-02 Chapter 2. Of Virtue.

2-02 Chapter 2. Of Virtue.

1. There are two parts of obedience: Virtue, and the action of Virtue. 2 Peter 1:5, Add to your Faith Virtue, etc. For if these things are with you and abound, they will make you such that you shall neither be barren nor unfruitful in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ.
2. This distribution is of the whole into its members: for these two are in their own nature joined together, and they make one and the same obedience.
3. Hence both VIRTUES and their ACTIONS are set forth by the same name, and they are also explained by the same definition, because they are altogether of the same nature: even as arguments of Logic are of the same name and nature, whether they are considered alone and by themselves, or in Axioms and Syllogisms.
4. Virtue is a habit whereby the Will is inclined to do good.
5. Virtue is called a habit, not as it is distinguished from a disposition, nor as it signifies a confirmed and perfect constitution of mind — for such a degree of virtue is scarcely granted to men while they live here — but generally, as it contains both a perfect and also imperfect degree of Virtue and state of mind.
6. Virtue is called a habit, not only because it is attained, but also because it makes the subject731 which it is in, have a certain manner in itself. That is, virtue determines the faculty to do good, which otherwise would not be determined. This is the sense of this word in Hebrews 5:14, Who by reason of habit, have their senses exercised to discern good and evil.
7. Virtue is in the Will: 1. First, because the will is the proper subject of Theology as it is the proper principle of life, and of moral and spiritual actions. 2. Because the will is that faculty which is properly carried to good, that is honest, Romans 7:19, Romans 7:21.732 3. Because virtue is a habit that is proairetikov or elective: the proper and immediate operation of which is voluntary election. 4. Because the will commends the other faculties; and so Virtue most agrees to the will, so that all the faculties may be rightly directed. 5. Because the will is neither by itself, nor by reason, sufficiently determined to good actions; and so it needs its own and internal disposition to work rightly. 6. Because the other faculties may be compelled; and thus by consequence one may, whether he wills it or not, lose virtue if it were to have its proper and fixed seat in other faculties. 7. Because praise is most properly due for the actions of the will, and for the operations of the other faculties so far as they flow from and depend upon the will; it is taught not only by the philosophers, but also by the Apostle, that it is proper for virtue to be praise-worthy, Php_4:8, If there is any virtue, any praise... 8. Because the understanding cannot be the subject of virtue, for intellectual habits, even if they were most perfect, would not make a man good; nor would any sensitive appetite be the subject of virtue, because true virtue is found in Angels, and their souls being separated from bodies, are void of this sensitive appetite; yet there are often some dispositions in the sensitive faculties which cause the will, commanding aright, to be more easily obeyed; and in that respect, they have a certain resemblance to Virtue.
8. Virtue is said to incline to God: 1. First, that it may be distinguished from a vitious733 habit whereby men are inclined to evil, Romans 7:17, Romans 7:20, Romans 7:23.734 2. That it may also be distinguished from those perfections of the mind which indeed do bring light, whereby the will may direct itself as doing good, but not incline it to do right.
9. Hence, First, true and solid virtues always make a man good in whom they are found; not that the very dispositions that inhere in us are the grace that makes us first accepted by God, as the Schoolmen speak of it — for that pertains to Faith — but because they are reciprocated by a good man, and goodness is derived from them into our actions.
10. Hence also, none can use virtue amiss, as being the principle of their actions, when notwithstanding, men may and usually do abuse any habit of the mind.735
11. Therefore, those virtues which are usually called intellectual do not exactly respect virtue.736
12. Moreover, virtue is said to incline not only to good, but also to doing good:737 because the manner of action chiefly flows from virtue.
13. But as the rule of doing good is the revealed will of God, so also is the rule of virtue, which only has the force of a certain rule in those things which pertain to the directing of life.
14. That is a Lesbian rule 738 of virtue, which Aristotle considers to be the judgment of moral men: for there are never men so wise, that we may always stand to their judgment; even if there were, they could not always be known or consulted by those who exercise themselves in virtue.
15. That which is said to be right reason, if absolute rectitude is looked for, is not to be sought elsewhere than where it is to be found: that is, in the Scriptures. Nor does it differ from the will of God revealed for directing our life. Psalms 119:66, Teach me the excellence of reason and knowledge, for I believe your precepts. But if those imperfect notions concerning what is honest and dishonest are to be understood, which are found in the mind of man after the fall — seeing they are imperfect and very obscure — they cannot inform virtue exactly. Nor indeed do they differ any from the written Law of God, except in their imperfection and obscurity.
16. Therefore there can be no other discipline of virtue than Divinity, which delivers the whole revealed will of God for directing our reason, will, and life.
17. Those who think otherwise bring no reasons which may move an understanding and sound man. They say the end of Divinity is the good of grace; but the end of Ethics is a moral or civil good — as if no moral or civil good were in any respect a good of grace, and spiritual; as if the proper good (i.e. blessedness or the end of man) were manifold; or as if the virtue of a man could be what does not lead him to his end and chief good. They say that Divinity is exercised about the inward affections of men, but Ethics about the outward manners — as if either Ethics (which they define as a prudence to govern the will and appetite) did not respect the inward affection; or as if Divinity did not teach outward as well as inward obedience. They would have it that Ethics are concluded within the bounds of this life, but that Divinity extends to a future life — as if a blessed life were not one, or as if it were not of one and the same life; as if there were one rule presently, and another rule to come. They say that the subject of Ethics is a man, approved, good, and honest, but that the subject of Divinity is a godly and religious man — when notwithstanding, the Apostle expressly teaches that Divinity instructs us to live not only piously and religiously, but also temperately and justly: that is, approvedly and honestly, Titus 2:12.739 Add to these, that the most eager defenders of the contrary opinion, acknowledge and contend that Moral virtues are the Image of God in man, and thus are a degree of Theological virtue; and they contend that moral virtue, compared to spiritual virtue, is as warmth is to heat, and as the morning light is to the noon light. As therefore warmth and heat, morning and noon light, are taught in the same act, so also virtue is both moral and spiritual.
18. Therefore, the judgment and wit of that greatest master of arts, Peter Ramus,740 was no less pious than prudent when he wrote:
“If I were to wish for what I would obtain, I would rather that this learning of philosophy were delivered to children out of the Gospel, by some Divine that is learned “and of approved manners, than out of Aristotle by a Philosopher. A child will learn many impieties out of Aristotle, which it is to be feared he will forget too late: e.g. that the beginning of blessedness arises out of men; that the end of blessedness is bounded in man; that all virtues are wholly contained in man’s power; that they are obtained by man’s nature, art, and industry; that although these works are great and Divine, yet God is never involved in them, either as an aider or a workman; that Divine providence is removed from this theatre of human life; that there is not a word spoken of Divine Justice; that man’s blessedness is placed in this frail life,” etc.
19. But the same habit in a man which is called virtue as it inclines in his manner to God, is also called a gift, as it is given by God and inspired by the Holy Spirit; and it is called grace, as it is freely bestowed upon us by the special favour of God; it is also called fruit in respect to the perfection which it has, together with the profit and sweetness which is perceived from it; and in respect to the hope that it brings of eternal life, it is called blessedness by some.
20. Therefore, they weary themselves in vain who make seven gifts of the Spirit out of Isaiah 11:2, Upon whom the Spirit of Jehovah shall rest: the Spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and of might, the Spirit of knowledge and of the fear of Jehovah — and they carefully distinguish these from virtues, and have enough to do to demonstrate the proportion of every one of them to some virtue. For there are not only seven gifts of the Spirit — although no more than six are reckoned there — because only the chief and most kingly gifts in respect to the subject are remembered (for it is spoken of Christ). Other gifts are understood by a Synecdoche. Those gifts mentioned are not indeed distinguished from virtues, but by a metonymy, they set forth all virtues by their causes.
21. For although those χαρισμάτων [charismata], Graces, which are mentioned in 1 Corinthians 12:4, are indeed distinguished from virtues, yet Grace, when it is not an inherent perfection in us, either sets forth some particular virtue, or else it sets forth all virtues jointly, as it were, in His root.

22. It is also in vain to gather twelve fruits of the Spirit from Galatians 5:22 : The fruit of the Spirit is Love, Joy, Peace, Long-suffering, Kindness, Goodness, Faith, Meekness, Temperance, together with the addition which is found in the common translation; and they are compared to virtues, as said before about gifts. For they are not the only fruits of the Spirit which are expressed upon the present occasion, and explained in that passage using the names of the virtues themselves — because virtues are fruits: such fruits as are required and expected by the husbandman; and they agree to the nature of the seed which he sowed; and they also bring profit and sweetness with them when they are perceived: all of which agrees to virtues, and to their actions in a certain manner in respect to God; but the profit is chiefly in respect to us. This is also why holiness, as with all virtues, is not only called a fruit of the Holy Spirit, but also our fruit, Romans 6:22.741 It is this profit, together with the sweetness, that is shown in that passage to the Galatians, inasmuch as joy and peace are reckoned as fruits of the fruits.
23. Those who think they have found eight beatitudes in the Sermon of Christ (Matthew 5:1-48) also use the same judgment; for there is only one beatitude. But seeing it has diverse signs, namely all solid virtues, together with their operations, the Lord propounds certain singular virtues, or operations of virtues, which most agree to his Kingdom, and are very remote from human sense; he partly persuades them by the promise of blessedness, and also partly describes blessedness, or blessed men, by the study and profession of these virtues.
24. The common affections of virtue are those four which are usually called CARDINAL VIRTUES.742
25. For they do not make four kinds of virtues, as most have thought up to now — those who do violence both to virtue and to reason itself, as they constrainedly refer all singular virtues to those four heads — but there are four conditions which are necessarily required in that disposition which deserves the name of virtue.
26. The first condition is called JUSTICE, in that general sense whereby it sets forth an inclination to do rightly, giving every man his due; and it may be called the rectitude of virtue. The Apostle propounds a description of virtue in a certain heap of words in Php_4:8 : Whatever things are true, whatever things are honest, whatever things are just, whatever things are pure, whatever things are lovely, whatever things are of good report, if there is any virtue, and if any praise — in that description, although truth, Justice, and purity set forth one and the same nature of virtue, yet Justice most intimately sets forth the essence of it.
27. The second condition is PRUDENCE, whereby all the strength of reason is used to discover what is right, and to direct aright all its means. It is therefore the sole discerning of those things which pertain to doing right; and it contains in itself the force of understanding, knowledge, and wisdom. So that all those perfections of the mind with are usually called intellectual virtues, pertain to virtue in this respect alone: so far as by their power, the will is directed in doing good.
28. It is called in the Scripture, Spiritual understanding and wisdom, Colossians 1:9 : where understanding seems to set forth a general perceiving of good and evil; and wisdom denotes the same perceiving, but as it is applied to several things considered in the circumstances with which they are clothed. So that understanding is considered to say, ‘It is lawful,’ while wisdom says, ‘It is expedient,’ according to that distinction which is found in 1 Corinthians 6:12 and 1 Corinthians 10:23.743 To this understanding is opposed FOOLISHNESS: Ephesians 5:17, Therefore do not be unwise, but understanding what the Will of the Lord is; and IGNORANCE, Ephesians 4:18, Being strangers from the Life of God, by reason of the ignorance that is in them. Prudence is also called Judgment, 1 Corinthians 2:15; and Discerning, Php_1:9-10,744 to which is opposed VANITY of mind, Ephesians 4:17, and a mind that is void of all Judgment, Romans 1:28.745
29. This Prudence ought to be exercised, 1. With circumspection, taking heed and due diligence, which are often commended in the Scripture under the name of watchfulness: Mark 13:33, Take heed, watch and pray. To this diligence is opposed that drowsy sleepiness which is said to have seized the foolish Virgins, Matthew 25:5, Matthew 25:13.746 2. With election in due proportion, so that the greater duties are preferred before the lesser, and in every one, a convenient measure is kept according to the intent of the affections and strength. Matthew 6:33, Seek first the Kingdom of God and the righteousness of it. 1 Corinthians 12:31; 1 Corinthians 14:1 : Have affection for the greater gifts, that you may rather profit.
30. The third condition 747 of virtue is FORTITUDE, which is a firm persisting in doing rightly, enduring and overcoming all those difficulties which may arise either from the continuance of the act which is required, or from other impediments, whatever they may be. Hence, “virtue” in Hebrew is set forth by the name “Christ”,748 even when it is ascribed to Women, Proverbs 31:10.749 And a mighty strengthening is required in every virtue, Ephesians 3:16.750 It therefore contains,
FIRST, that confidence which is commended in Acts 4:29;751 to which fear is opposed: Php_1:14, That they are bold to speak the word without fear. SECONDLY, perseverance and constancy: Revelation 2:26, Whoever overcomes and keeps my works to the end... To this is opposed a fainting of mind, and weariness in doing good: Galatians 6:9, Let us not be weary; 2 Thessalonians 3:13, Do not be weary faint not; Hebrews 12:3; Hebrews 12:12, Lest you faint in your minds; Raise up the weak hands and feeble knees.THIRDLY, endurance or patience, James 5:7-8. Be of patient mind, and establish your hearts; Hebrews 10:36, For you have need of patience.752
31. The fourth condition is TEMPERANCE, whereby all those desires which divert men from doing good are assuaged and restrained; and so it makes virtue undefiled. 2 Timothy 2:4, None that goes to war entangles himself. 1 Peter 1:13, Gird up the loins of your mind, be sober, etc. In Scripture it is often called Sobriety when that word is used in a more general sense, as in 1 Peter 1:13 & 1 Peter 5:8;753 and purity or cleanliness of heart, 1 Timothy 1:5; 1 Peter 2:22;754 and also sincerity, as it excludes pollution by any mixture. This sense of the word is shown in 2 Corinthians 1:12 : With simplicity and sincerity of God, not with fleshly wisdom.
32. Of these four conditions of virtue, the first (Justice) orders, and as it were, constitutes a virtue; the second (Prudence) directs and frees it from error; the third (Fortitude) strengthens it against inconveniences; the fourth (Temperance) makes it pure, and defends it against all allurements which seduce it.
33. All these virtues seem to be prescribed and explained together, almost by name, in 2 Peter 1:5-6 :755 Add to Faith, Virtue – that is, Justice or a universal rectitude — to virtue, knowledge — that is, Prudence directing aright all your ways — to Prudence, continence756 — that is, the temperance by which you may contain yourselves from all allurements of those pleasures with which men are usually tempted and drawn away from the right way — to continence, Patience — that is, Fortitude, whereby you may endure any hardship for righteousness’ sake. But what follows about piety and charity, contains a distribution of virtue, to be propounded in its proper place.
34. Yet because every one of those affections757 appears more in some virtues than in others, some special virtues take both their name and their definition from them. For because an accurate rectitude most appears in the number, measure, weight, and value of those things which are mutually received and given by man, the term Justice in a special way is usually associated with such things. And because those inconveniences are held as most terrible, which usually happen in war and similar dangers, the term Fortitude is usually restricted to such things. Because the pleasures of the senses are usually most tickled, Temperance is for the most part, associated with them only — although those three, together with Prudence, taken in a general sense, are tied and folded together among themselves, as that Philosopher observed who first most nearly propounded those four heads of virtues.758
35. Though the form of virtue is placed by many in a certain mediocrity 759 between two vices in the extreme,760 that cannot be reasonably defended: 1. Because privation is not the form of a habit; and mediocrity is nothing else than a privation of a defect and an excess. 2. Because the form of virtue is to be sought in that conformity which it has to God’s rule; but this conformity does not only, chiefly, or sometimes at all consist in mediocrity. 3. Because virtue, in its formal respect, cannot be over-intended;761 and so it does not permit excess, except either in that material thing which it has in common with vices, or in the circumstances of its operations — as when some of them are exercised when they should not be, or are not exercised when they should be.
36. That mean which is found in all virtues, is nothing else than a conformity to their rule or measure; for by this they have certain measures and bounds in which their nature is, as it were, contained; so that they may not decline to the right hand or to the left (Deuteronomy 17:19-20); but for this reason, mediocrity is no more the form of virtues than it is of all other things which are distinguishable by certain forms and differences.
37. But those virtues which consist in the middle between two vitious habits,762 are not virtues because they consist in the middle, but because they consist in the middle as their rule prescribes. In this way, mediocrity — whether from the participation or the negation of the thing (Rei vel rationis 763), or with respect to it — is to be considered as a subject matter, rather than as a perfecting form.
38. But it is obvious that such mediocrity has no place in some virtues; for the love of God is not praised for being mediocre, but for being most ardent: here the measure is without measure.
39. There is similar reasoning for all virtues in respect to their proper and specific nature.764 Someone who gives when he should not, is not too liberal (too giving), but he gives too much. So in this respect he ceases to be liberal; and in the same act, he may be just as defective in not doing what he should.
40. The wise man indeed admonishes that we not be overly just, Ecclesiastes 7:16 765. But this is not at all to be understood about Justice in its nature (for Ecclesiastes 7:20 follows, that there is none that is just upon the Earth, who does good and does not sin). Rather it is about self-opinion, whereby many attribute too much to themselves, and would have it attributed to Justice; but we should always endeavour to true virtue, that we may more and more abound in it, as we are often admonished in the Holy Scriptures.766
41. There are no degrees in any particular kind of virtue, if it is considered in itself and in its extent. For there is no virtue, at least in its disposition, that does not extend itself to all those things which are contained within the compass of its object. Someone is not temperate if he moderates himself in one lust, while favouring himself in others. But in respect to the subject, one virtue may be stronger in one man than in another, either because of a more apt disposition by nature; or because he makes a greater habit of it; or because his reason has better judgment; or finally, because of a greater Gift of God.767
42. It is usually said that virtues are increased by daily use and exercise; that must be understood about solid virtues that proceed from sanctifying grace; and it must be understood that daily exercise is the disposing cause; and in some way it is the procuring cause by virtue of the promise of God. But it does not principally or properly produce such an increase of virtue.
43. But virtues are lessened by opposite vitious acts, and that lessening is in respect to the disposition which they bring, and by reason of the merit that is in them.
44. By however much the acts of virtues, or the contrary vices, are more intent, more frequent, and more continual, they will prevail that much either to increase or diminish virtues.
45. Hence comes that distinction of virtues into human and heroic; into virtues purging, purged, and exemplary; of those who are endued with virtue, they are distinguished into Infants and Men of ripe age, Hebrews 5:13-14.768
46. The communion of virtues is both in their connexion and subordination among themselves.
47. For connexion is that whereby all virtues which are plainly necessary, cling together among themselves. 1. In respect to the source from which they flow; for every good giving and every perfect gift descends from the Father of lights, by the Spirit of grace, James 1:17; 1 Corinthians 12:4-7.769
2. In respect to the end and intention of virtue, which is generally to the same thing; for all virtues so respect God, that if his authority is violated in one, it is virtually violated in all, James 2:10.770 3. In respect to that helping endeavour which virtues mutually perform to one another. For one virtue disposes another to act, and also defends and confirms that virtue with the act.
48. Yet virtues are not so essentially and intrinsically knit together that every one is of the essence of the other, or necessarily depends upon it as it would upon a procreating cause.
49. Subordination of virtues is that [relation] whereby the act of one virtue is ordered according to the act and object of another; this is either as a means to an end, which is the command of a superior upon an inferior virtue — as Religion commands Justice, Temperance, and the like, when it refers their acts to furthering the worship and glory of God — or as a cause to its effect, which belongs to every virtue in respect to every other virtue; for thus Religion itself is ordained to bring forth and conserve Justice.
50. Whenever the act of one virtue is ordered to the end of another virtue, this ordination, although it depends upon Prudence in respect to directing the act, it depends upon a superior virtue in respect to its effectual force and authority.771