01.05. Question 05

Question 5. Whether Manifest Tyrants Can Lawfully Be Checked By Armed Force. To give a clearer answer to this question I must first lay down certain principles constituting as it were the foundations of the whole question. Assuredly, (it is clear) that peoples did not in the first instance originate from rulers, but whatever peoples desired to be ruled by a single monarch or by chief men elected by them were anterior to their rulers. Hence it follows that peoples were not created for the sake of rulers, but on the contrary the rulers for the sake of the people, even as the guardian is appointed for the ward, not the ward for the guardian, and the shepherd on account of the flock, not the flock on account of the shepherd. This proposition is not merely obvious in itself but may be corroborated by the history of nearly all nations, So much so that God Himself, although he had elected Saul to substitute him for Samuel in accordance with the desires of the people, yet willed1 that he should be chosen and accepted as King by the suffrages of the people. Thus David2 , although he had first been chosen as king by God Himself, yet would not undertake the administration of the Kingdom except he had first been confirmed by the suffrages and unfettered concord of the tribes of Israel. On similar grounds it happened even afterwards that though the kingship had by the will of God been granted to the family of David, yet in the last resort that one from the descendants of David should rule whom the people had approved and none other (unless perchance something irregular befell to prevent it as when now the Egyptian and then the Syrian kings ruled as tyrants over the people of God). So much so that this kingship was hereditary as far as the family was concerned, but elective as regards the individual incumbent, i.e. dependent upon the election of the people. This may be seen from the histories of Solomon3, Rehoboam4 , Joash5 , Ocias and Jehoahaz6 . For this reason also Absalom7 grasped the occasion of usurping his father’s throne. For thus Hushai the friend of David answered him8 : "Nay, but whom the LORD, and this people, and all the men of Israel have chosen, his will I be, and with him will I abide". In short, if we would investigate the histories of ancient times recorded by profane writers also, it will be established - as indeed Nature herself seems to proclaim with a loud voice - that rulers by whose authority their inferiors might be guided were elected for this reason that either the whole human race must needs perish or some intermediate class must be instituted so that by it one or more (rulers) might be able to command the others, (and) protect good men but restrain the wicked by means of punishments. And this is what not only Plato, Aristotle and the other natural philosophers - furnished with the light of human reason alone - have taught and proved, but God Himself by the utterance of St. Paul writing to the Romans 9:1-33, the rulers of almost the entire world, confirmed this with clear words. There the origin of all States and Powers is with the best of reasoning derived from God the author of all good. Thus Homer also recognized and freely testified when he called kings "the fosterlings of Zeus" and "the shepherds of the lost"10 . And therefore, since we are beginning a discussion concerning the power of Rulers, what shall prevent us from passing over to that prime origin from which they derived and from considering to what end they were instituted? For it is obvious that every discussion of things just or unjust must begin and end with the end (to which it exists). For we must judge that something has been rightly and duly done when it had attained that end to which it was designed. When therefore the duty of the rulers is inquired into, all will admit that it is assuredly right to remind them of their duty and also to admonish them roundly whenever they stray from it. But when a case occurs of either restraining tyrants who are such beyond a trace of doubt or of punishing them in accordance with their deserts, the majority commend patience and prayers to God so earnestly that they consider and condemn as mutineers and pseudo-Christians all those who refuse to bow their necks to torture. Here we are doubtless on dangerous ground; I would therefore once again beseech my readers to bear in mind my remarks immediately preceding lest they draw inadmissible conclusions from what must be said in the sequel. I admit that I most strongly approve of Christian patience as laudable beyond all the other virtues and never sufficiently commended; I admit that men should be zealously exhorted to it because it contributes largely to the attainment of eternal bliss: rebellions and all disorder I detest as awful abominations; in affliction especially I am of opinion that we should depend upon God alone; prayer accompanied by a serious recognition of our error I recognize as the true and necessary remedies for the overthrow of tyranny since this evil is rightly counted among the scourges sent by God for the chastisement of the people. But I deny that all these considerations deprive nations crushed by manifest tyranny of their right to safeguard themselves against it by means of prayers and repentance as well as other just remedies; and this I corroborate whilst I reply on the following powerful arguments.

Since these principles which were demonstrated above concerning the origin of kings and other rulers have been established, it follows that they are not legitimate rulers who by force or deceit usurp that authority which by no right belongs to them. Of such tyrants there are two kinds: for some, in violation of the laws laid down and received, usurp tyranny over their fellow-citizens, as Julius Caesar under the feigned title of perpetual dictator took possession of the Roman commonwealth; and many other tyrants, particularly in Greece, crushed the liberty of their country. Others however, not content with that absolute power which they rightfully acquire over their own people, extend their dominions at the cost of their neighbors’ liberty and increase them by means of fortified boundary-lines; for this reason have monarchies ever since the origin of the world achieved such wide dominions; of this the sacred writings offers us an example in Nimrod11 , as we also see that in this way the Israelites were generally oppressed by the neighboring peoples. Hence since those tyrants had no lawful right over the people of God, I maintain that the Israelites were free not merely to disobey the sinful commands of these peoples but even to set a just defense against their unjust violence, and that therefore the leaders of the tribes (of Israel) did a grievous wrong whenever they omitted to oppose the foreign foe with united courage and strength in defense of the liberty of their country, provided that the occasion for opposing him presented itself; for it admits of no doubt that even private individuals are bound by the law of both God and men to succor with all their power their country when oppressed and in distress, especially however when its religion and liberty are simultaneously endangered. For it was a true remark which the captive pirate dared to utter when he was dragged before Alexander; he declared that he differed in no way from (the king) but that the latter plundered the world with a multitude of ships whereas he did so with but a single vessel12 .

Objection. These remarks are not countered by objection which certain people are wont to make, namely that it is God by whom kingdoms and empires are transferred and exchanged and that therefore tyrants frequently gain the victory with the approval of God.

Answer. Far be it for me that I should on that account either support the view of Lucan13 who dared thus to write that "license had been granted to crime", or that I should condemn as unjust the cause of Demosthenes because he was overcome compelled to yield while defending the liberty of his country against the violence of Philip of Macedon whereas Philip came off victorious14 . These examples I use not that the consciences of pious men may rest upon them as upon rules, but because they are famous and very well known to most people, and for the further reason that though these events occurred among heathen nations, yet they are not so far removed from the standard of justice that it may not justifiably be said that justice was on one side and injustice on the other. For I would not hold that we must judge by the favorable or adverse result alone whether an undertaking was just or unjust - as indeed Demosthenes answered his opponent Aeschines what was reproaching him with the unfortunate result of the battle of Charoneia. For, to speak as Christians rather, God is generally wont thus to punish the sins of men or so far make trial of his people that he assigns to their undertakings, however good and just in themselves, an outcome far other than they had themselves expected, as may best be seen in the war which the remaining tribes of Israel waged against the children of Benjamin15 . But for all that God remains no less just, by whatever means He enforces His judgments; nor must it be held that the nations had a less lawful cause against their hostile tyrants because they were cast down by some just judgment of God and fell to ruin. Hence I could never approve of the view of those who without any distinction or exception at once and indiscriminately condemn all tyrannicides on whom the Greeks formerly bestowed such exceptional rewards16 . As little does the view of those command itself to whom the majority of liberations recorded in the Book of Judges 17:1-13 seen so foreign and strange that they are of opinion that these can in no way be adduced as examples. For however true it may be that those Judges of the people of Israel were moved and stirred to the performance of thEpigrammesose famous deeds by some divine and exceptional instinct, yet it does not immediately follow that the Israelites themselves, whether holding office or even as private citizens, could not in accordance with their ordinary right have expelled the tyranny of strangers who had been neither elected nor approved by the people. But that those liberations were effected by means of those men alone whom God summoned forth in a special way, does not go to disprove my contention, but rather demonst rates that the spirit of the Israelites had for their transgressions been stunned and broken by the just judgment of God. Therefore to follow those examples rightly and lawfully, I am of opinion that the following true means should be held fast, namely: if anyone strives to seize or has already usurped an unjust tyranny over others, whether he be a stranger or whether as a viper he leaps from the womb of his country that by his birth he may cause her death, then shall private citizen s before all else approach their legitimate magistrates in order that it may be the public enemy he cast forth by the public authority and common consent of all. But if the magistrate connives (at the attempt) or in some way refuses to perform his duty, then let each private citizen bestir himself with all his power to defend the lawful constitution of his country, to whom after God he owes his entire existence, against him who cannot be deemed a lawful magistrate since he either has already usurped that rank in violation of the public laws or is endeavoring to usurp it.

Next it should here be noted that a defect which originally adhered to an usurpation may afterwards be rectified, so much so that he who originally was a tyrant may become a lawful and inviolable ruler, that is of course if afterwards the free and lawful consent is gained of those who have the power to elect and appoint a true and lawful ruler. For example: The war undertaken against Caesar under the leadership of Pompey was just, though Caesar emerged victorious in it; but if it was true that Caesar afterwards by the free and voluntary assent of the Roman people obtained the supreme power under the pretense of a perpetual dictatorship, it would no longer be necessary to raise the question whether the conspiracy against him was just and lawful, unless it were shown forthwith that he had clearly abused those very dictatorial power. I venture to declare most positively that those leading citizens of Rome could have, and even should have, defended the Commonwealth against the Triumvirate; but I should not venture to maintain that Cinna and his associates could lawfully have conspired against the life of Augustus after the "Royal Law"18 as they call it had been promulgated and passed. But here too we must distinguish. It will, I think, readily be conceded to me that an agreement whether freely manifested by or extorted by means of violence or intimidation from the whole people or a majority of them should rather be annulled than observed if it were established beyond doubt that such agreement was clearly incompatible with fairness and honor. For who would persuade himself that some nation would freely, wittingly and unconstrained wish to subject itself to some ruler to this end that it might subsequently be murdered and utterly destroyed by him? But surely here again two (considerations) should be heeded, whenever those undertakings have to be annulled or set right to which agreement has been granted without due consideration: first nothing shall be attempted or done recklessly and, secondly, nothing by way of insurrection, but in due order and in a disciplined fashion as far as shall be possible. The present condition of the Christian Commonwealth furnishes us with two examples of this, both assuredly of the greatest importance. The first is that of the unjust and sinful submissiveness with which kings and nations have bound themselves by oath to the Roman Antichrist; I maintain that they are no more bound by that oath than if they had expressly and openly sworn to Satan that they would subvert all rights of God as well as men. The other example is that of the so-called temporal jurisdiction to which the ecclesiastic prelates have laid claim. Because this is diametrically opposed to the command of Christ as well as to the clearest examples of Him and of all Apostles - as particularly Saint Bernard has shown19 - it assuredly follows that of itself it is void since neither could the rulers divest and deprive themselves of that (jurisdiction), nor could the ecclesiastics receive it from kings or nations or acquire it at a price, much less should they have usurped it by force and cunning tricks as it is certain that they did in far the greater part of the world.

Let these remarks be made against tyrants who have unjustly grasped authority over their fellow-citizens or over foreign nations.Question 5 notes.

Question 5. Whether Manifest Tyrants Can Lawfully Be Checked By Armed Force.

1. 1 Samuel 10:1-27 & 1 Samuel 11:1-15 2. 2 Samuel 2:7; 2 Samuel 5:1-3 3. 1 Chronicles 29:22 4. 1 Kings 12:1-33 5. 2 Kings 11:12 6. 2 Chronicles 26:1; 2 Chronicles 36:1 7. 2 Samuel 15:1-13 8. 2 Samuel 16:18 9. Romans 13:1-5

10. For "Fosterlings of Zeus" see Homer passim, e.g. Iliad, XVII, 652; XXIV, 803, and Odyssey, IV, 391; XV, 155, 167. For "Shepherds of the lost" see ibid, e.g. Iliad, II, 85, 105; V, 566; XX, 110, and Odyssey, IV, 24, 532; XX, 106; XXIV, 368, 456.* 11. Genesis 10:8-18 12. Augustine, De civ. dei, IV, 4, 25. Cf Cicero, De repub., 3, 14, 24.

13. Lucan, De bello civili, 1, 2: "Iusque datum sceleri canimus". Cf. the latin text of Beza: "ius sceleri datum" (Ed. Sturm, p. 36.) 14. Demosthenes, De corona, 180 15. Judges 20:1-48 16. Aristotle, Politics, V, VIII, 7 and also 9 17. Judges 3:15-25

18. An allusion to lex regia. See Corpus Juris Civilis, Inst., I, 2, 6: "quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem, cum lege regia, quae de imperio eius lata est, populus ei et in eum omne suum imperium et potestatem comcessit." Cf. Dig., I, 4, 1.

19. St. Bernard of Clairvaux, De consideratione...ad Eugenium tertium, book 1, cap. 6. (Migne, P.L., 182, 735-36)