01 - Chapter 1

THE ART OF PREACHING IN THE LIGHT OF ITS HISTORY LECTURE I BIBLICAL, AND CLASSICAL BASES OF PREACHING AS AN ART WHEN your honored President gave me the invitation on behalf of the Faculty of this Seminary to deliver a course of lectures on the Holland foundation my first feeling was that of gratification at receiving this honor and opportunity. My second thought was what theme should be chosen for a series of addresses intended mainly for preachers and those who are deeply interested in preaching.

Since many years of my life were given to the study and teaching both of the theory and the history of preaching it was not hard for me to believe that I might hope to bring to you something of interest and profit in a brief historic survey of the main features of the art or theory of preaching as it has been taught and practiced in the course of the Christian centuries. We have come, after an easily understood analogy, to call the subject Homiletics, and to provide for the teaching of it in our seminaries for the training of preachers.

Homiletics needs and deserves a new appraisement. It is worthy of a more scientific study and treatment than it usually finds among those who teach and learn it, and it is entitled to far more respectful consideration than it ever has received from thinkers in the wider ranges of general science. The importance of preaching in history and in existing social conditions would seem to justify, if not demand, a better attitude toward the theory of preaching. Whether regarded merely as an accepted discipline of the theological schools, or more justly as a body of long and carefully tested principles for guidance in the performance of a great social task, homiletical theory has a claim to scientific recognition and treatment.

Along with the other Christian institutions, preaching has a notable history as one of the great forces which have made for human culture. If there is a history of art, of science, of philosophy, of literature, of music, of worship, of doctrine, of hermeneutics, of criticism, is there not also a history of preaching and of its theory? And are not these histories worth research and record? As in other great departments of knowledge a double process of development may be traced; that of action and that of thought practice and theory.

All along they have reacted on each other; practice has developed theory and theory has in turn guided and improved yes, sometimes refined and weakened practice. The question is, Is preaching an art? If our notion of art is hopelessly vitiated by thoughts of unreality and mere artifice, we ought not to think of preaching as an art. But if we have the proper conception of art we need not fear the term. If any sustained action and product of the human mind and body working together to effect impression through expression may be called an art, preaching certainly falls under that definition. This is the practical side.

Then is Homiletics an art? That which teaches how an art may be learned and practiced may itself be called an art. This is the theoretical side. The total concept of an art then lies in the cooperation of theory and practice to the end of expression in a product which shall in its turn produce impression. Art is social or nothing. An observer or observers must be either real or imagined. Even the pseudo-critical phrase, “art for art’s sake,” carries this implication, for it sup poses an uncritical or undeveloped taste which must be cultivated; and this, of course, necessitates those in whom the faulty taste resides.

Now the sense-appeal of art is almost exclusively to eye and ear; at least the other senses may be left out of account, as they must in all cases be either substitutes or auxiliaries. But it is evident that the primary and simple appeal of art to sight and hearing is enlarged, complicated and enforced by combination and derivation. All public speaking, oratory in general, is accordingly a complicated and highly developed art.

Taking up the group of arts to which preaching and its theory belong, we have no difficulty in relating them directly to oratory, and more generally to the language arts. Now the language arts may be distinguished, according to the mode of expression, as oral and literary. Whoever seeks to express himself in language so as to produce impression must do so either through signs and characters which appeal to the eye (written or printed words) or through sounds and modulations which appeal to the ear (sung or spoken words) or by some combination of these modes of expression, as where written or printed words may be spoken or sung, or words that have been spoken or sung may afterwards be written or printed and read silently. It is easy then to define the place of preaching among the language arts; if there is written preparation for it, or if there is written or printed reproduction of it, a place may be given to it among the literary arts; but if, as its nature requires, we have in mind chiefly public verbal expression for the sake of impression, then preaching is one branch of the art of oratory. But it is more than this. Its other connections and aims forbid that it should be so simply and narrowly defined. It is an established institution of the Christian religion; as such it is a function of worship; it is a means of public instruction in religion and morals; it is a great and worthy social occupation to which some of the best intellects and characters in human history have been devoted; it is, in the preparation required for its best exercise and in its actual performance, an individual function possessing both interest and merit. What is here said is presented from the practical side, but the theoretical side is necessarily involved, for the teaching of the art and the principles back of the teaching are wrapped up in the practice. The historic development of a theory or art of preaching arose and proceeded from a combined Biblical and classical (Graeco-Roman) initiative. The Bible furnished the motive, content and inspiration of Christian preaching, while the classic (Graeco-Roman) oratory (practice) and rhetoric (theory) supplied forms and rules for public discourse. We are therefore helped to a better understanding of the historic unfolding of Homiletics by a survey of the Biblical and classical impulses from which that development started. The Biblical Impulse

We are ready to ask then, Do we find any traces of rhetorical, or homiletical, theory in the Scriptures Preaching there is, and of the noblest sort; but along with the practice is there anything which may fairly be called theory or art? If this means any set of definite rules for the composing and delivering of religious discourses we of course must answer in the negative; but if it implies that certain principles to guide in the practice of preaching may be found in the Bible, we shall have to say that at least hints and suggestions are given in both the Old and the New Testaments. As to the Old Testament, granting that the prophets represent the proclamatory and the scribes the didactic, and both classes the hortatory, elements of preaching as a practice, are there any indications of a corresponding theory of religious discourse? Were there any accepted canons and any definite instruction as to the manner of giving religious discourses? It must be confessed that the data for forming an opinion on this point are somewhat scanty; but they are not wholly want ing. A slight indication is given in the provision for general education among the Hebrews. Three stages are recognized in the progress of Hebrew education: (1) the early period when home was the place and parents the teachers; (2) a later period, after the exile, when to the preceding there were added the scribes and the synagogue; (3) the last period, that of the rabbis and their schools. In all these it was incumbent on the learners to read and copy and repeat passages of the Scriptures. In the later times the public reading and exposition of Scripture seem to presuppose at least some instruction for the better performance of the duty. In all periods we know that careful attention was paid to the very words of the sacred text.

There is a more definite indication in the literature of the Old Testament. Its general character, especially in the prophetic writings, gives evidence of more or less of training in the art of expression, both oral and literary. There is unmistakable indication of care and presumably, therefore, of previous instruction in oratorical composition. Of course natural ability must be presupposed, and the divine call and empowering must not be forgotten; but along with all this one cannot read the remains of Joel, Amos, Micah, Zephaniah, and others of the minor prophets, and still less the immortal utterances of Isaiah and Jeremiah, without feeling sure that these men had studied to good effect the best ways of making their messages impressive to their hearers. They were not only great orators but trained orators.

They not only knew, but knew how. The case of Amos is of special interest because in a well-known passage (Amos 7:14-15) he disclaims being a prophet or a son of a prophet. But this disclaimer seems to refer to his occupation prior to his call and authorization rather than to lack of technical preparation for his work. On the contrary Dr. Davidson * speaks of Amos as the “oldest literary prophet, “ and as having “the prophetic mannerism and technique.” In the books of Proverbs and Ecclesiastes there are a few striking traces of rhetorical care, implying at least some rhetorical culture. Wisdom, instruction, and propriety i Hastings D. B., IV, p. 109. of speech are noted in Proverbs 1:1-4; and in Proverbs 25:11 we have a rhetorical principle of perennial importance: “A word fitly spoken is like apples of gold in network of silver/ In the classic passage, Ecclesiastes 12:9-12, we find a “preacher,” or master of assembly, who was himself “wise” and “taught the people knowledge,” who “pondered,” “gave ear,” “sought out proverbs,” sought “ac ceptable words,” or “words of delight”; there is praise of “the words of the wise” which are as “goads,” or incitements to action, and as “nails” which hold a structure together; there is mention of “many books” and of “much study,” with cautionary advices. Certainly from hints such as these we may infer that in the preparation of men for public duty as religious teachers, attention was duly paid to the study and selection of the language and form of discourse.

Further inference as to the existence of rhetorical instruction among the Hebrews may be drawn from their institutions: the order of Prophets, the order of Scribes, and the Synagogue. The long continued activity of an order of men whose chief duty was public religious speech certainly implies not only a body of traditional principles for the better performance of that duty, but also some instruction in those principles. The fact that so-called “schools of the prophets” are known to have existed adds force to this deduction, but too much force must not be allowed to it. For the school,” as applied to these communities or bands of prophets, is not itself found in the accounts of them; and we have no means of knowing how much attention was paid in these guilds or communities to study and disciplinary training for the exercise of the prophetic function. We may not, however, resist the conclusion that there was likely to have been some such instruction; but it would be a violent assumption to discover in the notices of these “sons of the prophets” a description of a modern theological seminary with its course in Homiletics! * It is not important for our present inquiries to determine the time when the order of scribes arose. We find them well established in New Testament times, and they certainly existed long before then. Their main business was the interpretation and teaching of the law, but this was enlarged to mean the whole body of Scripture. So that theirs was primarily a teaching function. While thus the content of their teaching is the main thing, yet it is reasonable to infer some attention to the form also of their discourses. The hortatory or applicatory part of their teaching called haggada was really preaching. Prof. Eobertson Smith, as quoted in Hastings Bible Dictionary, says it was “doctrinal and practical admonition, mingled with parable and legend... It was recognized as a rule of faith and life, and embraced doctrinal topics, practical exhortation, embellishments and fabulous developments of Bible narratives.” It is

1 See 1 Samuel 10:5, 1 Samuel 10:10, 1 Samuel 10:12; 2 Kings 2:3, 2 Kings 2:5, 2 Kings 2:7, 2 Kings 2:15; 2 Kings 4:1, 2 Kings 4:38; 2 Kings 6:1. scarcely to be denied that for instruction in this kind of teaching there must have been something more than example, though as to the amount and details of such technical training we are left to conjecture. Yet it is surely not an unreasonable inference, in view of the evidence which has been presented that there was some kind and degree of rhetorical or homiletical instruction among the ancient Hebrews. Can we find any traces of homiletical teaching in the New Testament? The historic basis of Christian preaching as such, both in its proelamatory and didactic forms, is of course to be found in the work of Jesus and his apostles. They preached both in the synagogues and in the open air, in private houses and other more retired places, as occasion offered or required. The content of their message is also well understood and need not here be considered. Among their teachings did they include any instructions which may fairly be called homiletical? Did Jesus and his apostles teach others how as well as whet to preach?

First, let us inquire whether the teaching of Jesus shows any attention, either in his own practice or in his instructions to others, to rhetorical, or homiletical, principles? x Let us waive the curious question of any instruction, general or homiletical, which in his human development our Lord i There is a thorough and able survey of the preaching and methods of Jesus in The Master Preacher a Study of the letics of Jesus, by Albert R. Bond, D.D. may have received. It is not improbable that he attended the synagogue school at Nazareth; but that he owed much if anything, humanly speaking, to the schools, either as to the contents or the manner of his teaching is exceedingly doubtful. The astonishment produced by his teaching, its marked contrast to that of the scribes, and especially the wondering question (John 7:15), “How knoweth this man letters, having never learned?” all go to show that the traditional lore and methods of the schools were little or nothing to him. But does his teaching show any care of form and method, as well as of content? Did he have and practice we ask with all reverence a homiletical method of his own? In his addresses as we have them there is wealth and vari ety of what may be called homiletical material.

Scripture fills an eminent place, being employed as authority, quoted frequently, often expounded, habitually assumed as revelation, and reverenced as the word of God. Authoritative assertion, based on his glorious consciousness of truth, gave power to his speech and impressed his hearers as one of his most marked qualities. Yet also he frequently used argument with powerful effect, and that both in its direct and indirect forms; his refutative logic was often crushing. And what is to be said of his wonderful illustrations? From the more elaborate parables down to brief mention and passing allusion there was mastery of this method of preaching. His application of truth to his hearers, both individual and general, is thorough, appropriate; often final. Thus in the Master’s own practice we find the indispensable and perennial homiletical categories of Scripture, Experience, Argument, Illustration, all used with marvelous skill to the crown of them all; Application. But what of order and language, or in rhetorical phrase, Arrangement and Style? While we discover no prominence of logical order or distinctly marked analysis in the recorded discourses of Jesus, there is yet in most of the longer ones an evident order and progress of thought, showing that he was not indifferent to this element of power in public discourse. The fadeless charm of his language scarcely needs comment; at times sweet simplicity, then suggestive obscurity, poetic grace, logical strength, fitness to thought and occasion, moving eloquence all were at his command.

We do not find in our Lord’s sayings or teachings any definite instructions which could be called homiletical; but his own example of careful speech, his remarks (Matthew 12:36-37) about the value of words, his teachings on many other points of detail in regard to hearing and preaching, his instructions in regard to prayer, and the general command to preach, may be taken as giving some hint at least that in his unrecorded teachings he may have sometimes touched upon matters regarding the forms and methods of presenting truth. It may be worth while to remark that the language of Matthew 10:19-20, cannot be interpreted as forbidding preparation for preaching; for it distinctly refers to over-anxiety on the part of the disciples in regard to their defense when they should be brought before rulers for the gospel’s sake. (See also Luke 12:11-12; Luke 21:15) In the Acts and Epistles there are some data from which we may infer at least a measure of attention to homiletical theory. The reported addresses of Peter in the early chapters of Acts show excellent homiletical skill. The narrative manner of Stephen’s speech (Acts 7:1-60) suggests the synagogue method, as does also that of Paul in Pisidian Antioch (Acts 13:1-52). There is clear evidence in Paul’s addresses of rhetorical training, both Jewish and classical. The short report (which most probably was given by himself) of the notable address on the Areopagus at Athens reveals not only a rare degree of oratorical skill, but the sure traits of culture. And the same may be said of the defense before Festus and Agrippa. In 1 Corinthians 1:17; 1 Corinthians 2:1-5, 1 Corinthians 2:13, we have the passages in which Paul depreciates as a medium of communicating the gospel “the words which man’s wisdom teacheth,” stating that on coming to Corinth he determined to “know nothing among them but Christ and him crucified.” These utterances have been unwarrantably pressed in the interest of discrediting proper study, and also in support of the unfounded hypothesis that Paul was conscious of bavins: made a failure at Athens when he attempted to use oratory in its home, and came to Corinth chastened and determined to discard in the future any attention to rhetoric. All this seems to me utterly wrong. It is far more likely that Paul would have taken his speech at Athens as an illustration of the principle here laid down. For when we remember that the style of popular speaking in that sub-classical age was degenerate and tawdry, bombastic and extravagant, we must see that the noble restraint, the sincere dignity, the faultless style of the Athenian address is as far as possible removed from the prevailing rhetorical fashion. It is good homiletics at any time and place to discard the meretricious aids of false taste and exaggerated conceits, and deliver a plain, chaste, straightforward message. This Paul did and commended. In the Epistles to Timothy several passages contain excellent homiletical hints, though of course nothing like formal homiletical instruction. Among the qualifications of the bishop (1 Timothy 3:2) is that he shall be “apt to teach,” implying skill as well as character and knowledge. In 1 Timothy 4:13-16 Paul urges that Timothy “give attention to the reading, the exhorting, the teaching”; that he should not neglect his gift, that he should “meditate on these things,” and that he should “take heed to himself and his teaching.” In 1 Timothy 5:17 he speaks of the elders “who labor in discourse and teaching.” In 2 Timothy 1:13 he mentions a “form of sound words” and though this refers probably to the body of doctrine, yet the phrase is significant. In 2 Timothy 2:2 he exhorts that what Timothy had received he should commit to “faithful men who should be able to teach others also”; in 2 Timothy 2:15-16 he urges that Tim othy be diligent to be a good workman, shunning “profane and vain babblings”; and in 2 Timothy 2:24 again insists on aptness to teach as an indispensable qualification for the minister. We cannot be wrong in inferring from these hints that a previous and continued training for the preacher’s task would, in Paul’s view, include attention to the manner as well as the content of his message. And on the whole we may say that while nothing like formal homiletical instruction in the modern sense may be found in the New Testament, yet there are clear indications that the ability to present the truth of God effectively in human speech is both exemplified and enjoined by the highest authority. And this surely is the essence and justification of homiletical theory.

We come now to see how to some extent parallel with this Biblical teaching there grew up, espe cially among the ancient Greeks and Eomans, a highly developed rhetoric, or theory of public speaking which joined with the Biblical principles to produce in time a theory of preaching, or art of Christian discourse. The Classical Impulse The splendid oratory of the Greek and Roman peoples during the flourishing periods of their history is too well known to need more than passing reference. Along with the practice a theory was also developed, and the Graeco-Roman rhetoric has been a rich storehouse of principles for all subsequent times. In deed, there has been little of real value or original thought added to the ancient treatises.

What has followed has been mostly in the way of necessary development and of adaptation to later times, languages and conditions. The Greek theory of oratory received its most scientific and enduring expression in Aristotle’s work on Rhetoric. Aristotle died in 322 B. C. The Ro-man rhetoric found its best and completes treatment in the works of Cicero and Quintilian, the former of whom died B. C. 43, and the latter about A. D. 120, possibly earlier. The Roman rhetoric was very largely dependent on the Greek as was the case in other departments of literature though Quintilian *s work is a far more finished and complete performance than Aristotle s.

We thus see that at the time when the ancient rhetoric came in contact with the post-biblical preaching the theory of public speaking had reached a high state of development and needed only adaptation to Christian discourse. And homiletical theory, both in its origin and in its development, is the application of accepted principles of public speaking to the particular ends and demands of the Christian gospel. Our business now is to trace briefly the rise and perfecting of this ancient classical rhetoric up to its impact upon the even more ancient though partly parallel development of Biblical prophecy, preaching and hermeneutics. The origin of the Greek people and their language cannot be traced, but their history and literature reveal them as a speaking people. In the Homeric poems the heroes are orators as well as warriors. Herodotus and Thucydides, as well as other historians, make record of speeches, and even report or invent them. Thucydides devotes especial attention to the noble oratory of Pericles. The drama also indicates the sway which oratory held in the popular esteem and customs. Lastly, oratory itself extended from practice into literature and theory. Published orations and treatises on the art of speaking are the latest development of Greek letters. Grote accounts for this oratorical element of Grecian culture as lying in the genius and language of the Hellenic peoples, in their love of liberty and their forms of government, in the parallel and sympathetic development among them of philosophy and art, in their popular assemblies, and especially in the nature of their law courts and systems of pleading. Jebb points out two forces in the origin and development of technical studies of oratory: (1) The impulse given to Greek thought and culture by the dialectic philosophy of the Ionian schools; and (2) the technical rhetoric of the Sicilian teachers.

Neither of these movements originated at Athens, but both found early lodgment and careful attention in the chief seat of Hellenic culture. The dialectic impulse came chiefly from Protagoras (who taught how to make the weaker cause appear the stronger), Prodicus (who taught how to distinguish synonyms), and Empedocles, the philosopher-poet of Sicily. The strictly rhetorical impulse came from Gorgias (a pupil of Empedocles), Korax, and Tisias (a pupil of Korax), all of Sicily. Grote was inclined to recognize Empedocles and Gorgias as the beginners of properly rhetorical instruction among the Greeks, but Jebb, with apparently better reason, considers Korax of Syracuse (B. C. 466) as the founder and father of Greek rhetoric, so far as that distinction may be given to any one man. At any rate it was he that published the first treatise which professed to give rules for the art of public speaking. In B. C. 466, Thrasybulus, tyrant of Syracuse, was overthrown and a democracy established. By him and his predecessors much land had been from time to time confiscated and bestowed on different ones, so that on the fall of the tyrant numerous claimants for these lands arose, and there was great confusion as to titles. The causes had to be tried before the popular courts, and the claim ants were required to present their arguments in person. Many were timid and unskilled in speaking. So Korax drew up a system of rules and taught the pleaders how to present their claims.

Cope, in his Introduction to Aristotle’s Rhetoric (p. 28), speaks very slightingly of this famous treatise, saying that it was occupied wholly with the argument from probability which was nothing more nor less than to make the worse appear the better reason, “in other words, to subvert truth and justice.” I have never seen the treatise nor any analysis of it and cannot therefore uphold or dispute the fairness of Cope’s criticism; but it seems a little one-sided and severe though no doubt well founded. Tisias was a pupil of Korax and carried on the work of his master. Gorgias, a contemporary of these and a pupil of Empedocles, came to Athens on a political errand and so captivated the Athenians by his florid style of eloquence that he was (no doubt easily!) induced to remain and become a teacher of the art of speaking. After him the orator Antiphon combined theory and practice by being both a pleader in the courts and an instructor of others. Lysias, as is well known, wrote speeches for his clients; and Isaeus, the teacher of Demosthenes, did likewise, besides giving instruction in oratory. The method of these earliest teachers has perpetuated itself. There was study of treatises, like that of Korax, which was speedily followed by many others; there was lecture or conversational discussion with the pupils; there was critical study, under the teacher’s guidance, both of the poets and orators; and there were models fur nished by the teacher, and exercises submitted by the pupils. Thus, as often, are we reminded of the famous saying of Sydney Smith, that “the ancients have stolen all of our best ideas. “Greek oratory and rhetoric practice and theory came to their culmination in the same age; the one in Demosthenes and the other in Aristotle, both of whom died in the year 322 B. C. The immortal treatise of Aristotle was the fruit of his reflections and teachings during the years of his great career as a teacher at Athens of all the elements of knowledge current in his day. The limits of this lecture forbid any study of this mar velous man and his many-sided and lasting influence upon thought and culture. We have here in view only his rhetorical theory. Quintilian some where states that Aristotle was accustomed to talk on rhetoric with his pupils as he walked, on the covered ways (peripatoi, hence Peripatetic) of his famous Lyceum, in the afternoons. We might infer from the wretched style and arrangement in which the great treatise reaches us that post prandial dullness and jog-trot conversation both figured somewhat in its preparation. Perhaps it is more charitable to assume that the work was not written by Aristotle at all, but is only the conglomerate notes of his pupils and taken in after noon walks! At any rate some sort of apology is due to posterity for the form in which this most interesting and valuable production has come down to us. A brief synopsis of its contents is all that can be here presented.

After preliminary definitions and explanations the three main topics treated as essential to rhetorical theory are Arguments (xforttf). Diction (Ae z), and Order (ragity and it might be assumed that the treatment would adhere to this lucid and comprehensive division, but it does so only in a general way. There are three books and the outline of them is this:

Book I. The Nature of Oratory and Rhetoric.

(Aristotle himself gives no such indication of his matter. This heading is inferred from the contents.) In chapters 1-3 there are introductory definitions and explanations: The relation of logic to rhetoric is stated, the utility of rhetoric defended, and rhetoric is defined as “the faculty of considering in any subject that which will in duce belief. It is the art of persuasion and there fore deals mostly with argument. Arguments are classified as (1) Technical (those which lie in the scope of rhetoric itself, i. e., may be produced or discovered by the speaker); and (2) Untechnical (those which lie outside of the speaker’s mind, external, legal, documentary, etc.). The Technical or Rhetorical Arguments are further explained as being derived (1) from the character of the speaker, (2) from the disposition of the hearer, and (3) from the speech itself i. e., the form its argument takes, whether (-1) enthymeme (rhetorical deduction) or (b) example (rhetorical induction). The three kinds of oratory are then distinguished: (1) Deliberative (political, legislative); (2) Epideictic (no good English equivalent; show oratory, declamatory, platform, belonging to some occasion, memorial, invective, etc., in other words “the big speech”); (3) Judicial, or Forensic (pertaining to law courts). In chapters 4-15 there follows a more detailed discussion of these, with suggestion of the topics appropriate to each. As an appendix to the treatment of judicial oratory Aristotle mentions and dismisses the untechnical arguments, such as testimony, oaths, deeds, etc.

Book II. Discussion of the Technical Arguments TTiffreis. The threefold distinction is reduced to two by merging the first two (those relating to speaker and hearer) into one, which are called ethical arguments, and are treated at length in chapters 1-18. In this section (2-11) there is an acute discussion of the feelings and how they are to be reached, such as anger and placability, love and hatred, confidence and fear, benevolence, pity, etc. Varieties of character and condition (age and fortune) are also brought under penetrating review, and the way to deal with them.

Then the logical arguments, i. e., those inhering in the speech itself, are taken up and discussed in chapters 19-26. First he briefly notices the common topics (c. 19), i. e., those belonging to all kinds of oratory, such as possibility, fact (past or future), and degree. Then there is a strong study of the rhetorical induction and deduction (example and enthymeme). Of the latter there is an ill-arranged enumeration of twenty-eight varieties.

Then comes a discussion of fallacies and of refu tation.

Book III. Diction (Style,A#tf) and Order (Ar- By way of preliminary in chapter 1 the three fold division into argument, style and arrangement is noted. Then the matter of delivery and voice is taken up. The subject is dismissed in a very brief but luminous and suggestive way.

Then follows a disjointed and repetitious discussion of diction or style. It is full of good things, but does not readily lend itself to brief analysis, and to enumerate all the points would take too much space. Such matters as faults of diction and construction, use of words, figures of speech, purity, dignity, rhythm, etc., are presented with sense and spirit. The four chief “virtues” of style are held to be: clearness, fitness, impressiveness, and beauty. Lastly and briefly, chapters 13-19, ar rangement is considered. The necessary parts of a speech are only two: Proposition and Proof; but Introduction and Conclusion may be added, making four. The Introduction may be derived from the speaker, the subject (or occasion), the audience, or the opponent. The Statement, or Narration varies according to the kind of oratory Epideictic, Forensic, or Deliberative. The Proof may be either direct (arguments appropriate to the kind of oratory again) or indirect, as interrogation, reply, ridicule. The Conclusion has one or more of four aims: (1) To incline the hearer favorably; (2) To amplify or dimmish for effect; (3) To appeal to feeling; or (4) To recall the line of thought.

It is a remarkable fact that this, the most suggestive and scientific treatise on rhetoric which appeared in ancient times, and almost in any time, came not from a professional rhetorician nor from an orator, but from a great all-round philosopher who was chiefly intent on other subjects but took this in as an important element of his teaching. This goes far to explain both the merits and the glaring defects of the work. It is easy to criticize its faulty arrangement, its inadequate definition, its dry and difficult style, its vexatious obscurities, and many other details here and there. But on the whole criticism is lost in admiration when we consider the ample knowledge, the wealth of illustration, the penetrating judgment and discrimination, the broad and firm grasp of fundamental and universal principles, the depth and acuteness of thought, and the exhaustiveness of suggestion displayed in this brief and vigorous treatise. How much Aristotle may have owed to his predecessors we may not say, but probably not much; for he commonly speaks very slightingly of other works. As it stands Aristotle’s Rhetoric is the supreme achievement of the Hellenic mind on the subject of which it treats. Besides the Rhetoric Aristotle wrote a less valuable work, to which he sometimes refers the Topics, or helps to invention. In the early Roman times there was a developing native oratory, but the later influence of the Greek practice and theory gave both to speaking and writing a Grecian method and bent. The lack of originality in the Latin literary product is notorious. Yet there was some slight theoretical instruction in public speaking in the early republican days of Rome. The Senate and Forum taught by example. Cato the Censor spoke contemptuously of rhetorical studies, and Crassus (himself an orator) when consul warned the people against the encroachment of Greek studies in this art. But Crassus had himself studied the Greek rhetoric, and Cato in spite of his growling had drawn up a set of rules for speaking derived mainly from his studies in Greek literature. One of his short rules is worth remembering: Rem tene, verba sequentur.

About B. C. 100 formal instruction in both Greek and Latin literature and rhetoric is said to have begun at Rome. Mommsen (Vol. III., p. 565) mentions an ancient Latin treatise on rhetoric dating from the time of Sulla as being “ remark able not merely for its close, clear and firm handling of the subject, but above all for its comparative independence as respects Greek models. “Julius Caesar wrote a treatise on the art of speaking correctly, and dedicated it to Cicero a fact which the orator mentions with pride (Brutus, chap. Ixxii), and proceeds to say that Caesar “laid it down as an axiom that an accurate choice of words is the foundation of eloquence. “ Cicero’s own rhetorical works are well known the treatise on Invention (derived almost entirely from Aristotle’s Topics and claiming no originality), the famous dialogue on the Orator, and the Brutus, or dialogue on the Celebrated Orators. These were not manuals of instruction, but literary treatises, very pleasant reading and giving careful discussion from many points of view of the accepted principles of oratory traditional and prevalent in Cicero’s time. But the great Latin treatise on rhetoric is the truly admirable and exhaustive work of Quintilian, the Education of an Orator, or, as sometimes called, the Institutes of Oratory. In passing from Aristotle to Quintilian we make a great leap: in time it is nearly four hundred years; in culture it is from the Greek at its culmination to the Roman in its early decline; in men it is from a great all-round thinker and genius to a cultivated specialist of excellent talent but no great depth of thought; in works it is from the original and suggestive but incomplete and unpolished production of a master mind chiefly intent and notably great in other departments, to the highly elaborated single achievement of a sound judgment and well-read intelligence directed through a long life to this one task.

Little is known of the life of Quintilian. Born, it seems, in Spain he came to Rome in the brief reign of the emperor Galba, and remained there a teacher of rhetoric all his long life, dying probably in A. D. 118, or thereabout. He was highly esteemed both in character and as a highly successful teacher. He was one of the first of those who received at Vespasian’s order a salary from the public revenues of the city; and Domitian committed to him the education of his great-nephews, presumably heirs to the purple. By the same emperor he was invested with the insignia of the consulship an event which is thought to have occasioned Juvenal’s sneer: Si fortuna volet fies derketore consul. Quintilian was incidentally a pleader in the courts, but with all his heart a teacher of oratory. And the practice and teaching of a lifetime are condensed in his famous book. This elaborate and satisfying production is wrought out in twelve books. It was actually written in about two years, though the studies, labors and reflections of many years lay back of its publication. It covers a wide range as the course of education was in that age chiefly rhetorical discussing many subjects which would now be classed in other departments of culture. It is complete in topics, thorough and discriminating in treatment, and attractive in style. The first book treats of the primary education of youth preparatory to oratorical training; the second book discusses the nature and principles of rhetoric; from the third to the seventh inclusive, the topics of invention and arrangement are considered; from the eighth to the eleventh, style and delivery are handled; and in the twelfth there is discussion of some important practical matters such as the orator’s morals, principles, choice of work, retirement, etc. The work has always been recognized by competent judges as a masterpiece. It has, of course, greatly colored and influenced all subsequent teaching and treatment of rhetoric. It is far superior to Aristotle’s work as a manual, as well as in the completeness and orderliness of its treatment, though falling below in originality and power of thought. The two treatises taken together represent the consummation of the Graeco-Roman rhetoric. A word must be said in regard to the place of rhetoric in the ancient systems of education. It was a leading place. The so-called Seven Liberal Arts, as later developed and correlated, were: Grammar, Dialectic (Logic), Ehetoric the Tri-vium; and Arithmetic, Geometry, Astronomy, and Music the Quadrivium. The post of honor belonged to the first three; and as both grammar and logic were closely connected with rhetoric, they were considered as necessary parts of the instruction of the orator. For teaching rhetoric, with grammar (or literature) and dialectic, teachers and schools abounded in all the ages of the Graeco-Roman education. During the first five centuries of the Christian era rhetoric in the larger sense, including literature held the chief place in school education. Vespasian is reported by Suetonius to have ordered that the salaries of teachers at Rome should be paid out of the municipal treasury, and this is held to be the beginning of state education. But Julius Caesar is said to have had a similar scheme in mind; and he actually did establish schools in Gaul. After Vespasian various emperors added to the dignities and emoluments of teachers, in some cases making their salaries a charge upon the municipal revenues of the chief provincial cities. Marcus Aurelius endowed chairs of rhetorical instruction at Athens. In A. D. 425 Theodosius II established a grand imperial school at Constantinople, directly under state control and supported by the government. It had thirty-one professors, most of whom taught rhetoric and the related subjects. Thus at the time when Christianity ceased to be persecuted and became a care of government, a great system of education in which the theory of speaking was a central, and perhaps the leading, element, had come to be thoroughly wrought out and established. Not only was education in this way chiefly rhetorical in tone, but a fondness for popular eloquence had also been developed and maintained, and in some sort a critical (though often vitiated) taste had been cultivated. It was into a society thus educated and trained that the longer, though part of the time parallel, stream of Biblical prophecy and preaching poured its new volume of power. And thus the preaching and homiletics of patristic and mediaeval times received their classic impulse.