ἢ τούτων ἀποδοθέντων τοῖς προτέροις ἐνδεῶν ἕξειν τὰ τῶν ὑστέρων.
Then to this they tragically add the devouring of offspring perpetrated by people in famine and madness, and the children eaten by their own parents through the contrivance of enemies, and the celebrated Median feast, and the tragic banquet of Thyestes; and they add, moreover, other such like unheard-of occurrences which have taken place among Greeks and barbarians: and from these things they establish, as they suppose, the impossibility of the resurrection, on the ground that the same parts cannot rise again with one set of bodies, and with another as well; for that either the bodies of the former possessors cannot be reconstituted, the parts which composed them having passed into others, or that, these having been restored to the former, the bodies of the last possessors will come short.
Next they dramatize all this by adding the cases of children eaten in famines and in fits of madness, and children eaten by their own parents through the plotting of enemies. They add the famous Median banquet and the tragic feast of Thyestes, and they string together other unheard-of horrors of this kind that have happened among Greeks and barbarians. From these they argue, as they suppose, that the resurrection is impossible. Their reasoning is that the same parts cannot rise again with one body and with another as well. Either the bodies of the earlier owners cannot be put together again, because the parts that made them up have passed over into others; or, if those parts are given back to the earlier owners, the bodies of the later owners will be left incomplete.
Translator’s note. The “Median banquet” refers to the story in Herodotus (Histories 1.119) of the Median king Astyages, who served Harpagus the flesh of his own son. In Greek legend, Thyestes was likewise tricked by his brother Atreus into eating his own sons. Both are examples of children eaten by their parents through an enemy’s plot.
Chapter 5
Ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι πρῶτον μὲν τὴν τοῦ δημιουργήσαντος καὶ διοικοῦντος τόδε τὸ πᾶν ἀγνοεῖν δύναμίν τε καὶ σοφίαν, ἑκάστου ζώου φύσει καὶ γένει τὴν προσφυῆ καὶ κατάλληλον συναρμόσαντος τροφήν, καὶ μήτε πᾶσαν φύσιν πρὸς ἕνωσιν ἢ κρᾶσιν παντὸς σώματος ἰέναι δικαιώσαντος μήτε πρὸς διάκρισιν τῶν ἑνωθέντων ἀπόρως ἔχοντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ καθ᾿ ἕκαστον φύσει τῶν γενομένων τὸ δρᾶν ἢ πάσχειν ἃ πέφυκεν ἐπιτρέποντος, ἄλλοτε καὶ κωλύοντος, καὶ πᾶν ὃ βούλεται καὶ πρὸς ὃ βούλεται συγχωροῦντος ἢ μεταστρέφοντος· πρὸς δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις μηδὲ τὴν ἑκάστου τῶν τρεφόντων ἢ τρεφομένων ἐπεσκέφθαι δύναμίν τε καὶ φύσιν. Ἦ γὰρ ἂν ἔγνωσαν ὅτι μὴ πᾶν ὃ προσφέρεταί τις ὑπενδόσει τῆς ἔξωθεν ἀνάγκης, τοῦτο γίνεται τῷ ζώῳ τροφὴ προσφυής· ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἅμα τῷ προσομιλῆσαι τοῖς περιπτυσσομένοις τῆς κοιλίας μέρεσι φθείρεσθαι πέφυκεν, ἐμούμενα τε καὶ διαχωρούμενα καὶ τρόπον ἕτερον διαφορούμενα, ὡς μηδὲ κατὰ βραχὺ τὴν πρώτην καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπομεῖναι πέψιν, ἤ που γε τὴν εἰς τὸ τρεφόμενον σύγκρασιν· ὡσπεροῦν οὐδὲ πᾶν τὸ πεφθὲν καὶ τὴν πρώτην δεξάμενον μεταβολὴν τοῖς τρεφομένοις μορίοις προσπελάζει πάντως, τινῶν μὲν κατ᾿ αὐτὴν τὴν γαστέρα τῆς θρεπτικῆς δυνάμεως ἀποκρινομένων, τῶν δὲ κατὰ τὴν δευτέραν μεταβολὴν καὶ τὴν ἐν ἥπατι γινομένην πέψιν διακρινομένων, καὶ πρὸς ἕτερόν τι μεταχωρούντων ὃ τὴν τοῦ τρέφειν ἐκβέβηκε δύναμιν· καὶ αὐτῆς γε τῆς ἐν ἥπατι γινομένης μεταβολῆς οὐ πάσης εἰς τροφὴν ἀνθρώποις χωρούσης, ἀλλ᾿ εἰς ἃ πέφυκε περιττώματα διακρινομένης· τῆς τε καταλειφθείσης τροφῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐσθ᾿ ὅτε τοῖς τρεφομένοις μέρεσι καὶ μορίοις πρὸς ἕτερόν τι μεταβαλλούσης, κατὰ τὴν ἐπικράτειαν τοῦ πλεονάζοντος ἢ περιττεύοντος καὶ φθείρειν πως ἢ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ τρέπειν τὸ πλησιάσαν εἰωθότος.
Reference to the Processes of Digestion and Nutrition.But it appears to me that such persons, in the first place, are ignorant of the power and skill of Him that fashioned and regulates this universe, who has adapted to the nature and kind of each animal the nourishment suitable and correspondent to it, and has neither ordained that everything in nature shall enter into union and combination with every kind of body, nor is at any loss to separate what has been so united, but grants to the nature of each several created being or thing to do or to suffer what is naturally suited to it, and sometimes also hinders and allows or forbids whatever He wishes, and for the purpose He wishes; and, moreover, that they have not considered the power and nature of each of the creatures that nourish or are nourished. Otherwise they would have known that not everything which is taken for food under the pressure of outward necessity turns out to be suitable nourishment for the animal, but that some things no sooner come into contact with the plicatures of the stomach than they are wont to be corrupter, and are vomited or voided, or disposed of in some other way, so that not even for a little time do they undergo the first and natural digestion, much less become incorporated with that which is to be nourished; as also, that not even everything which has been digested in the stomach and received the first change actually arrives at the parts to be nourished, since some of it loses, its nutritive power even in the stomach, and some during the second change, and the digestion that takes place in the liver is separated and passes into something else which is destitute of the power to nourish; nay, that the change which takes place in the liver does not all issue in nourishment to men, but the matter changed is separated as refuse according to its natural purpose; and that the nourishment which is left in the members and parts themselves that have to be nourished sometimes changes to something else, according as that predominates which is present in greater or less abundance, and is apt to corrupt or to turn into itself that which comes near it.
It seems to me that such people, first of all, do not understand the power and wisdom of the One who made and governs this whole universe. He fitted to the nature and kind of each living creature the food that is natural and suited to it. He did not decide that every nature should go into union or mixture with every body, nor is he at a loss to separate what has been united. He allows the nature of each created thing to do or to undergo what it naturally does, but at other times he also hinders it. He permits anything he wishes, or turns it toward whatever he wishes. Besides this, they have not considered the power and nature of each of the creatures that feed or are fed. Otherwise they would have known that not everything a creature takes in, under the pressure of outward necessity, becomes suitable nourishment for it. Some things are naturally destroyed as soon as they touch the folds of the stomach. They are vomited up, or passed out, or got rid of in some other way, so that they do not even undergo the first, natural digestion for a little while, much less become blended into the creature being fed. In the same way, not everything that has been digested and has undergone the first change reaches the parts being nourished. Some of it is separated off from the nourishing power in the stomach itself. Some is separated in the second change, the digestion that takes place in the liver, and passes into something else that has no power to nourish. Even the change that takes place in the liver does not all go to nourish people; part of it is separated off as waste, as nature intends. And the nourishment that is left in the parts and members being fed sometimes changes into something else, depending on which element is present in excess and tends to destroy, or to turn into itself, whatever comes near it.
Translator’s note. The author follows the medical theory of his time, which held that food is digested in stages: first in the stomach, then in the liver, and finally in the parts of the body.
Chapter 6
Πολλῆς οὖν οὔσης ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ζώοις τῆς φυσικῆς διαφορᾶς, καὶ αὐτῆς γε τῆς κατὰ φύσιν τροφῆς ἑκάστῳ γένει ζώου καὶ τῷ τρεφομένῳ σώματι συνεξαλλαττομένης, τριττῆς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἑκάστου ζώου τροφὴν γινομένης καθάρσεως καὶ διακρίσεως, δεῖ πάντως φθείρεσθαι μὲν καὶ διαχωρεῖν ᾗ πέφυκεν ἢ πρὸς ἕτερόν τι μεταβάλλειν πᾶν ὁπόσον ἀλλότριον εἰς τὴν τοῦ ζώου τροφήν, ὡς συγκραθῆναι μὴ δυνάμενον, συμβαίνουσαν δὲ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι τὴν τοῦ τρέφοντος σώματος δύναμιν ταῖς τοῦ τρεφομένου ζώου δυνάμεσι, καὶ ταύτην ἐλθοῦσαν δι᾿ ὧν πέφυκε κριτηρίων καὶ καθαρθεῖσαν ἀκριβῶς τοῖς φυσικοῖς καθαρσίοις εἰλικρινεστάτην γενέσθαι πρόσληψιν εἰς οὐσίαν· ἣν δὴ καὶ μόνην ἐπαληθεύων ἄν τις τοῖς πράγμασιν ὀνομάσειεν τροφήν, ὡς ἀποβάλλουσαν πᾶν ὁπόσον ἀλλότριον καὶ βλαβερὸν εἰς τὴν τοῦ τρεφομένου ζώου σύστασιν καὶ τὸν πολὺν ἐκεῖνον ὄγκον ἐπεισαχθέντα πρὸς τὴν τῆς γαστρὸς ἀποπλήρωσιν καὶ τὴν τῆς ὀρέξεως θεραπείαν.
Everything that is Useless or Hurtful is Rejected.Since, therefore, great difference of nature obtains in all animals, and the very nourishment which is accordant with nature is varied to suit each kind of animal, and the body which is nourished; and as in the nourishment of every animal there is a threefold cleansing and separation, it follows that whatever is alien from the nourishment of the animal must be wholly destroyed and carried off to its natural place, or change into something else, since it cannot coalesce with it; that the power of the nourishing body must be suitable to the nature of the animal to be nourished, and accordant with its powers; and that this, when it has passed through the strainers appointed for the purpose, and been thoroughly purified by the natural means of purification, must become a most genuine addition to the substance,-the only thing, in fact, which any one calling things by their right names would call nourishment at all; because it rejects everything that is foreign and hurtful to the constitution of the animal nourished and that mass of superfluous food introduced merely for filling the stomach and gratifying the appetite.
There is great natural difference among all living creatures. Even the food that suits each kind of creature varies along with the body being fed. In the feeding of every creature there is a threefold cleansing and separating. So whatever is foreign to the creature’s nourishment must be destroyed and passed out in the natural way, or changed into something else, since it cannot be mixed in. The power of the food must be in agreement with the nature and powers of the creature fed. When it has passed through the filters appointed by nature and been thoroughly purified by the natural cleansings, it becomes the purest intake into the creature’s substance. This alone, if one speaks truly of the matter, could be called nourishment. It throws off everything that is foreign and harmful to the makeup of the creature fed, and that great bulk of material taken in merely to fill the stomach and satisfy the appetite.
Ἀλλὰ ταύτην μὲν οὐκ ἄν τις ἀμφισβητήσειεν ἑνοῦσθαι τῷ τρεφομένῳ σώματι, συνδιαπλεκομένην τε καὶ περιπλαττομένην πᾶσι τοῖς τούτου μέρεσι καὶ μορίοις· τὴν δὲ ἑτέρως ἔχουσαν καὶ παρὰ φύσιν φθείρεσθαι μὲν ταχέως, ἢν ἐῤῥωμενεστέρᾳ συμμίξῃ δυνάμει, φθείρειν δὲ σὺν εὐμαρείᾳ τὴν κρατηθεῖσαν, εἴς τε μοχθηροὺς ἐκτρέπεσθαι χυμοὺς καὶ φαρμακώδεις ποιότητας, ὡς μηδὲν οἰκεῖον ἢ φίλον τῷ τρεφομένῳ σώματι φέρουσαν. Καὶ τούτου τεκμήριον μέγιστον τὸ πολλοῖς τῶν τρεφομένων ζώων ἐκ τούτων ἐπακολουθεῖν ἄλγος ἢ κίνδυνον ἢ θάνατον, ἢν ὑπὸ σφοδροτέρας ὀρέξεως τῇ τροφῇ καταμεμιγμένον συνεφελκύσηταί τι φαρμακῶδες καὶ παρὰ φύσιν· ὃ δὴ καὶ πάντως φθαρτικὸν ἂν εἴη τοῦ τρεφομένου σώματος, εἴ γε τρέφεται μὲν τὰ τρεφόμενα τοῖς οἰκείοις καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, φθείρεται δὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις.
This nourishment, no one can doubt, becomes incorporated with the body that is nourished, interwoven and blended with all the members and parts of members; but that which is different and contrary to nature is speedily corrupted if brought into contact with a stronger power, but easily destroys that which is overcome by it, and is converted into hurtful humours and poisonous qualities, because producing nothing akin or friendly to the body which is to be nourished. And it is a very clear proof of this, that in many of the animals nourished, pain, or disease, or death follows from these things, if, owing to a too keen appetite, they take in mingled with their food something poisonous and contrary to nature; which, of course, would tend to the utter destruction of the body to be nourished, since that which is nourished is nourished by substances akin to it and which accord with its nature, but is destroyed by those of a contrary kind.
No one could dispute that proper nourishment is united with the body that is fed. It is woven together with all the parts and members of that body and molded around them. The other kind, which is contrary to nature, is quickly destroyed if it mixes with a stronger power. If it overpowers a weaker one, it easily destroys it. It also turns into bad humors and poisonous qualities, since it brings nothing that is akin or friendly to the body being fed. The strongest proof is that many living creatures suffer pain, danger or death from such things. This happens when a too-eager appetite draws in something poisonous and contrary to nature, mixed in with the food. That would certainly destroy the body being fed, since living things are nourished by what is proper and natural to them and destroyed by what is opposite.
Εἴπερ οὖν τῇ διαφορᾷ τῶν τῇ φύσει διαφερόντων ζώων ἡ κατὰ φύσιν συνδιῄρηται τροφή, καὶ ταύτης γε αὐτῆς οὔτε πᾶν ὅπερ ἂν προσενέγκηται τὸ ζῶον οὔτε τὸ τυχὸν ἐκ τούτου τὴν πρὸς τὸ τρεφόμενον σῶμα δέχεται σύγκρασιν, ἀλλ᾿ αὐτὸ μόνον τὸ διὰ πάσης πέψεως κεκαθαρμένον καὶ μεταβεβληκὸς εἰλικρινῶς πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ποιοῦ σώματος ἕνωσιν καὶ τοῖς τρεφομένοις μέρεσιν εὐάρμοστον, εὔδηλον ὡς οὐδὲν τῶν παρὰ φύσιν ἑνωθείη ποτ᾿ ἂν τούτοις οἷς οὐκ ἔστι τροφὴ προσφυὴς καὶ κατάλληλος, ἀλλ᾿ ἤτοι κατ᾿ αὐτὴν τὴν κοιλίαν διαχωρεῖ, πρὶν ἕτερόν τινα γεννῆσαι χυμόν, ὠμὸν καὶ διεφθαρμένον, ἢ συστὰν ἐπὶ πλεῖον τίκτει πάθος ἢ νόσον δυσίατον, συνδιαφθείρουσαν καὶ τὴν κατὰ φύσιν τροφὴν ἢ καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς τροφῆς δεομένην σάρκα. Ἀλλὰ κἂν ἀπωσθῇ ποτε, φαρμάκοις τισὶν ἢ σιτίοις βελτίοσιν ἢ ταῖς φυσικαῖς δυνάμεσι νικηθέν, μετ᾿ οὐκ ὀλίγης ἐξεῤῥύη τῆς βλάβης, ὡς μηδὲν φέρον τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν εἰρηνικὸν διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἀσύγκρατον.
If, therefore, according to the different nature of animals, different kinds of food have been provided suitable to their nature, and none of that which the animal may have taken, not even an accidental part of it, admits of being blended with the body which is nourished, but only that part which has been purified by an entire digestion, and undergone a complete change for union with a particular body, and adapted to the parts which are to receive nourishment,-it is very plain that none of the things contrary to nature can be united with those bodies for which it is not a suitable and correspondent nourishment, but either passes off by the bowels before it produces some other humour, crude and corrupter; or, if it continue for a longer time, produces suffering or disease hard to cure, destroying at the same time the natural nourishment, or even the flesh itself which needs nourishment. But even though it be expelled at length, overcome by certain medicines, or by better food, or by the natural forces, it is not got rid of without doing much harm, since it bears no peaceful aspect towards what is natural, because it cannot coalesce with nature.
Natural food is distinguished according to the natural differences among living creatures. Even then, not everything an animal takes in, and not just any part of it, is blended with the body being fed. Only what has been purified through the whole process of digestion is blended. That food has been thoroughly changed for union with the particular body, and it fits the parts being nourished. It is therefore clear that nothing contrary to nature can ever be united with bodies for which it is not suitable and fitting food. Instead, one of two things happens. Either it passes out of the belly itself before it produces some other humor that is raw and spoiled. Or it stays longer and produces suffering, or a disease that is hard to cure. That disease also destroys the natural nourishment, or even the very flesh that needs feeding. Even if it is finally driven out, overcome by some medicines, by better food or by the body’s natural powers, it leaves only after doing considerable harm. It brings nothing peaceful to what is natural, because it cannot be blended with nature.
Chapter 7
Ὅλως δὲ κἂν συγχωρήσῃ τις τὴν ἐκ τούτων εἰσιοῦσαν τροφήν (προσειρήσθω δὲ τοῦτο συνηθέστερον), καίπερ οὖσαν παρὰ φύσιν, διακρίνεσθαι καὶ ματαβάλλειν εἰς ἕν τι τῶν ὑγραινόντων ἢ ξηραινόντων ἢ θερμαινόντων ἢ ψυχόντων, οὐδ᾿ οὕτως ἐκ τῶν συγχωρηθέντων αὐτοῖς γενήσεταί τι προὔργου, τῶν μὲν ἀνισταμένων σωμάτων ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων μερῶν πάλιν συνισταμένων, οὐδενὸς δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων μέρους ὄντος, οὐδὲ τὴν ὡς μέρους ἐπέχοντος σχέσιν ἢ τάξιν, οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ παραμένοντος πάντοτε τοῖς τρεφομένοις τοῦ σώματος μέρεσιν, ἢ συνανισταμένου τοῖς ἀνισταμένοις, οὐδὲν συντελοῦντος ἔτι πρὸς τὸ ζῆν οὐχ αἵματος οὐ φλέγματος οὐ χολῆς οὐ πνεύματος. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὧν ἐδεήθη ποτὲ τὰ τρεφόμενα σώματα, δεηθήσεται καὶ τότε, συνανῃρημένης τῇ τῶν τρεφομένων ἐνδείᾳ καὶ φθορᾷ τῆς ἐξ ὧν ἐτρέφετο χρείας.
The Resurrection-Body Different from the Present.Nay, suppose we were to grant that the nourishment coming from these things (let it be so called, as more accordant with the common way of speaking), although against nature, is yet separated and changed into some one of the moist or dry, or warm or cold, matters which the body contains, our opponents would gain nothing by the concession: for the bodies that rise again are reconstituted from the parts which properly belong to them, whereas no one of the things mentioned is such a part, nor has it the form or place of a part; nay, it does not remain always with the parts of the body which are nourished, or rise again with the parts that rise, since no longer does blood, or phlegm, or bile, or breath, contribute anything to the life. Neither, again, will the bodies nourished then require the things they once required, seeing that, along with the want and corruption of the bodies nourished, the need also of those things by which they were nourished is taken away.
Even if someone were to grant that the food entering from these sources is, though contrary to nature, separated out and changed into one of the moistening, drying, warming or cooling elements, our opponents still gain nothing from the concession. (Let it be called “food,” as that is the usual word.) The bodies that rise are put together again from their own proper parts. None of the things just mentioned is a part, nor does it hold the position or order of a part. Nor does it always remain with the parts of the body that are fed, or rise again with the parts that rise. For neither blood, nor phlegm, nor bile, nor breath will any longer contribute anything to life. The bodies that were once fed will also not need then what they needed before. When the bodies themselves are no longer in need and no longer perishing, the need for what fed them is removed as well.
Translator’s note. “Breath” translates pneuma, which can also mean “spirit” or “wind.” Here it refers to a bodily element.
ἔπειτ' εἰ καὶ μέχρι σαρκὸς φθάνειν τὴν ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς μεταβολὴν ὑποθοῖτό τις, οὐδ' οὕτως ἀνάγκη τις ἔσται τὴν νεωστὶ μεταβληθεῖσαν ἐκ τῆς τοιᾶσδε τροφῆς σάρκα προσπελάσασαν ἑτέρου τινὸς ἀνθρώπου σώματι πάλιν ὡς μέρος εἰς τὴν ἐκείνου τελεῖν συμπλήρωσιν, τῷ μήτε αὐτὴν τὴν προσλαμβάνουσαν σάρκα πάντοτε φυλάττειν ἣν προσείληφεν, μήτε τὴν ἑνωθεῖσαν ταύτην μόνιμον εἶναι καὶ παραμένειν παραμένειν τοῖς μέρεσιν ἃ συνδεῖν ἢ στέγειν ἢ θάλπειν πέφυκεν τὴν ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως ἐξειλεγμένην καὶ τούτοις προσπεφυκυῖαν οἷς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν συνεξέπλησε ζωὴν καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῇ ζωῇ πόνους. Ἀλλ᾿ οὔτε γὰρ καθ᾿ ὃ δεῖ κρινομένων τῶν ἔναγχος ἐξητασμένων, οὔτε κατὰ συγχώρησιν παραδεχθέντων τῶν ἐπ᾿ ἐκείνοις γεγυμνασμένων, ἀληθὲς δεικνύναι δυνατὸν τὸ πρὸς αὐτῶν λεγόμενον, οὔτ᾿ ἂν συγκραθείη ποτὲ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων σώματα τοῖς τῆς αὐτῆς οὖσι φύσεως, κἂν ὑπ᾿ ἀγνοίας ποτὲ κλαπῶσι τὴν αἴσθησιν δι᾿ ἑτέρου τινὸς μετασχόντες τοιούτου σώματος, κἂν αὐτόθεν ὑπ᾿ ἐνδείας ἢ μανίας ὁμοειδοῦς τινος μιανθῶσι σώματι· εἴ γε μὴ λελήθασιν ἡμᾶς ἀνθρωποειδεῖς τινες ὄντες θῆρες, ἢ μικτὴν ἔχοντες φύσιν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων καὶ θηρίων, οἵους πλάττειν εἰώθασιν οἱ τολμηρότεροι τῶν ποιητῶν.
To this must be added, that if we were to suppose the change arising from such nourishment to reach as far as flesh, in that case too there would be no necessity that the flesh recently changed by food of that kind, if it became united to the body of some other man, should again as a part contribute to the formation of that body, since neither the flesh which takes it up always retains what it takes, nor does the flesh so incorporated abide and remain with that to which it was added, but is subject to a great variety of changes,-at one time being dispersed by toil or care, at another time being wasted by grief or trouble or disease, and by the distempers arising from being heated or chilled, the humours which are changed with the flesh and fat not receiving the nourishment so as to remain what they are. But while such are the changes to which the flesh is subject, we should find that flesh, nourished by food unsuited to it, suffers them in a much greater degree; now swelling out and growing fat by what it has received, and then again rejecting it in some way or other, and decreasing in bulk, from one or more of the causes already mentioned; and that that alone remains in the parts which is adapted to bind together, or cover, or warm the flesh that has been chosen by nature, and adheres to those parts by which it sustains the life which is according to nature, and fulfils the labours of that life. So that whether the investigation in which we have just been engaged be fairly judged of, or the objections urged against our position be conceded, in neither case can it be shown that what is said by our opponents is true, nor can the bodies of men ever combine with those of the same nature, whether at any time, through ignorance and being cheated of their perception by some one else, men have partaken of such a body, or of their own accord, impelled by want or madness, they have defiled themselves with the body of one of like form; for we are very well aware that some brutes have human forms, or have a nature compounded of men and brutes, such as the more daring of the poets are accustomed to represent.
Next, suppose someone were to assume that the change from such food reaches as far as flesh. Even so, there would be no necessity that flesh newly changed from such food, once it joined the body of some other man, should again serve as a part to complete that body. The flesh that takes it in does not always keep what it has taken in. Nor is the flesh joined to it lasting, so as to remain … [the Greek text appears to have a gap here; see note] … to remain with the parts, namely those things that are fitted by nature to bind together, cover or warm the flesh that nature has chosen. That flesh has grown onto the parts with which it lived out its natural life and the labors of that life. So the points just examined may be judged as they ought to be, or the further arguments built on them may be granted as a concession. Either way, what our opponents say cannot be shown to be true. Human bodies could never be blended with other bodies of the same nature. This holds even if men have been tricked without knowing it and have eaten such a body through someone else. It also holds if they have knowingly defiled themselves with a body of their own kind through need or madness. That is, unless there are beasts in human form that have escaped our notice, or creatures of mixed nature, part man and part beast, of the sort the bolder poets like to invent.
Translator’s note. The Greek reads “unless some beasts in human form have escaped our notice,” an ironic hint that those who eat human flesh are such beasts.
Chapter 8
Καὶ τί δεῖ λέγειν περὶ τῶν μηδενὶ ζώῳ πρὸς τροφὴν ἀποκληρωθέντων σωμάτων, μόνην δὲ τὴν εἰς γῆν γῆν ταφὴν ἐπὶ τιμῇ τῆς φύσεως μεμοιραμένων, ὅπου γε μηδ᾿ ἄλλο τι τῶν ζώων τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἴδους εἰς τροφὴν ἀπεκλήρωσεν ὁ ποιήσας, κἂν ἐν ἄλλοις τισὶ τῶν ἑτερογενῶν τροφὴ γίνηται κατὰ φύσιν; Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἔχουσι δεικνύναι σάρκας ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρώποις εἰς βρῶσιν ἀποκληρωθείσας, οὐδὲν κωλύσει τὰς ἀλληλοφαγίας εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν, ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι τῶν τῇ φύσει συγκεχωρημένων, καὶ τούς γε τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγειν τολμῶντας τοῖς τῶν φιλτάτων ἐντρυφᾶν σώμασιν, ὡς οἰκειοτέροις, ἢ καὶ τοὺς εὐνουστάτους σφίσι τούτοις αὐτοῖς ἑστιᾶν. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδ᾿ εἰπεῖν εὐαγές, τὸ δὲ σαρκῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρώπους μετασχεῖν ἔχθιστόν τι καὶ παμμίαρον καὶ πάσης ἐκθέσμου καὶ παρὰ φύσιν βρώσεως ἢ πράξεως ἐναγέστερον, τὸ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν οὐκ ἄν ποτε χωρήσειεν εἰς τροφὴν τοῖς ταύτης δεομένοις μέρεσι καὶ μορίοις, τὸ δὲ μὴ χωροῦν εἰς τροφὴν οὐκ ἂν ἑνωθείη τούτοις ἃ μηδὲ τρέφειν πέφυκεν, οὐδὲ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων σώματα συγκριθείη ποτ᾿ ἂν τοῖς ὁμοίοις σώμασιν, οἷς ἐστιν εἰς τροφὴν παρὰ φύσιν, κἂν πολλάκις διὰ τῆς τούτων ἴῃ γαστρὸς κατά τινα πικροτάτην συμφοράν· ἀποχωροῦντα δὲ τῆς θρεπτικῆς δυνάμεως, καὶ σκιδνάμενα πρὸς ἐκεῖνα πάλιν ἐξ ὧν τὴν πρώτην ἔσχε σύστασιν, ἑνοῦται μὲν τούτοις ἐφ᾿ ὅσον ἂν ἕκαστον τύχῃ χρόνον· ἐκεῖθεν δὲ διακριθέντα πάλιν σοφίᾳ καὶ δυνάμει τοῦ πᾶσαν ζώου φύσιν σὺν ταῖς οἰκείαις δυνάμεσι συγκρίναντος ἑνοῦται προσφυῶς ἕκαστον ἑκάστῳ, κἂν πυρὶ καυθῇ, κἂν ὕδατι κατασαπῇ, κἂν ὑπὸ θηρίων ἢ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων ζώων καταδαπανηθῇ, κἂν τοῦ παντὸς σώματος ἐκκοπὲν προδιαλυθῇ τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν· ἑνωθέντα δὲ πάλιν ἀλλήλοις τὴν αὐτὴν ἴσχει χώραν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ αὐτοῦ σώματος ἁρμονίαν τε καὶ σύστασιν καὶ τὴν τοῦ νεκρωθέντος ἢ καὶ πάντη διαλυθέντος ἀνάστασιν καὶ ζωήν. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ πλεῖον μηκύνειν οὐκ εὔκαιρον· ὁμολογουμένην γὰρ ἔχει τὴν ἐπίκρισιν, τοῖς γε μὴ μιξοθήροις.
Human Flesh Not the Proper or Natural Food of Men.But what need is there to speak of bodies not allotted to be the food of any animal, and destined only for a burial in the earth in honour of nature, since the Maker of the world has not alloted any animal whatsoever as food to those of the same kind, although some others of a different kind serve for food according to nature? If, indeed, they are able to show that the flesh of men was alloted to men for food, there will be nothing to hinder its being according to nature that they should eat one another, just like anything else that is allowed by nature, and nothing to prohibit those who dare to say such things from regaling themselves with the bodies of their dearest friends as delicacies, as being especially suited to them, and to entertain their living friends with the same fare. But if it be unlawful even to speak of this, and if for men to partake of the flesh of men is a thing most hateful and abominable, and more detestable than any other unlawful and unnatural food or act; and if what is against nature can never pass into nourishment for the limbs and parts requiring it, and what does not pass into nourishment can never become united with that which it is not adapted to nourish,-then can the bodies of men never combine with bodies like themselves, to which this nourishment would be against nature, even though it were to pass many times through their stomach, owing to some most bitter mischance; but, removed from the influence of the nourishing power, and scattered to those parts of the universe again from which they obtained their first origin, they are united with these for as long a period of time as may be the lot of each; and, separated thence again by the skill and power of Him who has fixed the nature of every animal, and furnished it with its peculiar powers, they are united suitably, each to each, whether they have been burnt up by fire, or rotted by water, or consumed by wild beasts, or by any other animals, or separated from the entire body and dissolved before the other parts; and, being again united with one another, they occupy the same place for the exact construction and formation of the same body, and for the resurrection and life of that which was dead, or even entirely dissolved. To expatiate further, however, on these topics, is not suitable; for all men are agreed in their decision respecting them,-those at least who are not half brutes.
And why should I speak about bodies that were not assigned as food to any living creature? They are set apart only for burial in the earth, as an honor to nature. Indeed, the Maker has not assigned any kind of animal as food for creatures of its own kind, though among some different kinds one does naturally serve as food for another. Suppose, then, that they could show that human flesh was assigned to human beings to eat. Then nothing would stop cannibalism from being natural, like anything else that nature allows. Nothing would stop those who dare to say such things from feasting on the bodies of their dearest friends as something closer to themselves, or from serving these same bodies to their most devoted friends. But it is impious even to say such a thing. For men to share in the flesh of men is utterly hateful and abominable, and more defiling than any other lawless or unnatural food or deed. What is against nature could never become nourishment for the parts and members that need nourishing. What does not become nourishment could never be united with those parts, which it was never made to feed. So human bodies could never be built into other, similar bodies, for which they are unnatural food. This is so even if they should pass many times through those bodies’ stomachs by some most bitter misfortune. Instead, they escape the nourishing power and are scattered back into the things from which they were first formed. They stay united with those things for whatever length of time falls to each. Then they are separated from them again by the wisdom and power of him who put together the whole nature of every living creature with its own proper powers. Each part is then joined fittingly to its own part. This holds whether the body was burned by fire, rotted by water, devoured by wild beasts or whatever other animals happened by, or cut off from the whole body and dissolved before the other parts. When the parts are united with one another again, they take the same place in the harmony and structure of the same body. So the one who had died, or had even been completely dissolved, rises and lives again. It is not the right moment to spend longer on these matters. The judgment on them is agreed, at least among those who are not half-beasts.
Translator’s note. “Half-beasts” renders an uncommon Greek word (mixothēroi), meaning those of mixed human and animal nature. It picks up the creatures “part man and part beast” mentioned at the end of 7.b.
Chapter 9
Πολλῶν δὲ ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὴν προκειμένην ἐξέτασιν χρησιμωτέρων, παραιτοῦμαι δὴ νῦν τοὺς καταφεύγοντας ἐπὶ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔργα καὶ τοὺς τούτων δημιουργοὺς ἀνθρώπους, οἳ τὰ συντριβέντα τῶν ἔργων ἢ χρόνῳ παλαιωθέντα ἢ καὶ ἄλλως διαφθαρέντα καινουργεῖν ἀδυνατοῦσιν, εἶτα ἐξ ὁμοίου τοῖς κεραμεῦσι καὶ τέκτοσι δεικνύναι πειρωμένους τὸ καὶ τὸν θεὸν μήτ᾿ ἂν βουληθῆναι μήτε βουληθέντα δυνηθῆναι νεκρωθὲν ἢ καὶ διαλυθὲν ἀναστῆσαι σῶμα, καὶ μὴ λογιζομένους ὅτι διὰ τούτων τοῖς χειρίστοις ἐξυβρίζουσιν εἰς θεόν, συνεξισοῦντες τῶν πάντη διεστηκότων τὰς δυνάμεις, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ τῶν ταύταις χρωμένων τὰς οὐσίας καὶ τὰ τεχνητὰ τοῖς φυσικοῖς. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων σπουδάζειν οὐκ ἀνεπιτίμητον· ἠλίθιον γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ τοῖς ἐπιπολαίοις καὶ ματαίοις ἀντιλέγειν. Μακρῷ γε μὴν ἐνδοξότερον καὶ πάντων ἀληθέστατον τὸ φῆσαι τὸ παρὰ ἀνθρώποις ἀδυνατὸν παρὰ θεῷ δυνατόν. Εἰ δὲ δἰ αὐτῶν τούτων ὡς ἐνδόξων καὶ διὰ πάντων τῶν μικρῷ πρόσθεν ἐξητασμένων δείκνυσιν ὁ λόγος δυνατόν, εὔδηλον ὡς οὐκ ἀδύνατον. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾿ ἀβούλητον.
Absurdity of Arguing from Man's Impotency.As there are many things of more importance to the inquiry before us, I beg to be excused from replying for the present to those who take refuge in the works of men, and even the constructors of them, who are unable to make anew such of their works as are broken in pieces, or worn out by time, or otherwise destroyed, and then from the analogy of potters and carpenters attempt to show that God neither can will, nor if He willed would be able, to raise again a body that is dead, or has been dissolved,-not considering that by such reasoning they offer the grossest insult to God, putting, as they do, on the same level the capabilities of things which are altogether different, or rather the natures of those who use them, and comparing the works of art with those of nature. To bestow any serious attention on such arguments would be not undeserving of censure, for it is really foolish to reply to superficial and trifling objections. It is surely far more probable, yea, most absolutely true, to say that what is impossible with men is possible with God. And if by this statement of itself as probable, and by the whole investigation in which we have just been engaged reason shows it to be possible, it is quite clear that it is not impossible. No, nor is it such a thing as God could not will.
There are many points more useful to the inquiry before us. So for now I decline to answer those who take refuge in the works of men and in the men who make them. These craftsmen cannot make new again their works that have been smashed, or worn out by age, or ruined in some other way. The objectors then reason from potters and carpenters and try to show that God would not want to raise a body that has died or been dissolved, or that if he wanted to, he could not. They do not realize that by this they commit the worst insult against God. They put on the same level the powers of beings that are altogether different, or rather the very natures of those who use those powers, and they treat things made by craft as if they were things made by nature. It is not free from blame to take such arguments seriously, for it really is foolish to argue against shallow and empty objections. It is far more reputable, and the truest thing of all, to say that what is impossible with men is possible with God. The argument has shown that the resurrection is possible, both by these very statements, taken as reputable ones, and by everything we examined a little earlier. If so, it is plain that it is not impossible. Neither is it something God would not will.
Translator’s note. “Reputable” renders a Greek word used in philosophical argument for views that are widely accepted or held by respected authorities.
Scripture: Luke 18:27
Chapter 10
Τὸ γὰρ ἀβούλητον ἢ ὡς ἄδικον αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἀβούλητον ἢ ὡς ἀνάξιον. Καὶ πάλιν τὸ ἄδικον ἢ περὶ αὐτὸν θεωρεῖται τὸν ἀναστησόμενον ἢ περὶ ἄλλον τινὰ παρ᾿ αὐτόν. Ἀλλ᾿ ὅτι μὲν οὐδεὶς ἀδικεῖται τῶν ἔξωθεν καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἀριθμουμένων, πρόδηλον. Οὔτε γὰρ αἱ νοηταὶ φύσεις ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀναστάσεως ἀδικηθεῖεν ἄν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐμπόδιόν τι ταύταις πρὸς τὸ εἶναι, οὐ βλάβος οὐχ ὕβρις ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀνάστασις· οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν ἀλόγων ἡ φύσις οὐδὲ τῶν ἀψύχων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔσται μετὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν· περὶ δὲ τὸ μὴ ὄν οὐδὲν ἄδικον. Εἰ δὲ καὶ εἶναί τις ὑποθοῖτο διὰ παντός, οὐκ ἂν ἀδικηθείη ταῦτα, τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων σωμάτων ἀνανεωθέντων· εἰ γὰρ ὑπείκοντα νῦν τῇ φύσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ταῖς τούτων χρείαις ὄντων ἐνδεῶν, ὑπό τε ζυγὸν ἠγμένα καὶ δουλείαν παντοίαν, οὐδὲν ἀδικεῖται, πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἀφθάρτων καὶ ἀνενδεῶν γενομένων καὶ μηκέτι δεομένων τῆς τούτων χρείας, ἐλευθερωθέντα δὲ πάσης δουλείας οὐκ ἀδικηθήσεται.
It Cannot Be Shown that God Does Not Will a Resurrection.For that which is not accordant with His will is so either as being unjust or as unworthy of Him. And again, the injustice regards either him who is to rise again, or some other than he. But it is evident that no one of the beings exterior to him, and that are reckoned among the things that have existence, is injured. Spiritual natures (nohtai\ fu/seij) cannot be injured by the resurrection of men, for the resurrection of men is no hindrance to their existing, nor is any loss or violence inflicted on them by it; nor, again, would the nature of irrational or inanimate beings sustain wrong, for they will have no existence after the resurrection, and no wrong can be done to that which is not. But even if any one should suppose them to exist for ever, they would not suffer wrong by the renewal of human bodies: for if now, in being subservient to the nature of men and their necessities while they require them, and subjected to the yoke and every kind of drudgery, they suffer no wrong, much more, when men have become immortal and free from want, and no longer need their service, and when they are themselves liberated from bondage, will they suffer no wrong.
For what God does not will, he does not will either because it is unjust or because it is unworthy of him. Again, injustice would concern either the one who is to be raised or someone else besides him. But it is quite plain that no one outside him, among those counted as existing, is wronged. The spiritual beings could not be wronged by the resurrection of men. It is no obstacle to their existing, and it is no harm or insult to them. The same holds for the nature of irrational creatures and of lifeless things. They will not exist after the resurrection, and nothing can be unjust toward what does not exist. But suppose someone assumes that they do exist forever. Even then they would not be wronged by the renewal of human bodies. Now they give way to human nature and serve human needs while humans are in need. They are brought under the yoke and every kind of slavery, and still they are not wronged. How much less will they be wronged when human beings have become imperishable and free from need and no longer require their service, and when they themselves have been set free from all slavery.
Translator’s note. “Spiritual beings” translates a Greek phrase meaning “intelligible natures,” that is, beings known by the mind rather than the senses. The author probably means angels and similar beings, though he does not name them here.
Οὐδὲ γάρ, εἰ φωνῆς μετεῖχεν, ᾐτιάσατο ἂν τὸν δημιουργὸν ὡς παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἐλαττούμενα τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι μὴ τῆς αὐτῆς τούτοις τετύχηκεν ἀναστάσεως. Ὧν γὰρ ἡ φύσις οὐκ ἴση, τούτοις οὐδὲ τὸ τέλος ἴσον ὁ δίκαιος ἐπιμετρεῖ. Χωρὶς δὲ τούτων, παρ᾿ οἷς οὐδεμία τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις οὐδὲ μέμψις ἀδικίας.Οὐ μὴν οὐδ᾿ ἐκεῖνο φῆσαι δυνατὸν ὡς περὶ αὐτὸν θεωρεῖταί τις ἀδικία τὸν ἀνιστάμενον ἄνθρωπον. Ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὗτος ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, οὔτε δὲ εἰς ψυχὴν οὔτε εἰς σῶμα δέχεται τὴν ἀδικίαν. Οὔτε γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀδικεῖσθαι φήσει τις σωφρονῶν, ὅτι λήσεταί γε ταύτῃ συνεκβάλλων καὶ τὴν παροῦσαν ζωήν· εἰ γὰρ νῦν ἐν φθαρτῷ καὶ παθητῷ κατοικοῦσα σώματι μηδὲν ἠδίκηται, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀφθάρτῳ καὶ ἀπαθεῖ συζῶσα οὐκ ἀδικηθήσεται.
For if they had the gift of speech, they would not bring against the Creator the charge of making them, contrary to justice, inferior to men because they did not share in the same resurrection. For to creatures whose nature is not alike the Just Being does not assign a like end. And, besides, with creatures that have no notion of justice there can be no complaint of injustice. Nor can it be said either that there is any injustice done as regards the man to be raised, for he consists of soul and body, and he suffers no wrong as to either soul or body. No person in his senses will affirm that his soul suffers wrong, because, in speaking so, he would at the same time be unawares reflecting on the present life also; for if now, while dwelling in a body subject to corruption and suffering, it has had no wrong done to it much less will it suffer wrong when living in conjunction with a body which is free from corruption and suffering.
If irrational creatures and lifeless things could speak, they would not accuse the Creator of treating them unjustly by making them lower than human beings, on the ground that they did not receive the same resurrection. Those whose nature is not equal are not given an equal end by the Just One. Besides, where there is no judgment of what is just, there is no complaint of injustice either. Nor can anyone say that some injustice is done to the human being who is raised. He is made of soul and body, and he is wronged in neither soul nor body. No one in his right mind will say that the soul is wronged, because by saying so he would, without realizing it, be rejecting the present life as well. If the soul suffers no wrong now, while it lives in a body that is perishable and subject to suffering, then much less will it be wronged when it shares its life with a body that is imperishable and free from suffering.
Ἀλλ᾿ οὐδὲ τὸ σῶμα ἀδικεῖταί τι· εἰ γὰρ νῦν φθαρτὸν ἀφθάρτῳ συνὸν οὐκ ἀδικεῖται, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδ᾿ ἄφθαρτον ἀφθάρτῳ συνὸν ἀδικηθήσεται. Οὐ μὴν οὐδ᾿ ἐκεῖνο φαίη τις ἂν ὡς ἀνάξιον ἔργον τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ διαλυθὲν ἀναστῆσαι σῶμα καὶ συναγαγεῖν· εἰ γὰρ τὸ χεῖρον οὐκ ἀνάξιον, τοῦτ᾿ ἔστι τὸ φθαρτὸν ποιῆσαι σῶμα καὶ παθητόν, πολὺ μᾶλλον τὸ κρεῖττον οὐκ ἀνάξιον, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἀπαθές.
The body, again, suffers no wrong; for if no wrong is done to it now while united a corruptible thing with an incorruptible, manifestly will it not be wronged when united an incorruptible with an incorruptible. No; nor can any one say that it is a work unworthy of God to raise up and bring together again a body which has been dissolved: for if the worse was not unworthy of Him, namely, to make the body which is subject to corruption and suffering, much more is the better not unworthy, to make one not liable to corruption or suffering.
Nor is the body wronged. If a perishable body is not wronged now, while it is joined to a soul that is imperishable, then clearly an imperishable body will not be wronged when joined to an imperishable soul. Nor could anyone say that it is a work unworthy of God to raise up a body that has been dissolved and to bring it together again. If the lesser thing was not unworthy of him, namely making a body that is perishable and subject to suffering, then much more is the greater thing not unworthy, namely making one that is imperishable and free from suffering.
Translator’s note. The Greek says only “perishable joined to imperishable” and “imperishable joined to imperishable.” The word “soul” is not in the text, but it is clearly meant, and I have supplied it.
Chapter 11
Εἰ δὲ διὰ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν πρώτων καὶ τῶν τούτοις ἑπομένων δέδεικται τῶν ἐξητασμένων ἕκαστον, εὔδηλον ὅτι καὶ δυνατὸν καὶ βουλητὸν καὶ ἄξιον τοῦ δημιουργήσαντος ἔργον ἡ τῶν διαλυθέντων σωμάτων ἀνάστασις· διὰ γὰρ τούτων ἐδείχθη ψεῦδος τὸ τούτοις ἀντικείμενον καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀπιστούντων παράλογον. Τί γὰρ δεῖ λέγειν περὶ τῆς ἑκάστου αὐτῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον ἀντιστροφῆς καὶ τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα συναφείας, εἴ γε δεῖ καὶ συνάφειαν εἰπεῖν, ὡς ἑτερότητί τινι κεχωρισμένων, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν λέγειν βουλητόν, καὶ τὸ τῷ θεῷ βουλητὸν πάντως εἶναι δυνατόν, καὶ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ βουληθέντος ἀξίαν; Καὶ ὅτι μὲν ἕτερος ὁ περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας λόγος, ἕτερος δὲ ὁ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀληθείας, εἴρηται διὰ τῶν προλαβόντων μετρίως, οἷς τε διενήνοχεν ἑκάτερος, καὶ πότε καὶ πρὸς τίνας ἔχει τὸ χρήσιμον· κωλύει δὲ ἴσως οὐδέν, τῆς τε κοινῆς ἀσφαλείας ἕνεκεν καὶ τῆς τῶν εἰρημένων πρὸς τὰ λειπόμενα συναφείας, ἀπ᾿ αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ τῶν τούτοις προσηκόντων πάλιν ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἀρχήν.
Recapitulation.If, then, by means of that which is by nature first and that which follows from it, each of the points investigated has been proved, it is very evident that the resurrection of dissolved bodies is a work which the Creator can perform, and can will, and such as is worthy of Him: for by these considerations the falsehood of the contrary opinion has been shown, and the absurdity of the position taken by disbelievers. For why should I speak of their correspondence each with each, and of their connection with one another? If indeed we ought to use the word connection, as though they were separated by some difference of nature; and not rather say, that what God can do He can also will, and that what God can will it is perfectly possible for Him to do, and that it is accordant with the dignity of Him who wills it. That to discourse concerning the truth is one thing, and to discourse in defence of it is another, has been sufficiently explained in the remarks already made, as also in what respects they differ from each other, and when and in dealing with whom. they are severally useful; but perhaps there is no reason why, with a view to the general certainty, and because of the connection of what has been said with what remains, we should not make a fresh beginning from these same points and those which are allied to them.
Each of the points we have examined has been shown from the things that come first by nature and from what follows from them. So it is plain that the resurrection of dissolved bodies is a work that is possible, that is willed, and that is worthy of the Creator. By these arguments the opposite view has been shown to be false, and the position of the unbelievers has been shown to be unreasonable. Why should I speak of how each of these points implies each of the others, and how they are linked together? We may not even need to speak of a link, as though they were separated by some difference. Should we not rather say that what is possible is also willed, that what God wills is altogether possible, and that it fits the worth of the one who wills it? I have already said, adequately, that an argument about the truth is one thing and an argument in defense of the truth is another. I explained how each differs from the other, and when and toward whom each is useful. But perhaps nothing prevents us from making a fresh start from these same points and from those that belong with them. This will make the whole argument secure and connect what has been said with what remains.
Translator’s note. The distinction between an argument about the truth and one in defense of the truth refers back to the opening chapter of this treatise.
Προσῆκε δὲ τῷ μὲν τὸ πρωτεύειν κατὰ φύσιν, τῶ δὲ τὸ δορυφορεῖν τὸν πρῶτον ὁδοποιεῖν τε καὶ προανείργειν πᾶν ὁπόσον ἐμποδὼν καὶ πρόσαντες. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας λόγος, ἀναγκαῖος ὢν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ σωτηρίαν, πρωτοστατεῖ καὶ τῇ φύσει καὶ τῇ τάξει καὶ τῇ χρείᾳ· τῇ φύσει μέν, ὡς τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων γνῶσιν παρεχόμενος, τῇ τάξει δέ, ὡς ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἅμα τούτοις ὑπάρχων ὧν γίνεται μηνυτής, τῇ χρείᾳ δέ, ὡς τῆς ἀσφαλείας καὶ τῆς σωτηρίας τοῖς γινώσκουσι γινόμενος πρόξενος. Ὁ δ᾿ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀληθείας φύσει τε καὶ δυνάμει καταδεέστερος, ἔλαττον γὰρ τὸ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐλέγχειν τοῦ τὴν ἀλήθειαν κρατύνειν· καὶ τάξει δεύτερος, κατὰ γὰρ τῶν ψευδοδοξούντων ἔχει τὴν ἰσχύν· ψευδοδοξία δὲ ἐξ ἐπισπορᾶς ἐπεφύη καὶ παραφθορᾶς.
To the one kind of argument it naturally pertains to hold the foremost place, to the other to attend upon the first, and clear the way, and to remove whatever is obstructive or hostile. The discourse concerning the truth, as being necessary to all men for certainty and safety, holds the first place, whether in nature, or order, or usefulness: in nature, as furnishing the knowledge of the subject; in order, as being in those things and along with those things which it informs us of; in usefulness, as being a guarantee of certainty and safety to those who become acquainted with it. The discourse in defence of the truth is inferior in nature and force, for the refutation of falsehood is less important than the establishment of truth; and second in order, for it employs its strength against those who hold false opinions, and false opinions are an aftergrowth from another sowing and from degeneration.
It is fitting that one kind of argument should hold first place by nature, and that the other should act as its bodyguard: making the road for the first and clearing away beforehand everything that stands in the way or is hostile to it. The argument about the truth is necessary for all people, for their security and salvation, and it takes the lead in nature, in order and in usefulness. It leads in nature because it gives knowledge of the realities. It leads in order because it exists in and along with the very things it makes known. It leads in usefulness because it brings security and salvation to those who come to know it. The argument in defense of the truth is lower in nature and in power, because refuting falsehood is less than establishing truth. It is also second in order, because its strength is directed against those who hold false opinions, and false opinion has grown up from a later sowing and from corruption.
Translator’s note. The word for “later sowing” (episporá) may echo the parable of the weeds, where an enemy came and sowed weeds among the wheat after the good seed was planted (Matthew 13:25).
Ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων προτάττεται πολλάκις καὶ γίνεταί ποτε χρειωδέστερος, ὡς ἀναιρῶν καὶ προκαθαίρων τὴν ἐνοχλοῦσάν τισιν ἀπιστίαν καὶ τοῖς ἄρτι προσιοῦσι τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν ἢ ψευδοδοξίαν. Καὶ πρὸς ἓν μὲν ἑκάτερος ἀναφέρεται τέλος· εἰς γὰρ τὴν εὐσέβειαν ἔχει τὴν ἀναφορὰν ὅ τε τὸ ψεῦδος ἐλέγχων καὶ ὁ τὴν ἀλήθειαν κρατύνων· οὐ μὴν καὶ καθάπαξ ἕν εἰσιν, ἀλλ᾿ ὁ μὲν ἀναγκαῖος, ὡς ἔφην, πᾶσι τοῖς πιστεύουσι καὶ τοῖς τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ἰδίας σωτηρίας φροντίζουσιν, ὁ δ᾿ ἔστιν ὅτε καί τισι καὶ πρός τινας γίνεται χρειωδέστερος. Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν κεφαλαιωδῶς προειρήσθω πρὸς ὑπόμνησιν τῶν ἤδη λεχθέντων. Ἰτέον δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ προκείμενον, καὶ δεικτέον ἀληθῆ τὸν περὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως λόγον ἀπό τε τῆς αἰτίας αὐτῆς, καθ᾿ ἣν καὶ δι᾿ ἣν ὁ πρῶτος γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος οἵ τε μετ᾿ ἐκεῖνον, εἰ καὶ μὴ κατὰ τὸν ὅμοιον γεγόνασι τρόπον, ἀπό τε τῆς κοινῆς πάντων ἀνθρώπων ὡς ἀνθρώπων φύσεως, ἔτι δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ ποιήσαντος ἐπὶ τούτοις κρίσεως, καθ᾿ ὅσον ἕκαστος ἔζησε χρόνον καὶ καθ᾿ οὓς ἐπολιτεύσατο νόμους, ἣν οὐκ ἄν τις ἀμφισβητήσειεν εἶναι δικαίαν.
But, notwithstanding all this, it is often placed first, and sometimes is found more useful, because it removes and clears away beforehand the disbelief which disquiets some minds, and the doubt or false opinion of such as have but recently come over. And yet each of them is referrible to the same end, for the refutation of falsehood and the establishment of truth both have piety for their object: not, indeed, that they are absolutely one and the same, but the one is necessary, as I have said, to all who believe, and to those who are concerned about the truth and their own salvation; but the other proves to be more useful on some occasions, and to some persons, and in dealing with some. Thus much by way of recapitulation, to recall what has been already said. We must now pass on to what we proposed, and Show the truth of the doctrine concerning the resurrection, both from the cause itself, according to which, and on account of which, the first man and his posterity were created, although they were not brought into existence in the same manner, and from the common nature of all men as men; and further, from the judgment of their Maker upon them according to the time each has lived, and according to the rules by which each has regulated his behaviour,-a judgment which no one can doubt will be just.
Yet even though this is so, the defensive argument is often put first, and sometimes it becomes the more useful. It removes and clears away beforehand the unbelief that troubles some people, and the doubt or false opinion of those who are just now coming to the faith. Both arguments are directed to one end. The one that refutes falsehood and the one that strengthens truth both aim at piety. But they are not altogether one and the same. The argument for the truth is necessary, as I said, for all who believe, and for those who care about the truth and their own salvation. The defensive argument is sometimes more useful for certain people and in dealing with certain people. Let this be said briefly by way of summary, to remind us of what has already been said. Now we must go on to our subject and show that the teaching about the resurrection is true. We will argue first from the cause itself, according to which and for the sake of which the first man was made, and those after him as well, even though they were not made in the same way. Second, we will argue from the common nature of all human beings as human beings. Third, we will argue from the judgment which their Maker passes on them, concerning the whole time each one lived and the laws by which each one conducted his life. No one could dispute that this judgment is just.
Translator’s note. “Piety” translates eusebeia, which means right reverence toward God and a godly way of life.
Chapter 12
Ἔστι δὲ ὁ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς αἰτίας λόγος, ἐὰν ἐπισκοπῶμεν πότερον ἁπλῶς καὶ μάτην γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος ἤ τινος ἕνεκεν· εἰ δέ τινος ἕνεκεν, πότερον ἐπὶ τοῦτο γενόμενον αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν καὶ διαμένειν καθ᾿ ἣν ἐγένετο φύσιν ἢ διὰ χρείαν τινός· εἰ δὲ κατὰ χρείαν, ἤτοι τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιήσαντος ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν αὐτῷ προσηκόντων καὶ πλείονος φροντίδος ἠξιωμένων. Ὃ δὴ καὶ κοινότερον σκοποῦντες εὑρίσκομεν ὅτι πᾶς εὖ φρονῶν καὶ λογικῇ κρίσει πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν τι κινούμενος οὐδὲν ὧν κατὰ πρόθεσιν ἐνεργεῖ ποιεῖ μάτην, ἀλλ᾿ ἤτοι τῆς ἰδίας ἕνεκεν χρήσεως ἢ διὰ χρείαν ἄλλου τινὸς ὧν πεφρόντικεν ἢ δι᾿ αὐτὸ τὸ γινόμενον, ὁλκῇ τινι φυσικῇ καὶ στοργῇ πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ γένεσιν κινούμενος· οἷον (λεγέσθω γὰρ δι᾿ εἰκόνος τινός, ἵνα σαφὲς γένηται τὸ προκείμενον) ἄνθρωπος ποιεῖ μὲν οἶκον διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν χρείαν, ποιεῖ δὲ βουσὶ καὶ καμήλοις ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις, ὧν ἐστιν ἐνδεής, τὴν ἑκάστῳ τούτων ἁρμόζουσαν σκέπην, οὐκ ἰδίας ἕνεκεν χρήσεως κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν τὸ τέλος διὰ τοῦτο, κατὰ δὲ τὸ προσεχὲς διὰ τὴν τούτων ὧν πεφρόντικεν ἐπιμέλειαν· ποιεῖται δὲ καὶ παῖδας οὔτε διὰ χρείαν ἰδίαν οὔτε δι᾿ ἕτερόν τι τῶν αὐτῷ προσηκόντων, ἀλλ᾿ ἐπὶ τῷ εἶναί τε καὶ διαμένειν καθ᾿ ὅσον οἷόν τε τοὺς ὑπ᾿ αὐτοῦ γεννωμένους, τῇ τῶν παίδων καὶ τῶν ἐγγόνων διαδοχῇ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τελευτὴν παραμυθούμενος καὶ ταύτῃ τὸ θνητὸν ἀπαθανατίζειν οἰόμενος.
Argument for the Resurrection. From the Purpose Contemplated in Man's Creation.The argument from the cause will appear, if we consider whether man was made at random and in vain, or for some purpose; and if for some purpose, whether simply that he might live and continue in the natural condition in which he was created, or for the use of another; and if with a view to use, whether for that of the Creator Himself, or of some one of the beings who belong to Him, and are by Him deemed worthy Of greater care. Now, if we consider this in the most general way, we find that a person of sound mind, and who is moved by a rational judgment to do anything, does nothing in vain which he does intentionally, but either for his own use, or for the use of some other person for whom he cares, or for the sake of the work itself, being moved by some natural inclination and affection towards its production. For instance (to make use of an illustration, that our meaning may be clear), a man makes a house for his own use, but for cattle and camels and other animals of which he has need he makes the shelter suitable for each of them; not for his own use, if we regard the appearance only, though for that, if we look at the end he has in view, but as regards the immediate object, from concern for those for whom he cares. He has children, too, not for his own use, nor for the sake of anything else belonging to him, but that those who spring from him may exist and continue as long as possible, thus by the succession of children and grandchildren comforting himself respecting the close of his own life, and hoping in this way to immortalize the mortal.
The argument from the cause goes like this. We ask whether man was made without reason and for nothing, or for some purpose. If for some purpose, was he made just to live and to remain in the nature in which he was created, or to serve someone’s need? And if to serve a need, was it the need of the Maker himself, or of some other being who belongs to him and is thought worthy of greater care? Let us look at this in a more general way. We find that everyone of sound mind who is moved by reasoned judgment to make something does nothing he deliberately undertakes for nothing. He does it either for his own use, or for the need of someone else he cares for, or for the sake of the thing made, moved by a natural attraction and affection toward its coming into being. Take an illustration, so that the point is clear. A man builds a house for his own use. He also builds, for oxen and camels and other animals he needs, the shelter that suits each of them. To all appearance he does not do this for his own use, though in the end it is for that. The immediate reason is his care for the animals he looks after. He also has children. He does not have them for his own use or for the sake of anything else that belongs to him. He has them so that those he fathers may exist and last as long as possible. By the succession of children and grandchildren he consoles himself for his own death, and in this way he thinks he makes the mortal immortal.
Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὑπὸ τούτων. Ὁ μέντοι θεὸς οὔτ᾿ ἂν μάτην ἐποίησε τὸν ἄνθρωπον· ἔστι γὰρ σοφός, οὐδὲν δὲ σοφίας ἔργον μάταιον· οὔτε διὰ χρείαν ἰδίαν· παντὸς γάρ ἐστιν ἀπροσδεής. Τῷ δὲ μηδενὸς δεομένῳ τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲν τῶν ὑπ᾿ αὐτοῦ γενομένων συντελέσειεν ἂν εἰς χρείαν ἰδίαν. Ἀλλ᾿ οὐδὲ διά τινα τῶν ὑπ᾿ αὐτοῦ γενομένων ἔργων ἐποίησε τὸν ἄνθρωπον. Οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν λόγῳ καὶ κρίσει χρωμένων οὔτε τῶν μειζόνων οὔτε τῶν καταδεεστέρων γέγονεν ἢ γίνεται πρὸς ἑτέρου χρείαν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν αὐτῶν τῶν γενομένων ζωήν τε καὶ διαμονήν. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ λόγος εὑρίσκει τινὰ χρείαν τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων γενέσεως αἰτίαν, τῶν μὲν ἀθανάτων ἀνενδεῶν ὄντων καὶ μηδεμιᾶς μηδαμῶς παρ᾿ ἀνθρώπων συντελείας πρὸς τὸ εἶναι δεομένων, τῶν δὲ ἀλόγων ἀρχομένων κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὰς πρὸς ὃ πέφυκεν ἕκαστον χρείας ἀνθρώποις ἀποπληρούντων, ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ αὖ τούτοις χρῆσθαι πεφυκότων· θέμις γὰρ οὔτε ἦν οὔτε ἐστὶ τὸ ἄρχον καὶ ἡγεμονοῦν ὑπάγειν εἰς χρῆσιν τοῖς ἐλάττοσιν, ἢ τὸ λογικὸν ὑποτάττειν ἀλόγοις, οὖσι πρὸς τὸ ἄρχειν ἀνεπιτηδείοις.
Such is the procedure of men. But God can neither have made man in vain, for He is wise, and no work of wisdom is in vain; nor for His own use, for He is in want of nothing. But to a Being absolutely in need of nothing, no one of His works can contribute anything to His own use. Neither, again, did He make man for the sake of any of the other works which He has made. For nothing that is endowed with reason and judgment has been created, or is created, for the use of another, whether greater or less than itself, but for the sake of the life and continuance of the being itself so created. For reason cannot discover any use which might be deemed a cause for the creation of men, since immortals are free from want, and in need of no help from men in order to their existence; and irrational beings are by nature in a state of subjection, and perform those services for men for which each of them was intended, but are not intended in their turn to make use of men: for it neither was nor is right to lower that which rules and takes the lead to the use of the inferior, or to subject the rational to the irrational, which is not suited to rule.
That is how men act. But God would not have made man for nothing, because he is wise, and no work of wisdom is empty. Nor would he have made him for his own use, because he needs nothing. For one who needs nothing at all, nothing that he has made could serve his own use. Nor did he make man for the sake of any other work of his. For nothing that has reason and judgment, whether greater or lesser, has been or is made for another’s use. It exists for the sake of its own life and continuing. Reason can find no need that could be the cause of man’s creation. The immortals lack nothing and need no contribution from men in order to exist. The creatures without reason are by nature under rule, and they supply men with the services each is suited to give, but they are not made to use men in return. It was never right, and is not right, to bring what rules and leads down to the use of its inferiors, or to subject the rational to the irrational, which is unfit to rule.
Οὐκοῦν εἰ μήτε ἀναιτίως καὶ μάτην γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος (οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν ὑπὸ θεοῦ γενομένων μάταιον, κατά γε τὴν τοῦ ποιήσαντος γνώμην), μήτε χρείας ἕνεκεν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιήσαντος ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν ὑπὸ θεοῦ γενομένων ποιημάτων, εὔδηλον ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὸν πρῶτον καὶ κοινότερον λόγον δι᾿ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ πάσης τῆς δημιουργίας θεωρουμένην ἀγαθότητα καὶ σοφίαν ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, κατὰ δὲ τὸν προσεχέστερον τοῖς γενομένοις λόγον διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν τῶν γενομένων ζωήν, οὐκ ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἐξαπτομένην, εἶτα παντελῶς σβεννυμένην. Ἑρπετοῖς γάρ, οἶμαι, καὶ πτηνοῖς καὶ νηκτοῖς ἢ καὶ κοινότερον εἰπεῖν πᾶσι τοῖς ἀλόγοις τὴν τοιαύτην ζωὴν ἀπένειμεν ὁ θεός· τοῖς δὲ αὐτὸν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαλματοφοροῦσι τὸν ποιητήν, νοῦν τε συνεπιφερομένοις καὶ λογικῆς κρίσεως μεμοιραμένοις, τὴν εἰς ἀεὶ διαμονὴν ἀπεκλήρωσεν ὁ ποιητής, ἵνα γινώσκοντες τὸν ἑαυτῶν ποιητὴν καὶ τὴν τούτου δύναμίν τε καὶ σοφίαν, νόμῳ τε συνεπόμενοι καὶ δίκῃ, τούτοις συνδιαιωνίζωσιν ἀπόνως οἷς τὴν προλαβοῦσαν ἐκράτυναν ζωήν, καίπερ ἐν φθαρτοῖς καὶ γηΐνοις ὄντες σώμασιν.
Therefore, if man has been created neither without cause and in vain (for none of God's works is in vain, so far at least as the purpose of their Maker is concerned), nor for the use of the Maker Himself, or of any of the works which have proceeded from Him, it is quite clear that although, according to the first and more general view of the subject, God made man for Himself, and in pursuance of the goodness and wisdom which are conspicuous throughout the creation, yet, according to the view which more nearly touches the beings created, He made him for the sake of the life of those created, which is not kindled for a little while and then extinguished. For to creeping things, I suppose, and birds, and fishes, or, to speak more generally, all irrational creatures, God has assigned such a life as that; but to those who bear upon them the image of the Creator Himself, and are endowed with understanding, and blessed with a rational judgment, the Creator has assigned perpetual duration, in order that, recognising their own Maker, and His power and skill, and obeying law and justice, they may pass their whole existence free from suffering, in the possession of those qualifies with which they have bravely borne their preceding life, although they lived in corruptible and earthly bodies.
So if man was not made without cause and for nothing (for nothing God has made is pointless, at least as far as its Maker’s intention goes), and was not made to meet a need of the Maker himself or of any other work of God, then it is clear what follows. On the first and more general account, God made man for himself and for the goodness and wisdom seen in all his creation. But on the account that comes closer to the creatures themselves, he made man for the sake of their own life. That life is not lit for a little while and then put out altogether. To creeping things, I think, and birds and fish, or to speak more generally all creatures without reason, God gave a life of that kind. But to those who carry the Maker himself as an image within them, who bring with them a mind and share in rational judgment, the Maker assigned lasting existence for ever. He did this so that they might know their Maker, his power and his wisdom, and follow law and justice. In this way they might live through the ages, free from toil, together with the things by which they strengthened their former life, even though they lived in perishable, earthly bodies.
Translator’s note. The last clause is difficult; the Greek says “together with those things by which they strengthened their former life,” which probably refers to what has just been named: knowledge of their Maker, and law and justice.
Scripture: Genesis 1:26-27
Ὁπόσα μὲν γὰρ ἄλλου του χάριν γέγονεν, παυσαμένων ἐκείνων ὧν ἕνεκεν γέγονε, παύσεται εἰκότως καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ γενόμενα τοῦ εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ ἂν διαμένοι μάτην, ὡς ἂν μηδεμίαν ἐν τοῖς ὑπὸ θεοῦ γενομένοις τοῦ ματαίου χώραν ἔχοντος· τά γε μὴν δι᾿ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι καὶ ζῆν καθὼς πέφυκε γενόμενα, ὡς αὐτῆς τῆς αἰτίας τῇ φύσει συνειλημμένης καὶ κατ᾿ αὐτὸ μόνον τὸ εἶναι θεωρουμένης, οὐδεμίαν οὐδέποτε δέξαιτ᾿ ἂν τὴν τὸ εἶναι παντελῶς ἀφανίζουσαν αἰτίαν. Ταύτης δὲ ἐν τῷ εἶναι πάντοτε θεωρουμένης, δεῖ σώζεσθαι πάντως καὶ τὸ γενόμενον ζῶον, ἐνεργοῦν τε καὶ πάσχον ἃ πέφυκεν, ἑκατέρου τούτων ἐξ ὧν γέγονε τὰ παρ᾿ ἑαυτοῦ συνεισφέροντος, καὶ τῆς μὲν ψυχῆς οὔσης τε καὶ διαμενούσης ὁμαλῶς ἐν ᾗ γέγονε φύσει, καὶ διαπονούσης ἃ πέφυκεν (πέφυκε δὲ ταῖς τοῦ σώματος ἐπιστατεῖν ὁρμαῖς καὶ τὸ προσπίπτον ἀεὶ τοῖς προσήκουσι κρίνειν καὶ μετρεῖν κριτηρίοις καὶ μέτροις), τοῦ δὲ σώματος κινουμένου κατὰ φύσιν πρὸς ἃ πέφυκεν, καὶ τὰς ἀποκληρωθείσας αὐτῷ δεχομένου μεταβολάς, μετὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας ἢ κατ᾿ εἶδος ἢ μέγεθος τὴν ἀνάστασιν. Εἶδος γάρ τι μεταβολῆς, καὶ πάντων ὕστατον, ἡ ἀνάστασις ἥ τε τῶν κατ᾿ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον περιόντων ἔτι πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον μεταβολή.
For whatever has been created for the sake of something else, when that has ceased to be for the sake of which it was created, will itself also fitly cease to be, and will not continue to exist in vain, since, among the works of God, that which is useless can have no place; but that which was created for the very purpose of existing and living a life naturally suited to it, since the cause itself is bound up with its nature, and is recognised only in connection with existence itself, can never admit of any cause which shall utterly annihilate its existence. But since this cause is seen to lie in perpetual existence, the being so created must be preserved for ever, doing and experiencing what is suitable to its nature, each of the two parts of which it consists contributing what belongs to it, so that the soul may exist and remain without change in the nature in which it was made, and discharge its appropriate functions (such as presiding over the impulses of the body, and judging of and measuring that which occurs from time to time by the proper standards and measures), and the body be moved according to its nature towards its appropriate objects, and undergo the changes allotted to it, and, among the rest (relating to age, or appearance, or size), the resurrection. For the resurrection is a species of change, and the last of all, and a change for the better of what still remains in existence at that time.
Whatever has been made for the sake of something else will naturally cease to exist once the thing it was made for has ceased. It would not go on existing in vain, since nothing useless has a place among the works of God. But things made for the sake of existing and living according to their nature are different. Their purpose is bound up with their nature and is seen only in their very existence, so they could never admit any cause that would wipe out their existence altogether. And since this purpose is always seen in existing, the living being that has been made must be preserved without fail, doing and experiencing what is natural to it. Each of the two parts of which it was made contributes its own share. The soul exists and remains unchanged in the nature in which it was made, and does the work natural to it. It is natural for the soul to govern the impulses of the body, and to judge and measure whatever comes upon it by the proper standards and measures. The body moves according to nature toward the things natural to it, and undergoes the changes allotted to it. These include changes of age, of appearance and of size, and along with them the resurrection. For the resurrection is a kind of change, and the last of all. So too is the change for the better of those who are still alive at that time.
Translator’s note. The last sentence names two final changes: the resurrection of the dead, and the transformation of those still living when it happens; this echoes Paul in 1 Corinthians 15:51–52 (“we will not all sleep, but we will all be changed”) and 1 Thessalonians 4:15–17.
Scripture: 1 Corinthians 15:51-52
Chapter 13
Ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις τεθαῤῥηκότες, οὐ μεῖον ἢ τοῖς ἤδη γενομένοις, καὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἐπισκοποῦντες φύσιν, τήν τε μετ᾿ ἐνδείας καὶ φθορᾶς ζωὴν στέργομεν, ὡς τῷ παρόντι βίῳ προσήκουσαν, καὶ τὴν ἐν ἐφθαρσίᾳ διαμονὴν ἐλπίζομεν βεβαίως· ἣν οὐ παρ᾿ ἀνθρώπων ἀναπλάττομεν μάτην, ψευδέσιν ἑαυτοὺς βουκολοῦντες ἐλπίσιν, ἀπλανεστάτῳ δὲ πεπιστεύκαμεν ἐχεγγύῳ, τῇ τοῦ δημιουργήσαντος ἡμᾶς γνώμῃ, καθ᾿ ἣν ἐποίησεν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ ψυχῆς ἀθανάτου καὶ σώματος, νοῦν τε συγκατεσκεύασεν αὐτῷ καὶ νόμον ἔμφυτον ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ καὶ φυλακῇ τῶν παρ᾿ αὐτοῦ δεδομένων, ἔμφρονί τε βίῳ καὶ ζωῇ λογικῇ προσηκόντων, εὖ εἰδότες ὡς οὐκ ἂν τοιοῦτον κατεσκεύασε ζῶον καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς πρὸς διαμονὴν ἐκόσμησεν, εἰ μὴ διαμένειν ἐβούλετο τὸ γενόμενον. Εἰ τοίνυν ὁ τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς δημιουργὸς ἐποίησεν ἄνθρωπον ἐπὶ τῷ ζωῆς ἔμφρονος μετασχεῖν, καὶ γενόμενον θεωρὸν τῆς τε μεγαλοπρεπείας αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ πᾶσι σοφίας τῇ τούτων συνδιαμένειν ἀεὶ θεωρίᾳ, κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου γνώμην καὶ καθ᾿ ἣν εἴληχε φύσιν, ἡ μὲν τῆς γενέσεως αἰτία πιστοῦται τὴν εἰς ἀεὶ διαμονήν, ἡ δὲ διαμονὴ τὴν ἀνάστασιν, ἧς χωρὶς οὐκ ἂν διαμείνειεν ἄνθρωπος.
Continuation of the Argument.Confident of these things, no less than of those which have already come to pass, and reflecting on our own nature, we are content with a life associated with neediness and corruption, as suited to our present state of existence, and we stedfastly hope for a continuance of being in immortality; and this we do not take without foundation from the inventions of men, feeding ourselves on false hopes, but our belief rests on a most infallible guarantee-the purpose of Him who fashioned us, according to which He made man of an immortal soul and a body, and furnished him with understanding and an innate law for the preservation and safeguard of the things given by Him as suitable to an intelligent existence and a rational life: for we know well that He would not have fashioned such a being, and furnished him with everything belonging to perpetuity, had He not intended that what was so created should continue in perpetuity. If, therefore, the Maker of this universe made man with a view to his partaking of an intelligent life, and that, having become a spectator of His grandeur, and of the wisdom which is manifest in all things, he might continue always in the contemplation of these; then, according to the purpose of his Author, and the nature which he has received, the cause of his creation is a pledge of his continuance for ever, and this continuance is a pledge of the resurrection, without which man could not continue.
Confident of these things, no less than of what has already happened, and looking at our own nature, we accept a life of want and decay as fitting for our present existence. And we firmly hope for a life that continues in incorruption. We do not idly make up this hope out of human ideas, deceiving ourselves with false hopes. We believe it on a guarantee that cannot mislead: the purpose of the one who made us. According to that purpose he made man from an immortal soul and a body. He fitted him with a mind and an innate law, to save and guard the gifts he had given, which belong to a sensible way of life and a rational existence. We know well that he would not have made such a living being, and adorned him with everything needed for lasting, unless he wanted what he made to last. So the maker of this whole universe made man to share in a life of understanding. Having become an observer of God’s magnificence and of his wisdom in all things, man was to remain always in the contemplation of them. If that is so, then, in keeping with God’s purpose and with the nature man has received, the reason for man’s creation guarantees that he will last forever. And his lasting forever guarantees the resurrection, without which man could not last.
Ἐκ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων εὔδηλον ὡς τῇ τῆς γενέσεως αἰτίᾳ καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ τοῦ ποιήσαντος δείκνυται σαφῶς ἡ ἀνάστασις. Τοιαύτης δὲ τῆς αἰτίας οὔσης, καθ᾿ ἣν εἰς τόνδε παρῆκται τὸν κόσμον ἄνθρωπος, ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἴη τὸν τούτοις κατὰ φύσιν ἢ καθ᾿ εἱρμὸν ἑπόμενον διασκέψασθαι λόγον· ἕπεται δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐξέτασιν τῇ μὲν αἰτίᾳ τῆς γενέσεως ἡ τῶν γεννηθέντων ἀνθρώπων φύσις, τῇ δὲ φύσει τῶν γενομένων ἡ τοῦ ποιήσαντος ἐπὶ τούτοις δικαία κρίσις, τούτοις τε πᾶσι τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος. Ἐξητασμένων δὲ ἡμῖν τῶν προτεταγμένων ἐπισκεπτέον ἑξῆς τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν.
So that, from what has been said, it is quite clear that the resurrection is plainly proved by the cause of man's creation, and the purpose of Him who made him. Such being the nature of the cause for which man has been brought into this world, the next thing will be to consider that which immediately follows, naturally or in the order proposed; and in our investigation the cause of their creation is followed by the nature of the men so created, and the nature of those created by the just judgment of their Maker upon them, and all these by the end of their existence. Having investigated therefore the point placed first in order, we must now go on to consider the nature of men.
From what has been said it is quite clear that the resurrection is plainly shown by the reason for man’s creation and by the purpose of the one who made him. Since this is the reason for which man was brought into this world, the next step is to examine the argument that follows from it, either by nature or in sequence. In our inquiry, the nature of the human beings who were born comes after the reason for their creation. The just judgment of their maker upon them comes after the nature of those he made. And the end of life comes after all of these. Now that we have examined the point placed first, we must next look at the nature of human beings.
Chapter 14
Ἡ τῶν τῆς ἀληθείας δογμάτων ἢ τῶν ὁπωσοῦν εἰς ἐξέτασιν προβαλλομένων ἀπόδειξις, τὴν ἀπλανῆ τοῖς λεγομένοις ἐπιφέρουσα πίστιν, οὐκ ἔξωθέν ποθεν ἔχει τὴν ἀρχήν, οὐδ᾿ ἐκ τῶν τισι δοκούντων ἢ δεδογμένων, ἀλλ᾿ ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς καὶ φυσικῆς ἐννοίας ἢ τῆς πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα τῶν δευτέρων ἀκολουθίας. Ἤ γὰρ περὶ τῶν πρώτων ἐστὶ δογμάτων, καὶ δεῖ μόνης ὑπομνήσεως τῆς τὴν φυσικὴν ἀνακινούσης ἔννοιαν, ἢ περὶ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἑπομένων τοῖς πρώτοις καὶ τῆς φυσικῆς ἀκολουθίας, καὶ δεῖ τῆς ἐπὶ τούτοις τάξεως, δεικνύντας τί τοῖς πρώτοις ἢ τοῖς προτεταγμένοις ἀκολουθεῖ κατ᾿ ἀλήθειαν, ἐπὶ τὸ μήτε τῆς ἀληθείας ἢ τῆς κατ᾿ αὐτὴν ἀσφαλείας ἀμελεῖν, μήτε τὰ τῇ φύσει τεταγμένα καὶ διωρισμένα συγχεῖν ἢ τὸν φυσικὸν εἱρμὸν διασπᾶν.
The Resurrection Does Not Rest Solely on the Fact of a Future Judgment.The proof of the several doctrines of which the truth consists, or of any marten whatsoever proposed for examination, if it is to produce an unwavering confidence in what is said, must begin, not from anything without, nor from what certain persons think or have thought, but from the common and natural notion of the matter, or from the connection of secondary troths with primary ones. For the question relates either to primary beliefs, and then all that is necessary is reminiscence, so as to stir up the natural notion; or to things which naturally follow from the first and to their natural sequence. And in these things we must observe order, showing what strictly follows from the first truths, or from those which are placed first, so as neither to be unmindful of the truth, or of our certainty respecting it, nor to confound the things arranged by nature and distinguished from each other, or break up the natural order.
The proof of the teachings of the truth, or of any matter put forward for examination, is what brings unwavering confidence in what is said. It does not begin from anywhere outside, nor from what some people think or have decided. It begins from the common and natural understanding of the matter, or from the way later points follow from the first ones. For the question concerns either first principles, and then all that is needed is a reminder that stirs up the natural understanding. Or it concerns what naturally follows from the first principles, and their natural sequence, and then we need proper order in dealing with them. We must show what truly follows from the first points, or from those placed first. In this way we neither neglect the truth and our certainty about it, nor confuse what nature has arranged and distinguished, nor break up the natural chain of reasoning.
Ὅθεν οἶμαι χρῆναι δίκαιον περὶ τῶν προκειμένων ἐσπουδακότας, καὶ κρίνειν ἐμφρόνως θέλοντας εἴτε γίνεται τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων σωμάτων ἀνάστασις εἴτε μή, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπισκοπεῖν καλῶς τῶν πρὸς τὴν τοῦδε δεῖξιν συντελούντων τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ ποίαν ἕκαστον εἴληχε χώραν, καὶ τί μὲν τούτων πρῶτον τί δὲ δεύτερον τί δὲ τρίτον τί δὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὕστατον. Ταῦτα δὲ διαταξαμένους χρὴ πρώτην μὲν τάξαι τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων γενέσεως, τοῦτ᾿ ἔστι τὴν τοῦ δημιουργήσαντος γνώμην καθ᾿ ἣν ἐποίησεν ἄνθρωπον, ταύτῃ δὲ προσφυῶς ἐπισυνάψαι τὴν τῶν γενομένων ἀνθρώπων φύσιν, οὐχ ὡς τῇ τάξει δευτερεύουσαν, διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἀμφοτέρων γενέσθαι τὴν κρίσιν, κἂν ὅτι μάλιστα συνυπάρχωσιν ἀλλήλαις καὶ πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον τὴν ἴσην παρέχωνται δύναμιν.
Hence I think it behoves those who desire to handle the subject with fairness, and who wish to form an intelligent judgment whether there is a resurrection or not, first to consider attentively the force of the arguments contributing to the proof of this, and what place each of them holds-which is first, which second, which third, and which last. And in the arrangement of these they should place tint the cause of the creation of men,-namely, the purpose of the Creator in making man; and then connect with this, as is suitable, the nature of the men so created; not as being second in order, but because we are unable to pass our judgment on both at the same time, although they have the closest natural connection with each other, and are of equal force in reference to the subject before us.
For this reason I think that those who take the matter seriously and fairly, and who want to judge sensibly whether there is a resurrection of human bodies or not, should first consider carefully the force of the arguments that help to prove it, and what place each one holds: which is first, which second, which third, and which last. When they have put these in order, they should place first the cause of the creation of human beings, that is, the purpose of the Creator in making man. Next they should fittingly join to this the nature of the human beings who were made. They do not join it because it is second in order. They join it because we cannot pass judgment on both at once, even though the two very much exist together and carry equal weight for the question before us.
Διὰ δὲ τούτων, ὡς πρώτων καὶ τὴν ἐκ δημιουργίας ἐχόντων ἀρχήν, ἐναργῶς δεικνυμένης τῆς ἀναστάσεως, οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ διὰ τῶν τῆς προνοίας λόγων ἔστι λαβεῖν τὴν περὶ ταύτης πίστιν, λέγω δὲ διὰ τῆς ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὀφειλομένης κατὰ δικαίαν κρίσιν τιμῆς ἢ δίκης καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον τέλους. Πολλοὶ γὰρ τὸν τῆς ἀναστάσεως λόγον διαλαμβάνοντες τῷ τρίτῳ μόνῳ τὴν πᾶσαν ἐπήρεισαν αἰτίαν, νομίσαντες τὴν αἰτίαν γίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν κρίσιν. Τοῦτο δὲ περιφανῶς δείκνυται ψεῦδος ἐκ τοῦ πάντας μὲν ἀνίστασθαι τοὺς ἀποθνήσκοντας ἀνθρώπους, μὴ πάντας δὲ κρίνεσθαι τοὺς ἀναστάντας· εἰ γὰρ μόνον τὸ κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν δίκαιον τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἦν αἴτιον, ἐχρῆν δήπου τοὺς μηδὲν ἡμαρτηκότας ἢ κατορθώσαντας μηδ᾿ ἀνίστασθαι, τοῦτ᾿ ἔστι τοὺς κομιδῆ νέους παῖδας· ἐξὸν δὲ πάντας ἀνίστασθαι, τούς τε ἄλλους καὶ δὴ καὶ τοὺς κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἡλικίαν τελευτήσαντας, καὶ αὐτοὶ δικαιοῦσιν ὡς οὐ διὰ τὴν κρίσιν ἡ ἀνάστασις γίνεται κατὰ πρῶτον λόγον, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν τοῦ δημιουργήσαντος γνώμην καὶ τὴν τῶν δημιουργηθέντων φύσιν.
But while from these proofs as the primary ones, and as being derived from the work of creation, the resurrection is clearly demonstrated, none the less can we gain conviction respecting it from the arguments taken from providence,-I mean from the reward or punishment due to each man in accordance with just judgment, and from the end of human existence. For many, in discussing the subject of the resurrection, have rested the whole cause on the third argument alone, deeming that the cause of the resurrection is the judgment. But the fallacy of this is very clearly shown, from the fact that, although all human beings who die rise again, yet not all who rise again are to be judged: for if only a just judgment were the cause of the resurrection, it would of course follow that those who had done neither evil nor good-namely, very young children -would not rise again; but seeing that all are to rise again, those who have died in infancy as well as others, they too justify our conclusion that the resurrection takes place not for the sake of the judgment as the primary reason, but in consequence of the purpose of God in forming men, and the nature of the beings so formed.
These first arguments, which have their starting point in creation, clearly demonstrate the resurrection. Even so, we can also gain confidence about it from the arguments about providence. I mean the honor or penalty owed to each person by a just judgment, and the end of human life. Many who discuss the resurrection have rested the whole case on the third argument alone, supposing that judgment is the cause of the resurrection. But this is plainly shown to be false, because all people who die rise again, yet not all who rise are judged. If the justice of judgment were the only cause of the resurrection, then surely those who have done neither wrong nor right, that is, very young children, ought not to rise at all. But all are to rise, including those who died in earliest childhood. So these children themselves show that the resurrection does not happen first of all because of the judgment. It happens because of the purpose of the Creator and the nature of the creatures he made.
Chapter 15
Ἀρκούσης δὲ καὶ μόνης τῆς ἐπὶ τῇ γενέσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων θεωρουμένης αἰτίας δεῖξαι τὴν ἀνάστασιν κατὰ φυσικὴν ἀκολουθίαν ἑπομένην τοῖς διαλυθεῖσι σώμασι, δίκαιον ἴσως πρὸς μηδὲν ἀποκνῆσαι τῶν προτεθέντων, ἀκολούθως δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις καὶ τὰς ἐξ ἑκάστου τῶν ἑπομένων ἀφορμὰς ὑποδεῖξαι τοῖς ἐξ αὐτῶν συνιδεῖν μὴ δυναμένοις, καὶ πρό γε τῶν ἄλλων τὴν τῶν γενομένων ἀνθρώπων φύσιν, ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἄγουσαν ἔννοιαν καὶ τὴν ἴσην παρέχουσαν περὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως πίστιν. Εἰ γὰρ πᾶσα κοινῶς ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσις ἐκ ψυχῆς ἀθανάτου καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῇ συναρμοσθέντος σώματος ἔχει τὴν σύστασιν, καὶ μήτε τῇ φύσει τῆς ψυχῆς καθ᾿ ἑαυτὴν μήτε τῇ φύσει τοῦ σώματος χωρὶς ἀπεκλήρωσε θεὸς τὴν τοιάνδε γένεσιν ἢ τὴν ζωὴν καὶ τὸν σύμπαντα βίον, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐκ τούτων γενομένοις ἀνθρώποις, ἵν᾿ ἐξ ὧν γεννῶνται καὶ ζῶσι διαβιώσαντες εἰς ἕν τι καὶ κοινὸν καταλήξωσι τέλος, δεῖ πάντως ἑνὸς ὄντος ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ζώου, τοῦ καὶ πάσχοντος ὁπόσα πάθη ψυχῆς καὶ ὁπόσα τοῦ σώματος, ἐνεργοῦντός τε καὶ πράττοντος ὁπόσα τῆς αἰσθητικῆς ἢ τῆς λογικῆς δεῖται κρίσεως, πρὸς ἕν τι τέλος ἀναφέρεσθαι πάντα τὸν ἐκ τούτων εἱρμόν, ἵνα πάντα καὶ διὰ πάντων συντρέχῃ πρὸς μίαν ἁρμονίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν συμπάθειαν, ἀνθρώπου γένεσις, ἀνθρώπου φύσις, ἀνθρώπου ζωή, ἀνθρώπου πράξεις καὶ πάθη, καὶ βίος καὶ τὸ τῇ φύσει προσῆκον τέλος.
Argument for the Resurrection from the Nature of Man.But while the cause discoverable in the creation of men is of itself sufficient to prove that the resurrection follows by natural sequence on the dissolution of bodies, yet it is perhaps right not to shrink from adducing either of the proposed arguments, but, agreeably to what has been said, to point out to those who are not able of themselves to discern them, the arguments from each of the truths evolved from the primary; and first and foremost, the nature of the men created, which conducts us to the same notion, and has the same force as evidence of the resurrection. For if the whole nature of men in general is composed of an immortal soul and a body which was fitted to it in the creation, and if neither to the nature of the soul by itself, nor to the nature of the body separately, has God assigned such a creation or such a life and entire course of existence as this, but to men compounded of the two, in order that they may, when they have passed through their present existence, arrive at one common end, with the same elements of which they are composed at their birth and during life, it unavoidably follows, since one living-being is formed from the two, experiencing whatever the soul experiences and whatever the body experiences, doing and performing whatever requires the judgment of the senses or of the reason, that the whole series of these things must be referred to some one end, in order that they all, and by means of all,-namely, man's creation, man's nature, man's life, man's doings and sufferings, his course of existence, and the end suitable to his nature,-may concur in one harmony and the same common experience.
The cause seen in the creation of human beings is by itself enough to show that resurrection follows, by natural sequence, on the dissolving of bodies. Still, it is perhaps right not to hesitate over any of the points proposed. In keeping with what has been said, we should also point out the starting points that each of the following arguments provides, for those who cannot see them for themselves. First of all comes the nature of the human beings who were made. It leads to the same conclusion and gives the same assurance about the resurrection. Consider this. Human nature as a whole consists of an immortal soul and the body fitted to it at creation. God did not assign this kind of origin, or life, or whole course of existence to the soul’s nature by itself, or to the body’s nature apart from the soul. He assigned it to the human beings made from the two. He did this so that, when they have lived out their lives, they might come to one common end, made up of the same parts from which they are born and by which they live. The human being is one living creature made of both. It undergoes all the experiences of the soul and all those of the body. It acts and does whatever calls for judgment by the senses or by reason. So the whole chain of things that comes from these must be referred to one end. All of them, through every part, must come together into one harmony and one shared experience: man’s origin, man’s nature, man’s life, man’s actions and sufferings, his course of life, and the end that fits his nature.
Εἰ δὲ μία τίς ἐστιν ἁρμονία τοῦ ζώου παντὸς καὶ συμπάθεια, καὶ τῶν ἐκ ψυχῆς φυομένων καὶ τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιτελουμένων, ἓν εἶναι δεῖ καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις τέλος. Ἓν δὲ τέλος ἔσται κατ᾿ ἀλήθειαν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ζώου κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σύστασιν ὄντος, οὗπέρ ἐστι τέλος τὸ τέλος. Τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ ζῶον ἔσται καθαρῶς, τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντων πάντων ἐξ ὧν ὡς μερων τὸ ζῶον. Τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἰδιάζουσαν ἕνωσιν ἔσται, τῶν διαλυθέντων πάλιν ἑνωθέντων πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ζώου σύστασιν. Ἡ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπων σύσταστις ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑπομένην δείκνυσι τὴν τῶν νεκρωθέντων καὶ διαλυθέντων σωμάτων ἀνάστασιν· ταύτης γὰρ χωρὶς οὔτ᾿ ἂν ἑνωθείη τὰ αὐτὰ μέρη κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλήλοις, οὔτ᾿ ἂν συσταίη τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡ φύσις.
But if there is some one harmony and community of experience belonging to the whole being, whether of the things which spring from the soul or of those which are accomplished by means of the body, the end for all these must also be one. And the end will be in strictness one, if the being whose end that end is remains the same in its constitution; and the being will be exactly the same, if all those things of which the being consists as parts are the same. And they will be the same in respect of their peculiar union, if the parts dissolved are again united for the constitution of the being. And the constitution of the same men of necessity proves that a resurrection will follow of the dead and dissolved bodies; for without this, neither could the same parts be united according to nature with one another, nor could the nature of the same men be reconstituted.
But suppose there is one harmony and one shared experience for the whole living creature, covering what grows out of the soul and what is carried out through the body. Then the end of all these things must also be one. The end will be truly one if the living creature whose end it is remains the same in its makeup. The creature will be strictly the same if all the parts of which it consists are the same. And those parts will be the same, in their own proper union, if the parts that were dissolved are united again to form the creature. The reconstitution of these same human beings necessarily shows that the resurrection of dead and dissolved bodies follows. Without it, the same parts could not be united with one another according to nature, and the nature of these same human beings could not be reconstituted.
Translator’s note. “Makeup” and “reconstitution” render the Greek word sustasis, literally a “standing together.” Here it means the way the whole human being, body and soul, is put together.
Εἰ δὲ καὶ νοῦς καὶ λόγος δέδοται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρὸς διάκρισιν νοητῶν, οὐκ οὐσιῶν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς τοῦ δόντος ἀγαθότητος καὶ σοφίας καὶ δικαιοσύνης, ἀνάγκη, διαμενόντων ὧν ἕνεκεν ἡ λογικὴ δέδοται κρίσις, καὶ αὐτὴν διαμένειν τὴν ἐπὶ τούτοις δοθεῖσαν κρίσιν. Ταύτην δὲ διαμένειν ἀδύνατον, μὴ τῆς δεξαμένης αὐτὴν καὶ τῆς ἐν οἷς ἐστι διαμενούσης φύσεως. Ὁ δὲ καὶ νοῦν καὶ λόγον δεξάμενός ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, οὐ ψυχὴ καθ᾿ ἑαυτήν. Ἄνθρωπον ἄρα δεῖ τὸν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ὄντα διαμένειν εἰς ἀεί. Τοῦτον δὲ ἀδύνατον διαμένειν, μὴ ἀνιστάμενον. Ἀναστάσεως γὰρ μὴ γινομένης, οὐκ ἂν ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὡς ἀνθρώπων διαμένοι φύσις. Τῆς δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσεως μὴ διαμενούσης, μάτην μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ συνήρμοσται τῇ τοῦ σώματος ἐνδείᾳ καὶ τοῖς τούτου πάθεσι, μάτην δὲ τὸ σῶμα πεπέδηται πρὸς τὸ τυγχάνειν ὧν ὀρέγεται, ταῖς τῆς ψυχῆς ἡνίαις ὑπεῖκον καὶ χαλιναγωγούμενον, μάταιος δὲ ὁ νοῦς, ματαία δὲ φρόνησις, καὶ δικαιοσύνης παρατήρησις, ἢ καὶ πάσης ἀρετῆς ἄσκησις, καὶ νόμων θέσις καὶ διάταξις, καὶ συνόλως εἰπεῖν πᾶν ὅ τι περ ἐν ἀνθρώποις καὶ δἰ ἀνθρώπους καλόν, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡ γένεσίς τε καὶ φύσις. Εἰ δὲ πάντων καὶ πανταχόθεν ἀπελήλαται τῶν ἔργων τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τῶν ὑπ᾿ ἐκεῖνου διδομένων δωρεῶν τὸ μάταιον, δεῖ πάντως τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀτελευτήτῳ συνδιαιωνίζειν τὴν τοῦ σώματος διαμονὴν κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν.
And if both understanding and reason have been given to men for the discernment of things which are perceived by the understanding, and not of existences only, but also of the goodness and wisdom and rectitude of their Giver, it necessarily follows that, since those things continue for the sake of which the rational judgment is given, the judgment given for these things should also continue. But it is impossible for this to continue, unless the nature which has received it, and in which it adheres, continues. But that which has received both understanding and reason is man, not the soul by itself. Man, therefore, who consists of the two parts, must continue for ever. But it is impossible for him to continue unless he rise again. For if no resurrection were to take place, the nature of men as men would not continue. And if the nature of men does not continue, in vain has the soul been fitted to the need of the body and to its experiences; in vain has the body been lettered so that it cannot obtain what it longs for, obedient to the reins of the soul, and guided by it as with a bridle; in vain is the understanding, in vain is wisdom, and the observance of rectitude, or even the practice of every virtue, and the enactment and enforcement of laws,-to say all in a word, whatever is noble in men or for men's sake, or rather the very creation and nature of men. But if vanity is utterly excluded from all the works of God, and from all the gifts bestowed by Him, the conclusion is unavoidable, that, along with the interminable duration of the soul, there will be a perpetual continuance of the body according to its proper nature.
Human beings have also been given mind and reason, so that they can discern things grasped by the mind. These include not only what exists but also the goodness, wisdom and justice of the One who gave these gifts. Now the things for which rational judgment was given continue to exist. So the judgment given for them must continue too. But this judgment cannot continue unless the nature that received it, the nature in which it dwells, continues. The one who received both mind and reason is the human being, not the soul by itself. So the human being, who consists of both, must continue forever. But a human being cannot continue unless he rises again. If there is no resurrection, human nature as human nature would not continue. And if human nature does not continue, then the soul has been joined in vain to the body’s needs and experiences. In vain the body has been held back from getting what it craves, yielding to the soul’s reins and guided by its bridle. In vain is the mind, in vain is wisdom, in vain the keeping of justice and the practice of every virtue, in vain the making and ordering of laws. In short, everything good that is in human beings or done for their sake is in vain, and even more, the very creation and nature of human beings. But emptiness has been driven out entirely, in every way, from all God’s works and from the gifts he gives. So the body must last forever, according to its own nature, together with the soul’s endless existence.
Chapter 16
Ξενιζέσθω δὲ μηδεὶς εἰ τὴν θανάτῳ καὶ φθορᾷ διακοπτομένην ζωὴν ὀνομάζομεν διαμονήν, λογιζόμενος ὡς οὐχ εἷς τοῦ προσρήματος ὁ λόγος, οὐχ ἓν τῆς διαμονῆς τὸ μέτρον, ὅτι μηδὲ τῶν διαμενόντων φύσις μία. Εἴπερ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν ἕκαστον τῶν διαμενόντων ἔχει τὴν διαμονήν, οὔτ᾿ ἐπὶ τῶν καθαρῶς ἀφθάρτων καὶ ἀθανάτων εὕροι τις ἂν ἰσάζουσαν τὴν διαμονήν, τῷ μηδὲ τὰς οὐσίας τῶν κρειττόνων συνεξισοῦσθαι ταῖς καθ᾿ ὑπόβασιν διαφερούσαις, οὔτ᾿ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὴν ὁμαλὴν ἐκείνην τὴν ἀμετάβλητον ἐπιζητεῖν ἄξιον, ἅτε δὴ τῶν μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γενομένων ἀθανάτων καὶ διαμενόντων μόνῃ τῇ γνώμῃ τοῦ ποιήσαντος ἀτελευτήτως, τῶν δὲ ἀνθρώπων κατὰ μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἐχόντων τὴν ἀμετάβλητον διαμονήν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ σῶμα προσλαμβανόντων ἐκ μεταβολῆς τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν· ὅπερ ὁ τῆς ἀναστάσεως λόγος βούλεται· πρὸς ἣν ἀποβλέποντες, τήν τε διάλυσιν τοῦ σώματος, ὡς ἑπομένην τῇ μετ᾿ ἐνδείας καὶ φθορᾶς ζωῇ, περιμένομεν, καὶ μετὰ ταύτην τὴν μετ᾿ ἀφθαρσίας ἐλπίζομεν διαμονήν, οὔτε τῇ τῶν ἀλόγων τελευτῇ συνεξισοῦντες τὴν ἡμετέραν τελευτήν, οὔτε τῇ τῶν ἀθανάτων διαμονῇ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαμονήν, ἵνα μὴ λάθωμεν ταύτῃ συνεξισοῦντες καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν καὶ ζωὴν οἷς μὴ προσῆκεν.
Analogy of Death and Sleep, and Consequent Argument for the Resurrection.And let no one think it strange that we call by the name of life a continuance of being which is interrupted by death and corruption; but let him consider rather that this word has not one meaning only, nor is there only one measure of continuance, because the nature also of the things that continue is not one. For if each of the things that continue has its continuance according to its peculiar nature, neither in the case of those who are wholly incorruptible and immortal shall we find the continuance like ours, because the natures of superior beings do not take the level of such as are inferior; nor in men is it proper to look for a continuance invariable and unchangeable; in as much as the former are from the first created immortal, and continue to exist without end by the simple will of their Maker, and men, in respect of the soul, have from their first origin an unchangeable continuance, but in respect of the body obtain immortality by means of change. This is what is meant by the doctrine of the resurrection; and, looking to this, we both await the dissolution of the body, as the sequel to a life of want and corruption, and after this we hope for a continuance with immortality, not putting either our death on a level with the death of the irrational animals, or the continuance of man with the continuance of immortals, lest we should unawares in this way put human nature and life on a level with things with which it is not proper to compare them.
Let no one be surprised that we call a life that is cut off by death and decay a “continuance.” Consider that this word does not have only one meaning, and that there is not only one measure of continuing, because the nature of the things that continue is not one. Each thing that continues has its continuance according to its own nature. So the continuance of the purely incorruptible and immortal beings is not equal to that of beings below them, since the natures of higher beings are not put on the same level as those that stand lower. Nor is it right to look among human beings for that even, unchanging kind of continuance. The immortal beings were made immortal from the beginning and continue without end by the will of their Maker alone. Human beings, on the other hand, have an unchanging continuance in the soul from their birth, but in the body they receive incorruption through a change. This is what the doctrine of the resurrection means. With this in view, we expect the body to be dissolved, since that follows a life of want and decay. After this we hope for a continuance in incorruption. We do not put our death on a level with the death of the irrational animals, nor the continuance of human beings with the continuance of immortal beings. Otherwise we would unknowingly put human nature and life on a level with things that do not belong with it.
Οὐ τοίνυν ἐπὶ τούτῳ δυσχεραίνειν ἄξιον, εἴ τις ἀνωμαλία θεωρεῖται περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαμονήν, οὐδ᾿ ἐπειδὴ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος μερῶν καὶ μορίων διάλυσις τὴν συνεχῆ διακόπτει ζωήν, διὰ τοῦτ᾿ ἀπογινώσκειν χρὴ τὴν ἀνάστασιν. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπειδὴ τὴν κατὰ συναίσθησιν ζωὴν διακόπτειν δοκοῦσιν αἱ κατὰ τὸν ὕπνον φυσικῶς ἐγγινόμεναι παρέσεις τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν δυνάμεων, ἰσομέτροις χρόνου διαστήμασιν ὑπνούντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τρόπον τινὰ πάλιν ἀναβιωσκόντων, τὴν αὐτὴν παραιτούμεθα ζωὴν λέγειν· παρ᾿ ἣν αἰτίαν, οἶμαι, τινὲς ἀδελφὸν τοῦ θανάτου τὸν ὕπνον ὀνομάζουσιν, οὐχ ὡς ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν προγόνων ἢ πατέρων φύντας γενεαλογοῦντες, ἀλλ᾿ ὡς τῶν ὁμοίων παθῶν τοῖς τε θανοῦσι καὶ τοῖς ὑπνοῦσιν ἐγγινομένων, ἕνεκά γε τῆς ἠρεμίας καὶ τοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπαισθάνεσθαι τῶν παρόντων ἢ γινομένων, μᾶλλον δὲ μηδὲ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τῆς ἰδίας ζωῆς.
It ought not, therefore, to excite dissatisfaction, if some inequality appears to exist in regard to the duration of men; nor, because the separation of the soul from the members of the body and the dissolution of its parts interrupts the continuity of life, must we therefore despair of the resurrection. For although the relaxation of the senses and of the physical powers, which naturally takes place in sleep, seems to interrupt the sensational life when men sleep at equal intervals of time, and, as it were, come back to life again, yet we do not refuse to call it life; and for this reason, I suppose, some call sleep the brother of death, not as deriving their origin from the same ancestors and fathers, but because those who are dead and those who sleep are subject to similar states, as regards at least the stillness and the absence of all sense of the present or the past, or rather of existence itself and their own life.
So we should not be troubled if some unevenness is seen in the continuance of human beings. Nor should we give up hope of the resurrection because the soul’s separation from the parts of the body, and the breaking up of its members, cuts off continuous life. For the loss of sensation and of natural powers that happens naturally in sleep seems to cut off the life of conscious awareness. People sleep at regular intervals of time and in a way come back to life again. Yet we do not refuse to call it the same life. For this reason, I think, some call sleep the brother of death. They do not mean that the two come from the same ancestors or fathers. They mean that like conditions come upon the dead and the sleeping, because of the stillness and because they feel nothing of what is present or happening, or rather not even their own existence and life.
Translator’s note. Calling sleep the brother of death goes back to Greek poetry. Homer calls Sleep “the brother of Death” (Iliad 14.231), and Hesiod makes both children of Night (Theogony 211–212). That is why the author says he does not mean they share the same parents.
Εἴπερ οὖν τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ζωὴν τοσαύτης γέμουσαν ἀνωμαλίας ἀπὸ γενέσεως μέχρι διαλύσεως, καὶ διακοπτομένην πᾶσιν οἷς προείπομεν, οὐ παραιτούμεθα τὴν αὐτὴν λέγειν ζωήν, οὐδὲ τὴν ἐπέκεινα τῆς διαλύσεως ζωήν, ἥτις ἑαυτῇ συνεισάγει τὴν ἀνάστασιν, ἀπογινώσκειν ὀφείλομεν, κἂν ἐπὶ ποσὸν διακόπτηται τῷ χωρισμῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος.
If, therefore, we do not refuse to call by the name of life the life of men full of such inequality from birth to dissolution, and interrupted by all those things which we have before mentioned, neither ought we to despair of the life succeeding to dissolution, such as involves the resurrection, although for a time it is interrupted by the separation of the soul from the body.
So if we do not refuse to call the life of human beings the same life, though it is full of such unevenness from birth to dissolution and is interrupted by all the things we have mentioned, then we must not give up hope of the life beyond dissolution. That life brings the resurrection with it, even if for a time it is interrupted by the soul’s separation from the body.
Chapter 17
Αὕτη γὰρ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡ φύσις, ἄνωθεν καὶ κατὰ γνώμην τοῦ ποιήσαντος συγκεκληρωμένην ἔχουσα τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν, ἀνώμαλον ἔχει τὴν ζωὴν καὶ τὴν διαμονήν, ποτὲ μὲν ὕπνῳ ποτὲ δὲ θανάτῳ διακοπτομένην καὶ ταῖς καθ᾿ ἑκάστην ἡλικίαν μεταβολαῖς, οὐκ ἐμφαινομένων ἐναργῶς τοῖς πρώτοις τῶν ὕστερον ἐπιγινομένων. Ἢ τίς ἂν ἐπίστευσεν, μὴ τῇ πείρᾳ δεδιδαγμένος, ἐν ὁμοιομερεῖ καὶ διαπλάστῳ τῷ σπέρματι τοσούτων καὶ τηλικούτων ἀποκεῖσθαι δυνάμεων ἢ τῶν ταύτῃ ἐπισυνισταμένων καὶ πηγνυμένων ὄγκων διαφοράν, ὀστέων φημὶ καὶ νεύρων καὶ χόνδρων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ μυῶν καὶ σαρκῶν καὶ σπλάγχνων καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν τοῦ σώματος μερῶν; Οὔτε γὰρ ἐν ὑγροῖς ἔτι τοῖς σπέρμασι τούτων ἔστιν ἰδεῖν οὐδέν, οὔτε μὴν τοῖς νηπίοις ἐμφαίνεταί τι τῶν τοῖς τελείοις ἐπιγινομένων, ἢ τῇ τῶν τελείων ἡλικίᾳ τὰ τῶν παρηβηκότων, ἢ τούτοις τὰ τῶν γεγηρακότων.
The Series of Changes We Can Now Trace in Man Renders a Resurrection Probable.For this nature of men, which has inequality allotted to it from the first, and according to the purpose of its Maker, has an unequal life and continuance, interrupted sometimes by sleep, at another time by death, and by the changes incident to each period of life, whilst those which follow the first are not clearly seen beforehand. Would any one have believed, unless taught by experience, that in the soft seed alike in all its parts there was deposited such a variety and number of great powers, or of masses, which in this way arise and become consolidated-I mean of bones, and nerves, and cartilages, of muscles too, and flesh, and intestines, and the other parts of the body? For neither in the yet moist seed is anything of this kind to be seen, nor even in infants do any of those things make their appearance which pertain to adults, or in the adult period what belongs to those who are past their prime, or in these what belongs to such as have grown old.
Human nature has had this inequality assigned to it from the beginning, according to the purpose of its Maker. So human life and its duration are uneven. Life is broken off sometimes by sleep and sometimes by death. It is also broken by the changes of each stage of life, and what comes later is not plainly visible in the earlier stages. Who would have believed, unless experience had taught him, that so many great powers lie stored in seed that is soft and uniform? Or that so many different masses form and harden from it: bones, sinews and cartilage, and also muscles, flesh, internal organs and the other parts of the body? For none of these can be seen while the seed is still fluid. Nor does an infant show anything of what belongs to the grown person, nor the grown person anything of what belongs to those past their prime, nor these anything of what belongs to the old.
Translator’s note. “Soft and uniform” renders two Greek words meaning “of like parts” and “moldable.” The point is that the seed looks the same throughout and shows no visible structure.
Ἀλλὰ δὴ καίτοι τῶν εἰρημένων τινῶν μὲν οὔθ᾿ ὅλως τινῶν δὲ ἀμυδρῶς ἐμφαινόντων τὴν φυσικὴν ἀκολουθίαν καὶ τὰς τῇ φύσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιγινομένας μεταβολάς, ὅμως ἴσασιν ὅσοι μὴ τυφλώττουσιν ὑπὸ κακίας ἢ ῥαθυμίας περὶ τὴν τούτων κρίσιν, ὅτι δεῖ πρῶτον μὲν γενέσθαι τῶν σπερμάτων καταβολήν, διαρθρωθέντων δὲ τούτων καθ᾿ ἕκαστον μέρος καὶ μόριον καὶ προελθόντων εἰς φῶς τῶν κυηθέντων ἐπιγίνεται μὲν ἡ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἡλικίαν αὔξησις, ἥ τε κατ᾿ αὔξησιν τελείωσις, τελειωθέντων δὲ ὕφεσις τῶν φυσικῶν δυνάμεων μέχρι γήρως, εἶτα πεπονηκότων τῶν σωμάτων ἡ διάλυσις. Ὥσπερ οὖν ἐπὶ τούτῳ, οὔτε τοῦ σπέρματος ἐγγεγραμμένην ἔχοντος τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ζωὴν ἢ μορφὴν οὔτε τῆς ζωῆς τὴν εἰς τὰς πρώτας ἀρχὰς διάλυσιν, ὁ τῶν φυσικῶς γενομένων εἱρμὸς παρέχει τὴν πίστιν τοῖς οὐκ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν φαινομένων ἔχουσι τὸ πιστόν, πολὺ μᾶλλον ὁ λόγος ἐκ τῆς φυσικῆς ἀκολουθίας ἀνιχνεύων τὴν ἀλήθειαν πιστοῦται τὴν ἀνάστασιν, ἀσφαλέστερος ὢν καὶ κρείττων τῆς πείρας πρὸς πίστωσιν ἀληθείας.
But although some of the things I have said exhibit not at all, and others but faintly, the natural sequence and the changes that come upon the nature of men, yet all who are not blinded in their judgment of these matters by vice or sloth, know that there must be first the depositing of the seed, and that when this is completely organized in respect of every member and part and the progeny comes forth to the light, there comes the growth belonging to the first period of life, and the maturity which attends growth, and after the maturity the slackening of the physical powers till old age, and then, when the body is worn out, its dissolution. As, therefore, in this matter, though neither the seed has inscribed upon it the life or form of men, nor the life the dissolution into the primary elements; the succession of natural occurrences makes things credible which have no credibility from the phenomena themselves, much more does reason, tracing out the truth from the natural sequence, afford ground for believing in the resurrection, since it is safer and stronger than experience for establishing the truth.
Some of the things just mentioned give no sign at all of the natural order of events and of the changes that come upon human nature, and others give only a faint sign. Even so, everyone who is not blinded by vice or laziness in judging these things knows how it goes. First the seed must be sown. When it has been formed in every member and part and the child has come out into the light, there follows the growth of early life and the full maturity that growth leads to. After maturity the natural powers decline until old age, and then, when the body is worn out, it dissolves. Now the seed does not have written in it the life or form of the human being. Nor does life have written in it its dissolution back into its first elements. Yet in this case the sequence of natural events makes believable things that the appearances themselves do not make believable. Much more, then, does reason establish the resurrection when it traces out the truth from this natural order. Reason is a safer guide to the truth than experience, and stronger.
Chapter 18
Τῶν πρώην ἡμῖν εἰς ἐξέτασιν προτεθέντων λόγων καὶ τὴν ἀνάστασιν πιστουμένων πάντες μέν εἰσιν ὁμογενεῖς, ὡς ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς φύντες ἀρχῆς· ἀρχὴ γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἡ τῶν πρώτων ἀνθρώπων ἐκ δημιουργίας γένεσις· ἀλλ᾿ οἱ μὲν ἐξ αὐτῆς κρατύνονται τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς ἐξ ἧσπερ ἔφυσαν, οἱ δέ, παρεπόμενοι τῇ τε φύσει καὶ τῷ βίῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐκ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ ἡμᾶς προνοίας λαμβάνουσι τὴν πίστιν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἰτία, καθ᾿ ἣν καὶ δι᾿ ἣν γεγόνασιν ἄνθρωποι, συνεζευγμένη τῇ φύσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐκ δημιουργίας ἔχει τὴν ἰσχύν, ὁ δὲ τῆς δικαιοσύνης λόγος, καθ᾿ ὃν κρίνει θεὸς τοὺς εὖ ἢ κακῶς βεβιωκότας ἀνθρώπους, ἐκ τοῦ τούτων τέλους· φύονται μὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖθεν, ἤρτηνται δὲ μᾶλλον τῆς προνοίας.
Judgment Must Have Reference Both to Soul and Body: There Will Therefore Be a Resurrection.The arguments I just now proposed for examination, as establishing the truth of the resurrection, are all of the same kind, since they all start from the same point; for their starting: point is the origin of the first men by creation. But while some of them derive their strength from the starting-point itself from which they take their rise, others, consequent upon the nature and the life of men, acquire their credibility from the superintendence of God over us; for the cause according to which, and on account of which, men have come into being, being closely connected with the nature of men, derives its force from creation; but the argument from rectitude, which represents God as judging men according as they have lived well or ill, derives its force from the end of their existence: they come into being on the former ground, but their state depends more on God's superintendence.
The arguments we set out for examination a little while ago, which give assurance of the resurrection, all belong to one family, because they spring from one source. That source is the creation of the first human beings. But some of them draw their strength from that first source itself, from which they grew. Others follow the nature and the life of human beings and draw their credibility from God’s providence over us. The cause according to which and for the sake of which human beings were made is joined to human nature, and it has its strength from creation. But the argument from justice, by which God judges people who have lived well or badly, takes its strength from the end of human life. These arguments do spring from creation, but they depend more on providence.
Translator’s note. The Greek verb for “spring” (phyontai) repeats the verb used earlier in this section for the arguments springing and growing from their source, so the last sentence most naturally refers to the arguments from justice.
Δεδειγμένων δὲ ἡμῖν τῶν πρώτων ὡς οἷόν τε, καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ διὰ τῶν ὑστέρων δεῖξαι τὸ προκείμενον, λέγω δὲ διὰ τῆς ὀφειλομένης ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων κατὰ δικαίαν κρίσιν τιμῆς ἢ δίκης καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον τέλους, αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων προτάξαι τὸν κατὰ φύσιν ἡγούμενον, καὶ πρῶτόν γε διασκέψασθαι τὸν περὶ τῆς κρίσεως λόγον· τοσοῦτον μόνον ὑπειπόντας, φροντίδι τῆς προσηκούσης τοῖς προκειμένοις ἀρχῆς καὶ τάξεως, ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς ποιητὴν τὸν θεὸν τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς παραδεξαμένους τῇ τούτου σοφίᾳ καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ τὴν τῶν γενομένων ἁπάντων ἀνατιθέναι φυλακήν τε καὶ πρόνοιαν, εἴ γε ταῖς ἰδίαις ἀρχαῖς παραμένειν ἐθέλοιεν, ταῦτα δὲ περὶ τούτων φρονοῦντας μηδὲν ἡγεῖσθαι μήτε τῶν κατὰ γῆν μήτε τῶν κατ᾿ οὐρανὸν ἀνεπιτρόπευτον μηδ᾿ ἀπρονόητον, ἀλλ᾿ ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀφανὲς ὁμοίως καὶ φαινόμενον, μικρόν τε καὶ μεῖζον, διήκουσαν γινώσκειν τὴν παρὰ τοῦ ποιήσαντος ἐπιμέλειαν.
And now that the matters which come first have been demonstrated by me to the best of my ability, it will be well to prove our proposition by those also which come after-I mean by the reward or punishment due to each man in accordance with righteous judgment, and by the final cause of human existence; and of these I put foremost that which takes the lead by nature, and inquire first into the argument relating to the judgment: premising only one thing, from concern for the principle which appertains to the matters before us, and for order-namely, that it is incumbent on those who admit God to be the Maker of this universe, to ascribe to His wisdom and rectitude the preservation and care of all that has been created if they wish to keep to their own principles; and with such views to hold that nothing either in earth or in heaven is without guardianship or providence, but that; on the contrary, to everything, invisible and visible alike, small and great, the attention of the Creator reaches;
Now that we have shown the first of these as well as we could, it is fitting to prove our proposition from the later ones as well. I mean the honor or penalty owed to each person under a just judgment, and the end of human life. Of these I will put first the one that comes first by nature, and examine first the argument about the judgment. I will say only this much beforehand, for the sake of the proper starting point and order of our subject. Those who accept God as the Maker of this universe must attribute the keeping and care of everything made to his wisdom and justice, if they want to stay true to their own first principles. Holding this view, they must think that nothing on earth or in heaven is left without oversight or providence. They must recognize instead that the Creator’s care reaches to everything, unseen and seen alike, small and great.
Δεῖται γὰρ πάντα τὰ γενόμενα τῆς παρὰ τοῦ ποιήσαντος ἐπιμελείας, ἰδίως δὲ ἕκαστον καθ᾿ ὃ πέφυκε καὶ πρὸς ὃ πέφυκεν· ἀχρείου γὰρ οἶμαι φιλοτιμίας τὸ κατάγειν ἢ διαιρεῖν νῦν ἢ τὸ πρόσφορον ἑκάστῃ φύσει καταλέγειν ἐθέλειν. Ὅ γε μὴν ἄνθρωπος, περὶ οὗ νῦν πρόκειται λέγειν, ὡς μὲν ἐνδεὴς δεῖται τροφῆς, ὡς δὲ θνητὸς διαδοχῆς, ὡς δὲ λογικὸς δίκης. Εἰ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων ἕκαστόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ δεῖται μὲν τροφῆς διὰ τὴν ζωήν, δεῖται δὲ διαδοχῆς διὰ τὴν τοῦ γένους διαμονήν, δεῖται δὲ δίκης διὰ τὸ τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τῆς διαδοχῆς ἔννομον, ἀνάγκη δήπου, τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τῆς διαδοχῆς ἐπὶ τὸ συναμφότερον φερομένης, ἐπὶ τοῦτο φέρεσθαι καὶ τὴν δίκην, λέγω δὲ συναμφότερον τὸν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἄνθρωπον, καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνθρωπον γίνεσθαι πάντων τῶν πεπραγμένων ὑπόδικον, τήν τε ἐπὶ τούτοις δέχεσθαι τιμὴν ἢ τιμωρίαν.
for all created things require the attention of the Creator, and each one in particular, according to its nature and the end for which it was made: though I think it would be a useless expenditure of trouble to go through the list now, or distinguish between the several cases, or mention in detail what is suitable to each nature. Man, at all events, of whom it is now our business to speak, as being in want, requires food; as being mortal, posterity; as being rational, a process of judgment. But if each of these things belongs to man by nature, and he requires food for his life, and requires posterity for the continuance of the race, and requires a judgment in order that food and posterity may be according to law, it of course follows, since food and posterity refer to both together, that the judgment must be referred to them too (by both together I mean man, consisting of soul and body), and that such man becomes accountable for all his actions, and receives for them either reward or punishment.
For everything that has come into being needs the care of its Maker, and each thing needs it in its own way, according to what it is by nature and what it is naturally for. I think it would be a pointless show of effort to go through the list now, or to sort the cases out one by one, or to say what suits each kind of creature. But man, whom we are now to speak about, needs food because he is needy, needs succession (offspring) because he is mortal, and needs judgment because he is rational. Now suppose each of these belongs to man by nature. He needs food for the sake of life, he needs succession for the continuing of the race, and he needs judgment so that food and succession may be lawful. Then it must follow that, since food and succession apply to the two parts together, judgment must apply to them as well. By “the two together” I mean the man who is made of soul and body. Such a man must be held answerable for everything he has done, and must receive either honor or punishment for it.
Translator’s note. “Succession” translates the Greek diadochē, meaning the passing on of life to a next generation, that is, offspring or posterity.
Εἰ δὲ κατὰ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου φέρει τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς εἰργασμένοις δίκην ἡ δικαία κρίσις, καὶ μήτε τὴν ψυχὴν μόνην δεῖ κομίσασθαι τὰ ἐπίχειρα τῶν μετὰ τοῦ σώματος εἰργασμένων (ἀπροσπαθὴς γὰρ αὕτη καθ᾿ ἑαυτὴν τῶν περὶ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ἢ τροφὰς καὶ θεραπείας γινομένων πλημμελημάτων) μήτε τὸ σῶμα μόνον (ἄκριτον γὰρ τοῦτο καθ᾿ ἑαυτὸ νόμου καὶ δίκης), ὁ δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἄνθρωπος τὴν ἐφ᾿ ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰργασμένων αὐτῷ δέχεται κρίσιν, τοῦτο δὲ οὔτε κατὰ τήνδε τὴν ζωὴν εὑρίσκει συμβαῖνον ὁ λόγος (οὐ γὰρ σώζεται τὸ κατ᾿ ἀξίαν ἐν τῷ παρόντι βίῳ, διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς μὲν ἀθέους καὶ πᾶσαν ἀνομίαν καὶ κακίαν ἐπιτηδεύοντας μέχρι τελευτῆς διατελεῖν κακῶν ἀπειράτους, καὶ τοὐναντίον τοὺς κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἐξητασμένον τὸν ἑαυτῶν βίον ἐπιδειξαμένους ἐν ὀδύναις ζῆν, ἐν ἐπηρείαις, ἐν συκοφαντίαις, αἰκίαις τε καὶ παντοίαις κακοπαθείαις) οὔτε δὲ μετὰ θάνατον (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστιν ἔτι τὸ συναμφότερον, χωριζομένης μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος, σκεδαννυμένου δὲ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος εἰς ἐκεῖνα πάλιν ἐξ ὧν συνεφορήθη, καὶ μηδὲν ἔτι σώζοντος τῆς προτέρας φυῆς ἢ μορφῆς, ἤ πού γε τὴν μνήμην τῶν πεπραγμένων), εὔδηλον παντὶ τὸ λειπόμενον, ὅτι δεῖ κατὰ τὸν ἀπόστολον τὸ φθαρτὸν τοῦτο καὶ σκεδαστὸν ἐνδύσασθαι ἀφθαρσίαν, ἵνα, ζωοποιηθέντων ἐξ ἀναστάσεως τῶν νεκρωθέντων καὶ πάλιν ἑνωθέντων τῶν κεχωρισμένων ἢ καὶ πάντη διαλελυμένων, ἕκαστος κομίσηται δικαίως ἃ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔπραξεν, εἴτε ἀγαθὰ εἴτε κακά.
Now, if the righteous judgment awards to both together its retribution for the deeds wrought; and if it is not proper that either the soul alone should receive the wages of the deeds wrought in union with the body (for this of itself has no inclination to the faults which are committed in connection with the pleasure or food and culture of the body), or that the body alone should (for this of itself is incapable of distinguishing law and justice), but man, composed of these, is subjected to trial for each of the deeds wrought by him; and if reason does not find this happening either in this life (for the award according to merit finds no place in the present existence, since many atheists and persons who practise every iniquity and wickedness live on to the last, unvisited by calamity, whilst, on the contrary, those who have manifestly lived an exemplary life in respect of every Virtue, live in pain, in insult, in calumny and outrage, and suffering of all kinds) or after death (for both together no longer exist, the soul being separated from the body, and the body itself being resolved again into the materials out of which it was composed, and no longer retaining anything of its former structure or form, much less the remembrance of its actions): the result of all this is very plain to every one,-namely, that, in the language of the apostle, "this corruptible (and dissoluble) must put on incorruption," in order that those who were dead, having been made alive by the resurrection, and the parts that were separated and entirely dissolved having been again united, each one may, in accordance with justice, receive what he has done by the body, whether it be good or bad.
Now just judgment brings its penalty for deeds done upon the two together, soul and body. The soul alone should not receive the wages for what was done with the body, for by itself the soul is not drawn to the faults that arise from bodily pleasures, food and care. Nor should the body alone receive them, for by itself it cannot judge law or justice. Instead, the man made of both receives judgment for each thing he has done. Yet reason finds that this does not happen in this life. In the present life people do not get what they deserve. Many godless people practice every lawlessness and wickedness and go on to the end of life untouched by troubles. On the other hand, those who have shown a life tested in every virtue live in pain, in abuse, in slander, in beatings and in every kind of suffering. Nor does it happen after death. For the two together no longer exist: the soul is parted from the body, and the body itself is scattered back into the things it was gathered from. It keeps nothing of its former build or shape, much less any memory of what was done. So what remains is plain to everyone. As the apostle says, this perishable thing, which can be scattered, must put on imperishability. This must happen so that the dead may be made alive by resurrection, and what was separated or even wholly dissolved may be joined together again. Then each person may justly receive what he did through the body, whether good or bad.
Translator’s note. The apostle is Paul; see 1 Corinthians 15:53, “this perishable must put on imperishability.” The words “which can be scattered” (Greek skedaston) are the author’s own addition to Paul’s wording. The last clause echoes 2 Corinthians 5:10.
Scripture: 1 Corinthians 15:53; 2 Corinthians 5:10
Chapter 19
Πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺς ὁμολογοῦντας τὴν πρόνοιαν καὶ τὰς αὐτὰς ἡμῖν παραδεξαμένους ἀρχάς, εἶτα τῶν οἰκείων ὑποθέσεων οὐκ οἶδ᾿ ὅπως ἐκπίπτοντας, τοιούτοις χρήσαιτ᾿ ἄν τις λόγοις καὶ πολλῷ πλείοσι τούτων, εἴ γε πλατύνειν ἐθέλοι τὰ συντόμως καὶ κατ᾿ ἐπιδρομὴν εἰρημένα. Πρὸς δέ γε τοὺς περὶ τῶν πρώτων διαφερομένους ἴσως ἂν ἔχοι καλῶς ἑτέραν ὑποθέσθαι πρὸ τούτων ἀρχήν, συνδιαποροῦντας αὐτοῖς περὶ ὧν δοξάζουσι, καὶ τοιαῦτα συνδιασκεπτομένους, ἆρά γε πάντη καθάπαξ ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων παρῶπται ζωὴ καὶ σύμπας ὁ βίος, ζόφος δέ τις βαθὺς κατακέχυται τῆς γῆς, ἀγνοίᾳ καὶ σιγῇ κρύπτων αὐτούς τε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ τὰς τούτων πράξεις, ἢ πολὺ τούτων ἀσφαλέστερον τὸ δοξάζειν ὅτι τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ ποιήμασιν ἐφέστηκεν ὁ ποιήσας, πάντων τῶν ὁπωσοῦν ὄντων ἢ γινομένων ἔφορος, ἔργων τε καὶ βουλευμάτων κριτής.
Man Would Be More Unfavourably Situated Than the Beasts If There Were No Resurrection.In replying, then, to those who acknowledge a divine superintendence, and admit the same principles as we do, yet somehow depart from their own admissions, one may use such arguments as those which have been adduced, and many more than these, should he be disposed to amplify what has been said only concisely and in a cursory manner. But in dealing with those who differ from us concerning primary truths, it will perhaps be well to lay down another principle antecedent to these, joining with them in doubting of the things to which their opinions relate, and examining the matter along with them in this manner-whether the life of men, and their entire course of existence, is overlooked, and a sort of dense darkness is poured down upon the earth, hiding in ignorance and silence both the men themselves and their actions; or whether it is much safer to be of opinion that the Maker presides over the things which He Himself has made, inspecting all things whatsoever which exist, or come into existence, Judge of both deeds and purposes.
Against those who admit providence and accept the same first principles as we do, but then somehow fall away from their own position, one could use arguments like these, and many more, if he wished to expand what has been said briefly and in passing. But against those who dispute the first principles, it may be well to set down another starting point before these. We would share their doubts about what they believe and examine it together with them. Is the life of men, their whole existence, completely overlooked? Has a deep darkness been poured over the earth, hiding in ignorance and silence both the people and their actions? Or is it far safer to believe that the Maker stands over his own creations, overseeing everything that exists or comes to be in any way, and judging both deeds and purposes?
Εἰ μὲν γὰρ μηδεμία μηδαμοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώποις πεπραγμένων γίνοιτο κρίσις, οὐδὲν ἕξουσι πλεῖον τῶν ἀλόγων ἄνθρωποι· μᾶλλον δὲ κἀκείνων πράξουσιν ἀθλιώτερον, οἱ τὰ πάθη δουλαγωγοῦντες καὶ φροντίζοντες εὐσεβείας καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἢ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς, ὁ δὲ κτηνώδης βίος ἄριστος, ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀνόητος, δίκης δὲ ἀπειλὴ γέλως πλατύς, τὸ δὲ πᾶσαν θεραπεύειν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν τὸ μέγιστον, δόγμα δὲ κοινὸν τούτων ἁπάντων καὶ νόμος εἷς τὸ τοῖς ἀκολάστοις καὶ λάγνοις φίλον Φάγωμεν καὶ πίωμεν, αὔριον γὰρ ἀποθνήσκομεν. Τοῦ γὰρ τοιούτου βίου τέλος οὐδὲ ἡδονὴ κατά τινας, ἀλλ᾿ ἀναισθησία παντελής. Εἰ δέ ἐστί τις τῷ ποιήσαντι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τῶν ἰδίων ποιημάτων φροντὶς καὶ σώζεταί που τῶν εὖ ἢ κακῶς βεβιωμένων ἡ διάκρισις, ἤτοι κατὰ τὸν παρόντα βίον, ζώντων ἔτι τῶν κατ᾿ ἀρετὴν ἢ κακίαν βεβιωκότων, ἢ μετὰ θάνατον, ἐν χωρισμῷ καὶ διαλύσει τυγχανόντων.
For if no judgment whatever were to be passed on the actions of men, men would have no advantage over the irrational creatures, but rather would fare worse than these do, in as much as they keep in subjection their passions, and concern themselves about piety, and righteousness, and the other virtues; and a life after the manner of brutes would be the best, virtue would be absurd, the threat of judgment a matter for broad laughter, indulgence in every kind of pleasure the highest good, and the common resolve of all these and their one law would be that maxim, so dear to the intemperate and lewd, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die. For the termination of such a life is not even pleasure, as some suppose, but utter insensibility. But if the Maker of men takes any concern about His own works, and the distinction is anywhere to be found between those who have lived well and ill, it must be either in the present life, while men are still living who have conducted themselves virtuously or viciously, or after death, when men are in a state of separation and dissolution.
For if there were no judgment anywhere on what people have done, men would have no advantage over the animals without reason. In fact, those who keep their passions under control and care about godliness, justice and the other virtues would fare worse than the animals. The life of beasts would be the best life, virtue would be foolishness, the threat of judgment would be a big joke, and indulging every pleasure would be the greatest good. The shared creed of all such people, and their one law, would be the saying so dear to the undisciplined and lustful: “Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die.” For the end of such a life is not even pleasure, as some say, but total absence of feeling. But suppose the Maker of men does care about his own creations, and the distinction between those who have lived well and those who have lived badly is kept somewhere. Then it must happen either in the present life, while those who have lived in virtue or vice are still alive, or after death, when they have been separated and dissolved.
Translator’s note. The saying “Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die” is also found in 1 Corinthians 15:32 (quoting Isaiah 22:13).
Scripture: 1 Corinthians 15:32; Isaiah 22:13
Ἀλλὰ κατ᾿ οὐδέτερον τῶν εἰρημένων εὑρεῖν δυνατὸν σωζομένην τὴν δικαίαν κρίσιν· οὔτε γὰρ οἱ σπουδαῖοι κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ζωὴν φέρονται τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπίχειρα, οὔτε μὴν οἱ φαῦλοι τὰ τῆς κακίας. Παρίημι γὰρ λέγειν ὅτι, σωζομένης τῆς φύσεως ἐν ᾗ νῦν ἐσμέν, οὔθ᾿ ἡ θνητὴ φύσις ἐνεγκεῖν οἷά τε τὴν σύμμετρον δίκην πλειόνων ἢ βαρυτέρων φερομένων πλημμελημάτων. Ὅ τε γὰρ μυρίους ἐπὶ μυρίοις ἀνελὼν ἀδίκως λῃστὴς ἢ δυνάστης ἢ τύραννος οὐκ ἂν ἑνὶ θανάτῳ λύσειε τὴν ἐπὶ τούτοις δίκην· ὅ τε μηδὲν περὶ θεοῦ δοξάζων ἀληθές, ὕβρει δὲ πάσῃ καὶ βλασφημίᾳ συζῶν, καὶ παρορῶν μὲν τὰ θεῖα, καταλύων δὲ νόμους, ὑβρίσας δὲ παῖδας ὁμοῦ καὶ γυναῖκας, κατασκάψας δὲ πόλεις ἀδίκως, ἐμπρήσας δὲ οἴκους μετὰ τῶν ἐνοικούντων καὶ δηϊώσας χώραν, καὶ τούτοις συναφανίσας δήμους καὶ λαοὺς ἢ καὶ σύμπαν ἔθνος, πῶς ἂν ἐν τῷ φθαρτῷ σώματι πρὸς τὴν τούτοις σύμμετρον ἀρκέσειε δίκην, προλαμβάνοντος τοῦ θανάτου τὸ κατ᾿ ἀξίαν καὶ μηδὲ πρὸς ἕν τι τῶν εἰργασμένων τῆς θνητῆς ἐξαρκούσης φύσεως; Οὔτ᾿ οὖν κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ζωὴν ἡ κατ᾿ ἀξίαν δείκνυται κρίσις οὔτε μετὰ θάνατον.
But according to neither of these suppositions can we find a just judgment taking place; for neither do the good in the present life obtain the rewards of virtue, nor yet do the bad receive the wages of vice. I pass over the fact, that so long as the nature we at present possess is preserved, the moral nature is not able to bear a punishment commensurate with the more numerous or more serious faults. For the robber, or ruler, or tyrant, who has unjustly put to death myriads on myriads, could not by one death make restitution for these deeds; and the man who holds no true opinion concerning God, but lives in all outrage and blasphemy, despises divine things, breaks the laws, commits outrage against boys and women alike, razes cities unjustly, burns houses with their inhabitants, and devastates a country, and at the same time destroys inhabitants of cities and peoples, and even an entire nation-how in a mortal body could he endure a penalty adequate to these crimes, since death prevents the deserved punishment, and the mortal nature does not suffice for any single one of his deeds? It is proved, therefore, that neither in the present life is there a judgment according to men's deserts, nor after death.
But we cannot find a just judgment preserved on either of these suppositions. In the present life the good do not receive the reward of virtue, and the wicked do not receive the wages of vice. I will not even press the point that, if the nature we now have is kept as it is, mortal nature cannot bear a penalty proportionate to offenses that are many or heavy. A robber, a ruler or a tyrant who has unjustly killed ten thousand upon ten thousand could not pay for those deeds with a single death. Consider also a man who holds no true belief about God and lives in every kind of insolence and blasphemy. He disregards divine things and overthrows laws. He abuses children and women alike, razes cities unjustly, burns houses along with the people living in them, and ravages the countryside. Along with these things he wipes out whole communities and peoples, or even an entire nation. How could such a man, in a perishable body, suffer a penalty proportionate to these things? Death forestalls the punishment he deserves, and mortal nature is not equal even to any one of his crimes. So a judgment according to desert is shown to take place neither in the present life nor after death.
Chapter 20
Ἤτοι γὰρ παντελής ἐστι σβέσις τῆς ζωῆς ὁ θάνατος, συνδιαλυομένης τῷ σώματι τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ συνδιαφθειρομένης, ἢ μένει μὲν καθ᾿ ἑαυτὴν ἄλυτος ἡ ψυχή, ἀσκέδαστος, ἀδιάφθορος, φθείρεται δὲ καὶ διαλύεται τὸ σῶμα, οὐδεμίαν ἔτι σῶζον οὔτε μνήμην τῶν εἰργασμένων οὔτ᾿ αἴσθησιν τῶν ἐπ᾿ αὐτῇ παθημάτων. Σβεννυμένης μὲν γὰρ παντελῶς τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ζωῆς, οὐδεμία φανήσεται τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐ ζώντων φροντίς, οὐ τῶν κατ᾿ ἀρετὴν ἢ κακίαν βεβιωκότων ἡ κρίσις, ἐπεισκυκληθήσεται δὲ πάλιν τὰ τῆς ἀνόμου ζωῆς καὶ τῶν ταύτῃ συνεπομένων ἀτόπων τὸ σμῆνος, τό τε τῆς ἀνομίας ταύτης κεφάλαιον ἀθεότητος. Εἰ δὲ φθείροιτο μὲν τὸ σῶμα καὶ χωροίη πρὸς τὸ συγγενὲς τῶν λελυμένων ἕκαστον, μένοι δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ καθ᾿ ἑαυτὴν ὡς ἄφθαρτος, οὐδ᾿ οὕτως ἕξει χώραν ἡ κατ᾿ αὐτῆς κρίσις, μὴ προσούσης δικαιοσύνης· ἐπειδὴ μηδὲ θεμιτὸν ὑπολαμβάνειν ἐκ θεοῦ καὶ παρὰ θεοῦ γίνεσθαί τινα κρίσιν, ᾗ μὴ πρόσεστι τὸ δίκαιον.
Man Must Be Possessed Both of a Body and Soul Hereafter, that the Judgment Passed Upon Him May Be Just.For either death is the entire extinction of life, the soul being dissolved and corrupted along with the body, or the soul remains by itself, incapable of dissolution, of dispersion, of corruption, whilst the body is corrupted and dissolved, retaining no longer any remembrance of past actions, nor sense of what it experienced in connection with the soul. If the life of men is to be utterly extinguished, it is manifest there will be no care for men who are not living, no judgment respecting those who have lived in virtue or in vice; but there will rush in again upon us whatever belongs to a lawless life, and the swarm of absurdities which follow from it, and that which is the summit of this lawlessness-atheism. But if the body were to be corrupted, and each of the dissolved particles to pass to its kindred element, yet the soul to remain by itself as immortal, neither on this supposition would any judgment on the soul take place, since there would be an absence of equity: for it is unlawful to suspect that any judgment can proceed out of God and from God which is wanting in equity.
Death is either the complete extinguishing of life, with the soul dissolved and destroyed along with the body, or else the soul remains by itself, indissoluble, undispersed and incorruptible, while the body decays and is dissolved. In that second case the body no longer keeps any memory of what it has done, or any sense of what it experienced together with the soul. If human life is utterly extinguished, then no concern will be shown for people who are no longer alive, and there will be no judgment of those who lived in virtue or in vice. Instead the lawless life will come rolling back, with the whole swarm of absurdities that follow it, and the height of that lawlessness, atheism. Suppose instead that the body is destroyed and each of its parts goes to the element it is related to, while the soul remains by itself as incorruptible. Even so, a judgment against the soul would have no place, because justice would be missing from it. It is not right to suppose that any judgment coming from God and given by God could lack justice.
Οὐ πρόσεστι δὲ τῇ κρίσει τὸ δίκαιον, μὴ σωζομένου τοῦ διαπραξαμένου τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἢ τὴν ἀνομίαν· ὁ γὰρ διαπραξάμενος ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον ἐφ᾿ οἷς ἡ κρίσις ἄνθρωπος ἦν, οὐ ψυχὴ καθ᾿ ἑαυτήν. Τὸ δὲ σύμπαν εἰπεῖν, ὁ λόγος οὗτος ἐπ᾿ οὐδενὸς φυλάξει τὸ δίκαιον.
Yet equity is wanting to the judgment, if the being is not preserved in existence who practised righteousness or lawlessness: for that which practised each of the things in life on which the judgment is passed was man, not soul by itself. To sum up all in a word, this view will in no case consist with equity.
Justice is missing from the judgment if the one who practiced righteousness or lawlessness is not preserved. For the one who did each of the things in life for which judgment is passed was the human being, not the soul by itself. To put it in a word, this view does not preserve justice in any case.
Chapter 21
Κατορθωμάτων τε γὰρ τιμωμένων, ἀδικηθήσεται τὸ σῶμα σαφῶς ἐκ τοῦ κοινωνῆσαι μὲν τῇ ψυχῇ τῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς σπουδαζομένοις πόνων, μὴ κοινωνῆσαι δὲ τῆς ἐπὶ τοῖς κατορθωθεῖσι τιμῆς, καὶ συγγνώμης μὲν τυγχάνειν πολλάκις τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπί τινων πλημμελημάτων διὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἔνδειάν τε καὶ χρείαν, ἐκπίπτειν δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἐπὶ τοῖς κατορθωθεῖσι κοινωνίας, ὑπὲρ ὧν τοὺς ἐν τῇ ζωῇ συνδιήνεγκε πόνους. Καὶ μὴν καὶ πλημμελημάτων κρινομένων οὐ σώζεται τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ δίκαιον, εἴ γε μόνη τίνοι δίκην ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐνοχλοῦντος τοῦ σώματος καὶ πρὸς τὰς οἰκείας ὀρέξεις ἢ κινήσεις ἕλκοντος ἐπλημμέλησεν, ποτὲ μὲν κατὰ συναρπαγὴν καὶ κλοπήν, ποτὲ δὲ κατά τινα βιαιοτέραν ὁλκήν, ἄλλοτε δὲ κατὰ συνδρομὴν ἐν χάριτος μέρει καὶ θεραπείας τῆς τούτου συστάσεως.
Continuation of the Argument.For if good deeds are rewarded, the body will clearly be wronged, in as much as it has shared with the soul in the toils connected with well-doing, but does not share in the reward of the good deeds, and because, though the soul is often excused for certain faults on the ground of the body's neediness and want, the body itself is deprived of all share in the good deeds done, the toils on behalf of which it helped to bear during life. Nor, again, if faults are judged, is the soul dealt fairly with, supposing it alone to pay the penalty for the faults it committed through being solicited by the body and drawn away by it to its own appetites and motions, at one time being seized upon and carried off, at another attracted in some very violent manner, and sometimes concurring with it by way of kindness and attention to its preservation.
For if good deeds are honored, the body will clearly be wronged. It shared with the soul in the labors of its earnest efforts, but it will not share in the honor given for what was done rightly. Often the soul gets pardon for certain faults because of the body’s need and want, yet the body itself is shut out from any share in the good deeds for which it bore its part of the labors in life. Again, if faults are judged, justice is not kept toward the soul either, if it alone pays the penalty for faults it committed while the body troubled it and dragged it toward its own appetites and impulses. Sometimes the soul was seized and carried off by stealth. Sometimes it was dragged along more forcefully. At other times it went along with the body as a kindness, out of care for keeping the body alive.
Ἢ πῶς οὐκ ἄδικον τὴν ψυχὴν κρίνεσθαι καθ᾿ ἑαυτὴν ὑπὲρ ὧν οὐδ᾿ ἡντινοῦν ἔχει κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῆς φύσιν οὐκ ὄρεξιν, οὐ κίνησιν, οὐχ ὁρμήν, οἷον λαγνείας ἢ βίας ἢ πλεονεξίας ἢ ἀδικίας καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀδικημάτων; Εἰ γὰρ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν τοιούτων γίνεται κακῶν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ κατακρατεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τῶν ἐνοχλούντων παθῶν, ἐνοχλοῦνται δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἐνδείας καὶ χρείας καὶ τῆς περὶ τοῦτο σπουδῆς καὶ θεραπείας (τούτων γὰρ ἕνεκεν πᾶσα ἡ κτῆσις καὶ πρὸ ταύτης ἡ χρῆσις, ἔτι δὲ γάμος καὶ ὅσαι κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεις, ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ θεωρεῖται τό τε πλημμελὲς καὶ τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον), ποῦ δίκαιον, ἐν οἷς πρωτοπαθεῖ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἕλκει πρὸς συμπάθειαν καὶ κοινωνίαν τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἃ δεῖται πράξεων, αὐτὴν κρίνεσθαι μόνην, καὶ τὰς μὲν ὀρέξεις καὶ τὰς ἡδονάς, ἔτι δὲ φόβους καὶ λύπας, ἐφ᾿ ὧν πᾶν τὸ μὴ μέτριον ὑπόδικον, ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἔχειν τὴν κίνησιν, τὰς δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἁμαρτίας καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἡμαρτημένοις τιμωρίας ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν φέρεσθαι μόνην, τὴν μήτε δεομένην τοιούτου τινὸς μήτε ὀρεγομένην μήτε φοβουμένην ἢ πάσχουσάν τι τοιοῦτον καθ᾿ ἑαυτὴν οἷον πάσχειν πέφυκεν ἄνθρωπος;
How can it possibly be other than unjust for the soul to be judged by itself in respect of things towards which in its own nature it feels no appetite, no motion, no impulse, such as licentiousness, violence, covetousness, injustice, and the unjust acts arising out of these? For if the majority of such evils come from men's not having the mastery of the passions which solicit them, and they are solicited by the neediness and want of the body, and the care and attention required by it (for these are the motives for every acquisition of property, and especially for the using of it, and moreover for marriage and all the actions of life, in which things, and in connection with which, is seen what is faulty and what is not so), how can it be just for the soul alone to be judged in respect of those things which the body is the first to be sensible of, and in which it draws the soul away to sympathy and participation in actions with a view to things Which it wants; and that the appetites and pleasures, and moreover the fears and sorrows, in which whatever exceeds the proper bounds is amenable to judgment, should be set in motion by the body, and yet that the sins arising from these, and the punishments for the sins committed, should fall upon the soul alone, which neither needs anything of this sort, nor desires nor fears or suffers of itself any such thing as man is wont to suffer?
How could it be anything but unjust for the soul to be judged by itself for things toward which, in its own nature, it has no appetite, no movement, no impulse at all, such as lust, violence, greed, injustice, and the wrongs that follow from these? Most such evils come about because people do not master the passions that trouble them. And they are troubled by the body’s neediness and want, and by the care and attention it demands. For the sake of these come all acquiring of property, and, prior to that, all use of things, and also marriage and all the actions of life, in which and around which faultiness, or the lack of it, is seen. Where, then, is the justice in having the soul alone judged? In all these matters the body is the first to be affected, and it draws the soul into sympathy and partnership in actions aimed at what the body needs. The appetites and pleasures, and also the fears and griefs, in which anything beyond moderation is liable to judgment, get their movement from the body. Yet the sins that come from them, and the punishments for the sins committed, would fall on the soul alone. The soul has no need of any such thing. It does not desire or fear, and of itself it does not suffer anything of the kind that a human being naturally suffers.
Ἀλλὰ κἂν μὴ μόνου τοῦ σώματος, ἀνθρώπου δὲ θῶμεν εἶναι τὰ πάθη, λέγοντες ὀρθῶς διὰ τὸ μίαν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων εἶναι τὴν τούτου ζωήν, οὐ δήπου γε καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ ταῦτα προσήκειν φήσομεν, ὁπόταν καθαρῶς τὴν ἰδίαν αὐτῆς ἐπισκοπῶμεν φύσιν. Εἰ γὰρ πάσης καθάπαξ τροφῆς ἐστιν ἀνενδεής, οὐκ ἂν ὀρεχθείη ποτὲ τούτων ὧν οὐδαμῶς δεῖται πρὸς τὸ εἶναι, οὔτ᾿ ἂν ὁρμήσειεν ἐπί τι τούτων οἷς μηδ᾿ ὅλως χρῆσθαι πέφυκεν· ἀλλ᾿ οὐδ᾿ ἂν λυπηθείη δι᾿ ἀπορίαν χρημάτων ἢ κτημάτων, ὡς οὐδὲν αὐτῇ προσηκόντων. Εἰ δὲ καὶ φθορᾶς ἐστι κρείττων, οὐδὲν φοβεῖται τὸ παράπαν ὡς φθαρτικὸν ἑαυτῆς· οὐ γὰρ δέδοικεν οὐ λιμόν, οὐ νόσον οὐ πήρωσιν οὐ λώβην οὐ πῦρ οὐ σίδηρον, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ παθεῖν ἐκ τούτων δύναταί τι βλαβερὸν οὔτ᾿ ἀλγεινόν, οὐχ ἁπτομένων αὐτῆς τὸ παράπαν οὔτε σωμάτων οὔτε σωματικῶν δυνάμεων. Εἰ δὲ τὸ τὰ πάθη ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἰδιαζόντως προσάπτειν ἄτοπον, τὸ τὰς ἐκ τούτων ἁμαρτίας καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ ταύταις τιμωρίας ἐπὶ μόνας φέρειν τὰς ψυχὰς ὑπερβαλλόντως ἄδικον καὶ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ κρίσεως ἀνάξιον.
But even if we hold that these affections do not pertain to the body alone, but to man, in saying which we should speak correctly, because the life of man is one, though composed of the two, yet surely we shall not assert that these things belong to the soul, if we only look simply at its peculiar nature. For if it is absolutely without need of food, it can never desire those things which it does not in the least require for its subsistence; nor can it feel any impulse towards any of those things which it is not at all fitted to use; nor, again, can it be grieved at the want of money or other property, since these are not suited to it. And if, too, it is superior to corruption, it fears nothing whatever as destructive of itself: it has no dread of famine, or disease, or mutilation, or blemish, or fire, or sword, since it cannot suffer from any of these any hurt or pain, because neither bodies nor bodily powers touch it at all. But if it is absurd to attach the passions to the soul as belonging specially to it, it is in the highest degree unjust and unworthy of the judgment of God to lay upon the soul alone the sins which spring from them, and the consequent punishments.
Suppose we grant that these passions belong not to the body alone but to the human being. We would be right to say so, because a person’s life is one life made up of both. Still, we surely will not claim that these passions belong to the soul when we consider its own nature strictly by itself. If the soul needs no food at all, it could never desire things it does not need in order to exist. Nor could it feel an impulse toward things it is not made to use. It could not even be grieved by a lack of money or possessions, since these have nothing to do with it. And if it is also stronger than corruption, it fears nothing at all as able to destroy it. It dreads neither hunger nor disease, neither crippling nor disfigurement, neither fire nor sword. It cannot suffer any harm or pain from these, because neither bodies nor the powers of bodies touch it at all. Now if it is absurd to attach the passions to souls as their own, then it is unjust beyond measure, and unworthy of God’s judgment, to lay the sins that come from those passions, and the punishments for those sins, on souls alone.
Chapter 22
Πρὸς δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον τὴν μὲν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν μηδὲ νοηθῆναι δύνασθαι χωρὶς ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς (ἀνθρώπου γὰρ ἀρετὰς εἶναι γινώσκομεν τὰς ἀρετάς, ὡσπεροῦν καὶ τὴν ταύταις ἀντικειμένην κακίαν οὐ ψυχῆς κεχωρισμένης τοῦ σώματος καὶ καθ᾿ ἑαυτὴν οὔσης), τὴν δ᾿ ἐπὶ τούτοις τιμὴν ἢ τιμωρίαν ἐπὶ μόνης φέρεσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς; Ἢ πῶς ἄν τις καὶ νοήσειεν ἐπὶ ψυχῆς μόνης ἀνδρείαν ἢ καρτερίαν, οὐκ ἐχούσης οὐ θανάτου φόβον, οὐ τραύματος οὐ πηρώσεως οὐ ζημίας οὐκ αἰκίας, οὐ τῶν ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀλγημάτων ἢ τῆς ἐκ τούτων κακοπαθείας; Πῶς δὲ ἐγκράτειαν καὶ σωφροσύνην, οὐδεμιᾶς ἑλκούσης αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμίας πρὸς τροφὴν ἢ μῖξιν ἢ τὰς ἄλλας ἡδονάς τε καὶ τέρψεις, οὐδ᾿ ἄλλου τινὸς οὔτ᾿ ἔσωθεν ἐνοχλοῦντος οὔτ᾿ ἔξωθεν ἐρεθίζοντος;
Continuation of the Argument.In addition to what has been said, is it not absurd that, while we cannot even have the notion of virtue and vice as existing separately in the soul (for we recognise the virtues as man's virtues, even as in like manner vice, their opposite, as not belonging to the soul in separation from the body, and existing by itself), yet that the reward or punishment for these should be assigned to the soul alone? How can any one have even the notion of courage or fortitude as existing in the soul alone, when it has no fear of death, or wounds, or maiming, or loss, or maltreatment, or of the pain connected with these, or the suffering resulting from them? And what shall we say of self-control and temperance, when there is no desire drawing it to food or sexual intercourse, or other pleasures and enjoyments, nor any other thing soliciting it from within or exciting it from without?
There is more to add. Is it not absurd that virtue and vice cannot even be conceived of in the soul apart from the body, yet the reward or punishment for them is assigned to the soul alone? We recognize the virtues as the virtues of a human being, and likewise the vice opposed to them. They do not belong to a soul separated from the body and existing by itself. How could anyone even conceive of courage or endurance in the soul alone? It has no fear of death, wounds, maiming, loss or ill-treatment, and no pain from these or hardship resulting from them. And how could there be self-control or temperance, when no desire draws the soul toward food, sexual union or other pleasures and delights, and nothing else troubles it from within or provokes it from outside?
Πῶς δὲ φρόνησιν, οὐχ ὑποκειμένων αὐτῇ πρακτέων καὶ μὴ πρακτέων, οὔθ᾿ αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ μηδεμιᾶς ἐνούσης αὐτῇ κινήσεως τὸ παράπαν ἢ φυσικῆς ὁρμῆς ἐπί τι τῶν πρακτέων; Ποῦ δὲ ὅλως ψυχαῖς ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλας δικαιοσύνη προσφυὴς ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τῶν ὁμογενῶν ἢ ἑτερογενῶν, οὐκ ἐχούσαις οὔτε πόθεν οὔτε δι᾿ ὧν οὔτε πῶς ἀπονείμωσι τὸ κατ᾿ ἀξίαν ἢ κατ᾿ ἀναλογίαν ἴσον, ἐξῃρημένης τῆς εἰς θεὸν τιμῆς, οὐδ᾿ ἄλλως ἐχούσαις ὁρμὴν ἢ κίνησιν πρὸς χρῆσιν ἰδίων ἢ πρὸς ἀποχὴν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, τῆς μὲν χρήσεως τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἢ τῆς ἀποχῆς ἐπὶ τῶν χρῆσθαι πεφυκότων θεωρουμένης, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς μήτε δεομένης τινὸς μήτε χρῆσθαί τισιν ἤ τινι πεφυκυίας, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μήτε τῆς λεγομένης ἰδιοπραγίας τῶν μερῶν ἐπὶ τῆς οὕτως ἐχούσης ψυχῆς εὑρεθῆναι δυναμένης;
And what of practical wisdom, when things are not proposed to it which may or may not be done, nor things to be chosen or avoided, or rather when there is in it no motion at all or natural impulse towards the doing of anything? And how in any sense can equity be an attribute of souls, either in reference to one another or to anything else, whether of the same or of a different kind, when they are not able from any source, or by any means, or in any way, to bestow that which is equal according to merit or according to analogy, with the exception of the honour rendered to God, and, moreover, have no impulse or motion towards the use of their own things, or abstinence from those of others, since the use of those things which are according to nature, or the abstinence from them, is considered in reference to those who are so constituted as to use them, whereas the soul neither wants anything, nor is so constituted as to use any things or any single thing, and therefore what is called the independent action of the parts cannot be found in the soul so constituted?
How could there be practical wisdom, when there are no things to be done or not done, nothing to choose or avoid? Rather, the soul would have no movement at all, and no natural impulse toward any action. And where would justice toward one another, or toward anything else of the same or a different kind, naturally belong to souls at all? They would have no source from which, no means by which, and no way in which to give out what is equal according to merit or proportion, apart from the honor owed to God. Nor would they have any impulse or movement toward using what is their own or keeping away from what belongs to others. The use of natural goods, or abstaining from them, is observed in beings that are made to use them. But the soul needs nothing, and is not made to use anything. For this reason, what is called “each part doing its own work” could not be found in a soul of that kind.
Translator’s note. “Each part doing its own work” translates the Greek idiopragia; the idea goes back to Plato’s Republic, where justice is each part of the soul, or of the city, doing its own work.
Chapter 23
Καὶ μὴν κἀκεῖνο πάντων παραλογώτατον, τὸ τοὺς μὲν θεσπισθέντας νόμους ἐπ᾿ ἀνθρώπους φέρειν, τῶν δὲ νομίμως ἢ παρανόμως πεπραγμένων τὴν δίκην ἐπὶ μόνας τρέπειν τὰς ψυχάς. Εἰ γὰρ ὁ τοὺς νόμους δεξάμενος οὗτος δέξαιτ᾿ ἂν δικαίως καὶ τῆς παρανομίας τὴν δίκην, ἐδέξατο δὲ τοὺς νόμους ἄνθρωπος, οὐ ψυχὴ καθ᾿ ἑαυτήν, ἄνθρωπον δεῖ καὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἡμαρτημένων ὑποσχεῖν δίκην, οὐ ψυχὴν καθ᾿ ἑαυτήν· ἐπεὶ μὴ ψυχαῖς ἐθέσπισε θεὸς ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν οὐδὲν αὐταῖς προσηκόντων, οἷον μοιχείας φόνου κλοπῆς ἁρπαγῆς τῆς κατὰ τῶν γεννησάντων ἀτιμίας, πάσης τε κοινῶς τῆς ἐπ᾿ ἀδικίᾳ καὶ βλάβῃ τῶν πέλας γινομένης ἐπιθυμίας. Οὔτε γὰρ τὸ Τίμα τὸν πατέρα σου καὶ τὴν μητέρα σου ψυχαῖς μόνον εὐάρμοστον, οὐ προσηκόντων αὐταῖς τῶν τοιούτων ὀνομάτων· οὐ γὰρ ψυχαὶ ψυχὰς γεννῶσαι τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἢ τῆς μητέρος οἰκειοῦνται προσηγορίαν, ἀλλ᾿ ἀνθρώπους ἄνθρωποι· οὔτε οὖν τὸ Οὐ μοιχεύσεις ἐπὶ ψυχῶν λεχθείῃ ποτ᾿ ἂν ἢ νοηθείη δεόντως, οὐκ οὔσης ἐν αὐταῖς τῆς κατὰ τὸ ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ διαφορᾶς οὐδὲ πρὸς μῖξίν τινος ἐπιτηδειότητος ἢ πρὸς ταύτην ὀρέξεως.
Continuation of the Argument.But the most irrational thing of all is this: to impose properly sanctioned laws on men, and then to assign to their souls alone the recompense of their lawful or unlawful deeds. For if he who receives the laws would also justly receive the recompense of the transgression of the laws, and if it was man that received the laws, and not the soul by itself, man must also bear the recompense for the sins committed, and not the soul by itself, since God has not enjoined on souls to abstain from things which have no relation to them, such as adultery, murder, theft, rapine, dishonour to parents, and every desire in general that tends to the injury and loss of our neighbours. For neither the command, "Honour thy father and thy mother," is adapted to souls alone, since such names are not applicable to them, for souls do not produce souls, so as to appropriate the appellation of father or mother, but men produce men; nor could the command, "Thou shalt not commit adultery," ever be properly addressed to souls, or even thought of in such a connection, since the difference of male and female does not exist in them, nor any aptitude for sexual intercourse, nor appetite for it; and where there is no appetite, there can be no intercourse; and where there is no intercourse at all, there can be no legitimate intercourse, namely marriage; and where there is no lawful intercourse, neither can there be unlawful desire of, or intercourse with, another man's wife, namely adultery.
Here is the most irrational thing of all: laws are given to human beings, yet the penalty for what is done lawfully or unlawfully is turned over to souls alone. The one who received the laws is the one who would justly receive the penalty for breaking them. It was the human being who received the laws, not the soul by itself. So it must be the human being who answers for the sins, not the soul by itself. For God did not command souls to abstain from things that have nothing to do with them, such as adultery, murder, theft, robbery, dishonoring parents, and in general every desire that aims at wronging or harming one’s neighbors. Take the command “Honor your father and your mother.” It does not fit souls alone, because such names do not belong to them. Souls do not beget souls and so take on the title of father or mother; human beings beget human beings. Nor could “You shall not commit adultery” ever be properly said of souls, or even be thought of in that way. Souls have no difference of male and female, no fitness for intercourse, and no desire for it.
Translator’s note. The two commands quoted are from the Ten Commandments (Exodus 20:12, 14; Deuteronomy 5:16, 18).
Scripture: Exodus 20:12; Exodus 20:14
Ὀρέξεως δὲ τοιαύτης οὐκ οὔσης, οὐδὲ μῖξιν εἶναι δυνατόν· παρ᾿ οἷς δὲ μῖξις οὐκ ἔστιν ὅλως, οὐδὲ ἔνθεσμος μῖξις, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ γάμος· ἐννόμου δὲ μίξεως οὐκ οὔσης, οὐδὲ τὴν παράνομον καὶ τὴν ἐπ᾿ ἀλλοτρίᾳ γυναικὶ γινομένην ὄρεξιν ἢ μῖξιν εἶναι δυνατόν, τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι μοιχεία. Ἀλλ᾿ οὐδὲ τὸ κλοπὴν ἀπαγορεύειν ἢ τὴν τοῦ πλείονος ἐπιθυμίαν ψυχαῖς προσφυές· οὐδὲ γὰρ δέονται τούτων, ὧν οἱ δεόμενοι διὰ τὴν φυσικὴν ἔνδειαν ἢ χρείαν κλέπτειν εἰώθασιν ἢ λῃστεύειν, οἷον χρυσὸν ἢ ἄργυρον ἢ ζῶον ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν πρὸς τροφὴν ἢ σκέπην ἢ χρῆσιν ἐπιτηδείων· ἀχρεῖον γὰρ ἀθανάτῳ φύσει πᾶν ὁπόσον τοῖς ἐνδεέσιν ὀρεκτὸν ὡς χρήσιμον. Ἀλλ᾿ ὁ μὲν ἐντελέστερος περὶ τούτων λόγος ἀφείσθω τοῖς σπουδαιότερον ἕκαστον σκοπεῖν βουλομένοις ἢ φιλοτιμότερον διαγωνίζεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς διαφερομένους.
Nor, again, is the prohibition of theft, or of the desire of having more, applicable to souls, for they do not need those things, through the need of which, by reason of natural indigence or want, men are accustomed to steal or to rob, such as gold, or silver, or an animal, or something else adapted for food, or shelter, or use; for to an immortal nature everything which is desired by the needy as useful is useless. But let the fuller discussion of these matters be left to those who wish to investigate each point more exactly, or to contend more earnestly with opponents.
Where there is no such desire, intercourse is not possible either. Where there is no intercourse at all, there is no lawful intercourse, which is what marriage is. Where there is no lawful intercourse, there cannot be unlawful desire or intercourse with another man’s wife, and that is what adultery is. Nor is the prohibition of theft, or of the desire to have more, suited to souls. They do not need the things that people in natural want or need are accustomed to steal or rob, such as gold, silver, an animal, or anything else useful for food, shelter, or use. For an immortal nature, everything that needy people desire as useful is useless. But let a fuller discussion of these matters be left to those who want to examine each point more carefully, or to argue more eagerly against opponents.
Ἡμῖν δὲ ἀρκούντων τῶν ἀρτίως εἰρημένων καὶ τῶν συμφώνως τούτοις τὴν ἀνάστασιν πιστουμένων, τὸ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐνδιατρίβειν οὐκ ἔτ᾿ ἂν ἔχοι καιρόν· οὐ γὰρ τὸ μηδὲν παραλιπεῖν τῶν ἐνόντων εἰπεῖν πεποιήμεθα σκοπόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ κεφαλαιωδῶς ὑποδεῖξαι τοῖς συνελθοῦσιν ἅ χρὴ περὶ ἀναστάσεως φρονεῖν, καὶ τῇ δυνάμει τῶν παρόντων συμμετρῆσαι τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦτο φερούσας ἀφορμάς.
But, since what has just been said, and that which concurs with this to guarantee the resurrection, suffices for us, it would not be seasonable to dwell any longer upon them; for we have not made it our aim to omit nothing that might be said, but to point out in a summary manner to those who have assembled what ought to be thought concerning the resurrection, and to adapt to the capacity of those present the arguments bearing on this question.
For us, what has just been said is enough, together with the arguments that agree with it in establishing the resurrection. It would no longer be the right time to spend longer on the same points. Our aim has not been to say everything that could be said. It has been to show in summary form, to those who have gathered here, what ought to be thought about the resurrection, and to fit the arguments leading to it to the ability of those present.
Chapter 24
Ἐξητασμένων δὲ ποσῶς τῶν προτεθέντων ὑπόλοιπον ἂν εἴη καὶ τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους διασκέψασθαι λόγον, ἥδη μὲν τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐμφαινόμενον, τοσαύτης δὲ μόνον ἐπιστασίας καὶ προσθήκης δεόμενον, ὡς μὴ δοκεῖν τι τῶν μικρῶς ἡμῖν εἰρημένων ἀμνημόνευτον καταλιπεῖν καὶ παραβλάψαι τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἢ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γενομένην διαίρεσιν. Τούτων τε οὖν ἕνεκεν καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐγκεισομένων καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι τοσοῦτον ἐπισημήνασθαι μόνον, ὅτι δεῖ καὶ τῶν ἐκ φύσεως συνισταμένων καὶ τῶν κατὰ τέχνην γινομένων οἰκεῖον ἑκάστου τέλος εἶναι, τοῦτό που καὶ τῆς κοινῆς πάντων ἐννοίας ἐκδιδασκούσης ἡμᾶς καὶ τῶν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς στρεφομένων ἐπιμαρτυρούντων.Ἦ γὰρ οὐ θεωροῦμεν ἕτερόν τι τοῖς γεωργοῦσιν, ἕτερον δὲ τοῖς ἰατρεύουσιν ὑποκείμενον τέλος, καὶ πάλιν ἄλλο μέν τι τῶν ἐκ γῆς φυομένων, ἄλλο δὲ τῶν ἐπ᾿ αὐτῆς τρεφομένων ζώων καὶ κατά τινα φυσικὸν εἱρμὸν γεννωμένων;
Argument for the Resurrection from the Chief End of Man.The points proposed for consideration having been to some extent investigated, it remains to examine the argument from the end or final cause, which indeed has already emerged m what has been said, and only requires just so much attention and further discussion as may enable us to avoid the appearance of leaving unmentioned any of the matters briefly referred to by us, and thus indirectly damaging the subject or the division of topics made at the outset. For the sake of those present, therefore, and of others who may pay attention to this subject, it may be well just to signify that each of those things which are constituted by nature, and of those which are made by art, must have an end peculiar to itself, as indeed is taught us by the common sense of all men, and testified by the things that pass before our eyes. For do we not see that husbandmen have one end, and physicians another; and again, the things which spring out of the earth another, and the animals nourished upon it, and produced according to a certain natural series, another?
Now that the matters proposed have been examined to some extent, what remains is to consider the argument from the end, or purpose. It has already shown itself in what has been said, and it needs only a little more attention and addition. That way I will not seem to have left unmentioned anything I touched on briefly, or to have damaged the subject or the division of topics made at the beginning. For the sake of these points, and of what will be set out after them, it is fitting simply to point out this much: everything that comes into being by nature, and everything made by skill, must have its own proper end. The common understanding of all people teaches us this, and the things going on before our eyes bear witness to it. Do we not see that farmers have one end in view and physicians another? And again, that the things that grow from the earth have one end, and the animals that are nourished on it and born in a natural sequence have another?
Translator’s note. “End” translates telos, which means both the final point and the purpose a thing exists for.
Εἰ δὲ τοῦτ᾿ ἔστιν ἐναργὲς καὶ δεῖ πάντως ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἢ τεχνικαῖς δυνάμεσι καὶ ταῖς ἐκ τούτων ἐνεργείαις τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἕπεσθαι τέλος, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τέλος, ὡς ἰδιαζούσης ὂν φύσεως, ἐξῃρῆσθαι τῆς τῶν ἄλλων κοινότητος· ἐπεὶ μηδὲ θεμιτὸν ταὐτὸν ὑποθέσθαι τέλος τῶν τε λογικῆς κρίσεως ἀμοιρούντων καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν ἔμφυτον νόμον καὶ λόγον ἐνεργούντων, ἔμφρονί τε ζωῇ καὶ δίκῃ χρωμένων. Οὔτ᾿ οὖν τὸ ἄλυπον οἰκεῖον τούτοις ἂν εἴη τέλος, μετείη γὰρ ἂν τούτου καὶ τοῖς παντελῶς ἀναισθητοῦσιν· ἀλλ᾿ οὐδὲ τῶν τὸ σῶμα τρεφόντων ἢ τερπόντων ἀπόλαυσις καὶ πλῆθος ἡδονῶν· ἢ πρωτεύειν ἀνάγκη τὸν κτηνώδη βίον, ἀτελῆ δὲ εἶναι τὸν κατ᾿ ἀρετήν. Κτηνῶν γὰρ οἶμαι καὶ βοσκημάτων οἰκεῖον τοῦτο τέλος, οὐκ ἀνθρώπων ἀθανάτῳ ψυχῇ καὶ λογικῇ κρίσει χρωμένων.
If this is evident, and natural and artificial powers, and the actions arising from these, must by all means be accompanied by an end in accordance with nature, it is absolutely necessary that the end of men, since it is that of a peculiar nature, should be separated from community with the rest; for it is not lawful to suppose the same end for beings destitute of rational judgment, and of those whose actions are regulated by the innate law and reason, and who live an intelligent life and observe justice. Freedom from pain, therefore, cannot be the proper end for the latter, for this they would have in common with beings utterly devoid of sensibility: nor can it consist in the enjoyment of things which nourish or delight the body, or in an abundance of pleasures; else a life like that of the brutes must hold the first place, while that regulated by virtue is without a final cause. For such an end as this, I suppose, belongs to beasts and cattle, not to men possessed of an immortal soul and rational judgment.
If this is plain, and the natural or skilled powers, and the activities that come from them, must always be followed by an end that fits their nature, then the end of human beings must of necessity be set apart from what the rest have in common, since theirs is a distinct nature. It is not right to assume the same end for creatures with no share in rational judgment and for those who act according to the innate law and reason, and who live a thoughtful life and practice justice. So freedom from pain cannot be the proper end for human beings, because even creatures with no sensation at all would share in that. Nor can it be the enjoyment of things that feed or please the body, or an abundance of pleasures. If it were, the life of beasts would have to take first place, and the life of virtue would be without an end. This kind of end, I think, belongs to cattle and livestock, not to human beings, who have an immortal soul and rational judgment.
Chapter 25
Οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ μακαριότης ψυχῆς κεχωρισμένης σώματος· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν θατέρου τούτων ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκεν ἄνθρωπος ἐσκοποῦμεν ζωὴν ἢ τέλος, ἀλλὰ τοῦ συνεστῶτος ἐξ ἀμφοῖν· τοιοῦτος γὰρ πᾶς ὁ τόνδε τὸν βίον λαχὼν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ δεῖ τῆς τούτου ζωῆς εἶναί τι τέλος οἰκεῖον. Εἰ δὲ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου τὸ τέλος, τοῦτο δὲ οὔτε ζώντων αὐτῶν ἔτι κατὰ τόνδε τὸν βίον εὑρεθῆναι δυνατὸν διὰ τὰς πολλάκις ἤδη ῥηθείσας αἰτίας, οὔτε μὴν ἐν χωρισμῷ τυγχανούσης τῆς ψυχῆς, τῷ μηδὲ συνεστάναι τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνθρωπον διαλυθέντος ἢ καὶ πάντη σκεδασθέντος τοῦ σώματος, κἂν ἡ ψυχὴ διαμένῃ καθ᾿ ἑαυτήν, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα κατ᾿ ἄλλην τινὰ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ζώου σύστασιν τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φανῆναι τέλος.
Argument Continued and Concluded.Nor again is it the happiness of soul separated from body: for we are not inquiring about the life or final cause of either of the parts of which man consists, but of the being who is composed of both; for such is every man who has a share in this present existence, and there must be some appropriate end proposed for this life. But if it is the end of both parts together, and this can be discovered neither while they are still living in the present state of existence through the numerous causes already mentioned, nor yet when the soul is in a state of separation, because the man cannot be said to exist when the body is dissolved, and indeed entirely scattered abroad, even though the soul continue by itself-it is absolutely necessary that the end of a man's being should appear in some reconstitution of the two together, and of the same living being.
Nor is the end of man the happiness of a soul separated from the body. We are not examining the life or end of just one of the two parts of which a human being is made, but of the being made of both together. Every man who has been given this present life is of that kind, and this life must have some end of its own. Now if the end belongs to the two together, it cannot be found while they are still alive in this present life, for the reasons we have often given already. Nor can it be found when the soul is separated, because such a man no longer exists once the body is dissolved or entirely scattered, even if the soul continues to exist by itself. So the end of human beings must appear in some other constitution of the two together, as the same living being.
Τούτου δ᾿ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑπομένου, δεῖ πάντως γενέσθαι τῶν νεκρωθέντων ἢ καὶ πάντη διαλυθέντων σωμάτων ἀνάστασιν καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀνθρώπους συστῆναι πάλιν· ἐπειδή γε τὸ μὲν τέλος οὐχ ἁπλῶς, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων ἀνθρώπων, ὁ τῆς φύσεως τίθεται νόμος, ἀλλ᾿ αὐτῶν ἐκείνων τῶν κατὰ τὴν προλαβοῦσαν ζωὴν βεβιωκότων, τοὺς δ᾿ αὐτοὺς ἀνθρώπους συστῆναι πάλιν ἀμήχανον, μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν σωμάτων ταῖς αὐταῖς ψυχαῖς ἀποδοθέντων. Τὸ δ᾿ αὐτὸ σῶμα τὴν αὐτὴν ψυχὴν ἀπολαβεῖν ἄλλως μὲν ἀδύνατον, κατὰ μόνην δὲ τὴν ἀνάστασιν δυνατόν· ταύτης γὰρ γενομένης καὶ τὸ τῇ φύσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρόσφορον ἐπακολουθεῖ τέλος. Τέλος δὲ ζωῆς ἔμφρονος καὶ λογικῆς κρίσεως οὐκ ἂν ἁμάρτοι τις εἰπὼν τὸ τούτοις ἀπερισπάστως συνδιαιωνίζειν οἷς μάλιστα καὶ πρώτως ὁ φυσικὸς συνήρμοσται λόγος, τῇ τε θεωρίᾳ τοῦ ὄντος καὶ τῶν ἐκείνῳ δεδογμένων ἀπαύστως ἐπαγάλλεσθαι· κἂν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐμπαθέστερον καὶ σφοδρότερον τοῖς τῇδε προσπεπονθότες ἄστοχοι τούτου διατελῶσιν. Οὐ γὰρ ἀκυροῖ τὴν κοινὴν ἀποκλήρωσιν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀποπιπτόντων τοῦ προσήκοντος αὐτοῖς τέλους, ἰδιαζούσης τῆς ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐξετάσεως καὶ τῆς ἑκάστῳ συμμετρουμένης ὑπὲρ τῶν εὖ ἢ κακῶς βεβιωμένων τιμῆς ἢ δίκης.
And as this follows of necessity, there must by all means be a resurrection of the bodies which are dead, or even entirely dissolved, and the same men must be formed anew, since the law of nature ordains the end not absolutely, nor as the end of any men whatsoever, but of the same men who passed through the previous life; but it is impossible for the same men to be reconstituted unless the same bodies are restored to the same souls. But that the same soul should obtain the same body is impossible in any other way, and possible only by the resurrection; for if this takes place, an end befitting the nature of men follows also. And we shall make no mistake in saying, that the final cause of an intelligent life and rational judgment, is to be occupied uninterruptedly with those objects to which the natural reason is chiefly and primarily adapted, and to delight unceasingly in the contemplation of Him who is, and of His decrees, notwithstanding that the majority of men, because they are affected too passionately and too violently by things below, pass through life without attaining this object. For the large number of those who fail of the end that belongs to them does not make void the common lot, since the examination relates to individuals, and the reward or punishment of lives ill or well spent is proportioned to the merit of each. [This concluding chapter is of itself a masterpiece, and comforts my own soul unspeakably, as proving that this life is very precious, if only directed to the end from which we are created. Blest be Athenagoras for completing what St. Paul began on the Areopagus, and for giving us "beauty for ashes" out of the gardens of Plato. Now we find what power there was in the apostle's word, when he preached to the Athenians, "Jesus and the resurrection."]
Since this follows of necessity, there must be a resurrection of bodies that have died or even been completely broken down, and the very same people must be formed again. For the law of nature sets the end not for people in general, or for just any people, but for those same people who lived the earlier life. And it is impossible for the same people to be formed again unless the same bodies are given back to the same souls. For the same body to receive the same soul is impossible in any other way. It is possible only through the resurrection, for if that takes place, the end that suits human nature follows. One would not be wrong to say that the end of an intelligent life and rational judgment is to live on forever, without distraction, with those things to which natural reason is first and chiefly fitted, and to rejoice without ceasing in the contemplation of him who is, and of his decrees. This is so even though most people, who are more strongly and passionately attached to the things of this world, never reach it. The great number who fall short of the end that belongs to them does not cancel the common lot of humanity. Each person is examined individually, and honor or punishment is measured out to each according to how well or badly he has lived.
Translator’s note. “Him who is” translates tou ontos, which could also be read as “that which is” (true Being). The masculine reading recalls Exodus 3:14 in the Greek Old Testament, where God names himself “he who is.”
Sources. Greek text: J. C. T. von Otto’s edition (Jena, 1857), digitized by the Perseus Project and the First Thousand Years of Greek project (CC BY-SA 4.0). English (older translation): Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 2 (1885), public domain, from the Writings-Database collection (HistoricalChristianFaith); we matched its sentences to the Greek rows, and the translator’s chapter titles are kept. English (older translation): Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 2 (1885), public domain, from the Writings-Database collection (HistoricalChristianFaith); we matched its sentences to the Greek rows, and the translator’s chapter titles are kept. Modern English: prepared for SermonIndex with AI, based on that older English translation and checked clause by clause against the Greek, then checked again in a second AI pass, and released under CC BY-SA 4.0. Where the older translation departs from the Greek, our wording follows the Greek and a translator’s note says so. Translator’s notes also explain hard words and mark places where the author departs from Scripture.
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